INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE May 27. 2020 3.2 T0: The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners FROM: Chief of Police SUBJECT: OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTING NO. 028?1 9 Honorable Members: The following is my review, analysis, and ?ndings for Of?cer Involved Shooting (OIS), Force Investigation Division (FID) No. 028-19. A Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB) was convened on this matter on May 19, 2020. In this case, the recommended ?ndings were not unanimous, with a minority opinion rendered regarding the ?nding for Drawing/Exhibiting. I have weighed each opinion, considered the case in its entirety, and have adopted the recommendation of the UOFRB majority opinion with regard to the Drawing/Exhibiting fmding for Of?cer -. I hereby submit my ?ndings in accordance with Police Commission policy. Note: The criminal investigation in this matter was handled by the Corona Police Department (CPD). As a result, FID had limited access to the crime scene and associated evidence until it was completed and processed by CPD. FID investigators were allowed to conduct a walk-through and take positional photographs with Of?cer after CPD processed the crime scene and collected their evidence. Additionally, FID was provided with reports and witness interviews, some having been redacted, CPD Body Worn Video (BWV), and store surveillance videos from the location. FID investigators requested additional documents pertaining to this case; however, the request was denied. SUMMARY1 On June 14, 201.0. Of?cer -. and Wholesale Warehouse, located approximately 1945 hours, cor sample booth from witness was off?duty, and shopping with I spouse. - . after obtaining a store membership at ("ostco North McKinley Street in the City of Coronal A1 was obtaining a food sample at an Aldt?lli: food because - had become fussy. had The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 2 3.2 walked to a different section of the store to shop for other items. According to Of?cer -. I - in I left arm, close to I chest, and gave - a sample. According to I son Kenneth French, and . were in the store to shop for groceries and were sampling some food. was going to offer Kenneth a sample when Kenneth suddenly turned and slapped the on the cheek! According to Of?cer had a facial expression of absolute fear as ?ooked over I right shoulder and stated, ?Oh my God,? which caused - tn head to the righl. As I did so, Of?cer observed Kenneth with his rioht arm extended. pointing a small black compact ?rearm approx tmately an inch from Of?cer ilL?iiLl. it'i'tt-er remembered seeing a bright dash of white and hearing a I stated hot pain on the right side of I head and then everything ?n'cm him-it. {tiller-r stated that when regained consciousness, I was on the ?oor. lying on I back. and near I right shoulder, screaming and pounding on Of?cer chest. Of?ce not know how I fell to the ?oor and stated Felt intense pain on the right side of lit-ad, which described as absolute heat. Of?cer stated that I hotlr was numb and absolutely paralyzed and that. believed I had been shot. Of?cer estimated I was unconscious for approximately a second. felt was did According to the FID investigtn ion. while later providing I Public Safety Statement (P ES) to CPD investigators- oer was asked if Kenneth had a weapon. Of?cer 5 stated, ?Yes;? however, at was unable to describe it. No witnesses were identi?ed who observed Kenneth with a ?rearm, nor were there any small black objects recovered near Kenneth. Of?cer pistol was the only ?rearm recovered by CPD during their investigation. Of?cer No. qwas the ?rst of?cer to arrive on scene. followed by Of?cers ID No. If} Pitt. - CPD, and other arriving ?rst responders. According to the F113 investigation, Of?cer - initial statement to Of?cer - was ca tured by Of?cer - on BWV minutes atter the DIS. During that conversat itm. l: I Hicer stat art I believed I had been shot in the back of the head but did not tut that I had lost consciousness Or that I was paralyzed. There was no record of Of?cer expressing to anyone at scene or to a medical professional that I experienced paralysis during the incident. Note: During OPE oer - second FID interview. FID investigators asked Of?cer him I 't'lt?ilk' .tble: In the! - pounding on chest if I body was numb and paralyzed. Of?cer initial response was that tli ti ntit know; however, upon ?irther questionirtt- Of?cer - stated that felt petrified and overcome with fear because i hur'r't'rt-tt' I had been shut. ?tilt-er further stated I believed The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 3 3.2 the combination of being struck in the head and being overcome with fear is what caused Of?cer We? to feel paralyzed. FID investigators also asked with? I was able to estimate the length of time I was unconscious. Of?cer stated did not know, but Of?cer perception was that. momentarily lost consciousness. According to the FID investigation, there were no witnesses who reported seeing Of?cer in an unconscious state. at? - was giving food samples to 0w observed and Keane: standing to the right of Of?cer . had just given samples to and Kenneth when Kenneth quickly steppe-cl ton-unis t'lt'?cer tutti punched liliEL?T on the right Side of - stated Ol'l'tcer straight down with in I arm and heard Of?cer - state, ?Oh. my Lind. I shot me.? Nuts: strep rding to the FID investigation, whenF was ?rst contacted by Of?cer minutes after the incident occurred, described Kenneth?s action as a ?slap.? Witness I was in an aisle looking for cheese and could see people standing: at the sampling huuth when heard a noise, like a slap, which got. attention. Witness *il'ul'lL'Ll. I was at the Aidells booth at the time of the incident and standing a proximately two to three that north of Kenneth and four to ?ve feet east of Of?cer noticed Kenneth inn-trig at Of?cer - for four to ?ve seconds, while shut- Iv walking toward Of?cer -. Kenneth then lunged at Of?cer - and with a closed ?st on the right side of C1 {lit-er head. 11rd ti f?cet' was looking forward at the time and believed tittieci' never saw Kenneth approach. According to the FID investigation. LH'ticer - and - stated they had no prior contact with or Kr! teeth while inside the store. Additionaltv, there was no video evidence to an that t} then had any contact with Kenneth, -. m' - prior to the assault. both stated they did not observe any interaction between Kenneth and Of?cer print to the assault. According to Of?cer nearby food aisle. Ozl'l'icur observed Kenneth walking in a southwest direction in a stated there were two shoppers in the aisle with Kenneth, a male (later identi?ed as and a female (later identi?ed as Of?cer believed I heard state, ?He?s crazy. He?s sick.? Of?cer opined it was stated because "they had just witnessed me being shot in the head at point?hiank.? Of?cer stated that Kenneth was still holding a ?rearm in his right hand with is: right arm extended down to the side and walked with an absolute mission. Of?cer stated Kenneth continued to look at - and - as thev were laying on the ?oor. pon perceiving Kenneth was still armed with a reai'm, Of?cer used I left hand 14.. til: I shirt and then used I right hand to remnant-'1: I pistol, which was bolstered inside of. right front waistband. Of?cer - drew I pistol because I believed Kenneth was a deadly threat to both - The Honorable Board of Police Commis'sioners Page 4 3.2 and - Of?cer - untied I did not identify - as a police of?cer, because I did not have time to do so. (lirau'iuglExhibiting and Debrie?ng Points No. 1 and No. 2) Note: During Of?cer ?rst FID interview, FID investigators asked Of?cer how I was able to remove pistol when Of?cer was numb and paralyzed. Of?cer - s1 Ited I did not know how he wa able to overcome it. According to the 1-11.} investigation, Of?cer - initial statement to CPD personnel was ca. ?tted on Ut'Jieer BWV minutes alter the 01S. During that conversation, Of?cer 51 med I believed had been shot in the back of the head- but I did not mention had lost consciousness or that was 'naralyzed. Of?cer - asked Of?cer - if had observed a weapon, tng't'teer did not answer and naked to eak with a lawyer. While later providing 1 Phil-i to L'jl't investigators, O?ieer was asked if Kenneth had a ?rearm. Of?cer an id "?Yesg? however, I was unable to describe it. According to the FID investigation, Of?cer - did not sustain a gunshot wound during this incident, nor did sustain any veri?able injury. There was no record of Of?cer - expressing to anyone at scene or to a medical professional that i experienced paralysis during the incident. Of?cer - pistol was the only ?rearm recovered by CPD during their investigation. There were no witnesses identi?ed who observed Kenneth with a ?rearm, nor were there any objects recovered near Kenneth Which resembled a ?rearm. According to the FID investigation, during Of?cer - second FID interview, I stated I believed - and - were at the north end of the aisle where it intersected with the east/west at ale {later identi?ed as the aisle where the Aidells booth was located). According to the FID investigation, - observed Of?cer - lean down to I left and place - on the ?oor after being struck by Kenneth. I As Kenneth took a couple of steps backward, t'ti't'te er - rolled forward onto . left side and then to I back Ofiieer - l: inked at Kenneth for approximately a second and appeared stunned. - observer! enneth clenching his ?sts while standing approximately four to ?ve feet away from Of?cer - According to the FID investigation, stated I heard what