I

1

EXECUTIVE SESSION
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,

U.S.

HOUSE

OF REPRESENTATIVES,

wAsHrNGToN, D.C.

INTERVIEW

OF:

]AMES CLAPPER

Monday, JuLy

t7,

2Ot7

Washington, D.C.

The

Capitol,

interview in the above matten was held in
commencing

Room

HVC-304, the

at 9:34 a.m.

Pnesent: Representatives
SwalweIl.

I

Rooney, Wenstrup,

Schiff,

Sewe11, and

 I

2

Appeanances:

Fon

the

PERMANENT SELECT C0f,4I4ITTEE

0N INTELLIGENCE:

ALSO PRESENT:

WALTER ZAMPELLA, LEGISLATIVE LIAISON

For

lAJvlES CLAPPER:

KENNETH

L.

WAINSTEIN

MAIA MILLER

Cadwalander, Wickersham &
700

Sixth Street,

Taft

N.W.

Washington, D.C. 260AI

I

LLP

 I
statement on behalf
This is

for

all. rf

Good monning,

I

you

3

a

of the

we're neady, r'11 nead a

committee and then we'11 begin.

transcribed interview of Dinector

speaking

to

us

today.

Fon

James

the recond,

I

Clappen.

Thank

am

t

of the House Penmanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
AIso fon the necond, as you can see,

I'11

have everyone do an

introduction going down the now, beginning with

,

HPSCI,

my colleague.

majority.

MR. ROONEY: Tom Rooney from Flonida.

-DR. WENSTRUP: Bnad Wenstrup from Ohio.
MS. SEWELL: Terri Sewell, Alabama.
MR. SWALWELL:

Eric Swalwell, Califonnla.

T
, minority.
Thank you. Before we begin, I want to say a few
things- fon the record. The questioning wilI be conducted by membens
and staff. Durj.ng the course of this interview, membens and staff may
ask questions duning thein
seem

basic, but that is

understand the

allotted time peniod.

because we need

situation.

you

desire,

There

may

to clearly establish facts

and

facts

you

Please do not assume we know any

have pneviously disclosed as pant

During the counse of

questions

Some

of any other investigation on review.

this interview,

we

wiII take any breaks that

is a reponten making a necord of these proceedings

I

 I

4

so we can easily consult a written compilation
neponter

may ask you

use and may ask you

to spell certain

of your answers.

tenms on unusual phrases you might

to slow down on nepeat youn answens.

you give complete and fulsome

The

replies to questions,

We

ask that

based on your best

necollection.
Right now, we are cleared fon the Top Secnet/SCI level,
everyone

in this

noom

and

is also cleaned to that leve1.

If a question is unclear or you are uncertain in youn response,
please let us know. And if you do not know the answer to a question
or cannot

remember, slmply say so.

You are

I

see

entltled to

have a lawyen pnesent fon

that you have brought counsel.

Fon

thls interview and

the recond, Ken, would

you

please make your appearance?
MR. I^JAINSTEIN:

f8n Wainstein, Davis PoIk.

Good nronning..

Thank you.

This intenview

will

necond gestures, we ask

do

this,

be

transcribed.

Because

the neporter cannot

that you answen verbally. If you forget to

you might be reminded

to do so.

Consistent with the committee's rules of procedure, you and youn

will have a reasonable opportunity to inspect
the transcnipt of this interview in onden to determine whether youn
answers were conrectly transcribed. The transcript will remain in the
if

you wish,

committee's

custody.

counsel,

The committee

also nesenves the right to request

for additional questions should the need arise.
The process for the intenview is as foIlows, sin: The majority

you return

I

 I
will

be given 60 minutes

5

to ask questions, immediately followed

by the

minority will be given 60 minutes to ask questions. Thereafter,

will

will
questions, and the minonity will

take a 5-minute bneak, aften which the majonity

minutes

to ask followup

we

be given 20

be given 20

minutes to ask followup questions, with a hand stop, per your schedule,

at

12:30

today.

limits will be strictly adhered to by all
being granted. Time will be kept for each

These time

sides, with no extensions

pontion of the intenview, with wannings given at the S-mlnute

and

1-minute mark, nespectively.
To ensure

confidentiality,

we ask

that you do not discuss the

interview with anyone other than youn attorney. Our record today

reflect that

you have not been compelled

to appean.

wilI

You are reminded

that it is unlarful to deliberately provide false information to
Membens of Congness or staff.
Lastly, the record will neflect that you ane voluntarily
participating in this interview, which wil} be under oath.
Director Clappen, do you understand all these instnuctions?
MR. CLAPPER: Most of it, but I just have to telI everybody I'm
a little hard of hearing, so I need you to speak up.' I couldn't hear
most of what you said, but that's okay.
Okay, sir, will do.
MS. SEWELL: So long as your lawyer
MR. CLAPPER: The lawyen heand

did.

it.

That's good enough, sin.
Would you please

raise youn right hand to be sworn, sir? Sin,

I

 5

do you swear

or affirm everything you ane about to say is the tnuth,

the whole tnuth, and nothing but the truth?
MR. CLAPPER:

this,

do.

rhank you, sin.

I
And

I

also a gentle neminder fon

please make sure

to turn

all: If

you are speaking duning

on the micnophone so the

court neporter

can pnoperly tnanscribe.

to you, Dr. WenstnuP.
befone Dr. wenstnup goes.
MR. RooNEY: r'11 stara, I
Genenal, it's good to see you again. I just wanted to welcome
0ven

you and youn counsel. We are, as you know, conducting a senles of

interviews with people to discuss the Russian involvement in oun last

election, along with myself, Mike Conaway on the majonity si.de,
Tney Gowdy, along

with the assistance today of

and

Bnad.

like to do is tny to make the Intelligence Community
better for the future, not just for this committee, but for youn
successon and the successons in the other agencies that are in change
of gathering the intelligence for this country for national security
What we'd

purposes, as you know.
hle have

a dlfficult job comlng up, with the reauthorization of

things like 702.
upstairs

why

So making sure

that

we can convince

things like unmasking, on how to

you know, should be pant

of

maybe what

you could help us with those type

betten do unmasking,

our report shows. And so if

of things today, I think that

gain the most insight and value.

I

maybe

our colleagues

we would

 I
As

I've

been

7

sayingtowitnesses inthe past, oun job here is not

investigation. Our Job is to wnite a nepont
dealing with the Intelligence Community and how to make lt betten. Any

to

conduct a cnlminal

cniminal activity that
punview

of

Robent

the lustice
So, while

gained on discovered should be unden the

MueIIer.

committee, oun charge
and

is

And

if

we even

find anything in this

is to turn that infonmation over to Mn. Mueller

Department.

we may

talk about hene things like collusion, it

would

in the breadth of how that affected Russian involvement in oun
election process, if any. But more things 1ike, you know, the hacking
be

and

the pnopaganda and the things that

we have

talked about ad nauseam,

both privately and publicly. So I want to make that absolutely clean
so

that, you know, despite what we see in the news sometimes, what oun

nole

is

on

Community

this

committee and how we are

better,

somethlng

to

make

the Intelligence

that you've dedicated a 1ot of your 1lfe

to.
And

so, with that, to stant off with our side, the majority's

I'fi going to turn it oven to Bnad, and then I'11 follow up
after that. But the ranking member.
MR. SCHIFF: I just wanted to join in welcoming you, Director.
We appneciate youn long yeans of senvice to the community. Welcome
back. A lot has happened since you left, much of which we want to get
questions,

youn expert opinion on, given youn many decades

of senvice in this area.

I just want to add on an additional
point, in tenms of the issue of collusion.

note on my colleague's

You know,

 r
One

8

of the four areas that we've been charged with investigating

is whether the Russians had the help of any U.S. pensons in what they
did. And while Bob Muellen will have the nesponsibility of pnosecuting
anyone who rnay have been involved

with that,

we have

the nesponsibility

of telling the American people exactly what happened and who was
involved, if any U.S. people wene involved. Bob MueIIen is only likely
to be able to speak through an indictment, if he brings an indictment.
It will be oun job to give the public a full accounting of what happened,
whether charges are brought or not.
And one of the aneas, we'11 certainly want to ask your thoughts
on the

dnafting of the unclassified and the classlfied assessment, but

that's in the
public domain since you left, about the meeting with Donald, lr. and
some of the othen allegations. We'll be intenested to get youn

we'11.

also ulant to get your advice, given what you

insights into

where we might look

know

to find further evidence that eithen

allegations. So we'11 be looking
forwand to asking you questions on that subject as we1l.
With that, I'1I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chain.
corroborates on disproves the public

DR. ITIENSTRUP: Thank you.
EXAMINATION

sir. I appneciate you belng
hene today. You know, as I look at what we're trying to accomplish
here, I look at it the same way I do in my militany noIes, and that's
DR. WENSTRUP: And,

you want to do an

and you want

again, welcome,

to

have lessons leanned,

measunes vlhene

needed. And in that

after-action review,

to take cornective

I

you want

 I
pnocess, you look

9

at the procedunes that have been taken and how

this a long time, and I

assessments ane made. You've been doing

appreciate that.
So

in

I

want

to start with tnying to get

assessing and responding

to

an idea

Russian hacking

of

what DNI's role

of U.5. political

entities was. l,lhat was the DNI's role in responding to the hacking?
WelI, respondlng to the hacking ls actually

MR. CLAPPER:

a

policy matten. The Intelligence Community's nesponsibility, I
believe,

it

was

to tee up the informatlon that

we gathened as we gathened

it evolved as we gained mone insight. But doing something
about it is neally the realm of the policymaker.
and as

DR. WENSTRUP: So,

in

hacking U.S.

2876 and

political entities, it

publicly acknowledged by you

7th of 2OL6.

And why

of these activities
publicly

with that in mind, okay, so the Russian nole
was

first reported in July of

and Secretary lohnson on Octoben

wasn't an Intel.Iigence Community-wide assessment

ondened

until

December, when you acknowledged

befone?

MR. CLAPPER:

t^lelI, we had done a

lot of reponting

on

the magnitude of the Intelligence Community assessment that
up by President Obama the

record

it

will

show

we had reported

first

week

it, not to

was

ordered

in December. But I think the track

there had been a Iot of reporting on that. Centainly,

lt ln the PDB and had rendered numerous briefings

as

the situation evolved over tlme.
DR. WENSTRUP: 5o why were you doing

doing an assessment

the neponting

of it, just reporting it?

if

you wenen't

 I
MR. CLAPPER: We1I,

10

r think --

DR. WENSTRUP: Because

the

assessment wasn't ordered

until

December.

MR. CLAPPER: The assessment

is

a term

of ant that is

used as

a

panticulan type of nepont that we would issue as a community. So an

Intelligence

is

Community assessment; a sense

of the community

memorandum

another vehicle; or a National Intelligence Estimate.

I wouldn't nead a lot into the nomenclature of the report
that we eventually nendered and published on the 6th of Januany.
DR. WENSTRUP: We1l, this has a significant amount of gravity,
the whole notion. And even if the pnesident hadn't specifically
ondered an assessment and given this gravity of the Russian threat,
And so

I'm just cunious as to

why

you, as DNf, didn't onder a neview and report

to infonm the Amenican people prion to the
one

of

youn

2016

election when, you know,

specific efforts as DNI was youn transpanency initiative.

MR. CLAPPER:

Well, in the could have, would have, should have

I could agnee that maybe we should have pulled
people's coat sleeves earlier in a more public way. We had a lot of

department,

I

debate about

that,

I

guess

then the debate which nesulted in the statement which

thought was pnetty fonthcoming and pnetty dinect that Jeh lohnson

and

I

made on

The

the 7th of

Octoben.

issue, of course, at least I think in the administnation's

mind, was

if

we publicized

this,

do we magnify

it

and do we

dignify

what the Russians ane doing? Would the administnation then be seen
as putting

its

hand on

the scale?

I

So we had

aII those kind of debates.

 r
And

with the benefit of

we should have done

I

do

--

2O/2O

hindsight, yoU can say, well,

been mone public

the

used the term "hand on

hand on

penhaps make

be done by way

it

I think it

would have been

the scale.

"

DR. WENSTRUP: We11,

penhaps

earlien.

think in the context of something that could

of a lesson learned would be to

just

11

transparent.

You

In what way would you be putting

the scale?

I think the Pnesident -- not me. The President,
President Obama felt I think somewhat constrained by the appeanance
of, for example, his making a public statement about it, and whethen
MR. CLAPPER:

that would be construed as on intenpneted

in favor of

as

weighting the balance scale

Secretany Clinton.

DR. WENSTRUP: WeIl,

that's a matten of opinion, f guess,

as to

it would show favoritism to one or the othen.
MR. CLAPPER: It is exactly that, sir. It is a matter of opinion.
DR. WENSTRUP: It is. But transparency would tend to balance
those scales, I would think.
But on November 7th, you slgned a letter to me, and lt was a
blpantisan letter that I had sent you, but you sent a letter back to
me and the othens. And in that, you stated -- and this is Novemben

whether he thinks

I

 t2

I
7th, before the election

What
time

-

specific intelligence informed these

assessments

at that

?

MR. CLAPPER:

WeIl, I would have to have access to the

contemporany neporting
have

that I

that off the top of

my

had

available at the time, and I don't

head. What we were seeing at this point,

I think what pnobably influenced that nesponse, was the
neconnoitering, if I can use that term. At that point, I think it was
around'some ! stutes whene we'd seen R0ssian activity, which was
and

attributed to the Russians reconnoitering, not necessanily extracting
on attempting to manipulate data,

in various voten --

predomlnantly

voter registration databases. The number of States went
know

up. f don't

exactly what the count was when that letter was put togethen, but

that's pnimanily what f think influenced that letter.
And, as it tunned out, one of the judgments in the Intelligence
Community assessment was that we didn't see any evidence of actual
manipulation of voter ta11ies. That's not to say -- nor did we attempt
to make a pnonouncement about what impact any of the Russian

I

 I

13

interfenence activity, as we reponted out on the 6th of January,
on individual voten decisions.

We

had

could not make a judgment about

that.
DR. WENSTRUP: WeI1,

to

make

that would be pretty difficult to

be able

a judgment.

MR. CLAPPER:

Intelllgence

WeIl, not only difficult, we don't have -- the

Communlty

capability to

do

doesn't have the authonity on the expentise

and

that.

DR. WENSTRUP:

Yes. I think you'd have to talk to

eveny voten

in America -MR. CLAPPER: ExactIy.

DR. WENSTRUP:

like a far

-- to

be able

to establish that,

that seems

stnetch.

So ane you aware

of

any evidence

that the vote outcome of the 2016

Presidential election was manipulated through cyben
MR. CLAPPER:

means?

NO.

DR. WENSTRUP: Was Pnesident
undermine

and

Putin successful in his effont to

the credibility of the electoral pnocess, in your opinion?

MR. CLAPPER:

I believe -- I believe he absolutely was. I

believe that they were successful beyond thein expectations in terms

of

sowing doubt and discord about

the veracity or sanctity of our

election pnocess --

Is thene anythlng factual?
MR. CLAPPER: -- which I think was thein finst objective.
DR. WENSTRUP: Is there anything factual?
DR. WENSTRUP:

I

 r
MR. CLAPPER:

Well,

DR. WENSTRUP:

evidence

L4

how do you mean?

Well, you Just sald that it didn't .- thene's

that the vote

outcome was manipulated, but you

no

feel that this

is -- I take it -MR. CLAPPER:

that

I think the ensuing contnovensy

was contemponany

I have an utterance
Putin himself that says that? No.

kind of

that I can quote from

that point.

and the controvensy

DR. ITIENSTRUP: So

makes

Do

you're saying factually, he undenmined the

credibility of the electoral pnocess?
MR. CLAPPER:

That's

DR. WENSTRUP:

belief.

my

That's an oplnlon. Is that connect?

