Case 2:20-cv-05044 Document 1 Filed 06/08/20 Page 1 of 19 Page ID #:1

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Mohammad Tajsar (SBN 280152)
mtajsar@aclusocal.org
ACLU Foundation of Southern California
1313 West 8th Street
Los Angeles, CA 90017
Telephone: (213) 977-9500
Facsimile: (213) 977-5297
Jacob A. Snow (SBN 270988)
jsnow@aclunc.org
ACLU Foundation of Northern California
39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: (415) 621-2493
Facsimile: (415) 255-8437
Counsel for Plaintiffs
(continued on next page)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JUSTIN SANCHEZ and ERIC ALEJO;

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Plaintiffs,
v.

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LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION and CITY OF
LOS ANGELES,
Defendants.

CASE NO: 2:20-cv-05044
COMPLAINT

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(continued from previous page)

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Jennifer Lynch (SBN 240701)
jlynch@eff.org
Electronic Frontier Foundation
815 Eddy Street
San Francisco, CA 94109
Tel: (415) 463-9333
Fax: (415) 436-9993

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Douglas E. Mirell (SBN 94169)
DMirell@ggfirm.com
Timothy J. Toohey (SBN 140117)
TToohey@ggfirm.com
Greenberg Glusker Fields Claman & Machtinger LLP
2049 Century Park East, Suite 2600
Los Angeles, California 90067
Telephone: (310) 553-3610
Fax:
(310) 553-0687

 Case 2:20-cv-05044 Document 1 Filed 06/08/20 Page 3 of 19 Page ID #:3

INTRODUCTION

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1.

Beginning in late 2017, communities across California witnessed a

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near-overnight invasion of motorized electric scooters on city sidewalks. Equipped

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with tiny motors, batteries, and the sleek insignia of their proprietor technology

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companies, they introduced a new dockless mode of transit for smartphone-

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equipped consumers as an alternative to cars, bicycles, and public transit. Similar

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to a car ride-share service, riders reserve and pay for scooter rentals through a

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smartphone app. At the end of a trip, the user leaves the scooter on the street,

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where it can be rented again.

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2.

Soon after scooters appeared, complaints targeting the scooter

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companies followed. Although dockless scooters represented a novel and

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potentially useful form of transit, they also cluttered city sidewalks, lacked safety

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features, and interfered with disabled access to city streets. The scooter companies

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themselves often did jurisdictions no favors, aggressively pushing back against

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attempts to regulate the vehicles.

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3.

As in other cities across the country, this was the story of scooters in

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Los Angeles. In an attempt to avoid the unpopular profusion of scooters filling the

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sidewalks, Defendants Los Angeles Department of Transportation and the City of

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Los Angeles (collectively “LADOT” or “Defendants”) developed a far-reaching

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software tool that (they claim) is necessary to managing the right of way. Dubbed

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the Mobility Data Specification (“MDS”), this software interface, crafted in

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partnership with a private consultancy, forces operators of dockless vehicles to

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provide real-time and historical data about each vehicle and trip taken in Los

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Angeles, all as a condition of operating. Most importantly, the tool requires that

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scooter companies produce detailed trip data about every single scooter trip taken

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within city limits, including where each trip starts, the route it takes, and where it

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ends.

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4.

Although MDS does not record the identity of the rider directly, the

COMPLAINT

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precision with which it captures riders’ location information—often to within a few

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feet—likely allows riders to be identified. Knowing that a particular trip began at

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an office building and ended in front of a home, for example, makes the difficulty

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of identifying the individual rider as simple as knowing their home and work

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addresses. Given the large amount of public or otherwise accessible data about

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people’s lives that exists, simply cross-referencing MDS data about a particular

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trip with any other dataset (including mere observation of a routinely-taken scooter

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trip) can reveal who took the trip.

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5.

Beyond identifying an individual rider, the locations where an

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individual’s trip starts and ends can also reveal why that rider made the trip.

