1 10 XAVIER BECERRA Attorney General of California MICHAEL L. NEWMAN Senior Assistant Attorney General SATOSHI YANAI, SBN 186355 Supervising Deputy Attorney General MINSU D. LONGIARU, SBN 298599 MARISA HERNÁNDEZ-STERN, SBN 282477 MANA BARARI, SBN 275328 R. ERANDI ZAMORA-GRAZIANO, SBN 281929 Deputy Attorneys General 1515 Clay Street, 20th Floor P.O. Box 70550 Oakland, California 94612-0550 Telephone: (510) 879-1300 Fax: (510) 622-2270 E-mail: Minsu.Longiaru@doj.ca.gov Attorneys for the People of the State of California 11 [Plaintiff’s Counsel Continued on Next Page] 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 NO FEE PURSUANT TO GOVERNMENT CODE § 6103 12 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 13 COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 14 UNLIMITED JURISDICTION 15 16 17 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff, 18 19 20 21 22 Case No. v. COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, RESTITUTION, AND PENALTIES UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION; LYFT, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION; AND DOES 1-50, INCLUSIVE, [VERIFIED ANSWER REQUIRED PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL Defendants. PROCEDURE SECTION 446] 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 Additional Counsel for the People (Continued from Preceding Page): 2 [COUNSEL LISTED IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER] 3 MICHAEL N. FEUER City Attorney, City of Los Angeles MICHAEL BOSTROM, SBN 211778 Managing Assistant City Attorney DANIELLE GOLDSTEIN, SBN 257486 Deputy City Attorney Office of the Los Angeles City Attorney 200 North Spring Street, 14th Floor Los Angeles, California 90012 Telephone: (213) 978-1867 E-mail: michael.bostrom@lacity.org 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 MARA W. ELLIOTT City Attorney, City of San Diego MARK ANKCORN, SBN 166871 Chief Deputy City Attorney KEVIN B. KING, SBN 309397 MARNI VON WILPERT, SBN 321447 Deputy City Attorneys San Diego City Attorney’s Office 1200 Third Avenue, Suite 1100 San Diego, California 92101-4100 Telephone: (619) 236-6220 E-mail: KBKing@sandiego.gov DENNIS J. HERRERA City Attorney, City of San Francisco RONALD P. FLYNN, SBN 184186 Chief Deputy City Attorney YVONNE R. MERÉ, SBN 173594 Chief of Complex and Affirmative Litigation MOLLY J. ALARCON, SBN 315244 SARA J. EISENBERG, SBN 269303 MATTHEW D. GOLDBERG, SBN 240766 Deputy City Attorneys Office of the San Francisco City Attorney 1390 Market Street, Sixth Floor San Francisco, California 94102-5408 Telephone: (415) 554-3800 E-mail: matthew.goldberg@sfcityatty.org 25 26 Attorneys for the People of the State of California 27 28 2 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 Plaintiff, the People of the State of California (“People”), by and through Xavier Becerra, 2 Attorney General of the State of California; Michael N. Feuer, Los Angeles City Attorney; Mara 3 W. Elliott, San Diego City Attorney; and Dennis J. Herrera, San Francisco City Attorney, bring 4 this action against Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”), Lyft, Inc. (“Lyft”), and Does one through 5 fifty (collectively “Defendants”), and allege as follows: 6 7 INTRODUCTION 1. In their early stages, when Uber and Lyft started selling ride-hailing services in 2010 8 and 2012, respectively, they made the calculated business decision to misclassify their on-demand 9 drivers as independent contractors rather than employees. Both companies continue to 10 misclassify their drivers—and have exploited hundreds of thousands of California workers—in 11 direct contravention of California law. 12 2. By misclassifying their drivers, Uber and Lyft evade the workplace standards and 13 requirements that implement California’s strong public policy in favor of protecting workers and 14 promoting fundamental fairness for all Californians. This longstanding policy framework 15 includes a comprehensive set of safeguards and benefits established by the State of California 16 (“State”), cities, and counties, such as minimum wages, overtime premium pay, reimbursement 17 for business expenses, workers’ compensation coverage for on-the-job injuries, paid sick leave, 18 and wage replacement programs like disability insurance and paid family leave. Uber and Lyft 19 owe their drivers these benefits and protections. 20 3. Recognizing the serious problem of employee misclassification and the harms it 21 inflicts on workers, law-abiding businesses, taxpayers, and society more broadly, the California 22 Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 5, which took effect on January 1, 2020. (Assem. Bill No. 5 23 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (“A.B. 5”).) A.B. 5 codified and extended the California Supreme 24 Court’s landmark, unanimous decision in Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court (2018) 25 4 Cal.5th 903, rehg. denied (June 20, 2018) (“Dynamex”). California law is clear: for the full 26 range of protections afforded by California’s Wage Orders, Labor Code, and Unemployment 27 Insurance Code, workers are generally presumed to be employees unless the hiring entity can 28 3 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 overcome this presumption by establishing each of the three factors embodied in the strict “ABC” 2 test. 3 4. Uber and Lyft cannot overcome this presumption with respect to their drivers. Uber 4 and Lyft are traditional employers of these misclassified employees. They hire and fire them. 5 They control which drivers have access to which possible assignments. They set driver quality 6 standards, monitor drivers for compliance with those standards, and discipline drivers for not 7 meeting them. They set the fares passengers can be charged and determine how much drivers are 8 paid. 9 5. Uber and Lyft are transportation companies in the business of selling rides to 10 customers, and their drivers are the employees who provide the rides they sell. The fact that Uber 11 and Lyft communicate with their drivers by using an app does not suddenly strip drivers of their 12 fundamental rights as employees. 13 6. But rather than own up to their legal responsibilities, Uber and Lyft have worked 14 relentlessly to find a work-around. They lobbied for an exemption to A.B. 5, but the Legislature 15 declined. They utilize driver contracts with mandatory arbitration and class action waiver 16 provisions to stymie private enforcement of drivers’ rights. And now, even amid a once-in-a- 17 century pandemic, they have gone to extraordinary lengths to convince the public that their 18 unlawful misclassification scheme is in the public interest. Both companies have launched an 19 aggressive public relations campaign in the hopes of enshrining their ability to mistreat their 20 workers, all while peddling the lie that driver flexibility and worker protections are somehow 21 legally incompatible. 22 7. Uber’s and Lyft’s motivation for breaking the law is simple: by misclassifying their 23 drivers, Uber and Lyft do not “bear any of [the] costs or responsibilities” of complying with the 24 law. (Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 913.) When addressing investors, Uber pulls no punches: 25 “Our business would be adversely affected if Drivers were classified as employees instead of 26 independent contractors.” (Uber Securities and Exchange Com. (“SEC”) S-1, p. 28 [Filing Date: 27 April 11, 2019].) 28 4 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 8. As one federal district judge recently observed: “[R]ather than comply with a clear 2 legal obligation, companies like Lyft are thumbing their noses at the California Legislature . . . .” 3 (Rogers v. Lyft (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2020, No. 20-CV-01938-VC) ___ F.Supp.3d ___ [2020 WL 4 16484151, at *2].) 5 9. The State’s laws against employee misclassification protect all Californians. They 6 protect workers by ensuring they receive the compensation and benefits they have earned through 7 the dignity of their labor. (Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 952.) They protect “law-abiding” 8 businesses from “unfair competition,” and prevent the “race to the bottom” that occurs when 9 businesses adopt “substandard wages” and “unhealthy [working] conditions,” threatening jobs 10 and worker protections across entire industries. (Id. at pp. 952, 960.) They protect the tax-paying 11 public, who is often called upon to “assume responsibility” for “the ill effects to workers and their 12 families” of exploitative working arrangements. (Id. at p. 952-53.) They are a lifeline and 13 bulwark for the People against the “erosion of the middle class and the rise in income inequality.” 14 (A.B. 5, § 1(c).) 15 10. The time has come for Uber’s and Lyft’s massive, unlawful employee 16 misclassification schemes to end. The People bring this action to ensure that Uber and Lyft ride- 17 hailing drivers—the lifeblood of these companies—receive the full compensation, protections, 18 and benefits they are guaranteed under law, to restore a level playing field for competing 19 businesses, and to preserve jobs and hard-won worker protections for all Californians. 20 21 22 23 JURISDICTION AND VENUE 11. The Superior Court has original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Article VI, Section 10 of the California Constitution. 12. The Superior Court has jurisdiction over each Defendant named above because: 24 (i) each Defendant is headquartered in the State of California; (ii) each Defendant is authorized to 25 and conducts business in and across this State; and (iii) each Defendant otherwise has sufficient 26 minimum contacts with and purposefully avails itself of the markets of this State, thus rendering 27 the Superior Court’s jurisdiction consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial 28 justice. 5 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 13. Venue is proper under Code of Civil Procedure section 393(a), because each 2 Defendant named above is headquartered in the City and County of San Francisco and thousands 3 of the illegal acts described below occurred in the City and County of San Francisco. 4 5 6 PARTIES I. PLAINTIFF 14. Plaintiff is the People of the State of California, by and through: Xavier Becerra, the 7 Attorney General of the State of California; Michael N. Feuer, the Los Angeles City Attorney; 8 Mara W. Elliott, the San Diego City Attorney; and Dennis J. Herrera, the San Francisco City 9 Attorney (collectively referred to as “Plaintiff” or the “People”). 10 15. Xavier Becerra is the Attorney General of the State of California and is the chief law 11 officer of the State. (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.) The Attorney General is empowered by the 12 California Constitution to take whatever action is necessary to ensure that the laws of the State 13 are uniformly and adequately enforced. He has the statutory authority to bring actions in the 14 name of the People of the State of California to enforce California’s Unfair Competition Law 15 (“UCL”). (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) He also has the statutory authority to bring an 16 action for injunctive relief to prevent the continued misclassification of employees under A.B. 5. 17 (Lab. Code, § 2750.3(j).) 18 16. The Los Angeles City Attorney, Michael N. Feuer, has the statutory authority to bring 19 actions in the name of the People of the State of California to enforce California’s UCL. As the 20 City Attorney of a city with population in excess of 750,000, he also has the express statutory 21 authority under A.B. 5 to bring an action for injunctive relief to prevent the continued 22 misclassification of employees. (Lab. Code, § 2750.3(j).) 23 17. The San Diego City Attorney, Mara W. Elliott, has the statutory authority to bring 24 actions in the name of the People of the State of California to enforce California’s UCL. As the 25 City Attorney of a city with population in excess of 750,000, she also has the express statutory 26 authority under A.B. 5 to bring an action for injunctive relief to prevent the continued 27 misclassification of employees. (Lab. Code, § 2750.3(j).) 28 6 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 18. The San Francisco City Attorney, Dennis J. Herrera, has the statutory authority to 2 bring actions in the name of the People of the State of California to enforce California’s UCL. As 3 the City Attorney of a city and county, he also has the express statutory authority under A.B. 5 to 4 bring an action for injunctive relief to prevent the continued misclassification of employees. 5 (Lab. Code, § 2750.3(j).) 6 II. 7 8 19. Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. is a California corporation with its principal place of business in San Francisco, California. 9 10 DEFENDANTS 20. Defendant Lyft, Inc. is a California corporation with its principal place of business in San Francisco, California. 11 21. The true names or capacities of Defendants sued as Doe Defendants 1 through 50 are 12 unknown to the People. The People are informed and believe, and on this basis, allege that each 13 of the Doe Defendants, their agents, employees, officers, and others acting on their behalf, as well 14 as subsidiaries, affiliates, and other entities controlled by Doe Defendants 1 through 50 (hereafter 15 collectively referred to as “DOES 1 through 50”), are legally responsible for the conduct alleged 16 herein. The names and identities of defendants DOES 1 through 50 are unknown to the People, 17 and when they are known the People will amend this Complaint to state their names and 18 identities. 19 20 21 22 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS I. UNDER DYNAMEX AND A.B. 5, CALIFORNIA USES THE ABC TEST TO DETERMINE EMPLOYEE STATUS. 22. The California Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th 903, 23 along with the passage of A.B. 5, which went into effect January 1 of this year, have established 24 that the ABC test governs the determination of whether a worker is properly classified as an 25 employee or independent contractor for purposes of the Labor Code, the Unemployment 26 Insurance Code, and the Wage Orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission (“I.W.C.”). 