MR. CLAPPER: YES.
DR. WENSTRUP: Because,

oh, I

I

changed my vote because

mean,

f

haven't met anybody that said,

of what the Russians did. So, again,

opinion. It centainly isn't a fact, though.
MR. CLAPPER: I do think, though, it did create doubt about the
sanctity and secunity of our -- of the process. I do -DR. WENSTRUP: And that's why we'ne hene.
MR. CLAPPER: I do believe that.
DR. WENSTRUP: And that's pant of why we'ne hene, because thls
is important to all Amenicans that the process is one to be trusted.

that's

anothen

5o, based on the administnation's public statements and actions,

is it fair to conclude that the Russian hacking of U.S. political
entities, which began in July of 2AL5, became a highen priority fon
the Intelligence

Community

aften the election?

I

 I

15

I wouldn't saythat. What I would say is -- I
think this penhaps gets to your question -- is thene has been a centain
MR. CLAPPER: No,

amount

of

ambient involvement by the Russians, which goes back

to the

60s, whene they have monitored and in vanious ways tnied to influence

the outcome of the election.
The

difference here

aggressive

in lts

was

this,

as

it

evolved, was the most direct,

scope, and the multifaceted actions they took

wene

unpnecedented.

the

DR. WENSTRUP: WeIl,

I'm looking at this letter
cneate the

level of concern

I

neason

ask

fnom Novemben

and

that question is

because

7th, which doesn't seem to

pniority that

we saw

aften the election.

MR. CLAPPER: Rlght.

DR. WENSTRUP: Wou1d you agree

evidence

that --

was

that

due

to

new

or --

MR. CLAPPER: Yes, yes.
DR. WENSTRUP: Such ASI
MR. CLAPPER:

DR. WENSTRUP: So you mentioned

they've tnied to interfene with us in
HR. CLAPPER: Right.

I

that Russia/Soviet
many ways

for

Union,

decades.

 I
DR. WENSTRUP: And

15

I think we would all

agree with that.

to the notion of whene Russia is today with
their attempts -- and this ls just to get youn opinion, if we could.
I use the tenm for Russia in this election, it's heads I win/tails you
What would you say

if Mrs. Clinton wins, then they have weakened her in many
ways and tried to take away some of hen cnedibility. If DonaId Trump
lose,

because

wins, he's illegitimate.
So,

in

my

opinion, they succeeded no matten

who

wins, and

I'd

be

curious to get your opinion on their tactics.
MR. CLAPPER: WeI1, you can make

that argument. I think they

believed -- I mean,.the finst point, I think they had thnee objectives:
One was

to

sow

discond. Secondly, because of the significant personal

that Putin had for both the Clintons, both President Clinton
and Secnetany Clinton, so anything you do to undenmine hen. And, in
fact, at one point they kind of -- neading the polls, they believed
animus

that

she was going

to win,

and then

thein focus

seemed

to turn to

how

could they undermine a potential Clinton Presidency.

I

do

think, though, they thought that Pnesident,

now President

with. He is a buslnessman. He'd be mone
willing to negotiate and make deals. And I don't think it was anything
more sophisticated than that that sont of guided their objectives.
Trump would be

easier to deal

DR. WENSTRUP: 0n December

5th, your national intelligence

officer fon Russia briefed this committee, and I'm going to give
a quote hene: "In terms of favoring one candidate oven anothen,
know, the evidence

is a little bit

I

unc1ean. "

you
you

 I
Was

this

17

accurate and a complete assessment?

it wasn't. And as we explained at the hearing
I think we had on the 10th of January, she and many others in the
MR. CLAPPER: No,

community wene not aware

of this veny, veny sensitive information I

DR. WENSTRUP: A couple more

questions, referring to that

testimony then.

AIso, it

was

stated: It's unclear to

us

that the Kremlin had a

particulan -- that they had a panticulan favonite or they wanted to
see a particulan outcome. That

is

what

the neponting

shows.

this accurate and a complete assessmenti
MR. CLAPPER: WeII, at that time, no.
So was

that

all kind of came together there about that -- at about that
time, as I necollect.
evidence

DR. WENSTRUP: 5o

those weren't accurate statements at that time,

including we did not have a clean --

to

suggest

that there

MR. CLAPPER:

was

evolved.

did not

clear evidence
outcome?

That's -- weII, you know, I'd have to go back and
when we knew

-- I think our end assessment

Thein objectives

animus towards

have

a desire for a particulan

look again, do a chronology of
Again, the

we

was

evolved. Finst,

Mrs. C1inton.

And as

I

--

what we knew when.

that thein

sow

discond.

things evolved,

appnoach
Tremendous

and when

it

became

 I
evident that Pnesident

18

Tnump was a

serious candidate, then I think

their

approach evolved as well.
DR. WENSTRUP: So you

5th,

and

talk

about

timeline,

and

that

was December

you're saying that those statements weren't accurate at that

time.
MR. CLAPPER: They wene

of what we gathened

not completely accurate as

and assessed

after that.

DR. WENSTRUP: So wene you awane

bnief the committee on Decemben

-- in 1lght

th

was coming

to

5th?

I don't know -- and, you know, we've sent a lot of
people from the community up hene to brief a lot of people.
DR. WENSTRUP: I would think that would be something you'd know
MR. CLAPPER:

about.
MR. CLAPPER:

I believe I did know about it.

DR. WENSTRUP: So was thene a

of

anyone

decision on youn part on the part

in the administnation to not provide

Congness

with the latest

intelligence on this issue or not pnovide her with the latest
intelligence on this issue?
l,lR. CLAPPER: No, there wasn 't
DR. WENSTRUP:

coming

I

mean,

.

that's a pretty.important hearing she's

in for.

HR. CLAPPER: Right.
DR. WENSTRUP: And

wouldn't she be saying, do

f

have

the latest

like that?
MR. CLAPPER: Well, again, I have to -- I would have to audit when

intelligence?

How

does

this

go unchecked

 I

19

individual people were read in on certain
DR. WENSTRUP: We1I,

I

would centainly

accesses.

like to know that,

because

of the things we're tnying to do here is come fonth with best
practices. This committee has a significant no1e. And if we're

one

sending people from your department over here and

they're not

up to

an

injustice to us and the Amenican people, i.n my opinion.

So why was

the national intelligence officer for Russla not pnivy

speed,

that's

to this

compantmented reporting?

MR. CLAPPER:

In fairness,

over the 5-and-a-half years

I

my

experience has been, certainly

was DNI,

was

that as we gained mone

infonmation, as we gained accesses, as we saw what was evolving,

this infonmation. So
it centainly wasn't an intent to deceive or not to be complete.
DR. WENSTRUP: So do we need to somehow implement withln the
agency a cniteria that 1f someone is coming to testify befone the

would

brief

Intelligence

up more people who needed

Committee hene

to

we

know

in the House of Representatives that they

be bnought up to speed -MR. CLAPPER:

WeIl, what we could do --

DR. I'IENSTRUP:

--

on does

that

happen automatically?

it happens. As time unfolds and you acquine
more infonmation, that's the nature of the intelligence business.
MR. CLAPPER:

WeII,

You're always deallng with incomplete facts.

I

 I

20

I've seen other cases whene, as lnfonmatlon evolved, as we
acquire more infonmation, et cetena, not just on this but in othen
But

instances, now, we could centainly set up a formal vetting system where

all bniefings

before they come up hene are thoroughly vetted by

committee on something

like that.

Now,

that would

responsiveness, because my experience has been
happens, people are very anxious
So

a

slow

that

when something

to get whateven information

we have.

-DR, WENSTRUP:

I'd rather have accurate

responslveness than

inaccunate response. So -MR. CLAPPER:

know, we do

Well,

it is -- we do the best -- my expenience,

you

the best we can.

DR. WENSTRUP: We1I,

that if it's not

enough

I

might have to suggest to the agency today

of a pnionity,

coming

to the

House

Intelligence

to speed before you get here, I don't know what
is. And if the NIO for Russia didn't have enough access to infonm an

Committee,

to

be up

accunate judgment, I'm wondening what percentage
Community

of the Intelligence

analysis on Russia duning that time was effectively obsolete

at the time lt

was given

to us.

I

And

I'1I

move on fnom

there.

 


MR. CLAPPER:

DR . WENSTRUP:

MR. CLAPPER:

I
DR.

22

WENSTRUP:

I

I

MR. CLAPPER:

DR.

WENSTRUP:

MR. CLAPPER:

DR.

WENSTRUP:

With

IT

that, I yield to

Mn. Rooney.

MR. ROONEY: Thank you.

Genenal, f'm going

in on just

a few

things

to stant sort of

if I

have

time.

bnoad and then

tny to

The ranking member

the agreed-upon parameters of our investigation, so

nannow

talked about

I'd like to sort

of start with the focus there. And I know some of these might seem
overly broad, but if you could help us, that would be appneciated.
We talked about, a little bit about cyber activity and the Russian
role in that,

and

thein active

measunes

directed against us duning this

last campaign. You had mentioned briefly with regand to oun voting
capabilities and that you don't believe -- conrect me if I'm wrong,
if what I'm saying is wrong -- that you don't believe that they
penetrated our actual machines, precinct by precinct on State by State.

Is that

an accurate

--

as fan as evenything you know before you

I

left,

 I

23

is that tnue?
MR. CLAPPER:

WelI, we didn't do an assessment of aLL SO,QOO

polling places ln the United States,
we made

in the assessment

activity

and

non could

was based on

thein behavion.

And we

The statement

that

looking at the Russians and their

didn't

see any evidence

you know, influencing or manipulating voter
Now,

we.

of

them,

tallies.

the neconnoitening they did is cunious.

Whethen

that

you know, data gathening, information gathering fon the futune,

was,

f don't

know.
MR. ROONEY: 5o when you were

there, you didn't see any evidence

of it, but did you see evidence of like
hlhen you

talk

an

about data gathening, what

effort of them to do that?
--

MR. CLAPPER:

MR. ROONEY: Right
MR. CLAPPER:

MR. ROONEY:

In your opinion, knowing from youn body of wonk oven

government senvice over
Russians ane going

the yeans, what do you anticipate that the

to tny to do next, in the next election cycle,

on

soon? I mean, this is stnictly, you know, speculation on your part,

but as far as tnying to help us, you knoul, prepane fon with

data

 I

24

gathening, and obviously we saw and we've heand a 1ot of testimony over
the last few months about pnopaganda and what they've tried to do there.

activity that the Russians have
tnied to accomplish and whene you think that that's going with them.
MR. CLAPPER: WeIl, I can't envision them falling off on
But I'm talking about specific cyber

something

that for

them was veny successful

with very mlnimal

nesounces. So I would expect them to be even

-- to be emboldened,

as

I've said publicly before, and more aggresslve about influencing
elections. And I don't think they'ne going to cane too much whethen
it's Democrats on Republicans.
Thein pnincipal objective nemains consistently undenmining the

falth, trust, and confidence of the Amenican public of the electonate
in our system, and I think they'll continue to do that. And I have
to believe that there was a reason, although we didn't -- we couldn't
ascribe it. We don't know. We didn't have, at least that I sawJ

MR. RO0NEY: Do you

think it could possibly

be

to prepane fon

an

election in the future, even if they didn't -MR. CLAPPER:

I think they will

want

disnuption, if fon whatever reason they
time that's

to

have the option

make

of furthen

a detenmination at the

in their interests.

MR. ROONEY: l.lhat

other cyber activity did you see when you

were

in office with regard to this election cycle, did you see aside from
what we were just talking about?

I

 I

25

MR. CLAPPER:

all the other thlngs they dld klnd
of in the cyben rea1m, uhich is social media tnolIs, fake news plants,
Of course,

and, of counse,

than

this

mone

1s apant fnom

traditional but much more slick

and sophisticated

in the past was the propaganda pnomulgated by the RT Netwonk.
l4R. ROONEY: And I assume, just like with fishing thnough the

data, that you don't believe that in the futune that that's going to
cease

eithen, that this is what
I'lR. CLAPPER: No,

that's

we have

to

expect?

what the Russlans

do. It's

almost

genetic with them. They are impelled to gathen as much infonmation,
whether

it

has immediate

utility to them on not, but for futune -- fon

futune use.

it's a question, I asked this of Jeh Johnson,
but I wonder if you'd weigh in. Do you see any role for the way that
MR. ROONEY:

we conduct

oun

I

know

at the State leve1

and

local Ievel, the way that

we conduct

election process in protecting ourselves, do you have any advice

with regard to cyben activity, moving forward?
MR. CLAPPER: Wel1,

the Department of

Homeland

Security put

in panalIel, not pant of, but in panal1e1 to
Intelligence Community assessment -- a pamphlet on cyber best

out -- and it

was

I

the

 r
pnactices, which was intended,

distrlbute it to

eveny Member

26

I believe it

was

-- the plan

was

to

in the Congress, both 1n the Senate and

the House, as well as to State election commissions and other State

election officials, to

promote/necommend cyber enhancements,

cybensecunity enhancements.

I

Fnank1y, maybe
pushback

that leh got

was

naive, but

I

was

fnom many, many State

kind of taken aback by the

officials

who

did not

the Feds messing with State and loca1 election apparatus,
was

a 1ot of contnoversy

when

the recommendation --

And there

when Jeh posited

to include the election appanatus, if I
it that, as a part of oun cnltical infrastnuctune, a lot of

the

want

recommendation

can

call

pushback

from the States on that.

weII. And I think it
basically came to the point that the Feds ane thene if they need them,
but not necessanily, you know, a mandate, but I hear what you'ne saying.
On point number two, with regand to the parameters, which the
MR. ROONEY:

ranking

member

Right.

mentioned

He addressed

that

as

in his opening, deals with collusion

and the

activities, including links between Russia and individuals
associated with political campaigns. You had testified in the past
Russian

that you sah, no evidence of collusion

between

the

Tnump campaign and

the Russian Government. Is that still the case on has that
MR. CLAPPER:

changed?

WeIl, f,or it's not. I neven saw any direct

empinical evidence that the Trump campaign or someone in

plotting/conspiring with the Russians to

meddle

it

was

with the election.

That's not to say that there weren't concerns about the evidence

I

we

 I

27

were seeing, anecdotal evidence,

But

I

had

I

do not

recall

any instance

dinect evidence of the content of these meetings.

frequency and prevalence

of

MR. ROONEY: When you

them was

talk

of

whene

It's just

the

concern.

about anecdotal evidence of

emissanies, of people that wene pant

-- dld you say part of the campaign

or associated with it?
MR. CLAPPER:

WelI, associated with. I mean, lots of

folks -- the campaign had kind of a high tunnover thene, so -MR. ROONEY: And when you

talk

about meetings, we've met with some

in this room that were -- I guess that would fall into the
category of emissaries or have some peripheral role in the campaign
who had met with people of Russian origin.
I guess just trying to figure out with negard to this pant of the
people

parametens, what exactly should the

Intelligence

a campaign that may have emissanies on people

with

members

evidence

of the Russian

of collusion?

Community

in its

take fnom

univense meeting

wonld vensus not seeing dinect empirical

How ane we

to

answer

that

for

parameten

the

futune, moving forward?
lv1R.

CLAPPER:

MR. ROONEY:

I

mean,

I

I'm not sure I understand youn question.

I'm not sure

guess the

f

understand how I'm asking

it eithen.

point is on the question is, is at what time is

collusion collusion and at what time is it just people that
an

affiliation with the campaign meeting

I

on

may have

talking with, whether it

 I

28

be the Russian ambassador on somebody
when should

Russian

onigin,

and

that be taken as something that rises to the leve1 of

Intelligence
answer

an

Community concern?

MR. CLAPPER:

can't

that's of

it

That's a gneat question, and I asked -- I really

othen than the

why

all

consider are

an

sort of viscenal neaction to

these meetings with the Russians. They ane what

I

existential threat to this countny, a country that is not intenested
intenests, centainlyr on cooperating with us.

in furthening

oun

f'm biased.

