Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 1 of 59
AO 93 (Rev. 11/13) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
for the
District of Columbia
In the Matter of the Search of

Case: 1: 18-sc-02905
Assigned To: Howell, Beryl A.
Assign. Date : 9/26/2018
Description: Search & Seizure Warrant

(Briefly describe the property to be searched
or identify the person by name and address)

INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH ONE ACCOUNT
STORED AT PREMISES
CONTROLLED BY TWITTER

)

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT
To:

Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search
of the following person or property located in the
Northern
District of
California
(identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):

See Attachment A

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property
described above, and that such search will reveal (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):
See Attachment B

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before
October 9, 2018
(not to exceed 14 days)
~ in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.
0 at any time in the day or night because good cause has been established.
Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the
person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the
property was taken.
The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory
as required by law and promptly return this warrant and inventory to
Hon. Beryl A. Howell., Ch ief U.S. District Judge
(United States Magistrate Judge)

0 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3 !03a(b ), I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose
property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box)
0 for _ _ days (not to exceed 30) 0 until, the facts justifying, the later specific date of

Date and time issued:
City and state:

-tkl2P1J?g:/- f..:. (}o/;);
Wash ington, DC

- - - - - - -- - - - ---

Judge 's signature

Hon. Beryl A. Howell, Chief U.S. District Judge
Printed name and title

 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 2 of 59
AO 93 (Rev. 11/13) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)

Return

Case No.:

Date and time warrant executed:

Copy of warrant and inventory left with:

Inventory made in the presence of:
Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:

Certification

I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the
designated judge.

Date:
Executing officer's signature

Printed name and title

 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 3 of 59

ATTACHMENT A
Property to be Searched

This warrant applies to information associated with the following Twitter accounts, which
are stored at premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by Twitter, Inc. ("Twitter"), a
company headquartered in San Francisco, California:

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 4 of 59

ATTACHMENT B
I.

Information to be disclosed by Twitter
To the extent that the information described in Attachment A is within the possession,

custody, or control of Twitter, Inc. ("Twitter"), including any messages, records, files, logs, or
information that have been deleted but are still available to Twitter, or have been preserved
pursuant to a request made under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f), Twitter is required to disclose the following
information to the government for each account listed in Attachment A:
A.

All "Tweets" and Direct Messages sent, received, "favorited," or retweeted by the account,
and all photographs or images included in those Tweets and Direct Messages;

B.

The content of all communications (public or private) sent to or from, stored in draft form
in, or otherwise associated with the account, including the content of all messages,
attachments, and header information;

C.

All data and information associated with the profile page, including photographs, "bios,"
and profile backgrounds and themes;

D.

All other content associated with the account, including, but not limited to, posts,
documents, spreadsheets, photos, and videos;

E.

All information from the "Connect" tab for the account, including all lists of Twitter users
who have favorited or retweeted Tweets posted by the account, as well as a list of all Tweets
that include the username associated with the account (i.e., "mentions" or "replies");

F.

All photographs and images in the user gallery for the account;

G.

All location data associated with the account, including all information collected by the
"Tweet With Location" service;

H.

All information about the account's use of Twitter' s link service, including all longer
website links that were shortened by the service, all resulting shortened links, and all
information about the number of times that a link posted by the account was clicked;

I.

All data and information that has been deleted by the user;

J.

A list of all of the people that the user follows on Twitter and all people who are following
the user (i.e., the user's "following" list and "followers" list);

K.

A list of all users that the account has "unfollowed" or blocked;

L.

All "lists" created by the account;
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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 5 of 59

M.

All information on the "Who to Follow" list for the account;

N.

All privacy and account settings;

0.

All records of Twitter searches performed by the account, including all past searches saved
by the account;

P.

All current and historical subscriber and payment information, including full name, e-mail
address (including any secondary or recovery email addresses), physical address (including
city, state, and zip code), date of birth, gender, hometown, occupation, telephone number,
websites, screen names, user identification numbers, security questions and answers,
registration IP address, payment history, and other personal identifiers;

Q.

All email addresses and telephone numbers ever registered (whether successfully or not)
to the account, including dates of any changes and the IP addresses used for any changes;

R.

All past and current usernames, account passwords, and names associated with the account,
including dates of any changes and the IP addresses used for any changes;

S.

All data and information associated with the profile page, including photographs;

T.

All advertising data relating to the account, including, but not limited to, information
regarding unique advertising IDs associated with the user, any devices used to access the
account, application IDs, UDIDs, payment information (including, but not limited to, full
credit card numbers and expiration dates and PayPal accounts), ads clicked, and ads
created;

U.

The dates and times at which the account and profile were created, and the Internet Protocol
("IP") address at the time of sign-up;

V.

All transactional records associated with the account, including any IP logs or other records
of session times and durations;

W.

Any information identifying the device or devices used to access the account, including a
device serial number, a GUID or Global Unique Identifier, a phone number, serial numbers,
MAC addresses, Electronic Serial Numbers ("ESN"), Mobile Electronic Identity Numbers
("MEIN"), Mobile Equipment Identifiers ("MEID"), Mobile Identification Numbers
("MIN"), Subscriber Identity Modules ("SIM"), Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services
Digital Network Number ("MSISDN"), International Mobile Subscriber Identifiers
("IMSI"), or International Mobile Equipment Identities ("IMEi"), and any other
information regarding the types of devices used to access the account;

X.

All activity logs for the account;

Y.

All location information for the account, including all location data collected by any
plugins or widgets;

Z.

The types of service utilized by the user;
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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 6 of 59

AA.

All information about the account's use ofTwitter's link service, including all website links
embedded in, exporting data to, or importing data from, the account's website or blog;

BB.

All full website links that were shortened by Twitter's link service, all resulting shortened
links, and all information about the number of times that a link posted by the account was
clicked;

CC.

All information about connections between the account and third-party websites and
applications, including any Twitter, Face book or other social networking accounts to which
posts from the account are sent;

DD.

All data and information that has been deleted by the user;

EE.

The length of service (including start date) and the means and source of any payments
associated with the service (including any credit card or bank account number);

FF.

All privacy settings and other account settings, including email addresses or other accounts
that the account has blocked;

GG.

Information regarding linked accounts, including accounts linked by cookie, IP address
(including registration IP address), advertising ID, User Client UUID, User Guest Cookie
ID, Known Device Token, Normalized Email Address, Android ID, IMEi, GUID, device
identifier, or any other account or device identifier;

HH.

Information regarding accounts linked to accounts to which the Target Accounts are linked;

II.

All records pertaining to communications between the Service Provider and any person
regarding the user or the user's account with the Service Provider, including contacts with
support services, records of actions taken, and investigative or user complaints concerning
the subscriber.

II.

Information to be Seized by the Government
Any and all records that relate in any way to the accounts described in Attachment A

which consists of evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and
abetting), 18 U.S.C. § 3 (accessory after the fact), 18 U.S.C. § 4 (misprision of a felony), 18
U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy), 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (unauthorized
access of a protected computer); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505 and 1512 (obstruction of justice), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1513 (witness tampering), 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (attempt and
conspiracy to commit wire fraud), and 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (foreign contributions ban) for the
period from March 1, 2016 to the present, including:
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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 7 of 59

a.

All records, information, documents or tangible materials that relate in any way to
communications regarding hacking, release of hacked material, communications
with persons or entities associated with WikiLeaks, including but not limited to
Julian Assange, or communications regarding disinformation, denial, dissembling
or other obfuscation about knowledge of, or access to, hacked material;

b.

All records, information, documents or tangible materials that relate in any way to
communications or meetings involving Jerome Corsi,
Assange,

Julian
, Randy Credico, any

individual associated with the Trump Campaign, or any witness in the
investigation;
c.

Communications, records, documents, and other files related to any expenditure,
independent expenditure, or disbursement for an electioneering communication;

d.

Records of any funds or benefits disbursed by or offered on behalf of any foreign
government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign
principals;

e.

All images, messages, communications, calendar entries, search terms, "address
book" entries and contacts, including any and all preparatory steps taken in
furtherance of the above-listed offenses;

f..

Communications, records, documents, and other files that reveal efforts by any
person to conduct activities on behalf of, for the benefit of, or at the direction of
any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or
foreign principals;

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 8 of 59

g.

Evidence indicating how and when the account was accessed or used, to determine
the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating
to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner;

h.

Evidence indicating the account user's state of mind as it relates to the crimes under
investigation;

1.

The identity of the person(s) who created or used the account, including records
that help reveal the whereabouts of such person(s );

J.

Credit card and other financial information, including but not limited to, bills and
payment records evidencing ownership of the subject account;

k.

All images, messages and communications regarding wiping software, encryption
or other methods to avoid detection by law enforcement;

I.

The identity of any non-U.S. person(s)-including records that help reveal the
whereabouts of the person(s)-who made any expenditure, independent
expenditure, or disbursement for an electioneering communication; and

m.

The identity of any person(s)-including records that help reveal the whereabouts
of the person(s)-who communicated with the account about any matters relating
to activities conducted by on behalf of, for the benefit of, or at the direction of any
foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign
principals.

n.

Passwords and encryption keys, and other access information that may be necessary
to access the account and other associated accounts;

o.

All existing printouts from original storage which concern the categories identified
in subsection II.a.

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 9 of 59

III.