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Regular trips that start near a residence and end at an office reveal that a person

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living at the residence works at the office and takes a particular route to work.

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Periodic trips that begin at a high school and end in a family-planning clinic could

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reveal that a student is seeking reproductive health care. Even a single trip to a

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protest against police violence may result in a rider’s name being revealed and her

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presence at the protest exposed against her wishes.

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6.

LADOT has never articulated an adequate or reasonable justification

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for the collection of such sensitive location information en masse. When mandated

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by the Los Angeles City Council to identify, by February 25, 2020, its reasons for

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collecting precise location data, LADOT failed to do so. Now, over three months

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after this deadline, LADOT has still not articulated an operationally specific need

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for this data. To date, it has offered only the most generic justifications for

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collecting precise location information, stating at one point that its goal is to

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“experiment” with riders’ protected information when setting agency policy.

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7.

The Constitution prohibits LADOT from experimenting with the

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rights of its constituents. The Fourth Amendment strictly limits the warrantless

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collection of vehicular location information. As a Supreme Court majority

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recognized in United States v. Jones, “GPS monitoring generates a precise,

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comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of

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detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”

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565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (J., Sotomayor, concurring); id. at 430 (J., Alito,

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concurring) (long-term capture of vehicle location information violates reasonable

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expectation of privacy). This is particularly true here, where the scale and breadth

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of that data collection has no conceivable relation to a targeted investigation of a

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particular individual. MDS collects precise location data associated with every

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single rider of scooters within the City, every single time they ride such a vehicle.

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And once MDS software is deployed, it gathers location data without any human

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involvement and at the maximum precision generated by the vehicles.
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Plaintiffs ride electric scooters in the City of Los Angeles, using the

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vehicles to make trips from their homes to work, friends, businesses, and places of

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leisure. LADOT uses MDS to warrantlessly collect sensitive vehicle location data

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associated with each of Plaintiffs’ trips, in violation of their right to be free from

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unreasonable searches and seizures in contravention of the United States and

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California Constitutions. The compelled production of Plaintiffs’ location

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information also violates the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act

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(“CalECPA”).

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9.

LADOT violates these rights irrespective of whether it collects data

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about Plaintiffs’ movements in real-time or after a period of delay. The gathering

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of historical location information about individuals without sufficient justification

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violates the Constitution. United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018)

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(comparing the greater harms of historical location tracking as opposed to manual

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real-time observation, and explaining that “[u]nlike with the GPS device in Jones,

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police need not even know in advance whether they want to follow a particular

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individual, or when.”). When that location data is highly precise (as the MDS data

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is), the risks with collecting historical location information are too great without a

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warrant.

COMPLAINT

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10.

Through this action, Plaintiffs seek, among other forms of relief,

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expungement of their location data from LADOT’s servers and an injunction

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preventing MDS from collecting and storing precise location information en

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masse.
JURISDICTION

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This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under 28

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U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 because it alleges violations of the United

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States Constitution enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and under 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1367 because it alleges violations of the California Constitution and the

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California Penal Code.
VENUE

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Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) because Defendants are

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residents of this district, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the events and actions giving

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rise to the claims herein occurred in this District, and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) because

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Defendants are subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction in this District.
PARTIES

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13.

Plaintiff Justin Sanchez is a resident of Los Angeles, and a customer

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of and rider of dockless vehicles offered by Lime, Bird, and Lyft. Mr. Sanchez has

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ridden scooters operated by these three providers within the City of Los Angeles

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while MDS has been in effect. Mr. Sanchez intends to continue riding these

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dockless vehicles within Los Angeles in the future.

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14.

Plaintiff Eric Alejo is a resident of Los Angeles, and a customer of

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and rider of dockless vehicles offered by Lyft, JUMP, Bird, and Lime. Mr. Alejo

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has ridden scooters operated by these four providers within the City of Los

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Angeles while MDS has been in effect. Mr. Alejo also intends to continue riding

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these dockless vehicles within Los Angeles in the future.