You know,

of

I'm a Cold

Wan

Maybe

warrior and all that, but --

so

to me.
And certainly, it's penfectly legitimate for get-acquainted
meetings, for example, with -- you know, with the ambassadon on with
the projected officials in the next administnation. But I think there
that

was

concern

is a line thene between that and violating the pninciple that in this
country

we

tnaditionally

have one President and one

administration at

I will teII you I had concerns about that as I watched
all this before I left.
MR. ROONEY: I assume you're speaking of the Genenal F1ynn

a time. And

discussion with the --

that's one, yeah. Yeah. That's one case.
MR. ROONEY: I want to talk about -- I'1I skip oven the thind for
a second and talk about briefly the fourth and then some specific
MR. CLAPPER: We1l,

questions with regand

to the last election.

tJith the possible leaks of classified information that took place
neganding the

Intelligence

Community assessment

I

of these matters,

can

 I
you

talk about that,

questions

and then maybe

I'11

have some specific followup

?

MR. CLAPPER:

spoken

29

of this

WeII,

many

I don't -- I

mean, leaks are bad, and

times, publicly and in

my

I

have

testimony befone the

Senate Judiciary Subcommittee chaired by Senator Gnaham, made the point

that leaks can be very damaging. They jeopardize sounces, methods,
and

tnadecraft, and can in

instances put assets' lives at risk.

some

So leaks ane bad.

I don't

know who was

responsible fon these leaks

.

Fon

the recond,

I didn't leak anything.. And that was certainly one of the banes of
my

existence during

my

time as

MR. ROONEY: With regard

just

say so

--

you stated

just

DNI.

to leaks -- if this
now

anen't responsible fon the leaks.

sounds

repetitive,

that you don't believe -- that

you

bad. And
you said that you don't know who was responsible fon those leaks. Is
that correct?
MR. CLAPPER: That is cornect.
MR. ROONEY: I want to talk about -- because I want to go back
to leaks in a second, but befone that I want to talk about this
dossier -- dossier, dossier -- that Chnistopher Stee1e put together
that you'ne familiar with that had the connection with the FBI's
investigation of coondlnatlon

of

between

think that they

ane

the Russians and the associates

hJhen

did you first

I finst

became awane

Pnesident Trump.

and

You

become aware

of the dossier

1ts contents?
MR. CLAPPER:

I

of it

when lohn Brennan

called

 30

me and

after

-- it

was

started the preparatlon of the assessment. So it would

have

called

we

my

attention to it.
the second

been sometime maybe

week

And

it

would have been

of December. I can't put an exact

date, but that -- I do remember distinctly getting a phone call
John

to tell

me

about the dossien.

MR. R0ONEY: Was

fon review and

fnom

the matenial in the dossien shared with the DNI

comment?

MR. CLAPPER:

WeIl, the only -- I don't

review and comment. The only issue that

know what you mean by

came up

here was how to handle

it into the fonmal nanratlve of the
Intelligence Community assessment on not. And we decided to enclose
a one-and-a-half-page summary of it, but not as a fonmal part of the
Intelligence Community assessment, in the highly classified vension
of it.
it,

whether

to

inconporate

MR. ROONEY: Before

that, did the Intelligence

Community, as

far

to validate any of the dossier's sources on
subsources on contents? I know you say that you added it.
MR. CLAPPER: Yeah. And the reason we handled it that way was

as you're aware, tny

pnecisely because we could not conrobonate

I
MR.

ROONEY:

MR. CLAPPER:

Do you personally believe

I
I

what's in thene as --

 I

The

take that

the

on.

31

Intelligence

Community

at large didn't

responsibility of, if anyone, would

be

that you've testified to this before

on

That would be a

FBI.
MR. ROONEY: So

mentioned

it,

and

I

I

know

know

that this is sont of controvensial, this whole

scene, but adding those, what did you say, a page and-a-ha1f or two
pages when

it

the tnaditional way ,nd I
there's a contnoversy over this, was the

was not connoborated
and

it to just let the administnation know that
it was out there, on did you include it fon some other reason?
l4R. CLAPPER: No, the only purpose was to make sune that the
President-elect was aware it was out there. And when we went up to
reason why you included

brief

him and his team on the 6th

ahead

of time that we'd bning this up, but neck down just to

of January,

we had

delibenately planned
him and

to Directon Comey.
And

the main purpose was just to alent him that

it

was

out there.

if you wiII, that he should know.
MR. ROONEY: Do you feel like in your time in office that that
would be a nonmal thing to do like fon any President?
MR. CLAPPER: WelI, this whole situatlon --

We

felt,

you know, a duty

to

wann,

MR. ROONEY:

Right, but --

MR. CLAPPER:

-- is veny abnonmal. f've

I

neven seen anything

like

 r
it in my history,
for

and

32

I've wonked for -- in the tnenches of intelligence

eveny President since and including John Kennedy.

anything

I've

never seen

like it.

MR. R0ONEY: Do you remember any

would have included

other time in the past where you

stuff that was not necessanily corroborated intel

to a Pnesident?
MR. CLAPPER: Yes, as

I've

been asked about

Pnesldent

Obama when

long as

this befone.

it

was so charactenized. Sune.

And

yes, I had occasion to bnief

thene was stuff out thene, however unconnobonated,

but just we thought he should

know about

it.

MR. ROONEY: How many people were thene when you

Pnesident on Pnesident-e1ect
MR. CLAPPER: On

the

briefed the

at this point?

ICA?

MR. ROONEY: Yes.
MR. CLAPPER:

Director

WeII, it was the foun of us: Adminal

Comey, John Brennan, and

myself.

And then

it

Rogens,

was

Pnesident-elect Trump, Vice Pnesident-elect Pence, Mike Flynn, Reince

Pniebus. That was who was sitting at the main confenence table.

sitting along the sidelines
Spicer. I think that's it.
then

And

was Mlke Bossent, Mike Pompeo, Sean

MR. R0ONEY: 0kay.
MR. CLAPPER: Tom

Bossert, excuse

MR. ROONEY: So, based on

just

MR. CLAPPER: Now,

largen general

bniefing.

And

that

one

and

me.

getting back to the leaks --

additional point. That was fon the

then when that was over,

I think

Jim Comey

 said, you know,

I

33

we have one more

thing we'd like to discuss with you,

but we'd like to do it on a one-on-one basis.

it

MR. ROONEY: And

pages,

was

at that point you discussed the extra

or -didn't discuss it.

MR. CLAPPER: hle

0h, that was something different?

MR. RO0NEY:

MR. CLAPPER:

the Intelligence

This was -- we bniefed the bnoad, the flndings of

Community assessment.

MR. ROONEY: Right.
MR. CLAPPER: And

an hour,

I guess.

at the end of that, aften -- which went on fon

At the end of that,

the plan was either

I

we

then -- I think it was --

and

on Directon Comey would pnopose necking down fon

one additional aspect

that we just

wanted

to brief

on a restnicted

basls.
MR. ROONEY: That was

the Christopher Stee1e information?

MR. CLAPPER: Right.
MR. ROONEY: And so who

was

--

so were these people

that you named

befone, wene they given that intelligence too?
MR. CLAPPER:

up there,

No. Well, they had -- we left

a copy

of the report

of the --

l,lR. ROONEY: So they

all

had access

to it.

-- hlghly classified vension,
FBI spaces, if anyone wanted to read it.
MR. CLAPPER:

MR. ROONEY: 5o
MR. CLAPPER:

It

which we kept

ln the

the meeting aften the meeting, who was thene?
was

only, as far as I

I

know

-- I wasn't thene.

 I
The nest

of us 1eft.

As

34

far as I

know,

it

was

only Dinector

Comey and

the President-elect.
MR. ROONEY: Did you pensonally discuss

the dossien on any of the

othen intelligence related to Russian hacking? You alneady said that
you

didn't leak it to the jounnalists,
MR. CLAPPER:

I'm

so

I

assume

that's

a no, conrect?

sorny?

MR. ROONEY: Did you discuss

the dossier on any othen

intelligence related to Russia hacking of the 2016 election with
journalists

?

MR, CLAPPER:

NO.

MR. ROONEY: Dld you confinm

dossien with

CNN

jounnalist lake Tappen?

MR. CLAPPER:

it.

By the time

sequence

it

was

hlel1, by the time of that, they already knew about

it

was

there, but it

out

all

or corroborate the contents of the

-- it

was

over the

was

after -- I don't

pretty close to

place.

when we

The media had

it

know

exactly the

briefed it

by the

and when

way. We were

kind of behind the power cunve, because the media, many media outlets

that I

undenstood had

on the

that,

had

the dossier for

some

time,

as

did people

HilI.

MR. ROONEY: Do you have any

idea how they had

it,

how

they got

it?
MR. CLAPPER: ThE MCdiA?

MR. ROONEY: Yes.
MR. CLAPPER:
MR. ROONEY:

I

do not.

Llke lake Tappen and those guys.

tJhen

did you

first

 I
become aware

of the late

35

December

conversations between Genenal F1ynn

and Ambassadon Kislyak?
MR. CLAPPER: Sometime

have been the

but it

first

week

after the New Year's holiday. It

in Januany.

was Tuesday, !,lednesday,

would

I can't pin the date down,
or Thunsday of that week. I don't know
And

the exact day.
lvlR. ROONEY: Do you know who

l4R. CLAPPER: Bob

Litt,

told you about the

my genenal counsel.

MR. ROONEY: Nhat was youn response when he

WeII,

MR. CLAPPER:

frankly.

We had

just

December, you know,

f

done

convensation?

was

--

-- I

was

told

you?

kind of disturbed about it,

announced sanctions on

the 29th of

closing the dachas, expelling 35 of their

intelligence openatives,

and sanctioning some

other people.

So

it

was

disconcerting, I'11 put it that way, to learn of that conversatlon.

Right. Did you shane that -MR. CLAPPER: Especially for me, since I have a long history with
MR. ROONEY:

Mike Flynn.
MR. ROONEY:

Well, and as you say, I

mean

not to editonialize

hene, but, you know, given our nelationship with Russia oven the.
decades,

I think that, as you testified

and as you

stated eanlier,

certainly not something that, you know, General Flynn should
doing, not being a
Dld you ever

member

have been

of the government.

brief Presldent

Flynn-Kislyak phone calls?
MR. CLAPPER: No.

r

Obama

on the phone

it's

call,

the

 T
MR. ROONEY: Did you

36

brief President

Obama

on any other

intelligence lnvolving the Trump campaign or tnansition
MR. CLAPPER:

anticles that

wene

team?

WeIl, we had -- by bnief, I would include

neponted. And, of counse,

0DNI has a

PDB

nesponsibility

fon the PDB. So thene was a series of reponts thnough the

summer and

activity, that sort of thing.
The only time I actually had a briefing on the subject, if you

into the faII about, in general,
want

to call it that,

came

out,

morning

we sent

was when

Russian

the Intelligence

it to the White House first,

of the 5th of Januany.

And then

Pnesident

And then

Obama

And then

my

recollection is the

that afternoon I

with the Senate Anmed Services Committee. I

distinctly.

Community assessment

nemember

had a hearing

that very

the next day -- because we felt obliged, since

had tasked

us, to brief him finst.

the next day, we bniefed the

eanly morning, and then flew up to

New

Gang

of Eight

hene

in the

Yonk and bniefed the

Pnesident-elect and his team on the 6th

of

Januany.

MR. RO0NEY: Do you know how Deputy Attorney General Yates

of the Flynn-Kislyak phone calI?
MR. CLAPPER: Well, I surmise that --

leanned

I

so ilm assuming
MR. ROONEY: So you

it

was done unden

that basis.

weren't with hen when she leanned of

you know that?
MR. CLAPPER: Was

I physically with her?

I

it?

Do

 I

37

MR. ROONEY: YeS.
MR. CLAPPER:
MR. ROONEY:

NO.

okay.

January 12th of 2Qt7, do you know how many

On

people had knowledge of the Flynn-Kislyak phone ca1ll
MR. CLAPPER: How many people?

MR. ROONEY: Yes.
MR. CLAPPER: No,

I don't.

MR. ROONEY: Okay.
MR. CLAPPER:

MR. ROONEY:

Yeah. No, the

neason

for this line of questioning

is we're obviously tnying to figure out how something like this

becomes

available to people in the Washington Post and Davld Ignatius and the

like.

--

Do you have
MR. CLAPPER:

MR. ROONEY:

That's a gneat question.

Okay. So you don't --

I don't have any -MR. RO0NEY: -- have any guidance on that?
MR. CLAPPER: I would -- I guess the inference,
have been from a lot of sources.
MR. CLAPPER:

MR. ROONEY:

of questionlng,

Yes.

which

any questions hene, a

just give

me

a

And

though,

that's going to lead me into

f'm nunning out of time.

So

my

it

could

next line

I'm going through

}ot of which you've alneady answered, so if you'd

second so

I

can skip over.

r

 I
When

Vice President

Genenal Flynn on

38

I think elect at that point Pence defended

televlsion, publlcly clalming that Flynn told

him the

calls wenen't nelated to sanctions, did you have any communication with
Vice Pnesident-elect Pence negarding the nature of those calls after
he made those statements?

[10:33 a.m. ]

I

 I

39

I did not. I think that
nememben conrectly, was on the 17th of Januany.
MR. CLAPPER: No,

appeanance,

if I

MR. ROONEY: Right.
MR. CLAPPER: And

of --

and

all I

I

was

very alarmed by it aften being

saw, by the way, hras a

But

I felt that that needed to

I

aware

gist of the conversation. I
t^tas

very concerned about

lt.

be naised with the White House.

it with both John Bnennan
and ultimately Director Comey about -- I think I did that -- I had that
discussion the evening of the 19th of January. But I did not raise
it dinectly with the Vice President-e1ect.
MR. ROONEY: Okay. Finally, I want to talk about unmasking,
And

I did bneach that with - - I

because obviously, you know, we've

discussed

-- I'm the new subcommittee

chairman

on the NSA, along with Mr. Himes, and, you know, we've got a tough

lift

this faIl with neauthonization.
And, you know, obviously, whethen
people on the
do

it's

people on the

right, people are suspicious of the work that

in the Intelligence Communlty,

and

that,

left

or

you guys

you know, people ane neadlng

our emails and listening to our phone calls or, you know, in this case

unconstitutionally being outed or

unmasked, you know, when gathering

evidence.
So

to help us potentially wlth

regand

we've got a 1ot of information with regand

on Cabinet

level who can request --

I

and

to the neauthorization,

to people

maybe

at youn level

I'm not saying you do this,

 I

40

but I'm saying that we've seen a wide variance on what the reason

why

somebody would be unmasked.
And excuse

say,

I

want

this

the sont of, you know, snarkiness of
penson unmasked because

I

this,

some people

want them unmasked, and

it's

approved. And this mlght be mone appropriate fon Admiral Rogens,

but --

and some people give a

detailed expl.anation of

why

this

person

should be unmasked.
Moving forward, do you
amendments

that give

a U.S. person is
To be mone

mone

7O2

should be reauthorized with

detalI or stay the same with

unmasked on

a nequest for

702

to

how

with a mone

why a U.S. penson should be unmasked, even

high as a Cabinet leve1 position? 0n should thene be mone

uniformity, do you think, in the nequest and how it's
MR. CLAPPER:

Yeah. Curnently, the -- for

made unmasking nequests

was

regand

unmasking?

clear, should the Congress neauthonize

stringent explanation of
somebody as

think that

me,

requested?

there's --

and

I

not every day, but fairly often when I

-- during the 6 and a half yeans I

was DNI and befone

all this

came

up. And really, whateven rationale people wnite, it really boils down
to one thing, which is to undenstand the context of the panticular
SIGINT repont

you're reading.

So when thene ane refenences

to U.S.

penson

1, U.S. person 2,

and

it's a little hand to figune out the
significance of that report, And, of course, U.S. person 1 will be
a different U.S. person 1 the next report. So it's hand to read these
things anecdotally on just scan through them and dnaw, you know, the

U.S. person 3, et cetera,

I

 I

41

conclusions fnom them.
The

other point impontant to

rememben

is that what occasions an

ls collection on a vali.d, foneign tanget, who
appanently is in some sort of contact with a U.S. person.
So I did my share of unmasking. I don't know what the records
were. I didn't keep reconds, because the practice -- the process now
is that the original collecting agency is the one to whom you make a
nefernal when you want to -- if you're an official wanting an unmasking.
And so, for me, since most of the unmasking requests that I made
unmasking nequest

were a

collection derived from Section 7O2 of the

and so

NSA

The

would be the bean counter

only exceptlon

FISA Amendment Act,

for that.

-- now, the questlon 1s, should thene be a mone

nigorous pnocess for that, where, fon example, you put the DNI ln change

of appnoving or not unmasking requests. Rlght
that the

DNI has

ane Membens

of

responsibility fon governing

when

it

comes

to unmasking

Congress.

And you'11

recall the long -- the discussion

committee which eventuated

that I believe I

now, the only population

in

we had

in this

an lntelligence Community dlnective,

signed out before

I left,

Gates memonandum in 1992 governing

which memorialized the famous

incidental collection of

Membens

of Congress. But that is the only group of people that the DNI, fon
example, has any governance authority over.

think -- and this is my final
question -- do you think that the justification for -- I get the whole
U.5. person number 1, if it doesn't make sense in the context of what
MR. ROONEY: But do you

I

 I

42

you're reading, that lt needs to be

unmasked

fon your sake of

understanding what you'ne reading.

8ut do you think that -- and what was youn justification
you'd say, okay, U.S. person
Did you give details as
MR. CLAPPER:

to

numben

1, I want this

when

penson unmasked?

why --

No. No, I didn't.

MR. ROONEY: Do you

think that you should

at your

have and people

level?
MR. CLAPPER: !'1e11,

given the responsibilities of the

DNf

, I felt

for unmasking of this -- normally it would be all the
people mentioned in one report, all the U.S. pensons. It was to
understand the context, to undenstand the significance. And that
would be kind of the standand justification.
that if I

asked

I think, frankly, it

would be hard

to write a detailed

justification given the ambiguity of these reports
baldly

when

when you read them

they mention U.S. penson 1, 2, 3, et cetena.

MR. ROONEY: Thank you, General.
Adam.

Over

to the minonity.

MR. SCHIFF: Thank you,

Mr.

Chainman.

I'm going to go back over

some

of the

about and then

aneas

that you've been asked

I've got a few areas in addition

befone my colleagues.

The Kremlin pnefenence fon Donald Tnump, you mentioned thene wene

thnee
sow

-- basically

thnee motives the Russians

had:

The

finst

was

to

discond; the second was to harm Hillary Clinton any way they could;

I

 I
and

the thind

I've

was

a preference fon Donald

at least

heand

43

one

of

my

Tnump.

colleagues, not here today but in

the past, publicly cast doubt on that third conclusion that the Russians

affirmatively

wanted

to help

Donald Trump. And

I think the basis of

it is that bniefing that we received from bniefers who may not have
been read in to the most sensitive intelligence, and some of the
intelligence may not have been manifest until after that briefing.
And I thlnk my colleague has, you know, a good point. It wouldn't
have been the first time where we had a bniefing fnom people who were
not nead into things

and where we

I don't think thene was my motive

got a misleading impression.

on

And

intent behind it, but that is

an

issue.
But

I

want

to get to the core piece, which is, you know, what will

ultimately go into

that
Do

one

oun

of the motives

you have any

report,
was

and

that is the IC's ultimate conclusion

to help -- afflrmatlvely help

Donald Tnump.

-- do you have confidence in that assessment based on --

MR. CLAPPER:

I

do.

I

do.

MR. SCHIFF:
MR. CLAPPER:

that -- and this I'm interested
in as weII, because I think Directon Comey testified to the same thing,
that the basis for the preference for Donald Trump was largely that
this was a businessman and they had good history of working deals with
MR. SCHIFF: And you mentioned

business people.
MR. CLAPPER:

That, and as Directon

I

Comey

also pointed out,

you

 I

44

it kind of stanted with a very strong animus for the Clintons,

know,

panticularly fon Hillary Clinton,

who

Putin pensonally held

responsible fon fomenting what he considened an attempted colon

in 2011. Plus, he felt just disrespected by both of the
Clintons. So it stanted with that.
And then -- so just about anybody besides Hillany Clinton, I
nevolution

think,

would probably be appealing

he was not a

politician,

to the Russians.

appealing

to

the fact that

a businessman, a dealmaker, et cetena,

and, you know, he apparently had pnion dealings
mone

And

them than

in

I think,

Russia, made him

certainly she did.

Isn't it likely also, though, that the candidates'

MR. SCHIFF:

respective positions on key natlonal secunity interests of the Russians
would have played

into thein

decision-maki.ng?

WelI, I think so. I thinkr'you know, obviously

MR. CLAPPER:

they're very interested in being free of the sanctions.
at it, the sanctions, in

tenms

of impact on the

When

Russian GDP,

you look

is actually

not all that gneat,1.5 to 2 percent maybe, but I think it had more
to

do

with the image, the optic of being sanctioned and being sanctioned

so unlformly by the United States and certainly Eunopean countries.
So they wanted

to

be

MR. SCHIFF: So

sanctions that Mn.
have been

free of that.
the receptivity to potentially revisiting the

Tnump

expressed on the campaign

attnactive to the

MR. CLAPPER:

Russians?

Centainlyr Y€s,

MR. SCHIFF: And

trail, that would

it

would have.

if the Russians got any message

I

from the

Trump

 I

45

that they would also be receptive to a repeal of the Magnitsky

campaign

Act, would that also

have been

Yes, and,

MR. CLAPPER:

attractlve to the

Russians?

of counse, that's slnce

come

out ln light

of the meeting.
Iv1R.

SCHIFF: And the Magnitsky Act, was

pensonal distaste

to Hr.

why

something

of

veny

Putin?

Yes. Yes, it was. And I also think that, again,

MR. CLAPPER:

going back to

that

the resentment about sanctions

pensonal impacts on many of his

is because it did have

oligarchal buddies,

and fon

that matter,

himself.
5o

or

it

had less

to do, I think, with impact on Russia as much as

more impact on him and

Paper

publication

affronts.

So

and the

for all

his cnonies, on top of, you know, the

Panama

anti-doping nepont, which he took as personal

those reasons, he found Mr. Trump much mone

appealing.
MR.

NATO,

SCHIFF: Would Mn. Trump's position, his comments

belittling

also have been attractive to the Russlans?
MR. CLAPPER:

0h, sure, absolutely.

MR. SCHIFF: And

likewise, his support fon Brexit on funthen

departunes fnom the European Union,
MR. CLAPPER:

Absolutely.

is that consistent with Russian --

The Russians ane veny bent on

wedges between and among European

nations and a wedge between

as a collective and the United States.
MR. SCHIFF:

I

driving
Eunope

 I

45

I
MR.

I

CLAPPER:

MR. SCHIFF:

r

MR. CLAPPER:

MR.

SCHIFF:

I

want

to tunn to the comments that

you made today,

but also in the past, with nefenence to what you obsenved on the issue

of collusion. I think you testified at some point in the Senate, on
maybe it was said ln an open statement, that you wenen't necessarlly
in the chain of information that
and

his investigation.
MR. CLAPPER:

was being developed by

Can you

Directon

Comey

explain that?

Right. Finst,

we

didn't

have any evidence of

collusion certainly that met the evidentiany thneshold that would

its

way

into the Intelligence

Community assessment. That was

I

make

point

 I
one.

There was nothing

in the

47

assessment,

arluding to any collusion.

I
My

pnactice as DNI was to defer both to Director Muellen and then

--

to tell me about
sensitive cniminal investigations, if they devolved to that,

Directon

Comey

on whether one

particulanly involving U.S.
MR. SCHIFF: Now,
Manch

when and what

pensons.

Directon

Comey

testified in

open session in

that he began a counterintelligence lnvestigation of

campaign associates

Tnump

in July of last year.

MR. CLAPPER: Right.
MR.

SCHIFF:

Were you awane

in JuIy of last

yean

that

he had opened

that investigation?

I

of at that point only were the
financial activities for Tnump associates. That's all I knew about
in the way of an investigation on the pant of the FBI. I leanned that
MR. CLAPPER: What

informally from Director

was aware

Comey.

MR. SCHIFF: And what

MR. CLAPPER: WeII,

financial activities

I don't

know what

questionable business deals, involving people

ane you

referning to?

they wene. It
who wene

was

allegedly

Tnump

associates, with the Russians.
MR. SCHIFF: But

what Mn. Comey was

the details of those business transactions or

investigating

to your attention?
MR. CLAPPER: ft b,ras not

was

not something that would have been

brought

shaned

with me,

MR. SCHIFF: And whatever evidence

I

Mr.

no.

Comey would have

 I
of last

developed between JuIy

of collusion

yean and the time you

left

on the issue

would not necessarily have been shaned with you?

MR. CLAPPER:

evldence and

48

hlelI, there's two conditions here: Eithen he had

didn't share it or he hadn't developed evidence yet,

and

I don't know Lrhat the facts are thene.
MR. SCHIFF: But he

investigation

wasn't bniefing you on the pnogress of his

?

MR. CLAPPER: No.
MR. SCHIFF:

I just -- I

ask because

what you would have been awane of

5o

if

thene was evidence

been brought

to

would not necessarily have

I

I left it to the discnetion of the directons,

wonked

with, of the FBI to

whether and when and what

panticularly if it

was going

MR. SCHIFF: Now,

neports

to set the limits of

at the time that you wene the DNI.

of collusion, it

Again,

both directors that

to

want

youn attention?

MR. CLAPPER:

as

f

of intenactions

Govennment and Russian

to tell

me

make

to evolve into a cnlminal investigation.

the Steele dossien contained a

numben

between Trump campaign people and

individuals,

in hotel

judgment

about such investigations,

nooms

of

the Russian

and those were based on sounces

and on subsounces. That dossier included neports

salacious activity

that

with the

of,

you know,

now President.

But they also contained reports that Trump campaign people

wene

to neceive damaging information
about Hillary Clinton in exchange fon relief from sanctions. That was
also part of this, the memorandum, wasn't it?

meeting with Russians and agreeing

I

 I
MR. CLAPPER:

49

I believe so.

MR. SCHIFF: And

in that respect, thene wene neports of actual

collusion that could be conroborated or not corrobonated, but there
wene neponts

of collusion?

MR. CLAPPER:
MR.

I believe that's right.

SCHIFF: And neports

--

that

you said

in the sense that

some

some

of the dossierl

of the language used by

Mr. Steele's sounces about the Russian derogatony view of Secretany
Clinton

was

MR. CLAPPER: Right.
MR. SCHIFF:

--

about the Russian denogatory view towards

Secretary Clintoni
MR. CLAPPER: Correct.
MR. SCHIFF: And Mn.

inteI, wasn't

he?

MR. CLAPPER:

been, what

Steele himself was someone known to U.S.

Yes.

He was

certainly

known

to the FBI.

He'd

I believe they consldened, a cnedible source fon at least

I
MR. SCHIFF: And fnom what you know,

the FBI thought highly of

Mr. Steele?
MR. CLAPPER:

I can't say that. f

can

just

say

that I do know

they considened him a cnedible sounce.
MR.

SCHIFF:

And

the repont -- the dossier reponts of an agreement

on a sought-aften agreement between the Trump campaign people and the
Russians

to

tnade

dirt

on Hillany

I

for sanctions nelief, is that, in

 I
at least in part

your view, cornoborated
Don,

50

Jp., PauI Manafort,

and

lared

by what we now know about the

Kushner meeting

with

Russian

repre sentatives?

It

MR. CLAPPER:

would appear so.

MR. SCHIFF: Pnlon
where

the

pnesence

to going to the meeting wlth the Presldent

of the meeting

was necked down so

that the dossien

to the President, did you have a discussion with
Dinector Comey and others prior to that about whether to bnief the
could be bniefed

Pnesident on the dossien?
MR. CLAPPER: Yes, we did.
MR. SCHIFF: ANd

--

of us, at the end
of it, when the briefing seemed to come to an end, that one of us would
suggest to the President-elect -- I think lim actually did it -- that
MR. CLAPPER: And

we neck down,

that

the agreement

we had something

was

that

one

additional to discuss with

him,

but we thought it should be done on a one-on-one basis.
MR. SCHIFF: And why was

it felt that that

ought to be done

on

a one-on-one basls?
MR. CLAPPER:

WeII, again, you know, we were trying to

be

just thought

report. It was pretty salacious, and
that was a better -- a more discrete way to handle it.

Again, since

we

defenential to what was in this

MR. SCHIFF:
MR.

CLAPPER:

But

it

And

was --

the main point

I

was

to let

him know

of its

 I

51

exlstence.

it

MR. SCHIFF: And

that

pne-meeting discussion

not, it

was impontant

existence

f,

that

whethen

for the President

who were

in

it could be connoborated on
to at least know of its

?

MR. CLAPPER:

and

the consensus view of those

was

caucused on

Yes.
that

how we would handle

We

--

ahead

we, Dinector Rogens, Comey, Brennan,

of time

and came

to that agreement

and

it.

MR. SCHIFF: And how was

it

that Mn. Comey should be

determined

the one to deliver -MR. CLAPPER: Because

that

was

the source

was an FBI

sounce, and we thought

the logical one of us to speak to it.

MR. SCHIFF:

Aften the meeting, did you get any readout

fnom

that part of discussion went?
MR. CLAPPER: Not much. He told me laten that the
Pnesident-elect was very defensive about it.
MR. SCHIFF: Dinecton Comey testified in open session about a
numben of meetings with the President, including one in which he was

Director

Comey about how

asked by

the Pnesident to dnop the Flynn case. Did Mn. Comey

theneafter ever discuss with you that meeting with the President?
MR. CLAPPER: The

only discussion

I

had

with Dinecton

Comey

about

I was out to the Bureau
fon their farewell for me. And I had met briefly with Directon Comey
that whole subject

was on

the 27th of Januany.

before the ceremony, and he had just neceived appanently a phone call
from President Trump asking him

I

to dinner.

And he was, as

I

said

 I

52

public1y, he was uneasy with that.

it?
MR. CLAPPER: Because he thought it impacted the optic, if not
the substance, impacted his autonomy, the independence of his Bureau
MR. SCHIFF: Did he

tell

you why he was uneasy with

its director.
MR. SCHIFF: And I know this was after you had left, but did he
ever foIlow up with you to teII you how that meeting went?
and

of

him as

MR. CLAPPER: No, he
MR.

did not.

SCHIFF: Did anyone else even report to you that they thought

the President had asked them to do somethlng they considered
inappnopriate

?

MR. CLAPPER: Anyone

else besides this case? This instance?

Besides -MR. SCHIFF: Besides what
Comey,

did

you've already said about Director

anyone ever neach out

to

you from the IC

to teIl

you that

they thought that something they were being asked to do, eithen by the

their superions in the IC, was inappropriate?
MR. CLAPPER: I don't think so. It doesn't come readily to mind,

President on by

no

mR. SCHIFF: You wene asked about

that conversation

was

MR. CLAPPER:
Decemben, was

Right.

The one

And

ambassadon?

in question,

on the 29th of

with the ambassadon, yeah.

MR. SCHIFF:

Russians

with the Russian

the Flynn conversation.

At the time that the sanctions

didn't react.

They

wene imposed, the

didn't nespond. Was that contnany to

I

 I

53

your expectation?
MR. CLAPPER:

MR. SCHIFF: And was an

didn't

effort

made

to find out

why

the Russians

neact?

MR. CLAPPER:

Well, we -- I think oun antenna was up certainly

as, you know, what's the explanation fon that, and we soon leanned
MR. SCHIFF: And by you soon leanned

it,

it.

what ane you nefenning

to?
MR. CLAPPER:
same day

that

l,lelI, the conversation that General Flynn

essentially neutering --

had

just

my

been imposed.

MR. SCHIFF:

MR. CLAPPER:

I

MR. SCHIFF:

MR. CLAPPER:

MR. SCHIFF:
MR. CLAPPER:

r

had the

chanactenization -- the sanctions

 54

MR. SCHIFF: Would

it

logical -- if you're looking for

be

an

explanation fon the neason why the Russians

didn't

atypical neaction to these sanctions,

find a conversation with

a Russian

ambassadon, would

Russian ambassadon was
MR. CLAPPER:

it was known that
of Decemben.
MR.

it

be loglcal

talking

Yes.

