June 15, 2020
MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Record

FROM:

signed by
Stephen M. Volz, Ph.D.
VOLZ.STEPHEN.MICH Digitally
VOLZ.STEPHEN.MICHAEL.1504223694
Assistant Administrator for AEL.1504223694
Date: 2020.06.14 23:30:02 -04'00'
Satellite and Information Services
Scientific Integrity Determining Official (Delegated)

SUBJECT:

Final Decision on Allegations of Scientific Misconduct Nos.
2019-007, 2019-008, 2019-009, 2019-010

REFERENCE:

An Independent Assessment of Allegations of Scientific
Misconduct, National Academy of Public Administration, March
2020

Allegations of Scientific Integrity Misconduct
In August 2019 Hurricane Dorian was moving west across the Atlantic Ocean in the
direction of the southeastern United States. Throughout the lifecycle of the hurricane,
the National Weather Service (NWS) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) was continuously monitoring the storm and providing updates
and projections of the storm’s expected progress, to senior leadership inside the U.S.
government, to emergency managers at the federal, regional, state, and local levels, and
to the general public through regular forecasts, warnings, and alerts.
During the progress of the storm, in addition to the normal communications provided by
the NWS forecasters, there were additional, independent public announcements made by
the Executive Office of the President about the storm which, in at least one instance, was
inconsistent with the NWS forecaster announcements. Responding to calls from the local
community, on September 1, 2019 the NWS Birmingham, Alabama Weather Forecast
Office (WFO) sent a tweet reinforcing their previously communicated forecast for
Dorian’s expected affected areas (the September 1 Birmingham Tweet). NOAA released a
statement on September 6 (September 6 Statement) in an attempt to reconcile the
inconsistences between the NWS and the Executive Office of the President. Rather than
clarifying those inconsistencies, the September 6 Statement engendered strongly
negative reactions from multiple stakeholders, including the NWS forecaster community,
the broader community of commercial and private weather forecasters, the regional and
state emergency managers, and the public; all at a time when the region was responding
to a major hurricane event.
On September 9, 10, and 11, 2019, NOAA’s Scientific Integrity Officer (SIO) received
four separate complaints of alleged violations of scientific integrity filed under the
NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy (NOAA Administrative Order 202-735D: Scientific

1

 Integrity)1. The allegations relate to various communications surrounding Hurricane
Dorian, including the September 6 Statement.2
NOAA’s SIO assessed the allegations, and determined they warranted inquiry in
accordance with the Scientific Integrity Policy.3 In consultation with others, she then
determined it was in the best interest of NOAA that an independent, external
organization be chartered to conduct an inquiry and investigation of the allegations.
The SIO engaged the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA or the
Academy) to carry out this work. The goal of the investigation was to determine by a
preponderance of evidence if the NOAA personnel involved with the development
and issuance of the September 6 Statement violated NOAA’s Scientific Integrity Policy
and engaged in the misconduct intentionally, knowingly, or in reckless disregard of
the Scientific Integrity Policy. Pursuant to the Scope of Work, NAPA was tasked to:
•

Determine if scientific misconduct or loss of scientific integrity has not
occurred and the allegations be dismissed; or

•

Determine if scientific misconduct or loss of scientific integrity has occurred
and recommend any specific actions by NOAA to restore scientific integrity.

Summary of the Findings and Recommendations
Included as Attachment 1 to this Decision memorandum is the Report from the Academy.
Upon consideration of the allegations, and evaluation of the evidence gathered during
the investigation, a panel of experts established by NAPA (Panel) examined three specific
allegations, and issued findings on each. The full details of how the Academy framed the
events into these three allegations are in the Report; I list the allegations and findings
here in their totality. I will refer to the recommendations later in this memorandum.
Allegation One: Media guidance issued by NOAA leadership between September 1 and
6, 2019, limited the ability of scientists to communicate with the media and the public
about their research findings. Policies allegedly violated include Section 4.05; Section
4.06; and Section 5.02 (a), (d), and (k) of NOAA’s Scientific Integrity Policy.
Finding One: The Panel determined by a preponderance of the evidence on the record
that the allegation that the media guidance issued by NOAA leadership between
September 1 and 6, 2019, did not constitute scientific misconduct or a loss of scientific
integrity.
Allegation Two: The Birmingham WFO forecasters were not provided the opportunity to
review and opine on the September 6 Statement that referenced the September 1
Birmingham Tweet and underlying scientific activity. Policies allegedly violated include
Section 7.01 of NOAA’s Scientific Integrity Policy.
1