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15.

Defendant City of Los Angeles is a public entity, duly organized and

existing under the laws of the State of California.

COMPLAINT

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16.

Defendant Los Angeles Department of Transportation is a government

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agency created by Los Angeles city ordinance. It advertises that its mission is “to

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lead transportation planning, project delivery, and operations in the City of Los

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Angeles.” LADOT developed and operates the permitting program that licenses the

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operation of dockless vehicle providers within Los Angeles.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

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I.

DOCKLESS VEHICLES LAUNCH IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA IN

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2017, AND ARE FORMALLY ALLOWED IN THE CITY OF LOS

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ANGELES BEGINNING IN MARCH 2019.

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Beginning in 2017, numerous private companies began dropping

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dockless vehicles, including motorized scooters and electric bicycles, on Los

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Angeles streets. These vehicles are owned and maintained by private companies,

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and individual customers can rent them via a smartphone application. These

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vehicles are “dockless” in that rides need not start from a fixed docking station,

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like a traditional municipal bicycle share. Instead, rides can begin and end

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wherever a vehicle is located, with a user employing only the provider’s mobile

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application to terminate the rental. At that point, the application informs the rider

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of the cost of the ride, and charges the user accordingly.

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The operators typically outfit the vehicles with rechargeable batteries,

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Global Positioning System (“GPS”) trackers, and wireless connectivity to the

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internet. The vehicles broadcast precise GPS coordinates to the operator, which

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allows it to track rides and charge customers accordingly.

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With the growing use of dockless vehicles in neighboring cities, the

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Los Angeles City Council passed an ordinance on September 28, 2018 compelling

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LADOT to implement a “Shared Mobility Device Pilot Program” establishing an

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application process for the approval of City-issued permits to operators of dockless

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bicycles, electric bicycles, motorized scooters, and electric scooters. The ordinance

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mandated that under the Pilot Program, “an operator of a shared mobility device

COMPLAINT

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shall obtain a permit from the Department [of Transportation] and comply with all

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Department permit rules, regulations, indemnification, insurance and fee

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requirements.”

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In response, LADOT created the permitting program via an

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application and review process. In exchange for a license to operate a

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micromobility company within City limits, LADOT instructed operators to submit

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an application detailing their intended deployment in the City and agreeing to

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numerous regulatory requirements.1 These requirements included otherwise

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standard insurance requirements, an agreement to an indemnification provision,

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limits on the total number of vehicles any individual operator could deploy within

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Los Angeles, agreements to place safety features like lights and reflectors on

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vehicles, requirements that operators ensure vehicles are appropriately parked and

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not blocking pedestrian rights of way, and incentives for operators to diversify the

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geographic distribution of their vehicles. Relevant here, the permitting application

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required operators agree to implement MDS’s data collection protocols.

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Once an operator applied for a permit, LADOT reviewed the

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application and awarded an operating permit to the applicant accordingly.

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Individual end users were not parties to the application agreement, despite their

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sensitive location data being critical to the process.

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The original one-year pilot program launched in March 2019, and has

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been extended for six months through September 15, 2020. At the close of the

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now-eighteen-month pilot, LADOT plans to establish a one-year formal dockless

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mobility pilot program.

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II.

DEFENDANTS UTILIZE THE MOBILITY DATA SPECIFICATION

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TO UNLAWFULLY COLLECT PRECISE MOVEMENT DATA.

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23.