27 28 23. Under the ABC test, for a worker to be properly classified as an independent contractor rather than an employee, a hiring party, such as Uber or Lyft, has the burden of 7 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 establishing that all of the following three conditions are satisfied: (A) the worker is free from 2 the control and direction of the hiring entity in connection with the performance of the work, both 3 under the contract for the performance of the work and in fact; (B) the worker performs work that 4 is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and (C) the worker is customarily 5 engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the 6 work performed. (Lab. Code, § 2750.3(a)(1); see generally Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 957.) 7 These three requirements are referred to as Parts A, B, and C of the ABC test, respectively. 8 24. Because the hiring entity must establish all three parts of the ABC test in order to 9 lawfully classify a worker as an independent contractor, the hiring entity’s failure to satisfy any 10 one part of the ABC test results in the worker in question being classified as an employee rather 11 than an independent contractor. (Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 963.) 12 II. 13 EACH DEFENDANT OPERATES A TRANSPORTATION SERVICE THAT SELLS ON-DEMAND RIDES PROVIDED BY DRIVERS WHOM EACH DEFENDANT HAS MISCLASSIFIED AS INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS. 14 25. For the purpose of this Complaint, “Drivers” refers to individuals who fall into one or 15 both of the following two categories. First Category: All individuals who have driven for Uber 16 as ride-hailing drivers in the State of California at any time since May 5, 2016 and who (1) signed 17 up to drive as a ride-hailing driver directly with Uber or an Uber subsidiary under their individual 18 name or with a fictional/corporate name and (2) are/were paid by Uber or an Uber subsidiary 19 directly under their individual name or with a fictional/corporate name for their services as ride- 20 hailing drivers. Second Category: All individuals who have driven for Lyft as ride-hailing 21 drivers in the State of California at any time since May 5, 2016 and who (1) signed up to drive 22 directly with Lyft or a Lyft subsidiary as ride-hailing drivers under their individual name or with 23 a fictional/corporate name and (2) are/were paid by Lyft or a Lyft subsidiary directly under their 24 individual name or with a fictional/corporate name for their services as ride-hailing drivers. 25 “Passengers” refer to individuals who receive Uber and/or Lyft ride-hailing services through such 26 Drivers. 27 28 26. Each Defendant operates a ride-hailing transportation service in which Passengers may request and pay for on-demand rides from either Defendant by using that Defendant’s 8 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 smartphone application (the “Uber App,” the “Lyft App,” “App” or “Defendant’s App” 2 respectively, and collectively, “Apps” or “Defendants’ Apps”). 3 27. Each Defendant has hired hundreds of thousands of ride-hailing Drivers across the 4 State of California to provide on-demand rides throughout the State to Passengers who book such 5 rides through either Defendant’s App. 6 28. Lyft was founded in 2012 as a ride-hailing service of Zimride. Zimride later changed 7 its name to Lyft, and subsequently sold the “Zimride” component of its business (a long-distance 8 carpooling service) to focus on offering on-demand rides. As of January 2, 2020, Lyft had a 9 market capitalization of approximately $13 billion. 10 11 12 29. Uber was founded in 2009 as a ride-hailing service. As of January 2, 2020, Uber had a market capitalization of approximately $53 billion. 30. Among the various ride-hailing options offered by Defendants, by far the largest is an 13 option in which individuals with non-commercial drivers’ licenses provide on-demand rides to 14 Passengers via each Defendant’s App using ordinary passenger vehicles. Lyft refers to this on- 15 demand option as a “Lyft.” Uber refers to this option as “UberX.” 16 III. UNDER THE ABC TEST, EACH DEFENDANT MISCLASSIFIES ITS DRIVERS. 17 18 19 20 31. Since first launching their ride-hailing services, each Defendant has misclassified, and continues to misclassify, its Drivers as independent contractors instead of employees. 32. Each Defendant requires its Drivers, as a pre-condition of providing rides through 21 Defendant’s App, to agree to standard-form contracts and addenda. Each Defendant’s contracts 22 and addenda contain standardized terms and conditions that each Defendant sets regarding its 23 Drivers’ work. Each Defendant’s contracts and addenda also contain boilerplate language 24 unilaterally designating each Defendant’s Drivers as independent contractors. 25 A. Part A of the ABC Test (“control and direction”) 26 33. Each Defendant retains all necessary control over its Drivers’ work, which is to 27 transport Passengers from point A to point B in a car. 28 9 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 2 34. an algorithmic manager that effectively supervises its Drivers like a human manager. 3 4 Each Defendant’s App, in combination with each Defendant’s policies, functions like 35. Each Defendant determines what Drivers are eligible to provide ride-hailing services on its App and can change its Driver standards in its discretion. 5 36. Each Defendant dictates the types of cars its Drivers may use on its app, as well as the 6 standards its Drivers’ vehicles must meet. Each Defendant can change its vehicle standards in its 7 discretion. 8 9 10 37. Drivers’ tenure with each Defendant is for an indefinite time, but each Defendant retains the right to terminate or pause a Driver’s tenure at any time in accordance with terms, conditions, and policies that each Defendant sets in its discretion. 11 38. Each Defendant sets the fares that Passengers pay for rides received through its App. 12 39. Each Defendant, not its Drivers, collects fare payments directly from Passengers. 13 40. Each Defendant sets the amount of compensation that it pays its Drivers for providing 14 ride-hailing services to Passengers on its App. 15 16 41. Each Defendant handles invoicing, claim and fare reconciliation, and resolution of complaints that arise from its Drivers and Passengers. 17 42. Each Defendant mediates and resolves conflicts involving its Drivers in its discretion, 18 ranging from Driver-Passenger disputes, to allegations of Driver or Passenger misconduct, to lost 19 items, damaged vehicles, cleaning fees, and Driver complaints of not receiving the full amount of 20 compensation for ride-hailing services provided through the App. 21 22 43. Each Defendant monitors its Drivers’ work hours and logs a Driver off its App for six hours if the Driver reaches a twelve-hour driving limit. 23 44. Each Defendant does not freely permit its Drivers to choose their routes. For 24 example, if a Passenger complains to a Defendant about the route used by a Driver, each 25 Defendant reserves the right to adjust the fare if it decides that the Driver took an inefficient 26 route. 27 28 10 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 45. Each Defendant provides its Drivers with their work and pay by controlling the 2 dispatch of individual Passengers to individual Drivers through each Defendant’s App. Each 3 Defendant’s App controls which Drivers receive which ride requests and when. 4 46. Each Defendant controls and limits the information available to its Drivers and 5 Passengers through each Defendant’s App, which each Defendant may change at any time 6 without notice. 7 47. When a Passenger requests an on-demand ride through Defendant’s App, the App 8 shows and matches that Passenger with only one Driver at a time, regardless of the number of 9 nearby Drivers. Similarly, when a Driver is available to provide an on-demand ride, the App 10 shows and matches that Driver with only one Passenger at a time, regardless of the number of 11 nearby Passengers. Drivers and Passengers do not freely negotiate over the terms of an on- 12 demand ride. Instead, they are selectively steered to one another through the centralized direction 13 of the App. 14 48. Each Defendant’s App hides from its Passengers key information about its Drivers’ 15 experience and vehicles, limiting Drivers’ ability to differentiate themselves and increase their 16 earnings in the way a true independent contractor or entrepreneur typically would. 17 18 19 49. Each Defendant’s App allows its Drivers only approximately fifteen seconds to accept or reject a trip request. 50. Drivers for each Defendant who consistently do not accept or reject trip requests 20 within the fifteen-second time limit may be temporarily logged out from each Defendant’s App. 21 The length of this bar is within each Defendant’s discretion. 22 51. Each Defendant’s App tracks its Drivers. Drivers for each Defendant must notify the 23 respective Defendant through its App of the Driver’s trip status at every key step of the on- 24 demand ride: (1) acceptance of the Passenger’s ride request, (2) arrival to the pick-up location of 25 the Passenger, (3) start of the trip, and (4) end of the trip. Each Defendant uses its App to 26 constantly monitor and control its Drivers’ behavior while its Drivers are logged into the App. 27 28 52. Each Defendant specifies detailed rules for Drivers to follow to create a uniform ride experience from which each Defendant derives its brand recognition, reputation, and value. 11 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 These rules, which each Defendant bills as “suggestions” or “tips,” cover matters such as music, 2 how to pick-up Passengers, and what its Drivers can and cannot say to the Passengers. 3 53. Each Defendant retains the right to suspend or terminate its Drivers, or to cease 4 dispatching ride requests to its Drivers through its App at any time if its Drivers behave in a way 5 that Defendant deems inappropriate or in violation of a Defendant-mandated rule or standard. 6 These Driver behaviors can include, among other infractions, canceling too many rides, not 7 maintaining sufficiently high Passenger satisfaction ratings, or taking trip routes each Defendant 8 deems inefficient. 9 54. Each Defendant monitors, and ultimately controls, its Drivers through feedback it 10 solicits from its Passengers on every ride via a rating system that each Defendant uses to assess its 11 Drivers’ performance. Each Defendant’s App solicits feedback and prompts its Drivers and 12 Passengers to rate one another from one to five stars for each Defendant’s benefit, as each 13 Defendant uses the ratings for its own discipline of Drivers. 14 55. Each Defendant determines the type of data and feedback its Drivers and Passengers 15 may submit via its App. Each Defendant also defines on what basis its Passengers and Drivers 16 may provide feedback through its App. 17 56. Each Defendant uses information from its Passenger ratings to make decisions about 18 disciplining or terminating its Drivers. If the average rating of a Defendant’s Driver falls below a 19 certain threshold set by Defendant, Defendant may suspend or terminate that Driver from 20 providing ride-hailing services on Defendant’s App. 21 57. Each Defendant frequently experiments with software features that directly impact its 22 Drivers, creating an environment in which Drivers are subject to ever-shifting working 23 conditions, all determined in each Defendant’s discretion. According to Lyft, “We frequently test 24 driver incentives on subsets of existing drivers and potential drivers, and these incentives . . . 25 could have other unintended adverse consequences.” (See Lyft SEC 10-K, p. 20 [Filing Date: 26 February 28, 2020].) According to Uber, “[t]here are over 1,000 experiments running on our 27 platform at any given time.” (Deb et al., Under the Hood of Uber’s Experimentation Platform 28 (Aug. 28, 2018), (as of May 1, 2020).) 12 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 58. Each Defendant introduces and then takes away features from its App in accordance 2 with its own business decisions. Each Defendant exerts control over its App, and thereby over its 3 Drivers. 4 B. Part B of the ABC Test (“usual course of business”) 5 59. Each Defendant’s Drivers are engaged in work that is within the usual course of each 6 Defendant’s business: the provision of on-demand rides. Each Defendant is a transportation 7 company that sells on-demand rides to its customers, i.e., its Passengers, who book and pay for 8 such rides through the Defendant’s App. 9 60. Drivers provide the on-demand ride. They are an integrated and essential part of each 10 Defendant’s transportation business. The immediate availability and temporal convenience of an 11 on-demand ride is the service that each Defendant sells to its Passengers. 12 13 14 61. Each Defendant publicly holds itself out to the public as a transportation company in the business of selling on-demand rides. 62. Lyft has trademarked the slogan, “Your Friend with a Car.” Lyft advertises: “Get a 15 Ride Whenever You Need One”; “A ride in minutes”; and “Our drivers are always nearby so you 16 can get picked up, on demand, in minutes.” 17 63. Uber has trademarked the slogan, “Everyone’s Private Driver.” Uber advertises: “We 18 built Uber to deliver rides at the touch of a button”; “Always the ride you want”; “Request a ride, 19 hop in, and go”; “Sign up to ride. Rides on demand”; and “Get a reliable ride in minutes, at any 20 time and on any day of the year.” 21 64. Each Defendant represents to Passengers that it prescribes the qualifications of 22 Drivers on its App, as well as standards for Drivers’ quality of services. Each Defendant bills its 23 Passengers directly for the entire amount of the on-demand ride, and each Defendant’s Passengers 24 pay the fare for the service to each Defendant, not to the Driver. If a Passenger has an issue with 25 the quality of the on-demand ride provided through Defendant’s App, they report that problem to 26 Defendant, and Defendant may refund or cancel the Passenger’s fare. 27 28 65. Each Defendant is financially integrated with and dependent on its Drivers. Each Defendant only generates income for its ride-hailing business if its Drivers transport and provide 13 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 rides to its Passengers. Each Defendant sets the fare its Passengers pay, collects the entire 2 amount of the fare from its Passengers, and then disburses a percentage of those fares to its 3 Drivers as compensation for providing the on-demand ride its Passenger ordered while keeping 4 the remainder of the fare for itself. Without its Drivers’ labor to provide Defendant’s service, the 5 on-demand ride, each Defendant’s ride-hailing business would not exist. 