The four complaints are documented in Appendix E of the NAPA Report: An Independent Assessment of
Allegations of Scientific Misconduct, March 2020, hereinafter referred to as the Report.
2
Report, Appendix F.
3
The SIO consolidated the four separate complaints for the purposes of the Academy’s investigation.

2

 Finding Two: The Panel determined by a preponderance of the evidence on the record
that Dr. Neil Jacobs (Acting Administrator of NOAA) and Julie Roberts (Deputy Chief of
Staff and Director of Communications for NOAA)4 violated the Code of Ethics for Science
Supervision and Management set forth in Section 7.01 of NOAA’s Scientific Integrity
Policy when they failed to engage the Birmingham WFO in the development of the
September 6 Statement. Further, the Panel finds that they engaged in the misconduct
intentionally, knowingly, or in reckless disregard of the Code of Scientific Conduct or
Code of Ethics for Science Supervision and Management in NOAA’s Scientific Integrity
Policy.
Allegation Three: The drafting of the September 6 Statement was driven by external
political pressure from Department of Commerce (Commerce) senior leaders and
inappropriately criticized the September 1 Birmingham Tweet and underlying scientific
activity. Further, the September 6 Statement compromised NOAA’s integrity and
reputation as an independent scientific agency and violated Section 7.02 of NOAA’s
Scientific Integrity Policy.
Finding Three: The Panel determined by a preponderance of the evidence on the record
that the actions of Dr. Neil Jacobs and Julie Roberts involving the development and
issuance of the September 6 Statement violated the Code of Ethics for Science
Supervision and Management set forth in Section 7 of NOAA’s Scientific Integrity Policy.
Further, the Panel determined that they engaged in the misconduct intentionally,
knowingly, or in reckless disregard of the Code of Scientific Conduct or Code of Ethics
for Science Supervision and Management in NOAA’s Scientific Integrity Policy.
As part of the scientific integrity investigation process, both complainants and
respondents were provided the opportunity to review the Report and submit written
exceptions to its contents. The submitted exceptions are included as Attachment 2 to this
memorandum. I have carefully reviewed these exceptions, and considered the
information and perspectives they contain. In addition to Report itself, these submitted
exceptions have helped to inform my present decision.
Additional Observations and Considerations
Does the Scientific Integrity Policy cover all manner of communications?
NOAA’s mission of Science, Service, and Stewardship has been well established since its
founding in 1972. As described on our website, our charter is:
1. To understand and predict changes in climate, weather, oceans, and coasts;
2. To share that knowledge and information with others; and
3. To conserve and manage coastal and marine ecosystems and resources.

4

Julie Roberts left NOAA in December 2019 to join the Economic Development Administration, which is in
the Department of Commerce.