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As a condition of securing a permit to operate in the City of Los

LADOT’s original permit application is available at
https://files.acluwest.org/s/XATp4ErkW4WsSsT.
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COMPLAINT

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Angeles, LADOT requires mobility companies to implement MDS’s data

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collection requirements. MDS contains two interrelated parts: 1) the data-

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collection standard, which specifies what information mobility providers must

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deliver to the governing jurisdiction, and 2) reference implementations in software

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code that both mobility providers and the governing jurisdiction can use to set up

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the information exchange. MDS ingests data directly from the transportation

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companies, enabling LADOT “to actively manage private mobility providers and

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the public right-of-way . . . through a shared data vocabulary and to communicate

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directly with product companies in real time using code.”2

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The purpose of MDS is to accelerate information collection by cities

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and counties facing an increase in the volume of permitting associated with

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dockless scooters. According to the non-profit Open Mobility Foundation, the

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proprietor of MDS who took over its administration from LADOT, “the goals of

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MDS are to provide a standardized way for municipalities or other regulatory

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agencies to ingest, compare and analyze data from mobility service providers, and

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to give municipalities the ability to express regulation in machine-readable

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formats. . . . MDS is a key piece of digital infrastructure that supports the effective

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implementation of mobility policies in cities around the world.” Instead of each

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city deciding for itself what information to collect and writing the necessary

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software, MDS encourages cities to adopt a single existing standard.

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MDS, once implemented by private dockless scooter companies,

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ingests a wide variety of data directly from the providers without any human input.

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The data includes the provider’s name, a unique device identifier for the vehicle,

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the type of vehicle, the length of the trip, its starting point, end point, and the route

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the vehicle took on its trip. Relevant here is the route information requirement,

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“Mobility Data Specification: Information Briefing,” Los Angeles
Department of Transportation, https://ladot.io/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Whatis-MDS-Cities.pdf, Oct. 31, 2018.
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which calls for granular trip data from the providers to LADOT about every ride

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taken within Los Angeles—including the starting point of the ride, the starting time

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of the ride, the end point for the ride, and the ending time of the ride. LADOT

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requires that start and end locations be provided in real-time, and the route that the

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trip took between those points provided after 24 hours.

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26.

While MDS does not collect any information directly identifying the

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rider of a particular vehicle, the sensitivity of movement information makes it

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possible to identify individual riders anyway. Coupling a rider’s precise trip data

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with information from just one other dataset—for instance, additional scooter rides

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that show a pattern of repeated trips to and from the same locations, public voting

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records from particular addresses, or even simple physical observation of a rider—

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can likely identify the individual who took the trip. In addition, it may reveal

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important information about the individual’s residence, the identity of her

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employer, associates, or friends, the type of physicians she visits, or her favorite

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recreational activities. And when end points are sensitive locations—like

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therapists’ offices, marijuana dispensaries, or Planned Parenthood clinics—those

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routes may reveal why she made that trip.

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27.

In a time when protests are erupting around the country, the risk of

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identifying individuals based on physical observation takes on a new importance.

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Imagine a person who takes a scooter to a political protest, or even rides past and is

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captured by one of the many cameras used to document interaction between

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protesters and police. With the information LADOT ingests through MDS, that

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individual ride could be picked out of a haystack of data and handed over to the

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police, who would then know where the person ended their trip, where they started,

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and the precise route they took.

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28.

The likelihood of identifying individuals based only on location

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information is not a hypothetical concern. A growing body of research has

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demonstrated that location datasets are easily susceptible to identification. “With

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merged mobility datasets, this becomes even easier: An agent could potentially

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match users trajectories in anonymized data from one dataset, with deanonymized

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data in another, to unmask the anonymized data.”3 For instance, researchers have

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found that they could identify 50% of people from only two randomly chosen data

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points in a dataset that contained only time and location data.4

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29.