Review Protocols

Review of the items described in Attachment A and Attachment B shall be conducted
pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner consistent with
professional responsibility requirements concerning the maintenance of attorney-client and other
operative privileges. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter
team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 10 of 59
AO 106 (Rev. 04/10) Application for a Search Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

F

for the
District of Columbia

SEP 2. 6 2018
fWk U.S. District & Bankrupt(;Y

In the Matter of the Search of
(JJricjly describe ihe p roperty to be searched
or ide mijj, 1/w person by name and address)

INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH
ONE ACCOUNT STORED AT PREMISES CONTROLLED
BY TWITTER

)
)
)
)
)
)

r.~~~ts for tila 0\!Hict Di f,{llumbla

Case: 1: 18-sc-02905 1
Ass!gned To: Howell, Beryl A.
Assign. Date : 9/26/2018
Description: Search & Seizure Warrant

APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT
I, a foderal Jaw enfo rcement officer or an attorney for the government, request a search wa1rnnt and state under
penalty of pe1jury that I have reason to beli.eve that on the following person or property (identify the person or describe the
property to be searched and give its location):

See Attachment A
located in the

- --

Northern
-

--

District of

California

_ __ ____c:....;......;.;__.- - - - " - - --

, there is now concealed (identify the

person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment B

The basis for the search under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 ( c) is (check one or more):

~ evidence of a crime;
~ contraband, fruits of crime, or other items illegally possessed;

~ p~operty designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing a crime;
0 a person to be arrested or a person who is unlawfully restrained.
The search is related to a violation of:

Code Section
52 U.S.C. § 30121
18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1030, 371
See Affidavit for add'I

Offense Description
Foreign Contribution Ban
False Statements, Unauthorized Access of Protected Computer, Conspiracy

The application is based on these facts:
See attached Affidavit.

b/

Continued on the attached sheet.

0 Delayed notice of _ _ days (give exact ending date if more than 30 days: _ _ __ _ ) is requested
under 18 U.S.C. § 3103a, the basis of which is set forth on the attached sheet.

Reviewed by AUSA/SAUSA:
IKyle R. Freeny (ASC)

Applicant's signature

Patrick J. Myers, Special Agent, FBI
Printed name a.nd title

Sworn to before me and signed in my presence.

Judge's signature

City and state: Washington, D.C.

Hon. Beryl A. Howell, Chief U.S. District Judge
Printed name and title

 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 11 of 59

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
IN THE MATTER OF THE SEARCH OF
INFORMATION AS SOCIA TED WITH
ONE ACCOUNT STORED AT PREMISES
CONTROLLED BY TWITTER, INC.

SEP 2 6 2016
Clsrk, U.S. Dlst(fct & Bankruptcy
Courts for the Dfstrlct of Columbia

Case: 1:18-sc-02905
Assigned To : Howell, Beryl A.
Assign. Date : 9/26/2018
Description: Search & Seizure Warrant

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
AN APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT
I, Patrick J. Myers, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows:
INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND
1.

I make this affidavit in support of an application for a search warrant for

information associated with the Twitter account

, which is

stored at premises owned, maintained, controlled or operated by Twitter, Inc. ("Twitter"), a
company headquartered in San Francisco, California.

Upon receipt of the information described in Attachment A, government-authorized persons will
review that information to locate the items described in Attachment B.
2.

I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") assigned to

FBI Pittsburgh working directly with the Special Counsel's Office. I have been a Special Agent
with the FBI since 2017. I was previously employed as a network and software engineer for
approximately fifteen years, including for the FBI. As a Special Agent, I have conducted national
security investigations relating to foreign intelligence and cybersecurity.
3.

The facts in this affidavit come from my personal observations, my training and

experience, and information obtained from other FBI personnel and witnesses. This affidavit is

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 12 of 59

intended to show merely that there is sufficient probable cause for the requested warrant and
does not set forth all of my knowledge about this matter.
4.

Based on my training and experience and the facts as set forth in this affidavit,

there is probable cause to believe that the Target Account contains evidence, fruits, or
instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy), 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and
abetting), 18 U.S.C. § 3 (accessory after the fact), 18 U.S.C. § 4 (misprision of a felony), 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (unauthorized access of a protected
computer), 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (attempt and conspiracy to commit
wire fraud), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505 and 1512 (obstruction of justice), 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (witness
tampering), and 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(l)(C) (foreign expenditure ban). There also is probable
cause to search the information described in Attachment A for evidence, contraband, fruits,
and/or instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses, further described in Attachment B.

JURISDICTION
5.

This Court has jurisdiction to issue the requested warrant because it is "a court of

competent jurisdiction" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2711. Id. §§ 2703(a), (b)(l)(A), &
(c)(l)(A). Specifically, the Court is "a district court of the United States (including a magistrate
judge of such a court) ... that has jurisdiction over the offense being investigated." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2711(3)(A)(i). The offense conduct included activities in Washington, D.C., as detailed below.

PROBABLE CAUSE
A. Background on Relevant Individuals
i. Roger STONE
6.

Roger STONE is a self-employed political strategist/consultant and has been

actively involved in U.S. politics for decades. STONE worked on the presidential campaign of

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 13 of 59

Donald J. Trump (the "Campaign") until August 2015 . Although Stone had no official
relationship with the Campaign thereafter, STONE maintained his support for Trump and
continued to make media appearances in support of the Campaign. As described further below,
STONE also maintained contact with individuals employed by the Campaign, including thencampaign chairman Paul MANAFORT and deputy chairman Rick GATES.
ii. Jerome CORSI

7.

Jerome CORSI is a political commentator who, according to publicly available

information, currently serves as the "Washington Bureau Chief for Inforwars.com." According
to publicly-available sources, from 2014 until January 2017, CORSI was a "senior staff reporter"
for the website "World Net Daily" a/k/a "WND.com." CORSI has also written a number of
books regarding Democratic presidential candidates. As described further below, CORSI was in
contact with STONE during the summer and fall of 2016 regarding forthcoming disclosures of
hacked information by WikiLeaks, and appears to have obtained information regarding
upcoming disclosures which he relayed to STONE.

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 14 of 59

B.

Russian Government-Backed Hacking Activity During the 2016 Presidential
Election

9.

On January 6, 2017, the USIC released a declassified version of an intelligence

assessment of Russian activities and intentions during the 2016 presidential election entitled,
"Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections." In the report, the USIC
assessed the following:
[] Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the
US presidential election. Russia's goals were to undermine public faith in the US
democratic process, denigrate [former] Secretary [of State Hillary] Clinton, and harm her
electability and potential presidency. We further assess Putin and the Russian
Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump.
10.

In its assessment, the USIC also described, at a high level, some of the techniques

that the Russian government employed during its interference. The USIC summarized the efforts
as a "Russian messaging strategy that blends covert intelligence operations-such as cyber
activity-with overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third-party
intermediaries, and paid social media users or 'trolls."'
11.

With respect to "cyber activity," the USIC assessed that "Russia's intelligence

services conducted cyber operations against targets associated with the 2016 US presidential
election, including targets associated with both major US political parties." Further, "[i]n July
2015, Russian intelligence gained access to Democratic National Committee (DNC) networks
and maintained that access until at least June 2016." The USIC attributed these cyber activities
to the Russian GRU, also known as the Main Intelligence Directorate: "GRU operations resulted
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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 15 of 59

in the compromise of the personal e-mail accounts of Democratic Party officials and political
figures. By May, the GRU had exfiltrated large volumes of data from the DNC."
12.

With respect to the release of stolen materials, the USIC assessed "with high

confidence that the GRU used the Guccifer 2.0 persona, DCLeaks.com, and WikiLeaks to
release US victim data obtained in cyber operations publicly and in exclusives to media outlets."
13.

Guccifer 2.0, who claimed to be an independent Romanian hacker, made multiple

contradictory statements and false claims about his identity throughout the election.
14.

The Special Counsel's Office has determined that individuals associated with the

GRU continued to engage in hacking activity related to the 2016 presidential election through at
least November 1, 2016.
15.

For example, in or around September 2016, these individuals successfully gained

access to DNC computers housed on a third-party cloud-computing service. In or around late
September, these individuals stole data from these cloud-based computers by creating backups of
the DNC's cloud-based systems using the cloud provider's own technology. The individuals
used three new accounts with the same cloud computing service to move the "snapshots" to
those accounts.
16.

On or about September 4, 2016, individuals associated with the GRU stole the

emails from a former White House advisor who was then advising the Clinton Campaign. These
emails were later post on DCLeaks.
17.

On or about November 1, 2016, individuals associated with the GRU

spearphished over 100 accounts used by organizations and personnel involved in administering
elections in numerous Florida counties.

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 16 of 59

18.

On July 13, 2018, a grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an indictment

against twelve Russia military officers for criminal offenses related to efforts to influence the 2016
presidential election, including conspiracy to commit authorized access to protected computers.
See United States v. Viktor Borisovich Netyksho, et al. (Case No. 1: 18-cr-OO 125).
C. STONE's Public Interactions with Guccifer 2.0 and WikiLeaks

19.

On June 14, 2016, CrowdStrike, the forensic firm that sought to remediate an

unauthorized intrusion into the computer systems of the DNC, publicly attributed the hack to
Russian government actors and the media reported on the announcement. On June 15, 2016, the
persona Guccifer 2.0 appeared and publicly claimed responsibility for the DNC hack. It stated
on its WordPress blog that, with respect to the documents stolen from the DNC, "[t]he main part
of the papers, thousands of files and mails, I gave to Wikileaks. They will publish them soon."
In that post, Guccifer 2.0 also began releasing hacked DNC documents.
20.

On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks published approximately 20,000 emails stolen from

the DNC.
21.

On August 5, 2016, STONE published an article on Breitbart.com entitled, "Dear

Hillary: DNC Hack Solved, So Now Stop Blaming Russia." The article stated: "It doesn't seem
to be the Russians that hacked the DNC, but instead a hacker who goes by the name of Guccifer
2.0." The article contained embedded publicly available Tweets from Guccifer 2.0 in the article
and stated: "Here's Guccifer 2.0's website. Have a look and you'll see he explains who he is and
why he did the hack of the DNC." The article also stated: "Guccifer 2.0 made a fateful and wise
decision. He went to WikiLeaks with the DNC files and the rest is history. Now the world would
see for themselves how the Democrats had rigged the game."
22.

On August 8, 2016, STONE addressed the Southwest Broward Republican

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 17 of 59

Organization. During his speech, he was asked about a statement by WikiLeaks founder Julian
ASSANGE to Russia Today (RT) several days earlier about an upcoming "October Surprise"
aimed at the Hillary Clinton presidential campaign. Specifically, STONE was asked: "With
regard to the October surprise, what would be your forecast on that given what Julian Assange
has intimated he's going to do?" STONE responded: "Well, it could be any number of things. I
actually have communicated with Assange. I believe the next tranche of his documents pertain
to the Clinton Foundation but there's no telling what the October surprise may be." A few days
later, STONE clarified that while he was not personally in touch with ASSANGE, he had a close
friend who served as an intermediary.
23.

On August 12, 2016, Guccifer 2.0 publicly tweeted: "@RogerJStoneJr thanks that

u believe in the real #Guccifer2." That same day, Guccifer 2.0 released the personal cellphone
numbers and email addresses from the files of the DCCC.
24.

On August 13, 2016, STONE posted a tweet using @RogerJStoneJr calling

Guccifer 2.0 a "HERO" after Guccifer 2.0 had been banned from Twitter. The next day,
Guccifer 2.0's Twitter account was reinstated.
25.

On August 17, 2016, Guccifer 2.0 publicly tweeted, "@RogerJStoneJr paying you

back." Guccifer also sent a private message to @RogerJStoneJr stating "i'm pleased to say u r
great man. please tell me ifl can help u anyhow. it would be a great pleasure to me."
26.

On August 18, 2016, Paul MANAFORT, STONE's longtime friend and associate,

resigned as Chairman of the Trump Campaign. Contemporary press reports at the time indicated
that MANAFORT had worked with a Washington D.C.-based lobbying firms to influence U.S.
policy toward Ukraine.
27.

On August 21, 2016, using@RogerJStoneJr, STONE tweeted: "Trust me, it will

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 18 of 59

soon the [sic] Podesta's time in the barrel. #CrookedHillary." In a C-SPAN interview that same
day, STONE reiterated that because of the work of a '"mutual acquaintance' of both his and
[ASSANGE], the public [could] expect to see much more from the exiled whistleblower in the
form of strategically-dumped Clinton email batches." He added: "Well, first of all, I think Julian
Assange is a hero ... I think he's taking on the deep state, both Republican and Democrat. I
believe that he is in possession of all of those emails that Huma Abedin and Cheryl Mills, the
Clinton aides, believe they deleted. That and a lot more. These are like the Watergate tapes."
28.

On September 16., 2016, STONE said in a radio interview with Boston Herald

Radio that he expected WikiLeaks to "drop a payload of new documents on Hillary on a weekly
basis fairly soon. And that of course will answer the question as to what exactly what was erased
on that email server."
29.

On Saturday, October 1, 2016, using @RogerJStoneJr, STONE tweeted,

"Wednesday @ HillaryClinton is done. #WikiLeaks."
30.

On Sunday, October 2, 2016, MSNBC Morning Joe producer Jesse Rodriquez

tweeted regarding an announcement AS SANGE had scheduled for the next day from the balcony
of the Ecuadoran Embassy in London. On the day of the AS SAN GE announcement - which was
part of WikiLeaks' 10-year anniversary celebration - STONE told Infowars that his intermediary
described this release as the "mother load." On October 5, 2016, STONE used @RogerJStoneJr
to tweet: "Payload coming. #Lockthemup."
31.

On Friday, October 7, 2016, at approximately 4:03 PM, the Washington Post

published an article containing a recorded conversation from a 2005 Access Hollywood shoot in
which Mr. Trump had made a series of lewd remarks.
32.

Approximately a half hour later, at 4:32 PM, WikiLeaks sent a Tweet reading

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"RELEASE: The Podesta Emails #HillaryClinton #Podesta #im WithHer" and containing a link
to approximately 2,050 emails that had been hacked from John Podesta's personal email account.
33.

WikiLeaks continued to release John Podesta's hacked emails through Election

Day, November 8, 2016. On October 12, 2016, Podesta-referring back to STONE's August 21,
2016 C-SP AN and Twitter references - argued publicly that "[it is] a reasonable assumption to or at least a reasonable conclusion - that [STONE] had advanced warning [of the release of his
emails] and the Trump campaign had advanced warning about what Assange was going to do. I
think there's at least a reasonable belief that [Assange] may have passed this information on to
[STONE]." Commenting to the NBC News, STONE indicated that he had never met or spoken
with Assange, saying that "we have a mutual friend who's traveled to London several times, and
everything I know is through that channel of communications. I'm not implying I have any
influence with him or that I have advanced knowledge of the specifics of what he is going to do.
I do believe he has all of the e-mails that Huma Abedin and Cheryl Mills, the Clinton aides,
thought were deleted. I hear that through my emissary."
34.

On March 27, 2017, CNN reported that a representative of WikiLeaks, writing

from an email address associated with WikiLeaks, denied that there was any backchannel
communication during the Campaign between STONE and WikiLeaks. The same article quoted
STONE as stating: "Since I never communicated with WikiLeaks, I guess I must be innocent of
charges I knew about the hacking of Podesta's email (speculation and conjecture) and the timing
or scope of their subsequent disclosures. So I am clairvoyant or just a good guesser because the
limited things I did predict (Oct disclosures) all came true."

D. STONE's Private Twitter Direct Messages with WikiLeaks and ASSANGE
35.

On October 13, 2016, while WikiLeaks was in the midst ofreleasing the hacked

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Podesta emails, the Twitter account @RogerJStoneJr sent a private direct message to the Twitter
account @wikileaks. 1 The latter account is the official Twitter account of WikiLeaks and has
been described as such by numerous news reports. The message read: "Since I was all over
national TV, cable and print defending WikiLeaks and assange against the claim that you are
Russian agents and debunking the false charges of sexual assault as trumped up bs you may want
to rexamine the strategy of attacking me- cordially R."
36.

Less than an hour later, @wikileaks responded by direct message: "We appreciate

that. However, the false claims of association are being used by the democrats to undermine the
impact of our publications. Don't go there if you don't want us to correct you."
37.

On or about October 15, 2016, @RogerJStoneJr sent a direct message to

@wikileaks: "Ha! The more you \"correct\" me the more people think you're lying. Your
operation leaks like a sieve. You need to figure out who your friends are."
38.

On or about November 9, 2016, one day after the presidential election,

@wikileaks sent a direct message to @RogerJStoneJr containing a single word: "Happy?"
@wikileaks immediately followed up with another message less than a minute later: "We are
now more free to communicate."
39.

In addition, @RogerJStoneJr also exchanged direct messages with ASSANGE,

the founder of WikiLeaks. For example, on June 4, 2017, @RogerJStoneJr directly messaged
@JulianAssange, an address associated with ASSANGE in numerous public reports, stating:
"Still nonsense. As a journalist it doesn't matter where you get information only that it is
accurate and authentic. The New York Times printed the Pentagon Papers which were

1

On or about August 7, 2017, Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell issued a search warrant for the
Twitter account @RogerJStoneJr.
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indisputably stolen from the government and the courts ruled it was legal to do so and refused to
issue an order restraining the paper from publishing additional articles. If the US government
moves on you I will bring down the entire house of cards. With the trumped-up sexual assault
charges dropped I don't know of any crime you need to be pardoned for - best regards. R." That
same day, @JulianAssange responded: "Between CIA and DoJ they're doing quite a lot. On the
DoJ side that's coming most strongly from those obsessed with taking down Trump trying to
squeeze us into a deal."
40.

On Saturday, June 10, 2017, @RogerJStoneJr sent a direct message to

@JulianAssange, reading: "I am doing everything possible to address the issues at the highest
level of Government. Fed treatment of you and WikiLeaks is an outrage. Must be circumspect in
this forum as experience demonstrates it is monitored. Best regards R."

E. CORSl's Communications with STONE,
Forthcoming Leaks
41.

and Others Regarding

On September 11, 2017, Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell of the District of Columbia

issued a search warrant for STONE's

address,

On October

17, 2017, Chief Judge Howell issued a search warrant for one of STONE's

addresses,

On or about December 19, 2017, Chief Judge Howell issued a search
warrant for

email account. On or about March 14, 2018, Chief Judge Howell

issued a search warrant for STONE's iCloud account. Information recovered pursuant to those
search warrants indicated the following:
42.

emailed CORSI: "Here is my flight

On or about May 15, 2016,

schedule. Need to get something confirmed now .... " CORSI responded, "I copied Roger
Stone so he knows your availability to meet Manafort and DT this coming week." CORSI

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 22 of 59

appears to have forwarded the message to STONE a

who replied to

CORSI that, "May meet Manafort -guarantee nothing."
43.

On or about May 18, 2016, CORSI emailed STONE a

with the title, "Roger -- why don't you look this over before I send it to

I believe that
CORSI wrote,

and I did manage to see Mr. Trump for a few minutes today as we were
waiting in Trump Tower to say hello to Mike Cohen. Mr. Trump recognized us immediately and
was very cordial. He would look for this memo from you this afternoon."
44.

sent an email to

On July 25, 2016, STONE, using

CORSI with the subject line, "Get to Assange." The body of the message read: "Get to Assange
[a]t Ecuadorian Embassy in London and get the pending WikiLeaks emails ... they deal with
Foundation, allegedly."
45.

On or about July 31, 2016, STONE, using

CORSI with the subject line, "Call me MON." The body of the email read:
Assange[.]
Trump[.]
46.

emailed
should see

should find Bernie [S]anders brother who called Bill a Rapist- turn him for
should find

or more proof of Bill getting kicked out."

