1 Uimhir Thagartha: RIALTAIs Data: 26/02/2013 Abhar: 20. Abolition of the Seanad An tAire a thionscain: Oi?g an Taoisigh Data an Mheabhrain: 07/02/2012 Cinneadh an Rialtais: (1) noted the table containing the list of references to the Seanad in the Constitution, as set out at Appendix I to the memorandum, and (ii) the main references to the Seanad in the Constitution as summarised in Section 3 of the memorandum; (2) decided that a referendum on a proposal to amend the Constitution to abolish the Seanad would be held on a date to be determined later this year, (3) decided on the application of that approach that Section 5 of the memorandum proposes in relation to each issue, (ii) that the general scheme of the Constitutional Amendment (Abolition of Seanad) Bill 2012, as set out at Appendix 2 to the memorandum, is to be referred for drafting to the Of?ce of the Attorney General (AGO) with a View to publication of the necessary Bill or Bills as soon as possible, that the legislation would be drafted on the basis that, in the event that the Constitutional Amendment is passed, the current Seanad would continue until the end of its term, (iv) that preparations be put in train for the establishment of a Referendum Commission and that funding would be provided in the vote of the Department of the Taoiseach, that, based on the advice of the Attorney General and arising from a recent judgement of the Supreme Court, there would be no separate Government?funded information campaign; and (vi) that the Government would give further consideration to other Constitutional Referendums that might be held on the same date; (4) agreed the overall approach, prOposed in Section 4 of the memorandum, to dealing with the issues that arise from abolition of the Seanad; and (5) noted that a small number of speci?c policy issues will need to be determined by the Government before the legislation is ?nalised. Ard-R?nai an Rialtais coip curtha chuig: Oi?g an Aire Airgeadais, Oi?g an Aire Iompair, Turasoireachta agus Spoirt, Oi?g an Aire Leanai agus Gnothai Oige, Oi?g an Aire Ealaion, Oidhreachta agus Gaeltachta, Oi?g an Aire Caiteachais Phoibli agus Athchoirithe, Oi?g an Aire Slainte, Oi?g an Aire Gnothai Eachtracha agus Tr?dala, Oi?g an Aire Dli agus Cirt agus Comhionannais, Oi?g an Aire Talmhaiochta, Bia agus Mara, Oi?g an Ard?Aighne, Oi?g an Aire Cosanta, Oi?g an Aire Post, Fiontar agus Nualaiochta, Oi?g an Aire Comhshaoil, Pobail agus Rialtais Aiti?il., Oi?g an Aire Tithiochta, Pleanala, Pobail agus Rialtais Aitil?iil, Oi?g an Aire Ealaion, Oidhreachta, Gnothai? R?igil?inacha, Tuaithe agus Gaeltachta, Oi?g an Aire Cumarsaide, Fuinnimh agus Acmhainni Nadt'irtha, Oi?g an Aire Oideachais agus Scileanna, Oi?g an Aire Coimirce S?isialai, Oi?g an Aire Cumarsaide, Gniomhaithe ar son na hAeraide agus Comhshaoil, Oifig an Aire Stait ag Roinn an Taoisigh 07/02/2012 Ref: Oi?g an Taoisigh Memorandum for the Government Abolition of the Seanad 1. Decision Sought On foot of the Programme for Government commitment to abolish the Seanad, the Taoiseach asks the Government: to note the Table of references to the Seanad in the Constitution in Appendix 1 attached, and the main references to it as summarised ianection 3 below; to agree the overall approach proposed at Section 4 to dealing with the issues that arise from abolition; and to decide on the application of that approach that Section 5 proposes in relation to each issue; and (ii) to decide that the Scheme of Bill at Appendix 1, amended as necessary to re?ect the Govemment?s decisions at are to be referred for drafting to the Of?ce of the Attorney General (AGO) with a View to publication?of the necessary Bill or Bills as soon as possible. 2. Background/Reason for Memorandum The Government Programme Government for National Recovery 2011?2016 contains the following commitment: ?We will signi?cantly reduce the size of the Oireachtas by abolishing the Seanad, if the public approve in Constitutional referendum The Government at its ?rst meeting, on 9 March 2011, agreed that the Programme would form the framework for its policy. In furthering the Government Parliamentary reform agenda, the purpose of this Memorandum is to obtain the Government?s decision on each of the issues that necessarily arise in moving the Irish Parliamentary system from the bicameral one on which the Constitution is based to a unicameral system, so that the legislation necessary to enable the holding of a referendum can be drafted. The advice of the Attorney General was sought at the outset of preparations for bringing these issues to the attention of the Government for decision, and the issues identi?ed are those identi?ed by the AGO (though not of course the solutions proposed, as these are matters of policy). 3. References to Seanad in the Constitution The Constitution is based on and designed around two Parliamentary chambers, with the Dail having the primary role throughout and the Seanad?s role clearly and greatly subsidiary (and indeed, in some areas, the Seanad has no role at all). A Table is attached at Appendix 1 indicating for every Article in the Constitution whether it refers to the Seanad and if so, the nature of the reference and the action required in relation to it. The Table is a summary, with some amendments, of one prepared by the AGO. As will be seen from the Table, the main references to the Seanad in the Constitution, other than incidental ones, can in summary be classi?ed as follows (some of the Articles mentioned include provisions other than the references to the Seanad). Article 12.4 sets out the nomination procedures for the Presidency. A candidate requires to be nominated by at least twenty members of the Oireachtas (or by four County Councils). Article 15 provides that the National Parliament is to be called the Oireachtas, and that the Oireachtas consists of the President and two Houses, a House of Representatives to be called Dail Eireann and a Senate to be called Seanad Eireann. Articles 18 19 provide solely for the composition of the Seanad, elections to it, etc. Articles 20 24 lay down the role of the Seanad as regards legislation, including Money Bills (Articles 20 and 21 inter alia curtail the Seanad?s powers in relation to Money Bills; Article 22 enables the Seanad alone to initiate a procedure for determining whether a disputed Bill is a Money Bill): Article 23 limits the Seanad?s power to delay Bills; and Article 24 deals with Bills certi?ed as urgent for public security or public emergency reasons (Seanad time for consideration of such Bills is curtailed). Article 25 provides inter alia a role for the Seanad (alone) in agreeing whether the Government may ask the President for early signature of a Bill. Article 27 provides for a role for the Seanad in triggering a process whereby the President must consider referring a Bill to the people. Article 28 provides a role for the Seanad in a decision by the Oireachtas that a national emergency exists. Articles 12 and 13, 33 and 35 provide a role for the Seanad in procedures for removal from of?ce of the President, the and judges, respectively. Articles 14 and 31 provide, respectively, for the Chairman of the Seanad to be a member of the Presidential Commission (which acts for the President if away, incapacitated, etc.) and of the Council of State. 4. Overall Approach proposed for Considering the Issues that Arise from Abolition Abolishing the Seanad will involve deleting the provisions of the Constitution that are necessitated solely by the Seanad?s existence. The question arises as to what principles should be followed in dealing with the other provisions in the Constitution relating to the Seanad or in which the Seanad is mentioned. The ?rst principle should be that any function currently being performed by the Seanad should transfer to the Dail - in other words, functions in which the Seanad participates along with the Dail should be assigned to the Dail alone and functions that the Constitution assigns solely to the Seanad should be assigned solely to the Dail. However, some Seanad functions may have a more particular signi?cance, and it follows that the second principle should be that each such function must be examined to see whether any Constitutional change should be made in order to cater for the absence of the' Seanad to perform it. Another question then arises. If on examination a Constitutional change is found to be required, what principles should be followed in designing that change? Two seem clear. First, in each case, account must be taken of the balance of powers currently provided in the Constitution as between Dail and Seanad, between government and parliament, between parliament and the judiciary, and indeed between parliament and individuals, and the reason for such balance in each case; and the change should be designed in such a way as to replicate that balance as far as possible in the new, unicameral system. Second, the way of replicating the balance should if at all possible use methods already in existence in the Constitution, not devise new ones. Such methods arise in the speci?c instances in which the Constitution currently varies the general rule set out in Article 15.11 that questions in each House are to be determined by a majority of the votes of the members present and voting other than the Chairman or presiding member. As will be seen in the paragraphs that follow, this variation can take various forms - setting a speci?c number (rather than a proportion) of members; requiring a Speci?c number of members to be present; setting a different proportion of members; or requiring that the proportion be based, not on the number of members present and voting, but on the total membership of the House. If an issue raised by abolition of the Seanad suggests that some recalibration in the Dail is needed, then as far as possible one or a combination of the existing forms should be used to do so. This approach, of applying the four principles that - parliamentary functions should be retained in parliament - particular Seanad functions should be examined case-by?case to ascertain their particular signi?cance - in this examination, account must be taken of the current Constitutional balance of powers among the three arms of government (parliament, the executive and the judiciary) and between parliament and the individual, and - if the examination suggests that recalibration in relation to the Dail is appropriate, existing Constitutional methods should be used, should result in the least possible change to the Constitution consistent with abolishing the Seanad. It also offers the best prospect of avoiding debate being sidetracked by issues extraneous to the essential point of whether the Seanad should be abolished or not. As the next Section makes clear, issues arise from the way in which some functions are currently distributed between the two Houses, and the resolution of these issues is, in some cases at least, a matter of judgement and potentially therefore a matter of dispute. Also, while the overall approach proposed above should minimise the risk of extraneous issues arising, it cannot eliminate that risk. 5. Applying this Overall Approach to the Speci?c Issues that Arise Applying the approach outlined above, the following paragraphs propose solutions for the relevant areas in the order in which they are listed at Section (3) above. Nomination Requirements for Presidential candidatesArticle 12.4 sets out the nomination procedures for the Presidency. A candidate requires to be nominated by at least twenty members of the Oireachtas (or by four County Councils). Abolition of the Seanad would reduce the number of Oireachtas members from 226 currently to 166, the current number of Dail Deputies, (and fewer still when the number of TDs in the Dail is reduced in line with the Programme for Government commitment). In the light of this, it seems appropriate to reduce the number of Oireachtas members required to secure a Presidential nomination. A proportional reduction would be to about 15; alternatively, reducing it to ten might be a better option. De?nition of the National ParliamentArticle 15 says that the National Parliament shall be called the Oireachtas and that the Oireachtas shall consist of the President and two Houses, viz a House of Representatives to be called Dail Eireann and a Senate to be called Seanad Eireann. Clearly these provisions should be revised to say that the Oireachtas shall consist of the President and a House of Representatives to be called Dail Eireann. References elsewhere in the Constitution should be amended in line with this. Composition etc of the SeanadClearly Articles 18 and 19, which deal solely with these matters, should be deleted. Seanad?s role in legislationArticles 20 and 21, which respectively provide for the legislative procedures and powers between the Dail and Seanad and limit the extent to which the Seanad may delay and or have input into the passage of a Money Bill, should be deleted. So should Article 23, which deals with the situation of the Seanad rejecting a Bill or making amendments to a Bill to which the Dail does not agree. Seanad role in whether a Bill is a Money BillArticle 22 de?nes a Money Bill. The question of whether a Bill is a Money Bill is important for two reasons. First, because as noted above, the Seanad?s powers in relation to Money Bills are limited; and secondly, because Money Bills cannot be referred by the President to the Supreme Court for a determination as to whether they are repugnant to the Constitution. The ?rst of these reasons would fall away with the abolition of the Seanad, but the other would not. Section 22 provides that the Ceann Comhairle?s certi?cate that a Bill is a Money Bill is conclusive unless the Seanad, by a resolution passed at a sitting with at least 30 members present, asks the President to refer the question of whether the Bill is a Money Bill to a Committee of Privileges. The President must consult the Council of State before deciding whether to accept the request and, if accepting, must again consult the Council of State before appointing a Committee of Privileges consisting of an equal number of TDs and Senators, chaired by a Supreme Court judge (who has only a casting vote) to decide the matter. The Committee?s decision is ?nal. This procedure has never been used. But given the potential importance of the issues at stake, a procedure for determining whether a Bill is a Money Bill must clearly be retained, and the question is how to modify it to take account of the abolition of the Seanad. Applying the overall approach outlined in Section 4 above, it seems clear that the procedure should just be transferred to the Dail, Thus the Constitution would be amended to provide that the Dail, by a resolution passed at a sitting with at least half the members present, could ask the President to refer the question of whether a Bill is a Money Bill to a Committee of Privileges; and that the President, after consulting the Council of State, if accepting the request, must (again after consulting the Council of State) appoint a Committee of Privileges consisting of a number of TDs, chaired by a Supreme Court judge, to decide the matter. Bills certi?ed urgentArticle 24 provides as follows. If on Dail passage of a Bill the Taoiseach certi?es that in the Government?s opinion the Bill is urgently and immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace and security or by reason of the existence of a domestic or international public emergency, then the time for the Seanad to consider the Bill will, if the Dail so resolves and the President after consulting the Council of State agrees, be shortened to the period speci?ed by the Dail resolution. The Article goes on to provide that where Seanad time for consideration of a Bill has been shortened in this way, the ensuing Act will remain in force only for 90 days unless before the 90 days expire both Houses pass resolutions specifying a longer period. The Article 24 procedure has never been invoked. It might seem that abolition of the Seanad would remove the need for it as the Seanad would no longer be in a position of delaying the enactment of an urgently necessary Bill. It might also seem that the reason for having the ?sunset? provision in place - presumably because the ordinary timescale laid down in the Constitution for parliamentary scrutiny of the legislation had been shortened - would be overtaken by abolition of the Seanad, which inherently means that Dail scrutiny of legislation will suf?ce, and accordingly that that provision too should be deleted. But Bills certi?ed urgent under the Article 24 procedure are the subject of other provisions in the Constitution. Article 25.3 provides that where such a Bill is presented to the President for signature, it must be signed immediately, while Article 26 excludes such Bills from the possibility of being referred to the Supreme Court by the President for a decision as to whether the Bill or any provision of it is repugnant to the Constitution. In these circumstances, Article 24 should be remodelled to remove references to the Seanad but should retain the de?nition of the sort of Bills to which it currently applies, the requirement that the Taoiseach certify any such Bill and the sunset provision applying to such Bills. The other provisions of the Constitution relating to such Bills should be left in place, subject to any necessary changes to remove the references to the Seanad. Early signature motionsArticle 25.2.2 provides that at the request of the Government, with the prior concurrence of the Seanad, the President may sign a Bill earlier than the ?fth day after it has been presented to him /her (the ?fth day being generally the earliest day on which Bills can be signed otherwise). Abolition of the Seanad should reduce the need for early signature, because it will be possible to present Bills passed by the Dail to the President sooner than is possible at present, but it cannot be guaranteed to remove the need for early signature altogether. So the provision should be retained, but the function reassigned to the Dail. Seanad Role in Triggering possible Reference by the President of a Bill to the PeopleArticle 27 provides that a majority of the members of the Seanad plus not less than one third of the members of the Dail may by signing a joint petition request the President to decline to sign a Bill on the ground that the Bill contains a proposal of such national importance that the will of the people on it should be ascertained. The provision does not apply to Money Bills or to Bills certi?ed urgent under Article 24 or, of course, to Bills to amend the Constitution (which the President signs only if, and after, the related referendum has been carried). When presented with an Article 27, the President must consult the Council of State and give a decision within ten days of the deemed passage of the Bill by the Dail and Seanad. If his decision is not to sign, the President cannot sign the Bill unless and until it has within eighteen months either been approved in a referendum or aproved by a resolution of the Dail (only) passed after a dissolution and reassembly of the Dail. If a referendum is held, the Bill will be enacted into law unless a majority of the voters reject it and the number of votes cast against it amounts to not less than thirty?three and a third per cent of the voters on the register. In effect, Article 27 provides a way of resolving a dispute between the two Houses of the Oireachtas on a legislative matter of national importance. It has never been used: such disputes between the Houses have not arisen in practice because governments have traditionally had a majority in both. In addition, as will be clear from the foregoing paragraphs, the odds against members of the Oireachtas being in a position to petition for a referendum, and if successful, of the referendum being carried and the relevant Bill being defeated, are high. In the circumstances, it is proposed that Article 27 be deleted, on the grounds that it is designed to cater for a dispute between two Houses and that no such dispute can arise if there is only one House. It should be noted, however, that the Article 27 procedure has come into prominence recently in the context of calls for a referendum to be held, whether one is constitutionally required or not, in relation to the EU ?scal compact. This may give rise to arguments that some provision should be retained in the Constitution to enable a petition to be presented to the President that a referendum be held on a particular Bill. However, if a petition system is to be introduced it ought to be a completely new system. Such a system could presumably (subject to check) be introduced at the same time as the referendum to abolish the Seanad, but this would require a detailed wording and possibly a separate vote. (It might perhaps be included as an item for consideration by the Constitutional Convention). Seanad Role in deciding that a national emergency existsArticle 28.3.3 provides that nothing in the Constitution except the ban on enactment of laws imposing the death penalty shall be invoked to invalidate any law expressed to be for the purpose of securing the public safety and the preservation of the State in time of war or armed rebellion, or to nullify any act done or purporting to be done in time of war or armed rebellion in pursuance of any such law. The Article goes on to say that ?time of war? includes a time when there is an armed con?ict in which the State is not a participant but in respect of which each of the Houses of the Oireachtas has resolved that arising out of such armed con?ict a national emergency exists affecting the vital interests of the State; and that ?time of war and armed rebellion? includes such time after the termination of any war or armed con?ict or armed rebellion as may elapse until each of the Houses has resolved that the national emergency has ceased to exist. These powers can be exercised by the Dail alone. Accordingly, no change seems needed in this provision other than to remove the references to the Houses of the Oireachtas and substitute references to the Dail. Seanad Role in Impeachment of PresidentArticle 12 provides inter alia that a President may be impeached for stated misbehaviour. In summary, either House of the Oireachtas may prefer such a charge, but a proposal to prefer a charge cannot be entertained unless a notice of motion is signed by not less than thirty members of the House, and the proposal cannot be adopted unless passed by not less than two thirds of the total membership of the House. Where a charge is preferred, it is the other House that investigates the charge, or causes it to be investigated, and after the investigation a resolution that the charge has been sustained must be passed by not less than two thirds of the total membership of that House. The President has the right to appear and be represented at the investigation. Article 13 provides inter alia that the behaviour of the President can be brought under review for the purposes of the Article 12 procedure in either House of the Oireachtas or by any court, tribunal or body appointed or designated by either House for the investigation of a charge under Article 12. Abolition of the Seanad will clearly require changes to these Articles. But the principles they lay out are clear: The charge must originate in the Oireachtas; a signi?cant minority in a House of the Oireachtas is required for a charge against the President to be entertained; a large majority, of the total membership of that House, is required for an investigation to be set up; it is the other House, or a court, tribunal or other body appointed by it, that carries out the investigation; the President has the right to appear and be represented at the investigation; and a large majority, again of the total membership, of the investigating House is required to remove the President from of?ce. Abolition of the Seanad removes the possibility of making sure that the House preferring the charge is not the House investigating or voting on it, and to that extent diminishes the safeguards in these Articles in relation to the impeachment process. But the rest of the procedure can be retained and would seem very little less unlikely to achieve the removal of a President than the current provisions, which clearly envisage that removal would require strong Oireachtas support at every stage. Accordingly, the Article should be amended simply to cater for abolition of the Seanad, with no further provision required. Removal of the C&AGArticle 33 establishes the position of the Comptroller and Auditor General and provides that the is appointed by the President on the nomination of the Dail. This is appropriate, given the primacy of the Dail in ?nancial matters. However, removal of the which can be done only for stated misbehaviour or incapacity, requires a resolution not just of the Dail but also of the Seanad. This is presumably because the reports to the Dail and in the event of a clash with that House the inclusion of the Seanad offers a safeguard for the holder of the post. While no has ever been removed from of?ce, it is arguable that abolition of the Seanad should be accompanied by the insertion of some other safeguard. As has been seen earlier, in other parts of the Constitution safeguards take the form of departures from the general Constitutional provision that all questions in each House are to be determined by a majority of the votes of the members present and voting other than the Chairman or presiding member. If then an extra safeguard is sought so as to ensure the independence of the it should take the form of an increase in the proportion of Dail members required to remove the - to two-thirds, which is a much higher standard than exists at present. The question then arises as to whether the proportion should be based on those present and voting, or on themmembership of the Dail. In practice this might not matter much, as on an issue of this sort presumably all or virtually all members would be present to vote. Also, at present only removal of the President requires a two-thirds majority of the total majority. It does not seem appropriate that the (or judges, where the same point arises see below) should enjoy the same high level of protection as the President, who iselected by direct vote of the people, whereas the and judges areappointed, by the Dail and the President, respectively. However, it should be noted that the recently formed Association of Judges of Ireland recently wrote to the Taoiseach raising the question of the impact of Seanad abolition on the protection of udicial independence and pointing to the requirement for two-thirds of the entire membership of both Houses in impeachment of the President. Removal of JudgesAs mentioned above, a similar issue arises in relation to the removal of judges. Article 35.4 provides that a judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court shall not be removed from of?ce except for stated misbehaviour or incapacity, and then only upon resolutions passed by both Houses calling for their removal the same provisions as apply to the i.e. a two-thirds Dail majority be required. Given the importance of judicial independence, it is again arguable that an extra safeguard should be introduced on the abolition of the Seanad; and if so, it should presumably take the same form as that provided for the i.e. a two-thirds majority should be required. (It should be noted that under statute, judges of the District and Circuit Courts enjoy the same service as High and Supreme Court judges). Membership of the Presidential CommissionA different sort of issue arises in relation to the Presidential Commission. In summary, Article 14 provides that in the event of the President?s absence, incapacity, death etc, or when the of?ce is vacant, the President?s powers will be exercised by a Commission consisting of the Chief Justice, the Ceann Comhairle and the Cathaoirleach of the Seanad. The Article goes on to provide that the President of the High Court, the Leas?Cheann Comhairle and the Leas-Chathaoirleach, respectively, shall act in place of these three of?ce-holders if those of?ces are vacant or their holder is unable to act. The Commission may act by any two of their number and may act notwithstanding a vacancy in their membership. Abolition of the Seanad will reduce the parliamentary representation on the Commission to one member, and will reduce the Commission itself to two. At ?rst sight this might not seem of great importance, as the President acts mostly on the advice of the Government, and most Presidential duties are non-discretionary and non-controversial. However, there are duties in which the President has discretion: deciding whether or not to refer a Bill to the Supreme Court under Article 26; deciding whether or not to decline to sign a Bill unless it has been approved by the people in a referendum or by the Dail after a general election, under Article 27; and deciding whether to refuse to dissolve the Dail on the advice of a Taoiseach who has ceased to retain the support of a majority of the Dail, under Article 12.2. The latter is arguably the most important power of all, and it is noteworthy that while in the ?rst two cases the President is required to consult the Council of State, no such requirement applies to the decision about whether to refuse a dissolution indeed that decision is, expressly stated in the Constitution to be at the President?s absolute discretion. The question, then, is whether after abolition of the Seanad the Presidential Commission should consist just of two members (the Chief Justice and the Ceann Comhairle, each with a substitute), or whether a third member should be found and if so, who. It seems clear that there should be a third member, because currently the balance in the Commission is in favour of the parliamentary part of government compared with the judiciary. The third member should be the Leas-Cheann Comhairle, given that that of?ce is already mentioned in the Article. A further aspect is that the Leas?Cheann Comhairle is generally a member of the Opposition, or this would be seen as involving opposition parties. A further question arises: should there be substitutes for the Ceann Comhairle and Leas- Cheann Comhairle? This could be argued either way, in that the presence of two Dail of?ce- holders on the Commission could be regarded as a suf?cient parliamentary presence; on the other hand, if there were no substitutes, the unavoidable absence of one of the two would necessarily reduce the parliamentary presence to one, which is not what would happen at present. Who should the substitutes be? Applying the approach that they should be parliamentarians - and indeed given that they would be substituting for parliamentarians, that the current Constitutional provision is for parliamentary substitutes and that the other member of the Commission represents the judiciary, and given the nature of the three discretionary duties mentioned above, it is hard to see what other source of substitutes would be appropriate then they should be other members of the Dail. The Constitution mentions speci?c Dail members other than the Ceann Comhairle and Leas- Cheann Comhairle, (in Article 15.11, which (twice) refers to the Chairman (i.e Ceann Comhairle) ?or presiding member?. The solution would therefore seem to be to provide that each Dail would select two members to be substitutes for the Ceann Comhairle and Leas- Cheann Comhairle on the Presidential Commission a task similar to the current task of selecting members to stand in for the Ceann Comahaire and Leas-Cheann Comhairle. Their term as substitutes would probably need to be expressed as running on after a dissolution of the Dail until their successors have been appointed. It has already been settled in a court case that the outgoing Ceann Comhairle and Leas?Cheann Comhairle must be taken to survive in of?ce for the purpose of the Presidential Commission after a dissolution of the Dail. Membership of the Council of StateThe ?nal issue to be resolved concerns the membership of the Council of State. The Cathaoirleach of the Seanad is an ex of?cio member of the Council of State. The other ex of?cio members include the Ceann Comhairle, so it is arguable that abolition of the Seanad need not involve any change in membership. However, if it is decided to make the Leas?Cheann Comhairle a member of the Presidential Commission, as suggested above, then it would seem appropriate that the holder of that of?ce also be an ex of?cio member of the Council of State. 6. Impacts An impact analysis has not been conducted: the commitment to hold a referendum on abolition of the Seanad is contained in the Programme for Government. 7. Cost to Exchequer of Pr0posal Abolition of the Seanad would save the ongoing costs incurred in relation to it (the Houses of the Oireachtas Commission Report for 2010 shows direct Seanad costs salaries of members, secretarial assistance for non of?ce-holding members, travel expenses and other allowances and expenses -of some and also the costs of Seanad elections. The cost of holding a referendum on abolition of the Seanad (alone) would, on the basis of the Lisbon referendums, be a once-off cost of the order of ?20m. 8. Observations Returned No observations supplied APPENDIX 1 References to the Seanad in the Constitution Summary (with some amendments) of Table compiled by the Office Article Subject Relevance to Seanad Action Required Matter Preamble Preamble No reference to Seanad. - 1 National No reference to Seanad. - sovereignty 2 Citizenship and No reference to Seanad. - the Nation 3 National No reference to Seanad. - territory 4 Name of State No reference to Seanad. - 5 Character of No reference to Seanad. - State 6 Powers of No reference to Seanad. - Government 7 Flag No reference to Seanad. - 8 Language No reference to Seanad. - 9 Citizenship No reference to Seanad. - 10 National No reference to Seanad, but Consider in context of Resources reference to ?the Parliament whatever Government established by this Constitution?. decides re Article 15. 1. 2 11 State revenues No reference to Seanad. 12 President Articles 12.4.2, 12.6. 1, 12.6, 2, 12.8 Remove the implied and Articles 12.10. 2- 12. 10.7 refer references to two to ?Houses?, ?either House?, ?each Houses. House?, or ?the other House? Article 12.4 speci?es the nomination Re Article 12.4, requirements for candidates for a proceed as Presidential election. Government decides Re Article 12.10, The prodecure for impeachment of proceed as the President under Article 12.10 Government decides. requires the involvement of both Houses. 13 Powers of Articles 13.2.3, 13. 3. 1, 13.7.1, Remove the implied President 13.8.1 and 13.8.2 refer to ?either? or references to two ?both? Houses of the Oireachtas. Houses. Article 13. 8. 2 provides for the Re Article 13. 8. 2, President?s behaviour to be brought proceed as under review in either House or by a Government decides. court etc. designated by either House. This is linked to Article 12. 10 above 14 Presidential Under Article 14.2, the Chairman of Proceed as Commission the Seanad (or Deputy Chairman, in Government decides. Chairman?s absence) is a member of the Commission. 15 Oireachtas Article 15.2.2, 15 . l. 3 and Articles Remove the direct 15.8-15.15 refer in various places to /implied references ?each? or ?both? Houses. to two Houses. Article 15. 1. 2 de?nes the meaning Proceed re Article 15. of ?the Oireachtas?. This in turn, 1. 2 as Government de?nes the meaning of ?National decides. Parliament? by virtue of Article 15.1.1. These phrases appear in other parts of the Constitution also. 16 Dail Bireann No Reference to Seanad. - 17 Financial No Reference to Seanad. - measures 18 Seanad Bireann Article 18 makes extensive provision Delete. for the composition of, eligibility for, and nominations and elections to, the Seanad. 19 Vocational Permission for law to provide for Delete. elections to such elections. Seanad 20 Legislation This short Article provides for the Delete. legislative procedure and powers between the Dail and the Seanad. 21 Money Bills This Article regulates the extent to Delete. and the Houses which the Seanad may delay and/or have input into the passage of a Money Bill. 22 Money Bills This Article de?nes what constitutes Delete the aspects a Money Bill. referring to the Seanad. It also lays down a detailed procedure for determining whether a Proceed as disputed Bill is a Money Bill. This Government decides procedure is initiated by the Seanad. in relation to how to Part of the procedure?s importance determine whether a is that if a Bill is a Money Bill, it is disputed Bill is a exempted from Article 26 (ie cannot Money Bill. be referred by the President to the Supreme Court to determine whether it is repugnant to the Constitution), 23 Time for This Article deals with the situation Delete. consideration where the Seanad rejects a Dail Bill, of Bills or passes a Bill with amendments to which the Dail does not agree. 24 Urgent This Article abridges the time for Proceed as legislation consideration by the Seanad where a Government decides. Bil is certi?ed by the Taoiseach as immediately necessary for public security or because of a public emergency. Signing and Article 25. 2. 2 refers speci?cally to Remove the direct 25 promulgation the Seanad. Articles 25.1 and 25. 4. limplied references to 3 refer to ?both Houses of the the Seanad. Oireachtas?. Confer the ?early Article 25. 2. 2 confers on the signature? power on Seanad, only, the power to agree that the Dail. the Government may request the President to sign a Bill earlier than in the normal time frame. Proceed in light of what Government Article 25. 3 requires Bills passed decides re Article 24. under Article 24 (urgency certi?ed by Taoiseach) to be signed by the President on the day they are presented to him/her. 26 Reference to The preamble to Article 26 refers to Remove the Supreme Court the ?Houses? of the Oireachtas and references to refers to the Article 24 proceedure. ?Houses?. As to Article 24 reference, proceed in light of what Government decides re Article 24. 27 Petition for The preamble to Article 27, Article Remove the direct reference of 27. and Article 27. 6 refer /implied references to Bills to the respectively to ?both Houses?, ?the two Houses. People. Seanad? and ?each House?. The President decides whether a Bill ought to be referred directly to the Re the Article as a people, but the procedure is triggered whole, proceed as by a petition signed by a majority of Government decides. the Seanad and not less than one- third of the Dail. 28 Government Articles 28Remove the direct refer directly or implicitly to the /implied references. Seanad. Re national Article 28. 3. 3 requires Houses emergency power, to resolve that a national emergency proceed as the exists. Government decides. 28A Local No reference to the Seanad. - Government 29 International Articles 29refer to Remove the direct Relations ?both Houses of the Oireachtas?. /implied references. 30 Attorney No reference to the Seanad. - General 31 Council of Under Article 31. 2. 2 the Delete the reference State Chairman of the Seanad is a member to the Chairman of of the Council of State. The question the Seanad. Re replacement or not, arises of whether the Chairman should be replaced by another ?gure. proceed as decided by the Government. 32 Role of No reference to the Seanad. - Council of State 33 Comptroller Articles 33Remove the direct and Auditor refer to the Seanad and/or ?either? /implied references. General and ?each? House. Article 33. 5 lays down a procedure Re removal of for removal of the AG. It AG, proceed as the requires resolutions of both the Dail Government decides. and the Seanad. 34 The Courts No reference to the Seanad. - 35 The Judiciary Article 35.4 lays down a procedure Amend Articles 35. 4. for removal of a judge. It requires resolution of both the Dail and the remove the direct Seanad. /implied references to the Seanad and to more than one House of the Oireachtas. Re removal of judges, proceed as the Government decides. 36 Composition of No reference to the Seanad. - judiciary 37 Limited No reference to the Seanad. - judicial ?anctions 38 Criminal No reference to the Seanad. - matters 39 Treason No reference to the Seanad. - 40 Personal rights Article 40. 6. 1 (ii) allows freedom Remove the reference of assembly to be regulated to to two Houses of the control or prevent meetings in the Oireachtas. Vicinity of ?either Houses of the Oireachtas?. 41 Family No reference to the Seanad. - 42 Education No reference to the Seanad. - 43 Property No reference to the Seanad. - 44 Religion No reference to the Seanad. 45 Directive No reference to the Seanad. - Principles 46 Amendment of Article 46. 2 refers to ?both Houses Remove the reference the of the Oireachtas? to two Houses of the Constitution Oireachtas 47 Referendum No reference to the Seanad. Consider what if any changes might be needed in the light of what the Government decides re Article 27. 48 Repeal of 1922 No reference to the Seanad. Constitution 49 Continuance of No reference to the Seanad. powers, etc. 50 Continuance of No reference to the Seanad. legislation APPENDIX 2 Constitutional Amendment (Abolition of Seanad) Bill 2012 General Scheme of Bill Head 1: Long Title Provide for the Long Title of the Bill as follows: A Bill to amendrArticle 15 and delete Articles 18 and 19 of the Constitution so as to abolish Seanad Eireann as a House of the Oireachtas created by those Articles and to make all such further or other amendments of the Constitution as may be consequential on or rendered necessary by such amendment of the said Article 15 and such deletion of the said Articles 18 and 19. Head 2: Amend Article 15 Amend Article 15, to provide that the Oireachtas shall consist of the President and a House of Representatives to be called Dail Eireann. Head 3: Delete Articles 18 and 19 Delete Articles 18 and 19 (which provide for the composition of the Seanad, elections to it etc.) Head 4: Consequential Deletion of Articles of the Constitution Delete the Articles listed in Part 1 of the attached Schedule. Head 5: Consequential Amendment of Articles of the Constitution Amend the Articles listed in Part 2 of the Schedule. Head 6: Commencement Date Specify when the deletions and amendments are to come into effect. Head 7: Citation (Short Title) Provide for the citation (short title) of the Bill as the Amendment of the Constitution Act 2012. SCHEDULE PART 1 Provide for the deletion of the following Articles: Articles 20 (Legislation), 21 (Money Bills) and 23 (Rejection or Amendment of a Bill) Article 20 provides that Bills initiated and passed in the Dail must be sent to and can (except in the case of Money Bills) be amended by the Seanad. It also provides for the initiation of Bills (other than Money Bills) in the Seanad and for a Bill passed in one House and accepted in the other to be deemed to have been passed in both Houses. Article 21 regulates the extent to which the Seanad may delay or have an input into the passage of a Money Bill. Article 23 deals with a situation where the Seanad rejects or amends a Bill. SCHEDULE PART 2 Provide for the amendment of the following Articles as follows: Article 12 (The President) Amend Article 12.4.2 to provide that the President must be nominated by not less than persons, each of whom must be a member of the Dail. Amend Article 12.6.1 to provide that the President shall not be a member of the Dail. Amend Article 12.6.2 to provide that if a member of the Dail is elected President, he shall be deemed to have vacated his seat. Amend Article 12.8 to provide that the President shall enter upon of?ce by taking and subscribing a declaration publicly in the presence of (among others) members of the Dail. Amend Article 12.10.2 12.10.5 to remove the implied references to the Seanad. Article 13 (Powers of the President) Amend Article 13.2.3 to provide that the President may at any time, after consultation with the Council of State, convene a meeting of the D?il. Amend Article 13.3.1 to provide that every Bill passed by the Dail shall require the signature of the President for its enactment into law. Amend Article 13.7.1 to provide that the President may, after consultation with the Council of State, communicate with the Dail by message or address on any matter of national or public importance. Amend Article 13.8.1 to provide that the President shall not be answerable to the Dail or to any court for the exercise and performance of the powers and functions of his of?ce or for any act done or purported to be done by him in the exercise and performance of these powers and functions. Amend Article 13.8.2 to provide that the behaviour of the President may be brought under review in the Dail or by a court etc. designated by the Dail. Article 14 (Presidential Commission) Amend Article 14.2 to remove references to the Cathaoirleach and Leas Cathaoirleach; provide for the Leas Cheann Comhairle to be a member of the Presidential Commission, and (0) make provision for substitutes from the Dail in the absence of the Ceann Comhairle or Leas Cheann Comhairle. Articles 15 (The National Parliament) Amend Article 15.1.3 to provide that the Dail will sit in or near the City of Dublin. Article 15.8 15.15 deal with a range of practical arrangements in relation to the Houses of the Oireachtas, viz. sittings; election of Chairman and Deputy Chairman of each House; right of each Houses to make its own rules and standing orders; voting and quorums; attaching privilege to all reports, publications and utterances in either House; membership of one House only; and payments and allowances. Amend the Article to remove the references to both Houses. Article 22 (Money Bills) Article 22 de?nes what constitutes a Money Bill and provides a procedure for determining whether a disputed Bill can be regarded as a Money Bill. Amend the Article to re-assign this function to the Dail, with a requirement (as at present with the Seanad) that not less than half its members be present for a vote to initiate the procedure. Article 24 Amend this Article to remove the reference to the Seanad. Articles 25 (Signing and Promulgation of Laws) Article 25.1 deals with the signing of Bills passed, or deemed to be passed, by both Houses of the Oireachtas. Amend the Article to remove the reference to both Houses. Amend Article 25.2.2 to provide that at the request of the Government, and with the prior concurrence of the Dail, (i.e.not the Seanad) the President may sign a Bill earlier than the ?fth day after it is presented to him. Article 25.4.3 provides that the President shall Sign a Bill in the language in which it was passed by the Houses of the Oireachtas. Amend the Article to remove the reference to both Houses. Article 26 (Reference of Bills to the Supreme Court) The Preamble to Article 26, which deals with the referral of Bills by the President to the Supreme Court, makes reference to both Houses of the Oireachtas. Amend this to remove the reference to both Houses and substitute a reference to the Bail. The Preamble also refers to the Seanad in the context of Article 24. Amend this in line with what is proposed in Article 24. Article 27 (Reference to the People) Article 27 which provides for a petition for the referral of Bills to the people by the President, includes a reference to both Houses of the Oireachtas. Delete this Article if decided by the Government. Article 28 (The Government) Amend Article 28.3.3, which sets out the procedure for declaring a national emergency, to remove references to the Seanad. Amend Article 28.7.2, which requires that members of the Government must be members of the Dail or Seanad, with no more than two being members of the Seanad, to remove references to the Seanad. Amend Article 28.8, which gives every member of the Government the right to attend and be heard in each House, to substitute the Dail (only). Article 29 (International Relations) Articles 29.4.7 and 29.4.8 requires that the approval of both Houses must be obtained if the State wishes to exercise options or discretions or agree to decisions, regulations or other acts under EU Treaties. Amend the Article to remove the references to both Houses. Article 31 (Council of State) Amend Article 31.2.1 (1) to remove the reference to the Cathaoirleach of the Seanad and to appoint the Leas Cheann Comhairle to the Council of State. Article 33 (Comptroller and Auditor General) Amend Article 33.3 to state that the must not be a member of the Dail. Amend Article 33.5 to require that a resolution to remove the from of?ce must be passed by the Dail and to increase the proportion of votes by which the can be removed by the Dail (if and as decided by Government). Article 35 (The Courts) Amend Articles 35.4 to provide that a judge may be removed from of?ce by resolution of the Dail only and to increase the proportion of votes by which a Judge can be removed by the Dail (if and as decided by Government). Article 40 (Personal Rights) Article 40.6 allows freedom of assembly to be regulated to control or prevent meetings in the vicinity of either House of the Oireachtas. Amend the Article to remove the reference to either House and substitute a reference to the Dail. Article 46 (Amendment of the Constitution) Article 46.2 deals with the amendment of the Constitution and makes reference to both Houses of the Oireachtas. Amend the Article to remove the reference to both Houses and substitute the Dail. Article 47 (The Referendum) Amend if and as appropriate in the light of what the Government decides on Article 27. 92 a, 1 Uimhir Thagartha: 8180/80/05/0001 RIALTAIS Data: 05/03/2013 Abhar: 1. Private Members Bill: Seanad Electoral Reform Bill 2013 An tAire a thionscain: Oi?g an Aire Comhshaoil, Pobail agus Rialtais Aitiuil. Data an Mheabhrain: 04/03/2013 Cinneadh an Rialtais: Agreed to oppose the Seanad Electoral Reform Bill 2013 at second stage reading in the Seanad during Private Members Time on 6 March, 2013, on the grounds that the Programme for Government contains a commitment to prioritise putting to the people by referendum a number of parliamentary reform issues, including abolition of the Seanad. Ard-Runai an Rialtais C?ip curtha chuig: Oi?g an Aire Airgeadais, Oi?g an Taoisigh, Oi?g an Aire Caiteachais Phoibll' agus Athchoirithe, Oi?g an Aire Gnothai Eachtracha agus Tradala, Oi?g an Ard- Aighne, Oi?g an Aire Tithl'ochta, Plean?la, Pobail agus Rialtais Aiti?il, Oi?g an Aire St?it ag Roinn an Taoisigh 04/03/2013 Ref: F.03.09.23 Oifig an Aire Comhshaoil, Pobail agus Rialtais Aitil'lil. Memorandum for the Government Private Members Bill: Seanad Electoral Reform Bill 2013 1. Decision Sought The Minister for the Environment, Community and Local Government requests the Government to agree to oppose the Seanad Electoral Reform Bill 2013 at second stage reading in the Seanad during Private Members Time on 6 March 2013 on the grounds that the Programme for Government contains a commitment to prioritise putting to the pe0ple by referendum a number of parliamentary reform issues, including abolition of the Seanad. 2. Main features of the Bill The Bill introduced by Senator John Crown provides for the repeal and replacement of existing legislation in relation to Seanad elections. The main features of the new arrangements for Seanad elections proposed in the Bill would be as follows: the extension of the franchise in Seanad elections to all registered local government electors living in Ireland and to Irish citizens living abroad, the holding of Seanad elections on the same day as elections to Dail Eireann, Irish embassies and consulates would act as registration authorities for Seanad elections for citizens living abroad, the revision of the numbers to represent each Panel, a requirement for Panel candidates to submit 1,000 attestations, from members of the public registered as local government electors, with their nomination papers, attesting to the candidate?s ?surfeit of knowledge and practical experience within the interests and services of the panel selected?, and the revision of the University Constituencies to provide for the election of two senators each by graduates of the National University of Ireland, the University of Dublin and the group of Higher Education Institutions listed in the schedule to the Bill. The remaining provisions of the Bill set out technical provisions in relation to the operation of the new arrangements proposed. 3. Rationale for the decision sought The Bill is proposed as a Seanad electoral reform measure. As such, it would not be in line with Government policy to consider the Bill. This is because the Programme for Government contains a commitment to hold a referendum on the abolition of the Seanad and the Taoiseach has publicly indicated his intention to hold the referendum in the Autumn of 2013. In any event, the Bill proposes quite radical new measures which would require careful consideration. The extension of the franchise, as proposed, and the holding of the Seanad election on the same day as Dail elections would require detailed consideration of the logistics involved to assess how this could be successfully undertaken. It would also give rise to consideration of wider issues such as extending the franchise for other elections and referendums to the Irish diaspora. The matter of costs including, for example, embassy resources would also need to be fully analysed. It should also be noted that the Constitutional Convention has been asked to consider the Dail electoral system and giving citizens outside the State the right to vote in Presidential elections at Irish Embassies or otherwise. Quite apart from the intention to hold a referendum on the Seanad, it would be prudent to await the outcome of the deliberations on these issues before dealing with proposed changes in this area. 4. Impacts There are no impacts for the following: Employment, North?South, East-West Relations, Gender Equality, Poverty Proo?ng, Industry Costs, Rural Communities, Quality Regulation. 5. Cost to Exchequer of Proposal No costs. 6. Observations Returned No observations supplied 1 Uimhir Thagartha: 1 80/20/10/1742 CRUINNIU RIALTAIS Data: 30/04/2013 Abhar: ll. Drafting of the Thirty Second Amendment of the Constitution (Abolition of the Seanad) Bill 2013 An tAire a thionscain: Oi?g an Taoisigh Data an Mheabhrain: 17/04/2013 Cinneadh an Rialtais: (I) agreed that the Thirty Second Amendment of the Constitution (Abolition of the Seanad) Bill 2013, the drafting of which was approved on 26 February, 2013, should: provide that the date of abolition be the day immediately preceding the ?rst assembly of D?il Eireann after the enactment of the Bill after passage of the referendum), include, as appropriate, arrangements for the completion of outstanding business by the Seanad, prior to its abolition, provide that not less than 14 members of Dail Bireann may nominate a Presidential candidate (down from the current 20 members of the Oireachtas; and (ii) that subject to a further consideration by the Government, it may be appropriate to ask the Constitutional Convention to consider whether a petition system should exist in the Constitution and if so the form such a petition system would take; and (2) noted that the drafting of the Bill is proceeding on the basis that: a Committee of Privileges appointed by the President to consider whether a Bill is a Money Bill (Article 22) must report its decision thereon to the President within twenty-one days after the Bill is initiated in Dail Bireann (rather than after it is sent to the Seanad, as at present), Article 27, which provides for the possibility of a petition from the Houses of the Oireachtas to the President to refer a Bill of national importance to the people, be deleted, a Resolution to remove the Comptroller and Auditor General or a Judge of the Supreme or High Court must be supported by two-thirds of the total membership of Dail Eireann, a number of technical issues, which have arisen in drafting the Bill, will be brought to the attention of Government when the text is submitted for its consideration, it is intended to submit the text to Government by mid-May 2013, and if the Amendment is carried, it will be necessary to bring forward a Bill to remove references to the Seanad/Houses of the Oireachtas from all existing legislation. Ard-Runai an Rialtais coip curtha chuig: Oi?g an Aire Airgeadais, Oi?g an Aire Iompair, Turas?ireachta agus Spoirt, Oi?g an Aire Leanai agus Gnothai Oige, Oi?g an Aire Ealaion, Oidhreachta agus Gaeltachta, Oi?g an Aire Caiteachais Phoibli agus Athchoirithe, Oi?g an Aire Slainte, Oi?g an Aire Gnothai Eachtracha agus Tradala, Oi?g an Aire Dli agus Cirt agus Comhionannais, Oi?g an Aire Talmhaiochta, Bia agus Mara, Oi?g an Ard-Aighne, Oi?g an Aire Cosanta, Oi?g an Aire Post, Fiontar agus Nualaiochta, Oi?g an Aire Comhshaoil, Pobail agus Rialtais Aitiuil., Oi?g an Aire Tithiochta, Pleanala, Pobail agus Rialtais Aiti?il, Oi?g an Aire Ealaion, Oidhreachta, Gn?thai R?igiunacha, Tuaithe agus Gaeltachta, Oi?g an Aire Cumarsaide, Fuinnimh agus Acmhainni Nadurtha, Oi?g an Aire Oideachais agus Scileanna, Oi?g an Aire Coimirce soisialai, Oi?g an Aire Cumarsaide, Gniomhaithe ar son na hAer?ide agus Comhshaoil, Oi?g an Aire Stait ag Roinn an Taoisigh Mo 0., 29/04/2013 Ref: Oi?g an Taoisigh Memorandum for the Government Drafting of the 32nd Amendment of the Constitution [Seanad Abolition] Bill Supplemental Proposals 1. Decision Sought Further to his Memorandum of 17 Aprliil2013 on the Drafting of the Thirty Second Amendment of the Constitution (Abolition of the Seanad) Bill 2013, the Taoiseach asks the Government to - ?x a speci?c ?gure for the minimum number of TDs [which he proposes should be not less than 10 and not more than 14] required after abolition of the Seanad to nominate a Presidential candidate to agree that subject to a further consideration by the Government, it may be appropriate to ask the Constitutional Convention to consider whether a petition system should exist in the Constitution and if so the form such a petition system would take - to decide that a two-thirds majority of the total membership of the Dail should be required to remove a Judge of the Supreme or High Court, or the Comptroller and Auditor General. 2. Background The Taoiseach?s Memorandum of 17 April 2013 deals with a number of items that have arisen during the drafting of the Thirty Second Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2013 [Seanad Abolition]. Following submission of that Memorandum, the Taoiseach proposes some supplemental decisions in relation to some of the items covered in it. These further items are as follows. 3. Nomination of Presidential Candidate The Memorandum of 17 April 2013 proposed that the Bill would provide for a reduction in the number of Oireachtas members i.e. TDs after abolition of the Seanad required to secure a Presidential nomination. The reduction proposed was proportionate to the new number of members in Dail Eireann after the next General Election 158), as compared with the current number of members of both Houses (226). This would reduce the number required to secure a Presidential nomination from the current 20 to 14. The Government was asked to note, however, that in its ?rst report the Convention on the Constitution made a recommendation that citizens be given a say in the Presidential nomination process and that the Minister for the Environment, Community and Local Government would be bringing forward a draft response to the recommendations in the Convention?s ?rst report for the Government?s consideration in due course. The Memorandum went on to say that the Taoiseach might wish to revert to Government on the number of TDs required for a Presidential nomination when submitting the Referendum Bill to the Government for approval to publish. Having considered the matter further, the Taoiseach considers that the number should not be less than 10, as well as not more than 14, and he asks the Government to decide now on a Speci?c ?gure. 4. Reference of Bill to the people on foot of a petition to the President The Taoiseach?s Memorandum of 17 April recalls that Article 27 of the Constitution currently provides a mechanism whereby a majority of members of the Seanad and not less than one third of the members of the Dail may, by joint petition, request the President to decline to sign a Bill and instead refer it to the people on the grounds that the Bill is of such national importance that the will of the people thereon ought to be ascertained. It went on to note that this Article was in effect a way of resolving a dispute between the two Houses on a legislative matter of national importance, that following abolition of the Seanad it would no longer be required and that the Bill is being drafted on the basis that Article 27 will be deleted. The Taoiseach has re?ected further on this matter. He is conscious that abolition could give rise to arguments that some provision should be retained to enable a petition to be presented to the President that a referendum be held on a particular Bill. The Taoiseach considers that subject to further consideration by the Government, it may be appropriate to ask the Constitutional Convention to consider whether a petition system should exist in the Constitution and the form such a petition system would take. 5. Removal of certain Of?ce?Holders The Memorandum of 17 April recalled that the Memo which led to the Government decision of 26 February 2013 proposed, with regard to a resolution to remove the or a Judge of the Supreme/High Court, that a two?thirds majority in Dail Eireann (as opposed to the current straightforward majority in each House) be required. However, it pointed out that clari?cation was needed as to whether this should be two?thirds of the total membership of the Drill (as is the case for the President) or just a two?thirds majority of those present and voting. Having considered the matter further, the Taoiseach proposes that the majority should be of thetotal membershipof the Dail, and he asks the Government to decide accordingly. 6. Impacts There are no impacts for the following: Employment, North-South, East-West Relations, Gender Equality, Poverty Proofing, Industry Costs, Rural Communities, Quality Regulation 7. Cost to Exchequer of Proposal These proposals do not involve a cost to the Exchequer. 8. Observations Returned No observations supplied 3c. 17/04/2013 Ref: Oifig an Taoisigh Memorandum for the Government Drafting of the Thirty Second Amendment of the Constitution (Abolition of the Seanad) Bill 2013 1. Decision Sought The Taoiseach asks the Government to: agree that the Constitutional Amendment Bill to abolish the Seanad, the drafting of which was approved on 26 February 2013, should: provide that the date of abolition should be the day immediately preceding the ?rst assembly of Dail Eireann after the enactment of the Bill after passage of the referendum); (ii) include, as appropriate, arrangements for the completion of outstanding business by the Seanad, prior to its abolition; and provide that not less than 14 members of Dail Eireann may nominate a Presidential candidate (down from the current 20 members of the Oireachtas), subject to possible further consideration of this matter in the light of a related recommendation from the Convention on the Constitution; and note that drafting of the Bill is proceeding on the basis that: A Committee of Privileges appointed by the President to consider whether a Bill is a Money Bill (Article 22) must report its decision thereon to the President within twenty-one days after the Bill is initiated in Dail Eireann (rather than after it is sent to the Seanad, as at present); (ii) Article 27, which provides for the possibility of a petition from the Houses of the Oireachtas to the President to refer a Bill of national importance to the people, be deleted; A Resolution to remove the Comptroller and Auditor General or a Judge of the Supreme/High Court must be supported by two?thirds of Dail Eireann; (iv) A number of technical issues, which have arisen in drafting the Bill, will be brought to the attention of Government when the text is submitted for its consideration; It is intended to submit the text to Government by mid-May 2013; and (vi) If the Amendment is carried, it will be necessary to bring forward a Bill to remove references to the Seanad/Houses of the Oireachtas from all existing legislation. 2. Background/Reason for Memorandum The Government on 26 February 2013 [Ref: 8250/3 decided, inter alia, that a referendum on a proposal to amend the Constitution to abolish the Seanad would be held on a date to be determined later in the year, and agreed to the drafting of the Thirty Second Amendment of the Constitution (Abolition of the Seanad) Bill with a view to its publication as soon as possible. The drafting of the Bill has highlighted a number of matters on which further clari?cation of the Government?s intentions is required. These relate to the precise date for abolition of the Seanad and the arrangements for completing business prior to abolition, as well as the minimum number of TDs who must support a Presidential nomination after abolition of the Seanad. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 below set out how it is proposed to address these matters and Government approval is sought for the approaches proposed. In addition, paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 outline how it is proposed to proceed in relation to a number of other speci?c matters within the overall approach agreed by Government on 26 February. The Government is asked to note the approach proposed in each instance. These matters, which are mainly technical, relate to the timeframe within which the question of whether a Bill is a Money Bill must be decided; the deletion of Article 27 (which provides for the possibility of a petition from the Houses of the Oireachtas to the President to refer a Bill of national importance to the people); and the size of majority required to pass a Resolution in the Dail (following abolition of the Seanad) for the removal from of?ce of the or a Judge of the Supreme/High Court. A number of technical issues that have arisen during drafting will be brought to the Government?s attention when it is considering the text of the Bill. It is intended to submit the text to Government by mid-May. 3. Date of abolition of the Seanad The Government, in its decision of 26 February, agreed that the Constitutional Amendment Bill should be drafted on the basis that, in the event the referendum is carried, the current Seanad would continue until the end of its term. Further clari?cation is required, however, on when precisely its term should end. The Constitution currently provides for an overlap between the assembly of a new Dail, following a General Election, and the election of a new Seanad. However, in order to preclude any doubt regarding the constitutional status of our parliamentary system, it is important that there should be no overlap between the outgoing bicameral and incoming unicameral systems. At the same time, it would be prudent to retain some degree of continuity during the interim between dissolution of the current Dail and assembly of the next Dail. This will be necessary so as to preserve our existing parliamentary framework until a new Dail, elected in the knowledge that the Seanad is being abolished, has assembled; give the longest possible period for legislation passed by the current Dail to be also passed by the Seanad before it is abolished; and prevent any break in continuity in relation to the membership of the Presidential Commission and Council of State. With regard to the last point, the need for continuity is particularly important in the case of the Presidential Commission, which has only three members the Leas Ceann Comhairle replacing the Cathaoirleach of the Seanad when the Seanad is abolished. Given the constitutional requirement that the Commission?s ?inctions must be performed by at least two of its members, it would be prudent to ensure that the Cathaoirleach of the Seanad can continue to act on the Commission until as near as possible to the assembly of the new Dail. Following assembly, the new Dail, in addition to appointing a Ceann Comhairle and Leas Ceann Comhairle, will also be in a position (under the new constitutional arrangements) to appoint two members to act as substitutes on the Presidential Commission (in the absence of the Ceann Comhairle and Leas Ceann Comhairle). Accordingly, it is proposed to provide in the Bill that the Seanad be abolished on the day immediately preceding the ?rst assembly of the new Dail after the enactment of the Bill, assuming the referendum is carried. This will avoid any overlap between the two systems of parliament, while at the same time ensure continuity in relation to the exercise of certain functions passage of legislation, Presidential Commission, etc.). 4. Completion of outstanding business by Seanad prior to abolition As mentioned above, the proposed abolition date will give the outgoing Seanad the longest possible period to complete the passage of legislation, as well as to complete other outstanding business. The question arises, however, as to how to deal with any business not completed by the Seanad prior to abolition. In moving from a bicameral to unicameral parliament, a key principle to be followed is that any business not completed in the former will have to be re-introduced (and dealt with afresh) in the latter. While this would mean that the new Dail might have to deal with business already completed in the previous Dail, it would preclude any doubt regarding its constitutionality. So, for example, the current option whereby a Bill which has not completed its passage through both Houses may be restored to the Order Paper, in the House and at the stage it had reached prior to dissolution, will no longer be available. The Bill will simply have to be re- introduced in the new Dail and debated afresh. Of course, in practical terms, if the Bill had already passed all stages in that House, this could be taken into account by the Whips in agreeing timeframes for passage of the re-introduced Bill. Currently business other than legislation g. Resolutions) not completed in the previous Dail must, if it is proposed to proceed with the business, be re-initiated when the Houses have re-assembled following a General Election. This approach will continue following the abolition of the Seanad, though clearly the ?mctions will then be exercised exclusively by the Dail. This will mean that certain business exclusive to the Seanad g. disciplinary action against a Senator) would simply fall and could not be re-initiated once the Seanad is abolished. However, other functions previously exclusive to the Seanad, such as early signature motions on Bills and initiating the mechanism to determine if a Bill is a Money Bill, will be transferred to the Dail, as there will still be a need to exercise them. 5. Nomination of President The Constitution currently provides that a Presidential candidate must be nominated by either twenty persons, each of whom is at the time a member of one of the Houses of the Oireachtas; or by the Council of not less than four administrative Counties (as de?ned by law). The Memo which led to the Government decision of 26 February 2013 noted that abolition of the Seanad and the proposed reduction in the number of TDs after the next General Election would signi?cantly reduce the overall number of Oireachtas members: it seemed appropriate, therefore, that the number of Oireachtas members required to secure a Presidential nomination should also be reduced. It is proposed to provide in the Bill for a reduction in the number required to secure a Presidential nomination proportionate to the new number of members in Dail Eireann after the next General Election 158), as compared with the current number of members of both Houses (226). This will reduce the number required to secure a Presidential nomination from the current 20 to 14. The Government is asked to note, however, that in its first report the Convention of the Constitution made a recommendation that citizens be given a say in the Presidential nomination process. The Minister for the Environment, Community and Local Government will be bringing forward a draft response to the recommendations in the Convention?s first report for the Government?s consideration in due course. The Taoiseach may wish to revert to Government on the number of TDs required for a Presidential nomination when submitting the Referendum Bill to the Government for approval to publish. 6. Money Bills Article 22 provides a mechanism (involving the Seanad) for determining whether a Bill is a Money Bill. This is required because Money Bills cannot be referred to the Supreme Court for a determination as to whether they are repugnant to the Constitution. Accordingly, even after the Seanad is abolished (and even though the procedure has never been used) a mechanism will be required to clarify whether a Bill is a Money Bill. The Government, on 26 February 2013, agreed to the preposal to transfer this function exclusively to the Dail. However, clari?cation is needed regarding the timeframe within which the matter must be decided and the date from which the clock starts running. Under the current Constitutional provision, a Committee of Privileges (comprising equal membership from both Houses) must report its decision on the matter to the President within twenty?one days after the day on which the Bill is sent to the Seanad. The Government is asked to note the intention to amend this Article to provide that that the Committee must report its decision within twenty?one days after the Bill is initiated in the Dail. This will mean that the question of whether a Bill is a Money Bill may have to be addressed earlier in the life of the Bill but, importantly, the Committee of Privileges would still have the same length of time within which to report its decision, i.e. twenty?one days. 7. Reference of Bill to the people on foot of a petition to the President Article 27 currently provides a mechanism whereby a majority of members of the Seanad and not less than one third of the members of the Dail may, by joint petition, request the President to decline to sign a Bill and instead refer it to the people on the grounds that the Bill is of such national importance that the will of the people thereon ought to be ascertained. The Memo which led to the Government decision of 26 February 2013 made the point that this Article was in effect a way of resolving a dispute between the two Houses on a legislative matter of national importance and, following abolition of the Seanad, would no longer be required. The Memo went on to point out, however, that the Article had come to prominence during the referendum on the EU Fiscal Compact and this could give rise to arguments that some provision should be retained to enable a petition to be presented to the President that a referendum be held on a particular Bill. Notwithstanding this, the Bill is being drafted on the basis that Article 27 will be deleted. 8. Removal of certain Of?ce-Holders The Constitution provides a role for the Seanad in the procedures for impeachment of a President and the removal from of?ce of the or a Judge of the Supreme/High Court. In the Memo which led to the Government decision of 26 February 2013, the Taoiseach proposed that the current constitutional safeguards protecting the President from unfair impeachment will remain suf?cient, even when transferred to a unicameral parliament. These involve a requirement that two-thirds of the total membership of the Oireachtas must support the Resolution to impeach the President. With regard to a Resolution to remove the or a Judge of the Supreme/High Court, the Memo also proposed a two-thirds majority in Dail Eireann (as opposed to the current straightforward majority in each House). However, clari?cation is needed as to whether this should be two-thirds of the total membership of the Dail (as is the case for the President) or just a two-thirds majority of those present and voting. It is considered that the pr0posed increase from a simple majority in both Houses to a two-thirds majority of those present and voting in the Dail will provide suf?cient safeguards for the independence of these of?ces. In any event it is considered appropriate that there should be a higher threshold for the impeachment of a President, in order to re?ect the importance of that of?ce and the fact that the President is elected by direct vote of the people (while the is appointed by the President on the nomination of the Dail and Judges are appointed by the President on the nomination of the Government). The Government is asked, therefore, to note the intention to include in the Bill a provision for a two-thirds majority of those members present and voting on a resolution to remove from of?ce the or a Judge of the Supreme/High Court. 9. Other technical drafting issues In addition to the above, the preparation of the Bill has highlighted a number of drafting issues that must be addressed, though they are purely technical. These will be brought to the attention of Government when it is considering the text of the Bill. 10. Timeline for drafting and publication of Constitutional Amendment Bill The Government decision of 26 February asked that the Bill be prepared with a View to its publication as soon as possible. The Taoiseach asks the Government to note the intention to have the Bill ready by mid-May, at which point the Government can consider the precise timing of its publication, having regard to the constitutional requirements regarding the passage of the Bill through the Houses of the Oireachtas and subsequent timing of the referendum. 11. Supporting Legislation Finally, the Government is asked to note that, if the Constitutional Amendment is passed, it will be necessary to enact a new Bill to remove references to the Seanad/Houses of the Oireachtas from existing legislation. 12. Impacts There are no impacts for the following: Employment, North-South, East-West Relations, Gender Equality, Poverty Proo?ng, Industry Costs, Rural Communities, Quality Regulation 13. Cost to Exchequer of Proposal The proposals in this Memorandum do not involve a cost to the Exchequer. 14. Observations Returned No observations supplied 1 Uimhir Thagartha: 8180/20/10/1742 RIALTAIS Data: 14/05/2013 Abhar: Private Members Bill: Seanad Bill 2013 An tAire a thionscain: Oi?g an Aire Comhshaoil, Pobail agus Rialtais Aiti?il. Data an Mheabhrain: 13/05/2013 Cinneadh an Rialtais: Agreed that the following amendment to the motion for the second reading of the Bill be put down ?that Seanad Eireann postpones the second reading of the Seanad Bill 2013 until the result of the referendum on the proposal in the Programme for Government on the Seanad is known.? Ard-Rl'lnai an Rialtais C6ip curtha chuig: Oi?g an Aire Airgeadais, Oi?g an Taoisigh, Oi?g an Aire Caiteachais Phoibli agus Athchoirithe, Oi?g an Aire Gn?thai Eachtracha agus Tradala, Oi?g an Aire Stait ag Roinn an Taoisigh 13/05/2013 Ref: Oifig an Aire Comhshaoil, Pobail agus Rialtais Aitil'lil. Memorandum for the Government Private Members Bill: Seanad Bill 2013 1. Decision Sought The Minister for the EnvironmentjCommunity and Local Government requests the Government to consider and agree one of the following options for response to the motion for the Second Stage reading of the Seanad Bill 2013 during Private Members Time in the Seanad on 15 May 2013 - that the Government oppose the Seanad Bill 2013 on the grounds that the Government has con?rmed its intention to hold a referendum on the abolition of the Seanad in the Autumn, in accordance with the commitment in the Programme for Government, and that the Constitutional Amendment Bill to that end is to be published in the current Dail session, or (ii) that the following amendment to the motion for the second reading of the Bill be put down ?that Seanad Eireann postpones the second reading of the Seanad Bill 2013 until the result of the referendum on the proposal in the Programme for Government on the Seanad is known.? 2. Rationale for the decision sought The Bill proposes reform of the Seanad and its electoral system. The Government has made clear its intention to put to the people a proposal to abolish the Seanad by way of a referendum on a Constitution Amendment Bill. This commitment is in the Programme for Government and the Taoiseach con?rmed in the Dail on 30 April 2013 that the necessary Bill is being drafted with a View to its publication in the current session of the Dail. This is to ensure that there will be ample time for debate on the proposed amendments of the Constitution prior to a referendum later in the year. In the circumstances, it would not be in line with Government policy to consider this Bill. Rather than opposing the Bill, however, it would be preferable to propose, if necessary, that the second stage reading of the Bill be postponed. This is allowed within the Seanad Standing Orders and, if agreed, would enable the Minister to recognise, in his contribution to the Seanad debate, the work that has been undertaken in preparing the Bill while pointing out, at the same time, that it cannot be considered at this stage because of the Government?s commitment to holding referendum on the abolition of the Seanad. Senator John Crown introduced a Private Members Bill in the Seanad in March 2013. It too was a Seanad Reform Bill but it didn?t include proposals for reform of the role of the Seanad. The Government agreed on that occasion to oppose the Bill at Second stage on the grounds that the Programme for Government contained a commitment to prioritise putting to the people by referendum a number of parliamentary reform issues, including abolition of the Seanad. The proposal to advance the referendum on the abolition of the Seanad is even more advanced now, with draft legislation nearly ?nalised. While the Seanad Bill 2013 is more expansive than Senator Crown?s Bill, the substantive point remains the same that the pe0ple should have a say on the abolition of the Seanad ?rst of all. If the result of the referendum is that the Seanad should be retained, it may then be appropriate to further consider the Seanad Bill 2013. In any event, the Bill proposes new measures which would require careful consideration. For example, the preposals on public interest inquiries and inquiries into new legislation are based on provisions in the Houses of the Oireachtas (Inquiries, Privileges and Procedures) Bill 2012 and they would require careful examination in the context of the progress of that Bill. The extension of the franchise, as proposed, would present many operational and logistical challenges not least relating to the issue and return of possibly more than 3 million ballot papers by post and the subsequent opening of envelopes and counting of votes. The Convention on the Constitution has been asked to consider the Dail electoral system and giving citizens outside the State the right to vote in Presidential elections at Irish Embassies or otherwise. Quite apart from the intention to hold a referendum on the Seanad, it would be prudent to await the outcome of the deliberations on these issues before deciding on the related proposals in the Seanad Bill 2013. 3. Seanad Bill 2013 - background First Stage of the Seanad Bill 2013 was taken in the Seanad on 9 May 2013. Senator Katherine Zappone?s request for leave to introduce the Bill was agreed without debate. She described the Bill as it is described in the long title of the Bill which is in summary a Bill to confer additional roles on the Seanad and to reform the system for election of members of Seanad Eireann. In the Preamble to the Bill and in the Explanatory Memorandum published with it, it is stated that ?Seanad Eireann?s role under the Constitution includes important safeguards for the citizens and the State and important checks and balances in relation to the performance of the executive, legislative and judicial powers of government in the State and in relation to the European Union. In the Explanatory Memorandum it is contended that ?to the extent that Seanad Eireann may be said to be unrepresentative and of limited effectiveness? reforms which are proposed under the legislation would ?transform Seanad Eireann and enable it to ful?l the role envisaged by the designers of the Constitution?. In the ?nal paragraph under the background heading in the Explanatory Memorandum it is stated that publication of the Bill was preceded in September 2012 by a consultation paper entitled ?Radical Seanad Reform Through Legislative Change?, that the Bill derives from proposals in that paper and also takes into consideration submissions received during the course of the consultation process. The foreword to that paper was signed by Senator Feargal Quinn, Michael McDowell, Joe O?Toole, Noel Whelan and Senator Katherine Zappone. 4. Main features of the Bill The Bill sponsored by Senators Katherine Zappone and Fearghal Chuinn sets out a range of Constitutional and other ?tnctions to be carried out by of a newly constituted Seanad and provides for the repeal and replacement of existing legislation in relation to Seanad elections. In addition to the functions currently assigned to the Seanad under the Constitution which are repeated in Part 2 of the Bill, the Bill (Part 3) proposes to confer additional functions on the Seanad, including a new role in the scrutiny of draft legislation from the institutions of the European Union, a new role in the scrutiny of Statutory Instruments, scrutiny of Ministerial appointments to public bodies, power to hold public interest inquiries and inquiries concerning the necessity for legislation, the holding of debates on issues of national importance on foot of a petition signed by 1,000 people. The main features of the arrangements proposed in relation to Seanad elections (Parts 4-8) include - the extension of the franchise in Seanad elections to all registered local government electors living in Ireland, to persons resident in Northern Ireland who qualify for Irish citizenship and to Irish passport holders living abroad, Irish embassies and consulates would act as registration authorities for Seanad elections for citizens living abroad and would receive and count votes from those voters, the revision of the numbers to represent each Panel, nomination of candidates by nominating bodies, popular nomination 500 signatures of registered Seanad voters to secure nomination and by local authorities, the introduction of spending limits on candidates at Seanad elections, and the expansion of the University Constituencies to include graduates from third level institutions other than the NUI and Trinity College. Other more general provisions (Part 2) provide for equal representation of men and women in the Seanad and a reduction in salaries payable to 50% of a salary. 5. Impacts There are no impacts for the following: Employment, North-South, East-West Relations, Gender Equality, Poverty Proofing, Industry Costs, Rural Communities, Quality Regulation. 6. Cost to Exchequer of Proposal No costs. 7. Observations Returned N0 observations supplied 5 Di 1 Uimhir Thagartha: 8180/20/10/1742 CRUINNIU RIALTAIS Data: 05/06/2013 Abhar: 17. Thirty-second Amendment of the Constitution Bill (Abolition of Seanad Eireann): Approval of Text of Bill An tAire a thionscain: Oi?g an Taoisigh Data an Mheabhrain: 04/06/2013 Cinneadh an Rialtais: approved the text of the Thirty?second Amendment of the Constitution (Abolition of Seanad Eireann) Bill 2013, together with the associated Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill, as set out at Appendices and 2 respectively to the memorandum, (2) authorised the Taoiseach to arrange for the presentation of the Bill to the Dail and to have it circulated to Deputies; and (3) approved the Dail reform proposals outlined in section 6 of the memorandum. Ard?Rt?mai an Rialtais C?ip curtha chuig: Oi?g an Aire Airgeadais, Oi?g an Aire Iompair, Turas?ireachta agus Sp?irt, Oi?g an Aire Leanal' agus Gn?thai Oige, Oi?g an Aire Ealal'on, Oidhreachta agus Gaeltachta, Oi?g an Aire Caiteachais Phoibli agus Athch?irithe, Oi?g an Aire Sl?inte, Oi?g an Aire Gn?thai Eachtracha agus Tr?d?la, Oi?g an Aire agus Cirt agus Comhionannais, Oi?g an Aire Talmhaiochta, Bia agus Mara, Oi?g an Ard-Aighne, Oi?g an Aire Cosanta, Oi?g an Aire Post, Fiontar agus Nu?laiochta, Oi?g an Aire Comhshaoil, Pobail agus Rialtais Aiti?il., Oi?g an Aire Tithl'ochta, Plean?la, Pobail agus Rialtais Aiti?il, Oi?g an Aire Ealaion, Oidhreachta, Gn?thai R?igi?nacha, Tuaithe agus Gaeltachta, Oi?g an Aire Cumars?ide, Fuinnimh agus Acmhainni N?d?rtha, Oi?g an Aire Oideachais agus Scileanna, Oi?g an Aire Coimirce S?isialai, Oi?g an Aire Cumars?ide, Gm?omhaithe ar son na hAer?ide agus Comhshaoil, Oi?g an Aire St?it ag Roinn an Taoisigh 04/06/2013 Ref: 8180/20/10/1742 Oi?g an Taoisigh Memorandum for the Government Thirty?second Amendment of the Constitution Bill (Abolition of Seanad Eireann): Approval of Text of Bill 1. Decision Sought The Taoiseach asks the Government to approve: the text of the Thirty-second Amendment of the Constitution (Abolition of Seanad Eireann) Bill 2013 (Appendix 1), subject to any necessary drafting amendments that may be agreed with the Attorney General?s Of?ce, and its presentation to Dail Eireann and circulation to Deputies; (ii) the Explanatory Memorandum to accompany the Bill (Appendix and the Dail Reform proposals outlined in section 6 of the Memorandum. 2. Background The Programme for Government contains a commitment to bring forward proposals for a referendum on abolition of the Seanad. Government decision of 26 February 2013 approved drafting of a Bill on the basis proposed in the Taoiseach?s Memorandum that gave rise to that decision. On 30 April 2013 (81 80/20/ 10/1742) the Government agreed further provisions regarding the Bill. Brie?y, the principles agreed by the Government in relation to the carrying out of Seanad functions post-abolition were that functions appropriate to parliament should be retained in parliament and that each Article involving the Seanad should be examined on a case-by-case basis: if examination suggests that recalibration is appropriate, methods already existing in the Constitution should be employed. It will be seen that the Bill amends a signi?cant number of Articles of the Constitution. It is likely that because of this, the debate on it in the Dail and Seanad may give rise to consideration of other aspects of those Articles, or indeed of other Articles. The Bill is constructed on the basis of making only the changes required by or arising from abolition of the Seanad, and it is intended that this approach will be maintained throughout the debate, so as to keep the focus on the key issue, i.e. abolition of the Seanad. However, the proposed remodelling of the Money Bill determination procedure (Article 22), and the deletion of Article 27, could be used to suggest that the changes go beyond what is essential. A minor point in this context is that the opportunity is being taken in the transitional arrangements (set out in Schedule 4 of the Bill) to broaden the reference to a judge of the Supreme Court and High Court to include a judge of any other court established on foot of a referendum before abolition day: this would cater for a successful outcome to the Court of Appeal referendum, but does not prejudge it. The Bill has been prepared in accordance with the principles and with the approach on speci?c items agreed by the Government. The provisions of the Bill are outlined below. Finally, in the move to a unicameral system, it will be necessary to ensure that the Oireachtas continues to operate effectively and ef?ciently and to fully scrutinise proposed law. It is also important that it maintain all necessary checks and balances, as well as public con?dence. Proposals to achieve these aims through the reform of the procedures of the Dail are set out in section 6 below. 3. Overall Description of Bill: The Principal Amendments The Bill provides for the abolition of the Seanad and (subject to a successful referendum) this will take place at midnight of the day immediately preceding that on which the D?il ?rst meets after the next general election. Provision is also made that no general election for the Seanad will take place after the next dissolution of the Dail. From abolition day, the Oireachtas will consist solely of the President and a House of Representatives to be called Dan Bireann. The Bill also provides for the deletion or amendment of all relevant Articles of the Constitution in consequence of the abolition of the Seanad. About half of these amendments are technical in that they remove (direct and indirect) references to the Seanad from Articles which deal primarily with other matters g. powers and functions of the President, etc). The Articles which do relate directly its powers and ?inctions, and the proposals to amend or delete them, are set out in section 4 below. Finally, the Bill sets out the proposed transitional arrangements to facilitate a smooth changeover from a bicameral to unicameral parliamentary system (see section 6). 4. Consequential Amendments The Bill provides for the deletion/amendment of Articles relating to the functions of the Seanad (and its members) in consequence of its abolition. These functions involve the Seanad?s legislative role, as well as its role in providing a check in relation to the powers of the Dail. Legislative Functions: (1) Articles 20, 21, 23 and 24, which deal with the relationship between the Houses in relation to the passage of legislation (and the limitations on the Seanad?s role) will no longer be required and accordingly will be deleted. (2) Article 22 will be amended to provide that the Ceann Comhairle?s certi?cate that a Bill is a Money Bill will be ?nal and conclusive unless the Dail subsequently resolves that it is not a Money Bill. At present the Ceann Comhairle certi?es a Bill when it has been passed by the Dail and before it is sent to the Seanad. The Seanad may pass a resolution, at a sitting at which not less than thirty members are present half its membership), requesting the President to set up a Committee of Privileges to determine whether a Bill is a Money Bill. Where the President accedes to such a request, he appoints a Committee of Privileges comprising an equal number of members of the Dail and Seanad, with a Supreme Court judge as chairman (and with a casting vote if the Committee is tied). The Committee must report its decision to the President within 21 days of the sending of the Bill to the Seanad. While this provision is essentially a mechanism to resolve a diSpute between the Dail and the Seanad on whether a Bill is a Money Bill the Seanad can only make recommendations, not propose amendments, to a Money Bill the need for a procedure would nevertheless remain following abolition of the Seanad, because the President cannot refer a Money Bill to the Supreme Court to test its constitutionality. Under the Constitution as it stands at present, the determination of whether a Bill is a Money Bill is a matter for parliament and it is proposed to retain this. While it is appropriate to ask President (as the third component of the Oireachtas) to assist in resolving a dispute between the Houses on this matter, the abolition of the Seanad would mean that any new procedure must be designed to cater for a dispute within asinglechamber. Accordingly, the Bill proposes that, where a disagreement arises, the House itself must decide this matter, by resolution. (3) The power to request the President, at the request of the Government, to sign a Bill earlier than the ?fth day after it is presented to him (Article 25) will transfer to the Dail. (4) Article 27, which provides for the possibility of a majority of the members of the Seanad and one-third of the members of the Dail to petition the President to refer to the people a Bill of national importance, will be deleted. The Government had previously indicated that it might consider asking the Constitutional Convention to consider if, following the deletion of this Article, a petition system should exist in the Constitution and, if so, the form such a system would take. However, it is not proposed to proceed with this proposal. Checks and Balances Functions: Following abolition of the Seanad, it is proposed that the following functions will transferexclusivelyto the Dail, or its members: (1)The power to prefer, investigate and vote on a charge of stated misbehaviour against the President (Articles 12.10 and 13.8), and to remove the Comptroller and Auditor General (Article 33.5) and judges of the Supreme and High Courts (Article 35.4): The Constitution currently provides that a two?thirds majority of the total membership of the House is required to bring a charge against the President. The other House investigates the charge (or causes it to be investigated by a court, tribunal or body it appoints or designates for that purpose). After the investigation, a two-thirds majority of the total membership of that House is required to remove the President. . Abolition of the Seanad will remove the scope for one House bringing a charge and the other being the one that investigates it (or has it investigated) and then votes to remove or not, although of course all the other existing safeguards will be retained. However, given that the President is the ?rst citizen of the State (and is directly elected by the people) it is proposed to increase the majority required for his impeachment of the total membership of the Dailat each stage in the process. In relation to the and judges of the Supreme or High Court, the Bill increases the majority required from a simple majority of both Houses (of the members present and voting) totwo-thirds of the total membership of the the same as currently applies to the President (in both Houses). (2)The power to declare that a national emergency exists (Article 28): These powers of course only arise in exceptional circumstances (they were previously only used in relation to the Second World War and the security of the State during the 19703 to 1990s arising from the situation in Northern Ireland). (3)The requirement (under Article 29) for the prior approval of both Houses for the State to exercise powers conferred on it under certain provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon: This power, which currently can be exercised independently by each House (although the convention has been for the Houses to act in unison through the appropriate Joint Committees), has been referred to in arguments by persons opposing abolition of the Seanad and is likely to arise in the consideration of the Referendum Bill. (4)The Leas Cheann Comhairle will replace the Cathaoirleach of the Seanad on the Presidential Commission (Article 14). The Bill also makes provision for two nominated members of the Dail to act as substitutes should either the Ceann Comhairle or Leas-Cheann Comhairle be unavailable to act on the Presidential Commission or if the posts are vacant. Selection of the two substitutes will be required to be carried out by the Dail on, or as soon as may be after, its ?rst assembly after a general election. (5)The Leas Cheann Comhairle will replace the Cathaoirleach on the Council of State (Article 31 1: This is in keeping with what is proposed in relation to the Presidential Commission. (6)The number of members of the Oireachtas required to nominate a Presidential candidate will be reduced from 20 to 14 (Article 12.4): This will ensure that the current ratio between the number of Oireachtas members and the number of nominations required to secure a Presidential nomination will be retained following abolition of the Seanad and the reduction in the number of TDs after the next General Election. The Government may wish to note that the Bill will include a clause to allow any Tribunals of Inquiry that were established prior to abolition day to retain the rights currently available to them in relation to discussions at Cabinet which are pertinent to their inquiries. 5. Transitional arrangements The Bill also proposes the insertion of a new Article (50A) in the Constitution to cater for the transitional arrangements that will be necessary in the move from a bicameral to a unicameral parliamentary system. In summary, the arrangements will involve: Any Bill that has not passed, or been deemed to have passed, both Houses of the Oireachtas before the Seanad is abolished will be deemed to have lapsed. The Bill may of course be introduced or re-introduced in the new Dail. - Any Bill that has been passed, or been deemed to have been passed, both Houses of the Oireachtas, but has not yet been enacted, can complete the process of enactment as currently set out in the Constitution. This means that a Bill which has been passed or deemed passed by both Houses can be signed by the President, or referred to the Supreme Court (should he so decide under the relevant provisions of the Constitution). - A procedure to remove the President, the or a judge (see section 4 above) not completed prior to abolition will lapse, but the procedure can be re?initiated (under the new provisions of the Constitution following abolition of the Seanad). If, however, in relation to removal of the or a judge, the only remaining procedure is for the President to act on foot of a resolution already passed by both Houses, the President may complete that procedure. 6. Reform of Dail Procedures As mentioned previously, it will be necessary in the move to a unicameral system to ensure that the Oireachtas continues to operate effectively and ef?ciently and to fully scrutinise proposed law, while maintaining all necessary checks and balances and full public con?dence. In this context, it is proposed that following reforms will be advanced by the Government Chief Whip, in consultation with the Opposition and the Ceann Comhairle, as appropriate: 1. As a general rule, major non-emergency legislation will ?rst be submitted to the relevant Dail committee in Heads of Bill format. 2. To allow for extra consideration and scrutiny, each Bill will be referred back to the committee which considered it at Pre-Legislative and Committee Stages for a ?nal examination after Report Stage and before the Bill is passed by the House.This new stage will be known as Pre?Enactment Stage. It will be provided for in Dail Standing Orders. 3. It is proposed that a Minister will revert to the relevant select committee within 12 months of the enactment of a Bill, to discuss and review the functioning of the law and to allow for a debate from members and stakeholders as to whether the legislation is ful?lling its intended purpose. 4. As part of a strengthened committee system, there will be 14 Dail committees: four strategic committees on issues of major strategic and political importance (including PAC, Finance and EU scrutiny); seven sectoral committees to shadow Government Departments; and three thematic committees which will focus on speci?c issue (petitions, Good Friday Agreement, members? interests). It is envisaged that each committee will have twelve members and will be able to invite external experts to provide specialist input to its work. 5. When enacted, the Houses of the Oireachtas (Inquiries, Privileges and Procedures) Bill will enable Oireachtas committees to once again undertake parliamentary inquires into certain matters of major public importance. Since such inquires can involve unique and complex legal and policy issues a separate administrative system will ensure that they function smoothly. Once an inquiry is established, it will be undertaken by a sub- committee of the relevant select committee in order to ensure that the work of the select committee can continue uninterrupted. A proposed new Dail schedule will increase time spent on deliberating legislation. 7. The d?Hondt system will be introduced to distribute chairs of key committees on a prOportional and equitable basis. This proposal, if agreed by the House, will go hand in hand with a revised Dail schedule to allow committees to do as much work as possible when the House is not sitting. 8. A new ?10 Minute Bills? procedure will be introduced. 9? 7. Impacts The proposal in this Memorandum will enable implementation of the commitment to hold a referendum on the abolition of the Seanad contained in the Programme for Government, as part of the Government?s overall programme of political reform. There are no impacts for the following: Employment, North-South, East-West Relations, Gender Equality, Poverty Proofing, Industry Costs, Rural Communities, Quality Regulation. 8. Cost to Exchequer of Proposal As regards cost to the Exchequer, there will be a one-off cost associated with holding the referendum, but some of this cost will be offset if other referendums are held on the same day. Also, the Government has already decided that there will be no separate Government? funded information campaign, which will avoid the cost of such a campaign. As for savings arising from abolition of the Seanad, the total running costs of the Seanad have been estimated by the Of?ce of the Houses of the Oireachtas Commission to be in the region of ?20m per annum. This is based on the 2012 outturn and includes all direct and appertioned (indirect) costs. Direct costs relating to Seanad Members? salary, expense and staff costs amount to ?8.8m. Indirect pay and non-pay costs of the supporting sections (ICT, Of?ce of the Superintendent, procedural and support sections) amount to ?9.3m. There is also an annual cost of approximately ?2m in pensions relating to the Seanad. The Oireachtas have indicated that it is not possible to estimate the amount of net actual savings that would arise if the Seanad was abolished. While there would be savings relating to salary and expense costs, parliamentary printing, ICT, other support services, etc., there would be substantial increases in the pension costs and possible redundancy payments to outgoing Senators. 9. Observations Returned No observations supplied 1 Uimhir Thagartha: RIALTAIS Data: 19/06/2013 Abhar: 15. Referendum on the Thirty-second Amendment of the Constitution (Abolition of Seanad Eireann) Bill 2013 - Statement for the Information of Voters An tAire a thionscain: Oi?g an Aire Comhshaoil, Pobail agus Rialtais Aitiuil. Data an Mheabhrain: 18/06/2013 Cinneadh an Rialtais: Authorised the Minister for the Environment, Community and Local Government to arrange for the moving of a motion in both Houses of the Oireachtas, a copy of which is attached to the memorandum, for resolutions to prescribe a statement for the information of voters at the forthcoming referendum subject to any amendments which may be made to the Thirty-second Amendment of the Constitution (Abolition of Seanad Eireann) Bill 2013 during its passage through the Houses of the Oireachtas. l, Ard-Runai an Rialtais Coip curtha chuig: Oi?g an Aire Airgeadais, Oi?g an Taoisigh, Oi?g an Aire Iompair, Turasoireachta agus Spoirt Oi?g an Aire Leanal agus Gnothai Oige, Oi?g an Aire Ealalon, Oidhreachta agus Gaeltachta, Oi?g an Aire Caiteachais Phoibli agus Athch?irithe, Oi?g an Aire Sla'inte, Oi?g an Aire Gn?thai Eachtracha agus Tr?dala, Oi?g an Aire Dli agus Cirt agus Comhionannais, Oi?g an Aire Talmhaiochta, Bia agus Mara, Oi?g an Ard? ?Aighne, Oi?g an Aire Cosanta, Oi?g an Aire Post, Fiontar agus Nualaiochta, Oi?g an Aire Tithiochta, Pleanala, Pobail agus Rialtais Aitil?iil, Oi?g an Aire Ealaion, Oidhreachta, Gn?thai R?igii?inacha, Tuaithe agus Gaeltachta, Oi?g an Aire Cumars?ide, Fuinnimh agus Acmhainni N?d?rtha, Oi?g an Aire Oideachais agus Scileanna, Oi?g an Aire Coimirce S?isialai, Oi?g an Aire Cumars?ide, Gniomhaithe 211 $011 na hAer?ide agus Comhshaoil, Oi?g an Aire St?it ag Roinn an Taoisigh 18/06/2013 Ref: Oifig an Aire Comhshaoil, Pobail agus Rialtais Aitil'lil. Memorandum for the Government Referendum on the Thirty-second Amendment of the Constitution (Abolition of Seanad Eireann) Bill 2013 - Statement for the Information of Voters 1. Decision Sought The Minister for the Environment, Community?and Local Government seeks the authority of the Government to move in the Dail, and have moved in the Seanad, the motion in the Appendix to this memorandum for resolutions to prescribe a statement for the information of voters at the forthcoming referendum subject to any amendments which may be made to the Thirty - second Amendment of the Constitution (Abolition of Seanad Bireann) Bill 2013 during its passage through the Houses of the Oireachtas. 2. Background to and prescription of the statement Section 23 of the Referendum Act 1994 provides that at a referendum a statement in relation to the proposal which is the subject of the referendum may be prescribed for the information of voters by resolution of each House of the Oireachtas. Statements were prescribed by resolution of each House in all previous referendums. As with previous statements, it is proposed that it be included in a motion to be taken after the Fifth Stage of the Constitution Amendment Bill in both Houses of the Oireachtas as it is linked directly with the contents of the Bill. 3. Content of the statement The statement has been prepared by the Attorney General?s Of?ce. In making the request for the drafting of the statement the Department asked that consideration be given to an approach other than that of recent years wherein the Statement for the Information of Voters included the full text of the amendments to the Constitution. In this case because of the number of amendments such a statement (which will be made available to voters in both Irish and English) would be cumbersome, could be off-putting for voters and may not achieve the objective of providing information. Neither would it be user friendly when being used to assist voters in polling stations. The statement contains instructions on voting as on previous occasions. It has been the practice to also inform voters that a copy of the Bill can be inspected or obtained free of charge at any Post Of?ce and that it may also be Viewed on the internet at This is not included in the Statement on this occasion given that the requirement to make copies of the Bill available in Post Of?ces is proposed to be repealed in the Electoral (Amendment) Bill 2013. It?s not clear yet if that provision will be enacted in time to have effect for the Autumn referendums. Either way a line about viewing the Bill can be added to the booklet (polling information card and Statement for the Information of Voters) at a later stage. 4. Distribution of the statement The Statement will be sent to each elector with a polling information card, as one document, to arrive no later than the third day before polling day. This is the timeline speci?ed in Section 92 of the Electoral Act 1992 for the polling information card. A copy of the statement will also be sent to every elector whose name is on the postal and special voters list for each constituency. The statement will be displayed in the precincts of every polling station. The statement may be read out by the presiding of?cer when assisting visually impaired or physically incapacitated electors, or electors with reading or writing dif?culties, in marking their ballot papers. The statement will be in English and Irish in all of these communications. 5. Impacts There are no impacts for the following: Employment, North-South, East-West Relations, Gender Equality, Poverty Proo?ng, Industry Costs, Rural Communities, Quality Regulation. 6. Cost to Exchequer of Proposal The cost of the statement will be met, as with other referendum expenses, by the Department of Finance from the Central Fund. The combination of the statement and the polling information card into one document for issue to voters will result in signi?cant savings in postage costs compared to the cost of issuing them separately. 7. Ministerial Observations Time has not allowed for the circulation of this Memorandum to all Ministers for observations. The Department of the Taoiseach has been consulted on the text of the statement. 8. Observations Returned N0 observations supplied Appendix to the Memorandum to Government on the Statement for the Information of Voters MOTION THAT the statement set out in the Schedule to this Resolution be prescribed for the information of voters, pursuant to section 23 of the Referendum Act 1994 (No.12 of 1994), in relation to the proposal to amend the Constitution for the purpose of abolishing Seanad Eireann and providing that the Oireachtas shall, from the date of such abolition, consist of the President and Dail Eireann and in consequence of the foregoing, to amend otherwise the Constitution and, in particular, to amend those provisions of it that confer functions on Seanad Eireann or that are premised on the existence of that House, which is contained in the Thirty?second Amendment of the Constitution (Abolition of Seanad Eireann) Bill 2013 and is the subject of a constitutional referendum. Schedule You are being asked if you agree with the proposal to amend the Constitution to abolish Seanad Eireann, to provide that from the date of such abolition the Oireachtas shall consist of the President and Doll Eireann, and to amend other provisions of the Constitution that confer functions on Seanad Eireann or that are premised on the existence of Seanad Eireann. IF YOU APPROVE of the proposal, mark opposite the word YES on the ballot paper. IF YOU DO NOT APPROVE of the proposal, mark opposite the word NO on the ballot paper. 1 Uimhir Thagartha: 8180/20/ 10/ 1639 8180/20/ 10/1742 RIALTAIS Data: 23/07/2013 Abhar: 69. Date of Referendum An tAire a thionscain: Oi?g an Aire Comhshaoil, Pobail agus Rialtais Aiti?il. Data an Mheabhr?in: 24/07/2013 Cinneadh an Rialtais: Agreed that the date for the holding of Referenda to amend the Constitution to provide for the establishment of a Court of Appeal, and (ii) the Abolition of the Seanad be Friday, 4 October, 2013, with voting between 7am and 10pm. Ard?R?nai an Rialtais C?ip curtha chuig: Oi?g an Aire Airgeadais, Oi?g an Taoisigh, Oi?g an Aire Iompair, Turasoireachta agus Spoirt, Oi?g an Aire Leanai agus Gnothai Oige, Oi?g an Aire Ealaion, Oidhreachta agus Gaeltachta, Oi?g an Aire Caiteachais Phoibli agus Athch?irithe, Oi?g an Aire Slainte, Oi?g an Aire Gn?thai Eachtracha agus Tradala, Oi?g an Aire Dli agus Cirt agus Comhionannais, Oi?g an Aire Talmhaiochta, Bia agus Mara, Oi?g an Ard- Aighne, Oi?g an Aire Cosanta, Oi?g an Aire Post Fiontar agus Nu?lalochta, Oi?g an Aire Tithiochta, Pleanala, Pobail agus Rialtais Aiti?il, Oi?g an Aire Ealaion, Oidhreachta, Gn?thai R?igii'macha, Tuaithe agus Gaeltachta, Oi?g an Aire Cumars?ide, Fuinnimh agus Acmhainni N?d?rtha, Oi?g an Aire Oideachais agus Scileanna, Oi?g an Aire Coimirce S?isialai, Oi?g an Aire Cumars?ide, Gniomhaithe ar son na hAer?ide agus Comhshaoil, Oi?g an Aire St?it ag Roinn an Taoisigh 1 Uimhir Thagartha: RIALTAIS Data: 05/09/2013 Abhar: 14. Abolition of the Seanad: Present Position An tAire a thionscain: Oi?g an Taoisigh Data an Mheabhr?in: 04/09/2013 Cinneadh an Rialtais: Noted the present state of preparations relating to the Programme for Government commitment to put to the people a referendum on abolition of the Seanad. l; Ard-Ri'inai an Rialtais Coip curtha chuig: Oi?g an Aire Airgeadais, Oi?g an Aire Iompair, Turasoireachta agus Spoirt Oi?g an Aire Leanai agus Gn?thai Oige Oi?g an Aire Ealaion Oidhreachta agus Gaeltachta, Oi?g an Aire Caiteachais Phoibli agus Athchoirithe, Oi?g an Aire Slainte, Oi?g an Aire Gnothai Eachtracha agus Tradala, Oi?g an Aire Dli agus Cirt agus Comhionannais, Oi?g an Aire Talmhaiochta Bia agus Mara Oi?g an Ard- -Aighne, Oi?g an Aire Cosanta, Oi?g an Aire Post, iontar agus Nu?laiochta, Oi?g an Aire Comhshaoil, Pobail agus Rialtais Aiti?i1., Oi?g an Aire Tithiochta, Plean?la, Pobail agus Rialtais Aiti?il, Oi?g an Aire Ealaion, Oidhreachta, Gn?thai R?igi?nacha, Tuaithe agus Gaeltachta, Oi?g an Aire Cumars?ide, Fuinnimh agus Acmhainni N?d?rtha, Oi?g an Aire Oideachais agus Scileanna, Oi?g an Aire Coimirce S?isialai, Oi?g an Aire Cumars?ide, Gniomhaithe ar son na hAer?ide agus Comhshaoil, Oi?g an Aire St?it ag Roinn an Taoisigh 04/09/2013 Ref: 250/3 Oi?g an Taoisigh Memorandum for the Information of the Government Abolition of the Seanad: Present Position 1. Matter/Issue for Information The Taoiseach asks the Government to note the present state of preparations relating to the Programme for Government comrnitment to put to the people a referendum on abolition of the Seanad 2. Background/Reason for Memorandum The Programme for Government contains a commitment to put to the people a referendum on the abolition of the Seanad. The Taoiseach made clear in the Dail earlier this year the Govemment?s intention that the referendum would be held this Autumn. 3. Present Position On 5 June 2013 the Taoiseach and Tanaiste held a press conference to announce the publication of the Bill to enable the holding of the. referendum the Thirty?second Amendment of the Constitution (Abolition of Seanad Bireann) Bill 2013. The Bill and Explanatory Memorandum were published the following day, 6 June 2013. The Bill was then debated and passed by the Houses of the Oireachtas as follows. The Dail debated Second Stage June, and Committee and remaining Stages on 25 June 2013. The Seanad debated Second Stage on 26 and 27 June and 3 and 4 July, Committee Stage on 10 and 11 July, Report Stage on 17 and 23 July and remaining Stages on 23 July 2013. The Bill to enable the holding of the Court of Appeal referendum completed its passage through the Houses of the Oireachtas on 24 July and on that day the Minister for the Environment, Community and Local Government made an order ?xing Friday 4 October 2013 as the date for both referendums, with the polls to be open from 7 am. to 10 pm. 4. Public Information and the Referendum Commission The Government decided on 26 February 2013 that it would not be running a public information campaign in relation to the referendum on abolition of the Seanad. On 7 June 2013 the Minister for the Environment, Community and Local Government established the Referendum Commission for the Seanad Abolition referendum. It is chaired by High Court Judge Elizabeth Dunne. The Department of the Taoiseach has allocated ?1.8m to the Referendum Commission to fund the Commission?s public information campaign. The Referendum Commission is due to launch its information campaign on abolition of the Seanad on Thursday, 5th September at 11.00 am, in their of?ces at 18 Lower Leeson Street, Dublin 2. In keeping with the campaigns used for previous referenda, information booklets will be posted to every household in the country highlighting the relevant issues in favour and against abolition of the Seanad. Various media, including television, radio, newspapers, billboards as well as social media and the internet will also be used by the Commission to get its message across. The Commission?s information campaign on the Court of Appeal will be launched at the same time and will use the same formats as those being used for the campaign on abolition of the Seanad. 5. Implementing legislation If the proposed amendment to the Constitution is approved, the Taoiseach will need to bring forward implementing legislation. 6. Observations Returned No observations supplied 01 C1 1 Uimhir Thagartha: 1 80/20/1 0/1742/ 8180/20/10/1639 CRUINNIU RIALTAIS Data: 17/12/2013 Abhar: . Report of the Referendum Commission on the Referendums on the Thirty?second Amendment of the Constitution (Abolition of Seanad Eireann) Bill 2013 and Thirty?third Amendment of the Constitution (Court of Appeal) Bill 2013. An tAire a thionscain: Oifig an Aire Comhshaoil, Pobail agus Rialtais Aitiuil. Data an Mheabhrain: 11/12/2013 Cinneadh an Rialtais: Noted the report of the Referendum Commission on the referendums on the Abolition of Seanad Eireann and the Court of Appeal, prior to laying the report before both Houses of the Oireachtas Ard-Runai an Rialtais C?ip curtha chuig: Oi?g an Aire Airgeadais, Oi?g an Taoisigh, Oi?g an Aire Caiteachais Phoibli' agus Athchoirithe, Oi?g an Aire Gnothai Eachtracha agus Tradala, Oi?g an Aire Tithfochta, Pleanala, Pobail agus Rialtais Aitiuil OKLU 11/12/2013 Ref: Oi?g an Aire Comhshaoil, Pobail agus Rialtais Aiti?il. Memorandum for the Government Report of the Referendum Commission on the Referendums on the Thirty? second Amendment of the Constitution (Abolition of Seanad Eireann) Bill 2013 and Thirty-third Amendment of the Constitution (Court of Appeal) Bi112013. ,Ilgt 1. Matter for Information The Minister for the Environment, Communityand Local Government requests the Government to note the report of the Referendum Commission on the referendums on the Abolition of Seanad Eireann and the Court of Appeal, prior to his laying the report before each House of the Oireachtas as required under section 14(1) of the Referendum Act 1998. 2. Referendum Commission 2.1 Background A statutory Referendum Commission has been established for every referendum held since the enactment of the Referendum Act 1998. The function of a Referendum Commission, as provided for in section 3 of the Referendum ,Act 1998, as amended, is to prepare and distribute one or more statements to explain the subject matter of the referendum to the electorate, to promote public awareness of the referendum and to encourage the electorate to vote. The costs of a Referendum Commission. are met from the vote of the Department sponsoring the referendum, in this case the Departments of the Taoiseach and Justice and Equality as there were two referendums. Every Commission must submit a report to the Minister within six months of the completion of its work, in accordance with section 14 of the Referendum Act 1998. It is the practice of the Minister to bring the report of a Referendum Commission to the attention of Government before he lays it before the Houses of the Oireachtas. 2.2 Commission for the 2013 referendums On 6 June 2013, the Minister established a Referendum Commission for the referendum on the proposal for amendment of the Constitution in the Thirty?second Amendment of the Constitution (Abolition of Seanad Eireann) Bill 2013. On 10 July 2013, the Minister established a Referendum Commission for the referendum on the proposal for amendment of the Constitution in the Thirty-third Amendment of the Constitution (Court of Appeal) Bill 2013. Both Commissions, which effectively acted as one Commission, were chaired by the then High Court Judge Ms Justice Elizabeth Dunne. The ordinary members of every Referendum Commission are the same for each referendum. They are the Comptroller and Auditor General, the Ombudsman, the Clerk of the Dail and the Clerk of the Seanad. 3. The report of the Referendum Commission The report of the Referendum Commission On 29 November 2013 Judge Elizabeth Dunne, Chairperson, submitted to the Minister a report on the performance by the Commission of its functions under the Referendum Act 1998. A copy of the report is attached to this Memorandum. The report has 6 chapters. Chapter 1 Introduction covers the establishment of the Commission, the role of the Commission, elements of the Commission campaign and post-campaign research. Chapter 2 - Key Features of the Referendum- covers the referendum Bills, time available to the Commission, the ballot papers and voter turnout. Chapter 3 - The Commission?s Information Campaign - covers the importance of information for voters, the information campaign strategy and details on elements of the campaign. Chapter 4 Post-Campaign Research - covers awareness, understanding of the referendum issues, who didn?t vote, why did voters not vote, the referendum debate, effectiveness of the Commission?s campaign, timescale of the Commission?s campaign, ease of understanding the ballot paper and ballot paper confusion. Chapter 5 Resources covers funding of the Referendum Commission. The Commission was allocated a total budget of ?33 million to carry out its work - ?1.8 million from the Department of the Taoiseach and ?1 .5 million from the Department of Justice and Equality - of which 62.386 million was spent. The costs of the secretariat, provided by the Of?ce of the Ombudsman, were borne in full by that Of?ce and are not included in the ?23 86 million. Neither the Chairman nor the other members of the Referendum Commission received any payment for Commission work. Chapter 6 - Conclusions and Recommendations covers the Commission?s assessment of the effectiveness of the manner in which it discharged its functions and the recommendations of the Commission. When the Government has noted the report, the Minister will lay it before the Houses of the Oireachtas and it will then be published on the Commission website. 4. The Commission?s information campaign and post campaign research The Commission?s information campaign is described in Chapter 3 of the report. It has been a regular complaint from successive Commissions over the years that suf?cient time was not made available to enable Commissions to develop more considered information campaigns. On this occasion, the Commission acknowledges that suf?cient time (some 4 months) was available. This enabled them, at the start of their campaign, to review the ef?cacy of the ?hard copy? guide to referendum proposals that successive Commissions have sent to all homes on previous occasions. They concluded that the guide continued to play a vital part in the communications campaign this was subsequently borne out in the post campaign research which con?rmed that 70% of those who used the guide found it to be helpful. The additional time enabled the Commission to conduct focus group research with members of the public prior to publication of the guide, leading to helpful feedback and changes to design, layout and phraseology in the guide. The additional time also enabled the Commission to integrate the guide with a strong online presence that involved an expanded website with substantial video and text content and engagement on social media through Twitter and Facebook. The campaign also involved an extensive advertising campaign on television and radio, in print and online, encouraging people to vote. A press conference was arranged to announce the campaign; press statements were issued to regional press; newspaper articles by the Chairperson explaining the referendum proposals were published; use was made of social media (Facebook for the ?rst time) and links from the Commission website to the ?check the register? website were established. The website, which had a video clip targeting young people, was visited by 113,000 people compared to 49,000 for the Childrens referendum, re?ecting the increased volume and variety of material on the site and the use of social media directing people to the site. The level of recall among the public of the Commission?s advertisements was also the highest of recent referendums. The Commission carried out post-campaign research to assess the effectiveness of its public information campaign and to explore why some people had not voted in the referendum. The ?ndings, which are outlined in Chapter 4 of the Report, support the View that the campaign was effective. Some ?ndings of particular note include the fact that, among those who did not vote, the most prevalent reason given was lack of interest followed by otherwise busy Some 37% in the case of the Court of Appeal and 35% in the case of the Abolition of the Seanad felt that they either did not understand the issues, did not know enough about the issues or did not know which way to vote. 55% of respondents in the research undertaken by the Commission said that it was either quite dif?cult or very dif?cult to tell from the Seanad Referendum ballot paper what they were being asked to vote for. 5. Conclusions and Recommendations in the Commission Report Chapter 6 of the report summarises the Commission?s conclusions and recommendations. The main issues highlighted, with brief comments from the Minister on each, are set out below. 5.1 Low voter turnout - a matter for concern that could be addressed by a permanent Referendum Commission or an Electoral Commission. Low voter turnout for constitutional referendums is a matter of serious concern for the Commission and is, they say, deserving of further intensive research. The Commission says there is also a signi?cant issue in relation to very low voter turnout among young voters and that there is a need for an ongoing campaign among young people perhaps aimed at second level schools to encourage voter registration and voting by young people and that this work could only be done by the Referendum Commission if it had an appropriate statutory remit and a continuing legal existence. Comment of the Minister The Minister agrees that low voter turnout at constitutional referendums is a cause for concern. The Minister notes that the Convention on the Constitution in its Fourth Report also recommends the introduction of measures to improve voter turnout and of relevant education programmes in schools. While the Referendum Commission is already mandated to ?encourage the electorate to vote at the poll? it may be that the relatively short-term existence of the Referendum Commission does not allow for as comprehensive a response to these concerns as might be desirable. The Minister will take these points into consideration in the development of proposals for the establishment of an electoral commission that would subsume the functions of existing bodies and the Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government. It is expected that proposals on that Programme for Government commitment will be advanced in 2014. 5.2 Reported confusion in relation to the ballot papers format of ballot paper should be reviewed The post-campaign research undertaken by the Commission showed evidence of confusion among voters in relation to the ballot papers and that there was signi?cant confusion in relation to the Seanad Referendum ballot paper. The research showed that 55% of the respondents reported that it was quite dif?cult or very dif?cult to tell from the Seanad ballot paper what they were being asked to vote for. The comparable ?gure for the Court of Appeal referendum was 47%. The research showed that 13% of respondents who voted ?Yes? on the Seanad ballot paper meant their vote to be a vote for the retention rather than the abolition of the Seanad; 6% of those who voted ?No? meant their vote to be a vote for the abolition rather than the retention of the Seanad. The Commission notes that ?if these research ?gures accurately re?ect voter behaviour and intentions the outcome of the referendum the rejection of the proposal to abolish the Seanad would have remained the same and indeed the margin of rejection would have been greater?. This was the ?rst occasion on which the Referendum Commission asked questions designed to probe possible voter confusion and ease of understanding of the ballot paper. The Commission suggests that further research in this area would be and that consideration be given to a review of the format of the ballot paper. Comment of the Minister The Minister notes that the format of the ballot paper was the subject of considerable media attention in the days following the referendums. A small number of members of the public also communicated with the Department in the days following the referendums raising concerns about the format of the ballot paper. Similar concerns were raised with the Department after the October 2011 polls when two referendums were held together. The Minister agrees that the question being put to voters must be clear and notes that the format of the ballot paper, which is set out in the Referendum Act 1994, has been largely the same since 1963. Since then 35 constitutional referendums have been held and the format of the ballot paper will therefore be familiar to the majority of voters. An important consideration in looking at the format of the ballot paper is that in a constitutional referendum voters are not simply being asked their opinion on a particular issue. They are being asked to decide on the amendments to the Constitution that are set out in the relevant Constitution Amendment Bill. A question on constitutional amendment is signi?cant and deserving of appropriate consideration and re?ection. Signi?cant resources are assigned to the measures in place to assist voters in this regard and to inform them about the subject of the referendum, these include the work of the Referendum Commission and the prescription of a Statement for the Information of Voters which is sent to all voters with their polling information card. 5.3 Future Commissions should be given adequate time to plan and complete their work. While acknowledging that they had suf?cient time on this occasion, the Commission stresses the point that adequate time is essential for any referendum commission. The Commission notes that this time could be provided without any change to existing legislation by increasing the time for consideration of bills to amend the Constitution. The Commission suggests that the Houses of the Oireachtas might consider mandatory pre-legislative hearings by the appropriate Oireachtas Committee in the case of Bills to amend the Constitution and the taking of Committee stage of the Bill in an open-ended plenary session in the Dail. Comment of the Minister While the matter of the timing of a referendum is one for Government and the passage of legislation through the Houses is a matter for the Oireachtas, the Minister agrees that it is important to allow adequate time for a Commission to do its work and notes the acknowledgement by the Commission of the time provided on this occasion. 5.4 The referendum process should conform to accepted international standards. The Commission recommends that consideration be given to legislative change to ensure that the referendum process conforms to accepted international standards such as the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) Code of Good Practice on Referendums (March 2007). Comment of the Minister Previous Commissions have made similar recommendations and, as the Minister has noted in response to those recommendations, the ?Venice Code? emphasises a number of principles which are already a feature of our referendum procedures. It is important in the context of the circumstances described below to note that while it might be a useful point of reference and a guide in terms of principles for good practice at referendums generally, the EurOpean Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) Code of Good Practice on Referendums (March 2007) does not have direct effect in Irish law. This Code was referenced in the Supreme Court judgement of December 2012 in the case. In her judgement the Chief Justice described the European Commission for Democracy through Law, better known as ?the Venice Commission?, as the Council of Europe's advisory body on constitutional matters. ?The Commission was established in 1990 and it played a leading role in the adoption of constitutions which conform to the standards of Europe's constitutional heritage. Initially conceived as a tool for emergency constitutional engineering, the Commission has become an internationally recognised independent legal think?tank. Today it contributes to the dissemination of the European constitutional heritage, based on the continent's fundamental legal values, while continuing to provide ?constitutional first?aid? to individual states. Ireland was one of 18 founding member states of the organisation when it was set up on 10th May 1990. Ireland was also one of the ten founding members of the Council of Europe, which was established on 5th May, 1949.? The Code was subsequently cited by the plaintiff in the petition case relating to the Childrens referendum and most recently features in the plaintiff?s submissions in the plenary proceedings in that case in which the constitutionality of sections of the Referendum Act 1994 are being challenged. Those proceedings are due to be heard in the High Court on 10 and 11 December 2013. In the State?s submissions in those plenary proceedings, served on 3 December 2013, the point is strongly made that the ?Venice Code? does not have direct effect in Irish law. 6. Impacts There are no impacts for the following: Employment, North-South, East-West Relations, Gender Equality, Poverty Proo?ng, Industry Costs, Rural Communities, Quality Regulation. 7. Cost to the Exchequer of Proposal No additional costs arise. The cost of printing the report and publishing it on the Commission?s website will be met from the budget of the Commission. 8. Observations Returned No observations supplied. 9. Observations Returned N0 observations supplied