Identification of location data poses grave risks to individuals—

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particularly marginalized or justice-impacted members of the community. In

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addition to revealing sensitive information about people’s lives, this information

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can exacerbate persistent forms of state violence and bias that target those at the

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fringes. This includes police encounters, immigration enforcement, homelessness

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sweeps, or enforcement of pre-trial release terms or probation conditions, to name

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a few. Past experience has also shown that individual location information in the

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hands of authorities can stoke racial and gender-based violence. When collected

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without adequate safeguards, location information often results in cases of

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domestic abuse and stalking, as a recent investigation of automatic license plate

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reader information in California revealed.5

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Rob Matheson, The privacy risks of compiling mobility data: Merging
different types of location-stamped data can make it easier to discern users’
identities, even when the data is anonymized, MIT News (Dec. 7, 2018),
http://news.mit.edu/2018/privacy-risks-mobility-data-1207 (describing Daniel
Kondor et al., “Towards matching user mobility traces in large-scale datasets,”
IEEE Transactions on Big Data (Sep. 24, 2018), available at
http://senseable.mit.edu/papers/pdf/20180927_Kondoretal_TowardsMatching_IEEE-BigData.pdf)).
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Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, et al., Unique in the Crowd: The privacy
bounds of human mobility, 3 Nature Scientific Reports 1376 (2013),
http://www.nature.com/articles/srep01376 (finding that “in a dataset where the
location of an individual is specified hourly, and with a spatial resolution equal to
that given by the carrier’s antennas, four spatio-temporal points are enough to
uniquely identify 95% of the individuals.”).
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“Automated License Plate Readers: To Better Protect Individuals’’
Privacy, Law Enforcement Must Increase Its Safeguards for the Data It Collects,”
(cont’d)

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30.

Despite the sensitivity of location data and the increasing legal

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protections individuals have over their location information, LADOT’s MDS

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protocol demands maximally precise locations about individuals’ trips. LADOT’s

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technical consultants developed the program to collect as precise information as

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the vehicles generate. With the pilot program in full effect, LADOT captured GPS

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coordinates broadcast by scooters up to seven decimal places, an extraordinary

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level of accuracy even assuming a wide margin of error. For background, GPS

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coordinates are often expressed through decimal degrees via longitude and latitude

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coordinates. The more decimal places a GPS coordinate is measured in, the more

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precise the location it reveals is.6 MDS compels vehicle operators to provide the

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coordinates of each vehicle in latitude and longitude to the maximum precision

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allowed by the vehicle, which can be up to seven decimal places. For reference,

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coordinates in seven decimal degrees are accurate to within 1.11 centimeters at the

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equator. In real-world conditions away from the equator, the accuracy with which

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the companies capture a vehicle’s location depends on the scooter’s hardware, the

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availability of over-the-air internet connectivity, and the physical conditions

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surrounding a vehicle that may impact GPS signal strength. Given advances in

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technology and widespread access to 4G (and, soon, 5G connectivity), the

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coordinates generated by dockless vehicles can accurately place them within a few

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dozen feet, indicating with confidence, for example, where on a city block a

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scooter is and the building or piece of city infrastructure nearest which it is parked.

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Research has demonstrated that even truncating GPS coordinates of

trips’ origins and destinations by lopping off GPS decimal places does little to

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California State Auditor (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://www.auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2019-118.pdf, at 12–13 (discussing
instance of gender-based assault resulting from license plate location information).
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For a helpful explanation of the math behind the precision of GPS
locations, see “Decimal Degrees,” WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decimal_degrees (last visited June 3, 2020).
COMPLAINT

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protect individuals’ privacy. Such is the sensitivity of location data sets, which

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cannot reasonably be considered “anonymized” in any real sense when collected en

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masse and with the precision that MDS currently demands.

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32.

Given these facts, and upon information and belief, a simple analysis

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of MDS data will likely identify the precise trips taken by Plaintiffs in this case and

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where they live, work, shop, and frequent. Plaintiffs have never agreed to share

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their precise location data with LADOT, even though LADOT has used MDS to

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extract this data from the operators whose vehicles Plaintiffs rented.

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III.

DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO PROVIDE REASONABLE

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JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COMPELLING PRODUCTION OF

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LOCATION INFORMATION.

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33.

When LADOT launched its pilot MDS program, it did not identify

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with operational specificity how it intended to use the data ingested by MDS. Nor

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did it develop a data collection and retention program narrowly tailored to meet

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even the use cases it did identify. As a result, granular location information easily

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susceptible to identification is needlessly—and illegally—collected and at risk of

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being shared with third parties and targeted by other government actors.

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34.

According to LADOT, the purpose of MDS is multifaceted, and

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allows LADOT to “actively manage private companies who operate in our public

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space.”7 During the development of the pilot program, LADOT identified

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numerous overlapping and related benefits that mass location data may provide to

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the regulators, some more specific than others, but none that necessitated collecting

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all riders’ granular and precise location information en masse.

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35.

To the contrary, LADOT leadership expressly identified the MDS

pilot as a mechanism to “experiment” with this data collection project.8 Put
“LADOT   Putting Ideas into motion,” https://ladot.io/ (embedding
YouTube video entitled “The Future of Mobility – Mobility Data Specification”).
8
David Zipper, “Cities can see where you’re taking that scooter,” Slate, Apr.
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(cont’d)

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differently, LADOT has intentionally gathered sensitive and legally protected

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location information in an experimental posture with data concerning actual users

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in real time—unlawfully collecting data in order to determine post hoc how to

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exploit them to serve non-specific regulatory needs.

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36.

LADOT’s dockless scooter pilot program fails to tailor its collection

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of individual location data to articulable use cases. Given the lack of specificity for

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its proposed use cases, it is difficult to identify potential alternatives to maintaining

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individual trip data, or to gauge the necessity of mass location data collection to

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achieve LADOT’s regulatory ends.

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37.

To the contrary, LADOT has been exceptionally vague about how it

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intends to use this data, in part to allow the agency to experiment with exploiting

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the data after it is collected. Each of the articulated use cases LADOT has offered

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for its desire to collect en masse individual vehicle location data fails under

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scrutiny. For instance, the City Council mandated that LADOT’s pilot program

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incentivize providers to diversify access to its vehicles. Addressing equity in

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regional distributions of vehicles by itself does not require individual, granular

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location data. For instance, collecting a vehicle’s neighborhood-level locations at

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regular, but disparate, time intervals (e.g., every two hours) will adequately inform

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regulators whether providers are distributing their vehicles equitably—without

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collecting individuals’ trip data.

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38.

Even the few use cases LADOT has offered for why granular trip data

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is necessary do not require detailed vehicle telemetry data. For instance, even

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though MDS calls for acquiring GPS coordinates up to a maximum level of

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precision, current physical limitations on the accuracy of GPS broadcasts from

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2, 2019, https://slate.com/business/2019/04/scooter-data-cities-mds-uber-lyft-losangeles.html (quoting LADOT General Manager Seleta Reynolds, “When bikes
and scooters showed up, they gave us a pretty interesting sandbox to start
experimenting.”)
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vehicles make their coordinates too imprecise to determine whether scooters are

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appropriately parked adjacent to a curb versus inappropriately parked in the middle

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of a sidewalk a couple of feet away, another purpose LADOT has offered for why

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it needs individual users’ trip information.

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39.

Even when the City Council instructed LADOT to articulate “specific

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regulatory purposes for the collection and use of each type of data required by

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MDS,” LADOT simply did not comply. This request came in a Los Angeles City

8

Council Motion passed on November 27, 2019, which required LADOT to, among

9

other things, provide a report outlining the “specific regulatory purposes for the

10

collection and use of each type of data required by MDS” by February 25, 2020.9

11

To date, and more than three months after the deadline, LADOT has still not

12

articulated those purposes in response to the request.

13

40.

Importantly, LADOT lacks reasonable and justifiable uses for both

14

real-time location information and historical location data—both of which present

15

substantially similar violations of Plaintiffs’ rights. This is in contrast to concerns

16

raised by some of the micromobility providers, including JUMP. While JUMP has

17

historically protested LADOT’s requirement that it produce precise location

18

information in real-time, including by filings its own lawsuit challenging MDS

19

data collection by MDS, JUMP offered to produce that information to LADOT

20

after a 24-hour delay.10 According to JUMP, a 24-hour delay “significantly

21

mitigate[s] the frightening risks of direct and constant government surveillance and

22

possible interception of individual users.”11

23

41.

Perhaps most ominously, LADOT plans to extend the same model for

24
25
26
27
28

9

Motion No. 19-1355, Intro. By David Ryu (Nov. 1, 2019), available at
http://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2019/19-1355_mot_11-01-2019.pdf.
10
Social Bicycles LLC d/b/a JUMP v. City of Los Angeles, No. 2:20-cv02746 (C.D. Cal. filed Mar. 24, 2020), ECF No. 1, at ¶ 11 (challenging MDS
location collection from perspective of private scooter operator).
11
Id.
COMPLAINT

13

 Case 2:20-cv-05044 Document 1 Filed 06/08/20 Page 16 of 19 Page ID #:16

1

real-time geolocation information collection that it uses for dockless vehicles to

2

“all kinds of future transportation forms—from ride-hailing and car-sharing to

3

delivery drones and autonomous vehicles.”12 Under LADOT’s leadership, the use

4

of MDS for dockless vehicles has expanded to over eighty cities, with more to

5

come. While Plaintiffs do not challenge LADOT’s need to regulate emerging

6

technologies and transportation modalities, such regulation must not compromise

7

its obligations to protect the civil rights of its constituents.

8

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

9

FIRST CLAIM

10

Violation of the Fourth Amendment (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

11

(All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants)

12
13
14

42.

Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth

herein.
43.

Defendants’ deployment of MDS violates Plaintiffs’ right to be free

15

from unreasonable search and seizure, as protected by the Fourth Amendment to

16

the United States Constitution.

17

44.

Defendants’ administrative scheme to collect Plaintiffs’ granular

18

vehicle and mobility location information constitutes a search under the Fourth

19

Amendment, whether in real-time or historically. Defendants’ collection of this

20

data is unreasonable, unconnected to any legitimate government interest, and

21

occurs without any opportunity for administrative or judicial review pre-collection.

22

45.

Defendants’ administrative scheme also unreasonably conditions

23

Plaintiffs’ ability to ride dockless vehicles upon the disgorgement of Plaintiffs’

24

otherwise protected location information.

25
26
27
28

12

Laura Bliss, This City Was Sick of Tech Disruptors. So It Decided to
Become One., CITYLAB, https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2020/02/losangeles-transportation-data-mobility-scooter-mds-uber/606178/ (last visited June
7, 2020).
COMPLAINT

14

 Case 2:20-cv-05044 Document 1 Filed 06/08/20 Page 17 of 19 Page ID #:17

1

46.

Finally, Defendants’ ongoing retention of Plaintiffs’ precise location

2

data concerning their movements constitutes a warrantless search under the Fourth

3

Amendment, and is not reasonable or justified.

4

47.

Plaintiffs seek an injunction to compel Defendants to delete all precise

5

and identifiable location data concerning their movements collected by Defendants

6

via MDS. Plaintiffs also seek an injunction to end all prospective collection,

7

storage, or maintenance of their precise location data via MDS.

8

48.

Plaintiffs also seek damages against Defendants arising out of their

9

unconstitutional collection, storage, and maintenance of their location information.

10

SECOND CLAIM

11

Violation of Article 1, § 13 of the California Constitution

12

(All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants)

13
14
15

49.

Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth

herein.
50.

Defendants’ deployment of MDS violates Plaintiffs’ right to be free

16

from unreasonable search and seizure, as protected by Article 1, Section 13 of the

17

California Constitution.

18

51.