On or about August 2, 2016 (approximately 19 days before STONE publicly

tweeted about "Podesta's time in the barrel"), CORSI emailed STONE at
"Word is friend in embassy plans 2 more dumps. One shortly after I'm
back. 2nd in Oct. Impact planned to be very damaging." The email continued, "Signs are Fox
will have me on mid-Aug. more post Ailes shakeup underway. Expect Shine to surface victor,

for now. Post-DNC bump for HRC an artifact of rigged polling. Won't last. I expect presidential
campaign to get serious starting Sept. Still in pre-season games. Time to let more than Podesta to

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be exposed as in bed w enemy if they are not ready to drop HRC. That appears to be the game
hackers are now about. Would not hurt to start suggesting HRC old, memory bad, has stroke -neither he nor she well. I expect that much of next dump focus, setting stage for Foundation
debacle." Investigators believe that CORSI's reference to a "friend in embassy [who] plans 2
more dumps" refers to ASSANGE, who resided in Ecuador's London Embassy in 2016.
47.

an associate of STONE's, emailed

On or about August 5, 2016,

STONE at

The email contained a link to a poll indicating that Clinton

led Trump by 15 points. STONE responded "enjoy it while u can[.] I dined with my new pal
Julian Assange last night."

subsequently stated to investigators that, around the

same time, STONE told him he had gone to London to meet ASSANGE.
that in 2018,

also stated

told STONE he would be interviewed by the FBI and would have to

divulge the conversation about meeting AS SAN GE. STONE told

he was joking and

had not actually met AS SAN GE. 2
48.

Through a search of STONE's iCloud account, the FBI has uncovered evidence

suggesting that STONE was in Los Angeles for one or more meetings at the time that he claimed,
in his email to

to have "dined" with ASSANGE. For example, an associate of

STONE sent a text to STONE at approximately 3:38PM on August 2, asking "How did ur meeting
go in LA?" STONE responded. "It's this afternoon[.]" The following day, the associate asked,
"Any report from ur meeting?" On or about August 4, 2016, STONE texted the associate, "Will

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call later - heading for airport now[.]" Additionally, investigators have identified a photograph in
STONE's iCloud that appears to have been taken on August 3, 2016 and had geo-location
information indicating that it was taken in Los Angeles.
On or about August 15, 2016, CORSI emailed STONE at

49.

"Give me a call today if you can. Despite MSM drumroll that HRC is
already elected, it's not over yet. More to come than anyone realizes. Won't really get started
until after Labor Day. I'm in NYC this week. Jerry."
50.

On or about August 31, 2016, CORSI emailed STONE at
Did you get the PODESTA writeup." STONE replied "[y]es."

51.

On or about August 31, 2016, CORSI messaged STONE, "Podesta paid $180k to

invest in Uranium One - was hired by Rosatom in Giustra scandal. Podesta now under FBI
investigation - tied to Ukraine Yanukovych - Panama papers reveals Podesta hired by
S[b]erbank, Russia's largest financial institution- Podesta$$$ ties to Russia undermine Clinton
false narrative attempting to tie Trump to Putin."
52.

On or about September 6, 2016, CORSI emailed STONE at
Roger[,] Is NY Post going to use the Pedesta [sic] stuff?"

53.

On or about September 24, 2016,

emailed CORSI, "I will have much

more on Turkey. Need a back channel highly sensitive stuff." CORSI responded, "We have
secure back channel through Roger. I saw him again in NYC last Friday and spoke to him about
it again today."

wrote back, "Awaiting secret file. Explosive ... Hope you are well.

Can't wait for the debate. Channeling Reagan, I hope!" CORSI responded, "Keep me posted
about file[.]" In a subsequent meeting with investigators

indicated this

conversation concerned possible derogatory information he was trying to obtain from Turkey.

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54.

On or about October 3, 2016, an associate of STONE emailed STONE at
and asked: "Assange - what's he got? Hope it's good." STONE wrote

back, "It is. I'd tell Bannon but he doesn't call me back. My book on the TRUMP campaign will
be out in Jan. Many scores will be settled." The associate forwarded the email to Steve
BANNON, who was CEO of the Campaign at the time, and wrote: "You should call Roger. See
below. You didn't get from me." BANNON wrote back, "I've got important stuff to worry
about." The associate responded, "Well clearly he knows what Assange has. I'd say that's
important."
55.

On or about October 4, 2016, ASSANGE gave a press conference at the

Ecuadorian Embassy. There had been speculation in the press leading up to that event that
AS SANGE would release information damaging to then-candidate Clinton, but WikiLeaks did
not make any new releases. Instead, ASSANGE promised more documents, including
information "affecting three powerful organizations in three different states, as well as, of course,
information previously referred to about the U.S. election process." ASSANGE also stated that
WikiLeaks would publish documents on various subjects every week for the next ten weeks, and
vowed that the U.S. election-related documents would all come out before Election Day.
56.

On or about October 4, 2016, CORSI messaged STONE at his iCloud account:

"Assange made a fool of himself. Has nothing or he would have released it. Total BS hype."
57.

That same day, BANNON emailed STONE at

"What was

that this morning???" STONE replied, "Fear. Serious security concern. He thinks they are going
to kill him and the London police are standing done [sic]." BANNON wrote back, "He didn't
cut deal w/ clintons???" STONE replied, "Don't think so BUT his lawyer
democrat."

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 26 of 59

58.

When BANNON spoke with investigators during a voluntary interview on

February 14, 2018, he initially denied knowing whether the October 4, 2016 email to STONE
was about WikiLeaks. Upon further questioning, BANNON acknowledged that he was asking
STONE about WikiLeaks, because he had heard that STONE had a channel to ASSANGE, and
BANNON had been hoping for releases of damaging information that morning.
F. STONE and CORSI Communications on October 7, 2016, when the Podesta Emails
Are Released.
59.

According to a publicly available news article, 3 at approximately 11 AM on

Friday, October 7, 2016, Washington Post reporter David Fahrenthold received a phone call from
a source regarding a previously unaired video of candidate Trump. According to the same
article, "Fahrenthold didn't hesitate. Within a few moments of watching an outtake of footage
from a 2005 segment on 'Access Hollywood,' the Washington Post reporter was on the phone,
calling Trump's campaign, 'Access Hollywood,' and NBC for reaction."
60.

According to phone records

at approximately

11 :27 AM, CORSI placed a call to STONE, which STONE did not answer.
61.

At approximately 11 :53AM, STONE received a phone call from the Washington

Post. The call lasted approximately twenty minutes.
62.

At approximately 1:42PM, STONE called CORSI and the two spoke for

approximately seventeen minutes.
63.

At approximately 2:18PM, CORSI called STONE and the two spoke for

approximately twenty minutes.

3

https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/the-caller-had-a-lewd-tape-of-donald-trumpthen-the-race-was-on/2016/10/07 /31d74 714-8ce5-11e6-875 e-2cl bfe94 3b66_story.html
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64.

At approximately 4:00PM, the Washington Post published a story regarding the

Access Hollywood tape.
65.

At approximately 4:30PM, WikiLeaks tweeted out its first release of emails

hacked from John Podesta that focused primarily on materials related to the Clinton Foundation.
On or about August 2, 2016, CORSI emailed STONE usin

"I expect

that much of next dump focus, setting stage for Foundation debacle."
66.

At approximately 6:27PM

an author who has written about the

Clinton Foundation, and who, according to emails and phone records, regularly communicates
with STONE, sent STONE an email titled, "WikiLeaks -The Podesta Emails," with a link to the
newly-released Podesta emails. Approximately ten minutes later, STONE, using
forwarded

message to CORSI without comment. STONE

does not appear to have forwarded the email to any other individual.
G. STONE Asks CORSI for "SOMETHING" to Post About Podesta After STONE Is
Accused of Advance Knowledge of the Leak

67.

On or about October 8, 2016, STONE messaged CORSI, "Lunch postponed-

have to go see T." CORSI responded to STONE, "Ok. I understand." Approximately twenty
minutes later, CORSI texted, "Clintons know they will lose a week of Paula Jones media with T
attacking Foundation, using Wikileaks Goldman Sachs speech comments, attacking bad job
numbers."
68.
usin

On or about Wednesday, October 12, 2016, at approximately 8:17AM, STONE,
emailed Corsi asking him to "send me your best podesta links."

STONE emailed CORSI at approximately 8:44AM EDT, "need your BEST podesta pieces."
CORSI wrote back at approximately 8:54AM EDT, "Ok. Monday. The remaining stuff on

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Podesta is complicated. Two articles in length. I can give you in raw form the stuff I got in
Russian translated but to write it up so it's easy to understand will take weekend. Your choice?"
69.

On or about that same day, October 12, 2016, Podesta accused STONE of having

advance knowledge of the publication of his emails. At approximately 3:25PM EDT, CORSI
emailed STONE at both

and

with the subject

line "Podesta talking points." Attached to the email was a file labeled, "ROGER STONE
podesta talking points Oct 12 2016.docx." The "talking points" included the statement that
"Podesta is at the heart of a Russian-government money laundering operation that benefits
financially Podesta personally and the Clintons through the Clinton Foundation."
70.

CORSI followed up several minutes later with another email titled, "Podesta

talking points," with the text "sent a second time just to be sure you got it." STONE emailed
CORSI back via the
71.

Account, "Got them and used them."

On or about Thursday, October 13, 2016, CORSI emailed STONE at
"PODESTA -- Joule & ties to RUSSIA MONEY LAUNDERING to

CLINTON FOUNDATION." STONE responded, ''Nice but I was hoping for a piece I could
post under my by-line since I am the one under attack by Podesta and now Mook." CORSI
wrote back to STONE, "I'll give you one more -NOBODY YET HAS THIS[:] It looks to me
like

skimmed maybe billions off Skolkovo -

Skolkovo kept their money with

Metcombank[.] The Russians launched a criminal investigation[.] [web link] Once
had the channel open from Metcombank to Deutsche Bank America to Ban[k] of America's
Clinton Fund account, there's no telling how much money he laundered, or where it ended up.
Nothing in Clinton Foundation audited financials or IRS Form 990s about$$$ received via

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 29 of 59

Russia & Metcombank[.] I'm working on that angle now." STONE replied, "Ok Give me
SOMETHING to post on Podesta since I have now promised it to a dozen MSM reporters[.]"
72.

On or about Thursday, October 13, 2016 at approximately 6:30PM EDT, CORSI

sent STONE an email at

with the subject, "ROGER STONE article

RUSSIAN MAFIA STYLE MONEY-LAUNDERING, the CLINTON FOUNDATION, and
JOHN PODESTA." The text stated: "Roger[,] You are free to publish this under your own
name." That same day, STONE posted a blog post with the title, "Russian Mafia money
laundering, the Clinton Foundation and John Podesta." In that post, STONE wrote, "although I
have had some back-channel communications with Wikileaks I had no advance notice about the
hacking of Mr. Podesta nor I have I ever received documents or data from Wikileaks." The post
then asked, "Just how much money did

, a controversial Russian billionaire

investor with ties to the Vladimir Putin and the Russian government, launder through
Metcombank, a Russian regional bank owned 99.978 percent by

with the money

transferred via Deutsche Bank and Trust Company Americas in New York City, with the money
ending up in a private bank account in the Bank of America that is operated by the Clinton
Foundation?"
73.

On or about October 14, 2016, CORSI sent a message to STONE at his iCloud

account, "I'm in NYC. Thinking about writing piece attacking Leer and other women. It's
basically a rewrite of what's out there. Going through new Wikileaks drop on Podesta."
74.

On or about October 17, 2016, CORSI messaged STONE at his iCloud account,

"On Assange, can you call me now- before 2pm[.]" STONE responded, "Missed u- just
landed JFK- on Infowars now." CORSI wrote back, "Call afterwards. Have some important
intel to share."

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75.

On or about October 17, 2016, CORSI emailed STONE at
with the subject, "Fwd:

ASSANGE ... URGENT ... " CORSI wrote, "From a very trusted source," and forwarded an email
with the header information stripped out, showing only the body text. The email read, "Yes[.] I
figured this. Assange is threatening Kerry, Ecuador and U.K. He will drop the goods on them if
they move to extradite him. My guess is that he has a set of dead man files that include Hillary.
It's what they used to call a 'Mexican stand off[.]' Only hope is that if Trump speaks out to save
him[.] Otherwise he's dead anyway, once he's dropped what he has. IfHRC wins, Assange can
kiss his life away. Interesting gambit Assange has to play out. He's called Podesta's bluff and
raised him the election."
76.

On or about October 18, 2016, CORSI messaged STONE at his iCloud account,

"Pis call. Important."
77.

On or about October 19, 2016, STONE published an article on Breitbart.com in

which he claimed he had, "no'advance notice ofWikileaks' hacking of Podesta's e-mails."
STONE stated that, "I predicted that Podesta's business dealings would be exposed. I didn't hear
it from Wikileaks, although Julian Assange and I share a common friend. I reported the story on
my website." STONE linked to the story he had asked CORSI to write for him on October 13,
2016 discussed above.
78.

On or about November 8, 2016, the United States presidential election took place.

79.

On or about November 9, 2016, CORSI messaged STONE at his iCloud account,

"Congratulations, Roger. He could not have done it without you."

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 31 of 59

80.

On or about November 10, 2016, CORSI messaged STONE at his iCloud

account, "Are you available to talk on phone?" Several minutes later, CORSI messaged, "I'm in
London. Have some interesting news for you."

 Case Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 32 of 59

 

Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 33 of 59

I. STONE's Congressional Testimony and Public Statements About His Relationship
with Wikileaks
88.

On September 26, 2017, STONE testified before the House Permanent Select

Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). Although the hearing was closed, STONE released to the
public what he said were his opening remarks to the committee. In them, STONE stated:
Members of this Committee have made three basic assertions against me which must be
rebutted here today. The charge that I knew in advance about, and predicted, the hacking
of Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta's email, that I had advanced knowledge of
the source or actual content of the WikiLeaks disclosures regarding Hillary Clinton or
that, my now public exchange with a persona that our intelligence agencies claim, but
cannot prove, is a Russian asset, is anything but innocuous and are entirely false. Again,
such asse1iions are conjecture, supposition, projection, and allegations but none of them
are facts ....
My Tweet of August 21, 2016, in which I said, "Trust me, it will soon be the Podesta's
time in the barrel. #CrookedHillary" must be examined in context. I posted this at a time
that my boyhood friend and colleague, Paul Manafort, had just resigned from the Trump
campaign over allegations regarding his business activities in Ukraine. I thought it
manifestly unfair that John Podesta not be held to the same standard. Note, that my
Tweet of August 21, 2016, makes no mention, whatsoever, of Mr. Podesta's email, but
does accurately predict that the Podesta brothers' business activities in Russia with the
oligarchs around Putin, their uranium deal, their bank deal, and their Gazprom deal,
would come under public scrutiny ....
[L]et me address the charge that I had advance knowledge of the timing, content and
source of the WikiLeaks disclosures from the DNC. On June 12, 2016, WikiLeaks'
publisher Julian Assange[] announced that he was in possession of Clinton DNC emails.
I learned this by reading it on Twitter. I asked a journalist who I knew had interviewed
Assange to independently confirm this report, and he subsequently did. This journalist
assured me that WikiLeaks would release this information in October and continued to
assure me of this throughout the balance of August and all of September. This
information proved to be con-ect. I have referred publicly to this journalist as an,
"intermediary", "go-between" and "mutual friend." All of these monikers are equally
true.

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 34 of 59

89.

In a document dated March 26, 2018 titled "Minority Views," Democratic

members of HPSCI published excerpts from Stone's September 2017 testimony before HPSCI.
Those excerpts include the following:
Q: Have any of your employees, associates, or individuals acting on your behest or
encouragement heen in any type of contact with Julian Assange?
MR. STONE: No.
Q: So throughout the many months in which you represented you were either in
communication with Assange or communication through an intermediary with Assange,
you were only referring to a single fact that you had confirmed with the intermediary MR. STONE: That Q: -- was the length and the breadth of what you were referring to?
MR. STONE: That is correct, even though it was repeated to me on numerous separate
occasions.
90.

In the month that followed his testimony before HPSCI, on or about October 24,

2017, STONE published an article on his website, stonecoldtruth.com, titled "Is it the Podesta's
Time in the Ban-el Yet?" In that aiiicle, STONE stated: "[l]t was this inevitable scrutiny of the
Podestas' underhanded business dealings that my 'time in the barrel' referred to and not, as some
have quite falsely claimed, to the hacking and publication almost two months later of John
Podesta's emails .... [M]y tweet referred to Podesta's business dealings with Russia, and the
expectation that it would become a news story."

J. STONE's Messaging to Randy CREDICO about STONE's "Back channel"
91.

On or about November 19, 2017, Randy CREDICO (who, as described further

below, STONE publicly identified as his "intermediary" to ASSANGE), messaged STONE, "My
lawyer wants to see me today." STONE responded, "'Stonewall it. Plead the fifth. Anything to
save the plan' ........ Richard Nixon[.]" CREDI CO responded, "Ha ha."
92.

On or about November 21, 2017, CREDICO messaged STONE, "I was told that

the house committee lawyer told my lawyer that I will be getting a subpoena[.]" STONE wrote

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 35 of 59

back, "That was the point at which your lawyers should have told them you would assert your
5th Amendment rights if compelled to appear." They continued to message, and CREDI CO
wrote, "My lawyer wants me to cut a deal." STONE wrote back, "To do what? Nothing
happening in DC the day before Thanksgiving - why are u busting my chops?"
93.

On or about November 24, 2017, STONE, texted CREDICO, "Assange is a

journalist and a damn good one- meeting with him is perfectly legal and all you ever told me was
he had the goods [o]n Hillary and would publish them - which he himself said in public b4 u told
me. It's a fucking witchunt [sic]." CREDICO replied, "I told you to watch his tweets. That's
what I was basing it on. I told you to watch his Tweets in October not before that I knew nothing
about the DNC stuff[.] I just followed his tweets[.]" STONE responded, "U never said anything
about the DNC but it was August." CREDICO wrote back, "It was not August because I didn't
interview him or meet him until August 26th[.] That was my first communication with his
secretary in London, August 26th." STONE wrote back, "Not the way I remember it - oh well I
guess Schiff will try to get one of us indicted for perjury[.]"
94.

STONE and CREDICO continued to exchange messages and on November 24,

2017, CREDICO wrote to STONE, "Forensic evidence proves that there is no back Channel. So
now you can relax."
95.

On or about November 28, 2017, CREDICO tweeted a copy of a subpoena he

received from HP SCI that was dated November 27, 2017. Toll records show that on November
27 and 28, 2017, CREDICO and STONE communicated via text message more than a dozen
times.
96.

On November 29, 2017, STONE publicly stated that CREDICO was his

"intermediary." In a public Facebook post, STONE further stated that "Credico merely[]

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 36 of 59

confirmed for Mr. Stone the accuracy of Julian Assange's interview of June 12, 2016 with the
British ITV network, where Assange said he had 'e-mails related to Hillary Clinton which are
pending publication,' ... Credico never said he knew or had any information as to source or
content of the material."
97.