sounded like a slap and then screaming. When turned around, ttl?lriur'? ed Of?cer jump on the?oor with I child by I side stated Officer . "went on. utt and then. like put. head down. . and I teat [i he got in the defensive position.? added that believed Of?cer - drew I pistol before going to the ground. According to Ht'? eer . while Kenneth was in the aisle and in the process of raising his right arm in Of?cer direction. Kenneth simultaneously lowered his chin while looking at Of?cer - and . Of?cer - described Kenneth?s demeanor as having a face of intensity ferns; and no few- in his eyes. As Kenneth continued to raise his right The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 5 3.2 arm to an approximate 45-degree angle, Of?cer - believed tha1 I life was in danger. - life was in danger, and the other shopper-l Wt?l'? in danger. Of?cer - slated had a clear view of Kenneth in the middle of the aisle. tram itead-io-toe at the time Of?cer ?red. While lying on 3 back, Of?cer - raiser] I head, and while using a one-handed grip, extended iright arm and ?red two shots towards the bakery in a southern direction at Kenneth?s center body mass from a distance of approximately 15 feet. According to Of?cer believed Kenneth was holding a gun at the time Of?cer ?red. Of?cer experienced tunnel vision as Kenneth began to raise his right arm. Officer - focus then moved to the ?'ont sight of I pistol as aimed at Kenneth?s chest. Of?cer stale-L! I shot to stop the threat. (Lethal Use of Force First Volley and Debrie?ng Point No. 1) Note: The FID investigation determined that Of?cer .?red a total of 10 rounds but was unable to determine the sequence of ?re. Of?cer ?red south towards the meat department. The bakery was located approximately 150 fuel cast of where the DIS occurred. During the walk-through with FID investigators, O?icer - placed placards on the ground indie?Ming 2 location and Kenneth?s location at the time Of?cer discharged I pistol. FID investigators measured the distance between the two placards and noted they were approximately 22 feet, four inches apart. According to the FID investigation, a portion of this incident was captured on Costco?s security system. This store?s surveillance video does not support Of?cer assertion that Kenneth walked down the aisle by himself, turned around, and raised a ?rearm with his right hand. According to the FID investigation, during Of?cer - walk-through with FID investigators, Officer - demonstrated Kenna ll l1uldl11g the ?rearm in a bladed, two? hand low-ready stance. When Of?cer was questioned regarding this discrepancy during ?rst FID interview, Of?cer stated I did not recall making that characterization. During Of?cer second FID interview, described feeling disoriented and that I vision was ?off.? [Tritium - clari?ed that experienced ?blurred vision? rather than ?tunnel vision,? but I ?Elli still able to see Kenneth holding a ?rearm. According to the distance between Of?cer - and Kenneth to be four to five feet when ?flirt-r - ?red. According to Of?cer -. after I tired I ?rst two rounds- fell in a manner that was still a threat bCC?LtE-il: Emmeth was still facing Of?cer sill; I arm still extended outward and legs be u: lrlwards Kenneth?s torso. Of?cer stated that Kenneth still looked at and - wil E1 a concentrated, intense look in his eye. Kenneth had a closed fist and was hol what Of?cer - believed was a gun. Kenneth raised his arm which The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page6 3.2 Of?cer whed as consistent with him taking a shooting platform. While still on I back, Of?cer again utilized a one-handed shooting grip and ?red two additional rounds at Kenneth?s chest area from a distance of approximately 15 feet. Of?cer - stated that all four rounds of both volleys were ?red in a southern direction towards the bakery within two seconds and there was a clear view of Kenneth in the aisle. Of?cer I also stated that due to the immediate need to take action; was: unable to give Kenneth commands prior to ?ring rounds. After ?ring last shot, Of?cer stated Kenneth rolled onto hack and then into a ?fetal position? on his left side. Kenneth?s back was towards Of?cer and. . arms were tucked underneath his body. (Lethal Use of Force Second Volley and Debriefing Point No. 1) Note: According to the FID investigation. Of?cer - was not able to account for the six additional round ?red. Of?cer 3 ?nned it was possible I shot more than two times during each 0 t' two volleys and surmised that having been knocked unconscious may have distorted perception of the total number of rounds that ?red. In I ?rst interview, Of?cer - stated to FID investigators that I conducted an assessment after ?ring each round. in 5 second FID interview: however- Of?cer believed assessed between volleys. Of?cer - stated I ?rer! all I rounds within two seconds and estimated there was less than he second between I first and second volleys. According to the FID investigation, Of?cer - believed Kenneth was in possession of a ?rearm throughout the entirety of this incident but stated the last time I saw Kenneth holding a ?rearm was just prior to Of?cer - ?ring of i ?rst volley. Of?cer-r was not able to say defmitively that saw Kenneth holding or pointing a ?rearm at whe Of?cer - tired I additional rounds. According to the FID investigation, the store?s Hunt-i [lance vitteo depicted Kenneth falling on his left side with his back toward Officer -. HL?llilL'l ended up facedown, and not on his back, as described by Of?cer -. Despite Of?cer - assertion that I ll red I rounds at Kenneth?s chest area, the investigation determined Kenneth was struck twice in the lower back, once to his left buttock, and once to his left triceps area. The Riverside County Coroner?s Of?ce documented trajectories indicating that three of the rounds which struck Kenneth traveled from back to front. The gunshot wound to Kenneth?s left triceps traveled across and through his chest cavity stopping in front of the right shoulder. According to Of?cer . I stated that after thing I last round, [Ii] loudly pronounced that Kenneth hadjns.r thin and that Kenneth, ?still had the gun. . .still had a pistol.? Of?cer - believed I then heard a male?s vice from within the aisle state, doesn?t have a gun!? Officer continued to point. pistol at Kenneth because Of?cer - believed Kenneth might still have the ?rearm tucked underneath him] The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 7 3.2 According to the FID investigation, Officer - broke I ?tunnel vision? and observed - and - lying to the right and left of Kenneth res .ee tivelv. Both individuals appeared to have been injured and were holding their sides. O?ieer I did not know how they were injured, and did not see either of them in I thregmund or background at the time of the 018. Of?cer did recall, however, that ill-11:? I tired I last round, - moved from the east side of the aisle. towards the center of the aisle in front of Kenneth, and then back to the east side of the aisle. - also recalled seeing - move in a northwest direction while screaming, in what he interpreted to be an attempt to exit the aisle. Note: The FID investigation revealed that Of?cer - was captured on Of?cer BWV making the following statement: ?Those people (later identi?ed as - and I think that they were probably like got in the way. I don?t know.? According to the FID investigation- when Of?cer - drew I pistol. indicated I stepped in front of Kenneth and - to prevent them From being shut. believed she was the ?rst one struck by gunfire and that Of?cer - continued shout tug utter hit. - believed Of?cer - discharged two rounds before - and into the line of ?re. was moved According to heard a 1 yell, ?No, no, no!? Although I vision was blocked by a cooler, believed saw an older woman with gray lrrtir appearing to struggle with someone nuld not see. After hearing - yelling and a popping noise, started to see people Min and knew something. was t'm Jening, so I ran towards the Aidells huoth screaming tor and Of?cer observed it!? ittg on I back. holdinu in I right arm and 111511 ll in le? hamt'. said - asked Of?cer what oeettn'ed. and responded with. "It hurts right here on. my head and I feel like we been shut." stated that tltlieer - told t'elt like I was bleedine. hut did not heck Of?cer - tor an int] try. trhaert'ed on the Iloor near Kenneth and heard state. "1 Ie?s mentally ill." also observed lying on I back and crying. - then picked up I son and ran screaming for help. Note: According to Of?cer - did not recall who had picked up t'mrtt - According to the FID investigation. hen FID investigators asked observed any injuries to Of?cer res onded that observed Of?cer - tout. I hand after touching head and i saw little dripplets [sic] of blood. Upon review of the multiple BWVs depicting Ot't't eer interaction with CPD, blood was not observed on I hands or head, nor did I indicate that I was bleeding after the incident. The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 8 3.2 According to witnessF approached Of?cer - and asked where the shooter was. Of?cer re 1] ied. te?s still got a gun in his hand. He?s still got a gun in his hand.?l - also heard icreaming, ?My son?s sick! My son?s sickil Due to Kenneth?s posi i tH'l on the could not see Kenneth?s arms. In an effort to determine whether Kenneth Will-i in trait-session of a ?rearm. - walked toward Kenneth with witness .?ts a . reached. 