Defendants’ administrative scheme to collect Plaintiffs’ granular

19

vehicle and mobility location information constitutes a search under the California

20

Constitution. Defendants’ collection of this data is unreasonable, unconnected to

21

any legitimate government interest, and occurs without any opportunity for

22

administrative or judicial review pre-collection.

23

52.

Defendants’ administrative scheme also unreasonably conditions

24

Plaintiffs’ ability to ride dockless vehicles upon the disgorgement of Plaintiffs’

25

otherwise protected location information, itself a violation of the California

26

Constitution.

27
28

53.

Finally, Defendants’ ongoing retention of Plaintiffs’ precise location

data concerning their movements constitutes a warrantless search under the

COMPLAINT

15

 Case 2:20-cv-05044 Document 1 Filed 06/08/20 Page 18 of 19 Page ID #:18

1
2

California Constitution, and is not reasonable or justified.
54.

Plaintiffs seek an injunction to compel Defendants to delete all precise

3

and identifiable location data concerning their movements collected by Defendants

4

via MDS. Plaintiffs also seek an injunction to end all prospective collection,

5

storage, or maintenance of their precise location data via MDS.

6

55.

Plaintiffs also seek damages against Defendants arising out of their

7

unconstitutional collection, storage, and maintenance of their location information.

8

THIRD CLAIM

9

Violation of the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Cal.

10

Penal Code § 1546 et seq.

11

(All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants)

12
13
14

56.

Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth

herein.
57.

Under the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act, a

15

California government entity may only compel the production of electronic

16

information through the execution of a probable-cause warrant or analogous order,

17

or under a narrowly circumscribed set of exceptional circumstances. Cal. Penal

18

Code § 1546.1(a), (d).

19

58.

Location information gathered by MDS constitutes both “electronic

20

communication information” and “electronic device information” under the terms

21

of CalECPA, subjecting it to CalECPA’s strict requirements for access and

22

collection. See Cal. Penal Code § 1546(c)–(d), (g).

23

59.

The mobility providers that operate dockless vehicles, including

24

JUMP, Lyft, Lime, and others, constitute “service providers” within the terms of

25

CalECPA, since they offer “electronic communication service[s]” that in part

26

provide to riders “the ability to send or receive electronic communications”

27

Defendants constitute “government entities” under the statute. Cal. Penal Code

28

§ 1546(e), (j).

COMPLAINT

16

 Case 2:20-cv-05044 Document 1 Filed 06/08/20 Page 19 of 19 Page ID #:19

1

60.

Defendants’ compulsory requirement that operators disclose

2

Plaintiffs’ location information violates Penal Code sections 1546.1(b) and

3

1546.1(c). Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to expungement of all location records

4

collected by Defendants relating to them, pursuant to section 1546.4(c).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

5
6
7

61.

Plaintiffs request the Court grant the following relief:
a.

Issue a declaration stating that Defendants’ collection of precise

8

location information concerning every ride taken by Plaintiffs

9

violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States

10

Constitution, Article 1, section 13 of the California

11

Constitution, and CalECPA;

12

b.

location records associated with Plaintiffs’ rides;

13
14

Issue an injunction ordering Defendants to destroy all precise

c.

Issue an injunction ordering Defendants to stop the collection,

15

storage, and preservation of Plaintiffs’ precise location data via

16

the MDS API;

17

d.

Issue an injunction prohibiting Defendants from requiring

18

compliance with the MDS API’s precise location collection

19

requirement as a prerequisite for issuing LADOT’s Dockless

20

On-Demand Personal Mobility Permit;

21

e.

22

Award damages to Plaintiffs for violations of their federal and
state constitutional rights;

23

f.

Award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; and

24

g.

Grant any other relief that this Court may deem proper and just.

25
26
27
28

DATED: June 8, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Mohammad Tajsar
Mohammad Tajsar
Counsel for Plaintiffs

COMPLAINT

17