On or about December 1, 2017, CREDICO messaged STONE, "I don't know why

you had to lie and say you had a back Channel now I had to give all of my forensic evidence to
the FBI today what a headache[.] 4 You could have just told him the truth that you didn't have a
back Channel they now know that I was not in London until September of this year[.] You had
no back-channel and you could have just told the truth ... You want me to cover you for pe1jury
now[.]" STONE responded, "What the fuck is your problem? Neither of tis has done anything
wrong or illegal. You got the best press of your life and you can get away with asserting for 5th
Amendment rights ifu don't want talk about AND if you turned over anything to the FBI you're
a fool." CREDICO responded, "You open yourself up to six counts of perjury[.] But I'm sure
that wasn't sworn testimony so you're probably clear[.] Council for the committee knows you
never had a back Channel and if you had just told the truth wouldn't have put me in this bad spot
... you should go back ... and amend your testimony and tell them the truth." CREDICO
repeated: "you need to amend your testimony before I testify on the 15th." STONE replied, "If
you testify you' re a fool. Because of tromp [sic] I could never get away with a certain [sic] my
Fifth Amendment rights but you can. I guarantee you you [sic] are the one who gets indicted for
perjury if you' re stupid enough to testify[.]"
98.

STONE and CREDICO continued to message each other on or about December 1,

2017. In response to STONE's message about being "stupid enough to testify," CREDICO told

4

Contrary to his statement, CREDICO had not provided any forensic evidence to the FBI.
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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 37 of 59

STONE: "Whatever you want to say I have solid forensic evidence." STONE responded: "Get
yourself a real lawyer instead of some liberal wimp who doesn't kriow how to tell his guys to
fuck off good night." CREDICO then wrote: "Just tell them the truth and swallow your ego you
never had a back Channel particularly on June 12th[.]" STONE responded: "You got nothing."
99.

On or about December 13, 2017, according to public reporting, CREDICO

indicated that he would not testify before HPSCI and would invoke his Fifth Amendment rights.
100.

STONE and CREDICO continued to exchange text messages, and on or about

January 6, 2018, CREDICO indicated to STONE that he was having dinner with a reporter.
STONE responded, "Hope u don't fuck Up my efforts to get Assange a pardon[.]" CREDICO
messaged STONE, "I have the email from his chief of staff August 25th 2016 responding to an
email I sent to WikiLeaks website email address asking you would do my show[.] That was my
initial contact."
101.

On or about January 8, 2018, CREDICO messaged STONE, stating: "Embassy

logs ... + 17 other pieces of information prove that I did not have any conversations with
Assange until September of last year."

I 02.

CREDI CO and STONE continued to message each other, and on or about January

25, 2018, CREDICO wrote to STONE: "You lied to the house Intel committee ... But you'll get
off because you're friends with Trump so don't worry. I have all the forensic evidence[.] I was
not a ba[ck] Channel and I have all those emails from September of2016 to prove it[.]"
103.

On or about April 13, 2018, news repo1is stated that CREDICO had shown

reporters copies of email messages he had received from STONE in the prior few days that
stated, "You are a rat. You are a stoolie. You backstab your friends -

run your mouth my

lawyers are dying Rip you to shreds." Another message stated, "I'm going to take that dog away

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 38 of 59

from you," referring to CREDICO's therapy dog. CREDJCO stated that it was "ce11ainly scary .
. . When you start bringing up my dog, you're crossing the line[.]" 5
104.

On or about May 25, 2018, CREDICO provided additional messages he stated

were from STONE to another news agency. 6 In these messages, STONE, on April 9, 2018,
stated: "I am so ready. Let's get it on. Prepare to die[.]" In the article, CREDICO stated that he
considered this email from STONE a threat. STONE stated in the article that CREDICO "told
me he had terminal prostate cancer ... It was sent in response to that. We talked about it too.
He was depressed about it. Or was he lying." The article noted that CREDICO stated he did not
have prostate cancer and did not have any such discussion with STONE.
K. The Target Account

5

https ://www.yahoo.com/news/comedian-randy-credico-says-trump-adviser-ro ger-stonethreatened-dog-135911370 .html
6
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/05/roger-stone-to-associate-prepare-to-die/
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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 39 of 59

BACKGROUND CONCERNING TWITTER
110.

Twitter owns and operates a free-access social-networking website of the same

name that can be accessed at http://www.twitter.com. Twitter allows its users to create their own

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profile pages, which can include a short biography, a photo of themselves, and location
information. Twitter also pennits users create and read 140-character messages called "Tweets,"
and to restrict their "Tweets" to individuals whom they approve. These features are described in
more detail below.
111.

Upon creating a Twitter account, a Twitter user must create a unique Twitter

usemame and an account password, and the user may also select a different name of 20
characters or fewer to identify his or her Twitter account. The Twitter user may also change this
usemame, password, and name without having to open a new Twitter account.
112.

Twitter asks users to provide basic identity and contact information, either during

the registration process or thereafter. This information may include the user's full name, e-mail
addresses, physical address (including city, state, and zip code), date of birth, gender, hometown,
occupation, and other personal identifiers. For each user, Twitter may retain information about
the date and time at which the user's profile was created, the date and time at which the account
was created, and the Internet Protocol ("IP") address at the time of sign-up. Because every
device that connects to the Internet must use an IP address, IP address information can help to
identify which computers or other devices were used to access a given Twitter account.
113.

A Twitter user can post a personal photograph or image (also known as an

"avatar") to his or her profile, and can also change the profile background or theme for his or her
account page. In addition, Twitter users can post "bias" of 160 characters or fewer to their profile
pages.
114.

Twitter also keeps IP logs for each user. These logs contain information about the

user's logins to Twitter including, for each access, the IP address assigned to the user and the
date stamp at the time the user accessed his or her profile.

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115.

As discussed above, Twitter users can use their Twitter accounts to post "Tweets"

of 140 characters or fewer. Each Tweet includes a timestamp that displays when the Tweet was
posted to Twitter. Twitter users can also "favorite," "retweet," or reply to the Tweets of other
users. In addition, when a Tweet includes a Twitter username, often preceded by the @ sign,
Twitter designates that Tweet a "mention" of the identified user. In the "Connect" tab for each
account, Twitter provides the user with a list of other users who have "favorited" or "retweeted"
the user's own Tweets, as well as a list of all Tweets that include the user's username (i.e., a list
of all "mentions" and "replies" for that username ).
116.

Twitter users can include photographs or images in their Tweets. Each Twitter

account also 'is provided a user gallery that includes images that the user has shared on Twitter,
including images uploaded by other services.
117.

Twitter users can also opt to include location data in their Tweets, which will

reveal the users' locations at the time they post each Tweet. This "Tweet With Location"
function is off by default, so Twitter users must opt in to the service. In addition, Twitter users
may delete their past location data.
118.

When Twitter users want to post a Tweet that includes a link to a website, they

can use Twitter's link service, which converts the longer website link into a shortened link that
begins with http://t.co. This link service measures how many times a link has been clicked.
119.

A Twitter user can "follow" other Twitter users, which means subscribing to

those users' Tweets and site updates. Each user profile page includes a list of the people who are
following that user (i.e., the user's "followers" list) and a list of people whom that user follows

(i.e., the user's "following" list). Twitters users can "unfollow" users whom they previously
followed, and they can also adjust the privacy settings for their profile so that their Tweets are

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visible only to the people whom they approve, rather than to the public (which is the default
setting). A Twitter user can also group other Twitter users into "lists" that display on the right
side of the user's home page on Twitter. Twitter also provides users with a list of "Who to
Follow," which includes a few recommendations of Twitter accounts that the user may find
interesting, based on the types of accounts that the user is already following and who those
people follow.
120.

In addition to posting Tweets, a Twitter user can also send Direct Messages

(DMs) to one of his or her followers. These messages are typically visible only to the sender and
the recipient, and both the sender and the recipient have the power to delete the message from the
inboxes of both users. As of January 2012, Twitter displayed only the last 100 DMs for a
particular user, but older DMs are stored on Twitter's database.
121.

Twitter users can configure the settings for their Twitter accounts in numerous

ways. For example, a Twitter user can configure his or her Twitter account to send updates to the
user's mobile phone, and the user can also set up a "sleep time" during which Twitter updates
will not be sent to the user's phone.
122.

Twitter includes a search function that enables its users to search all public

Tweets for keywords, usernames, or subject, among other things. A Twitter user may save up to
25 past searches.
123.

Twitter users can connect their Twitter accounts to third-party websites and

applications, which may grant these websites and applications access to the users' public Twitter
profiles.
124.

If a Twitter user does not want to interact with another user on Twitter, the first

user can "block" the second user from following his or her account.

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 43 of 59

125.

In some cases, Twitter users may communicate directly with Twitter about issues

relating to their account, such as technical problems or complaints. Social-networking providers
like Twitter typically retain records about such communications, including records of contacts
between the user and the provider's support services, as well as records of any actions taken by
the provider or user as a result of the communications. Twitter may also suspend a particular user
for breaching Twitter' s terms of service, during which time the Twitter user will be prevented
from using Twitter's services.
126.

As explained herein, information stored in connection with a Twitter account may

provide crucial evidence of the "who, what, why, when, where, and how" of the criminal conduct
under investigation, thus enabling the United States to establish and prove each element or
alternatively, to exclude the innocent from further suspicion. In my training and experience, a
Twitter user's account information, IP log, stored electronic communications, and other data
retained by Twitter, can indicate who has used or controlled the Twitter account. This "user
attribution" evidence is analogous to the search for "indicia of occupancy" while executing a
search warrant at a r~sidence. For example, profile contact information, communications,
"tweets" (status updates) and "tweeted" photos (and the data associated with the foregoing, such
as date and time) may be evidence of who used or controlled the Twitter account at a relevant
time. Further, Twitter account activity can show how and when the account was accessed or
used. For example, as described herein, Twitter logs the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses from
which users access their accounts along with the time and date. By determining the physical
location associated with the logged IP addresses, investigators can understand the chronological
and geographic context of the account access and use relating to the crime under investigation.
Such information allows investigators to understand the geographic and chronological context of

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 44 of 59

Twitter access, use, and events relating to the crime under investigation. Additionally, Twitter
builds geo-location into some of its services. If enabled by the user, physical location is
automatically added to "tweeted" communications. This geographic and timeline information
may tend to either inculpate or exculpate the Twitter account owner. Last, Twitter account
activity may provide relevant insight into the Twitter account owner's state of mind as it relates
to the offense under investigation. For example, information on the Twitter account may
indicate the owner's motive and intent to commit a crime (e.g., information indicating a criminal
plan) or consciousness of guilt (e.g., deleting account information in an effort to conceal
evidence from law enforcement).
127.

Therefore, the computers of Twitter are likely to contain all the material described

above, including stored electronic communications and information concerning subscribers and
their use of Twitter, such as account access information, transaction information, and other account
information.

FILTER REVIEW PROCEDURES
128.

Review of the items described in Attachment A and Attachment B will be

conducted pursuant to established procedures designed to collect evidence in a manner consistent
with professional responsibility requirements concerning the maintenance of attorney-client and
other operative privileges. The procedures include use, if necessary, of a designated "filter
team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

CONCLUSION
129.

Based on the forgoing, I request that the Court issue the proposed search warrant.

130.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g), the presence of a law enforcement officer is not

required for the service or execution of this warrant.

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 45 of 59

REQUEST FOR SEALING

131.

I fmther request that the Court order that all papers in support of this application,

including the affidavit and search warrant, be sealed until further order of the Court. These
documents discuss an ongoing criminal investigation, the full nature and extent of which is not
known to all of the targets of the investigation. Accordingly, there is good cause to seal these
documents because their premature disclosure may seriously jeopardize that investigation.
Respectfully submitted,

c~
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this ~,1Zy of September, 2018.

~d/~

The Honorable Beryl A. Howell
Chief United States District Judge

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 46 of 59

ATTACHMENT A
Property to be Searched

This warrant applies to information associated with the following Twitter accoun~s, which
are stored at premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by Twitter, Inc. ("Twitter"), a
company headquartered in San Francisco, California:

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 47 of 59

ATTACHMENT B

I.

Information to be disclosed by Twitter
To the extent that the info1mation described in Attachment A is within the possession,

custody, or control of Twitter, Inc. ("Twitter"), including any messages, records, files, logs, or
information that have been deleted but are still available to Twitter, or have been preserved
pursuant to a request made under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f), Twitter is required to disclose the following
information to the government for each account listed in Attachment A:
A.

All "Tweets" and Direct Messages sent, received, "favorited," or retweeted by the account,
and all photographs or images included in those Tweets and Direct Messages;

B.

The content of all communications (public or private) sent to or from, stored in draft form
in, or otherwise associated with the account, including the content of all messages,
attachments, and header information;

C.

All data and information associated with the profile page, including photographs, "bios,"
and profile backgrounds and themes;

D.

All other content associated with the account, including, but not limited to, posts,
documents, spreadsheets, photos, and videos;

E.

All information from the "Connect" tab for the account, including all lists of Twitter users
who have favorited or retweeted Tweets posted by the account, as well as a list of all Tweets
that include the username associated with the account (i.e., "mentions" or "replies");

F.

All photographs and images in the user gallery for the account;

G.

All location data associated with the account, including all information collected by the
"Tweet With Location" service;

H.

All information about the account's use of Twitter's link service, including all longer
website links that were shortened by the service, all resulting shortened links, and all
information about the number of times that a link posted by the account was clicked;

I.

All data and information that has been deleted by the user;

J.

A list of all of the people that the user follows on Twitter and all people who are following
the user (i.e., the user's "following" list and "followers" list);

K.

A list of all users that the account has "unfollowed" or blocked;

L.

All "lists" created by the account;
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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 48 of 59

M.

All information on the "Who to Follow" list for the account;

N.

All privacy and account settings;

0.

All records of Twitter searches performed by the account, including all past searches saved
by the account;

P.

All current and historical subscriber and payment information, including full name, e-mail
address (including any secondary or recovery email addresses), physical address (including
city, state, and zip code), date of birth, gender, hometown, occupation, telephone number,
websites, screen names, user identification numbers, security questions and answers,
registration IP address, payment history, and other personal identifiers;

Q.

All email addresses and telephone numbers ever registered (whether successfully or not)
to the account, including dates of any changes and the IP addresses used for any changes;

R.

All past and current usemames, account passwords, and names associated with the account,
including dates of any changes and the IP addresses used for any changes;

S.

All data and information associated with the profile page, including photographs;

T.

All advertising data relating to the account, including, but not limited to, information
regarding unique advertising IDs associated with the user, any devices used to access the
account, application IDs, UDIDs, payment information (including, but not limited to, full
credit card numbers and expiration dates and PayPal accounts), ads clicked, and ads
created;

U.

The dates and times at which the account and profile were created, and the Internet Protocol
("IP") address at the time of sign-up;

V.

All transactional records associated with the account, including any IP logs or other records
of session times and durations;

W.

Any information identifying the device or devices used to access the account, including a
device serial number, a GUID or Global Unique Identifier, a phone number, serial numbers,
MAC addresses, Electronic Serial Numbers ("ESN"), Mobile Electronic Identity Numbers
("MEIN"), Mobile Equipment Identifiers ("MEID"), Mobile Identification Numbers
("MIN"), Subscriber Identity Modules ("SIM"), Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services
Digital Network Number ("MSISDN"), International Mobile Subscriber Identifiers
("IMSI"), or International Mobile Equipment Identities ("IMEI"), and any other
information regarding the types of devices used to access the account;

X.

All activity logs for the account;

Y.

All location information for the account, including all location data collected by any
plugins or widgets;

Z.

The types of service utilized by the user;
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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 49 of 59

AA.

All information about the account's use ofTwitter's link service, including all website links
embedded in, exporting data to, or importing data from, the account's website or blog;

BB.

All full website links that were shortened by Twitter's link service, all resulting shortened
links, and all information about the number of times that a link posted by the account was
clicked;

CC.

All information about connections between the account and third-party websites and
applications, including any Twitter, Facebook or other social networking accounts to which
posts from the account are sent;

DD.

All data and information that has been deleted by the user;

EE.

The length of service (including start date) and the means and source of any payments
associated with the service (including any credit card or bank account number);

FF.

All privacy settings and other account settings, including email addresses or other accounts
that the account has blocked;

GG.

Information regarding linked accounts, including accounts linked by cookie, IP address
(including registration IP address), advertising ID, User Client UUID, User Guest Cookie
ID, Known Device Token, Normalized Email Address, Android ID, IMEI, GUID, device
identifier, or any other account or device identifier;

HH.

Information regarding accounts linked to accounts to which the Target Accounts are linked;

II.

All records pertaining to communications between the Service Provider and any person
regarding the user or the user's account with the Service Provider, including contacts with
support services, records of actions taken, and investigative or user complaints concerning
the subscriber.

II.

Information to be Seized by the Government
Any and all records that relate in any way to the accounts described in Attachment A

which consists of evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and
abetting), 18 U.S.C. § 3 (accessory after the fact), 18 U.S.C. § 4 (misprision of a felony), 18
U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy), 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (unauthorized
access of a protected computer); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505 and 1512 (obstruction of justice), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1513 (witness tampering), 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (attempt and
conspiracy to commit wire fraud), and 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (foreign contributions ban) for the
period from March 1, 2016 to the present, including:

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 50 of 59

a.

All records, information, documents or tangible materials that relate in any way to
communications regarding hacking, release of hacked material, communications
with persons or entities associated with WikiLeaks, including but not limited to
Julian Assange, or communications regarding disinformation, denial, dissembling
or other obfuscation about knowledge of, or access to, hacked material;

b.

All records, information, documents or tangible materials that relate in any way to
communications or meetings involving Jerome Corsi,
Assange,

Julian
Randy Credico, any

individual associated with the Trump Campaign, or any witness in the
investigation;
c.

Communications, records, documents, and other files related to any expenditure,
independent expenditure, or disbursement for an electioneering communication;

d.

Records of any funds or benefits disbursed by or offered on behalf of any foreign
government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign
principals;

e.

All images, messages, communications, calendar entries, search terms, "address
book" entries and contacts, including any and all preparatory steps taken in
furtherance of the above-listed offenses;

f.

Communications, records, documents, and other files that reveal efforts by any
person to conduct activities on behalf of, for the benefit of, or at the direction of
any foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or
foreign principals;

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 51 of 59

g.

Evidence indicating how and when the account was accessed or used, to determine
the geographic and chronological context of account access, use, and events relating
to the crimes under investigation and to the account owner;

h.

Evidence indicating the account user's state of mind as it relates to the crimes under
investigation;

1.

The identity of the person(s) who created or used the account, including records
that help reveal the whereabouts of such person(s);

J.

Credit card and other financial information, including but not limited to, bills and
payment records evidencing ownership of the subject account;

k.

All images, messages and communications regarding wiping software, encryption
or other methods to avoid detection by law enforcement;

I.

The identity of any non-U.S. person(s)-including records that help reveal the
whereabouts of the person(s)-who made any expenditure, independent
expenditure, or disbursement for an electioneering communication; and

m.

The identity of any person(s)-including records that help reveal the whereabouts
of the person(s)-who communicated with the account about any matters relating
to activities conducted by on behalf of, for the benefit of, or at the direction of any
foreign government, foreign officials, foreign entities, foreign persons, or foreign
principals.

n.

Passwords and encryption keys, and other access information that may be necessary
to access the account and other associated accounts;

o.

All existing printouts from original storage which concern the categories identified
in subsection II.a.

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 52 of 59

III.

Review Protocols
Review of the items described in Attachment A and Attachment B shall be conducted

pursuant to established procedures designed to collect ~vidence in a manner consistent with
professional responsibility requirements concerning the maintenance of attorney-client and other
operative privileges. When appropriate, the procedures shall include use of a designated "filter
team," separate and apart from the investigative team, in order to address potential privileges.

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 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 53 of 59

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
IN THE MATTER OF THE SEARCH OF
INFORMATION AS SOCIA TED WITH ONE
ACCOUNT STORED AT PREMISES
CONTROLLED BY TWITTER

The United States of America, moving by and through its undersigned counsel, respectfully
moves the Court for an Order placing the above-captioned warrant and the application and affidavit
in support thereof (collectively herein the "Warrant") under seal, and precluding the provider from
notifying any person of the Warrant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b). In regard to the nondisclosure, the proposed Order would direct TWITTER, LLC ("TWITTER"), an electronic
communication and/or remote computing services provider headquartered in San Francisco,
California, not to notify any other person (except attorneys for TWITTER for the purpose of
receiving legal advice) of the existence or content of the Warrant for a period of one year or until
further order of the Court.
JURISDICTION AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
1.

The Court has the inherent power to seal court filings when appropriate,

including the Warrant. United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 315-16 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing

Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). The Court may also seal the
Warrant to prevent serious jeopardy to an ongoing criminal investigation when, as in the present
case, such jeopardy creates a compelling governmental interest in preserving the confidentiality of
the Warrant. See Washington Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 287-89 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
2.

In addition, this Court has jurisdiction to issue the requested order because it is "a

court of competent jurisdiction" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2711. Specifically, the Court is a

 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 54 of 59

"district court of the United States ... that - has jurisdiction over the offense being investigated."
18 U.S.C. § 2711 (3)(A)(i). Acts or omissions in furtherance of the offense under investigation
occurred within Washington, D.C. See 18 U.S.C. § 3237.
3.

Further, the Court has authority to require non-disclosure of the Warrant under 18

U.S.C. § 2705(b). TWITTER provides an "electronic communications service," as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 2510(15), and/or "remote computing service," as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2). The
Stored Communications Act ("SCA"), 18 U.S.C. §§,2701-2712, governs how TWITTER may be
compelled to supply communications and other records using a subpoena, court order, or search
warrant.

Specifically, Section 2703(c)(2) authorizes the Government to obtain certain basic

"subscriber information" using a subpoena, Section 2703(d) allows the Government to obtain other
"non-content" information using a court order, and Section 2703(a)-(b)(1 )(A) allows the
Government to obtain contents of communications using a search warrant. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
4.

The SCA does not set forth any obligation for providers to notify subscribers about

subpoenas, court orders, or search warrants under Section 2703. However, many have voluntarily
adopted policies of notifying subscribers about such legal requests. Accordingly, when necessary,
Section 2705(b) of the SCA enables the Government to obtain a court order to preclude such
notification. In relevant paii, Section 2705(b) provides as follows: 1
(b) Preclusion of notice to subject of governmental access. - A governmental
entity acting under section 2703 ... may apply to a court for an order commanding
a provider of electronic communications service or remote computing service to
whom a warrant, subpoena, or court order is directed, for such period as the court
deems appropriate, not to notify any other person of the existence of the warrant,
subpoena, or court order. The court shall enter such an order if it determines that
there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of the warrant, subpoena,
or court order will result in(1) endangering the life or physical safety of an individual;
1

Section 270.S(b) contains additional requirements for legal process obtained pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(b)(l)(B), but the Government does not seek to use the proposed Order for any legal process
under that provision.

2

 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 55 of 59

(2) flight from prosecution;
(3) destruction of or tampering with evidence;
(4) intimidation of potential witnesses; or
(5) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial.
18 U.S.C. § 2705(b). The United States District Court for the District of Columbia has made clear
that a nondisclosure order under Section 2705(h) must he issued once the Government makes the
requisite showing about potential consequences of notification:
The explicit terms of section 2705(b) make clear that if a courts [sic] finds that there
is reason to believe that notifying the customer or subscriber of the court order or
subpoena may lead to one of the deleterious outcomes listed under § 2705(b ), the
court must enter an order commanding a service provider to delay notice to a
customer for a period of time that the court determines is appropriate. Once the
government makes the required showing under § 2705(b), the court is required to
issue the non-disclosure order.

In re Application for Order of Nondisclosure Pursuant to 18 US.C. § 2705(b) for Grand Jury
Subpoena #GJ2014031422765, 41 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2014).
5.

Accordingly, this motion to seal sets forth facts showing reasonable grounds to

command TWITTER not to notify any other person (except attorneys for TWITTER for the
purpose ofreceiving legal advice) of the existence of the Subpoena for a period of one year or until
further order of the Court.
FACTS SUPPORTING SEALING AND NON-DISCLOSURE
6.

The Federal Bureau oflnvestigation ("FBI") is investigating violations of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2 (aiding and abetting), 18 U.S.C. § 3 (accessory after the fact), 18 U.S.C. § 4 (misprision of a
felony), 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy), 18 U.S.C. § 951 (acting as an unregistered foreign agent),
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (unauthorized access of a protected
computer); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (attempt and conspiracy to commit
wire fraud), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505 and 1512 (obstruction of justice), and 22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq.
(Foreign Agents Registration Act), and 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (foreign contribution ban) (the "Subject

3

 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 56 of 59

· Offenses"), arising out of the conduct of Roger Stone and others. It does not appear that Stone is
currently aware of the full nature and scope of the ongoing FBI investigation. Disclosure of this
warrant to Stone could lead him to destroy evidence or notify others who may delete information
relevant to the investigation.
7.

In this matter, the government requests that the Warrant be sealed until further order

of the Court and that TWITTER and its employees be directed not to notify any other person of
the existence or content of the Warrant (except attorneys for TWITTER for the purpose of
receiving legal advice) for a period of one year or until further order of the Court. Such an order
is appropriate because the Warrant relates to an ongoing criminal investigation, the scope and
nature of which is neither public nor known to the targets of the investigation, and its disclosure
may alert these targets to the nature, scope, and focus of the ongoing investigation. Disclosure of
the Warrant and related papers may also alert the targets to the scope of information known to the
FBI. Once alerted to this information, potential targets would be immediately prompted to destroy
or conceal incriminating evidence, alter their operational tactics to avoid future detection, and
otherwise take steps to undermine the investigation and avoid future prosecution. In particular,
given that they are known to use electronic communication and remote computing services, the
potential target could quickly and easily destroy or encrypt digital evidence relating to their
criminal activity.
8.

Given the complex and sensitive nature of the criminal activity under investigation,

and also given that the criminal scheme may be ongoing, the Government anticipates that this
confidential investigation will continue for the next year or longer.

However, should

circumstances change such that court-ordered nondisclosure under Section 2705(b) becomes no
longer needed, the Government will notify the Court and seek appropriate relief.

4

 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 57 of 59

9.

There is, therefore, reason to believe that notification of the existence of the

Warrant will seriously jeopardize the investigation, including by giving the targets an opportunity
to flee from prosecution, destroy or tamper with evidence, and intimidate witnesses. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2705(b )(2)-(5). Because of such potential jeopardy to the investigation, there also exists a
compelling governmental interest in confidentiality to justify the government's sealing request.

See Robinson, 935 F.2d at 287-89.
10.

Based on prior dealings with TWITTER, the United States is aware that, absent a

court order under Section 2705(b) commanding TWITTER not to notify anyone about a legal
request, TWITTER may, upon receipt of a warrant seeking the contents of electronically stored
wire or electronic communications for a certain account, notify the subscriber or customer of the
existence of the warrant prior to producing the material sought.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing reasons, the government respectfully requests that the
above-captioned warrant, the application and affidavit in support thereof, and all attachments
thereto and other related materials be placed under seal, and furthermore, that the Court command
TWITTER not to notify any other person of the existence or contents of the above-captioned
warrant (except attorneys for TWITTER for the purpose of receiving legal advice) for a period of
one year or until further order of the Court.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERTS. MUELLER, III
Special Counsel
Dated: :) /2 (o /l'3

By:
Kyl
The
cial Counsel's Office
(202) 616-3812

5

 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 58 of 59

1L'
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
IN THE MATTER OF THE SEARCH OF
INFORMATION AS SOCIA TED WITH ONE
ACCOUNT STORED AT PREMISES
CONTROLLED BY TWITTER

SEP 2 6 2018
Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy
Courts for the District of Golumb/a

Case: 1:18-sc-02905
Assigned To : Howell, Beryl A.
Assign. Date : 9/26/2018
Description: Search & Seizure Warrant

ORDER
The United States has filed a motion to seal the above-captioned warrant and related
documents, including the application and affidavit in support thereof (collectively the "Warrant"),
and to require TWITTER, INC. ("TWITTER"), an electronic communication and/or remote
computing services provider headquartered in San Francisco, California, not to disclose the
existence or contents of the Warrant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b).
The Court finds that the United States has established that a compelling governmental
interest exists to justify the requested sealing, and that there is reason to believe that notification
of the existence of the Warrant will seriously jeopardize the investigation, including by giving the
targets an opportunity to flee from prosecution, destroy or tamper with evidence, and intimidate
witnesses. See 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b)(2)-(5).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion is hereby GRANTED, and that the
warrant, the application and affidavit in support thereof, all attachments thereto and other related
materials, the instant motion to seal, and this Order be SEALED until further order of the Court;
and

 Case 1:19-mc-00029-CRC Document 29-23 Filed 04/28/20 Page 59 of 59

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), TWITTER and its
employees shall not disclose the existence or content of the Warrant to any other person (except
attorneys for TWITTER for the purpose of receiving legal advice) for a period of one year or until
further order of the Court.

TIIEHON&t~LL

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2