In re: Broward County Public Schools Personnel Investigation of Thompson, Tyson (P00025464) INVESTIGATIVE REPORT March 17, 2020 By: Jennifer V. Ruiz, Esq. Cole, Scott Kissane, PA. on behalfofBroward County Public Schools a vow Hi Cole, Scott Kissane THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 APPENDIX 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 NOTIFICATIONS AND CONSENT TO INTERVIEW 5 NOTES 5 BACKGROUND 6 ALLEGATIONS ASSERTED 7 APPLICABLE POLICIES AND DUTIES 3 SUMMARY OF EMPLOYMENT HISTORY 20 SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION 23 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 30 1. SECURITY AND STAFF RESPONSE TO THE INCIDENT 37 2?3 A THREAT 64 CONCLUSION 81 SIGNATURES 82 Page 2 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson aw Notices 1 Transcript of Statement of T. Thompson taken on Aug. 22, 2018 2 Transcript of Statement of T. Thompson taken on Nov. 5, 2018 3 Transcript of Sworn Statement of T. Thompson with Exhibits taken on Dec. 10, 2019 4 Principal Job Description and Essential Performance Responsibilities 5 Assistant Principal Job Description and Essential Performance Responsibilities 6 Security Specialist Job Description and Essential Performance Responsibilities 7 Campus Monitor Job Description and Essential Performance Responsibilities 8 Af?davit of V. Smith, SIU with Exhibits dated Dec. 18, 2019 9 Af?davit of A. Butler, SIU with Exhibits dated Feb. 24, 2020 10 Transcript of Statement of A. Butler, SIU taken on Sept. 7, 2018 11 BCPS Memo dated Aug. 25, 2017 Mandatory Emergency Preparedness 12 Emergency Preparedness Manual 2017-18 13 MSD SAFE Team Training 2017-18 Presentation with Notes 14 MSD Faculty Training 2017-18 Presentation with Notes 15 Af?davit of B. Goldstein with Exhibits dated May 2, 2019 16 Af?davit of C. Reyes with Exhibits dated May 2, 2019 17 Threat Assessment Procedures Manual (2012) 18 Af?davit of J. Stanley, School Applications with Exhibits dated Dec. 18, 2019 19 Transcript of Statement of M. Dubin, BCPS Social Worker with Exhibits taken on Dec. 16, 2019 20 MSD Campus Map 21 MSD Building 1 Map 22 List of Witness Statements 23 List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 24 Relevant portions of personnel ?le of T. Thompson 25 Critical Resource Manual 2017-18, Relevant Portions Composite 26 MSD Student Class Schedules Composite 27 Class schedule for- 28 Certain Personnel Records for D.Wanamaker and L.Rosen Composite 29 Relevant Portions Yearbook from the 2016?2017 School Year 30 Page 3 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CSK Matter 5888.23 49?00 Subject Name: Tyson Thompson Employee P00025464 Investigator Name: Jennifer V. Ruiz, Esq. Incident Date: Feb. 14, 2018 Assignment Date: Apr. 3, 2019 Policy 4.9 - Corrective Action (Allegations Nos. 1-12) NJC Policy 4.9 Corrective Action I (Allegations Nos. 13, 14, 15) Policy 2302 - Facility Security NJ (Allegations Nos. 1?15) Policy 4009.11 Code of Conduct NJC (Allegations Nos. 1-15) Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-1 0.081 The Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education . . . . NJC Professton 1n Florlda (Allegations Nos. 1-15) Policy 4008 Responsibilities and Duties Principals and Instructional Personnel NJ (Allegations Nos. 1-12) Policy 4008 Responsibilities and Duties Principals and Instructional Personnel I (Allegations Nos. 13, 14, 15) Principal Job Description and Essential Performance Responsibilities NJ (Allegations Nos. 1?5, 7-12) Principal Job Description and Essential Performance Responsibilities No. 15 (Allegation No. 6) Page 4 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Principal Job Description and Essential Performance Responsibilities ?Nos. 15, 16, 31 (Allegations Nos. 13, 14, 15) Threat Assessment Procedures Manual (2012) NJC (Allegations Nos. 13-15) NOTIFICATIONS AND CONSENT TO INTERVIEW Mr. Thompson (former Principal at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School) was informed of the pending investigation and allegations asserted via noti?cation letters.1 Pursuant to Policy 4.9, Action, Mr. Thompson is entitled to representation and is represented by attorney Christopher Whitelock of Whitelock Associates, PA. All communications from our of?ce were with Mr. Whitelock on behalf of Mr. Thompson. At no time did I speak with Mr. Thompson outside the presence of his counsel, Mr. Whitelock. Mr. Thompson consented to and attended a recorded, sworn interview on December 10, 2019, where Mr. Whitelock was present.2 To Broward County Public Schools? or the ??District?) knowledge, Mr. Thompson is not the subject of a criminal investigation, however, in an abundance of caution-and at the request of Mr. Thompson?s counsel, Mr. Thompson was provided with a Garrity warning prior to commencement of his sworn interview on May 22, 2019. Mr. Thompson?s acknowledgment of receipt of the Garrity warning, which was prepared by Of?ce of the General Counsel, is incorporated as Exhibit 1 to the transcript of Mr. Thompson?s December 10, 2019 sworn statement.3 NOTES Extraneous factors affecting the completion of this report include the following: the sensitive nature and complexity of the subject matter investigated; delays in production of requested records, statements, and information; volume of records; delay in obtaining the surveillance video, necessary to conduct thorough investigation; ongoing parallel investigations; availability of witnesses (and counsel). 1 See Not. dated Mar. 20, 2019 App. 1. 2 See Thompson, 12.10.19, Tx. at App. 4. 3 See Thompson, 12.10.19, TX. at Ex. 1. Page 5 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025 464) BACKGROUND Marjory Stoneman Douglas is a high school within the Broward County School District located in Parkland, Florida. MSD is situated on 45 acres of land, with approximately 3,300 enrolled students during the 2017?18 school year.4 On February 14, 2018, a former MSD student,?committed one of the deadliest mass school shootings in U.S. History, killing peop an injuring 17 others in Buildin the MSD Campus (hereinafter referred to as the ??Incident?). From the ?rst shots ?red by the last shot ?red, the active shooting lasted approximately 6 minutes and 28 seconds. At least one teacher within Building 12 during the shooting stated that it all happened ?in a matter of just a few seconds.?6 In response, then-Govemor Rick Scott established the MSD Public Safety Commission to investigate the Incident pursuant to the MSD Public Safety Act.7 The MSD Commission commenced its investigation and made certain ?ndings regarding the perceived actions or inactions of MSD administrators prior to and on the day of the Incident. Those ?ndings are contained in the Commission?s Initial Report issued on January 2, 2019.8 Certain ?ndings contained in the Commission?s Initial Report form the basis of this personnel investigation. On January 23, 2019, i was retained to conduct a personnel investigation of four MSD administrators related to the Incident.9 On March 20, 2019, BCPS through its Special Investigative Unit (STU), placed Mr. Tyson Thompson (MSD Principal) on notice that he was the subject of a persomiel investigation related to the Incident and reassigned from MSD pending the outcome of his personnel investigation. On April 3, 2019, I was retained to investigate Mr. Thompson as to his actions and/or inactions related to the Incident and whether said employee followed Broward County School Board policies and procedures in effect at that time in response to the Incident.?10 pecitically, the scope of my retention and the investigation as it pertains to Mr. Thompson includes ?fteen (15) separate allegations, which were extracted from the MSD Commission?s Initial Report.l1 Thus, the scope of this investigation is to: Determine whether [Mr. Thompson] engaged in any of the [?fteen] alleged actions or inactions . . and If so, whether such action(s) or inactior12(s) violated any District policy, procedure, and/or his job duties in effect on Feb. 14, 2018.? 4 Rosario, 08.22.13, 6:2; Staubly, 09.05.18, 37:24; Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 22:17?25; Thompson, 08.22.18, 5:7-14. 5 MSD Comm?n In. Rep. at 25, 33 (?rst shot ?red at 2:21:30 last shot ?red at 2:27:10 pm), available at 6 SJohnson, 08.24.18, 14:14-20. 7 Fla. Stat. 943.687 (2018). 8 See generally MSD Comm?n In. Rep. 9 See BCPS-CSK Retainer Agreement etrective date Jan. 23, 2019. '0 See BCPS-CSK Second Addendum to Retainer Agreement effective date Apr. 3, 2019. See BCPS-CSK Second Addendum to Retainer Agreement effective date Apr. 3, 2019. '2 See Second Addendum to Retainer Agreement effective date Apr. 3, 2019. Page 6 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) In preparing the Initial Report, the MSD Commission conducted an exhaustive investigation, interviewing over 100 witnesses consisting of administrators, teachers, students, and other personnel. The Commission also took possession of the relevant external and internal surveillance camera video footage. The Commission prepared diagrams and maps of the MSD campus, certain buildings, and surveillance camera layout. The Commission provided me with access to and copies of the transcripts of recorded statements taken by law enforcementf Commission Investigators, maps utilized, surveillance camera footage, con?dential appendices of the Initial Report, and other data gathered during the Commission?s investigation. I conducted an independent review of all materials provided by the Commission, as well as a review of records and information provided by BCPS, in the course of this personnel investigation as set forth below in the Summary of Investigation. The decision to utilize information gathered by the Commission was based on several key factors: the fact that the allegations asserted arise from the investigation conducted by the Commission; the sensitivity of the Incident; efforts to minimize interference with the day-to-day operation of MSD towards the end of the 2018?19 school year; the unavailability of or delay in obtaining certain records; and the time constraints provided by the BCPS Policy 4.9~C0rrective Action governing personnel investigations. Although access to voluminous information, data, and records, as well as numerous witness statements permitted a thorough review of the allegations asserted, the ?ndings in this Report cannot rule out the effect of unavailable information that could have been discovered with additional time. ALLEGATIONS ASSERTED The Scope of this Investigation is to determine whether the following alleged actions or inactions by Mr. Thompson violated any existing BCPS policy or the Essential Performance Duties of a Principal in effect as of February 14, 2018: 1. Allowed campus monitor(s) to open the pedestrian gate located on the east side of campus on Pine Island Road prior to afternoon dismissal on Feb. 14, 2018. 2. Failed to ensure campus monitors were advised as to their specific roles as ofFeb. 14, 2018. 3. Allowed the east door to Building 12 to be unlocked and unstaffed on Feb. 14, 2018. 4. Allowed classroom doors to be locked from the outside on Feb. 14, 2018. 5. Allowed teachers to determine whether to lock their assigned classroom doors on Feb. 14, 2018. 6. Allowed the locking of Building 12?s first and third ?oor bathroom doors prior to and on Feb. 14, 2018. Page 7 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) 7. Failed to ensure personnel and administration were trained on how to operate the camera system as of Feb. 14, 2018. 8. Failed to ensure that Det. Butler?s Code Red Training held on Jan. 11, 2018 was followed and implemented by all administrators, faculty, and staff including, but not limited to, assistant principals, teachers, security specialist, and campus monitors prior to Feb. 14, 2018. 9. Failed to ensure that Det. Butler?s Code Red Training held on Jan. 11, 2018 was followed and implemented in the classrooms window coverings, marking hard corners) prior to Feb. 14, 2018. 10. Failed to ensure all administrators, faculty, and staff including, but not limited to, assistant principals, teachers, security specialist, and campus monitors understood how to call a Code Red as of Feb. 14, 2018. 1 1. Failed to require or conduct Code Red drills from Feb. 14, 2017 up to and including Feb. 14, 2018. 12. Failed to act upon information received from two students and one of the student?s mother about witnessing a pattern of concerning behavior from-believed to be warning signs for potential school shooters. 13. Disengaged from the threat assessment process at 14. Failed to establish reporting procedures that would ensure he was knowledgeable about threats on campus. 15. Failed to ensure administrators whom where tasked with conducting threat assessments were trained and knowledgeable on how to conduct, implement, and report threat assessments (allegations Nos. 1-15 above, hereinafter ?Allegations Asserted?). APPLICABLE POLICIES AND DUTIES Upon reviewing all BCPS policies and Principal job description and duties in effect as of February 14, 2018, the following policies and duties were found to apply to the Allegations Asserted against Mr. Thompson: A. Policy 4.9 - Corrective Action Provides, in relevant part, that ?[e]mployees are expected to comply with workplace policies, procedures and regulations, local, state, and federal laws, and State Board Rules, both in and out of the work '3 Policy 4.9, adopted 05.01.01, last amended on 04.19.] 8, available at: Page 8 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Policy 4.9 further provides that ?[s]upervisors are encouraged to continually provide coaching, counseling, feedback, and/or additional support to help ensure each employees? success.?1?4 B. Policy 2302 Facility Security Provides, in relevant part, that administrators (designee) on receipt of any information relative to . . . threats against schools/students, and staff such as . . .suspicious or strange-acting individuals . . . or any other pertinent information concerning safety and security shall notify and forward such information to the SIU immediately.?15 C. Policy 4009.11 Code of Conduct Provides, in relevant part, that ?[a]ny violations of law or policy by administrative personnel are subject to disciplinary action by the superintendent.?16 D. Florida Administrative Code Rule The Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida Rule 6A-10.081 provides, in relevant part, that ?Florida educators shall be guided by the following ethical principles:? (2) Florida educators shall comply with the following disciplinary principles. Violation of any of these principles shall subject the individuals to revocation or suspension of the individual educator?s certi?cate, or the other penalties as provided by law. Obligation to the student requires that the individual: Shall make reasonable effort to protect the student from conditions harmful to learning and/or to the student?s mental andlor physical health andlor safety.? E. Policy 4008 Responsibilities and Duties (Principals and Instructional Personnel) Policy 4008 provides that ?[a]ll employees of the board who have been issued contracts as provided by Florida Statutes, or annual work agreements as provided by the Board, shall comply 14 Policy 4.9, adopted 05.01.01, last amended on 04.19.18, available at: ?5 Policy 2303 at Rules adopted on 07.17.1990, last adopted 11.17.1998, available at: 16 Policy 4009.11, adopted 03.02.1978, available at: ?7 Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-10.08. Page 9 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) with the provision of the Florida School Code, State Board Regulations and Regulations and policies of the Board.?18 Policy 4008 further imposes the following duties upon principals: A. DUTIES OF PRINCIPALS The Principal shall: 1. Assume administrative responsibility and instructional leadership, under the supervision of the superintendent in accordance with rules and regulations of the School Board, for the planning, management, operation, and evaluation of the educational program of the school to which the individual is assigned. 3. Assume administrative responsibility for all records and reports required regarding pupils, for the transfer of pupils within the school, and for the promotion of pupils.19 BLANK GO TO NEXT 18 Policy 4008, adopted 04.25.1968, last amended on, 09.17.02, available at: 19 BCPS Policy 4008 at A. Page 10 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) F. Principal Job Description and Essential Performance Responsibilities A Principal?s Job Description and Responsibilities provides, in relevant part:20 REQUIRED KNOWLEDGE. SKILLS AND ABILITIES The School Principal will effectively perform the performance responsibilities using the following knowledge, skills and abilities to: provide instructional leadership for all educational programs at the school; prepare and manage the school's budget and manage and inventory the school?s assets; to read, interpret, follow and enforce the State Board Rules, Code of Ethics, School Board policies, and other state and federal laws; use effective interview techniques, coaching procedures, and evaluation procedures; enforce collective bargaining agreements; use effective public speaking skills, group dynamics, and interaction and problem solving skills; maintain a sensitivity to multicultural issues; perceive the impact of a decision on other components of the organization; communicate effectively, both orally and in writing, and through use of technology; and analyze and use data. The School Principal will need knowledge of current educational trends and research. Knowledge and understanding of the unique needs and characteristics of school system. SUPERVISES: All Administrative, Instructional, and Service Personnel assigned to the school. POSITION GOAL: To provide the leadership and management necessary to administer and supervise all programs, policies and activities of the school to ensure high quality educational experiences and services for the students in a safe and enriching environment. ESSENTIAL PERFORMANCE RESPONSIBILITIES The School Principal shall effectively lead and manage through the items listed by category below. 15. Utilize processes to empower others and distribute leadership when appropriate. 16. Manage the school, operations, and facilities in ways that maximize the use of resources to promote a safe, ef?cient, legal, and effective learning environment. 19. Manage and delegate tasks while consistently demonstrating ?scal efficiency. 23. Cultivate, support, and develop others within the school. 29. Demonstrate personal and professional behaviors consistent the Code of Ethics and the Principles of Professional Practice. 31. Establish the job assignments and supervise all assigned personnel and conducts performance assessments according to School Board Policy and procedures, using instruments adopted by the School Board. 36. Ensure adherence to good safety procedures. 37. Follow Federal and State laws, as well as School Board policies. 2? Pr. Job. Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities at App 5. Page 11 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) G. Emergency Preparedness Manual vs. Critical Resource Manual 2017-2018 While the Emergency Preparedness Manual addresses certain emergencies and crises (mostly weather or natural event-related), the entire 151~page Manual does not contain any guidelines or procedures on an emergency involving a code red or lockdown situation. Moreover, the Manual does not contain a requirement or form for any code red or lockdown drill.21 Rather, in the 2017-18 school year, emergency exercises or code policy can be found via District Memos and the electronically available Critical Resource Manual As of the 2017-18 school year and currently, the CRM is only available online and is password protected, accessible only through webpage. It is not accessible to the public. Thus, I was not able to locate or access the CRM without SIU provided access. In the course of this investigation, I was not provided online access to the CRM, but was provided with a link to certain documents available online represented to be the current version of the CRM, which was also in effect in 2017-18. As discussed below in Section the electronic version of the CRM available in 2017?18 and the version of the CRM originally implemented and distributed in hard copy throughout the District is substantively different, as not all portions of the original CRM can be found in the electronic CRM. H. Emergency Preparedness Policies and Procedures 1. Development and Implementation of Emergency Response Preparedness Code System) and the Critical Resource Manual Within the District and MSD a. BCPS Receives an Emergency Response Grant from the U.S. Department of Education In the Fall of 2003, BCPS, through its SIU Department (ffkfa Professional applied for and Emergency Response Grant from United States Department of Education (hereinafter ?Grant The Grant Application was handled by the former Executive Director of SIU, Dr. Joseph Melita.24 On October 10, 2003, the Grant Application was approved, and the US. DOE approved a $1 Million Grant to BCPS for ?Emergency Response Plans for School Safety Initiative? under Grant Award No.: Q184E030372.25 Noti?cation of the Grant Award was sent 21 See generally Elmerg. Prep. Man. 2017?18. 22 See Smith, 12.18.19, In 45 at App. 9; Butler, 02.24.20,11 19 at App. 10. 23 Smith, 12.18.19, 8; Ex. A. 24 Smith, 12.18.19, 1[ 8, EX. A. 25 Smith, 12.18.19, 1] 8; Ex. A at Comprehensive Emergency Mng?t Project Grant Evaluation Proposal (undated), By: Jones, Elizabeth Schatten External Evaluator. Page 12 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) to the BCPS Superintendent at the time, Frank Till.26 BCPS records re?ect that SIU called this Grant the ?Emergency Response Grant? (hereinafter the The Grant had two award periods: (1) a Budget period from 10l01l2003 -07/01/2005 ($500k award); and (2) the Performance period from 10l01/2003 -07l01/2005 ($500k award .23 In October 2003, established a ?Comprehensive Emergency Management Project? to effectuate performance responsibilities under the Grant under the direction of former SIU Executive Director Melita.29 According to BCPS records, the Comprehensive Emergency Management Project or the CEMP ?was designed to improve and strengthen the District?s emergency response plans. . . to redesign the school safety plans to information the four phases of crisis management, namely, preventionlmitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.?30 In 2004, in furtherance of the CEMP, hired an External Evaluator, Elizabeth Schatten Jones, and a Project Coordinator, June Triangolo, to help implement the CEMP and assist with compliance with the Grant requirements. 31 On February 4, 2003, implementation of the CEMP commenced with a BCPS Safety Security Committee Meeting held at the BCPS administrative building.32 b. BCPS via SI Implements the Comprehensive Emergency Management Project to Comply with Federal Grant Requirements Emergency Code System and Critical Resource Man an! Introduced SI Prevention eam Established As part of the CEMP and the Grant, the National School Safety Center provided SIU with live training and materials on emergency preparedness and crisis situations, which were contained in a Critical Resource Manual.33 The SIU members who were trained by the National School Safety Center were then responsible for training BCPS school SAFE Teams.34 The SlU~trained members where formally part of Gang Unit, but thereafter unof?cially known as the Crisis Prevention Team.35 The SIU Crisis Prevention Team was led by former Executive Director Melita 25 Smith, A. 27 Smith, A. 28 Smith, 12.18.19, 11 8; Ex. A at US. DOE Grant Award Noti?cation, Comprehensive Emergency Mng?t Project Grant Evaluation Proposal (undated), By: Jones, Elizabeth Schatten -Externa1 Evaluator. 29 Smith, 12.18.19, 11 8; Ex. US. DOE Grant Award Noti?cation, Comprehensive Emergency Mng?t Project Grant Evaluation Proposal (undated), By: Jones, Elizabeth Schatten ?External Evaluator. 3? Smith, 12.18.19, 11 8; Ex. US. DOE Grant Award Notification, Comprehensive Emergency Mng?t Project Grant Evaluation Proposal (undated), By: Jones, Elizabeth Schatten ?External Evaluator. 31 Smith, 12.18.19, 11 8; Ex. US. DOE Grant Award Noti?cation, Comprehensive Emergency Mng?t Project Grant Evaluation Proposal (undated), By: Jones, Elizabeth Schatten External Evaluator; see also Grant Performance Report dated 05.25 .04, Attachments p. 4. 32 Smith, 12.18.19, 11 8; Ex. Emergency Response Grant, Calendar? Timeline of Events for the Emergency Response Grant. 33 Smith, 12.18.19.119, 11. 3? Smith, 12.18.19,11119, ll. 35 Smith, 12.18.19,11119, 11. Page 13 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) and Reginald Brovvne.36 Other Crisis Prevention Team Members included: Victor Smith; Margaret Gianni; Michelle Gallagher; Michael Berg; Nema Smith; Lynda Daher; and Rico Robinson.37 Of the eight-member Prevention Team established, Victor Smith is the only one still employed by BCPS and working in the SIU Department.38 On March 18, 2004, former SIU Executive Director Melita sent a letter to former MSD Principal, Anne Kowalski, requiring her attendance at a SAFE Team training to be held from April 19-20, 2004, and further asking her to ?nd two other high schools Teams to attend.39 Of note, MSD would be one of the ?rst high schools to attend a SAFE Team Emergency Response Training pilot as part of the CEMP. Records re?ect that Anne Kowalski was the BCPS High School representative on the Safety and Security Committee at the time.40 On March 19, 2004, former SIU Executive Director Melita sent a Memo to all Principals providing a Threat Assessment Flyer for a seminar to be held on April 29, 2004 at a U.S. Secret Service Field Of?ce, stating that the purpose of the threat assessment training is to prevent targeted violence in schools.41 On March 23, 2004, former SIU Executive Director Melita sent a Memo to all Principals with the subject line ?Emergency Preparedness Training.?42 This Memo provided notice to all Principals ofxthe April 19-20, 2004 pilot SAFE team training and schedule for rest of schools to be trained"?to facilitate school plans, drills, and other security related issues.?43 The Memo also provides a chart titled ?Performance Evaluation Model for Exercises? and identi?es members of a school?s SAFE Team: the principal, assistant principals, security specialist, guidance director, front desk secretary, "and head custodian.44 Of note, this appears to be the ?rst notice of District- Wide implementation of Emergency Preparedness Exercises (training and drills) a/k/a code exercises training and drills). SAFE Team Emergency Preparedness Training records show that former MSD Principal Daniel Traeger attended said Training on October 28, 2004.45 c. Commences Emergency Code Trainings Drills; Critical Resource Manual Redesigned and Disseminated From April through October 2004, SIU provided SAFE Team Emergency Preparedness Trainings to SAFE Teams based upon training materials provided to SIU by the National School 36 Smith, 37 Smith, 11. 33 Smith, 39 Smith, 12.18.19, Ex. A, Emergency Response Grant, Memos. 4? Smith, 12.18.19, Ex. A, Emergency Response Grant, Memos. ?11 Smith, 12.18.19, Ex. A, Emergency Response Grant, Memos. 42 Smith, 12.18.19, Ex. A, Emergency Response Grant, Memos. 43 Smith, 12.18.19, Ex. A, Emergency Response Grant, Memos. 4? Smith, 12.18.19, Ex. A, Emergency Response Grant, Memos. 45 Smith, 12.18.19, Ex. A, Emergency Response Grant, Memos. Page 14 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Safety Center as part of the Grant.46 The Trainings included ?safety plan/emergency drills . . . [and] Site assessment.?47 On April 19 and 20, 2004, the ?rst, pilot SAFE Team Training was conducted by the SIU Crisis Prevention Team for ten (10) schools including MSD.48 On May 25, 2004, submitted a Grant Performance Report for reporting period: 10f01/03 - to the US. DOE, signed by then~Superintendent Till (?Grant Report?). 49 In the Grant Report, reported that its CEMP (or Grant Project) included: ?training school response teams in emergency procedures . . . developing their individual school safety plans . . . providing training, practices, and drills for parents, student, and school staff to prepare for crisis situations.?50 The Grant Report also identi?es ?gaps and weaknesses? such as: ?lack of comprehensive school safety plans; . . . training for support staff/crisis response teams; common procedures to evaluate school safety plans; centralization of information for schools.?51 Of note, the Grant Report states that ?as of May 31, 2004 project outcomes include . . . a redesigned Critical Resources Manual.?52 On June 2, 2004, former Executive Director Melita sent a Memo to all principals with the subject line Team Training? providing notice of what appears to be the first Emergency Drill Training for all SAFE Team leaders to take place on August 6, 2004.53 On August 16, 2004, Critical Resource Manual was distributed to all Principals by former Executive Director Melita with a Memo stating that the CRM was already distributed to all SAFE Teams who attended the August 6, 2004 Emergency Drill Training and that schools should reference the CRM to assist in developing their respective safety plans.54 On August 18, 2004, the CRM was distributed to the BCPS School Board, then~ Superintendent Till, his Chief of Staff, and the Area Superintendents/Directors.55 On August 26, 2004, former Executive Director Melita sent a Memo to all Principals with a ?Timeline Reminder of Important Dates for School Safety Plans? stating that ?school safety training and emergency preparedness drills are ?rst priorities in safeguarding our schools.?56 4? Smith, 12.18.19, Ex. A, Emergency Response Grant, Memos; Grant Performance Report dated 05.25.04, p. 5. 47 Smith, 12.18.19, 1 14; Ex. A, Emergency Response Grant, Memos; Grant Performance Report dated 05.25.Smith, 12.18.19, 14; Ex. A, Emergency Response Grant, Memos; Grant Performance Report dated 05.25.04 at p. 6. 49 Smith, 12.18.19, Ex. A, Emergency Response Grant, Memos; Grant Performance Report dated 05.25.04. 50 Smith, 12.18.19, Ex. A, Emergency Response Grant, Memos; Grant Performance Report dated 05.25.04, at p. 1. 5? Smith, 12.18.19, Ex. A, Emergency Response Grant, Memos; Grant Performance Report dated 05.25.04, at pp. 1- 2. 52 Smith, 12.18.19, Ex. A, Emergency Response Grant, Memos; Grant Performance Report dated 05.25.04, at p. 2. 53 Smith, 12.18.19, 11 15, Ex. A, Emergency Response Grant, Memos. 54 Smith, 12.18.19, 16, Ex. B, Composite Ex. B?l, Emergency Response Grant, Memos. 55 Smith, 12.18.19, Ex. A, Emergency Response Grant, Memos. 56 Smith, 12.18.19, Ex. A, Emergency Response Grant, Memos. Page 15 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) On September 24, 2004, Melita sent another Memo to all Principals providing another reminder of Important Dates and a four-page document titled ?Emergency Preparedness?? This Memo explained that in furtherance of Emergency Drill Planning, schools are to ?refer to CRM, Item #99, pp. 46-47; submit Emergency Drill planning dates and after?action report dates to SIU, Attn: R. Browne? and that Drill Dates were due on September 30, 2004.58 The ?Emergency Preparedness? portion of this Memo (four pages) also covered many topics, such as: Safety plans; emergency drills; site assessments; trainings; threat assessment training; SAFE team training; emergency drill training.59 It appears that this September 24. 2004 Memo is the ?rst time that the Emergency (or code) Drill requirements were implemented by the District; speci?cally, this Memo provides that as of January 2005 all schools ?are required to conduct one emergency drill to test the emergency preparedness unique to their schools in collaboration with local emergency agencies; schools have 1 of 7 types of emergencies [or code colors] to choose from; there are two types of drills table top discussion or full scale exercise.?60 In sum, as part of the US. DOE Emergency Response Grant provided to the original CRM, which established Emergency Response Procedures (119., code trainings and drills), was provided by the National School Safety Center to SIU in early 2004. SIU redesigned the CRM to ?t the District?s needs and disseminated it as follows: initially, to the SAFE Teams of ten (10) schools (which included MSD) during the pilot training held on April 19-20, 2004; thereafter, to all Principals on August 6, 2004 via District Memo from former SIU Executive Director Melita; and ?nally, to then~Superintendent Till and the School Board on August 18, 2004 also via District Memo from Melita. Also, via District Memo dated September 24, 2004, the District implemented the required protocol for Emergency Preparedness, which included consulting the CRM to develop safety plans, conduct emergency (or code) trainings and drills, conduct site assessments, and even threat assessment training. Moreover, via the September 24, 2004 Memo, the District established the policy that each school was required to conduct of the seven types of emergency (or code) drills to test the emergency preparedness unique to their schools in collaboration with local emergency agencies; a policy that remained in effect through the date of the Incident. BCPS Emergency Preparedness: Code Trainings and Drills Conducted by SIU From 2004 2007, the SIU Prevention Team was responsible for training all of the school?s SAFE Teams in Emergency Preparedness.61 It was not until 2007 that SIU began going out to schools to practice Emergency Code Drills.62 Schools were to conduct one emergency drill a school year to test the Emergency Preparedness unique to the school and in collaboration with local law enforcement and fire agencies.63 Schools would choose one of the seven types of emergencies or codes (is, Red, Yellow, Black, Brown, Blue, Green, and Orange).64 The schools 57 Smith, 12.18.19,1] 17, Ex. A, Emergency Response Grant, Memos. 53 Smith, 12.18.19,1] 17, Ex. A, Emergency Response Grant, Memos. 59 Smith, 12.18.19,1] 17, Ex. A, Emergency Response Grant, Memos. 6? Smith, 12.18.19,1] 17, Ex. A, Emergency Response Grant, Memos. 6' Smith, 62 Smith, 12.18.19,1] 18. 63 Smith, 1213194113. 64 Smith, Page 16 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) would also choose one of two types of drills table top discussion or full-scale exercise.65 A table top discussion exercise or drill was a meeting with the school?s SAFE Team that would introduce the Emergency code, evacuation or lockdown, the procedures during such emergency situation, and the role and responsibilities of the each member of the SAFE Team.66 From late 2007 through May 2016, the SIU Prevention Team that had been originally trained by the National School Safety Center went from an eight-member team to just three members.67 As some Prevention Team members resigned, they were not replaced")8 And others were let go due to SIU department budget reductions.59 Similarly, after former Executive Director Melita, who had overseen the Grant, the CEMP, and the creation and implementation of Emergency Preparedness or code trainings and drills left in late 2009Xearly 2010, his position was eliminated.70 From 2012 through 2016, the only three remaining members of the SIU Prevention Team who were performing the Emergency Preparedness or code trainings and drills throughout the District were: Victor Smith, Reggie Browne, and Margaret Giani.71 At the time (in 2016), Margaret Giani was assigned to Sometime within the 2009-2010 school year, the CRM and school safety plans became accessible only electronically.73 Both the CRM and the safety plans were and still are password protected, and otherwise not accessible to the public.? In or around 201 5, the SIU Prevention Team revised the Emergency Preparedness exercises and code drill Memo distributed to all principals, whereby principals were advised that they could not repeat the same Emergency Preparedness or code training and drill two consecutive years and had to alternate between an evacuation code and a lockdown code from year to year.75 On or about July 22, 2015, one of the former Prevention Team members, Margaret Giani, sent a Memo titled ?Rationale? to Superintendent Robert Runcie and Chief of Staff, Jeff Moquin, providing a brief summary of the Grant, the CEMP, as well as the Emergency Preparedness (1.9., code training and drill) history within the District.76 In the letter, Giani explained that the goal of the letter was to ?promote emergency preparedness and provide a safe learning environment to all students and employees of the Broward County District Schools?? The letter also references the 65 Smith, 12.18.19,1118. 6?5 Smith, 12.18.19,11 19; Ex. at SAFE Team Assignmcuts/Responsibilities; Butler, 02.24.20, 11 24. 67 Smith, 12.18.19,111121Smith, 12.18.19,111121Smith, 12.18.19, 1121Smith, 12.18.19,1123. 7? Smith, 12.18.19,1130. 72 Smith, 12.18.19,1130. 73 Smith, 12.18.19,1124. 74 Smith, 12.18.19,1124. 75 Smith, 12.18.19,1131. 76 Smith, 12.18.19, 1132, Ex. D. 77 Smith, 12.18.19, Ex. D. Page 17 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) ?School Emergency Checklist? stating that it ?assists schools and centers with ongoing emergency preparedness throughout the school year and is completed by schools, signed off by the Prevention Team Member and sent to the Cadre Director once completed; the School Emergency Check List ensures and documents that schools and centers are in compliance with annual emergency preparedness procedures and will assist them in the event of a school crisis.?78 In May 2016, the last SIU Prevention Team Member, Victor Smith?s title was changed to ?District Safety and Security Coordinator?? At the time, the SIU department was divided into two divisions: (1) SRT (special response team members); and (2) IA (internal affairsipersonnel investigators)?0 In or around July 2016, Mr. Moquin and then?Major Craig Kowalski of SIU instructed Victor Smith create training materials for the SIU SRT detectives at the time and train those detectives based on the training Mr. Smith had received in 2003 from the National School Safety Center as part of the Grant.81 Mr. Smith prepared such training materials and trained all of the SIU detectives in August 2016, September 2016, and March 2017.82 In the summer of 2017, after being trained by Mr. Smith, SIU Det. A1 Butler was assigned thirty-six (3 6) schoolsfwork sites for purposes of conducting and evaluating the Emergency Exercises (code trainings and drills), which included MSD for the 2017-18 school year.83 While Prevention Team Member Victor Smith?s title during the 2017?1 8 school year was District Safety and Security Coordinator, Mr. Smith maintains that he was not responsible for overseeing the assigned SIU detective?s review of a school?s Emergency Preparedness process, which includes their Safety Plan, Site Assessment, as well as Emergency Preparedness exercises aflda code trainings and drills.84 2. BCPS Emergency Preparedness Requirements During the 2017-18 School Year In 2017-18, Emergency Preparedness requirements were communicated via a District Memo dated August 25, 2017 addressed to all principals and assistant principals85 with the bolded subject line: 2017?2018 SCHOOL SAFETY PLANS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS The Memo states: As part of our continued focus on safety and security planning throughout the school district, it is time to review and update all of the safety plans and emergency code procedures for your sit. These annual requirements are completed with the support of the Special Investigative Unit (SIU), law enforcement, ?re rescue/EMS and other partners to ensure collaboration 7? Smith, 12.18.19, EX. D. 79 Smith, 12.18.19, 11 36. 3? Smith, 12.18.19,1 39. 31 Smith, 12.18.19,11 40. 32 Smith, Exs. E, F, Butler. 02.24.20, 11117?8, EX. A. 33 Butler, 02.24.20,11 I2. 8? Smith, 12.18.19,1151. 35 Several others were copied on the Memo: former SIU Chief Robert I-lutchison; Directors of the Of?ce of School Performance Accountability; Cadre Directors; then-Maj or Craig Kowalski; and SIU SRT Detectives. ?6 Smith, 12.18.19, 1145, Ex. (emphasis in original). See Memo dated Aug. 25, 2017 at App. 12. Page 18 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) and coordination for planning, preparedness and responses. The SIU detective assigned to your location shall contact you within the ?rst month of the school year to schedule your emergency preparedness exercises for the 2017-18 school year.? The Memo further states that ?the following is required to be completed:? I School Safety Plans: ?must be completed by November 6 2017.? Lockdown and Emergency Exercises: ?all unplanned lockdowns, evacuations and school emergency exercises must be recorded? 0 2017?18 School Emergency Checklist: ?All schools and centers are to meet with their SIU detective to collaborate, conduct and complete this checklist. . . . All exercises are to be completed prior to March 12 2018. 0 School Emergency Preparedness, Staff Development and Communication Checklist: ?use this as a checklist to cover all staff development plans devoted to the safety of both students and staff? - Table-top Exercise Meeting and Emergency Exercises (Mk/a code training and drill): ?All principals will participate in these exercises to ensure successful collaboration and learning experience for the safety of the location . . 3?38 With regard to the emergency preparedness exercise (a?da code drill), the Memo instructs that schools should ?refrain from pre-staging the environment; training outcomes in a staged environment do not accurately provide best practices for that school, denying critical lessons learned to improve our plans and preparedness.?89 As such, all schools were required to complete a Safety Plan modeled after the CRM, 8. Site Assessment modeled after the CRM, a School Emergency Checklist, and a School Emergency Preparedness Staff Development Communication Checklist. 90 The Memo also included blank forms to be used by the school on the School Emergency Checklist and the School Emergency Preparedness Staff Development Communication Checklist. 91 Upon completion, the Emergency Checklist was to be submitted to the District?s Of?ce of School Performance and Accountability speci?cally, to the principals or school?s assigned Cadre Director.92 ?7 Smith, 12.18.18, Ex. H. See Memo dated Aug. 25, 2017 (emphasis added). 38 Smith, 12.18.19, Ex. H. See Memo dated Aug. 25, 2017 at App. 12 (emphasis in original). 39 Smith, 12.18.19, Ex. H. See Memo dated Aug. 25, 2017. 90 Smith, 12.18.19, 1145, Ex. Butler, 02.24.20, 11 16. 91 Smith, 12.13.19, 11 45, Ex. Butler, 02.24.211.11 19, EX. B. 92 Smith, 12.18.19,1152. Page 19 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) While District Safety and Security Coordinator Smith states that during the 2017?1 8 school year, a school?s assigned SIU detective along with the principal andfor principal?s designee (228., assistant principal) were the ultimate assessors of the adequacy of a school?s Safety Plan and/or Site Assessment, Det. Butler (who was assigned to MSD during 2017-18) states that detectives were not required to review a school?s Safety Plan.93 Thus, there appears to be a discrepancy within SIU as to the role and responsibilities of the assigned SIU detective over a school?s Safety Plan. Similarly, While Smith states that during 2017?18 the assigned SIU detective would decide the type of Emergency code and drill to be practiced that school year, Det. Butler states that it was Principal Thompson and Assistant Principal Porter who decided the type of Emergency code and drill to be practiced that year.94 I. Threat Assessment Procedures Manual (2012 Revised Edition) Initiated in 2002, the Threat Assessment Procedures Manual consists of District-mandated set of procedures for violence prevention and threat assessment.95 The Threat Assessment Procedures Manual (2012) contains ?detailed instructions, procedures, and forms for responding to threat situations in the school setting.?96 SUMMARY OF EMPLOYMENT HISTORY Mr. Thompson was hired by BCPS in 1994 as a teacher. 97 In 2001, and upon successfully completing mandatory LEAD Program for aspiring administrators, Mr. Thompson applied for an Assistant Principal position at Taravella High School.98 In his application to become an Assistant Principal, which Mr. Thompson authenticated during his sworn statement, Mr. Thompson submitted a two-page short essay with his ?Vision? and ??rst month plan as an Assistant Principal,? in which he stated as follows: . . . I feel it is most important to evaluate my assigned duties. Assessing the items that need immediate attention and developing a plan to address those issues would be my first priority. . . . it would be important to become familiar with all school policies, including . . discipline plan . . . and accountability reports . . .99 93 Compare Smith, 12.18.19, 46-49, with Butler, 02.24.20, '11 17. 94 Compare Smith, with Butler, 02.24.20, 10, 21. 95 Goldstein, 05.02.19,1[ 10 at App. 16; Reyes, 05.02.19, 11 10 at App. 17; Threat Ass?t Man. (2012) p. 6 at App. 18. 96 Threat Ass?t Man. (2012) p. 10. 97 Thompson, 12.10.19, 6: 17?20. See also Relevant portions of Personnel File of Thompson at App. 25. 93 Thompson, 12.10.19, 7:4?6; 12: 12?19, EX, 2. See also Relevant portions of Personnel File of Thompson. 99 Thompson, 1210,19, 8:1-25; 9:1?3; 15:4-21; Ex. 2 at p. 39. Page 20 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Of note, Mr. Thompson acknowledges that the above ?vision? and ??rst month plan? is what he would expect of any Assistant Principals he would subsequently hire as a principal.100 Mr. Thompson served as an Assistant Principal at Taravella from 2001-09 (eight years). 101 As an Assistant Principal at Taravella, Mr. Thompson organized a mock lockdown with the Coral Springs Police Department.102 In 2009, Mr. Thompson was transferred to Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School where he served as an Assistant Principal from 2009-2013 (four years) until promoted to Principal. 103 In total, Mr. Thompson served as an Assistant Principal from 2001~2013 (12 years). As an Assistant Principal, Mr. Thompson interviewed and hired staff.104 While an Assistant Principal at MSD, Mr. Thompson did not oversee security, but admits participating in two mock lockdowns before the Incident, which was coordinated with SIU and Broward Sheriff?s Of?ce Police.105 Rather, Mr. Thompson?s specialty was master scheduler (116., coordinating class assignments throughout the school). Mr. Thompson worked with Denise Reed at MSD, both as Assistant Principals, and thereafter as her supervisor when he became Principal.106 In 2013, Mr. Thompson applied to be MSD Principalm At the time, Mr. Thompson held the following degrees: Bachelor of Science (political science), Master of Science (social science), and Specialist, Educational Leadership Certi?cation.108 In the resume submitted with his application for MSD Principal, which Mr. Thompson authenticated during his sworn statement, Mr. Thompson identi?ed the following areas of expertise and experience: Instructional Plan Implementation 0 Coordinated and monitored the administration of mini- assessments for the entire school. Learning Environment 0 Organized mock ?lockdown? in cooperation with the Coral Springs Police Department I Developed School Safety Plan that outlined evacuation procedures and protocol for emergency situations Leadership Development 0 Served as mentor to multiple Interim Assistant Principals 10? Thompson, 12.10.19, 16:3?8. Thompson, 12.10.19, 7:4-6. Discussed in further detail below, it bears to note that the Threat Assessment Procedures Manual was ?rst introduced by BCPS in 2002 and the Critical Resource Manual was ?rst introduced in 2004, both while Mr. Thompson was an Assistant Principal at Taravella High School. Thompson, 12.10.19, 18:1?13. See also Relevant portions of Personnel File of Thompson at App. 25. Thompson, 12.10.19, 7:8-9. See also Relevant portions of Personnel File of Thompson. 10? Thompson, 12.10.19, 18:1-13. Thompson, 21:1?3; Thompson, 12.10.19, 24:14?16. Thompson, 12.10.19, 7:11?12; 17:9-20; Ex. 3. See also Relevant portions of Personnel File of Thompson. Thompson, 12.10.19, Ex. 3. See also Relevant portions of Personnel File of Thompson. Page 21 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) - LEAD Cohort mentor for aspiring leaders who are currently enrolled in LEAD programs I School Management - Assigned and supervised the duty rosters for Assistant Principals over the entire year for extra?curricular activities in order to provide safety and security at all events. Communication 0 Created STU Reports reporting critical incidents and the details regarding those incidents Professional and Ethical Behaviors - Made decisions based on the legal, moral and ethical implications of policy options and political strategies 0 Presented Code of Ethics and Professional Standards and Practices during pre-planning staff development??9 While Mr. Thompson?s personnel ?le is devoid of any acknowledgement of Principal job duties, during his sworn statement, Mr. Thompson admitted being familiar with and reviewing a Principal?s job duties when he applied for principal to MSD in 2013 (such duties are summarized below).110 Mr. Thompson acknowledged that as a Principal, he was responsible for supervising all administrative, instructional, and service personnel, stating was over all of the assistant principals . . . I?m supervising everybody. . . Mr. Thompson stated that as an Assistant Principal and Principal he attended many District-mandated trainings, signing the ?sign?in sheet.?1 12 Mr. Thompson admitted that the main form of communication from the District would be in the form of what he and others call ?Principal Memos,? which he accessed on PIVOT (recently) and previously on the principal memo ?nder.113 As far as attendance, Mr. Thompson stated that the District memo would say, ?Hey, this mandatory training is being offered at XYZ time and place. Be sure that you sign up for it or, you know, have your people sign-up for it.?114 Mr. Thompson maintains that he would disseminate Principal Memos, including those requiring training, to administrators, especially Assistant Principals.?5 With respect to Principal Memos providing dates for mandatory Threat Assessment training, Mr. Thompson acknowledged receiving those as an administrator and Principal, and that his practice ?09 Thompson, 12.10.19, Ex. 3 at resume pp. 1-4 (emphasis in original). ?0 Thompson, 12.10.19, 56:7?25; 6. See also Relevant portions of Personnel File of Thompson at App. 25. 