6 66. Defendants do not facilitate a marketplace or matchmaking service between 7 independent Drivers and Passengers. Instead, they utilize their substantial resources and 8 technology to shape every facet of the service they sell to Passengers—a branded, on-demand 9 ride. To offer an on-demand ride, Defendants use their technology to choreograph the 10 deployment of countless Drivers in a localized geographic area, and integrate themselves into 11 every aspect of how those Drivers provide the service of getting Passengers to their destinations. 12 67. Far from being a mere technology company, each Defendant is deeply enmeshed in 13 the provision of transportation services. Each Defendant controls its Passengers’ access to its on- 14 demand ride service and its Drivers’ access to providing such services. Each Defendant 15 prescribes qualifications for its Drivers, determines its Driver supply, and designs and monitors 16 the level and quality of service that its Drivers must provide to Defendant’s Passengers. Each 17 Defendant sets the fees, pricing, and incentives on its rides, and each Defendant uses its App to 18 distribute its Drivers across a geographic area to provide an on-demand ride at a price and 19 quantity that each Defendant, in its business discretion, deems the most beneficial to its business 20 model and delivery of services. 21 68. Each Defendant also engages in extensive data collection and surveillance of its 22 Drivers, tracking its Drivers’ hours, movements, quality of services, and other metrics from when 23 the Drivers log on to Defendant’s App until they log off. Each Defendant uses this data to 24 monitor and make disciplinary decisions regarding its Drivers, as well as for other business 25 purposes. 26 69. Lyft’s prospectus for its 2019 initial public offering (“IPO”) describes how its overall 27 business strategy depends on its Drivers. Lyft describes its growth strategy as “continu[ing] to 28 add density to our ridesharing marketplace by attracting and retaining drivers to our platform to 14 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 further improve the rider experience.” (See Lyft SEC S-1, p. 1 [Filing Date: March 1, 2019], 2 emphasis added.) The prospectus identifies a “key factor” affecting Lyft’s performance as 3 “maintaining an ample number of drivers to meet rider demand in our ridesharing marketplace.” 4 (Id., at p. 88, emphasis added.) In response to the fundamental question underlying Lyft’s 5 business model, “Why Lyft Wins,” Lyft’s IPO prospectus definitively answers: because Lyft is 6 “Driver-Centric.” (Id., at p. 3.) 7 70. Uber’s prospectus for its 2019 IPO also describes how Drivers, and the labor they 8 furnish providing on-demand rides, are the lifeblood of its business strategy. Uber does not 9 mince words: “If we are unable to attract or maintain a critical mass of Drivers . . . our platform 10 will become less appealing to platform users, and our financial results would be adversely 11 impacted . . . . Any decline in the number of Drivers . . . using our platform would reduce the 12 value of our network and would harm our future operating results.” (See Uber SEC S-1, supra, 13 at pp. 29-30, emphasis added.) Uber’s business model begins and ends with its Drivers. 14 C. Part C of the ABC Test (“independently established trade, occupation, or business”) 71. Each Defendant’s Drivers are not engaged in an independently established trade, 15 16 17 occupation, or business of the same nature as the work they perform for each Defendant. Driving 18 itself is not a distinct trade, occupation, or business. 19 20 21 72. When driving for each Defendant, Drivers are not engaged in their own transportation business, but are instead driving Passengers and generating income for the respective Defendant. 73. There are no specialized skills or training necessary to drive passengers on a ride- 22 hailing service. Consequently, each Defendant permits Drivers without any such skills or training 23 to provide on-demand rides on its App. For example, both of Defendant’s largest ride-hailing 24 options, “Lyft” and “UberX,” permit Drivers to offer ride-hailing services with an ordinary 25 driver’s license and a personal vehicle. 26 27 74. Each Defendant provides its Drivers with a necessary tool and instrumentality to perform their on-demand, ride-hailing services—its App. 28 15 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 2 3 75. Each Defendant’s App is the exclusive means by which Passengers and Drivers can connect to, request, and provide each Defendant’s on-demand rides. 76. Each Defendant’s Drivers generally invest little to no capital to drive for each 4 Defendant. To offer ride-hailing services on each Defendant’s App, Drivers only need a 5 smartphone and a car. 6 77. Each Defendant directly shapes its Drivers’ earnings, and thereby effectively prevents 7 its Drivers from attaining the profits and losses that would ordinarily be the hallmarks of running 8 their own independent businesses. 9 78. Each Defendant, not its Drivers, prescribes the key factors that determine its Drivers’ 10 earnings. Each Defendant sets the prices charged to its Passengers, and controls its Drivers’ rate 11 of pay, its Drivers’ territory, the supply of its Drivers on the overall App, and the marketing and 12 advertising of each Defendant’s brand. 13 79. The limited economic levers that each Defendant leaves to its Drivers, such as 14 whether to drive at busier times or for more hours, are not consistent with the level of decision- 15 making normally exercised by entrepreneurs or those operating their own independent businesses. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 80. Each Defendant limits its Drivers’ ability to freely decline and cancel rides that Drivers think will be unprofitable. 81. Each Defendant limits its Drivers’ ability to see all ride requests in an area, and thus to gauge their potential earnings based on demand for their services. 82. Each Defendant limits its Drivers’ ability to share their accounts with other Drivers, thereby curtailing its Drivers’ ability to individually expand their business offerings. 83. Each Defendant prohibits its Drivers from soliciting Passenger information, limiting 23 the ability of its Drivers to market themselves independently for repeat rides outside of 24 Defendant’s App. 25 84. Each Defendant limits its Drivers’ ability to take advantage of its App’s financial 26 incentives in an entrepreneurial fashion. Each Defendant specifically targets individual Drivers it 27 invites to participate in various, time-limited financial incentives that, for example, reward 28 Drivers for driving longer, or for driving at certain times and places. These financial incentives 16 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 are targeted to individual Drivers based on each Defendant’s own opaque criteria as implemented 2 by the algorithmic decision-making engines in its App. By selecting which Drivers will be 3 invited to participate in which financial incentives and on what individualized terms, each 4 Defendant, in effect, chooses which Drivers are financial “winners” and “losers.” Each 5 Defendant as the employer, not the Driver as an “entrepreneur,” determines the Driver’s earnings. 6 85. Each Defendant controls its Drivers’ ability to earn compensation via its App, making 7 trade-offs between its Drivers’ earnings and the price each Defendant charges to Passengers to the 8 benefit of each Defendant’s profit. 9 86. Lyft describes these trade-offs in its 2019 annual SEC report reporting that “changes” 10 made by Lyft “may be viewed positively from one group’s perspective (such as riders)” and 11 “negatively from another’s perspective such as (drivers).” (See Lyft SEC 10-K, supra, at p. 24.) 12 87. Uber’s SEC filings describe how the “greatest impact” on Uber’s Take Rate (the 13 company’s “take” on the difference between the Passenger’s fare on a ride and what the ride- 14 hailing company pays out to the Driver) has “historically” come through Uber’s unilateral 15 “adjustments to Driver incentives.” (See Uber SEC S-1, supra, at p. 100.) In its 2019 IPO 16 prospectus, Uber freely admits the control it exerts over its Drivers’ earnings—and the fact that 17 Uber’s own profit comes at its Drivers’ expense: “[A]s we aim to reduce Driver incentives to 18 improve our financial performance, we expect Driver dissatisfaction will generally increase.” 19 (Id., at p. 30.) 20 IV. 21 22 DEFENDANTS’ UNLAWFUL MISCLASSIFICATION OF DRIVERS RESULTS IN UNLAWFUL AND UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES. 88. It is evident that neither Uber nor Lyft can meet their burden of showing that their 23 Drivers are independent contractors under California’s ABC test for misclassification as adopted 24 in Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th 903, and as codified in A.B. 5. Under Part A of the ABC test, 25 Defendants exercise control over their Drivers through their Apps, which, in combination with 26 their policies, function like algorithmic managers that effectively supervise Defendants’ Drivers 27 like human managers. Under Part B of the ABC test, Drivers perform services within 28 17 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 Defendants’ usual course of business—providing on-demand rides. Under Part C of the ABC 2 test, Defendants cannot show that Drivers have established independent businesses. 3 89. Uber claims that “Drivers are at the heart of our service” and Lyft claims that Drivers 4 are “what makes Lyft ... Lyft.” But by misclassifying their Drivers, Defendants have devised an 5 unlawful business model that denies these very same Drivers the protections and benefits they 6 have rightfully earned as employees, and thereby gained an unlawful and unfair competitive 7 advantage in the marketplace. Defendants’ misclassification scheme hurts vulnerable Drivers, 8 undermines law-abiding competitors, evades Defendants’ responsibility to contribute their share 9 as employers into the State’s social insurance programs, and harms taxpayers who are often called 10 upon to address the negative consequences to Drivers and their families of Defendants’ 11 exploitative employment practices. 12 A. Defendants’ unlawful misclassification deprives Drivers of their rights as employees. 90. Defendants’ misclassification of their Driver workforce has allowed Defendants to 13 14 15 gain an unlawful competitive advantage over their competitors by circumventing the protections 16 and benefits that the law requires employers to provide to their employees. The laws violated by 17 Defendants include, but are not limited to, requirements relating to minimum wages, overtime 18 wages, business expenses, meal and rest periods, wage statements, paid sick leave and health 19 benefits, and social insurance programs. 20 21 22 23 1. 91. Minimum Wages The law requires Drivers to be paid the applicable state or local minimum wage for each hour worked, regardless of the compensation formula or method. 92. Defendants do not guarantee their Drivers a minimum wage under state and local 24 laws. Instead, each Defendant pays its Drivers for completed rides based on the time and distance 25 of the ride and other factors dictated by each Defendant, including, but not limited to, dynamic 26 pricing pay surges, base rates, and minimum fares. 27 28 93. Defendants do not pay their Drivers for all their hours worked. Examples where each Defendant fails to pay its Drivers include, but are not limited to, time spent refueling, time spent 18 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 cleaning and maintaining their vehicles, time spent for off-duty rest periods, time spent driving to 2 and returning from rides, and time spent logged on and monitoring each Defendant’s App for ride 3 requests. Defendants cannot provide on-demand rides without the performance of these tasks. 4 94. Defendants have failed—and continue to fail—to meet their minimum wage 5 obligations with respect to their Drivers, including hours that are entirely unpaid and hours that 6 are paid at less than the applicable minimum wage. 7 8 2. 95. Overtime Wages The law requires Drivers to be paid the applicable overtime rate of pay—one-and- 9 one-half times or two times the Drivers’ regular rate of pay—for all hours worked in excess of 10 forty per week, for all hours worked in excess of eight per day, and for all hours worked on the 11 seventh consecutive day of work in a workweek. 12 96. Defendants do not pay their Drivers overtime as required by law, despite the fact that 13 Drivers working overtime help Defendants to ensure the steady and constant supply of rides on 14 which Defendants’ businesses depend. 15 16 97. with respect to their Drivers. 17 18 19 20 Defendants have failed—and continue to fail—to meet these overtime pay obligations 3. 98. Business Expenses The law requires Drivers to be paid or reimbursed for the necessary expenses in performing their work. 99. Drivers pay for business expenses they incur in the course and scope of performing 21 their work for Defendants, including, but not limited to, vehicle expenses (wear-and-tear, 22 registration, insurance, gas, maintenance, repairs, etc.) and phone and data expenses associated 23 with using Defendants’ Apps. 24 100. These expenses are substantial. For example, the Internal Revenue Service publishes 25 a “standard mileage rate,” which currently estimates the cost of operating a vehicle for business 26 purposes at 57.5 cents per mile. Drivers provide ride-hailing services for Defendants using their 27 vehicles, without any reimbursement for this significant, work-related expense. 28 19 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 101. Defendants impose all the costs of operating the vehicles necessary to perform their 2 ride-hailing business on Drivers, though Defendants could not operate their ride-hailing business 3 without them. 4 5 6 7 102. Defendants have failed—and continue to fail—to meet these expense reimbursement obligations with respect to their Drivers. 4. Meal and Rest Periods 103. The law requires Drivers to be provided with one 30-minute duty-free meal period for 8 a work period of more than five hours, and a second 30-minute duty-free meal period for a work 9 period more than ten hours. The law further requires Drivers to be provided a ten-minute, paid, 10 off-duty rest period for every four hours worked, or major fraction thereof. Authorized or 11 required rest period time shall be counted as paid time worked. 12 104. Defendants do not provide for off-duty meal periods and do not authorize or permit 13 paid, off-duty rest periods. Defendants do not provide a premium of one hour of pay at the 14 employee’s regular rate of compensation for each failure, as required by law. 15 16 17 18 105. Defendants have failed—and continue to fail—to meet these meal and rest period obligations with respect to their Drivers. 5. Wage Statements 106. The law requires Drivers to receive regular and complete itemized wage statements 19 from Defendants, which include, as applicable, gross and net wages earned, hours worked, hourly 20 wages, piece rate wages, rest period pay, and nonproductive time pay. 21 22 23 24 25 26 107. Defendants do not provide Drivers with itemized wage statements in conformance with California law. 108. Defendants have failed—and continue to fail—to meet these wage statement obligations with respect to their Drivers. 6. Paid Sick Leave and Health Benefits 109. The law requires Drivers to be provided paid sick leave benefits as specified under 27 California law and various local laws, including, but not limited to, the Los Angeles, San Diego, 28 and San Francisco sick leave ordinances. 20 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 110. The law currently requires Drivers in San Francisco to receive health care 2 expenditures of $3.08 per hour. In recent years the rate has ranged between $2.53 and $3.08 per 3 hour. 4 5 6 7 111. Drivers do not accrue the paid sick leave benefits or receive the health care expenditures from Defendants that employers are required to provide under state and local law. 112. Defendants have failed—and continue to fail—to meet these sick leave and health care expenditure obligations with respect to their Drivers. 8 9 7. Social Insurance Programs 113. The law requires Defendants to remit contributions or take other mandatory actions 10 under the State’s social insurance programs, including, but not limited to, unemployment 11 insurance, disability insurance, paid family leave, workers’ compensation, and San Francisco’s 12 Paid Parental Leave Ordinance. 13 114. These programs are intended to provide wage replacement and other benefits in the 14 event an employee loses a job, becomes disabled or injured (whether on the job or off), needs to 15 care for a family member, or is otherwise unable to work. 16 17 18 19 20 115. Defendants have failed—and continue to fail—to meet these social insurance program obligations with respect to their Drivers. B. Defendants’ unlawful misclassification harms law-abiding competitors and would-be competitors. 116. Defendants’ unfair and unlawful treatment of their Drivers also confers an unfair 21 advantage on Defendants over their law-abiding competitors and would-be competitors. 22 Defendants utilize the illegitimate savings they gain from depriving their Drivers of the full 23 compensation and benefits they earn as employees to offer their ride-hailing services at an 24 artificially low cost, decimating competitors and generating billions of dollars in private investor 25 wealth off the backs of vulnerable Drivers. 26 27 117. Defendants’ misclassification of their Drivers allows both companies to unlawfully reduce a substantial portion of the labor and vehicle fleet costs they would otherwise incur if they 28 21 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 lawfully classified and compensated their Drivers as employees, including reimbursing Drivers 2 for their vehicle maintenance and fuel expenses. 3 118. Because driver compensation, along with vehicle maintenance and fuel expenses, 4 generally constitutes the lion’s share of operating costs for a car service, Defendants’ illicit 5 savings allow them to gain an out-sized competitive advantage over other transportation 6 providers. Defendants’ misclassification scheme unlawfully shifts the substantial labor and 7 vehicle costs of running a transportation service from well-resourced Defendants onto their 8 under-resourced Drivers, placing law-abiding competitors who bear those costs themselves at a 9 substantial competitive disadvantage. 10 119. In addition to avoiding paying Drivers for the full compensation and reimbursements 11 they earn as employees under state and local wage and hour laws, Defendants also avoid paying 12 their share of state and local payroll taxes and workers’ compensation insurance premiums. 13 120. On information and belief, the illicit cost savings Defendants have reaped as a result 14 of avoiding employer contributions to state and local unemployment and social insurance 15 programs totals well into the hundreds of millions of dollars. Defendants’ denial to Drivers of the 16 full compensation and benefits they are guaranteed under law as employees pushes the total 17 amount of Defendants’ illicit cost savings over their law-abiding competitors—or would-be 18 competitors who cannot enter the market—even higher. 19 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 20 INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, RESTITUTION, AND PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 17200 (Against all Defendants) 21 22 23 24 25 121. The People reallege and incorporate by reference each allegation contained in the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 122. Defendants have engaged, and continue to engage, in acts or practices that are 26 unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent and which constitute unfair competition within the meaning of 27 section 17200 of the Business and Professions Code. These acts or practices include, but are not 28 limited to, the following: 22 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 2 3 a. Failing to classify Drivers as employees as required by Labor Code section 2750.3, I.W.C. Wage Order 9-2001, and California law; b. Failing to pay Drivers at least the California minimum wage for all time worked as 4 required by Labor Code sections 1182.12, 1182.13, 1194, 1197, I.W.C. Wage Order 9- 5 2001, section 4 (currently $13.00 per hour for employers with 26 or more employees), 6 and the California Minimum Wage Order (MW-2019); 7 c. Failing to pay Drivers who worked in San Francisco at least the San Francisco 8 minimum wage for all time worked as required by the San Francisco Minimum Wage 9 Ordinance, San Francisco Administrative Code, Chapter 12R (currently $15.59 per 10 hour); 11 d. Failing to pay Drivers who worked in Los Angeles at least the Los Angeles minimum 12 wage for all time worked as required by the Los Angeles Minimum Wage Ordinance, 13 Los Angeles Municipal Code, Chapter 18, Article 7, section 187.00 et seq. (currently 14 $14.25 per hour); 15 e. Failing to pay Drivers who worked in San Diego at least the San Diego minimum wage 16 for all time worked as required by the City of San Diego Earned Sick Leave and 17 