1 observed Kenneth?s body twitching and that Kenneth?s breathing was shallow. and rolled Kenneth onto his back and observed blood coming out of his mouth. it fter determining Kenneth was unarmed, - attempted to render aid by elevating I feet. According to Of?cer ?Of?cer - approached, Of?cer - remained covering Kenneth because Of?cer sti II eonsitlered Kenneth to be a threat. When Of?cer - asked what had occurred. t'Jt'l'teer stated advised Of?cer -. ?That guy just shot me. . .he still has a gun." Ui'?t'er stated was then approached by a second o??icer with a ri?e who told Of?cer - to give t?tl'tieer ?01. Of?cer said?that the of?cer then reached out with his left hand and Of?cer handed it over to the of?cer. (Debrie?ng Point N0. 2) Note: According to the FID investigation. a review of Of?cer - BWV captured Of?cer - approaching Of?cer -. Of?cer - mike-J 'lt'tieeF ii was injured. It'lieer responded with. guess not,? and settled that thought had been shut in the httek el' head. When asked by Of?cer - where the ehooter was, Of?cer - pointed to Kenneth and suited, ?That guy.? Of?cer - did not immediately identity - to Of?cer - ar- the shooter or as an elf-duty police of?cer. The FID investigation a i so noted that in Of?cer - BWV. Of?cer - was not holding I pistol when I was ?rst approached by t'll'i'teer -. r?teeurdiitu Of?cer I observed the stock of a pistol protrudi . from Of?cer right ?ont pants pocket. Of?cer removed Of?cer pistol and secured it in I own pants pocket. According to the FID investigation, Of?cer - BWV captured - questioning Of?cer further regarding what had occurred. Of?cer stated that while holding - .?lHLl uniting to receive a sample. 5 saw a blast and felt it head getting knocked out. Of?cer - 5t tried I thmteht had been shot and dropped - as Of?cer fell to the Ileer. When I'll'lieer looked up, I observed Kenneth ?hunkered down? in the aisle. title er believed Kenneth was still armed and Of?cer - shot him. When Of?cer was asked speci?cally by Of?cer - it' I observed a weapon, Of?cer - did not answer the question and advised I wont not speak any further without his lawyer. Of?cer - continued to question Of?cer and asked - how many rounds I ?red and if The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 9 3.2 there were any outstanding suspects. Of?cer - stated that did not know the answer to either question. During the same conversation with Of?cer . ?irt-1' - can be heard on BWV saying ?Hey, dude, my head really hurts, dude. head does hurt.? Note: According to the FID investigation, in Of?cer ?rst FID interview, I stated observed Kenneth walking with a ?rearm, turn towards and then point the ?rearm at In Of?cer - second FID interview. was asked to explain that statement in ligh: of what i originally told Of?cer - rlrar observed Kenneth ?hunkering down? and believed Kenneth was armed, as opposed to actually seeing him with a ?rearm. Of?cer - acknowledged that ?hunker down? was a term I used but did not recall saying it hen speaking with Of?cer -. I de?ned the term ?bunker down? as someone who is possibly hiding with a weapon or crouching down in a different position. With regard to the eci tir- verbiage i used when ?rst describing to Of?cer - what had occurred, Of?cer stated, ?As far as the I saw that day was I saw a gun and I don?t believe that I had enough time to go into a thorough explanation to the of?cer of what had occurred.? Of?cer added that I recollection of the incident could be off due to the injury sustained to head. According to the FID investigation, Of?cer - BWV captured Of?cer - lying on the ?oor directlv in ?ont (south) of the Aidul booth and not near the west 51 dr- ofthe booth, as {lilicer - had demonstrated during walk-through and described in administrative interview. When questioned regarding this issue, Of?cer - indicated did not move or change position after falling to the ?oor and ?ring I pistol. in examining the impacts to the glass front of the re?'igerator case, it seemed improbable Of?cer - cnu id have caused both impacts from the position was in when ?rst a 1.. iroached by Of?cer I. In an effort to resolve this con?ict, Of?cer Serial No. Investigative Support Unit, FID, utilized crime scene measurements and the Department?s mapping software to establish bullet path trajectories for the above impacts. The mapping technology showed that both impacts were likely caused by projectiles ?red from one location near the west side of the Aidells booth, consistent with where Of?cer - pine-ed - during I walk-through. According to Captain Fire Station No. City of Corona Fire Department (CFD), in an active shooter incident, CFD personnel grab their gear from the ?re station and respond to a staging area in preparation for a tactical response as a rescue task force. In this incident, they staged until they were cleared by CPD dispatch to enter the location with a force protection team. (Debriefing Point No. 2) According to the FID investigation, Of?cer - de icted Of?cer - rubbing the right side of head. Several minutes later, Of?cer can be heard telling a ?re?ghter I believed had been shot and that I lost consumtl?neah. The FID investigation determined that Kenneth, - n] - were struck by gun?re during the OIS. A portion of this incident was captured on 1hr: store?s surveillance video; The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 10 3.2 however, the initial assault by Kenneth on Of?cer - was obscured from the camera?s view by a storage shed display. The footage also did not capture Of?cer - falling to the ?oor or any of subsequent actions. According to the FID investigation, what can be determined from this surveillance video is that at approximately 1945 :30 hours, - was in the ntocess of pushing Kenneth away from the Aidells booth, south into the refrigerated aisle. can then be seen moving in a westerly direction away from the Aidells booth. While bending forward at the waist. Epeared to extend arms outward while loniti ng down toward the area where Of?cer indicated was. lying. At 1945:34 hours, I can be seen falling to the ?oor, followed immediately by and then Kenneth, who alatt collapsed. The FID investigation determined that the area in ?ont of the Aidells fGL'lLl sample booth was not visible in the footage. FID investigators were unable to determine if the surveillance video captured the entirety of the 018, or if it began prior to -- -. and Kenneth moving into camera view. Based on a review of the store?s surt'ci [lance video by FID investigators, there appeared to be no obvious reaction by customers as began pushing Kenneth into the refrigerated aisle. However, multiple people can be seen reacting by immediately ?eeing the area when - fell to the ?oor. According to the FID investigation. t'lt'tieet - elected not to nrovide a voluntarv statement: however, Of?cer did give a PSS to Detectives tin. and CPD, while at Corona Regional Medical Center. During PSS. Utt'zeer rill-livid that he ?red his pistol approximately four times while near the Aidel tr: booth inside the store. Of?cer - stated that I red I rounds down an aisle towart! the bakery department, opposite the cash registers. 1'Jt'li'tle providing his PSS, Of?cer was asked if Kenneth had a ?rettnn. Of?cer - stated ?Yes,? but .was unable to describe it. Of?cer - believed I was shot once during the incident and stated. mean, ?rst off I felt like I [sic] fucking blew my head off.? Of?cer - also stated I did not know if there were other people involved in the shooting. Note: During Of?cer - ?rst FID interview, I described Kenneth holding a small black compact ?rearm, similar to a LCP (Ruger) .380 pistol. During the FID presentation at the UOFRB, FID investigators advised that a search was conducted for a weapon inside of the store and all the shelves were emptied in the vicinity during that search. Additionally, CPD detectives utilized a drone for an overhead view of the crime scene, which depicts the top of the aisles and the shelves. Neither a ?rearm, nor any object resembling a possible ?rearm was located in those searches. The FID investigation revealed that Kenneth had no personal property on him at the time of the incident. The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 11 3.2 According to the incident report completed by CPD Of?cer - I checked Kenneth for a pulse but could not ?nd one. After observing no signs of life, Of?cer - pronounced Kenneth deceased at approximately 1952 hours. Of?cer . . and - were all transported by separate rescue ambulances to local hngnirala. and were taken to the Riverside Community Hospital and Of?cer was taken to the Corona Regional Medical Center. 