3

 To achieve these objectives the communities we serve must be confident that the
information NOAA provides is based on the best observations available, backed by the
best scientific understanding and analysis, and presents NOAA’s best understanding of
the facts using solely our observations and scientific analyses. Every communication from
NOAA in the service of our operational mission is founded in science, and is supported by
our established reputation of scientific integrity.
All communications from NOAA, if issued by NOAA personnel in the performance of their
mission responsibilities, are subject to the scientific integrity policy. The policy applies
equally to science publications in refereed journals, to presentations at conferences and
workshops, to weather alerts or warnings, website posting, press releases and other
statements, and tweets from WFOs or other NOAA facilities. Further, the NOAA Scientific
Integrity Policy explicitly covers media communications, including press releases, that
reference scientific products, and is consistent with the scope of the Departmental
Administrative Order (DAO 219-1) covering public communications. Our voice is our
primary tool for achieving our mission of Service and Stewardship, and we must maintain
our reputation for accuracy and integrity to be effective.
Does the scope of the Report cover all relevant participants to the events?
The scope of this investigation is necessarily limited to personnel and activities within
NOAA. In her charge to the Academy, the SIO made clear that the Scientific Integrity
Policy applies to all NOAA personnel, but is also limited to NOAA personnel, and the
jurisdiction of NOAA to investigate scientific and research misconduct is accordingly
limited to the agency itself.5 When there is a claim of political interference, such potential
interference may (as it did in this case) arise from a point outside the agency. For the
interference to impact NOAA's scientific integrity, it must penetrate into the agency at
some point. Considering the limits of NOAA's jurisdiction under its policy, it is this point of
penetration, and the impacts that flow within the agency after that penetration, which
are the focus of the investigation.
The Academy and the SIO were aware that other investigations were underway into
these events, and that it was likely that there will be parallel reports and findings which
may be complementary to the Report.
Finally, while the allegations of misconduct were considered only as they applied to
NOAA personnel, the scope for consideration of corrective action was not constrained,
and recommendations for corrective action could apply to offices or organizations
outside of NOAA as appropriate.

5

From the NOAA Administrative Order 202-735D, the Scientific Integrity Policy applies to “All NOAA
employees, political and career, who are engaged in, supervise, or manage scientific activities, analyze
and/or publicly communicate information resulting from scientific activities, or use scientific information or
analyses in making bureau or office policy, management, or regulatory decisions and all contractors who
engage in or assist with activities identified above.”

4

 Was the participation in the investigation full and open?
All participants engaged fully and freely with the Panel in their investigation. I want to
thank the respondents and all of the many witnesses for being open and available, and
for supporting lengthy interviews by the Academy, sometimes for many hours and for
follow-up interviews. The openness of the interviewees was noted by the Panel, and
allowed for a thorough and complete communication of their actions.
As noted above, due to the necessary jurisdictional limits of this investigation under the
Scientific Integrity Policy, the Panel did not interview and did not have access to a number
of individuals who were heavily involved in some of the matters of critical importance to
these events. As a result, the Report summarizes the Panel’s understanding of the events
through the recollections of the NOAA personnel who were engaged. The Panel believes,
nonetheless, that an accurate assessment can be made with this information. I agree the
factual record that the Panel has developed is thorough and complete, and that all of the
information that I have been provided, in the Panel’s report, in the exceptions, and in the
underlying record, is sufficient for me to render a final decision in this matter.
Decision and Mitigation Activities
Based on the Academy’s thorough review of this matter, and the reasoning outlined in
the Report, I concur with the Academy’s findings related to each of the three allegations.
Finding One: The Panel determined that the media guidance issued by NOAA leadership
between September 1 and 6, 2019, did not constitute scientific misconduct or a loss of
scientific integrity.
I concur with the Panel’s finding and with the recommendations provided by the Panel.
Their finding was based on the common understanding and past practice that during
significant weather events the NOAA Communications office routinely directed
forecasters and WFOs to channel all media inquiries through their office. However, this
approach should be modified per the Academy recommendations. Specifically, I disagree
with the observation by the NOAA Communications office that their intention was to
“shield NOAA forecast offices and forecasters from aggressive media reporters.”6
Instead NOAA subject matter experts should be supported to continue communicating
details and updates to weather and environmental events that are within their area of
expertise throughout the event.
Recommendations:
1.

6

Develop formal policy guidelines for the issuance of media guidance to NOAA
operations staff. The guidelines should codify the lead role NOAA scientific and
operational staff have for direct communications of scientific information to the
public, particularly during critical weather events. Specifically, these guidelines

Report, page 44.

5

 should clarify roles and responsibilities, institutionalize the process, and identify
the circumstances under which the agency should issue media guidance.
- Recommend assignment to the NOAA Communications Office, the NWS, and
the SIO.
2.

Develop an interagency framework (that includes other federal agencies and the
Executive Office of the President) for the sharing of scientific data and materials
concerning severe weather-related events. The framework would include
protocols for the timely update of information to reflect changing weather
conditions and the release of the information to the general public through all
relevant media.
- Recommend assignment to the Deputy Undersecretary for Operations.

Finding Two: The Panel determined that Dr. Neil Jacobs (Acting Administrator of
NOAA) and Julie Roberts (Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of Communications for
NOAA) violated the Code of Ethics for Science Supervision and Management set forth
in Section 7.01 of NOAA’s Scientific Integrity Policy when they failed to engage the
Birmingham WFO in the development of the September 6 Statement.
I concur with the Panel’s finding. The Scientific Integrity Policy is intended to ensure
the subject matter experts who generate the scientific content and issue the public
communications are engaged in any revision of or evaluation of the same.
Recommendations:
3.

Review and revise the Scientific Integrity Policy’s written policy statement on the
right of NOAA scientists to review, comment, and amend any official
communication that relies on their scientific analysis. Develop an implementation
plan that provides guidance for how the policy should be applied, specifically
related to severe weather events. The policy statement and plan should clarify
the definition of an “operating unit,” with the intention that coordination should
be at the level of the office or individual responsible for issuing the scientific
product. This policy statement will complement NOAA’s Scientific Integrity
Policy.
- Recommend assignment to the SIO and to the NOAA Communications Office.

4.

Review and revise the Scientific Integrity Policy’s accompanying Procedural
Handbook and associated training materials to include criteria and supporting
examples to assist with the determination of scientific misconduct and a loss of
scientific integrity. For example, NOAA could cite this case as an example of a
violation of NOAA’s Scientific Integrity Policy with regard to several criteria.
- Recommend assignment to the SIO.

6

 Finding Three: The Panel determined that the actions of Dr. Neil Jacobs and Julie
Roberts involving the development and issuance of the September 6 Statement
violated the Code of Ethics for Science Supervision and Management set forth in
Section 7 of NOAA’s Scientific Integrity Policy.
I concur with the Panel’s finding. I recognize, however, that the drafting and issuance
of the September 6 Statement involved many active participants other than Dr.
Jacobs and Julie Roberts, participants who are not subject to NOAA’s Scientific
Integrity Policy. By issuing the September 6 Statement as a NOAA release, the NOAA
participants violated the Scientific Integrity Policy. Dr. Jacobs and Julie Roberts did
not believe it was a good idea to release a statement, but felt significant external
pressure to do so. They recommended, at two different points, that the reference to
the Birmingham WFO be removed – an edit that, if accepted, may have avoided the
policy violation. However, when the edit was not incorporated, they chose to release
the statement as a NOAA document.
Recommendations:
5.

Establish a formal intra-departmental agreement to guide the interactions
between Commerce and NOAA officials in the drafting of NOAA severe weather
communications, acknowledging the responsibility for NOAA to own the
scientific content and allowing for Commerce to weigh in on policy content.
- Recommend assignment to the Deputy Undersecretary for Operations and the
SIO.

6.

Incorporate key principles of scientific integrity, including NOAA’s Codes of Ethics
for Science Supervision and Management, into NOAA’s annual ethics training.
- Recommend assignment to the SIO, the Office of Human Capital Services
(OHCS), and the General Counsel.

7.

Require NOAA senior leadership and staff and NOAA political officials to take
scientific integrity training that includes the Code of Ethics for Science
Supervision and Management. Define the appropriate level of management that
needs to receive the training. Once a staff member has completed the training,
he/she will sign a statement confirming they will abide by these principles.
- Recommend assignment to the SIO and the OHCS.

8.

Establish protocols with the Commerce Office of Inspector General (OIG) and/or
other agencies to investigate alleged violations of scientific integrity involving
senior NOAA and Commerce political leadership. The protocols should maintain
the primacy of NOAA’s Scientific Integrity Policy for addressing allegations
against NOAA practices or personnel. Record these protocols in an updated
Policy.
- Recommend assignment to SIO.