Minimum Wage Ordinance, San Diego Municipal Code, Chapter 3, Article 9, Division 18 1 (currently $13.00 per hour); 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 f. Failing to pay Drivers the appropriate premium for overtime hours worked as required by Labor Code sections 510, 1194, 1198, and I.W.C. Wage Order 9-2001, section 3(A); g. Failing to reimburse Drivers for business expenses and losses as required by Labor Code section 2802; h. Failing to provide meal periods and pay meal period premiums as required by Labor Code sections 226.7, 512, and I.W.C. Order 9-2001, section 11; i. Failing to authorize, permit, and pay for rest periods and rest period premiums as required by Labor Code section 226.7 and I.W.C. Wage Order 9-2001, section 12; 27 28 23 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 j. Failing to provide Drivers with itemized written statements as required by Labor Code 2 section 226, and failing to maintain and provide Drivers with records as required by 3 I.W.C. Wage Order 9-2001, section 7; 4 k. Failing to provide paid sick leave to Drivers as required by Labor Code section 246; 5 l. Failing to provide paid sick leave to Drivers who worked in San Francisco, as required 6 by the San Francisco Paid Sick Leave Ordinance, San Francisco Administrative Code, 7 Chapter 12W; 8 9 10 11 m. Failing to provide paid sick leave to Drivers who worked in Los Angeles, as required by the City of Los Angeles Paid Sick Leave Ordinance, Los Angeles Municipal Code section 187.00 et seq.; n. Failing to provide paid sick leave to Drivers who worked in San Diego, as required by 12 the City of San Diego Earned Sick Leave and Minimum Wage Ordinance, San Diego 13 Municipal Code Chapter 3, Article 9, Division 1; 14 o. Failing to make health care expenditures on behalf of Drivers who worked in San 15 Francisco as required by the San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance, San 16 Francisco Administrative Code, Chapter 14; 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 p. Failing to pay Drivers who worked in San Francisco as required by the San Francisco Paid Parental Leave Ordinance, San Francisco Police Code, Article 33H; q. Failing to pay unemployment insurance taxes for Drivers as required by Unemployment Insurance Code section 976; r. Failing to pay Employment Training Fund taxes for Drivers as required by Unemployment Insurance Code section 976.6; s. Failing to withhold and remit State Disability Insurance taxes for Drivers as required by Unemployment Insurance Code section 986; t. Failing to withhold and remit state income taxes for Drivers as required by Unemployment Insurance Code sections 13020 and 13021; u. Failing to provide workers’ compensation for Drivers as required by Labor Code section 3700; and 24 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 v. Failing to provide other rights and benefits to Drivers under the Labor Code, I.W.C. 2 3 Wage Order 9-2001, and other local employee protection laws. 123. Each Defendant’s misclassification of its Drivers as independent contractors and 4 accompanying failure to comply with numerous provisions of the California Labor Code, 5 including the employee classification provision of Labor Code section 2750.3, and applicable 6 local ordinances, constitutes an unlawful and unfair business practice and, therefore, violates 7 California’s Unfair Competition Law. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §17200 et seq.) 8 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 9 INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR VIOLATIONS OF A.B. 5 (Labor Code § 2750.3) (Against all Defendants) 10 11 12 13 124. The People reallege and incorporate by reference each allegation contained in the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 125. A.B. 5 permits an action for injunctive relief to prevent the continued 14 misclassification of employees as independent contractors. (Lab. Code, § 2750.3(j).) This action 15 may be prosecuted by the Attorney General, or by a City Attorney of a city having a population in 16 excess of 750,000, or by a City Attorney in a city and county. 17 126. Each Defendant continues to misclassify its Drivers as independent contractors. 18 127. The People seek an order of this Court, pursuant to Labor Code section 2750.3(j), to 19 prevent the continued misclassification of each Defendant’s Drivers as independent contractors. 20 PRAYER FOR RELIEF 21 WHEREFORE, the People pray for the following relief: 22 1. Pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17203, that each Defendant, their 23 successors, agents, representatives, employees, and all persons who act in concert with each 24 Defendant, be permanently enjoined from engaging in unfair competition as defined in Business 25 and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., including, but not limited to, the acts and practices 26 alleged in this Complaint; 27 28 25 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties 1 2. Pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17203, that the Court enter all 2 judgments as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property that 3 may have been acquired by violations of Business and Professions Code section 17200 as may be 4 proved at trial; 5 3. Pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17206, that each Defendant be 6 assessed a civil penalty in an amount up to $2,500 for each violation of Business and Professions 7 Code section 17200 et seq., as proven at trial; 8 9 10 11 12 4. Pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17206.1, that each Defendant be assessed an additional civil penalty in an amount up to $2,500 for each violation of the UCL perpetrated against a senior citizen or disabled person, as proven at trial; 5. Pursuant to Labor Code section 2750.3(j), an order to prevent each Defendant from continuing to misclassify its Drivers as independent contractors; 13 6. That the People recover their costs of suit; and 14 7. Such other and further relief that the Court deems appropriate and just. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 26 The People’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties m?dQM-thI?OKDOqum-bmml?O Dated: May 5, 2020 MICHAEL N. FEUER City Attorney, City of Los Angeles MICHAEL BOSTROM Managing Assistant City Attorney DANIELLE GOLDSTEIN Deputy City Attorney MARA W. ELLIOTT City Attorney, City of San Diego MARK AN KCORN Chief Deputy City Attorney KEVIN B. KING MARNI VON WILPERT Deputy City Attorneys DENNIS J. HERRERA City Attorney, City of San Francisco RONALD P. Chief Deputy City Attorney YVONNE R. MERE Chief of Complex and Af?rmative Litigation MOLLY J. ALARCON SARA J. EISENBERG MATTHEW D. GOLDBERG Deputy City Attorneys LA2019504400 I 91244721.docx 27 Respectfully Submitted, XAVIER BECERRA Attorney General of California MICHAEL L. NEWMAN Senior Assistant Attorney General SATOS HI YANAI Supervising Deputy Attorney General MARISA MAN A BARARI R. ERAN DI ZAMORA-GRAZIANO MINSU D. LONGIARU Deputy Attorneys General Attorneys for the People of the State of California ex rel. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General The People?s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Penalties