31.! rnximately 2130 hours, while at the Corona Regional Medical Center where Of?cer was being. evaluated, Detective contacted the Los Angeles Police Department on Of?cer behalf and advised Sergeant Serial No- Watch Commander. southwest Patrol Division, of the 01s. Lieutenant Serial No. - Southwest Putrul Division, responded to Corona Regional Medical Center and monitored Of?cer - until relieved by FID investigators. (Additional Tactical Debrief Topic - Off- Duty A ctions and Additional Department Operations Center Noti?cation) - sustained a gunshot wound to I right ?ank, was transported to the Riverside Cum Inunitv Hospital, underwent surgery, and was later released. - did not consent to a release of I medical records. - sustained a through and through gunshot wound that entered I lower left abdominal area and exited midline between the buttocks area. was transported in the Riverside Communitv Hospital, underwent surgery, and was later released. - did not consent to a release of medical records. According to the FID investigation, Of?cer - stated that after I was struck. I sustained severe hearing loss to 1 right ear, blurred vision, pain to the right side of I head, and loss of consciousness. Of?cer was transported to the Corona Regional Medical. Note: The FID invent: quiun noted that prior to Of?cer - leaving the area of the DIS. Paramedic from American Medical Response. walked with Of?cer for approximately 10 yards to the ambulance. According to - Of?cer was able to alk without assistance and negotiate I irujr inn} the ambulance on own. Based on I observations, - did not believe Of?cer balance or gross murm- skills were compromised. Hirer: inside the ambulance, observed Of?cer - place hand on th ri 1hr side of. head and complain of pain - head. Accordine to rl?lieer did not have indicative of having a concussion. did; however, note what appeared to be a small, quarter-sized hematoma to the right side of Of?cer head. According to the FID investigation, Of?cer - was treated by Doctor at the Corona Regional Medical Center. who ordered a computed tomography (CT) scan or head and spine. A review of Of?cer - medical record revealed there was no evidence of acute The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 12 3.2 intracranial hemorrhage (bleeding inside the skull), extra-axial collection (a collection of ?uid within the skull), mass effect (e?ect of a growing mass), mid-line shift (the result of something pushing the brain of its naturally centered position between the le?? and right hemispheres), herniation (the shifting of brain tissue, blood, and cerebrospinal ?uid from their normal position inside the skull), or hydrocephalus (a condition in which ?uid accumulates in the brain, enlarging the head). The surrounding soft tissues and osseous structures (bones) were unremarkable (normal). Note: According to the FID investigation, there was no documentation in Of?cer - "medical record that sustained any trauma to the head or spine. The FID investigation determined that Of?cer did not have any veri?able injuries. Of?cer - was discharged from the hospital on June 15, 2019 at 0032 hours and was prescribed pain .md nausea medication to be used as needed. was medically cleared to return to work, full-duly on June 19, 2019; however, Of?cer was assigned to home following the incident and a was subsequently relieved from duty effectively removing i police powers] Of?c or signed a release authorizing the De wartment to obtain medical records related to treatment at Corona Regional Medical Center. also voluntarily provided a blood sample to FID investigators that was later analyzed and tested negative for the presence of alcohol and narcotics. According to Of?cer long-term injuries include pain to the right side of I head, a stiff neck, increased stuttering issues, and vision that has gotten progressively worse, particularly in his right eye. FINDINGS Tactics ?Administrative Disapproval, Of?cer - Drawing/Exhibiting Out of Policy, Administrative Disapproval, Of?cer -. Lethal Use of Force Out of Policy, Administrative Disapproval, Of?cer ANALYSIS Detention Of?cer 13 off-duty and shopping with I family at a store. While Of? cer - was hol ding and obtaining a food sample at Ll food vendor?s booth, I was struck in an The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 13 3.2 unprovoked attack, resulting in an 013. While Of?cer - did not seek to conduct enforcement activity, I was a victim of a crime. Tactics Department policy relative to a Tactical Debrief is: ?The collective review of an incident to identi?) those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those areas where actions and decisions could have been improved The intent of a Tactical Debrief is to enhance future performance. "Department policy relative to Administrative Disapproval is: ?nding, supported by a preponderance of the evidence that the tactics employed during a UOF incident unjustifiably and substantially deviated ?om approved Department-tactical training? (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05). The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be ?exible and incident speci?c, which requires that each incident be looked at objectively and the tactics be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances. Tactical De-Escalation Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an o??icer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation. Tactical De-Escalation Techniques Planning 0 Assessment I Time - Redeployment and/or Containment 0 Other Resources I Lines of Communication (Use of Force - Tactics Directive No. I 6, October 2016, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques Tactical de-escalation does not require that an of?cer compromise his or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-eslcalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so. Planning Officer - was off-dutv in civilian clothing, armed with I pistol concealed in a holster, and shopping in a store an I I family. Whi1_e obtaining a food sample and holding -. Of?cer 3 was struck on the right side of head in an unprovoked attack. and subsequently became involved in an 013. The unanticipated attack limited Of?cer The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 14 3.2 ability to plan for this incident; however, with regard to planning ahead for a possible off-duty incident, Of?cer stated I had discussed actions to take with should such an incident occur. Additionally, Of?cer strut-d practiced shooting off-duty pistol approximately once every six months. Of?cer Lu pt I pistol loaded with Department- approved ammunition and secured it inside of a holster that met the Department?s off-duty holster requirements. Assessment Of?cer - stated that I thought had been shot in the back of the head, was paralyzed, and lost currst'iousness. t'?ccr A did not mention that 1 had lost consciousness or that I v. as paralyzed in I initial contact with CPD Of?cer . . There was no record of Of?cer expressing to anyone at scene or to a medical rot'essional that I experienced paralysis. According to the FID investigation, Of?cer idid not sustain any veri?able injury during this incident. Of?cer - described seeing, Out of I peripheral vision, Kenneth point a black compact ?rearm approximately one inch from the right side of Of?cer - head; however, none of the idemi tied witnesses observed Kenneth with a ?rearm or a ?rearm pointed at Of?cer head. Additionally, investigating personnel did not locate any evidence of an additional ?rearm or any object that could be construed as a ?rearm in their canvassing of the immediate area. In his assessment, Of?cer - stated I believed Kenneth was still holding a ?rearm in his right hand, with his right arm extended down to his side while in the aisle. Furthermore. I described Kenneth as having stopped, turning to his right, and facing Of?cer -. Officer stated Kenneth began to raise his right arm in Of?cer direction, while still holding the ?rearm. According to the FID investigation, the store?s surveillance video did not depict Kenneth walking in the aisle by himself, turning around, and raising his right arm. Of?cer - stated that after I ll red I ?rst two rounds, Kenneth fell in a manner that Of?cer assessed was a thrust lit-cause Kenneth was facing Of?cer I with his arm still extended runward. Of?cer stated that Kenneth had closed ?sts and was holding what Of?cer - believed was a firearm. Of?cer - described Kenneth taking a shooting plat Ihrm while raising his right arm. According to the FID investigation, the surveillance video depicted Kenneth initially falling on his left side, with his back towards Of?cer Although Of?cer stated Kenneth was in possession of a ?rearm throughout the entirety of this incident, Off], stated the last time I observed Kenneth holding a ?rearm was prior to Of?cer Iiri mg I ?rst volley. The investigation determined thaL {?llet-1' - ?red a total of 10 rounds. In I ?rst FID interview, Of?cer - SliHL'd I conducted .an assessment after ?ring each round. In I second FID interv icw: hmvever, Of?cer believed assessed only between volleys. Of?cer - l-itulctl I tired all of rounds within two seconds and estimated there was less than a second between ?rst and second volleys. The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 15 3.2 vision and focused through sights on Kenneth?s chest area. In FID interview, Of?cer -- clari?ed that had experienced blurred vision rather than tunnel vision, but was still able to assess that Kenneth was holding a ?rearm. Of?cer Weak assessed that Kenneth was armed with a ?rearm, which resulted in an 01S. Of?cer stated that I assessed Kenneth to be in possession of a ?rearm throughout the entirety of this incident. The investigation by CPD and FID did not identify any corroborating evidence or witnesses who observed that Kenneth was in possession of a ?rearm or object which resembled a ?rearm. As previously mentioned in {l?rst FID interview, Of?cer quilted I experienced tunnel Time Due to this incident being an unprovoked attack, the time afforded to Of?cer - to plan for such was limited and did not provide the opportunity to move to a position of cover or ain additional distance from Kenneth prior to the assault. However, after the assault, Of?cer did not take the time to assess physical condition or his level of injury prior to unholstering I pistol. Of?cer stated that believed that I had been shot in the back of the head but lrad no veri?able injury. Assessing that I had not, in tact, been shot would have allowed Of?cer more time and options rather than drawing 1 ?rearm and ultimately resorting to the use {if lethal force. Of?cer - made no attempts to communicate with Kenneth in an ell": :rL 1o de-escalate the incident. Additionally, Kenneth was