7

 Overall Observations and Additional Recommendations
The NOAA National Weather Service’s effectiveness as an organization is, in large part,
determined by how the communities NOAA serves respond to the information we
provide. For individuals and localities to take appropriate action in the face of a significant
or catastrophic severe weather event such as a hurricane, they must act quickly and
decisively, and they must trust the information they receive. NOAA’s Scientific Integrity
Policy guides the actions of everyone in the NOAA organization, and our adherence to it
helps to ensure that our communications, analyses, and publications are trusted by the
public.
For the Policy to be effective, it must be understood and followed by all involved in our
mission. There appeared to be, at best, inconsistent awareness amongst the many
participants at the NOAA and Commerce level about where and how NOAA’s Scientific
Integrity Policy applied to the communications during this event. The recommendations
above will address that lack for NOAA, but greater training and discipline is needed at the
Commerce level. In addition, NOAA and Commerce should review and revise companion
policies for the two organizations, to ensure future participants in critical events
understand how they will work together.
Recommendations:
9.

The Department of Commerce should establish a scientific integrity policy,
covering the career and political leadership at Commerce. Commerce’s policy
should be complementary to the NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy. The NOAA policy
has been successfully implemented and applied to NOAA issues and should be
validated. Commerce should consider an umbrella directive that documents how
Commerce works in coordination with the policies of the individual bureaus and
agencies, and as a default allows the bureau or agency policies to be applied first
to investigations.
- Recommend assignment to the Department of Commerce and the NOAA SIO

10. Scientific integrity policy training should be mandated for all management and

leadership positions at Commerce, including both career and political staff.
Training should be whenever a new employee comes on board, and should be
refreshed annually after that.
- Recommend assignment to the Department of Commerce
I want to acknowledge that following the incidents described in the Report, and the
public and Agency reaction to them, Commerce leadership did reach out to NOAA seeking
to understand how Commerce and NOAA could work together more effectively in the
future. The recommendations in this section are consistent with ideas considered in those
initial discussions between NOAA and Commerce.

8

 Actions to Restore NOAA’s Scientific Integrity
Soon after Hurricane Dorian had passed, NOAA leadership, including Dr. Neil Jacobs, Dr.
Louis Uccellini, and others, travelled to the National Weather Service offices in Alabama
and the surrounding regions, reaffirming their confidence and faith in the forecasters and
their mission. These steps were necessary and appropriate, and well received by the
communities NOAA serves. The public communications were an important public
statement at the time of NOAA leadership’s support for science-based, trustworthy
services to the community.
With the release of this Decision, NOAA should commit to reaffirming their support for
and commitment to the scientific integrity of their services. I recommend that NOAA as
an organization, and NOAA’s leadership commit to taking the following actions.
I.

NOAA should commit to address all of the recommendations in this Decision.

II.

NOAA should commit to providing an open and transparent approach to
implementation, including regular release of progress updates on the individual
recommendations in this Decision. The updates should be to NOAA’s sponsors in
the Administration, in the Congress, and in the public.

III.

NOAA leadership, including the Undersecretary for Oceans and Atmosphere,
should affirm the importance of the NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy to the entire
NOAA organization, through NOAA townhalls or similar internal communication
events.

Closing Comments
I extend my appreciation to all involved in this process. I believe that the complainants,
respondents and others who participated did so with a common intent to improve our
systems and to ensure NOAA continues to provide critical information to the public
without compromise and with the trust of the public. The investigation performed an
essential service by examining the events and actions around Hurricane Dorian, and by
providing NOAA with clear and actionable recommendations for correction and recovery.
I am confident that the investigation’s results are accurate and relevant, and the
recommendations for action identified in this Decision memorandum, when
implemented, will help strengthen the processes that ensure the integrity of the scientific
activities that NOAA conducts.

Attachments
1.

An Independent Assessment of Allegations of Scientific Misconduct, National
Academy of Public Administration, March 2020

2. Written Exceptions

9