And,

and you

to

want

nespond,

to

nesponding

know who

that

to?

of course,

Mike Flynn was talking

he had

been. -- I believe

to Kislyak befone the 29th

SCHIFF: So an unmasking nequest to find out

ambassador was

their

talking to to explain why the

r.rho

the Russian

Russians wene not

to U.S. sanctions, that would have been a legitimate

unmasking nequest?
MR. CLAPPER:

WeIl, I think it's -- it would be legitimate, in

my mind,

for just

standard

thing we've

about any U.S. penson -done going back

I

mean,

this

has been

a

to the Soviet era,
SO

it wouldn't have been done specifically.
I don't know the cincumstances of the unmasking, you know.
That's a better question to dinect to the FBI or the DOl.
MR. SCHIFF: But if the Russians are talking to U.S. persons and
you'ne tnying to understand why the Russians didn't nespond, why the

I

 I
Russians acted very
were

55

atypically, it

would be necessary

to

know who they

talking with to tny to figure that outl
MR. CLAPPER:

evinced

WeII, as I say, Congressman

itself pnetty early.

So we

dldn't

Schlff, the explanation

have

to

dwe1l

for a long

time on tnylng to agonize oven, gee, why they'd behave that way, which

is,

you know, very non-typical fon

them.

We

didn't have to wait very

Iong fon an explanation, at least the one that was satisfactory to
MR.

numben

SCHIFF:

I

mean,

me.

the reason I ask the question obviously, is,

one --

MR. CLAPPER:

I

mean, and

part of this, you have to allow for,

weIl, Russia is a bureaucracy too. It would take them some time to
identify the

names

of

people and prepane a

notification to the United

States.

it's through the normal diplomatic pnocesses by which you PNG
people. It wouldn't necessanily be something that would happen
ovennlght. But it certalnly was curious that after the 29th, the 30th,
the 31st, they dldn't react as we would have expected them to.
And

MR. SCHIFF:

I

I
MR. CLAPPER:

I

MR. SCHIFF:

MR. CLAPPER:

I

 I

MR. SCHIFF: And

the

second

56

conflation is thene's no evidence

that I've seen in this connection that any unmasking nequest was
inappnopriate; indeed, it would've been negligent not to find out why
the Russians didn't respond the way they did.
MR. CLAPPER:

That's

MR. SCHIFF: But

the

my view.

unmasklng

leaking, whlch ls lmpnoper. But to

is

use

being conflated with the

the unmasking as anothen neason

not to neauthonizeTO2, a statute that wasn't implicated, is yet anothen
neason,

in

my

view, that 702

is

being assailed on a basis

that really

doesn't apply hene.

Schiff, And
unfortunately, this stuff is pnetty arcane and technical. And I don't
think the public gets into this, into the details and the technlcal
aspects to understand the differences between a Title I FISA and the
MR. CLAPPER:

resultant

That's night,

unmasking and

a section

Congnessman

7OZ FI,SA Amendment

Act

unmasking.

And those ane pnetty arcane.
MR. SCHIFF:

happened since you

Let

me

tunn to a couple othen incidents that have

left that I'd like to get youn insights on.

The

first involves a man named Ponter Smith, who necently passed away.
He's the subject of a couple open source

is that

he was attempting

reponts.

to gather opposition

I

And

the reporting

neseanch from foneign

 I

57

hackers, likety Russian hackens, pertaining

to the Hillary Clinton

emails.
The

allegation is also that he was ln touch with Michael

and othens associated

with the campaign, and he was putting

Flynn

wond out

essentially to these foreign hackers that he would be interested in
these stolen emails, this
be a conduit back

dirt

on

Hillary,

to the campalgn.

For the Russian hackens getting

that

and what's more, he could

may be working

this

message, Russian hackens

either in concert with the Russian

Government or

on an ad hoc basis with the Russian Govennment, how would the Russian
Government

likely receive that inquiry? Would they

opportunity?

What kind

MR. CLAPPER:

of

response would you

to a fare thee weII,

thein services are very competltive.

We saw

and

nun-up

to the

of their services

saw

to exploit, to gain insight, to gain infonmation that

they could use for leverage 1ater, they would.
MR.

knowing

also, by the way,

that in the

5o any way the Russians and any one

an oppontunity

that as an

think they would take?

Well, purely speculation, but just

Russians ane oppontunistic

election.

see

SCHIFF: Now, the assessment indicates that the

MR. CLAPPER: Yes, and

with deniability,

I

because

 5

on

MR. SCHIFF:

MR. mm: I 


MR. CLAPPER:

scam: 

I

59

MR. CLAPPER:

MR. SCHIFF:

MR. CLAPPER:

MR. SCHIFF:

of inquiny.

Okay. WeII, we'I1 try to follow up on those lines

Thank you.

Similar questlons with nespect to the public allegations about
a meeting between Donald Tnump, Jn., PauI Manafont, Jared Kushnen -MR. CLAPPER: And othErS.

I

 60

MR. SCHIFF:

Akhmetshinr a
even who the

--

and others,

with Veselnitskaya, Rinat

translaton, a Bnitish

pnomoter Goldstone, we don't know

identity of the interpreten is.

What would be necessany

to find out the identity of the intenpreten who uras pnesent in that
meeting?
MR. CLAPPER:

might

--

one

of

Well,

if -- weII, centainly the other participants

them might know who the

Russian attorney would know

that

translator was.

Perhaps the

on the othen Russian pensonage thene,

the former military officer.

f don't know if thene ane any kind of records kept by the Secnet
Service, because I think at the time of the meeting he was the
nominee -- Pnesident Trump was then thq nominee. So I don't know, but
Secnet Senvice would have some necond

of

it's

who was

entering Trump Tower.

laid out in the emails,
pnovides evidence that the Russians reached out to Donald Trump, Jr.,
claiming to have dirt on Hillary Cllnton. They did so in a tnail that
MR. SCHIFF: The meeting, as

been

begins with the Russian chief prosecutor, goes
goes from

the oligarch

ollganch's son, the
Tnump,

JF.,

and

pop

who

did business with

singer, through the

pop

to a Russian oligarch,
Donald Trump

to

the

singer's agent to Donald

also potentially dinectly to Rona, the President's

assistant.
'

Is that chain indicative of Russian tradecraft? l,lould the
Russians be likely to use cutouts in an approach to the campaign?
MR. CLAPPER: It centainly is. And this whole thing to me was
the typical soft approach, which is kind of typical of Soviet Russ'ian

I

 I

61

-- thetn finst obJective
here was determine interest on the pant of Donald Trump, ln. Would
he take the bait, which he did. And that's pnobably all they wanted
to accomplish fon this initial meeting.
MR. SCHIFF: And part of that -- the message he would have gotten
back would have been Donald Trump, Jn., saying he would love to get
the information. But also would it also have been a message that he
tnadecraft.

neached

And

I thlnk the flnst

entnance

out and brought other high-Ieve1 people in the Trump campalgn

into the meeting at neally

a

critical

time when the candidate

is seizing

the nomination?
PlR. CLAPPER:

of the

Russians

I think that

simply senved to amplify in the eyes

the intense interest in gathering dirt on Hillany

Clinton, going to him. But he then brought in other senior officials
in the campaign.

So

I think from their standpoint, they kind of struck

gold there.

I think their only objectlve was to determine a leve1 of
interest, and it turned out -- it appeared to be pnetty intense.
Again,

MR. SCHIFF: And

Magnitsky Act duning
campaign

what's the implication of their bringing up the

that meeting whene they're responding to the

intenest and dirt on Hillary Clinton?

MR. CLAPPER:

Congressman.

It

WeIl,

appeans

all I
to

me

know

is what I'm reading in the media,

that that

what was intended was at some point some

if this

I

was

objective,

and perhaps

sort of quid pro quo fon relief

of the Magnitsky Act in neturn fon dlnt
MR. SCHIFF: Now,

was an

on the opposition candidate.

the initial approach, as you

 I

62

suspect, what would you expect to fo1low? !,Jhat would the Russians'

next step Ilkely

be?

WelI, they wi1l, f would guess -- again,

MR. CLAPPER:

stereotypical pattern hene would

be they would look fon some othen way,

I don't know what that is, to follow up on -- given
the intenest. Now, again, this -- I'm punely -- I'm speculating hene.
some

othen means, and

I honestly don't know.
But it r*ould be strange to me if making this soft approach -- and,
of counse, they did, you know, a very intricate daisy chain of
personages involved in it, that they found that there was great interest
in this, that they wouldn't have followed up and taken advantage
somehow.

I don't know -- again, I'm speculating, and I'm only
extrapolating based on what I know of how the Russians typically
Now,

do

these things.

Jr.'s email, he suggested the best
time would be late summen. This meeting was in June. At the end of
MR.

SCHIFF: Now, in Donald,

luIy, the Russians

began dumping

the stolen Hillary Clinton emails.

Could the dumping of the emails have been the Russian nesponse, on would

you expect thene

to

have been an

effont to further cunry favor with

the campaign by a mone direct we're doing this fon you, we'ne giving

this to

youi

MR. CLAPPER:

would

think they

and make sune

l,lell, f 'm -- again, I'm extnapolating here, but I

r^rould want

that there

to

was

achieve as much levenage as possible

a nelationship

I

between

the attempt at

 I
reaching out and thein delivery

53

in retunn fon some commitment, I

guess,

relief. But, again, I don't know this. I don't have any
evidence of it. f'm just -- I'm surmising.
MR. SCHIFF: And if you were, again, to go about trying to
determine what the IC might have in its holdings on this subject, you
would want to get whatever -- you would want to search the IC database
on Magnitsky

for the oligarch, the ollgarch's son, the Russian lawyer, the Russian
interpreten, if

we can

I

MR. CLAPPER:

find the identity of the interpneten,
assume

and

the

--

the special counsel is doing that.

MR. SCHIFF: tJe11, we need

to do the same. And I

the Russian lobbyist, who's a dual citizen.

suppose with

Then you would use the

other procedures that you mentioned before in order to gather insight

into whether -MR. CLAPPER: 1l1e11, dual

cltlzen is a littIe dlffenent categony,

since, you know, he can be subpoenaed and all that, I would think.
MR. SCHIFF: Ane

terms of what the IC

there any othen steps that we should take in

may be

in possession of that would help

whether thene wene subsequent steps the Russians took

the initial

us detenmine

to fol}ow

up on

meeting?

I can't -- off the top of my head, I can't
think of any, Congressman Schiff. I think that if a specific -- as
specific as can be -- as lt can be made, which ls hard hene. But
MR. CLAPPER:

certainly,

WeII,

we do know some

of the individuals involved in the meetlng,

if there are any electronic reflections of communications, either
by phone on email for many of them.
and

I

 I

64

Centainly, the lawyer' s presence here would govenn that. I would
pensonally be interested

in that,

you know, what was the basis

for

her

visa. I believe she was here at the time as an attorney repnesenting
a company that was involved in a money laundening count proceeding.
So I would certainly be interested to -- I think it would be intenesting
to sont of play that out.
MR. SCHfFF: Lastly, I want to, before I hand it off to my
colleagues, ask you about public neponts that the administnation

may

give back these pnoperties that were a pant of the sanctions over the
Russian

hacking.

How would

the Russians interpnet that? First of

aII,

what can you

Were

they being used to spy on --

te1I

us about how those

facilities

were being used?

MR. CLAPPER:

That's what they
used

it fon.

And

so, to me, it's, you know, why do that? What have

the Russians done to deserve that?
MR. SCHIFF:

MR. CLAPPER: Oh, yeah,

for

years.

if we were to give those pnoperties back without
fon it, what message are the Russians likely to get

HR. SCHIFF: And

obtaining anything
fnom that?

I think they'd -- I think they'd feel like
a majon concession that they didn't do anything for to gain. And they
MR. CLAPPER: I.le11,

I

 I
neally can't reciprocate because the

65

companable

-- the analogous

is -- doesn't compare.
MR. SCHIFF: I'm going to hand it over to my colleagues. Do you
want a break at all before we continue? We are about an hour and a
half in.
MR. CLAPPER: That would be a good idea. I'm an older guy.
By the way, f do need to add to the recond. On the attendees at
pnoperty

in the -- in

Russia

the Tnump Towen briefing on the 5th of Januany, the other attendee was
Ted Gustano, who was the designated bniefen

fon Pnesident-eIect

Trump.

also present since he was the custodian fon the hand copy neport.

He was

I just

want

to

add

that to the

MR. ROONEY: The

recond.

minonity's time ends at 20 til,

but we'II

centainly delay that so long as the witness needs to take a bneak,

and

then we'11 go night into our 20-minute/20-minute redirects.
Thank you.

IBrief

necess. ]

will go to a quarter of and then we'11
get into our 20-minute/20-nlnute. Sir, lf you want to take anothen
bneak in 2O minutes, we can do that.
MR. CLAPPER: Well, I have a commltment at the SSCI to do the same
thing all aftennoon. So I would llke to get -MR. ROONEY: Yeah. Well, I don't have any othen questions. I
MR. ROONEY: A11

do want

to

make one

night.

ble

thing before the minority continues on their line

of questions for the next 20 minutes with negand to Title I

I

am

fully

awane

that they

ane not

I

the

same

thing.

vensus 702.

And

I'm

fully

 I
aware

that

when we'ne

on foreignens

that

66

talking about 7O2 we're talking about collecting

goes through

was hene, and General Flynn

is

the

FISA count, wheneas

an Ameni"can

citizen

Mr. Kislyak

who was

here. I

get that.
I'm saying that

if

you

don't think that oun job is immensely harden

for reauthorizing 7O2 because of the unmasking of that, which wasn't
7Q2, and I understand that, then I think that we probably need to powwow
together as an Intetligence Committee and figune out

to

how we'ne going

move forwand.

lt lncreasingly mone difflcult,
regardless of the fact that it was Title I and not7O2. We're having
trouble in oun own committee getting people to agnee whether or not
I think lt's

going

to

make

702 should be neauthonized.
So people

upstains, as you know, on youn side of the aisle

and

of the aisle, think that thene's a govennment conspiracy
with people like General Clapper listening to our phone calls and

on oun side

reading our emails.
And

to minimize that as --

so

that

we

don't

undenstand

that this

Tltle I, I think misses the whole point that we've got
an extnemely difficult task ahead of us this falI in trying to allow
the Intelligence Community to keep gathening this infonmation.
And I get that it was Title I in this case, but they don't cane
upstains. And I hope that you undenstand that. I hope that you
was7O2 vensus

understand

that f

General Clappen

undenstand

that.

And, you know, your exchange with

that this was, you know, some kind of

I

mispenception

 I
on my pant misses the

67

point politically that we're going to have a really

tough job with reauthorization, regandless

of if it

was

Title I

vensus

702.

I just want to make the minority clean, and I hope that you
understand that I know. And as Trey Gowdy said in the open heaning,
nobody out on the countryside gives a hlll of beans what 782 vensus
Title I is. It is our Job to get that neauthonized. And I hope that
we can, but it's going to be veny difficult with unmaski.ng of U.S.
citizens to the press.
MR. SCHIFF: And, Tom, f'm not nefenning to you. I understand
So

what you're saying, and

difference

between the

I'm not suggesting you don't appreciate the

two. I

am

saying

that I think it's pant of oun

responsibility, you know, both here but also upstairs, to
people understand that unmasklng
because

right

now

MR. ROONEY:

they think

I

ls not the

it's the

same

same

make sune

thing as leaklng,

thing.

agnee.

I still -- and maybe you have stuff that we
haven't seen, but I still haven't seen the evidence of a systemic
problem with unmasking. So while thene's been a lot of talk about
unmasking, and the White House likes to talk about unmasking, my
concern ls that the effort to push the unmasking issue is realIy
damaglng prospects for 7O2 when we haven't seen a pnoblem wlth 702.
And so I am concerned that all this gets conflated. And I think
we'ne in the best position in this committee to be making the case.
And so I think we've got to do all we can to say, you know, what 702
MR. SCHIFF: And

I

 I
is used fon, what teaking ls

68

and how that's

different

fnom unmasking;

that, you know, the case-ln-chief here, centnal assault on 702 was
oven Mike Flynn, which had nothing to do with 702. And so that's my
and

concern. But I --

I agree. I'm just

all have to be
wonking together. And whether or not unmasking -- the line of
questioning of what I was trying to say with unmasking deals with the
fact that, you know, maybe it will be an argument fon the people upstairs
that unmasking is important if we somehow tighten it up a bit with how
people request an unmasking to go fonward.
So I think all these things ane things that we should be discussing
MR. R0ONEY:

togethen as a committee to

I

asked

that question of

saying that we

try to get reauthonization.

Genenal Clapper

with negard to

And

that's

why

how people ane

if it can be done betten.
And so we'11 talk about this at a laten date, but I just -- I appreciate
unmasked, because

I

honestly want

to

know

what you said.
MR. SCHIFF: And, Tom,

I

hope you know,

f'm not trying to cast

any aspensions on you.
MR. ROONEY:

WeII, I aPPneciate that.

MR. SCHIFF: You'ne a gneat member

you've taken

alI this

of the committee, and I think

veny seriously.

I feel like being the subcommittee chairman
to the NSAthat it's going to faIl on myself and lim to try to convince
oun colleagues upstains why it's a good thing to reauthonize, and I
think that we've got a huge hurdle to cross. So I'm pnobably showing
MR. RoONEY: L'1e11,

I

 I
some

69

frustration.
MR. SCHIFF:

blame

lim

If

we have any problem,

Himes, but only because

I

am mone

than

wllling to

he's not here.

MR. ROONEY: Thank you.
MR. SCHIFF: Dinecton,

over to my colleague.

Who

just

one

last question before I turn it

would hold

the secunity cleanance for

White House pensonnel? There's been an issue naised about whether
Jared Kushner should continue

to

have

his cleanance.

Who

would be the

holder of that cleanance?
MR. CLAPPER: l.Je11,

based on my knowledge

anything works

now

the

NSC

would. I

mean, again, I'm responding

of the prior administnations. I don't know how

in this administration. But the National Security

Council staff would hold the clearances

for people assigned there.
MR. SCHIFF: And in youn experience, let's say this didn't -MR. CLAPPER: We11, I should say, in the case of notatlonals, you
know, detailees from various components as opposed to sort of the
permanent cadne, their cleanances would pnobably be held by the
donatlng donon agency. But would 1t have to be approved, vetted and
approved by the NSC, and, again, that's -MR. SCHIFF: So would it be an elenent of the IC, though, that
would be the doing the neview of someone's clearance if thene was naised
a question about whether they should retain that clearance?
MR. CLAPPER:

at least before,
would

still

WelI, in the case -- yes, in the case of Mike F1ynn,

when he was

be held by

in retined status aften DIA, his cleanance

DIA.

As a matter

I

of fact, I

know

that fon a

 I

70

fact.
MR. SCHIFF: But you

don't

in particular holds the

know who

clearance fon Mr. Kushner?
MR. CLAPPER:

I

not,

do

because

he's not a government employee

prion to his appointment as an advison. So I don't

know who

would hold

it.
In your experience, and taking someone who is not
the President's son-in-law, just an ondinany public senvant, if they
MR. SCHIFF:

failed to disclose multiple
were correct

meetings with Russians,

if

that he had a discussion about setting

the allegations
up a secnet back

channel with the Russians thnough Russian diplomatic

facilities,

and

participated in a meeting to get -- to invite Russian Government
involvement

in the U.S. election,

would

that penson ever continue to

hold a clearance?

it would centainly cause great concern on the
part of -- if lt wene just a, you know, civil senvice employee, fon
example, who wene to do that, and at a minimum, at least suspend the
cleanance and investigate the facts and circumstances of those
MR. CLAPPER:

We1l,

contacts.
Perhaps they were innocent; penhaps

it

was

just

failune of memory. You know, those things would

an undenstandable

have

to

be

until those were cleared up, and since thene appeans
to be a pattern of it, I think that would be of concenn to a
adjudicated.
cleanance

But

-granting entitY.

MR. SCHIFF: With

that, I yield to

I

Ms. Sewel1.

 I

7L

MS. SEWELL: So, Directon Clapper, my question
have thnee questions

really.

The

how would

oun

?

WouId you
knew

reganding

of the Russians' intenference in

you characterize the nature
election

finst question is

is really -- I

characterize

-- I mean, given the fact that -- what you

prion to lanuany 20th and now subsequently what has been publicly

leaked

or alIeged,

interfenence?

how would you

Would you

chanacterize the nature of Russia's

specifically constitute it a hostile

act?

You have obviously -MR. CLAPPER: A what}

MS. SEWELL: A

hostile act.

MR. CLAPPER: Oh.

MS. SEI'IELL: Would you

-- given youn years of

experience

exposure

to this type of -- you said earlier that you had never

anything

like this.

MR. CLAPPER:

So can you help us charactenlze

and

seen

--

Well, I will tell you how it stnuck me. In

my

intel business, I've seen a lot of bad
cnap -- that's a technical tenm -- and none that disturbed me mone than
S0-plus yeans in the

this.

I

r remember being --

in your mind -MR. CLAPPER: -- actually being nauseous. It just viscerally
affected me like nothing I've even expenienced since I got ln the intel
business in 1953.
lvlS. SEIdELL: There's no doubt

I

 72

MS. SEWELL: So would you say

that thene's no doubt --

it is an assault on us. It's an attempt
to undermine one of the basic pillars of this country. And evenyone,
regardless of party affiliation, panty stnipes, ought to be concenned
MR. CLAPPER: So,

yes,

about that.
MS. SEIIELL: And what do you
MR. CLAPPER:

Nell, I

did take on the 29th -a first

step.

things

done

And

think is

considen the sanctions

announced on

I think

an appropnlate response?

Russians

after that. But that

menely

was a good

mone.

feel like this curnent administration is

doing what lt should do ln an approprlate response to

thls

intenfenence?

WeIl, no, I haven't seen them do anything other than

Putin. The Pnesident asked him, did you do it?
counse, said no. lust asking kind of bothered me.

to

ultimately

the 29th of Sanuary, as

initial step, but there should have been a lot

MR. CLAPPER:

we

the expectation was that thene would be mone

to penalize the

M5. SEI,IELL: Do you

that

ask

[11:38 a.m.]

I

And

Putin, of

 r
MS. SEWELL:

was not

73

Is thene any doubt in youn mind that the interference

only punposely done by the Russians, but authonized by the

highest levels of the Kremlin?
MR. CLAPPER: No doubt

I

MS. SE!'IELL:

lt's

know

in

my mind,

that our President has said that

he thinks

lnterfered. Howwould you respond -MR. CLAPPER: That was news to me when he made the speech in
Poland, that thene were others involved. WeII, I don't -- I was not
Russia,

awane

and othens have

of any evidence of

the Russians. ft

anybody else being involved

was them and nobody

MS. SEWELL: Since

inauguration,

also

in this other than

else that wd had evidence of.

the dissemination of the assessment and the

information about the Russian meddling has emerged.

more

Most necently, you were quoted

ln the medla saylng that you don't

believe that the emails associated with the meeting that DonaLd Tnump,

ln.

had took

with the Russian Government lawyers ane the only evidence

of collusion
you

between Dona1d Tnump and

explained - - and I think this

you explained

in Ciphen Bnief .

that the Russian offer to provide the

negative matenials about

traditional

was

the Russians. To the contrary,

Russian

To

the contrany,

Tnump campaign

their competitons centainly comports

with
with

tradecraft to give leverage and influence any way

that they could.
In this classified venue, why do you believe that

of collusion will

mone evldence

emergel

MR. CLAPPER:

WeII,

I don't knowthat it wi1l, but I find it

I

hand

 I

74

to believe that the entire boundary of evidence here is just bound up
tn those -- in that emall exchange in early lune of 2Ot6. I just find

it. That was a one-time anecdote,
and nothing else happened. I find that hand to accept.
MS. SEWELL: Do you believe that -- how would you chanactenize
Donald Jr.'s -- Donald Tnump, Jn.'s accepting this meeting? t^Jas it
concenning to you that he accepted it? Do you think that it's something
that most folks, given the same circumstances, would?
MR. CLAPPER: I mean, his reaction, "I love itr " I think it kind
of, to me at least, speaks volumes.
MS. SEWELL: Was it pnoblematic?
MR. CLAPPER: Yes, it was.
MS. SEWELL: How else would you characterize sont of the

that

hand

to believe that that

development

?

MR. CLAPPER:
we wene

that

was

I

guess

it

does

-- it

does pnove one

not surveilling Trump Tower, because

we

thing, that

would have known about

contemporaneously.
MS. SEWELL: So my othen

we neceived from

question really is about the emails that

lared -- well, what

Kushnen, the son-in-1aul,

with Russian officials.
dashboard wanning

light

we know about

the backdrop from

wlth respect to sont of back-channel contact
You commented
was

clearly on,

publicly that, quote,'"My
and

I think that was the case

with all of us in the Intelligence Community. Very concenned
the nature of these

appnoaches

MR. CLAPPER: Yes, and

to the Russianr "

end quote.

I think lohn Brennan

I

about

spoke

to that

when

 I
he

testified

75

befone your committee about

understanding necessarlly the content

the concerns we had, not

of these lntenactlons wlth the

Russians, but centainly what we wene anecdotally seelng. lust

-- the meetings were a source of concenn to all of us.
was my comment. And this is befone I left the govennment.
these

that

5o

MS. SEWELL: Right.
MR. CLAPPER: That my dashboard wanning
because

lights

were on

just

of that.

M5. SEWELL: Since

the neponter was asking about classified

information, you were unable to confirm or respond in detail. I

r
MR. CLAPPER:

I
And so

were awane
Kis1yak.

that's

one

thing that

of the content of

became

directly visible,

where

such an engagement between Flynn

we

and

 I

76

so

it

made you wonden.

I think any responsible official in a position like DNI on
National Secunlty Adviser, we ane all concerned about it.
MS. SEWELL: I know that on March 5th you were asked whethen

You know,

intelligence exists that could deflnitely
whethen thene was

collusion,

and you said

answen

the question of

that thene

was nO evidence

of collusion at the time.
MR. CLAPPER:
Dodd on Meet

WeII, the context of that conversation with

Chuck

the Press was - - that was right after the Pnesident's tweet

finst point was
to deny that. I did consult with both Directon Comey and f think spoke
with Rick Leggett just to be sune.
And then what I did say, that we didn't have any evidence of
collusion, that was -- found its way into the Intelligence Communlty
assessment. And thene ls nothing ln there, tn certainly the hlghly
about

surveilling

Tnump

Towen. And so that was -- the

classlfied version on the unclasslfled version, about that.
MS. SEWELL: Do you stiIl stand -MR. CLAPPER: The

I

was not awane,

to

inference is thene, but

my knowledge,

collusion between the

any

Tnump camp and

MS. SEWELL: And since

the stuff that's

of

been coming

I wasn't -- as I

said,

direct content knowledge of

the

Russians.

then, you have given the context of aII
out in the public domain, you did say in

it up to the special counsel
to determine whether the legal threshold of collusion was bFeached,
but from this layman's point of view, it centainly appeans that way
the Ciphen Brief that, quote, "I'11 Leave

 I
to

77

me. "

Can you elaborate on what
MR. CLAPPER: No,

speaks

led you to --

I can't. I think the statement stands -- it

for itself. I don't --

MS. SEWELL: Do you stand by that?

I can't make a judgment about what the Iegal
thneshold, lega1 definition of -- or if thene is one, collusion here.
I can't judge that. It just looks kind of funny to me, you know, walks
like a duck, quacks like a duck, it's pnobably collusion. But I'm just
a layman. And I'm out of the govennment, I'm a private citizen. I
don't have access to, thank God, the classified infonmation anymore.
MR. CLAPPER:

M5. SEWELL: No, but you have 30-plus yeans

IC.

And what

of experience in the

you're saying, if I can just infen, is that --

tlell, collusion is -- again, that is a Iegal,
more of a legal tenm, and I'm not competent to make that call.
MR. CLAPPER:

MS. SEWELL: But

at the veny Ieast,

much

wouLd you be concerned about

the pattenn that we've been seeing out of this adminlstnation?

absolutely. I'm very concenned about it.
MS. SEWELL: l4y last question. To the extent that we really
MR. CLAPPER: Sune,

should be forward leaning, because we know that you' ve said and IC has

said that the Russians
you make

will

do

this again, what necommendations

would

to us, as policymakens --

MR. CLAPPER: l,'1e11,

MS. SEWELL:

a number of things.

-- to get at this?

MR. CLAPPER: One, we

absolutely positively must secure our

I

 I

78

voting appanatus.
MS. SEhIELL: And does

that

mean imposing minimum standards

of,

you know, secunity, cybersecunity standards?
MR. CLAPPER:

WelI, f

mean,

that

would have

to be legislated, I

think.
M5. SEITIELL: Right, night.
MR. CLAPPER:

That's not something that can be done just via the

executive bnanch.

I

MS. SEWELL: No,
MR. CLAPPER: But

hean You.

that's point one. secondly is educating the

of the objectives we had by publishing the
unclassified version of the Intelligence Community assessment.
Fnustnating to some because, well, it didn't have all the

public, which is

one

substantiating information.

I think we must do. I also think it
might be -- as I alluded earlien, it might be useful -- in fact, I think
So those ane two

thene

may be news

big things

accounts

injects on requires

I've

nead about your

some mandatory

authorization act, which

reporting --

MS. SEWELL: Yes
MR. CLAPPER:

-- on the pant of the Intelligence

should be made public on a timely basis

if

thene

is

community, which

any evidence that

the IC detects of such intenference.
MS. SEWELL: Yes, but we would

I

limit that to

Federal elections.

 I
MR. CLAPPER: Rather

politics of

79

than getting involved and agonizing oven the

to go public on such intenfenence.
MS. SEWELL: You think it should just be mandatory?
MR. CLAPPER: Yes. Then thene's no doubt, and we won't have the

pulling

whether and when

and hauling between the

to report or not,

parties over whether it's appropriate

on the accusations

that the Intelllgence

that

were made by some on the

Conmunity was being used as a too1.

lvlS. SEWELL: Do you

think that thene's sufficient checks and

balances cunnently betureen the Depantment

of

Homeland

FBI,ODNI, thene's enough that we could neally get

potential cyber attacks that

to put in

more

belts and

MR. CLAPPER:

gain insight

to the heart of

or do you think that

suspendens types

we need

of provislons that --

You know,

I think

we

dld a reasonably

good Job

turbulent, controversial, politically fnaught

campaign. And I don't
ensuning

woul.d happen,

Security, the

WeII, I'm not sure how you legislate you need to

faster.

under a veny, veny

HiIl

know

that I could necommend to you, othen than

that if there is evidence detected of interference that that

be promptly neported publicly.
MS. SEWELL: Thank you.
MR. SWALWELL: Thank
When

you, Director Clapper.

you briefed President-elect Trump about Russia's

lnterfenence campalgn, how would you descnibe hls response or
undenstanding

of it?

MR. CLAPPER:

WeIl, first of aII, he was veny solicitous,

courteous, solicitous, even complimentary duning the houn,

I

 I
houn-and-a-half

against the

--

we were

there.

He

80

really couldn't

push back very much

on the cyben and fonensic evidence, because

it

was,

as

laid out by Adminal Rogers, pretty, pnetty compelling. So we didn't
hean anything about the A00-pound guy in his bed in New Jersey or any

of that stuff.
He

did allow as how he didn't believe in

I would say it was a professional exchange. He got off on
wouldn't it be gneat if we could get along with the Russians? I said,
yeah, sune, lf we found some convengence of our interests. But I'm
in the trust but venify camp when it comes to Russia. I mean, maybe
So

I've just

been anound

too

1ong.

I'tR. SWALWELL: Would you descnibe

his neaction to receiving the

nepont as matching his public statements anound Russia's interference
campaign?

HR. CLAPPER:

I,M SONNY?

MR. SWALWELL: Would you

nepont from you and the IC

his public

describe his reaction to neceivlng the

privately,

does

it

comport

with or

match

statements?

MR. CLAPPER: No,

it didn't,

when he chanactenized

us, i.nferned

in his press confenence I think on the 10th of
January, which caused me to call him. And amazinglY, he took my call.
I just -- I just felt I had to defend the Intelligence Community against
a characterization like that.

that

we wene Nazis

I

 I

81

his neaction to that?
MR. CLAPPER: Well, he was -- you know, he just said, well,
MR. SWALWELL: What was

understand how
do

is

I feel

about

this dossier. And what he wanted me to

put out a public statement completely nebutting the dossier, which

I couldn't

and wouldn't do.

MR. SWALWELL: What
MR. CLAPPER:

did he ask specifically for you to

do?

I'm sorry?

MR. ShIALWELL: So he asked you

the

you

to put out a statement rebutting

dossien?
MR. CLAPPER: Yes, he

all that,

did.

And

I

put out a statement explaining

by the way.

MR. STJAL!'IELL: And

to your

knowledge,

did he ask anyone else to

put out a statement rebutting the dossier?
MR. CLAPPER: WeI},

read

that he appnoached DNI Coats

and

-- well, I guess that had to do with
rebutting the -- or curtailing the FBI investigation. I guess I
misspoke there. So no, I don't -- I guess I can't -- I can't necall
a case of which you're asking.
MR. SWALWELL: Have any parts of the dossien been proven to be
false, to your knowledge?
MR. CLAPPER: No. Much of it has not been connobonated as tnue

Dlrecton Rogers about

lt,

I've

about

either.
MR. SWALWELL:

That's conrect.

r

 I

82

I don't necaIl him reciting the names.
!lR. SWALWELL: He told you thene were
trlR. CLAPPER:

MR. CLAPPER: Yes.
MR. SI{ALWELL: Ane you

to

Moscow

for

2015 going

an RT celebration?

MR. CLAPPER:

I

heand about

MR. SWALWELL: And
Community and

familian with General Flynn in

at

from DIA.

with your knowledge in the Intelligence

ODNI, what type

dinector have as to

it

of understanding

who RT was and what

their

would a former DIA

connection

to Russia's

intelligence senvice was?
MR. CLAPPER:

Anmy, and, you knoul,

WeII, Mike was a caneer intelligence officen in the

I

knew, you know, what
do

salute his senvice in the Army. But he centainly

the -- on he should

have known the Russians.

f

think the Russians, even duning the time he served as dinector of

DfA, were wooing him.
MR. SWALWELL: hlhat makes you say that?
MR. CLAPPER:

DIA In the early

headquarters

no,

I

was wooed by

the Russians when I was director of

nlneties, you know.

just like

And

they had

he bnagged he was the

me come

finst

one

into thelr

ever.

I did in L992, and f'm sure there were othens befone me.

Russians do
And

WeI1,

And the

that.

I think he felt

because he had - -

Openations and

he had a special cachet with

particulanly with the GRU, because

the Russians,

he had both Special

intelligence backgnound. And he was unique that

I

way,

 I
at least in

modenn

83

tlmes, of a DIA director that had those cnedentials.

r think he felt that he -- he could do business with the Russians.
And that's based on discussions r had with him when he was stirl
so

director
MR. SWALLTIELL: What

Flynn

sitting

did you make, just as a layperson, of Genenal

next to Vladimin Putin

WeII,

MR. CLAPPER:

I

wondered what was he doing

was

at an RT dinner?

certainly taken aback by it.

thene.

I

My undenstanding from DrA was he

didn't exactly nepnesent -- because they briefed him up, which is a
courtesy that is offened to former dinectors of agencies -- briefed
him up, at his request, befone he went.
r don't know that he explained to them what the purpose of this

it was paid for, all that. My impression is they
didn't tel} him that -- he didn't tell the DIA that.
MR. SWALT^IELL: And I guess not with -- as a laypenson, somebody
with intelligence experience, an expert opinion in the field, what do
tnip

was and whether

you make of him neceiving payment fnom RT to give a speech

that part of the

Russian way

or the soft

It's pretty

there? rs

appnoach?

-- I believe, at least
in lntelligence annals, what RT is neaIIy all about. ft's
predominantly funded by the Russian Government as it's considered a
MR. CLAPPER:

propaganda

arm.

And

MR. SWALWELL:

the

cEO

of

well-known what

RT

ls a friend, a confldante of putln's.

FinaIIy, Director, over youn S0-plus years of

service to oun countny and in the community, when you look at the number

of contacts that

Dona1d Tnump,

I

his family, his campaign, and his

 I
businesses had with Russia

tnansitlon,

84

prlor to the election, during the

and dunlng the eanly

part of his adminlstnatlon, can you

put that in context with othen campaigns that you've observedi
MR. CLAPPER:

necessanily

to

WeII, I, first of all, wasn't in a position

obsenve campaigns

I

MR. SWALWELL:

--

guess has anything

like this

even landed on your

radar?

-- as this one, going back over that 50-p1us yeans.
I just -- as I said, my dashboard wanning lights were on just because
MR. CLAPPER:

of the

number

of these

meetings

that

we

sont of anecdotally detected,

just by virtue of collection activitles
was of concenn.

on fonelgn

MR. SWALWELL: Wene thene countnies

tangets.

other than

And

it

Russia?

I don't know of a case. Again, my database hene
 sn't equally comprehensive, going back over the history of our
political campaigns, but I certainly am not aware of nor have I read
MR. CLAPPER:

of that much engagement with panticularly

oun primany adversary, the

nation-state that poses an existential thneat to this countny, and
embarked on a very aggnessive modernizatlon campaign

weaponry, which

They'ne

it

--

has

of their strategic

and they only have one advensary

in mind for.

in vlolation of the INF Treaty. So, in the context of that,

makes you wonder.
MR. SI^,,ALWELL: Wene

saw

the

there countries othen than Russia that

Trump campaign communicating with?

MR. CLAPPER: YCS.

I

you

 I
MR.

SWALWELL:

85

I.lho?

I

MR. CLAPPER:

llR.

SWALWELL:

MR.

CLAPPER:

MR.

SWALWELL:

llhat was the natune of those contacts?

I don't know.
Any other country?

plR. CLAPPER:

But,

again, I'm -- at least

my mental database hene,

dredge up fon you the content

of those

I don't -- I can't

meetings.

MR. SWALWELL: Thank you.

And

I

thank Mr. Rooney

for

extending the time.

EXAMINATION

a

Dinector, thank you for being

here.

My name

is

I'm a memben of the maJorlty staff. I Just wanted to follow up on
several items that we've discussed so fan hene today, and I'11 try to
be as concise as

it

I

can.

earlier that you did, in fact, discuss the
so-caIled dossien with CNN jounnalist lake Tapper?
Was

youn testimony

MR. CLAPPER.

WeIl, after it was out, yeah.

a

out, what do you mean by that?

And by

MR. CLAPPER,

lt

Well, once it was public. It wasn't -- you

know,

wasn't like this ls an fntelligence Community document or anything.

This was out in the media.

a

And what wene

lvlR. CLAPPER.

the nature of those convensations?

I don't

remember

I

specifically.

 I
a

86

Did you discuss the dossier with any other --

-- I probably sald much of what I sald here,
that it was not a part of oun nepont, and the reason was because we
I

MR. CLAPPER.

may

could not conrobonate the second-, third-orden assets that were used,

apparently,

a

to put the dossien together.

Did you discuss --

MR. CLAPPER. Oun pnimary

we

purpose

-- I

this -- was that
Trump that it was out

do nemember

felt obliged to alent then Pnesident-elect

there.

a

Did you discuss the dossier with any other Journallsts

besides Mn. Tapper?
MR. CLAPPER.

I could have. I don't nemember specifically talking

about the dossien.

a
statement
Trump

Now, you mentioned eanlien

that you issued a public

in connection with youn subsequent

after the dossier

phone

call with President

leaked.

MR. CLAPPER. Right.

in that statement, you said that the Intelligence
Community had not made any judgment that the informatlon in this
document is neliable, correct?
MR. CLAPPER. Yes, I think that's what I said.
a So, in retnospect, even though, given that you hadn't
validated on made any judgment on the infonmation, do you sti1l believe
it was the conrect decision to include this as an annex to a
compartmented nepont bniefed to the President and President-elect?

a

And

I

 I
MR. CLAPPER. Yes,

a

And

is that

I

87

do.

because

of the duty to

or fon

wann

some othen

neason?
MR. CLAPPER. No,

know about

it.

that

And, as

I

was

the basic reason.

It

was that he should

said earlier, we did have discussion about

whether should that report have been included in the report, the formal
assessment

ltself.

And our judgment was

not to do that, because of

the inability to conroborate, either rebut on confinm

in that dossier. But yeah, f
impontant

do

much

of what

think, for reconds purposes, it

was
was

that it at least be appended to the classified version.

a

And subsequently, have you ever chanacterized

that decision

to include the dossier as an annex to the ICA as a model or exemplar
for IC professionals to follow going forward?
MR. WAINSTEIN:

That

is

It

wasn't annexed.

I

believe

it

was a summary.

not the whole --

night. That's night.
MR. CLAPPER. WeIl, I think fon the highly classified
That's

I:

vension
what
we

is

-- weII,

what

-- that's

a gneat

an abnonmal, unusual, unique

didn't formally include it

situation here?

was because

mainly centered around veracity or the

of the

question. What's a model fon
And so

of tnadecraft

the reason

concerns that

inability to verify the veracity

sources.

a
understand

,"I'
Now,

it's

been youn nepeated testimony

today, as I

it, that there was no -- you're not aware of any dinect

I

 I

88

evidence of collusion between Russia and the Trump campaign durlng your

senvice as

DNI. Is that

,vtR. CLAPPER. That '

a
in

litanch

conrect?

s right .

And tils. Sewell bnought up

with Chuck Todd of

earlien in an intenview you did

NBC, whenein

you said thene was no evidence

of that included in our repont, which you testified?
MR. CLAPPER. Yes, that's night. We didn't have evidence of
collusion that met -- that found its way into the neport. I did make
that

statement.

a

And

then, after followup questions from Mr. Todd --

MR. CLAPPER. I

a

--

you

said, not to

my knowledge.

said: At the time,

we had no evidence

of

such

collusion.
MR. CLAPPER.

That's night.

I believe -MR, CLAPPER. That met the evidentiany bar. Again, you know, I
know it's cool to take individual sentences, but you got to understand
the context of the entire exchange with Chuck Todd.
a

And then subsequently,

a

lJell, aften you sald, there

in the nepont,

said, not to

he

1s no evidence

of that lncluded

said, I understand that, but does it exist?

And you

my knowledge.

MR. CLAPPER.

That's night.

asked: If it existed, it would have been in
this nepont? You answened, this could have unfolded or become
available in the time since I left the government, implying that it

a

And you wene

I

 r
was

89

not available prion to lanuany 20th.
MR. CLAPPER.

No. It could

have been

available, but not

made

available to -- it could have been -- it could have existed, but not
made

available to me, or it could not have existed. I don't

know.

a

asked

But you subsequently followed up, because he sont

of

several questions on this point, that at the time we had no evidence

of

colluslon. That ls what you told hlm, correct?
MR. CLAPPER. That's night. We had no evidence that

such

met the

evidentiany thneshold of the confidence levels that we were striving

fon in that

a

community assessment.

But at that timer you

didn't provide that additional

caveat

about confidence levels, conrect?
MR. CLAPPER.

Well, I think I did. If I necall the

transcnipt -- I'11 have to go back and re-read the transcript.

a
said there

On Manch
uJas no

6, you gave an interview to

evidence whatsoever at the time

the Trump campaign and the Russians.
ABC News,

Brian

Do you

ABC News, where you

of colluslon

between

recall telling that to

Ross?

I didn't have any evidence -- I don't care how you
want to caveat it -- of collusion.
a Right. So in Manch -- that's sont of the question I'm
hoping to get some clanlfication on -- is on two successive days in
March, you said at the tlme, whether on not it existed, you dldn't have
any evidence of collusion. And I 'm wondering what's changed fnom then
until now, whene it's gone fnom no evidence to sort of no direct
MR. CLAPPER.

I

 90

evldence

?

MR. CLAPPER. Wel1,

an

adjective. I don't get what you'ne getting at
a f'Il move on. So -there's certainly

MR. CLAPPER. And

out.

it that's

come

the email

exchanges.

O
you

I don't see a neal difference- That's just

t'1e11,

about.

campaign

that's

When

that

was

the lune meeting and the lead-up --

actually the next thing f

did you first

become aware

widely neponted in the

pness?

out, last

WeIl, I think

weekend

or

wheneven

So you wenen't aware

MR. CLAPPER. No,

I

I saw it
it was.

was going

on

Jn.,

and

of

and

to

of the meeting between

Tnump,

MR. CLAPPER.

a

been evidence suggestive

ofFicials, including Donald

been

a

Witness

here.

ask

Tnump

the Russian Lawyer

television

wheneven

it

came

of that meeting prion to January 20th?

was not.

So any discussion about a quid pro quo on

the assessment

that thene would be additional evidence out thene, that's

based on your

intel professional, not from any evidence, right?
MR. CLAPPER. Exactly. As I said, I just find it hard to believe
that thene was just this one anecdote, this one email trail fon oven
6 days and the meeting, and that was it, nothing else happened. I just
find that kind of hand to believe.

judgment as an

a
perhaps

And

the

same

for the assessment that these individuals

or secunity
based on what you've read in the

acting as cutouts to the Russian

services, that's just an assessment

I

were

Govennment

 91

open press?
MR. CLAPPER. Yes,

that's

a judgment

that I've

made and

othens have

as weII, expenienced intelligence officers.
a

MR. CLAPPER.
a

)

MR. CLAPPER.
a

MR. CLAPPER.

a

I
MR. CLAPPER.

a

 I

97.

MR. CLAPPER.

I

a

MR. CLAPPER.

a

You

also stated that you didn't personally brief the

this information. Is that conrect?
MR. CLAPPER. I did NOt.

President on

a

Do you know whethen he was bniefed on

that conversation?

I don't know for sure. I can't testify to that.
You also said eanlier that you expected - - aften the

MR. CLAPPER.

a

of our govennment were announced on the 29th, you expected
the Russlan Government to necipnocate by expelling the same numben of
U.S. pensonnel from Russia. Is that right?

measures

MR. CLAPPER.

That's right.

a

a

I

 I

MR. CLAPPER.

93

I

a

MR. CLAPPER.

a
last

to the ICA,

Tunning

my undenstanding

infonmatlon was Decemben 29th, and

that it

is that the date of
was published on

-- sent to the White House on January 5th, and published and
briefed all around on lanuany 6th.
Can you just tell us what happened between Decemben 29th and
January

January 5th

or

6th?

MR. CLAPPER.

a

Well, I don't --

Other than the New Year's ho11day.

MR. CLAPPER.

--

know

exactly the date, but what the main --

main involvement at ODNI was

to

oun

pnovide top coven fon the people, the

ce1l of people,
who wene

putting this together,

and

to

see

if

thene

were any intennal problems, intennal obstacles, and pnovide top cover

to allow them to get their

to get this done.
And so they wonked over holidays and all that in orden to
finish -- finish the ICA, because Pnesident Obama made it veny clean
he wanted it done before the end of his administration. So we hustled
work done and

I

 I
to get it -- to
a

comply

with that direction.

elaborate on what you

Can you

Top cover against what
MR. CLAPPER.

94

Critics, outsldens,

to -- give them the latitude.

editorial

windage on the conclusions

orchestrate

some

by provide top cover?

sort of fine?
wanted

to inject

to the community,

and allow

anybody

themselves, eithen internal on external
them

mean

that

didn't give them any
on the wniting of it. We had to
And we

very sensitive cleanance accesses

among

the

thnee

agencies who wene involved.
And what was your

a

any disputes with nespect

role in neviewing, editing, adjudicating

to the

MR. CLAPPER. Very minimal,

did

nead a

ICA?

other than

draft of it, just fon ovenall

work and did

make

sure

it got done. I

awareness and

quality of the

the -- you know, the evidence, that did it

comport on an

evidentiany basis with what the stneam

of

nepontlng

that we'd

been

seeing

And, again,

I tnied to -- I

guess

the only issue

was

the

one

confidence leveI that Admiral Rogens pensonally lowened. That was not
an

institutional ca11. That was his own pensonal calI,

and

that's his

prerogative.

a

And

recommendations

did you make any pensonal edits, adjustments,
?

MR. CLAPPER.

a
review the

I did NOt.

And do you

necaIl roughly

ICA?

I

when you had

the opportunity to

 r

of lune -- the 4th of June,
I guess. I don't know when it was. I reviewed lt. I knou I stayed
qulte late to nevlew lt, because f was golng to bnief Pnesident obama
on it on the 5th. So probably the 3nd or 4th.
a And just for the recond, that's Januany, not June, night?
MR. CLAPPER.

I

95

know

2:30 on the 5th

Yes. If I said June, f misspoke. Januany.
a So the fCA was directed on or about Decemben 9th?
MR. CLAPPER. It was sometime during the first week of Decemben.
MR. CLAPPER.

I don't

nememben

a
to

the exact date.

And you mentioned

that President Obama wanted it

done prion

him leaving office
MR. CLAPPER. Exactly.

a

In

my

it or not, intel
was

it's not -- or often, whethen we like
can sometimes take quite a bit longer. What

undenstanding,

pnoducts

his reason for directing a hard date as to

when

the repont

had

to

be neleased?

it out befone the end of his tenm to pass
on to the next administration. He wanted all the repontlng, on as much
as we could gathen up in that timefname, and put it together in one
repont, as opposed to all these separate stneams of reporting we had.
Get it all in one p1ace. And he wanted to hand -- his intent was to
hand it off to. the next administration, to the President-e1ect and
Pnesident Tnump and to the Congress. And he also mandated that, to
MR. CLAPPER. He wanted

the

maximum

extent possible, that we issue an unclassified version fon

the benefit of the public.

r

 I
And given

a
was

that the nepont was directed by the President

9th,

on about December

95

of infonmatlon was December 29th,

and the date

there any concenn that oven that 2@'day peniod that, given

quickly

lt

on nushed

was put

together, that something might

in

way?

any

on

MR. CLAPPER. WeII, you always have

be missed

how

or inconnect

that concenn. It doesn't

-- such a document takes. And thene is
fixed timeline fon length of time it takes to do an ICA.
a But thene was in this case, night?
matten how long the nepont

no

HR. CLAPPER. I'm sonrY?

fixed timeline in this case, night?
MR. CLAPPER. No, I'm just saying thene is no fixed dead -- there's

a
no

There was a

fixed rule

book on how long

it

takes to do an Intelligence Community

assessment.

a
this

So was

there any concern about havlng a flxed timeline in

case?

MR. CLAPPER.

operates unden

WeIl, sure. I

mean,

the Intelligence

tight deadlines all the time.

ane concenned about

or completeness,

that,

sure.

you know,

Community

And, you know, you always

that you've

But we've done estimates

compnomised accunacy

that take

months

that

you have the same concenn.

: r think we just have a couple minutes left. r'm going
to ask our last questions.
to tunn it over to my colleague, I
f

I

rhanks,

,YI

I

I

 I
a
many yeans

And

thank you, General Clapper,

of

senvice

for being here,

h,as a WaIl Stneet

in tlme a little blt, at the end of

lournal antlcle neganding

NSA

aften that article, you

came

in with Admiral

26L5

collection of

U.S. penson infonmation related to llembers of Congness or
week

and fon youn

to our country.

Real qulck, golng back

there

97

staff.

Rogers and you

The

briefed

the committee on the inaccunacies of the article and setting the necord

straight.
And

Rogers

at that briefing, I think majority, minonity, you and Adminal

aII

agreed on

MR. CLAPPER.

a

0f

the necessity of Gates pnocedures.
what?

The Gates procedures.

MR. CLAPPER. Yes.

a

So, kind of tying

as you mentioned

earlier, of

it
oun

back

into the idea of the sanctity,

electlons, but also

one

things about oun country is the peaceful tnansitlon of
Do you

of the great
powen.

think th'at we should have a similan type of

pnocedures

related to the U.S. Presidential transition team or even Presidential
campaigns, whene the dissemination

be infonmed

to

of that type of information should

Congress?

MR. CLAPPER. It should be neponted

to

Congress?

lt's just your opinion.
MR. CLAPPER. I don't know. Again, this whole evolution is a veny
unusual situation. I mean, I can undenstand a congresslonal intenest
in lt, so I guess -- I mean, I wouldn't have any reason to oppose that.
A

I

 I
Put

it that
A

2OL7,

way.

you.

Thank

the

98

New Yonk

Then so

fast forwardlng in time,

Tlmes published an

on March 1st,

article statlng that the obama

administration nushed to preserve intelligence on Russian election

hacking.

And

White House

efforts to

I'm quoting frorn the article hene.

officials

undenmine

scnambled

to

It

says

that,

spnead information about Russian

the Presidential election and about possible

contacts between associates of President-elect Donald J.
Russians across
So

Tnump and

the government. "

is this article

f'1R. CLAPPER. The

a

"Some

accurate?

opposlte was true.

The opposite was true?

MR. CLAPPER.

Yes.

Because

of the sensitivity, panticularly for

the super-duper classified version of that report, the interest
mone

in protecting it.

So

the places that had access to it

was

were

basically the three contributing agencies and ODNI.

a

MR. CLAPPER.

a

-- to

send

MR. CLAPPER.

A

effort on behalf of the administration -No, not that I'm aware of.

5o thene was no

Okay.

this stuff all

acnoss

the

government?

NO.

And

then

my

final question, there was an earlien line

of questioning negarding searching through

NSA

stones using U.S. penson

it happened to make me think about the ability for
NSA to seanch in its stores using U.S. person identifiers, specifically
in the 7A2 collection, which is an issue. This U.S. person query line
identifiers.

And

 I
of questioning

99

has centainly been discussed over the past few yeans.

Would you please

explain, over your counse as being DNI, why, if

Congness wene

to put in

change the way

the Intelligence Community is able to search in

data,

how

some

sont

of

probable cause requirement on

that would impact the Intelligence

it

MR. CLAPPER. We1I,

of is whether, if there is

would

to --

you want

to

impact

I

can think

situation, unless there

you know, some safety valve there whene

you know, you have

Community negatively?

-- the immediate

an extnemls

its 702

were,

if for whatever neason that,

have

that outlet in case of

Ilke that.
And also, just to follow up, do you

a

cincumstance

A

know negarding the

dossier that was discussed earlier, do you know who paid Mn. Steele

to

conduct the information or the investigation

that would lead to the

dossier?
MR. CLAPPER.

I don't know -- well, if

payment'fon the document, and
been

I don't

know

thene was

that, it

if

you, Directon. I just have a couple mone

questions, then I'11 hand it

off to my staff.

that while Mike Flynn

that the Russian intel agencies,
and

or not.

you, sir.

MR. SCHIFF: Thank

You mentloned

was

I don't know

thene was some compensation arnangement there
Thank

to --

thene

would probably have

the FBf. But, again, you'd have to ask them.

personally

-- if

GRU

was

We're almost at the end.

the director of the

on othens, had made an

I can't remember the tenm you used fon it.

MR. CLAPPER: Woo.

I

DIA

effort

 I

100

MR. SCHIFF: To woo him.

MR. CLAPPER: As

they had

MR. SCHIFF: What
And you mentioned

me when

I

was

dlrecton of

efforts dld they make to

DIA.

woo Michael Flynn?

that he thought that he might have

some special

ability to cultivate that nelationship. Can you descnibe that for us?
MR. CLAPPER: That is simply my amateur analysis., because he was
very big on engaging with the GRU.

chief visit him. I did the

same

He

thing

visited thene
when

I

and had the

served as

GRU

director of

in the eanly nineties, and had an engagement with the Russians,
tried to partnen with them, which was completely unsuccessful.
So I have a very jaundlced vlew of deallng with the Russlans. And
I tried to impart some fatherly advice to Mike Flynn when he was engaging
with them, because I said, you know, my own experience when I was the

DIA

dinector of

DIA.

MR. SCHIFF: Now,
was involved

the

GRU

is

one

in the hacking of emails.

after he left the DIA, maintained
MR. CLAPPER: I dO NOt.

of the two main agencies that
Do

you know whethen

any relationship with

MR. SCHIFF: Do you know whether, when he went

RT-supponted

trip,

to

Mr. Flynn,
GRU?

Moscow on the

whether he also had GRU meetlngs?

I don't know that. It would have not been unusual,
I think, for him, as a formen dinector of DIA, to have met with the
GRU. I doubt if they did. hleIl, I don't know. But, again, I don't
MR. CLAPPER:

know

that he did.
MR.

SCHIFF:

Can you

teII

us a litt1e

I

bit

about the circumstances

 I
in

101

left the DIA?
We1I, bean in mind I'd

which Mike Flynn
MR. CLAPPER:

known him

a long time

and

r was a co-officiant at his pnomotion ceremony to thnee-star genenal
in the woman's Memonial, and he worked for me fon about 11 months at
ODNI, and was
He went

fine.

to DIA,

and he had issues

there.

And my concern was

his

lmpact on the Agency. And Dr. Mike Vickers, who was my successor as

for Intelligence, was -- for him, it was
a case of flat-out insubondination. So Mike Vickens and I had a numben
of discussions about it, and he was adamant about endingMike Flynn's
tenure as DNr -- as DrA director. As a Defense agency, he kind of had
Under Secretany

of

Defense

the primacy thene.

-- I think this was in early 20t4,
r'11 say about Febnuary of 2ot4 perhaps -- and lald lt out fon General
Flynn. And he actually took it very well. He was very gnacefur about
it. At no time was there any discussion about his stnident views on
ISIS. That neven came up. It wasn't a topic of discussion, and it
wasn't -- it didn't bear on the decision to curtail his time as DrA
director. We told him he could stay until the summer of 26L4, so he
5o we met with General Flynn

could get his 3 yeans

in as a lieutenant-generaI, which is the minimum

to netire in that grade.
So it was some months laten, I thlnk July of

you need

2Ot4, when he had

a magnificent farewell, netirement and awand cenemony for him, which
both Dn. Vickers and
MR.

I panticipated.

And he seemed

fine.

SCHIFF: So you mentioned he had issues at DIAand that also

r

 102

thene was an issue

the issues at

of insubordination with Directon Vickers.

DIA?

MR. CLAPPER:

constantly changing

Pompeo, he

CIA and

but

WeIl, his rather ernatic

it

management

style, just

things. His neorganization of DIA, which wasn't

idea. It actually

a bad

What wene

presaged CIA's modennization, which Dinector

doesn't like that tenm, but, anyway, the neonganization at

the setting up mission centers. And so it

was

-- the execution was very --

was a good idea,

was bad, and

it

was

very hard

on the employees.
And

then, of course, there

General F1ynn was convlnced

was

the infamous F1ynn facts,

that the Iranian

Dankan

where

Iphonetic]

was

behind the Benghazi attack, which wasn't the case, and he kind of
pounded

up

the employees there to go find

his supposition.

just

bad

So he had cases

some evidence

that would back

like that. But he was -- it

for the Agency and, you know, the morale of the

was

employees was

going down.
MR. SCHIFF:

Vickers

In what r,lay was he insubordinate to Directon

?

MR. CLAPPER:

anound

f don't

know

the exact issues, but it

the Defense Clandestine Service, which

initiative fon Dn. Vickens.

And

was

centened

a big important

you'd best talk to him about it.

MR. SCHIFF: The explanation

that he gave fon being pushed out

tnuthfully about the thneat posed by ISIS,
and that that was evidently, in his view, inconsistent with the
political nanrative the White House wanted to te11. Did you ever see

was

that

he was speaking

I

 I
any evtdence

103

of that?

No. That wasn't -- that was not a factor for me,
and nothing -- you know, I didn't think he said anything untoward about
MR. CLAPPER:

that.
MR. SCHIFF: And

either during on aften his departure, did

demonstrate any bittenness towands the IC as a

the

how he

left

IC?
MR. CLAPPER:

as

result of

he

I necounted.

tdeIl, not that I

The

I

never

of at the time. That's

last time f actually had contact with

pensonal contact, was the cenemony
And

was aware

-- the next time I

I think in July of
had any contact

two telephone conversations with him during the

him ata11,

2Ot4.'

with him, I

tnansition,

had

which wene

professional and courteous.
MR.

SCHIFF: Did he ever demonstnate a particular grudge towands

the CIA?
MR. CLAPPER:

WeIl, he had issues with the CIA when he senved in

that

of the article that he had his

Afghanistan.

And

on, which

quite critical of intelligence in and of Afghanistan.

And

was

was pant

name

I think thene was perhaps at that time some animus towards CIA.
MR. SCHIFF: Let me hand it oven to staff now.
BY

A

Sin, I just

have two quick

questions.

you about the short timeline you had in the IC

Intelligence

Community assessment

you have any reason

to

prepare the

of Russian intenfenence. Sin,

to believe the

I

My colleague asked

ICA contains unsupponted

do

 104

conclusions

?

MR. CLAPPER.

And you stand by

a

MR. CLAPPER.

a
aware

NO.

its

findings?

I do. I did and do.

You mentioned also

that,

as you

sit

here today, you're not

of dinect evidence of collusion. In the email exchange outlining

the meeting

between

the Russian

Govennment lawyen and

senior

Tnump

officials, is that evidence of at least an intent to collude?
MR. CLAPPER. Well that's -- agaln, fnom a layman's perspective
only, that's what it appears to me.
A And we look forwand to, as a commlttee, exploning those
issues, that if, in fact, damaging naterial is passed, as it was implied
in the email, and if the campaign took any actions in response to that,
does that sound like collusion?
MR. CLAPPER. WelI, again, from a layman's perspective, if -- yes,
it does.
Thank you. Thank you very much, sir.
campaign

BYI
I

a
MR.

a

Just have one questlon.
CLAPPER. Do you have a micnophone?

I'm sorry. Getting

away

I can't

hean you.

from collusion, fnom an

intelligence penspective, from a HUMINT necnuitment cycle,
counterintelligence, as you'ne watching these contacts and looking at

it
met

fnom

the Russian objective, are you seeing thein objectives being

?

I

 I
MR. CLAPPER. We11,

specifically,
now. I

because

105

I can't -- f don't

f don't

have any

pnobably wouldn't have even

know, you know,

insight into that sont of thing

if I

to classified

had access

information.
But certainly, the approach they took here

is

very

steneotypically Soviet/Russian practice. A soft appnoach, plausible

deniability, determine if there is interest, which thene was, and

that's

pnobably

all they wanted to

detenmine

for that

a And the ICA dealt with an entire influence
one activity, but an entire campaign.

encounter.
campaign, not

l.'lR. CLAPPER. Right

a

When

you look

at the

campaign and you look

at the

Russians

establishing a netwonk, that would lnclude, fnom youn expenience, both
people who may knowingly be cooperating, may unknowingly

be

et cetena, but
meanwhile that can aII, from Putin's perspective, all work to
coopenating, may think they'ne building wonld peace,

accomplish

his objectives?

MR. CLAPPER.

Yes.

And

that people can be recruited

it's too late.

And

I think

John Bnennan has spoken

and coopted, penhaps

that is, again, the soft

to that,

unwittingly, until

approach

that

Russians

have long used.

I

I
MR. SCHIFF:

have no othen

questions.

rhat's 1t, sin.

Thank you.

Directon, thank you very

fon coming in again.

r

Thank you.

much

fon your service

and

 I
MR. CLAPPER:

[Whereupon,

Sune.

106

Thank You.

at 12:32 p.m., the interview

I

was concluded]