being pushed away from Of?cer - and was not armed. Of?cer - did not take the time to correctly assess the incident and to analyze the threat. Redeployment and/or Containment It would have been preferable for Of?cer - to take a position of cover or concealment to allow additional time to assess the incident properly and safelv secure - am! - from further harm. A position of cover would also provide Of?cer with time to consider additional options and mitigate the risk of resorting to the use of lethal force. Other Resources Since Of?cer - was off-duty, I available resources were limited. Had Of?cer awaited the arrival of the jurisdictional law enforcement agency, would have bene?ted from the valuable resource of additional responding personnel who would have assumed int est igative responsibility and taken appropriate action, thereby reducing the risk to Of?cer - and other persons in the immediate area. I ?nes of Communication Following the unprovoked physical assault by Kenneth, Of?cer - did not verbalize to Kenneth to stop his actions, nor did advise nearby shoppers that an annual person was presenting an immediate safety hazard. Following the 018, Of?cer focused on a perceived injury and did not exercise control to warn bystanders to avoid the area and keep them away from Kenneth. As the incident progressed requiring CPD response, Of?cer - was noticeably lacking and hesitant in 5 response to initial responding CPD personnel and failed to communicate essential, pertinent, and relevant public safety information, thereby reducing the ability of CPD of?cers to respond ef?ciently in a critical incident. The choice to provide incomplete information also delayed the administering of medical aid to injured victims by CFD personnel who were staged The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 16 3.2 outside of the store until the location was deemed safe enough to enter. Additionally, Of?cer did not immediately identify as an armed, off-duty police of?cer. in accordance with the Department?s guidelines. Of?cer decision to not identify as a police of?cer after being involved in a signi?cant off-duty incident and 018, increased risk for being misidenti?ed as a suspect from the local responding law enforcement agency. The UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Of?cer - did not appropriately utilize the elements of de-escalation and substantiallv deviated withor ll justi?cation ?om approved Department tactical training. Of?cer would have bene?ted from properly assessing I environment and surroundings which would have afforded - additional options rather than resorting to the use of lethal force. During the review of the incident, the following Debrie?ng Topics were noted: Debriefing Point No. 1 Situational Awareness (Substantial Deviation without Justi?cation Of?cer No matter what patrol strategy is deployed, o?icers on patrol must rely on their own observation and perception skills. O?icers must ?mction as trained observers. O?icers on patrol are expected to practice disciplined observation and apply their training and experience to accurately perceive what is occurring or is about to occur. 0 an officer, observation means the ability to gather information by noting facts or occurrences with a heightened sense of awareness. VWiile on patrol, o?icers must use not only their eyes, but all of their senses including hearing, smell, etc, to obtain information from the outside world. Observation can be enhanced by training (knowing what to look for), experience (knowing where and when to look for it), a variety of special tools binoculars, night vision scopes, etc. (California Commission on Peace O?icer Standards and Training, Revised July 2005, Workbook Correction April 2012, Learning Domain No. In this case, Of?cer adid not take the time to asses? pl?: cal condition or level of injury prior to unholstering pistol. Of?cer stated that believed th: Ii had been shot in the back of the head but had no veri?able injury. Assessing that I had not been shot would have allowed Of?cer - more time and options rather than drawing I ?rearm and ultimately resorting to the use lethal force. In this incident, Of?cer - inunrrectlv assessed that Kenneth was armed with a ?rearm, which resulted in an 018. Of?cer - stated that assessed Kenneth to be in possession of a ?rearm throughout the entirety of this incident. The investigation by CPD and FID did not identify any corroborating evidence or witnesses who observed that Kenneth was in possession of a ?rearm or object which resembled a ?rearm. The UOFRB acknowledged Of?cer new the victim of an unprovoked attack; however, Of?cer lack of assessment and the resultant de?cient situational awareness caused the UOFRB great concern. The UOFRB noted Of?cer - had an obligation to take the time to The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 17 3.2 assess the situation prior to making the decision to draw and e?ibit a ?rearm inside of a crowded store. While Of?cer stated that believed had sustained a gunshot wound to the back of his head. Of?cer did not have any veri?able injury. This mistaken belief was cited by Off?)? as a factor in his decision to draw and exhibit ?rearm. Although Of?cer had been struck by Kenneth?s hand in some manner, I was obligated to conduct an assessment in order to react appropriately. The UOFRB noted that Of?cer a did not correctly assess the incident and believed that Kenneth was armed with a ?rearm. Of?cer did not conduct a proper assessment of. background where the incident occurred, which was in a crowded warehouse store on a Friday evening. The UOFRB reviewed all of the evidence that was available, includin transcripts from witnesses. The only ?rearm recovered at the incident was possessed by Of?cer . There were no witnesses who observed Kenneth armed with any ?rearm or in possession of any object that resembled a ?rearm. The UOFRB also noted that Of?cer - had suf?cient time to assess and consider his tactical options rather than escalate the retinal ion by drawing and discharging pistol. The UOFRB was concerned that Of?cer - did not take more time to analyze the threat. Based on the preponderance of the evidence and Of?cer inconsistent accounts, the UOFRB determined that Of?cer did not assess the situation accurately. At the time of the OIS, - was with Kenneth who was in the process of moving away from Officer Haas-Li on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Of?cer did not properly assess the situation. The UOFRB determined, and I concur, Of?cer actions unjusti?ably and substantially deviated from approved Department tactical training. I will direct this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief. Debrie?ng Point No. 2 Tactical Communication (Substantial Deviation without Justi?cation Of?cer O??icers are trained to work together and function as a team. In order to ensure o?icer safety and help ensure an appropriate outcome, the primary o?icers and cover o??icers must e?ectively communicate with one another. Appropriate communication involves: - advising the primary o?icer of any critical occurrences or safety issues movement within the target vehicle, someone approaching outside the primary o?icer?s?eld of vision, possible crossfire situations, etc. - avoid inappropriate interruptions, and - avoid giving directions which con?ict with those given by the primary of?cer. Only one person, usually the primary o??icer, gives the commands, unless a specific situation calls for another o?icer to issue a command (California Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training, Learning Domain) The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 18 3.2 Lines of Communication. Maintaining open lines of communications between o??icer and communicating ejj?ectively with a suspect are critically important when managing a tense or potentially dangerous encounter. Communication between officers can improve decision- making under tense circumstances and increase the e?ectiveness of coordinated actions. In addition, when a suspect observes that o?icers are prepared, well organized, professional, and working as a team, he or she may be deterred from attempting to ?ee, ?ght, or actively resist. (Use of Force Tactics Directive No. 16 -?Tactical De-Escalation Techniques) Of?cer - did not effectively communicate essential and relevant safety information to responding law enforcement personnel. Of?cer did not employ the elements of de? escalation to reduce the intensity of the encounter with Kenneth, nor did I warn bystanders to keep a safe distance from Kenneth. Operational success is based on the ability of of?cers to effectively communicate during critical incidents. Of?cers, when faced with a tactical incident, improve their overall safety by their ability to recognize an unsafe situation and work collectively to ensure a successful resolution. As the incident progressed requiring CPD response, Of?cer was noticeably lacking and hesitant in Eresponse to initial responding CPD personnel and failed to communicate pertinent and important public safety information, thereby reducing the ability of CPD of?cers to respond ef?ciently and coordinate their actions in a critical incident. This lack of cooperation also hindered other ?rst responders, such as paramedic and ?re department personnel. Of?cer lack of communication to responding personnel also resulted in the deployment of CPD of?cers into the store and a tactical search of the location for possible additional suspects. The tactical search of the store unnecessarily utilized CPD resources and also placed them at unnecessary and increased risk of a mishap or accident. Additionally, Of?cei choice to provide incomplete information also delayed the response to injured victims by CFD personnel who were staged outside of the store until the location was deemed safe enough to enter. Due to CPD personnel believing this incident was an active shooter event, CFD personnel were kept outside of the store until the tactical situation had stabilized suf?ciently to allow CFD personnel into the location. This created a delay of medical treatment being more expeditiously rendered to critically injured persons inside of the store. Hitler-r - did not immediately identify as an armed. off-duty police of?cer, in accordance With the Department?s guidelines, thereby increasinir risk for being misidenti?ed as a suspect from the local responding law enforcement agency. Following the unprovoked physical assault by Kenneth, Of?cer did not verbalize to Kenneth to stop actions, nor did I advise nearby shoppers that an armed person was presenting an irmm-diate safety hazard. Subsequent to the OIS, Of?cer focused on I The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 19 3.2 perceived injury and did not exercise control to warn bystanders to avoid the area and keep them away from Kenneth for their own safety. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Of?cer - did not appropriately utilize the elements of de?escalation. Moreover, Of?cer lack of communication during this incident placed the responding CPD of?cers at a tactical disadvantage, increased the intensity of the encounter, and endangered the public. Of?cer 1 is reminded that effective communication of possible tactical concerns to other law enforcement personnel is vital in their ability to react and respond to threats that may arise during a tactical encounter. When faced with a tactical incident, overall safety is improved by an of?cer?s ability to recognize an unsafe situation and work collectively to ensure a successful resolution. The UOFRB determined, and I concur, Of?cer - actions unjusti?ably and substantially deviated ?om approved Department tactical training. I will direct this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief. Additional Tactical Debrief Topic Off-Duty Actions - Of?cer - had just been involved in an off-duty OIS. Of?cer - did not notify his comnumni directly that was involved in a signi?cant off-duty incident in which discharged - pistol. Of?cer is reminded that of?cers who are involved in a reportable use of force incident shall notify their supervisor or watch commander without unnecessary delay. I will direct this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief. Command and Control Command and Control is the use of active leadership to direct others while using available resources to coordinate a response, accomplish tasks and minimize risk Command uses active leadership to establish order, provide stability and structure, set objectives and create conditions under which the function of control can be achieved with minimal risk. Control implements the plan of action while continuously assessing the situation, making necessary adjustments, managing resources, managing the scope of the incident (containment), and evaluating whether existing Department protocols apply to the incident. Command and Control is a process where designated personnel use active leadership to command others while using available resources to accomplish tasks and minimize risk Active leadership provides clear, concise, and unambiguous communication to develop and implement a plan, direct personnel and manage resources. The senior o?icer or any person on scene who has gained su??icient situational awareness shall initiate Command and Control and develop a plan of action. Command and Control will provide direction, help manage resources, and make it possible to achieve the desired outcome. Early The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 20 3.2 considerations of PA TROL will assist with the Command and Control process. (Los Angeles Police Department, Training Bulletin, Volume XLVII Issue 4, July 2018) Line Supervision De?ned. A supervisor who has the specific responsibility of issuing directions and orders to designated subordinates shall be considered as having the duty of line supervisor and shall be held accountable for achieving conformance with the directions and orders that he/she issues. (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 135) Incident Commander (1C) In accordance with Department Policy, the IC sets the objectives, the strategy and directs the tactical response. Directing the tactical response means applying tactics appropriate to the strategy, assigning the right resources and monitoring performance. (Los Angeles Police Department, Supervisor ?s Field Operations Guide, Volume 2, Emergency Operations Guide) Lieutenant responded to the Corona Regional Medical Center and monitored Of?cer - until was relieved of that duty by FID investigators. The details of Of?cer separation and monitoring were recorded on the Watch Commander?s Daily Report, dated June 14, 2019. In reviewing this incident, the actions of Lieutenant - were consistent with Department supervisory training and my expectation of a ?eld supervisor during a critical incident. Tactical Debrief In conducting an objective assessment of this case, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that the tactics utilized by Of?cer - tactics substantially, and unjusti?ably, deviated from approved Department tactical training, thus requiring a ?nding of Administrative Disapproval. Each tactical incident also merits a comprehensive debrie?ng. In this case, there were areas identi?ed where improvement could be made. A Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for the involved personnel to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident. Therefore, I will direct that Of?cer attend a Tactical Debrief and that the speci?c identi?ed topics be discussed. Note: Additionally, the Tactical Debrief shall also include the following mandatory discussion points: Use of Force Policy; Equipment Required/Maintained; Tactical Planning; Radio and Tactical Communication (including Code Six); Tactical De-Escalation; The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 21 3.2 0 Command and Control; and, 0 Lethal Force. General Training Update (GTU) Of?ce - has not yet attended a GTU as I has been assigned to I residence pending the ?nal adjudication of this incident. Drawing/Exhibiting Department policy relative to drawing and exhibiting a ?rearm is: ?An o?icer ?s decision to draw or exhibit a ?rearm should be based on the tactical situation and the o?icer?s reasonable belief there is a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume No. 1, Section 556.80) According to Of?cer observed Kenneth walking in a southwest direction in a nearby food aisle. Of?cer stated there were two shoppers in the aisle with Kenneth, a male (later identi?ed as and a female (later identi?ed as 1. Of?cer - believed I heard - state, ?He?s crazy. He?s sick.? Of?cer believed it was stated because ?they had just witnessed me being shot in the heat! a: point-blank.? Of?cer - stated that Kenneth was still holding a ?rearm in his right hand v.11 it his right arm extended down to the side at iLl wa Iked with an ?absolute mission.? Of?cer - stated Kenneth continued to look at - mu! - as thev were laving on the ?oor. on perceiving Kenneth was still armed with a ?rearm. I??cer used I left hand to shirt and then used I right hand to remove I pi?lt?li. which was hoisnrred inside 01" right front waistband. Hitter - drew I Flaw] I believed Kenneth was a deadly threat to both and -. Of?cer stated I did not identify - as a police of?cer because did not have time to do so. Of?cer - recalled, Into the aisle, not away from me, but still in close proximitj' I recall two shoppers closer to the frozen aisle section. as he walked and as I was drawing out my weapon, I heard someone yell out, "He 's crazy. He 's sick. And I remember thinking, yeah, he 's crazy and, yes, he 's sick. Who would ever shoot their -- who would ever shoot someone while they're holding their little Costco? And I believe that people said that because they had just witnessed being me being shot in the head at point-blank. The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 22 3.2 he walked with an absolute mission purpose looking down at me, still holding that black, small handgun in his right body ?s direction was almost repositioning himself to come back and face me again. During this time, I still believed he was a deadly threat towards me and my -. and at the same time I began to draw my weapon. With my left hand, I lifted up my shirt ever so just so expose the weapon to ?ee it from any clothing. i" recall, with my right hand, placing it around the handle of the weapon, and I pulled it out. In this case. the UOFRB conducted a thorough review in evaluating the reasonableness of Of?cer - Drawing/Exhibiting. The UOFRB majority noted that although the attack on Of?cer - by Kenneth was unprovoked, the inconsistencies in Of?cer - statements and the lack of supporting evidence led them to determine that this incident did not support the drawing and exhibiting of a ?rearm by Of?cer An of?cer?s statente and explanation of actions merit signi?cant review; however, in this particular case, Of?cer statements were con?icting, contradictory, and confusing within the two interviews. This caused the UOFRB great concern. This required the UOFRB majority to rely on timelines, witness statements, CPD BWV immediately following