1? Thompson, 12.10.19, 57:2?22. ?2 Thompson, 12.10.19, 30:13; 31:10-25. ?3 Thompson, 12.10.19, 33:5-19; 34:18-24; Comp. Ex. 4. ?4 Thompson, 12.10.19, 41:10-25; 42:1-2. ?5 Thompson, 12.10.19, 3325?19. Page 22 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) was to ?send them to the APs saying to make sure that if you haven?t gotten this training, to get it doneoaall? However, Mr. Thompson?s in?service training attendance records do not re?ect that he himself had attended the mandatory Threat Assessment training as of February 14, 2018.117 During his sworn statement, Mr. Thompson stated that he remembers completing the Threat Assessment training and receiving a binder with the Threat Assessments Procedures Manual, but cannot recall when.118 When asked why the Threat Assessment Training is not re?ected on his training attendance records until March 2019 (a year after the Incident), Mr. Thompson explained that it could have been integrated into an Assistant Principal training.119 During his sworn statement, Mr. Thompson admitted being familiar with the Threat Assessment Procedures Manual and the Emergency Preparedness Manual, which Mr. Thompson explained was for ?natural-type stuff, like how to prepare the school if there?s a hurricane coming.?120 However, while Mr. Thompson stated that he knows what all the emergency codes are and mean red, black, etc.), does not know whether the emergency code system was covered by any type of ?manual that actually outlines, other than PowerPoints slides from SIU, that de?ne or try to explain what these different [code] scenarios are.?121 Speci?cally, despite being an administrator for approximately twelve (12) years as of the date of the Incident, Mr. Thompson stated that he was not familiar with or ever heard of the Critical Resource Manual, stating that he never reviewed it and that he has ?never heard of anything called Mr. Thompson remained a Principal at MSD until March 20, 2019 when he was reassigned pending this investigation. Mr. Thompson?s personnel ?le contains positive performance evaluations and does not contain any disciplinary action or reprimand against Mr. Thompson up until February 14, 2018, during his twenty?four years of employment with BCPS.123 SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION Mr. Thompson was noti?ed of this investigation on March 20, 2019. I was retained on April 3, 2019 to conduct a personnel investigation as to Mr. Thompson?s actions and/or inactions related to the Incident and whether Mr. Thompson followed BCPS policies and procedures in effect at that time.124 I was previously retained by BCPS to conduct similar personnel investigations of four other MSD administrators (three Assistant Principals and the Security Specialist), so I was able to use ?5 Thompson, 12.10.19, 35:1-19; Comp. EX. 4. ?7 Thompson, 12.10.19, Ex. 5. ?8 Thompson, 12.10.19, 5. ?9 Thompson, 12.10.19, 48:11-25; 49:1-18; Ex. 5. 120 Thompson, 12.10.19, 48:11?25; 49:1-18; 46:4?25; 47:1?5; 4813-5. 121 Thompson, 12.10.19, 47:6?19. 122 Thompson, 12.10.19, 47:20-25; 48:1-2. 123 See Relevant portions of Personnel File of Thompson at App. 25 . 124 See BCPS-CSK Second Addendum to Retainer Agreement effective date Apr, 3, 2019. Page 23 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) the evidence gathered prior to April 3 2019 in furtherance of Mr. Thompson?s investigation, which is summarized below. On January 24, 2019, I conducted a thorough review of the MDS Commission?s Initial Report issued on January 2, 2019, along with its supporting Appendices, except Appendices and marked ?Con?dential,? which were not available to the public. I then determined the materials, documents, records, and information I would need based on the Initial Report. I then conducted online research to locate and extract those documents available in the public records referenced in the MSD Initial Report. I also conducted research on the website to locate, review, and identify all policies applicable to this investigation. I also requested the documents needed for this investigation from the Of?ce of the General Counsel and other BCPS departments on a rolling basis. Additional documents were requested based on my review of documents produced and witness statementstinterviews as the investigation progressed. Many documents were made available, while others were not located. I reviewed all BCPS policies governing personnel investigations. In particular, Policy 4.9- Correcttve Action. Due to the types of records requested in this investigation, I also reviewed BCPS policies regarding handling of student records, to ensure compliance therewith; speci?cally, Policy 5100.2-Student records: transfer, retention, and disposal, and Policy 5100.-Student records: con?dentiality andfamtly educational rights. I reviewed the job descriptions and essential performance responsibilities in effect as of February 14, 2018 for the following BCPS positions: (1) Campus Monitor; (2) Security Specialist; (3) Assistant Principal; and (4) Principal. I carefully reviewed those BCPS policies I found to be applicable to the allegations asserted against Mr. Thompson: 23 02.11-Facility Security; 4.009.11-Code of Conduct; Fla. Admin. Code Rule 6A-10.081-The Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession; Policy 4008?REsponsiblities and Duties of Principals; as well as training materials provided to the subject, such as Safe Team Training on The Key to School Safety Security, 2017?18; Faculty Training on The Key to School Safety Security, 2017-18; Emergency Preparedness Manual 2017?18; District Memos requiring performance during the 2017?1 8 school year; and the Critical Resource Manual. I reviewed Mr. Thompson?s personnel ?le, including documents re?ecting his employment history, applications, appointments, reassignments, certi?cations, and performance evaluations. I also reviewed Mr. Thompson?s in?service training attendance records maintained by Of?ce of Professional Development. I reviewed 50 transcripts and 6 summaries of statements taken by MSD Commission law enforcement investigators.125 I reviewed all statements in detail, extracting corroborating and con?icting portions relevant to the allegations asserted, while developing supplemental questioning for the subject and other witnesses. 125 See List of Witness Statements at App. 23. Page 24 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) I reviewed email production results from the followmg searches Terms . To/From/Between/Comed 1 ?door? Jan 11, 2018 to Feb. 14,2018 - Jeff Morford and/or ?lock? - Kelvin Greenleaf - Winford Porter I reviewed record production from the following request for Principal Memoranda sent by BCPS to all principals for dissemination: Security specialist training Apr. 10, 2011 Feb. 14, 2018 On May 15, 2019, at 10:00 am, I interviewed Kelvin Greenleaf, under oath. On May 20, 2019, I conducted an in?person, physical inspection of the MSD exterior campus, inspecting the campus layout, Building 1 (administration), and portion of Building 8 (the instrument or band building). I also inspected the perimeter of Building 12 that was accessible (as of May 20, 2019, the 12 Buildin is fenced off and the interior is not accessible due to the pending criminal case of State vi Case No. 18-001958CF10A, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Broward County, Florida). On May 21, 2019, I spoke with Robert Docimo, counsel for Maria Colavito (retired teacher) regarding setting her interview time and con?rmed the same via email. After not receiving a response, on June 3, 2019, I followed-up with Mr. Docimo regarding Ms. Colavito?s interview. No response was received. I take the non-responsiveness as a refusal to be interviewed. On May 22, 2019, at 10:00 am, I interviewed Winfred Porter, under oath, in the presence of his counsel, Christopher Whitelock. On May 29, 2019 at 10:00 am, I interviewed Denise Reed, under oath, in the presence of her counsel, Christopher Whitelock. On May 29, 2019 at 2:00 I interviewed Jeff Morford, under oath, in the presence of his counsel, Christopher Whitelock. I also reviewed the ?oor plan and map of MSD Campus, Building 12, and Building 1 (the administration building) prepared by the MSD Commission, which were all authenticated as accurate depictions by witnesses. Page 25 of 82 'l?yson (P00025464) On July 2, 2019 at 10:00 a.n1., I conducted a follow~up interview of Kelvin Greenleal" who provided sworn af?davit testimony. On August 21 2019, 1 reviewed class schedules for the 2016-17 school year 0 a so revrewe err ast (nown contact in orma'ion provue On August 21, 2019 at 11:28 am, I spoke with the 0 request an interview of- a a agrees to Sit for a sworn interview and the same was scheduled for August 22, 2019 at 3:00 pm. On August 21, 2019 at 11:30 am, I spoke with the to request an interview oI?tgreed an telephonic interview was scheduled for August 21, 2019 at 4:00 pm. pm. EST. 11 August 21, 2019 at 11:38 am. 1 eke with th to request an interview of?agreed to speak with a on Sit ?ing for an interview. On August. 21, 2019 at approximately 7:00 pm, .1 conducted the sworn interview of- consent and in .iresence. MSD On August 22, 2019 at approximately 3 :00 pm, I conducted the sworn interview 01" MSDW at the law offices of Cole, Scott Kissane, P..A. located at 600 N. Pine 3 an .0 . L11 'e Plantation, Florida 33324. ?was present. On August 26, 2019, I reviewed class schedules for the 2016-17 school year of! mm attended MSD, identi?ed by other witnesses as having knowledge relevant to investigation: I also renewed their last known contact information provided by BCPS. On August 26?27, 2019, I reviewed the MSD 2017 Yearbook encompassing the 2016-17 school year and extracted certain photos of witnesses. On August 27, 2019 at 8:30 am, I called Ms. Debra Wanamaker, a receptionist at MSD, to request her interview. Ms. Wanamaker and 1 exchange emails whereby I provided adequate notice under BCPS ?Policy 4.9 Corrective Action, setting her swom interview for August 29, 2019 at 1:00 pm. at MSD. On August 27, 2019 at 8:47 i called the? to request an interview 0- exchanged voicemail messages, in -xp1'essed .mwillingness interviewed. Page 26 of 82 TI IOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) On August 27, 2019 at 8:58 am, I called the 0 request an interview o_agreed to speak with about sitting for an interview related to this investigation. From Se tember 6-9, 2019, 1 exchange correspondences with-to coordinate. interview inhOn September 13, 2019 at approximately 3:46 I spoke wit coordinating-interview for September 19, 2019 at 11:30 am. in On August 27, 2019 at 10:23 am, 1 called th an interview of_1grecd to speak with interview related to this investigation. place telephonically on September 2, 2019 at 1:00 pm. However, the int - duled due to the impending arrival of Hurricane Dorian and upon learning that represented bv counsel during - interview. coordinated elephonic interview for September 13, 2019 at 2:00 pm. On August 29, 2019 at approximately 1:00 pm, I conducted the sworn interview ol'current MSD receptionist, Debra Wanamaker, at SD. Based on information provided dtu'ing Ms. Wanamaker?s interview, also on August 29, 2019 at approximately 1:29 pm, I conducted the sworn interview of another current MSD receptionist, Linda Jones, at MSD. Based on information provided by Ms. Jones, 1 followed?up or continued Ms. Wanamaker?s sworn interview. On September 4, 2019, 1 reviewed certain personnel records of Debra Wanamaker and Lauren Rosen provided by BCPS. On September 9, 2019 at 6:35 pm, I called the to request an interview o_agreed an interview was scheduled For September 26, 2019 at 6:30 pm. On September 26, 2019, due to a con?ict with schedule-nterview was rc-scheduled for October 4, 2019 at 4:00 pm. On Se tember 13 2019 at a. roximately 2:00 pm, I conducted the r11 interview otHat the law of?ce til-attorney, in On September 13, 2019 at 4:01 pm, an interview related to this investi ation. September 19, 2019 at 12:00 pm. i, oke with ?about sitting for a rreed and-nterview was scheduled for On September 19, 2019 at approximately 11:35 am, I conducted the telephonic sworn interview of former _t a court reporter?s of?ce in On September 19, 2019 at approximately 11:50 am, I conducted the telephonic sworn a court reporter?s of?ce in? interview of Page 27 01?82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) On September 19, 2019, based on the statement of I reviewed the MSD 2017 Yearbook encompassing the 2016-17 school year and extracted certain photos of additional witnesses from the Guidance Department. On October 4 2019 at a proximately 4:00 pm, I conducted the Heath the consent of and in.nesence .t the law of?ces of Cole, Scott Kissane, P.A. located at 600 N. Pine Island Road, Suite 500, Plantation, Florida 33324. On October 14, 2019 at approximately 11:45 am, I conducted the sworn interview of current MSD guidance employee, Amelia Pena, at MSD. On October 14, 2019 at approximately 11:59 am, I conducted the sworn interview of current MSD guidance employee, Patrice Frohman, at MSD. On October 14, 2019 at approximately 12:23 pm, I conducted the sworn interview of current MSD guidance employee, Veronica Ziceardi, at MSD. Ms. Ziccardi was represented by counsel, Librada G. Herrera-Navarrete, during her interview. In October 2019, I followed-u with?s to interviewing- On October 21, 2019,?clephonie interview was scheduled for October 22, 2019 at 11:00 am. On October 22, 2019 at approximately 11:00 am, I conducted a telephonic interview of nd repared an af?davit for-signature based on the same. On October 31, 201 provided-sworn af?davit. On November 1, 2019, I reviewed the MSI) Commission?s Second Report issued on November 1, 2019. On November 2, 2019, I reviewed the transcripts of additional interviews conducted MSD Commission Investigators; speci?cally, _aken on September 5, 2019 and _aken on September 17, 2019; and Abby Freedman taken on September 9, 2019. On November 5, 2019, I reviewed a Twitter post by Sun Sentinel reporter, Scott 'l?ravis, posting a photo of a Table of Contents page titled ?Critical Resource Manual? published by $111. The same day, I requested production of the any ?Critical Resource Manual? from SIU, since it had not been provided to date, nor had any witness interviewed by me or the M81) Commission, to that date, referenced a ?Critical Resource Manual.? On November 6, 2019, I received (for the ?rst time) and reviewed a version of the Critical Resources Manual provided in electronic format by Chief Craig Kowalski, $111. On November 7, 2019, I scheduled and conducted an interview of SIU employee, Victor T. Smith. During the interview, I was provided with a hard copy of the original CRM and other Page 28 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) original records related to the implementation, dissemination, and existence of the CRM and Emergency Response and Preparedness procedures within BCPS. I also requested additional records from BCPS and SIU regarding certain documents and forms referenced in the CRM for MSD during the 2016-17 and 2017-18 school years, including District Principal Memos. I reviewed the original documents provided by V. Smith consisting of 1,261 pages. On November 19, 2019, I received new portions of student records and comments/notes created by BCPS Social Worker, Marianne Dubin, related to-Ihreat Assessment. On December 2, 2019, I received and reviewed the Safety Plan submitted by MSD for the 2016-17 school year and the 2017-18 school year, provided for the ?rst time. On December 3, 2019 at approximately 11:45 am, I spoke with Marianne Dubin, about sitting for an interview related to this investigation. Ms. Dubin agreed and her interview was scheduled for Monday, December 16, 2019 at 1:30 pm. in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. On December 5, 2019, commenced the interview of Jeffrey Stanley, Director of School Applications for BCPS. On December 9, 2019, I received and reviewed BCPS District Memos regarding Emergency Preparedness from 2015-2018, extracting Memos applicable to the 2017-18 school year. On December 10, 2019, I interviewed Ty Thompson, under oath, in the presence of his counsel, Christopher Whitelock, and also Lisa Maxwell, Executive Director of the Broward County Principals Association, for a portion of the interview. On December 16, 2019 at approximately 1:30 pm, I conducted the sworn interview of current BCPS Social Worker, Marianne Dubin, at Lauderdale Manor in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. On December 18, 2019, I continued and ?nished the interview of Victor Smith, SIU, whereby he provided a sworn affidavit. On December 19 continued and completed the interview of Jeffrey Stanley, and received. new portions of RMS school records, such as disciplinary history, intervention history, and comments by BCPS Guidance Counselor, Debra Work. Mr. Stanley provided a sworn af?davit. All newly provided student records for-were reviewed, analyzed, and compared agains eat Assessment records as well as all other evidence gathered in the course of this investigation. On February 24, 2020, I conducted the interview of Detective Al Butler of BCPS, SIU, whereby he provided a sworn af?davit. Page 29 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Mr. Thompson was interviewed by MSD Commission investigator Detective Walter Bonasaro on August 22, 2018 and again on November 5, 2018 by MSD Commission investigators Sergeant John Suess and Detective Christopher Lyons. ?25 I interviewed Mr. Thompson, under oath, on December 10, 2019.12? Summary of Mr. Thompson?s Quali?cations The Principal Job Description provides that an applicant must have the following education, experience, and certi?cation: a master?s degree; a minimum of five (5) years of public- school experience; a minimum of three (3) years as a Principal or Assistant Principal; and hold or be eligible for Florida Certi?cation in School Principal or Professional School Principal or a Certi?cate in Educational Leadership, Administration, or Supervision. ?23 At the time Mr. Thompson applied for MSD Principal (in 2013), he was quali?ed for position, holding the following degrees and certi?cation: Bachelor of Science (political science), Master of Science (social science), and Specialist, Educational Leadership.129 Moreover, Mr. Thompson served as an Assistant Principal for eight (8) years prior to becoming Principal where he acquired administrative experience such as: I Coordinated and monitored the administration of mini- assessments for the entire school. I Organized mock ?lockdown? in cooperation with the Coral Springs Police Department I Developed School Safety Plan that outlined evacuation procedures and protocol for emergency situations I Served as mentor to multiple Interim Assistant Principals I LEAD Cohort mentor for aspiring leaders who are currently enrolled in LEAD programs I School Management I Assigned and supervised the duty rosters for Assistant Principals over the entire year for extra-curricular activities in order to provide safety and security at all events. I Created STU Reports reporting critical incidents and the details regarding those incidents I Made decisions based on the legal, moral and ethical implications of policy options and political strategies ?26 See Thompson, 08.22.18 TX. at App. 2; Thompson, 11.05.18 TX. at App. 3. 127 See Thompson, 12.10.19 Tx. at App. 4. ?28 Pr. Job Description Essential Perf. Resp. at App. 5. 129 Thompson, 12.10.19, Ex. 3. Page 30 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) - Presented Code of Ethics and Professional Standards and Practices during pro-planning staff development.130 It is with the foregoing knowledge and experience that Mr. Thompson took the reins as Principal and thus, the highest-ranking administrator at MSD. Role of Mr. Thompson as MSD Principal Duties Mr. Thompson admits being familiar with and reviewing his job duties as Principal. 131 Mr. Thompson acknowledges that as Principal, he was responsible for supervising all administrative, instructional, and service personnel, stating was over all of the assistant principals . . . I?m supervising everybody. . . ?132 During his sworn statement, Mr. Thompson admitted that he was responsible for the overall discipline of the school and record keeping, stating ?I?m over everything As Principal, Mr. Thompson was required to use ?knowledge, skills and abilities to: . . . read, interpret, follow and enforce the State Board Rules, Code of Ethics, School Board policies, and other state and federal laws . . . use effective interview techniques, coaching procedures, and evaluation procedures . . .?134 Mr. Thompson reported to his supervisor, Director (afk/a Cadre Director) of School Performance and Accountability.135 Delegation and Supervision MSD Assistant Principals reported directly to Principal Thompson.136 Although Mr. Thompson was an Assistant Principal with Denise Reed at MSD, once becoming Principal, Mr. Thompson hired Jeffrey Morford and Winfred Porter as Assistant Principals?? During the 2017- 18 school year, there were ?ve Assistant Principals at MSD: (1) lvette Figueroa; (2) Jeff Morford?, (3) Winfred Porter; (4) Denise Reed; and (5) Max Rosario.138 Assistant Principals were expected to collaborate with Principal Thompson and perform duties assigned by Mr. Thompson, which may include, but not be limited to, establishing job assignments for employees whom he or she has been tasked to supervise by Mr. Thompson. 139 '30 Thompson, 12.10.19, Ex. 3 at resume pp. 1-4 (emphasis in original). Thompson, 12.10.19, 56:7?25; 6. 132 Thompson, 12.10.19, 57:2-22. See also Pr. Job Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities at p. 3 under ?Supervises? at App. 5. 133 Thompson, 12.10.19, 119:19-25; 120:1?10. 13?? Pr. Job Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities at p. 3. ?35 Pr. Job Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities at p. 3 under ?Reports to.? See also, Thompson, 12.10.19, 125:7-25; 12611-4. 136 AP Job Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities at App. 6; Thompson, 12.10.19, 57:2-22; Reed, 05.29.19, 9:6-9; 19:7-9. ?37 Thompson, 12.1019, 24:14-16; 25:1?7. ?33 Thompson, 08.22.18, 7:18-25; 8:1?7; Porter, 05.22.19, 12:24?15; 13:1. ?39 AP Job Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities, pp. 2?4, No. 30. Page 31 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Prior to the commencement of a new school year, Mr. Thompson would review a list of administrative duties for purposes of delegating oversight of the same to the ?ve (5) Assistant Principals (hereinafter referred to as ?Assigned Some of the Assigned Duties included oversight of transportation, discipline (broken up by grade and alphabet), master scheduling, guidan?lel department, ESE, athletics, professional development, and security, among many others. However, Mr. Thompson admits there was no formal list of responsibilities associated with each of the Assigned Duties; for example, there does not appear to be a list of the responsibilities associated with the Assigned Duty of ?campus security.?142 During his sworn statement, Mr. Thompson stated ?you?re over security . . . [there] wasn?t like a secondary list saying here?s what that means.?143 Rather, Mr. Thompson expected his administrators to take their Assigned Duties and meet with staff to carry out the responsibilities associated with their Duties. ?14 Once assigned, Mr. Thompson relied completely on his administrators to handle the Duties, stating had a pretty veteran staff in all of those different areas, so a lot of that stuff just, kind of, ran itself??ij MSD Assistant Principals corroborate the foregoing stating that Mr. Thompson would meet with the Assistant Principal to discuss his or her Assigned Duties and then, the Assistant Principal would meet with his or her predecessor to effectuate the transition in those Duties.146 There was no formaltraining provided regarding the Assigned Duties.147 Generally, as part of the Assigned Duties, the Assistant Principal was expected to supervise employees within the departments he or she was overseeing.143 Campus Security Mr. Thompson fully delegated all security-related responsibilities to the assistant principal assigned to security for a particular school year; in the 2017?1 8 year, it was Assistant Principal, Winfred Porter. ?49 As part of this delegation, Mr. Thompson also delegated supervision of the Security Specialist and the Campus Monitors to Mr. Porter.150 Since he was assigned to oversee campus security, Mr. Porter handled the day?to?day supervision of the Security Specialist and the ?0 Thompson, 12.10.19, 53:6?24; Porter, 05.22.19, 11:20?22; 13:2-9; Reed, 05.29.19, 8:11-18; 10:5-9; 19:21?22; Morford, Thompson, 12.10.19, 53:6?24; Porter, 05.22.19, 12:1?3, 15-17; Reed, 05.29.19, 9:20?22; Morford, 05.29.19, ?2 Thompson, 12.10.19, 62:11?25; 6311?6. 1?13 Thompson, 12.10.19, 63:4?6. ?44 Thompson, 12.10.19, 63:7-18. '45 Thompson, 12.10.19, 63:16?18. Porter, 05.22.19, 14:9?25; Reed, 05.29.19, 21:2-4; Morford, 05.29.19, 16:16?25; 17:1?3. ?47 Morford, 05.29.19, 16:21?22 ?43 Porter, 05.22.19, 18:22-25; 19:1-6, 11?15; 20:9-12. ?49 Thompson, 12.10.19, 58:1-8, 1316?8, 18-21;Porter, 05.22.19, 15? Thompson, 12.1019, 58:1-8, 19?22; Porter, 05.22.19, 12:20; 14:9-25; 18:22?25; 19:1-6, 11-15; 20:9-1; Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 13:18-21; Rosario, 08.22.18, 11:6-10; Reed, 05.29.19, 18:22-24; Morford, 05.29.19, 14:2-3. Page 32 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Campus Monitors.151 Mr. Thompson stated that it was not he, but Mr. Porter with input from the Security Specialist who were responsible for developing the duties of Campus Monitors.152 Similarly, Mr. Thompson stated that it was not he, but Mr. Porter who was responsible for evaluating the performance of the Security Specialist and all Campus Monitors for the 2017-18 school year. 153 When Mr. Thompson was asked whether as Principal he ever requested to review the performance evaluations for the Security Specialist or Campus Monitors, Mr. Thompson responded, ?No. no.?154 The Security Team at MSD on the date of the Incident consisted of Mr. Porter, the Security Specialist (Kelvin Greenleat), and all Campus Monitors (David Taylor; Eliott Bonner; Aaron Feis; Andrew Medina; Brian Staubly; Ana Principal Thompson stated he did not have formal meetings with Mr. Porter about the ?little things he did.? 156 When asked whether Principal Thompson would check in with him as to campus security, Mr. Porter stated, ?Mr. Thompson and I we spoke[;] [w]henever there were issues we would we would talk about it or even, you know, we would bounce ideas off each other just to get clarity and determine which direction we wanted to go in or he wanted school.?157 However, other than the weekly ?Monday morning meetings? at which Mr. Thompson expected Mr. Porter to speak up as to any security-related issues or concerns, there is no evidence of additional oversight by Mr. Thompson of Mr. Porter and the carrying out of his Duties related to security. Threat Ass'essment Oversight Mr. Thompson states that, to his knowledge, ?[a]ll APs know how to do a threat assessment.?158 Mr. Thompson states that he expects his administrators to be familiar with the Threat Assessment Procedures Manual, follow the procedures set forth therein, and attend all District-mandated trainings including, but not limited to, the Threat Assessment Training.159 However, despite delegating oversight of student threat assessments to Assistant Principals, Mr. Thompson did not have a system in place to con?rm whether administrators were familiar with and/or properly following the applicable Threat Assessment Procedures Rather, Mr. Thompson expected his Assistant Principals to bring things to his attention if there was an issue. However, Mr. Thompson states (and insists) that he did not expect his Assistant Principals to bring student threat assessments to his attention because the Threat Assessment Procedures Manual in 15' Thompson, 12.10.19, 58:1?8, l9-22;Porter, '52 Thompson, 12.10.19, 60:11?18. ?53 Thompson, 12.10.19, 59:13-25. ?54 Thompson, 12.10.19, 60:16. ?55 Bonner, 09.05.18, 10:21?25; 11:1?5; Taylor, 09.06.18, 3:19?20; 4:11-17; Staubly, 09.05.18, 3:15?17; Thompson, 08.22.18, 17:1, 20?24; 18:9?11. ?55 Thompson, 08.22.18, 55:5?12. ?57 Porter, 05.22.19, 20:21?25; 21:1?6. 15" Thompson, 12.10.19, 86:8. 159 Thompson, 12.10.19, 34:18-25; 35?43. 160 Thompson, 12.10.19, 42:11?25; 43:1-11. Page 33 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) effect prior to and at the time of the Incident do not require that the Principal be noti?ed of an ongoing threat assessment. 1 61 With respect to District?mandated training, Mr. Thompson maintains that he would disseminate Principal Memos requiring training to administrators, especially Assistant Principals.162 However, Mr. Thompson admits he did not have any system in place to check if the administrators completed the required training.163 Rather, he assumed ?everyone has been trained.?164 In fact, Mr. Thompson admits assuming that Assistant Principal Jeffrey Morford whom he hired had already been trained because was an ?old veteran.?165 It is undisputed that Assistant Principal Morford had not attended a Threat Assessment Training, nor was familiar with the Threat Assessment Procedures Manual.166 However, there is no evidence that his supervisor, Mr. Thompson, made any inquiries into whether Mr. Morford was trained or was otherwise familiar with Threat Assessments, despite delegating oversight of student Threat Assessments to Mr. Morford (as well as other Assistant Principals). Culture at MSD Created by Principal Thompson Upon becoming Principal at MSD, Mr. Thompson established what he and his administrators called ?Monday morning meetings,? which Mr. Thompson describes as weekly meetings with all administrators to ?touch base for the week.?167 Mr. Thompson would create agendas for these meetings and conduct a ?round robin? table discussions with expectation that administrators would raise issues or concerns at that time.168 However, there was norequirement to report, it was completely voluntary and left to the discretion of the administrators whom Mr. Thompson supervised. Thus, there was no oversight by Mr. Thompson to ensure the Assigned Duties and responsibilities related to the same were being carried out by the administrators. Instead, the evidence shows that Mr. Thompson delegated away many of his own responsibilities or duties to his Assistant Principals, but failed to implement any type of system to oversee compliance by the Assistant Principals. In his sworn statement, when asked about decisions affecting the school facilities and practices, Mr. Thompson admitted: gave a lot of responsibility to my peers to make these kinds of decisions, so not everything came to me.?169 However, Mr. Thompson further stated that ?whatever the situation that would come up to me, I would deal with it??0 (5721?22) ?51 Thompson, ?52 Thompson, 12.10.19, 33:5-19. 153 Thompson, 12.10.19, 42:3?23. ?64 Thompson, 12.10.19, 4213?23; ?55 Thompson, 12.10.19, 42:22-23. 16? Morford, 05.29.19, 56:6-9. Thompson, 12.10.19, 50:18-25; 51:1?5; Thompson, 08.22.18, 58:13?14; Porter, 05.22.19, 15:4?10, 23?15; pp. l6? l9; Reed, 05.29.19, 17:39, 13?19; Morford, 05.29.19, 14:17?25. 153 Thompson, 12.10.19, 52:5-21; Porter, 05.22.19, 16:10-13; Morford, 05.29.19, 15:1?10, 15-23; Reed, 05.29.19, 17:10?19, 23-25; 18:1-21. ?59 Thompson, 12.10.19, 117:13?16 (emphasis added). Thompson, 12.10.19, 57:21?22. Page 34 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) With respect to campus security, when shown District memos, forms, and checklists related to security for the 2017?18 school year, Mr. Thompson stated he completely relied on Assistant Principal Porter to timely and accurately complete and comply with such District mandatesm In fact, with respect to at least one of the 2017-18 Security-related District documents titled ?School Emergency Preparedness Staff Development and Communication Checklist,? Mr. Thompson admitted never seen it before and stating ?hopefully, [Mn Porter]?s seen this list.?172 Mr. Thompson explains his lack of oversight of Mr. Porter regarding campus security was because Mr. Porter was ?on top of his game . . . he came and told me what was going on . . . Thus, there was no system in place to ensure compliance or identify problems regarding campus security, rather, Mr. Thompson expected Mr. Porter to self-report. Regarding his managerial style as Principal, Mr. Thompson was asked: Q: Would you say that your philosophy or your theme at Stoneman as principal was, ?stay in your own lane. Everyone should stay in their own A: Yes. Yeah I was very clear about that. . . . Iwouldn?t want some peopled creeping into someone else?s? lane because they are more familiar with that particular thing. . . as far as dealing with the staff or dealing with an issue and interpreting their duties, that?s exactly what I would always say, ?stay in your own lane. Do not get out of your lane.?174 During his sworn statement, when asked whether he followed up with his administrators, Mr. Thompson stated: I mean, to say, ?follow-up? 1 can?t. To me, that means, like, a formalized conversation about something. I doubt that ever happened. I was pretty good at managing on the fly.?175 Despite, Mr. Thompson?s apparently hands-off managerial approach, according to Mr. Thompson, he was supervised in the same way by his Cadre Director(s). Mr. Thompson stated that his Cadre Directors while he was MSD Principal were Michael Ramirez and Alan Strauss.176 Mr. Thompson described his interactions with his supervisorf Cadre Director as coming ?around a couple of times a year . . . and check-in . . . . and see how things are going?m Mr. Thompson stated that in all his time as Principal, his Cadre Director never did any of the following: ?1 Thompson, 12.10.19, 74:4-8; 131:22?25; 132:1. '72 Thompson, 12.10.19, 78:18-25; 79:1?5; 87:20-25 (emphasis added). 173 Thompson, 12.10.19, 74:10-16. ?74 Thompson, 12.10.19, 134:22-25; 135:1?10. ?75 Thompson, 12.10.19, 102:2?5 (emphasis added). 176 Thompson, 12.10.19, 125:7?13. ?77 Thompson, 12.10.19, 125:14?17; 126:20?21. Page 35 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) 0 Reviewed the principal job duties; 0 Asked whether he and all administrators completed the 'lhreat Assessment training; 0 Asked whether he had completed the emergency preparedness exercise or code training and drill; a Review the safety plan with him; and/or 0 Review the Emergency Preparedness communication check list with him.178 Based on the foregoing account, it appears that there were no substantive or meaningful evaluations or accountability of Mr. Thompson completing District mandates or his job duties as Principal by his supervisor/Cadre Director. Areas of Investigation The Allegations Asserted against Mr. Thompson arise out of ?ndings contained in the MSD Commission?s Initial Report concerning certain perceived security failures at MSD on the date of the Incident, the handling 0' Threat Assessment, and alleged complaints that was a threat. Below is an analysis of the Allegations Asserted, witness statements regarding the Allegations, and ?ndings as to whether (1) a preponderance of the evidence establishes the ?fteen (15) Allegations Asserted, and (2) if so, whether any applicable BCPS policies and/or any Essential Performance Responsibilities of a Principal in existence as of the date of the Incident were violated. The areas of investigation are grouped as follows: (1) Security and Staff Response to the Incident; and (2?s a Threat. The Allegations Asserted are analyzed within each area of investigation. For example, Security and Sra?' Response to the Incident, includes allegations regarding the MSD facilities (126., the pedestrian gate, building exterior and interior doors, and surveillance cameras), compliance with BCPS mandates regarding emergency preparedness or code exercises, training, and implementation, as well as delegation and supervision of administration and security employees. Similarly! . 1, includes allegations regarding supervisio ministrators responsible for con uctin Threat Assessment and alleged notice tha as a threat. '78 Thompson, l2.lO.l9, 127:3-25; 128:1-14. Page 36 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) 1. SECURITY AND STAFF RESPONSE TO THE INCIDENT A. Facilities East Pedestrian Gate It is alleged that Mr. Thompson ?[a]llowed campus monitor(s) to open the pedestrian gate located on the east side of campus on Pine Island Road prior to afternoon dismissal on Feb. 14, 2018? (Allegation No. 1). The MSD Campus is enclosed by a chain link fence around the perimeter.179 There are certain pedestrian or walk-in gates located along the perimeter of the MSD campus. 180 On the east side along Pine Island Road, there is a pedestrian gate adjacent to the East parking lot and just east of Building 12, where the Incident took place.181 As of the date of the Incident, the east pedestrian gate was regularly opened shortly prior to dismissal and used heavily by students to leave campus.182 A Campus Monitor would open the east pedestrian gate for dismissal and then return to hisfher assigned post in the general area of that gate, ful?lling other responsibilities, until returning to lock the gate again.183 Mr. Thompson states that no Campus Monitor was able to man each gate when it was opened because there was ?not enough man power to do that.?184 During his sworn statement, Mr. Thompson explained that it was an established pattern and practice at MSD since he started as an Assistant Principal in 2010 that: between 15 and 25 minutes before dismissal, the monitors or a monitor will go around and. start opening the gates to get ready for dismissal because they need to unlock the gate and be back on their post prior to the dismissal bell ringing[;] so that?s why those gates were open, you know, prior to the actual bell ringing, to get ready for the traf?c ?ow of 3,300 kids and everyone else to get off campus for dismissal.185 ?79 Thompson, 08.22.18, 11:18-25; 12:1?4; Porter, 05.22.19, 30-32, Ex.3; Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 20:22?25; Morford, 05.29.19, 22:22-25, 23; 24:1?16, EX. 5; Reed, 05.29.19, 21:10-25. '30 Thompson, 08.22.18, 11:18?25; 12:1-4; Porter, 05.22.19, 30?32, Ex.3; Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 20:22?25; Morford, 05.29.19, 22:22-25, EX. 5; Reed, 05.29.19, 21:10?25. See MSD Campus map, prepared by the MSD Comm?n at App. 21, authenticated as an accurate depiction by: Thompson, 12.10.19, 146:12-18, Ex. 11; Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 58:1?18, at Ex. 6; Porter, 05.22.19, 30-32, Ex.3; Reed, 05.29.19, 40:6-18, at Ex. 6; Morford, 05.29.19, 23:4?13 at Ex. 5. '82 Thompson, 08.22.18, 12:10, 15?22; 13:9-19; Taylor, 12:20?23; Figueroa, 08.22.18, 7:21?24; 8:1?11; Morford, 05.29.19, 23:17?22, 25; 24:1-7; Reed, 05-2919, 21:14-25; Porter, 05.22.19, 33:1-13; Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 5:23?25; Thompson, 08.22.18, 13:9?19; 14:6-11, 13?18; Figueroa, 08.22.18, 7:21-24; 8:5?11, 25; 9:1?3; 10:4?10, 14-16.; Staubly, 09.05.18, 26:19-21; 28:4?7; Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 21:15?25. ?84 Thompson, 08.22.18, 14:6-11. Thompson, 12.10.19, 95:11?19. See also Thompson, 08.22.18, 11:18?25. Page 37 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson 900025464) When asked if he, as principal, had any concerns about the pedestrian gate being opened and a trespasser entering the campus, Mr. Thompson stated: I was not concerned. It?s been 20-some years since it?s been opened, and that?s why they?ve been doing. So it was common practice, and so there was no concern.186 Security Specialist Greenleaf corroborates Mr. Thompson?s statement, acknowledging that the opening of the pedestrian gate prior to dismissal was an established practice throughout Mr. Greenleaf?s time at MSD under the supervision of three Principals Ms. Kowalski; Mr. Collado; and Mr. Thompson and ?ve Assistant Principals assigned to oversee campus security Mr. Rosario; Ms. Ms. Reed; Mr. Morford; and Mr. Pox-ten.187 Mr. Greenleaf explained, ?[t]hat was the norm??8 As of the date of the Incident, the Monitor technically assigned to open/close the east pedestrian gate was Aaron Feis; however, since it was dif?cult for Aaron Feis to get from his post in the north lot to the east pedestrian gate, Aaron Feis and Monitor Andrew Medina agreed that Medina would open/close the east pedestrian gate at dismissal.'39 On the day of the Incident, Medina was to open the east pedestrian gate at 2:15-2:20 pm. for dismissal; however, Medina would not stay at the east pedestrian gate while it was open, but would be located in the general vicinity. ?90 The east pedestria was a principle means of ingress and egress for students; Mr. Greenleaf stated ?the gate that?walked in, most kids go out that gate.?91 Findings as to Allega?on No. 1: It is undisputed that the east pedestrian gate was open, unlocked, and unstaffed on 2:19 pm. on February 14, 2019; however, a preponderance of the evidence shows that it was an established pattern and practice at MSD to open and unlock the east pedestrian gate at dismissal time as a means of egress/ingress for students, and leave the gate unstaffed until its closure when all students had left off or come onto the campus. The evidence suggests that this pattern and practice existed prior to Mr. Thompson joining MSD as an Assistant Principal in 2010. And, the evidence supports that this practice existed under the leadership of at least two of Mr. Thompson?s predecessor Principals. Mr. Thompson, as Principal, was to ?provide the leadership and management necessary to administer and supervise all programs, policies, and activities of the school.?192 In doing so, Mr. Thompson had a duty to use his ?knowledge, skills, and abilities? to ?effectively perform certain essential responsibilities.?193 While there is evidence to support that Mr. Thompson, the ultimate supervisor of all personnel, ?[a]llowed campus monitor(s) to open the pedestrian gate located on '36 Thompson, 12.10.19, 95:25; 96:1-6. '87 Thompson, 08.22.18, 1329-19; 13-18; Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 5:23-25; 13:18-21; 14:1-8; 21:15-25. '38 Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 26:5?1 1. '39 Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 25:6?18, 21-25 '90 Thompson, 08.22.18, 13:9-19; 14:6?1 1, 13-18; Greenleaf, 09.05.18, 47:13-25; 48:1-5. Greenleaf, 05.15.19, l-16; 26:2-12 '92 Pr. Job. Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities at ?Position Goal,? p. 3. at App 5. '93 Pr. Job. Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities at ?Required Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities,? p. 3. Page 38 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson- (P00025464) the east side of campus on Pine Island Road prior to afternoon dismissal on Feb. 14, 2018,? such conduct did not violate any existing BCPS policy or a Principal?s Essential Performance Responsibilities in existence at the time. (ii) East Building 12 Door It is alleged that Mr. Thompson ?[a]llowed the east door to Building 12 to be unlocked and unstaffed on Feb. 14, 2018? (Allegation No. 3). As of the date of the Incident, it was an established pattern and practice for the doors to Building 12 to remain unlocked so students could enter and exit the Building for class.194 When asked what the practice was at MSD regarding the unlocking of Building 12?s east door, Mr. Thompson stated: There is no policy or anything about looking the doors. And I have 13 buildings on my campus, all of which have exterior doors unlocked to facilitate traf?c of 3,300 kids that have class change, and up to 500 kids that are moving around throughout that class, to go to guidance, media, whatever the normal operation of a school is. so it was not it was never a thought, to be honest with you, to lock those doors because that would shut down the facilitation of traf?c on campus.195 This is corroborated by Mr. Porter who stated that it was necessary to have the doors to Building 12 unlocked because ?we have three thousand kids on campus; [i]t would be unreasonable to expect at any given time there were thirty classrooms in that building ten on each to control the traf?c ?ow and maximize patterns it just made sense to keep the doors opened . . . there was no need to lock the door from our perspective as a leadership team.?196 Similarly, Mr. Morford also stated that the doors to Building 12 remained unlocked because of ?[t]he amount of students that go in and out of there every period[,] every hour.?197 Ms. Reed also stated that it would have been infeasible to have someone locking and unlocking the doors to Building 12 because there was not enough nuinpower.198 Moreover, Mr. Thompson stated that it was a common practice throughout the District to have the exterior doors to buildings on a campus unlocked to facilitate traf?c and the same was true of the prior high schools he worked at Taravella and Plantation. 199 194 Porter, 05.22.19, 27:3?14; Reed, 05.29.19, 23:14-23; Reed, 08.22.13, 05.29.19, 26:23?25; 27:1? 10. 195 Thompson, 12.10.19, 98:15?25; 99:1?2. 196 Porter, 05.22.19, 27:21-25; 28:1, 7?9. 197 Morford, 05.29.19, 26:23-25; 27:1-4. 193 Morford, 05.29.19, 27:5-10. 199 Thompson, 12.10.19, 99:9-20. Page 39 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Findings as to Allegation N0. 3: It is undisputed that the east door to Building 12 was unlocked and unstaffed on February 14, 2019; however, a preponderance of the evidence shows that it was an established pattern and practice at MSD to have the east door to Building 12 unlocked and unstaffed so students could enter and exit the Building for class, as there were 30 classrooms in Building 12. Moreover, there is no evidence that Mr. Thompson was on notice that having the east door to Building 12 unlocked and unstaffed posed a safety concern for the students prior to February 14, 2018. As such, the preponderance of the evidence does not support that Mr. Thompson failed to make a reasonable effort to protect the students from conditions harmful to the students? physical safety by failing to change the established pattern and practice of keeping the east door to Building 12 unlocked and unstaffed (see Fla. Admin. Code R. Consequently, Mr. Thompson was not in violation of any existing BCPS policy, procedure, or any Principal Essential Performance Responsibility when the east door to Building 12 was unlocked and unstaffed on February 14, 2018. Classroom Doors It is alleged that Mr. Thompson ?[a]llowed classroom doors to be locked from the outside on Feb. 14, 2018? (Allegation No. 4) and ?[a]llowed teachers to determine whether to lock their assigned classroom doors on Feb. 14, 2018? (Allegation No. 5). Building 12 was constructed prior to Mr. Thompson joining MSD as an Assistant Principal.200 The door handlefhardware of the classroom doors in Building 12 as of February 14, 2018 were the ones in existence since Mr. Thompson joined MSD.201 There is no evidence to support that Mr. hompson had the authority to change or modify the door handles/hardware of the classroom doors in Building 12, to change the locking mechanism so that the door would not lock from the outside on February 14, 2018. Mr. Porter stated that ?[Building 12?s] doors are standard across the district, I mean, that?s not something that is uncommon for those types of handles. . . 3:202 While no written policy was found requiring classroom doors to remain locked at all times, it is undisputed that the protocol or ?unwritten rule? was that classroom doors were to be locked.203 Mr. Thompson stated that he ?always stressed the fact that classroom doors need to be locked.?204 Teachers did not have discretion to lock their classroom doors, according to Mr. Thompson, ?they 20? Porter, 08.22.18, 8:24?25; 9:1-11. Porter, 05.22.19, 26:3?9. 202 Porter, 05.22.19, 26:10-18. 203 Thompson, 08.22.18, 30:22?23; Greenleaf, 09.05.18, 51:17-24; Porter, 08.22.18, 21:15-25; 22:1?9, 23; 53:20-23; Reed, 08.22.18, 15:46, '14?19;Morford, 05.29.19, 27:18?25; Figueroa, 08.22.18, 16:22?23; 17:2?6; Rosario, 08.22.18, 13:23-24; 14:4?6; Bonner, 09.05.18, 10:1?4; Taylor, 09.06.18, 13:12?19; Ramos, 09.05.18, 15:7?8. Thompson, 12.10.19, 99:21-24. Page 40 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) were told to lock their doors at all times.?205 If classroom doors were found unlocked, Campus Monitors were to report it to the administration.206 One of the teachers located in Building 12 on the day of the Incident who had been at MSD for 15 years, stated that his classroom door was looked that day of the Incident; further, that he routinely locked his door.207 Findings as to Allegations Nos. 4 and 5: It is undisputed that classroom doors within Building 12 had handles/hardware that allowed the doors to be locked from the outside on February 14, 2018. However, a preponderance of the evidence shows that Mr. Thompson did not have the authority to change the door handles/hardware to the classroom doors in Building 12. Moreover, there is no evidence that Mr. Thompson was on notice that Building 12 classroom door handles?hardware in existence as of February 14, 2018 posed a safety concern for the students. As such, the preponderance of the evidence does not support that Mr. Thompson failed to make a reasonable effort to protect the students from conditions harmful to the students? physical safety because the Building 12 classroom doors had handlesihardware that could be locked from the outside (see F.A.C. Consequently, Mr. Thompson was not in violation of any existing BCPS policy, procedure, or any Principal Essential Performance Responsibility with respect to Allegation No. 4. The evidence does not support Allegation No. 5 the Mr. Thompson ?[a]llowed teachers to determine whether to lock their assigned classroom doors.? To the contrary, a preponderance of the evidence shows that teachers were not allowed to determine whether to look their assigned classroom doors as of February 14, 2018. While there was no written policy requiring classroom doors to be locked, it was an established rule, which Mr. Thompson had the administration, faculty, and staff enforce. Consequently, Allegation No. 5 against Mr. Thompson is unsubstantiated. (iv) Building 12 Bathroom Doors It is alleged that Mr. Thompson ?[a]llowed the locking of Building 12?s first and third ?oor bathroom doors prior to and on Feb. 14, 2018? (Allegation No. 6). At some point during the 2017?18 school year, it was decided that the ?rst and third ?oor bathroom doors of Building 12 would be locked.208 While Mr. Porter recalls that this decision was made ?as an administrative team,? with Principal Thompson in agreement,209 Mr. Thompson states otherwise. Mr. Thompson denies having any knowledge of the bathroom doors being locked, stating: don?t have any recollection of this that speci?c decision.?210 Rather, Mr. Thompson states that the decision was made by Mr. Porter and the Security Team.211 However, 205 Thompson, 12.1.19, 100:14?18; Thompson, 08.22.13, 30:22?23. 206 Thompson, 08.22.18, 40:16; Greenleaf, 09.05.18, 52:15-25; 53:3-17; Ramos, 09.05.18, 7-8, 15-16. S.Johnson, 08.27.18, 19:5?12. Taylor, 09.06.18, 19:18-25; Porter, 05.22.19, 36:8?10, 38:18-25: 39:1-3; Reed, 08.22.18, 17:1-5. 209 Porter, 05.22.19, 39:1-3. 2'0 Thompson, 2? Thompson, Page 41 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Security Specialist Greenleaf stated he had no knowledge of the decision to lock the ?rst and third ?oor bathroom doors in Building 12.212 Nonetheless, Mr. Thompson stated that: There is no policy or procedure about not being able to lock doors. It was common practice in al the different schools that I?ve been in if there was (sic) troubled areas, that bathrooms would get locked. There could be a multitude of issues. There could be behavior. It could be, vaping, smoking. It could be vandalism. It could be plumbing issues. It could be a myriad of different reasons why they would lock a bathroom.?3 Mr. Porter also stated that to his knowledge there was no policy providing that bathroom doors could not be locked and, in fact, it was a common practice to lock bathroom doors for a variety of reasons; moreover, other bathroom doors on the MSD were also locked (referencing certain classrooms in Buildings 1 and Carnpus Monitor David Taylor stated that the decision to lock the ?rst and third ?oor bathrooms in Building 12 was made by Mr. Porter after they discussed how he was the only Monitor in Building 12, ?going up now three ?ights of stairs all day every day.?215 According to Monitor Taylor, the decision was ?supposed to be a deterrent for loitering, vaping, skipping, smoking. . . 3?216 Monitor Taylor stated that he and Mr. Porter never discussed that locking these bathroom doors may be a safety hazard.217 Campus Monitors Bonner and Staubly stated they were not part of the decision to close the ?rst and third ?oor bathrooms in Building 12.218 Findings as to Allegation N0. 6: A preponderance of the evidence shows that the decision to lock the first and third ?oor bathrooms doors in Building 12 prior to and on February 14, 2018 was made by Mr. Porter, and it appears that the only other person that was aware of Mr. Porter?s decision was Campus Monitor Taylor. Mr. Thompson denies having any prior knowledge about such decision and no witness to date has corroborated Mr. Thompson?s knowledge and consent to such decision. Nonetheless, I could not ?nd any BCPS policy prohibiting the locking of bathroom doors. Consequently, 2'2 Greenleaf, 09.05.18, 54:10?12; 55:14-21 2?3 Thompson, 117:1?5. 2?4 Porter, 05.22.19, 36:16-20; 37:1-15; 38:4. 2'5 Taylor, 09.06.18, 19:18-25. 216 Taylor, 09.06.18, 20:3?5. 2? Taylor, 09.06.18, 20:6?12. 213 Bonner, 09.05.18, 10:14?20; Staubly, 09.05.18, 29:5?20. Page 42 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Allegation No. 6 that Mr. Thompson ?[a]llowed the locking of Building 12?s ?rst and third floor bathroom doors prior to and on Feb. 14, 2018,? is unsubstantiated. However, as Principal, Mr. Thompson was to ?provide the leadership and management necessary to administer and supervise all programs, policies, and activities of the school.?219 In doing so, Mr. Thompson had a duty to use his ?knowledge, skills, and abilities? to ?effectively perform certain essential responsibilities.?220 One of Mr. Thompson?s Essential Performance Responsibilities was to ?distribute leadership when appropriate. ?221 It is undisputed and Mr. Thompson admits that he distributed or delegated all responsibilities and aspects of campus security to Mr. Porter during the 2017-18 school year. Despite admittedly failing to provide Mr. Porter with a list of responsibilities associated with ?campus security,? Mr. Thompson also failed to provide Mr. Porter with any training or oversight in the carrying out of such duties. Moreover, Mr. Thompson?s lack of involvement in or knowledge of a decision to prevent access to certain portions of the campus bathrooms within Building 12) shows his failure to supervise at least this aspect of the ?policies and activities? at MSD. Thus, the evidence supports that such distribution of security-related duties to Mr. Porter without oversight was a breach of a Principal?s Essential Performance Responsibility No. 15. Surveillance Cameras It is alleged that Mr. Thompson ?[f]ailed to ensure personnel and administration were trained on how to operate the camera system as of Feb. 14, 2018? (Allegation No. 7). Mr. Thompson states that the District is responsible for providing training on use of the security cameras and that most the MSD administrators had done the training.222 However, Mr. Thompson admits he took no efforts to verify whether his administrators completed such training: Q: Did you follow?up with your administrators so that you would know who was trained on operating surveillance cameras and who would be able to train others? A: I mean, to say, ?follow-up? 1 can?t. to me, that means, like a formalized conversation about something. I doubt that that ever happened. I was pretty good about managing on the fly?? 2?9 Pr. Job. Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities at ?Position Goal,? p. 3 at App 5. 22" Pr. Job. Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities at ?Required Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities,? p. 3. 22? Pr. Job. Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities at No. 15 (emphasis added). 222 Thompson, 12.10.19, 922-14. 223 Thompson, 12.10.19, 101:23?25; Page 43 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Access to the camera room at MSD was restricted to the administration and security personnel.224 According to Mr. Thompson, the security team that consists if the Campus Monitors and Security Specialist are the ones that utilize the camera system the most.225 The overall consensus is that Assistant Principal Max Rosario was the most knowledgeable person on the MSD Campus in using the surveillance camera system as of February 14, 2018.226 The next person with the most knowledge in using the camera system was Security Specialist Greenleaf?? Mr. Rosario stated that he personally trained ?many of the security personnel? on how to manipulate the camera system, including campus monitors, the security specialist, and some assistant principals.228 Mr. Greenleaf likewise stated that Mr. Rosario trained him on how to use the camera system, and that other security team members were also trained on how to use the cameras, such as: Assistant Principal Porter as well as Campus Monitors Feis, Bonner, and Hixon.229 Mr. Porter con?rmed that Mr. Rosario trained him and Mr. Greenleaf on how to use the surveillance camera system.?0 Similarly, Assistant Principal Denise Reed acknowledged that she had some basic knowledge on how to operate the camera system and that most administrators knew how to use the camera system.231 Mr. Morford also stated that he had some basic knowledge on operating the camera system from observing others like Mr. Greenleaf, Mr. Rosario, Monitor Feis, and Monitor Hixon.232 However, Deputy Scot Peterson, the MSD SRO, did not know how to operate the surveillance camera system.233 Thus, it appears that at least most Assistant Principals, the Security Specialist, and most Campus Monitors knew how to operate the camera system as of February 14, 201 8. Findings as to Allegation N0. 7: It is alleged that Mr." Thompson ?[fjailed to ensure personnel and administration were trained on how to operate the camera system as of Feb. 14, 2018.? Mr. Thompson maintains that he was trained and knew how to operate the surveillance camera system at MSD as of February 14, 2018 (although Mr. Thompson was not on campus the day of the Incident). 1 was unable to ?nd any BCPS policy requiring all personnel at a school to be trained on how to operate a surveillance camera system, let alone that such duty to train rested upon Mr. Thompson, even as the Principal during the 2017-18 school year. For example, the Principal job description and Essential Performance Responsibilities does not contain any requirement that a Principal be trained or pro?cient in the operation of the surveillance camera 22? Porter, 05.22.19, 40:12?25; 41:1?25. 225 Thompson, 12.10.19, 92:14-17. 22? Greenleaf, 09.05.18, 4:4?23; Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 42:7?25; 43:1?14; Rosario, 08.22.18, 25:14-15; Morford, 08.22.18, 22:21?24; Porter, 05.22.19, 40:4?3. 227 Greenleaf, 09.05.18, 4:4?23; 32:11?25; Rosario, 08.22.18, 25:11-20; Staubly, 09.05.18, 5:1?5. 22" Rosario, 08.22.18, 25:15?18. 229 Greenleaf, 09.05.18, 4:4?5, 8-10, 24-25; 5:1-8; Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 42:7?25; 43:1?14. 23? Porter, 05.22.19, 40:4?8. 231 Reed, 05.29.19, 27:4-25; 28:1?18. 232 Morford, 05.29.19, 28:16-25; 29:1-15. 233 Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 43:10-16; Porter, 05.22.19, 40:24?25; 41:1-4. Page 44 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) system, nor does it contain any requirement that a Principal train other personnel on the use of the surveillance camera system. Instead, it appears that access to the camera room where the system is located was restricted to only certain personnel as of February 14, 2018. While Mr. Thompson admits that he made no effort to ensure that his staff was trained on how to operate the camera system, the evidence shows that the many administrators and security personnel had at least basic knowledge in operating the camera system. Consequently, there is insuf?cient evidence to support Allegation No. 7. B. Supervision Campus Monitors It is alleged Mr. Thompson ?[?ailed to ensure campus monitors were advised as to their specific roles as of Feb. 14, 2018? (Allegation No. 2). It is undisputed that in 2017?18 Campus Monitors were supervised by the Assistant Principal assigned by the Principal to oversee campus security, Winfred Porter.234 Mr. Thompson fully delegated all security-related responsibilities to Mr. Porter during the 2017-18 school year, which included supervision of the Campus Monitors.235 Mr. Porter handled the day-to-day supervision of the Campus Monitors, including assignment of duties.236 Similarly, Mr. Thompson stated that it was not he, but Mr. Porter who was responsible for evaluating the performance of the Campus Monitors in 2017-18.237 When Mr. Thompson was asked whether as Principal he ever requested to review the performance evaluations for the Campus Monitors, Mr. Thompson responded, ?No. no.?238 As of the date of the Incident, Campus Monitors believed they reported initially to Security Specialist Greenleaf, but Mr. Porter was the ultimate supervisor or ?boss? who assigned monitor tasks or duties.239 Mr. Greenleaf stated that the Assistant Principal who oversaw campus security would give him his day?to-day duties, and would tell him what to relay to the Monitors.240 According to Mr. Greenleaf, he was not in charge of the campus monitors; stating, ?Monitors report to the APs . . . they?re not my responsibility . . . they reported to the assistant principal.?241 Mr. Porter con?rmed that ?security specialists don?t supervise anyone.?42 23? Porter, 05.22.19, 19:20?25; 20:6-17; Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 16:21-25; 17:1-25; Thompson, 08.22.18, 8:8?14. 235 Thompson, 12.10.19, 58:1-8, 19-22; Greenleaf, 05.22.19, 12:21?25; 13:6?8, 18?21; Porter, 05.22.19, 12:20; 14:9? 25; 18:22?25; 19:1-6, 11?15; 20:9?10; Reed, 05.29.19, 18:22?25; 19:1-14; Morford, 05.29.19, 13:17?25; 14:1?3; Rosario, 08.22.18, 1126?10. 236 Thompson, 12.10.19, 5811?8, 11?22; Porter, 05.22.19, 18:22-25; 19:1-6, 11-15; 209?12. 237 Thompson, 12.10.19, 59:13-25. 23* Thompson, 12.10.19, 60:1?6. 239 Ramos, 09.05.18, 526-7; Taylor, 09.05.18, 4:18?22, 25; 5:1?3, 9?10; Bonner, 09.05.18, 4:7-13; Staubly, 09.05.18, 22:11?14; Medina, 09.06.18, 6:16?25; 7:1-5. 24" Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 18:51-11; Greenleaf, 09.05.18, 35:7-15. 242 Porter, 05.22.19, 19:23?24. Page 45 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Mr. Thompson admits he had ultimate control over the Campus Monitors, however, he believed the Monitors were experienced and knew what was expected of them.243 Mr. Thompson stated that the Student Resource Of?cer Scot Peterson, was regularly involved with the Campus Monitors.244 Notwithstanding, Mr. Porter along with Mr. Greenleaf did meet with Campus Monitors to discuss their duties and roles; during the 2017-18 school year, Mr. Porter organized and led the meetings.245 Mr. Greenleaf stated that Mr. Porter ?met with everyone, told us his expectations.?246 Mr. Porter similarly stated that he would interact with the Campus Monitors on a daily basis and discussed with them their duties and responsibilities?? While Mr. Greenleaf stated that he and Mr. Porter met with the Campus Monitors at least once a week and Mr. Porter stated that he met with Monitors ?all the time,? one Campus Monitor stated they met occasionally, mainly after drills to de?brief, while another said they met and talked about security.?48 Findings as to Allegation No. 2: As Principal, Mr. Thompson was to ?provide the leadership and management necessary to administer and supervise all programs, policies, and activities of the school.?249 In doing so, Mr. Thompson had a duty to use his ?knowledge, skills, and abilities? to ?effectively perform certain essential responsibilities.?250 It was an Essential Responsibility for Mr. Thompson to ?[e]stablish the job assignments and supervise all assigned personnel and conduct performance assessments according to School Board Policy and procedures, using instruments adopted by the School Board.?251 Additionally, Mr. Thompson was to ?distribute leadership when appropriate.?252 It is undisputed, and Mr. Thompson admits, that he distributed or delegated supervision of the Campus Monitors to Assistant Principal Porter during the 2017?18 school year. The Campus Monitor job description provides that Monitors are to report to the ?administrator of campus site??3 Per the job description, an Assistant Principal has a duty to ?[e]stablish the job assignments and supervise alt assigned personnei.?254 It is undisputed that Mr. Thompson assigned Mr. Porter as the ?administrator of campus site? tasked with ?supervising? Campus Monitors in 2017-18. Based on the job description for Campus Monitors and Assistant Principals, it appears that Mr. Thompson?s delegation or assignment or supervision of the Campus Monitors to Mr. Porter was appropriate (since both descriptions contemplate such delegationfassignment). Notwithstanding, the preponderance of the evidence supports that Mr. 243 Thompson, 08.22.18, 22:2?7, 15-21; 23:1-6, l3?16. Thompson, 08.22.18, 28:3?1 1. 245 Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 18:12?22; 19:1; Porter, 08.22.18, 15:12?17; Taylor, 09.06.18, 29:9?25; Staubly, 09.05.18, 30:9-14. Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 15:11?12. Porter, 05.22.19, 20: 1 24? Compare, Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 19:13-19 Porter, 05.22.19, 26:20-25, with Taylor, 09.06.18, 29:9?18, 24-25 Staubly, 09.05.18, 30:9?14. 249 Pr. Job. Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities at ?Position Goal," p. 3 at App. 5. 25" Pr. Job. Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities at ?Required Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities,? p. 3. 25? Pr. Job. Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities, No. 31. 252 Pr. Job. Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities, No. 15 (emphasis added). 253 Campus Monitor Job Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities at App. 8 (emphasis added). 254 AP ob Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities No. 30 at App. 6 (emphasis added). Page 46 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Porter did regularly meet with the Campus Monitors to discuss their assignments and ?speci?c roles.? Consequently, the allegation that Mr. Thompson ?[f]ai1ed to ensure campus monitors were advised as to their speci?c roles as of Feb. 14, 2018? is unsubstantiated. C. Emergency Preparedness - Code Red Training and Drill Compliance With respect to Emergency Preparedness/Code Training and Drill, it is alleged that Mr. Thompson: - Failed to ensure that Det. Butler?s Code Red Training held on Jan. 11, 2018 was followed and implemented by all administrators, faculty, and staff including, but not limited to, assistant principals, teachers, security specialist, and campus monitors prior to Feb. 14, 2018 (Allegation No. 0 Failed to ensure that Det. Butler?s Code Red Training held on Jan. 11, 2018 was followed and implemented in the classrooms (116., window coverings, marking hard corners) prior to Feb. 14, 2018 (Allegation No. . Failed to ensure all administrators, faculty, and staff including, but not limited to, assistant principals, teachers, security specialist, and campus monitors understood how to call a Code Red as of Feb. 14, 2018 (Allegation N0. 10); and 0 Failed to require or conduct Code Red drills from Feb. 14, 2017 up to and including Feb. 14, 2018 (Allegation No. 11). A summary of the evidence obtained and ?ndings with respect to the four above?referenced Allegations Nos. 8?11 are found below. Compliance with Emergency Preparedness Requirements During the 2017?18 School Year assigned SIU detective during the 2017-18 school year was Butler.255 District Safety and Security Coordinator Smith states that some principals pushed back on conducting Emergency Drills throughout the District.256 For example, Det. Butler states that it was common knowledge among the SIU detectives that MSD was a dif?cult school to handle because the parents, staff, teachers, and overall community had historically pushed back on conducting Emergency Code training and drills.257 255 Smith, 12.18.19, 1] 44; Butler, 02.24.20, 1[ 12. 256 Smith, 12.18.19, 1120. 257 Butler, 02.24.20, 13. Page 47 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Det. Butler states that he met with Principal Thompson at the start of the 2017-18 school year at which time Mr. Thompson advised Det. Butler that Assistant Principal Winfred Porter was overseeing safety and security that school year.258 Thereafter, Assistant Principal Porter was Det. Butler?s primary contact at MSD.259 Mr. Thompson, corroborating, states that after meeting with Det. Butler, ?Mr. Porter, kind of, took the rein from there.?260 According to Det. Butler, as well as the August 25, 2017 Memo discussed above, MSD was required to complete: 1) a Safety Plan; 2) a Site Assessment; 3) a School Emergency Checklist; and 4) an Emergency Preparedness or Code Exercise (training and drill).261 Det. Butler recalls that MSD completed its Safety Plan and electronically submitted it through webpage.262 Mr. Thompson also recalls Mr. Porter printing a copy of the Safety Plan for 2017-18 for his review and that he approved its submission.263 With respect to its Site Assessment, Det. Butler recalls walking through the MSD campus with Assistant Principal Porter and the Facilities Coordinator, Eduardo Suarez, for purposes of completing Site Assessment for 2017?18264 During the Det. Butler states that he inquired as to why the school gates were opened around dismissal time, and was advised that it was common practice at MSD because so many students were coming back onto the campus for after-school activities.265 While Det. Butler recalls that MSD completed its required 2017-18 School Emergency Checklist, he cannot locate a copy at this time.266 To date, I have not been provided with 2017-18 Emergency Checklist, which would have listed the completion dates for the safety plan, site assessment, SAFE Team meeting/faculty training table top exercise, and the live emergency exercise or drill lockdownfevacuation. See sample below on the next page: 258 Butler, 02.24.20, 11 15. 259 Butler, 02.24.20, 11 15. 26" Thompson, 12.10.19, 67:13?21. 26' Butler, 02.24.20,1[ 16. 262 Butler, 02.24.20, 11 17. 253 Thompson, 12.10.19, 71:6?22. 25? Butler, 02.24.20,1] 18. 265 Butler, 02.24.20, 1] 18. 266 Butler, 02.24.20, 1] 20. Page 48 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) 13415-2 some HWWMIEJ FKOREDA 1.1le RGHEWT ?r metastases QHIEF it)? FQLIGE Telephone: [emitter-07m- rmimue; 1154132141531: ?shnet Hams: altimeter: ?rearm! Bismt?aheels '?welalinrastleethw Unit?m Bahama: am cmw?t?i? ravines! mam. pennant: mutate: sanity Plum . Elia Bn?lu ream mating Tammy-Emmet Faculwmainlnm . Live Emergency Mamas Lraakdevacim?am animate witt- wmt: summit! with that! against- unit arr-T: ?amers In reactant and seminar ?shnet safely ?anaemia slim-teasing, ealmawatlcn swam? QMWBIY. usesetaa-aml-eanduatlng u. um mama-cs ?tment; ?muf?n Bisma'h?miy Gautdf?mr' As shown above, the Emergency Checklist has a column for a principal to initial. However, when Mr. Thompson was shown the blank Emergency Checklist form included as part of the August 25, 2017 Memo, Mr. Thompson stated do not recall this form.?267 When asked whether he remembered initialing the 2017?1 8 Emergency Checklist for MSD, Mr. Thompson stated, ?Honestly I don?t.?268 a) MSD Chooses to Practice a Code Biack (Evacuation) Not Red (Lockdown) in 201 7-18 Despite prior witness accounts, it has been discovered that MSD did not plan on conducting a code redflockdown drill during the 2017-18 school year; rather, a code black/evacuation drill was planned and in fact, scheduled to take place on February 16, 2018 (the Friday after the 26" Thompson, 12.10.19, 72:13?24 (emphasis added). 263 Thompson, 12.10.19, 73:10-14 (emphasis added). 269 Butler, Page 49-0f 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) When asked whether a code red/lockdown exercise was planned for MSD in 2017-18, both Principal Thompson and Assistant Principal Porter insisted it was: Thompson Q: Do you know at what point the training the code emergency preparedness exercise was decided it would be a code red, [the] 2017-18 school year? TT: I would say - I don?t know the exact date but I would say prior to the Christmas break, it was Mr. Porter and Detective Butler that had worked out what we were going to do. Q: And that was communicated to you through .Mr. Porter? TT: Correct. . . . we were doing training in January, and we were going to be doing a code red drill after that time. A date had not yet been determined at that point. 27? Loam Q: While you were in charge of security . . . did you ever do a Code Red drilldidn?t do a Code Red drill because there?s no date certain that you have a variety of options in terms of conducting a drill. There?s no policy - there was no policy pre~incident that said a Code Red drill needs to be conducted as frequently as any other ?re drill or, you know, any other tornado drill, ?re drill. Basically you could conduct a code drill at any point throughout the course of the year and that was something that we were working on with Detective Butler. Mr. Thompson and I were pushing for that. Mr. Thompson reiterated it to me over and over again but there were conflicts with the schedule between Detective Butler and that that presented some challenges but it. Was on the schedule to get it completed. Q: Do you have any information that would corroborate the fact that there was a Code Red drill in the works in the 2017/2018 school year? WP: Yes, I mean, I kind of eluded to this a little but earlier. Detective Butler and I and Mr. Thompson were working out the details but there were con?icts in our schedules?? 27" Thompson, 12.10.19, 70:7?16; 74:17-20 (emphasis added). 27? Porter, 05.15.19, 52:15-25; 53:1?8; 78:1-8 (emphasis added). Page 50 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) However, Det. Butler?s sworn statement directly refutes the above accounts by Mr. Thompson and Mr. Porter.272 Speci?cally, Det. Butler states that while he reviewed all the emergency codes with the MSD administration, staff, and faculty during his two presentations (or table top discussions/exercises), the emphasis in his training was on code black, which calls for an evacuation.?3 Speci?cally, Det. Butler maintains that since Mr. Thompson and Mr. Porter advised there had been a code redflockdown exercise the previous school year 2016-17), Mr. Thompson and Mr. Porter chose to conduct a code blackfevacuation exercise in 2017-18.274 Security Specialist Kelvin Greenleaf corrOborates Det. Butler?s account when asked whether they had practiced evacuation rather than loclcdown procedures, Mr. Greenleaf stated ?we were in discussion about doing [an] evacuation down to, I think it was North Spring Park, maybe down - the street.?275 Of note, Det. Butler states that no time did Principal Thompson andror Assistant Principal Porter ask that I conduct a code red, lockdown Exercise (training and drill)??6 b) 2017-18 Emergency Preparedness able-Top Exercise or Code Training Det. Butler states that the ?rst thing he did in furtherance of Emergency Preparedness was ?to schedule the Table-Top Discussion Exercise with the SAFE Team for December 20, 2017,? which he coordinated through Assistant Principal Porter.277 Det. Butler explained that during a ?Table?Top Discussion Exercise . . . [he would meet with the school?s SAFE Team . . . to introduce the emergency code, evacuation or lockdown, the procedures during such emergency situation, the role and responsibilities of the SAFE Team members.?278 On December 20, 2017, Det. Butler ?performed a PowerPoint presentation to the MSD SAFE Team titled ?The Key to School Safety Security Team Training?), which was the Table?T op Exercise??!9 While the SAFE Team Training PowerPoint presentation contained notes for most of the slides, Det. Butler states that he was not aware that the presentation contained such notes and did not review nor refer to them during the SAFE Team Training.280 Det. Butler states that he discussed SAFE Team assignments and responsibilities during his presentation?? While Det. Butler states that all emergency codes were discussed during the SAFE Team Training, ?the focus was on code black, evacuation, as decided previously with Principal 272 See Thompson, Porter, Reed, Morford. Compare with, Butler, 02.24.20, 1121. 273 Butler, 022420411127, 30. 274 Butler, 02.24.20, 21. 275 Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 30:22-31 (emphasis added). 276 Butler, 02.24.20, 11 22. 27-; Butler, 02.24.20, 11 23; Butler, 09.07.18, 9:23-25; 10:2?4; Porter, 05.22.19, 45:13-20; Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 31:4? 9, 15-23. 273 Butler, 02.24.20, 1[ 24. 279 Butler, 02.24.20, 1 25; Ex. Thompson, 12.10.19, 105:11?17. See aiso SAFE Team Training Pres. at App. 14. 23? Butler, 02.24.20, 1125; Ex. C. See aiso SAFE Team Training Pres, p. 1 notes (A review of the Safe Team Training presentation document in its native form within Microsoft PowerPoint contains meta-data re?ecting it was created on September 8, 2016; the presentation notes provide the following individuals needed to attend the Safe Team Training: ?All radio holders, Principals and Aps, Head custodian, ESE, Guidance, Clerical, Nurse, Behavior Tech?). 231 Butler, 02.24.20, 1] 26. Page 51 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Thompson and Assistant Principal Porter.?282 Det. Butler states that ?after the SAFE Team Training, I walked the campus, in particular, out to the evacuation location (326., football ?eld) along with Principal Thompson and Assistant Principal Porter, discussing the code black, evacuation procedures.?283 Once the SAFE Team had been trained, on January 11, 2018, Det. Butler ?performed a PowerPoint presentation to the MSD Faculty titled ?The Key to School Safety Security ?(?Faculty However, like the SAFE Team Training presentation, the Faculty Training presentation contained notes for most of the slides, but Det. Butler did not know there were such notes nor did he review nor refer to the notes during the Faculty Team Training.285 Like the SAFE Team Training, all codes were discussed during the Faculty Training; however, Det. Butler again states that ?the focus was on code black, evacuation, as decided previously with Principal Thompson and Assistant Principal Porter.?286 Mr. Thompson states he attended both Trainings.237 Both the SAFE Team and Faculty Trainings were mandatory and nearly identical in substance.288 Det. Butler also stated that the principal or his/her designee is responsible during a code red to ?get the alert out to everybody that you can, as fast as you can. . . [the] lockdown.?289 Both the Trainings included explanations of all color code situations.290 In explaining the code red procedure, both Trainings provided the following: ?Code Red - Lock doors?cover window- move away?stay quiet.?291 Despite the focus on code blackfevacuation, Det. Butler maintains that ?[d]uring both the SAFE Team and Faculty Trainings, I reviewed code red, lockdown procedures, advising all in attendance that Whoever sees the threat should call a code red by any means necessary.?292 However, Det. Butler does not ?recall entering any classrooms with anyone from MSD during the 2017?18 school year for purposes of demonstrating code red, lockdown procedures.?293 232 Butler, 02.24.20, 1] 27 (emphasis added). 233 Butler, 02.24.20, 1] 28. 23? Butler, 02.24.20, 1] 29; EX. D. See also Faculty Training Pres. at App. 15. 235 Butler, 02.24.20, 1] 29; Ex. D. See also Faculty Training Pres. (A review of the Faculty Training presentation document in its native form within Microsoft PowerPoint contains meta-data re?ecting that it was likewise created on September 8, 2016. Based on the meta-data reviewed, it appears both the SAFE Team and Faculty Training presentation documents were created over a year before they were presented at MSD in December 2017 (to the SAFE Team) and January 2018 (to aculty)). 23? Butler, 02.24.20, 1[ 30 (emphasis added). 237 Thompson, 12.10.19, 105:18?20. 23? Compare SAFE Team Training Pres, with Faculty Training Pres. See also Porter, 05.22.19, 46:18?25; 47:1?6. 239 Butler, 09.07.18, 15:13-23. 29" SAFE Team Training Pres. at 9; Faculty Training Pres. at 9. 29? SAFE Team Training Pres. at 9 (emphasis added); Faculty Training Pres. at 9 (emphasis added). 292 Butler, 02.24.20, 1] 31 (emphasis added). 293 Butler, 02.24.20, 1] 32. Page 52 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Neither Trainings mention ?hard? or ?safe? corners.294 There is no instruction or note in either Training presentation that the administration or teachers should mark ?hard? or ?safe? corners.295 However, it appears that the ?move away? portion of the Trainings included an explanation of moving away to the ?safe zone? or ?safe corner? in the classroom, which was the corner furthest away from line of sight through the classroom door window.296 In sum, the Trainings provided the following instruction to MSD personnel in the case of a code red: (1) Lock doors (2) Cover window (3) Move away (4) Stay quiet?? Principal Thompson states that the MSD Security Team (Assistant Principal assigned to security, Security Specialist, and Campus Monitors) was not responsible for conducting any additional training for the staff; that STU performs the training and that the Security Team is trained at the same time as the rest of the MSD staff. 298 Mr. Greenleaf stated that Det. Butler did a great job with the Trainings and was very clear. 299 Ms. Reed likewise stated that upon completing the Trainings, she ?felt very con?dent in a code red but you don?t know what you?re going to do until your (sic) in it getting shot at.?300 Campus Monitor Bonner also found the Trainings to be helpful.301 Det. Butler maintains that all MSD SAFE Team members and Faculty were instructed that anyone can call a code red via radio or by calling the office.302 In the case of an active killer, anyone who hears ?gun shots or some kind of terror happening? can call 911.303 Det. Butler recalls instructing staff that anybody can call a code red, stating: ?whoever is closest to the threat[;] if you see the threat, you make the call[;] you try to get the word out.?304 Mr. Greenleaf likewise recalls hearing Det. Butler and Mr. Porter instructing the SAFE Team and Faculty during the Trainings that ?anyone can call a code red; [a]nyone who sees a threat can call a code red.?305 294 See SAFE Team Training Pres. at App. 14; Faculty Training Pres. at App. 15. 295 See SAFE Team Training Pres; Faculty Training Pres. ?96 Thompson, 08.22.18, 3519-13, 16-21; Porter, 05.22.19, 51:22-25, 52:1?9; Morford, 05.29.19, 33:15-20. See also Osio, 02.20.18, p. 12 (while in Building 12 during the Incident, her teacher, Ms. Lazaro, had the students down at the corner of the classroom). 297 See SAFE Team Training Pres. at 9; Faculty Training Pres. at 9. 293 Thompson, 08.22.18, 32:22-25; 332?6. 299 Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 33:1-3. Reed, 05.29.19, 37:23?25. Bonner, 09.05.18, 13:24-25; 14:1. 302 See SAFE Team Training Pres. at 10; Faculty Training Pres. at 10; Butler, 09.07.18, 11:12-14; 12:4?7; Thompson, 08.22.18, 40:18-21. 303 SAFE Team Training Pres. at 10; Faculty Training Pres. at 10. 30? Butler, 09.07.18, 11:12-14; 12:4?7. 305 Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 66:20?25; 6711-7. Page 53 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) With respect to implementation the emergency or code procedures discussed during the Trainings, Mr. Thompson stated: Q: What did you do to make sure that process, that those procedures were being implemented in the classrooms? A: Sure. I can recall very vividly that that was a Thursday, January 11th because it was a half-day or something when we did the training. I went into classrooms on that Friday and -- I don?t know if that Monday was a holiday anyway, I went two days in a row, Friday and the next day, to do observations. I was going around and observing teachers, and while I was there, they were reviewing everything that Mr. Porter had gone over him (sic) in Detective Butler in the classroom, not just code red. You?re talking about the ?re drills, evacuations, where to go for code black, where to go for code yellow, code red. And the teachers the four teachers or so that I popped in on, they were all going over the exact stuff that Mr. Porter and Detective Butler were going over, to include, what a code red is, and where to go during a code red. This is going to be this is the safer zone. We never use the term ?hard corner.? Here?s the safer zone for this classroom. So I personally witnessed that in the days following that training on January 11th.306 Mr. Thompson?s statement is corroborated by Campus Monitor Taylor who stated he saw Mr. Porter and Mr. Greenlea'f walking around and checking for implementation of parts of the Training, such as door-locking and identifying safe corners.307 Mr. Porter states that after the Faculty Training, teachers were instructed to review the safety procedures with their students in the event of an emergency.308 Mr. Porter further stated that he and Mr. Thompson walked around the MSD Campus after the Faculty Training and saw teachers showing students how to get into the ?safe zone? or ?hard corner? of the classroom, verifying the safe space?09 Mr. Thompson?s statement is further corroborated by a teacher (who was within a Building 12, third-?oor classroom the day of the Incident) who reported that upon completion of the Faculty Training the MSD administration made it ?clear? that they wanted teachers to go back to their classes and drill their students on a code red.310 In fact, this particular teacher trained his students on code red and what their behavior is supposed to be like, and states that is why his students knew what to do the day of the Incident.311 This teacher believes it was because of the Faculty Training 306 Thompson, 12.10.19, 106:7?25; 107:1-4. 307 Taylor, 09.06.18, 18:19-22, 24-25; 19:1?5. 30? Porter, 05.22.19, 53:21-25; 54:1-16. 309 Porter, 05.22.19, 53:25; 54:1-16. 3'0 S.Johnson, 08.24.18, 5:24?25; 6:1-3; 10:19-23. 3? S.Johnson, 08.24.18, 6:14-19; 7:6?19. Page 54 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) that he and his students were prepared the day of the Incident and ?it saved lives.?312 As of the day of the Incident, nearly all administrators, monitors, and teachers understood what a code red meant: lockdown, no movement, due to imminent danger or dangerous threat.313 0 Classroom Doors: ?Lock doors? While no written policy was found requiring classroom doors to remain locked at all times, it is undisputed that the protocol or ?unwritten rule? was that classroom doors were to be locked.314 If classroom doors were found unlocked, Campus Monitors were to report it to the administration.315 One of the teachers located in Building 12 on the day of the Incident who had been at MSD for 15 years, stated that his classroom door was looked that day of the Incident; further, that he routinely locked his door even before the Training.316 0 Classroom Door Windows: ?Cover window? Similarly, no written policy was found requiring teachers to cover their classroom door windows during a code red. However, during the Trainings, MSD personnel were instructed to cover their windows during a code red emergency.317 Mr. Thompson stated that the MSD staff received mixed messages from SIU on the procedure to cover the classroom door windows; for example, to cover the window fully versus not covering if the threat was within the classroom.318 Mr. Thompson stated that, as a result, it was discussed during the Trainings that teachers should partially cover the three?quarters of the window to create more of a safe zone?? Mr. Thompson explained that during the Trainings Det. ?Butler said, ?You know, if it?s safe you can cover the windows, cover the window. didn?t make it sound like it was a mandatory thing.?320 ?2 S.Johnson, 08.24.18, 7:6?19. See also, MSD Public Safety Comm?n Investigative Report No. MSD-0051 (Apr. 25, 2019), at l, 3 (While four other teachers who were within Building 12 on the day of the Incident were interviewed by the MSD Commission (Catherine Britt; Marcia Cunningham; Ernest Rospierski; and Shanti ViswanthanJ as part of its investigation, the audio recordings were misplaced and there was no transcript available of the interview; rather, the Commission provided an investigative report with a summary of the substance of the interviews. While unable to conduct an independent review of the statements, the Commission found that the teachers ?statements ?were consistent with information gathered from other teacher interviews with regards to the training provided by Detective A1 Butler.? At least two of the teachers interviewed (Catherine Britt and Marcia Cunningham) credited Det. Butler?s Faculty Training to knowing to keep students ?silent as they were hiding in the corner? and ?as saving many lives.? 3'3 Greenleaf, 09.05.18, 58:20?25; Porter, 08.22.18, 23:17?25; Reed, 08.22.18, 08.22.18, 15:18- 19; Figueroa, 08.22.18, 19:7-6; Rosario, 08.22.18, 14:20?24; Thompson, 08.22.18, 32:16?21; Staubly, 09.05.18, 30; Taylor, 09.06.18, 21:1-10; Ramos, 09.05.18, 9:11-15; Bonner, 09.05.18, 11:22-25; 12:1; S.Johnson, 08.24.18, 4:17- 23. 3? Greenleaf, 09.05.18, 51:17-24; Porter, 08.22.18, 21:15?25; 22:1-9, 23; 53:20?23; Reed, 08.22.18, 15:4-5, 14?19; Morford, 05.29.19, 28:3-15; Figueroa, 08.22.18, 16:22?23; 17:2?6; Rosario, 08.22.18, 13:23-24; 14:4~6; Thompson, 08.22.18, 30:22-23; Bonner, 09.05.18, 10:1-4; Taylor, 09.06.18, 13:12-19; Ramos, 09.05.18, 15:7?8. 3?5 Greenleaf, 09.05.18, 52:15?25; 53:3-17; Ramos, 09.05.18, 7-8, 15?16; Thompson, 08.22.18, 40:1?5. 316 S.Johnson, 08.27.18, 19:5?12. 3? SAFE Team Training Pres. at 9 at App. 14; Faculty Training Pres. at 9 at App. 15. 318 Thompson, 08.22.18, 36:4-16. 3?9 Thompson, 08.22.18, 36:21?25. 32? Thompson, 12.10.19, 108:11-14. Page 55 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Similarly, Mr. Porter stated that during the Faculty Training, Det. Butler advised teachers to cover their windows if there is time depending on where the threat is located.321 Mr. Porter admitted that, unlike locking classroom doors, there was no policy written or unwritten that teachers were to cover the door windows, and so the Security Team did not check to see if teachers were covering their door windows.322 When asked how teachers were supposed to cover their door windows, Mr. Greenleaf explained that they should put something in the window, like a piece of cardboard.323 Mr. Greenleaf stated that there was nothing in place at MSD as of February 14, 2018, such as a curtain, for teachers to cover the classroom door window.324 Mr. Thompson also stated that there was nothing that the school provided teachers to cover their windows with, it was up to the teacher to do so. 5 0 Safe Area of the Classroom: ?Move away? Marking ?hard? or ?safe? corners was likewise not a requirement. The Training materials make no mention of ?hard? or ?safe? corners, nor instruct that said comers should be marked with tape or otherwise.325 Mr. Thompson recalls that the Trainings advised that in a code red scenario to have the ?lights off, get away from the windows and doors and crouch down.?327 Mr. Thompson con?rmed that teachers were free to set-up their classrooms in a manner conducive to their desired learning environment.328 At least one Campus Monitor did not believe the Trainings said anything speci?cally about taping the ?oor.329 Yet, moving away to the furthest corner away from the doors was discussed during the Trainings.330 By account of one Campus Monitor, after the Trainings, Mr. Porter and Mr. Greenleaf ?were going around seeing where the best place would be to avoid being seen through that little glass window on the door.?331 Putting a ?tape zone? to mark the safe comers was something that was being discussed between Mr. Porter and Mr. Greenleaf after the Trainings and prior to February 14, 2018, but not required}32 According to a Campus Monitor, only two classrooms in Building 12 had taped or marked ?hard? or ?safe? corners because the Security Team was trying that procedure.333 Mr. Thompson was surprised that any teacher had taped the ?oor to indicate the ?safe? corner because doing so was 32? Porter, 05.22.19, 51 :6-21. 322 Porter, 05.22.19, 50:14-25. 323 Grecnleaf, 05.15.19, 39:22?25; 40:1-6. 32? Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 41 325 Thompson, 12.10.19, 109:1~7. 326 See SAFE Team Training Pres. at App. 14; Faculty Training Pres. at App. 15. 32? Thompson, 12.10.19, 109:14?16. 323 Thompson, 08.22.18, 30:22-23. 32" Taylor, 09.06.18, 18:11?14. 33" Porter, 05.22.19, 51:25; 52:1?9; Morford, 05.29.19, 33:15?20; Taylor, 09.06.18, 16:1?10; Johnson, 08.24.18, 14:2- 7. See also Osio, 02.20.18, p. 12 (while in Building 12 during the Incident, her teacher, Ms. Lazaro, had the students down at the corner of the classroom). 33? Taylor, 09.06.18, 16:3-9; 18:19-25; 19:1~5. 332 Taylor, 09.06.18, 16:3?7; 17:19-25; 18:1-10. 333 Taylor, 09.06.18, 17:19?25; 18:1-10. Page 56 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) not discussed during the Trainings; rather, if a classroom was marked, it was because the teacher took the initiative to do so after the Faculty Training. c) MSD ?s 201 7-18 Emergency Preparedness Live Exercise or Code Drill Mr. Thompson states that a code red/lockdown drill was planned for the 2017-18, but not yet scheduled as of the date of the incident: we were doing training in January, and we were going to be doing a code red drill after that time. A date had not yet been determined at that point. Q: Do you know when the date was determined? A It wasn?t. Q: It never was? A Not well, not until we had our incident. Q: So as of February 14th, 2018, a date for the live emergency exercise had not been set? A: That?s correct. 334 Although Principal Thompson insisted during his sworn interview that a code red/lockdown drill (er live exercise) was planned, Det. Butler states otherwise: The code black. evacuation school?wide Live Exercise (code drill) was scheduled and calendared to take place on Friday, February 16, 2018. This date was coordinated with Principal Thompson and Assistant Principal Porter, as well as my calendar, since I was going to be out of town from February 9, 2018 through February 14, 2018.335 Det. Butler further states that the only time a code redflockdown drill was even mentioned prior to the Incident was or about February 5, 2018, during a SIU staff meeting including all detectives, [when] SIU then?Maj or Craig Kowalski asked me what code exercise was planned for MSD that school year, to which I responded a code black, evacuation.?336 Det. Butler further states 33? Thompson, 12.10.19, 74:17-25; 75:1?6 (emphasis added). 335 Butler, 02.24.20, 1[ 33 (emphasis added). 336 Butler, 02.24.20,1[ 34. Page 57 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) that ?then-Maj or Kowalski mentioned that he and former Chief Robert I-Iutchison had discussed possibly doing a code red, lockdown at [h]owever, since I was going to be out of town from February 9, 2018 through February 14, 2018, I did not change the Live Exercise (code drill) from black, evacuation to red, lockdown.?337 Det. Butler also stated that hen?Maj or Chief Kowalski did not give me any explanation or reason as to why the MSD Live Exercise (code drill) would be changed from a code black, evacuation to a code red, Thus, of February 14, 2018, a code black, evacuation Live Exercise (code drill) was scheduled to proceed [at on February 16, 2018.?339 Curiously, Mr. Thompson insists that the live exercise or code drill was going to be a code redflockdown and that ?it was not on [his] calendar,? stating, ?we never got a date on the calendar.?340 However, Det. Butler states that MSD was scheduled to have a code blackfevacuation drill on February 16, 2018.341 Also, when asked whether he knew what the District?s requirements were on conducting emergency code drills, Mr. Thompson responded as follows: Q: And do you know What the requirement was from the district for conducting these types of code exercises? Were you supposed to do these like ?re drill, two in a school year, like a tornado? Do you know what the expectation was from the district? A. I don?t. Because like I said, SIU drove the ship on that. So they came in and told us what we we?re gonna do. I was under the impression years back that it was supposed to be annually. But once again, that was something? SIU would come in and tell us,? This is what we?re gonna do.?342 However, Mr. Thompson?s statement that SIU ?drove the ship? regarding live exercises or code drills and that he did not have any knowledge of the District?s expectation regarding such drills, is contradicted by the District Memo dated August 25, 2017 addressed to all principals343 with the bolded subject line: 2017?2018 SCHOOL SAFETY PLANS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS This Memo, addressed to Mr. Thompson (who acknowledged receipt during this sworn statement), clearly states that the District had certain Emergency Preparedness ?annual requirements,? which required all live exercises or code drills to be completed prior to March 12 2018. Thus, it appears that despite planning to perform a code blackfevacuation instead of a code redflockdown drill, MSD scheduled its drill to take place before the deadline ofMarch 12, 2018 (126., February 16, 2018). 337 Butler, 02.24.20, 1[ 34. 3 3 Butler, 02.24.20, 1[ 35. 339 Butler, 02.24.20, 1[ 36 (emphasis added). 340 Thompson, 12.10.19, 110: 1 1-17. Butler, 02.24.20, 33. 342 Thompson, 12.10.19, 110: 1 8-25; 111:l~4. 343 Several others were copied on the Memo: former SIU Chief Robert Hutchison; Directors of the Of?ce of School Performance Accountability; Cadre Directors; then?Major Craig Kowalski; and SIU SRT Detectives. 34? Smith, 12.18.19, 1[ 45, Ex. (emphasis in original). See BCPS Memo dated Aug. 25,2017 at App. 12. Page 58 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Findings as to Allegations 8-11: 0 Failed to ensure that Det. Butler?s Code Red Training held on Jan. 11, 2018 was followed and implemented by all administrators, faculty, and staff including, but not limited to, assistant principals, teachers, security specialist, and campus monitors prior to Feb. 14, 2018 (Allegation No. I Failed to ensure that Det. Butler?s Code Red Training held on Jan. 11, 2018 was followed and implemented in the classrooms (15.6., window coverings, marking hard corners) prior to Feb. 14, 2018 (Allegation No. 0 Failed to ensure all administrators, faculty, and staff including, but not limited to, assistant principals, teachers, security specialist, and campus monitors understood how to call a Code Red as of Feb. 14, 2018 (Allegation No. 10); and 0 Failed to require or conduct Code Red drills from Feb. 14, 2017 up to and including Feb. 14, 2018 (Allegation No. 11). Implementation of Training (Allegations Nos. 8-9): With respect to ensuring that ?Det. Butler?s Code Red Training held on Jan. 11, 2018 was followed and implemented by all administrators, faculty, and staff prior to Feb. 14, 2018,? I found no policy or Principal Essential Performance Responsibility that would obligate Mr. Thompson to ensure implementation and following of Det. Butler/SIU?S Emergency Preparedness or Code Training by all MSD personnel. The evidence shows that SIU was responsible for conducting the Training. A preponderance of the evidence also shows that the MSD personnel did follow and implement the Training to the best of their ability prior to and on February 14, 2018. The preponderance of the evidence also supports that the information provided by Det. Butler/SIU during the Trainings (118., lock doors; cover window; move away; stay quiet) was implemented by MSD teachers with the help of Assistant Principal Porter, Security Specialist Greenleaf, Mr. Thompson, and Campus Monitors to the best of their ability prior to and on February 14, 2018. Although some MSD personnel were unsure about how to best ?cover [the] window? in the classrooms, the evidence shows that there was an open dialogue between Mr. Thompson, Mr. Porter, Mr. Greenleaf, Monitors, and Teachers as how to best cover the classroom door windows, while still providing the ability to see into the classroom in case the threat was within the classroom. Page 59 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Based on the foregoing, there is insuf?cient evidence to support the allegations that Mr. Thompson ?failed to ensure that Det. Butler?s Code Red Training held on Jan. 11, 2018 was followed and implemented by all administrators, faculty, and staff? (Allegation No. 8), and ?failed to ensure that Det. Butler?s Code Red Training held on Jan. 11, 2018 was followed and implemented in the classrooms? (Allegation No. 9). How and When to Calla Code Red (Allegation No. 10): Both Training presentations performed by Det. Butler provide that anyone can call a code red.345 Det. Butler instructed MSD staff that anybody can call a code red, stating: ?whoever is closest to the threat[;] if you see the threat, you make the call[;] you try to get the word out.?346 Det. Butler stated that the safest way for a teacher to call Code Red is to call the of?ce?? While covering the code redilockdown procedures at MSD, Det. Butler states he advised all in attendance ?that whoever sees the threat should call a code red by any means necessary.?348 Similarly, Mr. Greenleaf recalls hearing Mr. Butler and Mr. Porter state during the Trainings that ?anyone can call a Code Red; [a]nyone who sees a threat can call a Code Red.?349 Although most administrators stated that their understanding as of February 14, 2018 was that anyone can call a Code Red,350 there was some inconsistency on how to call the Code Red: some said anyone with a radio can call a code red (although there are only limited radio-holders on campus),351 others said teachers can use a personal cell phone to call the of?ce,352 while others said teachers can use the PA call button or panic button?53 When asked what Det. ButlerXSIU?s Training communicated to the MSD staff about when and how a code red/lockdown would be initiated, Mr. Thompson explained: I don?t think that training -- I don?t think there was a cut-?and-dry of when do you call it. I think he was just, like, the person who calls it is the person who is closest to the threat. And, you know, it gets the call off. Now, of course, that opened the whole Pandora?s box of the 52,000 scenarios that could happen about what do we do about this, and what do we do about that? And I think that was when -- I think I got up and spoke at that point and said, ?Listen, we?re all college educated. You need to do what you think is best at the time that it happens based on the situation that you get.? And I, kind of, stopped 345 See SAFE Team Training Pres. at 10 at App. 14; Faculty Training Pres. at 10 at App. 15; Butler, 09.07.18, 11:12- 14; l2:4~7; Thompson, 08.22.18, 40:18-21. 34? Butler, 09.07.18, 11:12-14; 12:4?7. Butler, 09.07.18, 56:13-24. 343 Butler, 02.24.20, 11 31. 349 Greenleaf, 05.15.19, 66:20-25; 67:1?7 (emphasis added). 35? Greenleaf, 09.05.18, 59:3-9; Porter, 08.22.18, 243?10; 32925; 33:15; Figueroa, 08.22.13, 20:7-12, 20-25; Rosario, 08.22.18, 14:20?24; 08.22.18, 17:1-7. 35? Figueroa, 08.22.18, 20:7-12; Morford, 08.22.18, 17:1-7; 352 Porter, 08.22.18, 32:9?25; 33:1-18; Figueroa, 08.22.18, 20:20-25; Thompson, 08.22.18, 41:8-22. 353 Greenleaf, 09.05.18, 60:17-25; 61:1?2; Rosario, 08.22.18, 15:5-11; Thompson, 08.22.18, 41:8?22. Page 60 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) that conversation because you could ?what it? forever, so -- but there was no, ?Okay. When you see this, that?s when you call it in.? It was just like, when you feel a threat or you see a threat, that?s when you call it. So it was the individual person?s judgment call? A. Yes. Investigation to date has revealed that SIU was wholly responsible for the development, implementation, and oversight of Emergency Preparedness or Code Trainings including all materials and presentations provided to MSD. Any issues regarding when and how to call a code red would have been part of a debrie?ng after the code drill or live exercise was conducted. This is supported by the District?s August 25, 2017 Mandatory Emergency Preparedness Exercises Memo, which states that ?[a]fter the exercise is completed, the SRT Detective will conduct the debriefing and discus What changes, if any, need to be placed into the safety plan.?354 However, the evidence also shows that a code redflockdown drill or exercise was not even planned for the 2017 ?1 8 school year, rather a code black/evacuation was planned. Therefore, even if the code drill! live exercise would have been scheduled prior to the Incident, the MSD staff would not have practiced what to do in case of a code red/lockdown that school year. Consequently, the evidence does not support that Mr. Thompson ?failed to ensure all administrators, faculty, and staff understood how to call a Code Red as of Feb. 14, 2018 (Allegation No. 10). Further Investigation Warranted Notwithstanding the foregoing, further investigation is warranted into the Emergency Preparedness or Code Training materials and presentations used by SIU as well as the current version of the CRM available online. Sometime in 2009I2010, the CRM and school safety plans became accessible only e1ectronically.355 However, the SAFE Team and Faculty Training presentations used by Det. Butler in 2017-18 do not reference the CRM or that the CRM is an available resource to be used. Moreover, there has been no evidence to date that principals and administrators were advised in 2017~18 that the CRM was an available resource to be consulted in preparation of safety plans or emergency preparedness exercises. In fact, despite being an administrator since 2001 Mr. Thompson stated that he had never ?heard of anything called? the ?Critical Resource Manual,?: Q: Was there a resource that you can refer to regarding the handling of code scenarios, such as red, yellow, or blue? I think there?s a black. 35? Smith, 12.18.19, 1 45, Ex. (emphasis in original). See BCPS Memo dated'Aug, 25, 2017 at ?School Safety Plan Rationale? at App. 12 (emphasis added). 355 Smith, 12.18.19, 11 24. Page 61 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) A: Yeah, I know what they all are. But I don?t know I don?t remember. I don?t know if there?s a manual that actually outlines, other than PowerPoint slides from SIU, that de?ne or ?y to explain what these different scenarios are. Q: Are you familiar with or ever heard of the ?critical resource manual?? No 356 The 2017-18 CRM has two sections relevant to the Incident. One, titled ?Crime or Violence Situation Incident Intruder on Campus,? and a second one, titled ?Weapon Situation Incident - Discharge of Firearm.? 357 These sections of the 2017-18 CRM provide an outline of procedures and protocol during the three phases involving these incidents: pre~plan action; (2) immediate action; and (3) follow-up action.358 With respect to ?Intruder on Campus,? the CRM makes the following pre~plan action recommendations, in part: I School grounds should be fenced and only one or two entrances, if possible. I Consider that an intruder may be armed with a weapon I Use established CODE WORDS for intruder or lockdown359 Next, ?Intruder on Campus? immediate action recommendations include, in relevant part: I Inquire as to person?s business on the campus If the person becomes hostile or you feel threatened, go to the nearest classroom and call the front office and notify police I Keep the person in sight I Administrator in charge should respond to the area I If subject tis not cooperative, CALL 911, if. applicable Administrator call for lockdown if appropriate360 Similarly, ?Discharge of Firearm,? also makes the following relevant pro?plan action recommendations: I This is primarily a law enforcement ACTION MATTER I Pre?plan with law enforcement I Train custodians to be eyes and ears of the school 355 Thompson, 12.10.19, 47:12-22; 48:1-2 (emphasis added). 357 CRM 2017-18, Crime or Violence, Intruder on Campus at No. (14), Weapon Situation, Discharge of Firearm at No. (28) at Comp. App. 26. 358 CRM 2017-18, Crime or Violence, Intruder on Campus at No. (14), Weapon Situation, Discharge of Firearm at No. (23). 359 CRM 2017-18, Crime or Violence, Intruder on Campus at No. (14) at Pre-Plan Action. 3?5? CRM 2017?18, Crime or Violence, Intruder on Campus at No. (14) at Immediate Action. Page 62 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) 0 Stay abreast of violence threats 0 Establish a procedure It Be aware of and report any employeer?student school site violence potential 0 Studentstemployees shall report all violations361 Immediate action recommendations for ?Discharge of Firearm? include, in relevant part: 0 This is primarily a law enforcement ACTION MATTER - Call 911 and SIU - Call for an administrator - Call for resource of?cer or local law enforcement a Secure students/employees away from immediate threat a DO NOT provoke person with weapon! 0 Initial lockdown Manually override bell for class change or make P.A. announcement 3?62 However, many of the foregoing recommendations do not appear to be in the Emergency Preparedness or Code Training materials and presentations used by SIU. Consequently, further investigation is warranted into whether all District Emergency Preparedness resources can be reconciled and are being effectively communicated to the schools. Code Red Drill or Emergency Live Exercise (Allegation No. 11): It is undisputed that, in 2017?18, Mr. Thompson assigned all campus security-related duties to Assistant Principal Porter, which included compliance with the District?s Emergency Preparedness or Code requirements. The District?s Emergency Preparedness requirements were communicated via a District Memo dated August 25, 2017 addressed to all principals and assistant principalsm with the bolded subject line: 2017?2013 SCHOOL SAFETY PLANS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (hereinafter ?Mandatory Emergency Preparedness Exercises MSD via Mr. Thompson (and his designee, Mr. Porter) was required to complete, among other requirements, a ?Table?top Exercise Meeting and Emergency Exercises (a/k/a code training and drill)?365 Moreover, via its August 25, 2017 Mandatory Emergency Preparedness Memo, the District directed ?[a]ll principals [to] participate in these exercises to ensure successful collaboration and learning experience for the safety of the location . . .?366 With respect to a Live Exercise or code drill, MSD was required to complete the same by March 12 2018.367 36? CRM 2017?18, Weapon Situation, Discharge of Firearm at No. (28) at Pre-Plan Action at Comp. App. 26 3?62 CRM 2017?18, Weapon Situation, Discharge of Firearm at No. (28) at Immediate Action. 363 Several others were copied on the Memo: former SIU Chief Robert I-Iutchison; Directors of the Of?ce of School Performance Accountability; Cadre Directors; then-Major Craig Kowalski; and SIU SRT Detectives. 36" Smith, 12.18.19, 11 45, Ex. (emphasis in original). See BCPS Memo dated Aug. 25, 2017 at App. 12. 365 Smith, 12.18.19, Ex. H. See BCPS Memo dated Aug. 25, 2017 (emphasis in original). Smith, 12.18.19, Ex. H. See BCPS Memo dated Aug. 25, 2017. 367 Smith, 12.18.19, Ex. H. See BCPS Memo dated Aug. 25, 2017. Page 63 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Contrary to Mr. Thompson?s account that MSD had completed the Training ?in January, and we were going to be doing a code red drill after that time[;] date had not yet been determined at that point,? the evidence supports that MSD had scheduled a Live Exercise or code drill forj?bruam 16, 2018. However, the emergency/code planned to be exercised or drilled was code black, evacuation and n_o_t code red, lockdown. Although some evidence suggests that in or around 2015, SIU advised all principals they could not repeat the same Emergency Preparedness or code training and drill two consecutive years and had to alternate between an evacuation code and a lockdown code from year to year,368 the District?s August 25, 2017 Mandatory Emergency Preparedness Exercises Memo does not reference such a requirement. However, Det. Butler states that Mr. Thompson and Mr. Porter chose to conduct a code black/evacuation exercise in 2017-18 because there had been a code red/lockdown exercise at MSD the previous school year (1164., As of the date of this Report, whether MSD practiced a code red/lockdown during the 2016-17 school year cannot be con?rmed or denied, due to lack of information provided and lack of recollection by the witnesses interviewed. As such, while the preponderance of the evidence shows that Mr. Thompson ?Method to require or conduct Code Red drills from Feb. 14, 2017 up to and including Feb. 14, 2018,? Mr. 'lhompson did not violate any existing District policy at the time because (and contrary to his own sworn statement) a code live exercise or drill was scheduled to take place on February 16, 2018 before the March 12, 2018 deadline established by the District?s August 25, 2017 Mandatory Emergency Preparedness Exercises Memo and there was no requirement at the time that MSD conduct a code red/lockdown instead of a code black/evacuation. 2. ?8 A THREAT A. Reports to Mr. Thompson 0-3ehavior and a School Shooter Threat It is alleged that Mr. Thompson ?[fJailed to act upon information received fron- about witnessing a pattern of concerning behavior stud in nd - of the student? fro believed to be warning Signs for potential school shooters? Alle ation No. 12). rca i, the two students were identified as whose Multiple witnesses were interviewed to investigate whether Mr. son failed to act upon knowing information provided to him regarding-behavior an eing a ?potential school shooter.? Below is a summary of the witness statements. 3? Smith, 12.18.19,13l. Butler, 02.24.20, ?l 21. Page 64 of 82 '1?1 10 'l?ysotl 000025464) Summarv of Witness Statements Student Services Receptionist Debra Wannamaker, and Student Services Receptionist Linda Jones was interviewed on October 30. 2018 by Sergeant John Sucss of the MSD Commission (hereinafter? 'tioned regarding currently in at SD (hereinafter Of note, was not_g rovided with a copy of the transeri 2018 Statement nor nterv iewed rcgardinh tatement prior to providing worn Statement (nearly a year later, regarding same events that trans ired during the 2016-17 school year). I found ?Statement and Statement to be vastly consistent, mostly corroborated by other witnesses, and thus, highly credible. was in A review Students ?consistently states (in 2018 and again under oath in 2019' personally observed: 10. 3 18 1 15-1 1 (with the consent of and in the presence cc cnerallvbO 30.18. 0. 0/1 19, 2, 5:17-19; 5:22-25; 621-3 (with the consent of and in the presence 0? 6:14-22- 10.30.18, 4:1?6, 16-1813; 10: 1-2 (additional students identii'ic not interviewed due to time constraints in comilctin .z5?,l9 211; l6:?1415. 375 S?ee 2016-17 Class Schedules pp. 27. 376 10.04 191.2218 21; (1.30.19, 4:19-25. 37" 10.01191222225- 37? 100419 13 6 8; ?08. 22 19 91415-191919, 716-9. this investi ation . See ?11.80, Page 65 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) 0 ?looking up guns on the computer? during - 79 0 -?say that he wanted to see people in 13211117330 -say ?1 am fucking crazygsasi .133? own two Shotguns.?382 'n the com uter? to is in so I 9:383 Student Teacher assumed new ?people who . . . go hunting . . . [and ?as looking at maybe hunting weapons or something like that. However, in the ?middle of the school year,? upon observing say .was ?.t?uckin kes seein eople in pain,? and tha ?shotguns,? Student- 1 of?ce as ?a school shooting threat? initially with Students in lass, and then with Student class.334 Student account, as do Student 1? (?li crazy, oth corroborate Student las? Ihi 1e 21 ater rat wanted to ?go to urther states that Student corroborates this repor- as first made the escribes as a a school shooting threat.?386 Student go to the of?ce to report .87 Student the of?statement.388 Student-(insistently states tha then went to Student Service a ?school shooting throat? with Studcn Student states that report to the Student Services receptionist during, the 2016? so. 00] year wh ?blonde. . . white lady? and not the other Student Services receptionist wh tescribed as an African?American woman.389 A review of personnel records For Debra maker and two other women who worked in or around the 2016-17 school year as Student Services receptionists Lauren Rosen and Linda Jones) con?rms that Debra Wannamaker and Linda Jones were the 0.04.19, 1421-4; 0.04.19, 14:17-18; 0.04.19, 14:19-22; 7:16-17; 825-7. 0.04.19, 13:16-24. See a/s 10.30.19, 10:12-15 (statin th. idn?t a too much attention because?ms res onsible men 5 who enjoy ?rearms, anciust ought ?as one of those). 10.30.18, 6:21-22. .3018, 7:6?7; 8:5-7. 10.30.18, 5:17-18; 8:5-7. 38" .0419, 15:3-10; 23:1-4. 335 15:1-3; 10.30.19, '11 10-14, 8, MSD Comm?n Rep. No. MSD-042 dated Jan. 2019. 386 10.04.19, 15:8-10; 25:5-25; 0.30.18, 12:17-21; 16:10-17. 33? 10.04.19, 2619-15. 10.30.19 at'? 13-14. 2111-14. 388 389 Page 66 of 82 Tyson (P00025464) only two Student Services receptionists during the 2016-17 school year.390 Moreover, Ms. Linda Jones con?rmed that Ms. Wannamaker replaced Ms. Rosen upon her retirement.391 Using a 2016- 17 yearbook photograph, Studementi?ed Debra Wannamaker as the person to whom lclieve'nade the initial report. Student Services Receptionist Debra Wannamaker was interviewed, under August 29, 2019.393 Although upon looking at a yearbook photograph of Student Receptionist Wannamaker states ?looks familiar,? Ms. Wannamaker states she does not recall having a conversation with Studehor any student) regarding a threat to the school or a shooting threat.394 Ms. Wannamaker a so states that she has that has stemmed from the [Incident],? and is taking medication that she only started earlier in 2019 that she believes ?could interfere with memory.?395? When asked, ?do you think the medication would aiTect your ability to remember if a student came to you and told you about a threat to shoot the school?? Ms. Wannamaker responded, think the topic, with the anxiety and the is where i get cloudy when I have to go back and start thinking details of the event [or Incident]. . . [r]clating to what led up to the incident.?396 Ms. Wannamaker goes on to explain that her-was in the ?rst room that was shot into? on the ?rst ?oor of Building 12 the day of the Incident and survived ?physically.?397 Student Services Receptionist Linda Jones was also interviewed, under oath, on August 29, 2019.398 Ms. Jones states that she does not remember any student asking to speak with an administrator re arding a school shooting threat.399 Studen marked on a map of the Administration/Building 1 the Student Services reception desk wher ade the init' ort and then Assistant Principal Jeffrey Morford?s of?ce as the administrator to who ade the report that was a ?school shooting threat.?400 Student -lso tracked and indicated with a line arro_novement that day through the Student Services door, to the Reception desk (where Ms. Wanamaker sat), around the Reception desk, to Mr. Morford?s Both Ms. Wannamaker and Ms. Jones likewise identi?ed where they each sat at the Student Services reception desk and Mr. Morford?s of?ce durin the 2016-17 school year on an identical map of the Administration/Building 13"02 Student ind Ms. Wannamaker marked the same locations for Ms. Wanamaker?s desk and 39? See certain personnel records of D.Wanamaker and 1,.Rosen at Comp. App. 29. As re?ected, 14.Rosen retired prior to the 2016-17 school year. Jones, 0829.19, 9:17-20. 3. ?3 annamaker, 08.29.19. 39" Wannamaker, 08.29.19, 12:] 1-25; 1321?25; 14:1; 15x. 3 (2016-17 yearbook photo of Studen-. 39? Wannamaker, 08.29.19, 16:11-17. 39" Wannamaker, 08.29.19, 16:20?25; 17:1, 4. 39? Wannamakcr, 08.29.19, 17:12-18. 398 Jones, 08.29.19. 29.19, 826-23. ?00 0.04.19, 17-19; Ex. 2. 0.04.l9, Ex. 2. Wannamakcr, 08.29.19, 8:12-16; 9:17-25; 1011-5, 10-14; Ex. 1; Jones, 08.29.19. 5:7?25; 6; 7:1-7. Page 67 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Morford?s office.403 Ms. Jones marked that she sat to the right of Ms. Wannamaker, which is consistent with Ms. Wanamaker?s statement as to where Ms. ones 321L404 See below stude- Sworn Statement, Exhibit 2 BUILDING 1 403 C(mzpure 10.04.19, Ex. 2, with Wannamaker, 08.29.19, at Ex. 1. Compare Jones, 08.29.19, Ex. 1, with Wannamaker, 08.29.19, Ex. 1. Page 68 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Receptionist Wanamaker Sworn Statement, Exhibit 1 BUILDING 1 5R0 i CAMERA OFFICE . - . ROOM OFFICES RECEPTION OFFICES Receptionist Jones Sworn Statement, Exhibit 1 BUILDING i SRO CAMERA OFFICE ROOM OFFICES OFFICES Page 69 of 82 Tyson (P00025464) consistently states (in 2018 and under oath in 2019) that-)ported what Studen 11d tolt??d?m fucking crazy;? ?own shotguns;? like seeing people in pain?) and that believed memo] shootin threat? to Mr. Morford in the resenee of SRO Peterson and Studeu 05 Student also consistent] describinteracti on with Morford stating that Olv-_Ir. Morford showed Stud (and Stu - a not to W'orry, thmiot Mr.l\ photograph 0 base r?lp ption and told have guns, that as pulling 1406 it of the school and to google autism.4 When asked, ?how con?dent do you think'you are that it was rt?ord?? Student answered, ?Prettv confident it was Mr. Student urther stated, went back to just make sure the of?ce was Mr. Morford?s and the of?ce is Mr. Dtuinlworn statement 'hen asked to mark the location of the of?ce where met with an Assistant Principal to reporin a ?oor plan ol?Building l, Studen ar ed the location that Mr. Moi-ford marked as his own of?ce location on an identical ?oor plan of Building 1 during his sworn statement.409 Additionally, Mr. Morford (a white, male) admits that he could not be confused with one of the other Assistant Principals at the time due to their physical characteristics Mr. Porter, who is African?American; Mr. Rosario, who is Hispanic; Ms. Reed, a female).410 hrcat to Mr._Mor_f_or_d, Studen id tell-parents.? Studcn sworn statement, corroborat After reportin the same to any teachers, bu who was present during the (ii) Student Guidance Counselor Veronica Ziecardi, and School Board Member Abby Freedman was interviewed on November 5, 2018 by MSD Commission Investiaators, Sergeant John Suess and 'l )etectivc Christopher Ly tudcn- mly allowed the Investigators to interview Student melephonically without recording the same, which was summarized by the M81) Commission Investigators?12 405 40(- 40'] 408 10 30. 8. 12:17-25; 1311-10; 20:17-25; 21. 10.04.19, 16. 10.04.19, 19:11-25; 20:1-2. 10.30.18, 17:11-13 (cmp asrs a ded). 18:] 1-13 (emphasis added). Comparem100419, at 16x. 2, with 05.29.19, at Ex. 6. ?0 Morfmd, 9:21-25; 10: 1-13. Mr. Morford is a white, male. See MSI) 201647 Yearbook, p. 228 at Composite App 30. 2.00419 232425 2412 69 4 1 that Stu ent 0< l8, MSD Comm Rep \10. MSD-042 dated Jan. 4, 20l9 (although this interview summary states -'as interviewed telephonically on Monday, Nov. 4, 2018, this appears to be a typographical error, since Nov. 4, 2018 was a Sunday and Monday was Nov. 5, 20l8). Page 70 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) as 1:1 lass, with nd Student 0 ore the conclusion of the 2016-17 school year, on or about Student. the 2016-17 se vas i 'lass, as well as Student March31, 2017.415 Man of the students interviewed did not know who Student 5, except Students We - escribes Studen ?quietlitl like I wasn rea ere a 0' an en. as mostly sleeping and id talk to me mostly than other people . . . because we also sha Student es that Ire ortcd Is 21 ?501100 ooter threat? to Mr. Morford along with Student 8 Student likewise states thatilwent to the front of?ce with Studenlo report tha-wa to shoot up the school.?419 Like Student- Studen ates that upon reporting to a white male administrator, the administrator told that they ?should read about Autism and that.? 'as being sent to. an school. ??420 Student fkewise stat-cs that the administrator who as Jeff M01 ford (a white male), tel 11 Student- 5 takin of the school .you might want to research autism ?mm Stu cut and Student statements, while not identical, are inherently consistent and credible. 422 Student-was interviewed telephonieally again b. MSD Commission investigator John Suess on September 17, 201?) (contemporane sl wit*.423 Now several months afte.nior interview, Student gain states, rmeipal that I talked to was male, and I?m about 95 percent sure he was white.?424 Studemiigain states 4'3 See 2016? 1 7 Class Schedule 1111?27; see aim-I 1.05.1 s, MSD Comm?n Rep. No. MSD- 042 dated Jan-?1 2019 at p. 2 4? See 2016 -17 Class Schedule for pp. 27; see also Class Schedule tel-t App28 e. . .. ed Tan 4 2019, atp. 2,-1011119, 11-1113, 25; 12:1- ?5 15.19; 1ee (1121 1-13. ?6 ?1004 11.04.19, 11:25- 12:14. 413 419 423 0.04.19, 12:17-25; 13:1?10; 20:17-25; 21. 11.05.18, MSD omm 11 ep. No. MSD-042 dated Jan. 4, 201?), at p. 2 (emphasis added). 1 1.05.18, MSD Comm?n Rep. No. MSD-042 dated Jan10.04.19, 16:4-23. ?23 'l?1e MSD C0 In i raters also found that Student-provided details that were consistent with the statement given bmin Oct. 2018. - 1.05.18, MSD Comm?n Rep. No. 101513-042 dated Jan. 4, 201 l. 7 09.17.19, 4:8 (Student vas not interviewed again by the undersigned due during . 17, 2019 interview tha 1 not wish to be involved with anything regarding this situation anymore. See 9.17.19, 09.17.19, 4:13-15 (emphasis added). L21 Page 71 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (1300025464) th' ofhce? ?to 1ep01_when was with Studen tudent?tates that the SRO was present at the time It bears to note that duringliirst int? 1 1 Studen tated thalcquested to eak with the al, but when asked whethe want the as 1' Student interjected with wn statement.427 states that Student to Principal Ty Thompson and that met with Principal . 1wing day, Thompson 11d ?ex ressed a great deal of concern abou bein 11'ca the safety to the states that l?rineimon tel hat 'as not happy he ran IS sc oo thex hould withdra (1 even rovided Forms with St information aheady 011 them to effectuate the withdrawal. 429 "tines th also met with Guidance Co -being a rea on 16, Veronica Ziccardi about 2016 at 11: 44 a. 1n. and that poke with School Board member, Abby Freedman regarding was interviewed by the MSD Commission Investigator John Suess again on 5, 2019 and alon with Student-on Se 1te-mber 17, 2019.4? During these subsequent interviewsjontinues to claim that nd Student-old Principal W11 and Guidance Counselor Ziccardi that Studen id not feel safe at MSD because 0 "2 However, unlike Studen- statements which have been corroborate- are unsubstantiated to date. For example, three witnesses rebut statement. Guidance Counselor Veronica Ziccardi provided a detailed and highly credible account of her communications with?which she maintained 1n a call log with notes ?1s to the substance of such conversati 1 states all of her conversations with _we1e re rarding Studen 33 Counsel )r Ziccardi 3 statement regardi?len; nt?pooH 1y Studenistatement that Studen 'as mostly sleeping.?434 speaking 35 Moreover, Ms. Freedman states that the ?rst time she ever heard the nam. 'as on February 14, 2018.?36 Ms. Freedman also states that if she had 17. 19,5:1 091719, 5:15~24. 11.05.18, MSD Comm?n Rep. No. MSD-042 dated Jan. 4, 2019, at p. 2. I 1.05.18, MSD Comm?n Rep. No. MSD-042 dated Jan. 4, 2019, at p. 2. 11.05.18. MSD Comm?n Rep. No. dated Jan. 4, 2019, at p. 2 11.05.18, MSD Comm?n Rep. No. MSD-O42 dated Jan. 4, 2019, at p. 2. 09.05.19' 09.17.19. 432 See generally, 133 14-24. See 11:25; 1214 (stating that Stu ?wasn?t really there a lot and who. sleeping?). 13?- 00419 1197?21 121 ?35 11?1reedma11,03 25 19, MSD Comm 11 Rep. No. MSD- 0048 dated Mar. 25, 2019 (Abby Freedman was intewiewed telephonically by MSD Commission Investigator Detective Walter Bonasaio) Freedman, 09.09.19. Freedman, 03.25.19, MSD Comm? 11 Rep. No dated Mar 25, 2019; Freedman, 09 09.19 Page 72 of 82 'l?l ON, 'l?yson 900025464) received a call with information that a student posed a danger to any school she would have immediately contacted the Superintendent regardless of the time of day.437 Ihir_d, Mr. Thompson denies knowing a student by the name 0 3 Mr. Thompson also denies the entire interaction described specially the allegation that he provide 'th withdrawal forms ?lled-out with ame on it based 0 and Student reports of-Dcing a threat, stating ?that?s never been a practice of any of my administrators here at Stoneman Douglas . . . 'l?y Thompson does not advocate the fact that we push kids out and have paperwork ready to go[;j that?s very uncharacteristic of any of my administrators so I?m kind of shocked to even hear that to be honest . . . .?439 During his sworn statement, while denying any knowledge of who-vets before the Incident, let alone thalosed a threat or was a potential ?school shooter,? Mr. Thompson stated as follows: Q: you have any recollection of any administrator or staff member bringing to your attention 01 year, so before the incident, pie?incident, tha as a threat to the school? A: No. Q: Or to others? A: No. Q: And do you have any recollection of any students at Stoneman Douglas speaking with ou and advising you that they believed, he or she, believed thahwas a threat of seine type? No. Q: Do you have any recollection of any parents coming to '01: are- incident and communicating that they believed math osed some type of threat to the campus? A: No. Q: Or to others? A: No. Q: Do you ever recall discussin-ith any of your administrators pro-incident? A: No. ?37 Freedman, 03.25.l9, Comm?n Rep. No. dated Mar. 25, 2019; Freedman, 09.09.19. ?38 Thompson, 11.05.18, 3:6-9. 4? Thompson, 11.05.18, Page 73 of82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Do you ever recall discussing-Iith Denise Reed, pro?incident? No. What about with eff Morford? No. When was the first time you heard the nan? February 14, 2018.?0 4? Findings as to Allegation N0. 12: It is allc ed that Mr. Thomison ?mailed to act upon information received fro stud and of the student? bout witnessing a pattern of concerning behavior fro elieved to he warning signs for potential school shooters? (Allegation No. 12). Based on the fore oin summar of witness statements, the evidence 1 ?upport that Students?made any reports regarding?ichavior as ?warning signs for potential school shooters? to Mr. Thompson. Rather overwhelming that such report was made to Assistant Principal Jeffrey Morford. Additionally, tatemcnt that-opened! behavior and believed tha 1 threat for a otential school shooter? to Mr Thompson an that M1. lhompson instructc to withdraw _roml MST) remains wholly uncorroborated and unsubstantiate . rinally, since Mr \dorfor domes receiving such reports from Student_ the1e 15110 evidence that Mr. Morford communicated such reports to Mr lhompson. Consequently, there is no evidence to support Allegation No. 12 asserted against Mr. Thompson. B. Threat Assessments at MSD Durin the 2016?] 7 School Year With respect to Threat Assessments conducted at MSD in 2016-17, it is alleged that Mr. Thompson: - Was disengaged from the threat assessment process at (Allegation No. 13); 0 Failed to establish reporting procedures that would ensure he was knowledgeable about threats on campus (Allegation No. 14); and 0 Failed to ensure administrators whom where tasked with conducting threat assessments were trained and knowledgeable on how to conduct, implement, and report threat assessments (Allegation No. 15). 44? Thompson, 12.10.19, 123:10-25; 12411-15. Page 74 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) A summary of the evidence obtained and ?ndings with respect to the three above-referenced Allegations Nos. 13-15 is found below. Threat Assessment Requirements The Introduction and Overview of the Threat Assessment Procedures Manual (2012) (?Manual?) states that your faculty and/or staff have not received this training, or need a refresher, you may contact the Department of Services . . . to schedule a training session.?44' The Manual also provides that ?these materials will be a valuable resource to school administrators and staff in fostering a safe and healthy'learning environment.?442 The Manual establishes several reporting requirements to be followed by the ?administrator? conducting the threat assessment.??13 ?Administrator? is identified as an or Principal.?444 The Manual requires ?maintenance of records.? Speci?cally, it provides the following: The screening packet becomes a part of the student?s records. The packet should be securely maintained in an assigned administrator?s of?ce, separate from the student?s cumulative ?le. A flag, indicating the existence of an administrative ?le, should be placed in the student?s cumulative fuel45 Both Levels 1 and 2 assessment forms provide that ?this protocol is only to be used by staff who have completed the required District Threat Assessment (ii) Threat Assessments Assignment and Oversight During the 2016-17 school year, Mr. Thompson did not have any set of procedures or protocol regarding the handling of threat assessments. Rather, Mr. Thompson would assign each of his ?ve (5) Assistant Principals to oversee a group of students. For example, in 2016-17, Mr. Morford was assigned supervision of eleventh grade students, which included -and such supervision included the handling of threat assessments. Mr. Thompson states that, to his knowledge, ?[a]ll APs know how to do a threat assessment.?448 Mr. Thompson states that he expects all of his administrators to be familiar with the Threat Assessment Procedures Manual, follow the procedures set forth therein, and attend all Threat Ass?t Man. (2012) p. 6 at App. 18 (emphasis added). "42 Threat Ass?t Man. (2012) p. 10. ?43 See generally, Threat Ass?t Man. (2012). ?4 Threat Ass?t Man. (2012) p. 18 (emphasis added). ?5 Threat Ass?t Man. (2012) pp. 19, 28 (emphasis added). ?6 Threat Ass?t Man. (2012) pp. 20, 27 (emphasis added). ?7 MSD 20l6-17 Yearbook, pp. 228, 23] at App. 30; Reed, 08.22.18, 33:l4~15; Reed, 05.29.19, 69: ;91:23- 25; 92:1; Morford, 05.29.19, 55:119-25. See also -20l6?l7 Class Schedule, showing I. Morforcl awssigned administrator at App. 28. 443 Thompson, 12.10.19, 86:8. Page 75 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) District~mandated trainings including, but not limited to, the Threat Assessment However, despite delegating oversight of student threat assessments to Assistant Principals, Mr. Thompson did not have a system in place to con?rm whether administrators were familiar with and/or properly following the applicable Threat Assessment Procedures Manual.?150 Rather, Mr. Thompson expected his Assistant Principals to bring things to his attention if there was an issue. Nonetheless, Mr. Thompson states that he did not expect his Assistant Principals to bring student threat assessments to his attention because the Threat Assessment Procedures Manual does not require that the Principal be noti?ed of an ongoing threat assessment.451 With respect to District-mandated training, Mr. Thompson maintains that he would disseminate Principal Memos requiring training to administrators, especially Assistant Principals.452 However, Mr. Thompson admits he did not have any system in place to check if the administrators completed the required training.?3 Rather, he assumed ?everyone has been trained.?454 In fact, Mr. Thompson admits assuming that Assistant Principal Jeffrey Morford whom he hired had already been trained because was an ?old veteran.?455 It is undisputed that Assistant Principal Morford had not attended a Threat Assessment Training, nor was familiar with the Threat Assessment Procedures Manual.456 And, there is no evidence that his supervisor, Mr. Thompson, made any inquiries into whether Mr. Morford was trained or was otherwise familiar with Threat Assessments, despite delegating oversight of student Threat Assessments to Mr. Mori?ord (as well as other Assistant Principals). During his sworn statement, Mr. Morford adm?r doing a threat assessment.457 Speci?cally, Mr. Morford was asked whether at the tim hreat Assessment was conducted he was ?familiar with the threat assessment procedures manua and the steps to conduct the threat assessment at the time?? To which Mr. Morford responded, had never threat assessment.?458 Similarly, Assistant Principal Denise Reed stated she initiated neat Assessment because don?t know that [Morford] had ever done one.?459 Mr. Morford admits that he took over-Threawm from Ms. Reed ??led it in my ?le cabinet under his nam ?450 Despite bein ssigned administrator, Mr. Morford admits he did not review ?hreat Assessment pac et? including, but not limited to, the Level 1 TRAC prepared by Ms. Reed.461 449 Thompson, 12.10.19, 34:18-25; 35?43. 45? Thompson, 12.10.19, 42:11-25; 43:1?11. Thompson, 12.10.19, 120:1-10; 121:14-24; 1123:1-9. "52 Thompson, 12.10.19, 3315-19. 453 Thompson, 12.10.19, 42:3-23. Thompson, 12.10.19, 423-23; ?55 Thompson, 12.10.19, 42:22~23. ?55 Morl?ord, 05.29.19, 56:69. 45" Morford, 05.29.19, 5626-9. 45? Morford, 05.29.19, 56:6-9 (emphasis added). 459 Reed, 08.22.18, 33:15-18; 35:13 {emphasis added). 460 Morford, 05.29.19, 55:23-25; 56:1-2. 46? Morford, 05.29.19, 58:16-18. Page 76 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson In addition, Mr. Morford failed to complete or properly complete all seven of the required Steps of the Level 2 Assessment. The Teacher Information Forms (part of Step 3) were sent out by Ms. Reed and Mr. Morford admits he did not review them.462 The Level 2 ?ed by Mr. Morford is incomplete. Moreover, Mr. Morford admits he did not reviemhreat Assessment Records from the Initial Response and Level 1 Stages prior to developing the Level 2 Plan, in direct violation of the Threat Assessment Procedures Manual. In addition, despite setting a date of November 15, 2016 upon which the Threat Assessment Team would review the Level 2 Plan and complete the Student Supervision Plan Review, Mr. Morford failed to do so misguidedly stating that he ?didn?t have to do a new threat assessment.?463 Mr. Morford?s lack of trainin and experience conducting threat assessments is evident in his handling (or mishandling) of l?hreat Assessment. By using the incorrect/outdated version of the Threat Assessment Manual and failing to complete (or properly complete) all seven Steps required by the Level 2: In-Depth Assessment of the District-Mandated Threat Assessment Manual. However, Mr. Thompson would have never been aware of Mr. Morford?s incompetence in handlin-hreat Assessment because he did not have any system in place to check if Mr. Mort?ord had completed the required training, and in fact assumed Mr. Morford was trained because he was an ?old veteran.?464 Mr. Thompson also did not con?rm whether Mr. Morford was familiar with the Threat Assessment Procedures Manual, despite assigning the handling of threat assessments to Mr. Morford.465 Finally, Mr. Thompson provided his Assistant Principals with the wide discretion to advise him of any issues on his campus, including threat assessments. It is undisputedthat Mr. Thompson was never advised 0 assessment. Both Mr. Mei-ford and Ms. Reed, the Assistant Principals who conducte Threat Assessment, admit they did not report the same to Mr. Thompson: Morford Q: Was rinei al Thompson aware, Thompson, aware that? was being monitored and Mr. Greenleaf on a daily basis? No. He had no knowledge? No. Did you ever go talk to him about it? N0 466 Morford, 05.29.19, 58:12-18. Morford, 05.29.19, 69:12-17. Thompson, 12.10.19, 42:3-23. ?5 Thompson, 12.10.19, 42:] 1?25; 43:1-11. ?65 Morford, 05.29.19, 76: 125; 7721-? (emphasis added). Page 77 of 82 TI IOMPSON, Tyson Reed I would probably have gone to him [Thompson] personally if it was a threat to the school not harm to self. I would have personally gone to him if I felt, yes, because I would keep him in the loop. I called - I always self I told him I'd self report this is what happened today. I'm going to self report, you know, whatever happened during the day that he needed to know.467 (P00025464) Moreover, Marianne Dubin, the Social Worker who was o-l'hreat Assessment 'l?eam states that she did not report her concerns re gardin she relied on Assistant Principal Reed to do so: Q: Q: Anybody else that you communicated concerns [regarding threat assessment] with at Stoneman Douglas, that you recall? Ms. Reed. And I took it for granted, and maybe that?s wrong, but that she would take it to the other administrators. And Mr. Mort?ord was a part of the process. But I brought it to her. And Principal Thompson? [I]t wasn?t unusual for me to have at times when I was concerned about things to go to him. But I believe, with this, it was discussed with Ms. Reed.468 Findings as to Allegations 13-15: 0 Was disengaged from the threat assessment process at MSDI-IS (Allegation N0. 13); 0 Failed to establish reporting procedures that would ensure he was knowledgeable about threats on campus (Allegation N0. 14); and ?7 Reed, 05.29.19, 106:2-9 (emphasis added). "68 Dubin, 12.16.19, 48:16, 12-18, 22-23; 49:45. Page 78 of 82 hreat Assessment to Mr. Thompson because THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) 0 Failed to ensure administrators whom where tasked with conducting threat assessments were trained and knowledgeable on how to conduct, implement, and report threat assessments (Allegation No. 15). As Principal, Mr. Thompson was to ?provide the leadership and management necessary to administer and supervise all programs, policies, and activities of the school.?469 In doing so, Mr. Thompson had a duty to use his ?knowledge, skills, and abilities? to ?effectively perform certain essential responsibilities.?470 Mr. Thompson?s Essential Performance Responsibilities included, in relevant part, to: 15. ?distribute leadership when appropriate. ?Establish the job assignments and supervise all assigned personnel and conduct performance assessments. . 3?47: 16. ?Manage the school, operations, and facilities in ways that maximize the use of resources to promote a safe, efficient, legal, and effective learning BCPS Policy 4008 titled Responsibilities and Duties (Principals and Instructional Personnel) provides that a principal shall: ?[a]ssume administrative responsibility for all records and reports required regarding pupils. . . 3?4" . ?rst, since the Threat Assessment Procedures Manual provides that the assessor should be either an Assistant Principal or Principal, distribution of the responsibility to conduct threat assessments to Assistant Principals by Mr. Thompson was appropriate, as the Manual contemplates the same. Second, while Mr. Thompson correctly points out that the Manual is silent as to any requirement to report the existence or results of a threat assessment to the principal, the Manual does require mandatory record keeping relative to the threat assessment that is ?part of the student?s records.? Since pursuant to Policy 4008 Mr. Thompson was administratively responsible for all student records and reports, delegation of such record keeping to the Assistant Principals without any veri?cation or oversight. was an inappropriate distribution or delegation by Mr. Thompson of his duties in violation of his Essential ce Responsibility No. 15 (distribute leadership when appropriate). Moreover, sine I?hreat Assessment records were incomplete, this is a further violation by Mr. Thompson of his non-delegable responsibility over all student records and reports under Policy 4008. ?69 Pr. Job. Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities at ?Position Goal," p. 3 at App 5. 47? Pr. Job. Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities at ?Required Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities," p. 3. 47' Pr. Job. Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities at No. 15 (emphasis added). ?72 Pr. Job. Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities at No. 31 (emphasis added). ?'73 Pr. Job. Description Essential Perf. Responsibilities at No. 16 (emphasis added). ?74 Policy adopted 04.25.1968, last amended on, 09.17.02, available at: (emphasis added). Page 79 of 32 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Ihi?, Mr. Thompson is required to supervise his Assistant Principals and establish job assignments. However, when it came to threat assessments, Mr. Thompson provided no guidance as to what he expected from the Assistant Principals other than to comply with the Manual. Mr. Thompson admits he had no reporting mechanism established to monitor an Assistant Principal?s compliance with the Manual and it is undisputed that Assistant Principals Reed and Morford failed to follow the Manual diu'ing -Fhreat Assessment; such failure by Mr. Thompson constitutes a violation of his Essential Performance Responsibility No. 31 (establish the job assignments and supervise all assigned personnel). Fourth, the Manual provides in at least two instances a requirement that the Manual is only to be used by those who ?have completed the required District Threat Assessment trainings.? However, Mr. Thompson admittingly assigned threat assessments to Assistant Principals without inquiring, let alone verifying, if he/sh ttended the man eat Assessment training. In fact, Mr. Morford who was assigne participated i Threat Assessment had not attended the required Training. This constitutes a violation by Mr. Thompson of his Essential Performance Responsibility No. 31 (establish the job assignments and supervise all assigned personnel). In sum, the foregoing evidence of Mr. Thompson?s f?disengagement from the threat assessment process,? ?failure to establish reporting procedures that would ensure he was knowledgeable about threats on campus,? and ?failure to ensure administrators whom where tasked with conducting threat assessments were trained and knowledgeable on how to conduct, implement, and report threat assessments,? collectively also constitutes a ?failure to Manage the school, operations, and facilities in ways that maximize the use of resources to promote a safe, ef?cient, legal, and effective learning environment? Essential Performance Responsibility No. 16. As such, the evidence supports that Mr. Thompson?s distribution of threat assessments to Assistant Principals without establishing reporting procedures, ensuring proper record keeping, verifying training and knowledge, and a complete lack of oversight was a violation his Essential Performance Responsibilities Nos. 15, 16, and 31, as well as Policy These violations also constitute a violation of Policy 4.9 Corrective Action, which provides that ?[elmployees are expected to comply with workplace policies, procedures and regulations, local, state, and federal laws, and State Board Rules, both in and out of the work place,? and ?[s]upcrvisors are encouraged to continually provide coaching, counseling, feedback, and/or additional support to help ensure each employees?s uccess.? 475 ??75 Policy 4.9, adopted 05.01.01, last amended on 04.19.18, available at: Page 30 or 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth herein, a preponderance of the evidence does not support that Mr. Thompson violated any Policy, procedure, or Principal Essential Performance Responsibility as it pertains to the Allegations Asserted Nos10, 11, and 12. However, a preponderance of the evidence supports a ?nding that Mr. Thompson violated his Essential Performance Responsibility No. 15, as it pertains to Allegation Assorted No. 6. A preponderance of the evidence also supports a ?nding that Mr. Thompson violated his Essential Performance Responsibilities Nos. 15, 16, and 31, Policy Responsibilities and Duties (Principals and Instructional Personnel), and Policy 4.9 Corrective Action as it pertains to Allegations Assorted Nos. 13, 14, and 15. Page 81 of 82 THOMPSON, Tyson (P00025464) Barry A. Postman, Esq. SIGNATURES 02-11200 Date 03- Date Page 82 of 82