the incident, and in-store video to discern what Of?cer - did or did not believe at the point he chose to draw and exhibit. pistol. The UOFRB majority also noted that Of?cer a indicated I was struck hard enough to be rendered unconscious, yet after receiving medical treatment, the re was a lack of any substantiated injuries from Kenneth?s strike and what Of?cer I stated was a subsequent fall to the ground. Of?cer provided a detailed description of I observations of Kenneth?s movements afte being struck, which were inconsistent with being unconscious. Based on Of?cer assertion that. was unconscious, had blurred vision, was dizzy, and somehow partially incapacitated, drawinu and exhibiting a ?rearm in that situation would have created a greater vulnerability to both - and I had suffered a concussionand had received a gunshot wound to the back of head, which the UOFRB majority noted should cause a person to consider their own ability to properlv control and retain a ?rearm in that situation. The UOFRB majority was critical of Of?cer claim to have clarity in thought and conversely describe being unclear and possibly In addition, the UOFRB majority discussed that omeet initially described observing a gun pointed at head, describing Kenneth?s actions in dead and then after drama; I own pistol, aiming for Kenneth?s center body mass. Of?cer - later clouded - own statement with doubt when I stated that I experienced blurred vision and disorientation. The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 23 3.2 Furthermore, the UOFRB majority considered Of?cer statement of having heard a blast; however, there was no evidence to support that anyone else at that approximate time also heard a blast. During the UOFRB, FID investigators presented the surveillance video which did not depict other customers in the area reacting in a manner which would suggest that they heard a loud noise prior to Of?cer 5 opening ?re. There was no indication of a change of movement or reaction of customers until - .md - fell down to the ground after Of?cer - discharged his pistol. The UOFRB majority found Of?cer lack of forthcoming and unwillingness to divulge essential information, coupled with a general lack of cooperation to the responding CPD personnel to be troubling. The UOFRB majority determined that Of?cer Drawing/Exhibiting to be Out of Policy. Note: According to FID investigators, with regard to whether or not witnesses recalled any loud noises prior to the incident, there was no indication of aloud, unexpected noise concurrent with Kenneth?s physical assault on Of?cer - to which any store customer reacted to on available video. The UOFRB minority reviewed the same set of facts and came to a different conclusion based on the review of the video, statements. and evidence. The UOFRB minority considered the statements made by Of?cer to FID investigators over the course of two interviews with regard to the diagnosis of injuries, which included a loss of consciousness, blunt force trauma to the head. and a fall to the ground. In addition. Kenneth had initiated an unprovoked attack on Of?cer - that occurred while Of?cer was holding 5.1111: UOFRB minority noted the combined evidence of seeing facial expression, Of?cer belief that I was shot in the head and being physically struck hard enough to fall to the ground would cause any reasonable of?cer to believe he/she may need to draw their weapon for protection. As such, in that particular moment, there was a reasonable belief that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justi?ed. Utilizing statements from Of?cer -. the UOFRB minority opinion was focused on what Officer - believed to be 01' the [lasts articulated and perceived at the time of the incident. The assessment by Of?cer - of I injury resulting in a loss of consciousness due to the attack, when making the decision to draw a ?rearm, was in accordance with Department policy, speci?cally the, ?Belief there is a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the mint where deadly force may be justi?ed.? The UOFRB minority determined that Officer was in accordance with the standard set forth of what was determined objectively reasonable and found no evidence that Of?cer substantiallv deviated from approved Department policy. The UOFRB minority determined Of?cer Drawing/Exhibiting to be In Policy. I considered Of?cer - decision to draw I pistol after being struck in an unprovoked manner and closely scrutinized the evidence presented before me. I analyzed Of?cer varying accounts and inconsistent statements regarding assessment and articulation of Kenneth holding a weapon, speci?callv a ?rearm. This included a review of on scene BWV from CPD of?cers capturing Of?cer words contemporaneous to the OIS as well as Of?cer - FID interviews. Officer failed to properly assess the situation which The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page untenable and unreasonable conclusion to unholster I weapon. Based on the totality of the circumstances and weighing all the available evidence, the UOFRB maj oritv concluded, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Of?cer while faced with similar circumstances, would not reasonably believe that there was a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justi?ed. Therefore, I ?nd Of?cer - Drawing/Exhibiting to be Out of Policy, Administrative Disapproval. Use of Force General25 "It is the policy of this Department that personnel may use only that force which is ?objectively reasonable to: Defend themselves; Defend others; Ejj?ect an arrest or detention; Prevent escape; or, Overcome resistance The Department examines reasonableness using Graham v. Connor and from the articulated facts ?om the perspective of a Los Angeles Police O??icer with similar training and experience placed in generally the same set of circumstances. In determining the appropriate level of force, o?icers shall evaluate each situation in light of facts and circumstances of each particular case. Those factors may include, but are not limited to: The seriousness of the crime or suspected o??ense; The level of threat or resistance presented by the subject; Whether the subject was posing an immediate threat to officers or a danger to the community; The potential for injury to citizens, officers or subjects; The risk or apparent attempt by the subject to escape; The conduct of the subject being con?onted (as reasonably perceived by the o?icer at the time); The amount of time and any changing circumstances during which the o?icer had to determine the type and amount of force that appeared to be reasonable; The availability of other resources; The training and experience of the of?cer; The proximity or access of weapons to the subject; The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 25 3.2 O?icer versus subject factors such as age, size, relative strength, skill level, injury/exhaustion and number o??icers versus subjects; and, The environmental factors and/or other exigent circumstances (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10). Lethal Use of Force Law enforcement o?icers are authorized to use deadly force to: 0 Protect themselves or others from what is reasonably believed to be an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury; or, - Prevent a crime where the subject is actions place person(s) in imminent jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury; or, - Prevent the escape of a violent fleeing felon when there is probable cause to believe the escape will pose a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to the o?icer or others if apprehension is delayed. In this circumstance, o??icers shall, to the extent practical, avoid using deadly force that might subject innocent bystanders or hostages to possible death or injury (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume No.1, Section 556.10). The reasonableness of an O??icer ?5 use of deadly force includes consideration of the o?icer ?s tactical conduct and decisions leading up to the use of deadly force (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume No.1, Section 556.10). Of?cer - - 9mm, 10 rounds in a southerly direction from an approximate distance of 15 feet. First Volley (two rounds, according to Of?cer Note: The FID investigation determined that Of?cer - ?red a total of 10 rounds. Investigators from FID were unable to determine the exact sequence of ?re. According to Of?cer . while Kenneth was in the aisle and in the process of raising his right arm in Of?cer direction. Kenneth simultaneously lowered his chin while looking at Of?cer - and . Of?cer described Kenneth?s demeanor as having a face of intensity, focus, and absolutely no fear in his eves. As Kenneth continued to raise his right arm to an approximate 45-degree angle, Of?cer believed that i life was in danger, - life was in danger, and the other shoppers nun: in danger. Of?cer - slulud had a clear View of Kenneth in the middle of the ais'l c. from head-to-toe at the time Of?cer ?red. While lyi_ng on 5 back, Of?cer - mi and I head, and while using a one-handed grip, extended right arm and ?red two shots towards the bakery in a southern direction at Kennetb?s center body mass from a distance of approximately 15 feet. According to Of?cer I believed Kenneth was holding a gun at the time Of?cer a ?red. Of?cer experienced tunnel vision as Kenneth began to raise his right arm. Of?cer The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 26 3.2 stated focus then moved to the front sight of I pistol as I aimed at Kenneth?s chest. Of?cer 51mm I shot to stop the threat. Of?cer - recalled, I could see he was increasing his concentration on me. And when he began to lower his chin and raise his Because it was a face of intensity, focusl He had absolute no fear in his eyes as he walked. He also?he was also carrying the some black gun that I saw that was pointed towards my but he walked with an absolute mission.? purpose looking down at me, still holding that black, small handgun in his right right arm coming up and to a 45-degree angle. towards the bakery in the south?south direction. When he stopped, and he turned his body to face me, my vision went towards my ?'ont sight, and he began to raise his right arm towards me and my little boy. I remember also there was other customers within the aisle. And I believed he was going to kill me, my son, and the shoppers that were there. And then I raised my wea on and I ?red twice. My from sight was on him. I had a clear view of him from head to toei I was on my back] arm was extended And then that?s when I aimed at his center boaj/ mass and I ?red two shots] I?d estimate I 5 feet] I want to clarify that right before the first volley as it was being raised. The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 27 3.2 And then my tunnel vision went directly into his chest and my ?'ont sight or my front sight and his center body mass. And I shot to stop the threat. Second Volley (two rounds. according to Of?cer -1 Note: The FID investigation determined that Of?cer - ?red a total of 10 rounds. Investigators from FID were unable to determine the exact sequence of ?re. According to Of?cer -. he stated that after I tired I ?rst two rounds. Kenneth fell in a manner that was still a 151 rest because Kenneth was still facing Of?cer 1111 I arm still extended outward and Inga bent towards Kenneth?s torso. Of?cer stated that Kenneth still looked at and - with a concentrated, intense look in his eye. Kenneth had a closed ?st and was h. aiding what Of?cer - believed was a gun. Kenneth raised his arm which Of?cer ?ibed as consistent with taking a shooting platform. While still on I back, Of?cer again utilized a one-handed shooting grip and ?red two additional rounds at Kenneth?s chest area from a distance of approximately 15 feet. According to Of?cer -. all four rounds of both volleys were ?red in a southern direction towards the bakery within two seconds and there was a clear View Kenneth in the aisle. Of?cer also stated that due to the immediate need to take action, was unable to give Kenneth commands prior to ?ring I rounds. After ?ring i last shot, Of?cer stated Kenneth rolled onto his back and then into a ?fetal position? on his left side. Kenneth?s back was toward Of?cer and I anus were tucked underneath I body. Of?cer - recalled, He went down after I fired twice. And then he fell in a manner that was still a threat to me and my son and the other Costco shoppers. His arm was still extended outward. He was still facing me. He still had a concentrated, intense look in his eyes, still looking at me and my son. I remember we were face-to-face and his arm was still extended out, and I believe he still had that same gun, and I fired twice more in his direction at him. That he still had a closed ?st, holding what I believe was a gun. Him raising his arm consistent with him taking a shooting platform at me. One-handed? lowered my weapon, I looked down, and I saw he fell in the position that was still presenting a threat towards me with his arm still extended out. and I aimed The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 28 3.2 again my ?'ont sight at his chest, and I fired once. The tunnel vision was still I could still see his chest and I believe that his arm was still extended outward, and I fired again. Again, 15 feet. Two towards the bakery in the south?south direction. But what I saw was the suspect and the clear view standing in the middle of the aisle ?om head to toe clear, and I believe I had a clear shot to stop that threat. No, I couldn?t. Again, because it was just immediate] After my second shot from my second set, when he was down and after he made himself into a fetal position away from me and my son, I stopped -- I stopped ?ring and I continued to cover him I believed it was still tucked under the suspect ?slarms still at that point. When Of?cer - was asked by FID investigators if there was anyone in front or behind Kenneth when Of?cer - ?red, Of?cer replied, ?No. I Note: The FID investigation revealed that Kenneth had no personal property on him at the time of the incident. There were no witnesses who observed Kenneth armed with a ?rearm or in possession of any object that resembled a ?rearm. The only ?rearm recovered at the incident was possessed by Of?cer -. Of?cer 1 had no veri?able injuries. In evaluating Of?cer use of lethal force, the UOFRB thoroughly examined the evidence and witness related this incident. The UOFRB determined that Of?cer account of the incident had various inconsistencies. Evidence and witness statements did not support Of?cer - perception of the incident with regard to the application of lethal force. The UOFRB acknowledged that based on a preponderance of the evidence. Of?cer was struck by Kenneth without provocation. The UEFRB noted that Of?cer - stated believed had sustained a gunshot wound to l?ad. This belief started 1 :e series of events which culminated in Of?cer - discharging I pistol. Of?cer - stated that I fell down to the ground and monicnturiiv lost consciousness and was paralyzed from the injury. These perceptions of Of?cer - contributed to Of?cer belief that the incident was The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 29 3.2 escalating. After the 018, Of?cer - received medical treatment and underwent a series of exams. Of?cer - did not have any veri?able injuries. The UOFRB noted that there was no evidence to support Of?cer belief that had sustained a signi?cant injury. Of . additional concern to the UOFRB was that Of?cer was discovered lying on the ground directly in front (south) of the Aidells booth by Officer . Of?cer remained lying on the ground in that location for a period of time. The l" investigation determined that at least two of Of?cer rounds were ?red from a pnsitinn near the west side of the Aidells booth. consistent with where Of?cer - placed - during the walk-through. Of?cer - stated that I did not move or change position after falling to the ?oor and ?ring I pistol. The discrepancy between the two locations was not resolved during the FID investigation and was noted by the UOFRB. The UOFRB noted that Of?cer - believed Kenneth was armed with a ?rearm. No other witnesses stated they observed Kenneth in possession of a ?rearm. No objects from Kenneth were recovered during the investigation which resembled a ?rearm. There were no factors that the UOFRB could identify that supported a basis for what OW stated was a belief that Kenneth was armed with a ?rearm and had shot Of?cer . During the UOFRB, FID investigators presented that at the approximate time of the DIS, Kenneth was moving down an aisle with away from Of?cer Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an of?cer with similar training and experience as Of?cer -. would not reasonably believe that the suspect?s actions presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and that the use of lethal force would not be objectively reasonable. Therefore, I ?nd Of?cer - use of lethal force to be Out of Policy, Administrative Disapproval. Additional/Equipment Department Operations Center (DOC) Noti?cation The Watch Commander?s Daily Re ort, dated June 14, 2019, indicated an initial incident noti?cation time by CPD Detective to the Watch Commander of Southwest Patrol Division at 2130 hours. The incident was reported to the DOC at 2235 hours at the direction of Captain Serial No. Commanding Of?cer, Southwest Patrol Division. Captain noti?ed the DOC after was able to verify the details of the incident with additional information from CPD. Audio/Video Recordings Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS) According to CPD, there were 19 DICVS videos from CPD police vehicles that responded to this incident after the 018 and were parked outside of the Costco store. The videos were reviewed by FID investigators. The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners Page 30 3.2 Body Worn Video (BWV) According to CPD, there were 23 BWVs from CPD officers that responded to this incident after the OIS. The videos captured various portions of the incident, including statements made after the 018 by Of?cer and witnesses. Outside Video The Costco store was equipped with 46 security cameras mounted at various locations inside and outside of the building at the time of this incident. The cameras were labeled based on their location and recorded at 10 frames per second without audio. The only camera found to have captured a portion of this incident was designated ?Camera Centers and was mounted 15 feet above the ?oor and approximately 150 feet from the Aidells booth.52 Social Media Social media sites and news organizations were monitored from the date of the incident by FID investigators. This incident was publicized by local news outlets and was discussed by several individuals on various social media posts. Additionally, there were multiple printed news articles related to this incident, as well as post-DIS cell phone videos circulating in the media. FID investigators reviewed all the information and coordinated with CPD investigators to ensure attempts were made to identify and interview all potential witnesses to this incident. Respectfully, I MOORE Chief of Police Date: