Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar
Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues
for Congress
Updated June 10, 2020

Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RL34391

 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program

Summary
The Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program is a program to acquire three new PSCs
(i.e., heavy polar icebreakers), to be followed years from now by the acquisition of up to three
new medium polar icebreakers. The PSC program has received a total of $1,169.6 million (i.e.,
about $1.2 billion) in procurement funding through FY2020, including $135 million in FY2020,
which was $100 million more than the $35 million that the Coast Guard had requested for
FY2020. With the funding it has received through FY2020, the first PSC is now fully funded and
the second PSC has received initial funding.
The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2021 budget requests $555 million in procurement funding for
the PSC program. It also proposes a rescission of $70 million in FY2020 funding that Congress
had provided for the procurement of long lead time materials (LLTM) for a 12th National Security
Cutter (NSC), with the intent of reprogramming that funding to the PSC program. The Coast
Guard states that its proposed FY2021 budget, if approved by Congress, would fully fund the
second PSC.
The Coast Guard estimates the total procurement costs of the three PSCs as $1,039 million (i.e.,
about $1.0 billion) for the first ship, $792 million for the second ship, and $788 million for the
third ship, for a combined estimated cost of $2,619 million (i.e., about $2.6 billion). Within those
figures, the shipbuilder’s portion of the total procurement cost is $746 million for the first ship,
$544 million for the second ship, and $535 million for the third ship, for a combined estimated
shipbuilder’s cost of $1,825 million (i.e., about $1.8 billion).
On April 23, 2019, the Coast Guard-Navy Integrated Program Office for the PSC program
awarded a $745.9 million fixed-price, incentive-firm contract for the detail design and
construction (DD&C) of the first PSC to VT Halter Marine of Pascagoula, MS, a shipyard owned
by Singapore Technologies (ST) Engineering. VT Halter was the leader of one of three industry
teams that competed for the DD&C contract. The first PSC is scheduled to begin construction in
2021 and be delivered in 2024, though the DD&C contract includes financial incentives for
earlier delivery.
The DD&C contract includes options for building the second and third PSCs. If these options are
exercised, the total value of the contract would increase to $1,942.8 million (i.e., about $1.9
billion). The figures of $745.9 million and $1,942.8 million cover only the shipbuilder’s costs;
they do not include the cost of government-furnished equipment (GFE), which is equipment for
the ships that the government purchases and then provides to the shipbuilder for incorporation
into the ship, or government program-management costs. When GFE and government programmanagement costs are included, the total estimated procurement cost of the first PSC is between
$925 million and $940 million, and the total estimated procurement cost of the three-ship PSC
program is about $2.95 billion.
The operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet currently consists of one heavy polar icebreaker,
Polar Star, and one medium polar icebreaker, Healy. In addition to Polar Star, the Coast Guard
has a second heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Sea. Polar Sea, however, suffered an engine casualty
in June 2010 and has been nonoperational since then. Polar Star and Polar Sea entered service in
1976 and 1978, respectively, and are now well beyond their originally intended 30-year service
lives. The Coast Guard plans to extend the service life of Polar Star until the delivery of at least
the second PSC. The Coast Guard is using Polar Sea as a source of spare parts for keeping Polar
Star operational.

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 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program

Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Missions of U.S. Polar Icebreakers ........................................................................................... 1
Statutory Duties and Missions ............................................................................................ 1
Multiple Missions (Not Just Icebreaking) ........................................................................... 2
Polar (Not Just Arctic) Operations ...................................................................................... 2
Current U.S. Polar Icebreakers.................................................................................................. 3
Required Numbers of U.S. Polar Icebreakers ........................................................................... 4
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC) Program .................................................................. 4
Overview ............................................................................................................................. 4
Program Name .................................................................................................................... 5
Coast Guard-Navy Integrated Program Office (IPO) ......................................................... 5
Parent Design Approach ..................................................................................................... 5
Program Schedule ............................................................................................................... 5
Procurement Cost ................................................................................................................ 5
Program Funding ................................................................................................................ 5
Contract Award ................................................................................................................... 6
Ship Design ......................................................................................................................... 7
Home Port .......................................................................................................................... 11
FY2021 Funding Request .................................................................................................. 11
Service Life Extension for Polar Star ..................................................................................... 12
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 12
Potential Impact of COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Situation ........................................................ 12
FY2021 Funding ..................................................................................................................... 12
Contract with Options vs. Block Buy Contract ....................................................................... 13
Funding Coast Guard Polar Icebreakers through Navy’s Shipbuilding Account .................... 14
Technical, Schedule, and Cost Risk for PSC Program ............................................................ 16
Parent Design and PSC Design ......................................................................................... 16
February 2020 GAO Testimony ........................................................................................ 17
Common Design for Heavy and Medium Polar Icebreakers .................................................. 18
Legislative Activity for FY2021 .................................................................................................... 20
Summary of Appropriation Action on FY2021 Funding Request ........................................... 20

Figures
Figure 1. Rendering of VT Halter Design for PSC ........................................................................ 7
Figure 2. Rendering of VT Halter Design for PSC ........................................................................ 8
Figure 3. Rendering of VT Halter Design for PSC ........................................................................ 8
Figure 4. Rendering of VT Halter Design for PSC ........................................................................ 9
Figure 5. Rendering of SDC Concept Design for Polarstern II .................................................... 10
Figure A-1. Polar Star and Polar Sea ........................................................................................... 22
Figure A-2. Polar Sea .................................................................................................................... 23

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Figure A-3. Healy .......................................................................................................................... 24
Figure A-4. Nathaniel B. Palmer ................................................................................................... 25
Figure A-5. Laurence M. Gould .................................................................................................... 26
Figure A-6. Sikuliaq ...................................................................................................................... 27
Figure E-1. Great Lakes Icebreaker Mackinaw ............................................................................. 58

Tables
Table 1. Estimated PSC Procurement Costs .................................................................................... 6
Table 2. Summary of Congressional Appropriations Action on FY2021 Procurement
Funding Request......................................................................................................................... 21
Table A-1. Coast Guard and NSF Polar Ships ............................................................................... 28
Table B-1. Major Icebreakers of the World as of May 1, 2017 ..................................................... 34
Table C-1. Funding for PSC Program in FY2013-FY2021 Budget Submissions ......................... 48
Table C-2. Funding in Procurement, Construction, and Improvements (PC&I) Account ............. 49

Appendixes
Appendix A. Current U.S. Polar Icebreakers and Polar Research Ships ....................................... 22
Appendix B. Required Numbers of U.S. Polar Icebreakers .......................................................... 29
Appendix C. PSC Program Funding ............................................................................................. 48
Appendix D. Funding Level in PC&I Account ............................................................................. 54
Appendix E. Great Lakes Icebreakers ........................................................................................... 58

Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 62

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 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program

Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Polar Security Cutter
(PSC) program—the Coast Guard’s program for acquiring new PSCs (i.e., heavy polar
icebreakers). The PSC program has received a total of $1,169.6 million (i.e., about $1.2 billion) in
procurement funding through FY2020, including $135 million in FY2020, which was $100
million more than the $35 million that the Coast Guard had requested for FY2020. With the
funding it has received through FY2020, the first PSC is now fully funded and the second PSC
has received initial funding.
The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2021 budget requests $555 million in procurement funding for
the PSC program. It also proposes a rescission of $70 million in FY2020 funding that Congress
had provided for the procurement of long lead time materials (LLTM) for a 12th National Security
Cutter (NSC), with the intent of reprogramming that funding to the PSC program. The Coast
Guard states that its proposed FY2021 budget, if approved by Congress, would fully fund the
second PSC.
The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Administration’s FY2021
procurement funding request for the PSC program and the proposed rescission of FY2020 NSC
funding, and, more generally, whether to approve, reject, or modify the Coast Guard’s overall
plan for procuring new polar icebreakers. Congress’s decisions on this issue could affect Coast
Guard funding requirements, the Coast Guard’s ability to perform its polar missions, and the U.S.
shipbuilding industrial base.
For a brief discussion of the Coast Guard’s Great Lakes icebreakers, see Appendix E. A separate
CRS report covers acquisition of general-purpose cutters (including NSCs) for the Coast Guard.1
Another CRS report provides an overview of various issues relating to the Arctic.2

Background
Missions of U.S. Polar Icebreakers
Statutory Duties and Missions
The permanent statute that sets forth the Coast Guard’s primary duties—14 U.S.C. 102—states
that among other things, the Coast Guard shall (emphasis added) “develop, establish, maintain,
and operate, with due regard to the requirements of national defense, aids to maritime navigation,
icebreaking facilities, and rescue facilities for the promotion of safety on, under, and over the
high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” and “pursuant to
international agreements, develop, establish, maintain, and operate icebreaking facilities on,
under, and over waters other than the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.... ”3

1

CRS Report R42567, Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
CRS Report R41153, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Ronald O'Rourke.
3 14 U.S.C. 102(4) and 102(5), respectively. This statute was previously 14 U.S.C. 2; it was renumbered as 14 U.S.C.
102 by Section 103 of the Frank LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018 (S. 140/P.L. 115-282 of December
4, 2018). (Title I of P.L. 115-282, consisting of Sections 101-124, specified a general reorganization of Title 14.)
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In addition, Section 888(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (H.R. 5005/P.L. 107-296 of
November 25, 2002)—the law that established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
transferred the Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation to DHS—sets forth 11
specific missions for the Coast Guard (often referred to as the Coast Guard’s 11 statutory
missions), including the mission of “ice operations.”4

Multiple Missions (Not Just Icebreaking)
The Coast Guard’s polar icebreakers do not simply break ice—they are multimission cutters5 that
conduct a variety of other operations that are conducted in lower-latitude waters by the Coast
Guard’s general-purpose cutters. U.S. polar ice operations conducted in large part by the Coast
Guard’s polar icebreakers support 9 of the Coast Guard’s 11 statutory missions.6 The roles of U.S.
polar icebreakers can be summarized as follows:






conducting and supporting scientific research in the Arctic and Antarctic;
defending U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic by helping to maintain a U.S. presence
in U.S. territorial waters in the region;
defending other U.S. interests in polar regions, including economic interests in
waters that are within the U.S. exclusive economic zone (EEZ) north of Alaska;
monitoring sea traffic in the Arctic, including ships bound for the United States;
and
conducting other typical Coast Guard missions (such as search and rescue, law
enforcement, and protection of marine resources) in Arctic waters, including U.S.
territorial waters north of Alaska.7

Polar (Not Just Arctic) Operations
The Coast Guard’s large icebreakers are called polar icebreakers rather than Arctic icebreakers
because they perform missions in both the Arctic and Antarctic. Operations to support National
Science Foundation (NSF) research activities in both polar regions account for a significant
portion of U.S. polar icebreaker operations.
Supporting NSF research in the Antarctic focuses on performing an annual mission, called
Operation Deep Freeze (ODF), to break through Antarctic sea ice so as to reach and resupply
McMurdo Station, the large U.S. Antarctic research station located on the shore of McMurdo
Sound, near the Ross Ice Shelf. The Coast Guard states that Polar Star, the Coast Guard’s only
currently operational heavy polar icebreaker, “spends the [northern hemisphere] winter [i.e., the
southern hemisphere summer] breaking ice near Antarctica in order to refuel and resupply
4

The 11 missions set forth in Section 888(a) are marine safety; search and rescue; aids to navigation; living marine
resources (fisheries law enforcement); marine environmental protection; ice operations; ports, waterways and coastal
security; drug interdiction; migrant interdiction; defense readiness; other law enforcement.
5 Cutters are commissioned Coast Guard vessels greater than 65 feet in length.
6 For a list of the 11 missions, see footnote 4. The two statutory missions not supported by polar ice operations are
illegal drug interdiction and undocumented migrant interdiction. (Department of Homeland Security, Polar Icebreaking
Recapitalization Project Mission Need Statement, Version 1.0, approved by DHS June 28, 2013, p. 10.)
7 This passage, beginning with “The roles of ... ,” originated in an earlier iteration of this CRS report and was later
transferred by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) with minor changes to Government Accountability
Office, Coast Guard[:]Efforts to Identify Arctic Requirements Are Ongoing, but More Communication about Agency
Planning Efforts Would Be Beneficial, GAO-10-870, September 2010, p. 53.

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McMurdo Station. When the mission is complete, the Polar Star returns to dry dock [in Seattle]
in order to complete critical maintenance and prepare it for the next ODF mission. Once out of
dry dock, it’s back to Antarctica, and the cycle repeats itself.”8 In terms of the maximum
thickness of the ice to be broken, the annual McMurdo resupply mission generally poses the
greatest icebreaking challenge for U.S. polar icebreakers, though Arctic ice can frequently pose
its own significant icebreaking challenges for U.S. polar icebreakers. The Coast Guard’s medium
polar icebreaker, Healy, spends most of its operational time in the Arctic supporting NSF research
activities and performing other operations.
Although polar ice is diminishing due to climate change, observers generally expect that this
development will not eliminate the need for U.S. polar icebreakers, and in some respects might
increase mission demands for them. Even with the diminishment of polar ice, there are still
significant ice-covered areas in the polar regions, and diminishment of polar ice could lead in
coming years to increased commercial ship, cruise ship, and naval surface ship operations, as well
as increased exploration for oil and other resources, in the Arctic—activities that could require
increased levels of support from polar icebreakers, particularly since waters described as “ice
free” can actually still have some amount of ice.9 Changing ice conditions in Antarctic waters
have made the McMurdo resupply mission more challenging since 2000.10
The Coast Guard’s Arctic strategic outlook document, released in April 2019, states
In order to prosecute its missions in the Arctic, the Coast Guard must fully understand and
operate freely in this vast and unforgiving environment. Effective capability requires
sufficient heavy icebreaking vessels, reliable high-latitude communications, and
comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness. In order to respond to crises in the Arctic,
our Nation must also muster adequate personnel, aviation, and logistics resources in the
region. The Coast Guard is the sole provider and operator of the U.S. polar capable fleet
but currently does not have the capability or capacity to assure access in the high latitudes.
Closing the gap requires persistent investment in capabilities and capacity for polar
operations, including the Polar Security Cutter. 11

Current U.S. Polar Icebreakers
The operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet currently consists of one heavy polar icebreaker,
Polar Star, and one medium polar icebreaker, Healy. In addition to Polar Star, the Coast Guard
has a second heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Sea. Polar Sea, however, suffered an engine casualty
in June 2010 and has been nonoperational since then.
Polar Star and Polar Sea entered service in 1976 and 1978, respectively, and are now well
beyond their originally intended 30-year service lives. The Coast Guard in recent years has
invested millions of dollars to overhaul, repair, and extend the service life of Polar Star, but as a
result of its advancing age, the ship’s material condition has nevertheless become increasingly
fragile, if not precarious. During its annual deployments to McMurdo Station in Antarctica,
NyxoLyno Cangemi, “Coast Guard Icebreaker Crew Completes Second Arctic Mission; U.S. Interests in Arctic
Domain Depends [sic] on Fleet Recapitalization,” DVIDS (Defense Visual Information Distribution System), October
19, 2018.
9 For more on changes in the Arctic due to diminishment of Arctic ice, see CRS Report R41153, Changes in the Arctic:
Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Ronald O'Rourke.
10 National Research Council, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World, An Assessment of U.S. Needs, Washington,
2007, pp. 6-7, 14, 63.
11 United States Coast Guard, Arctic Strategic Outlook, April 2019, p. 6.
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shipboard equipment frequently breaks, and shipboard fires sometimes occur.12 Replacements for
many of the ship’s components are no longer commercially available. To help keep Polar Star
operational, the Coast Guard is using Polar Sea as a source of replacement parts.
For additional background information on current U.S. polar icebreakers and polar research ships,
see Appendix A.

Required Numbers of U.S. Polar Icebreakers
Coast Guard officials state that the service in coming years will need six PSCs, including three
capable of breaking heavy polar ice, to perform its various polar missions. The Coast Guard
testified in February 2020, for example, that
The 2010 High Latitude Mission Analysis Report (HL MAR) identified the need for six
new polar icebreakers (at least three of which must be heavy) under the assumption that,
in the future, the Coast Guard would be required to perform nine of its eleven statutory
missions year-round in the Arctic, and meet all icebreaking needs in support of the United
States Antarctic Program.
In 2017, the Coast Guard’s Center for Arctic Study and Policy completed an addendum to
the HL MAR. The objectives were to provide a broad overview of changes in the polar
regions over the last seven years and to provide specific information for use in determining
potential impacts on mission areas in the polar regions. This addendum provides
confidence in the original findings and encourages the sustained reliance on its initial
recommendations on the Nation’s need for six icebreakers, three of which must be heavy
icebreakers.13

On June 9, 2020, President Trump issued a memorandum directing DHS, in coordination with the
Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Commerce, the Department of State, and the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to review required numbers of polar security cutters,
U.S. and international basing options for polar security cutters, and options for bridging the gap in
polar vessels until new polar security cutters are delivered, and to report back to President Trump
within 60 days (i.e., by August 8, 2020) on the results of the review.
For additional background information on required numbers of U.S. polar icebreakers, including
the text of the above-mentioned June 9, 2020, memorandum, see Appendix B.

Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC) Program
Overview
The PSC program was initiated in the Coast Guard’s FY2013 budget submission, and envisages
the acquisition of three new PSCs (i.e., heavy polar icebreakers), to be followed years from now
by the acquisition of up to three new medium polar icebreakers. The Coast Guard wants to begin
construction of the first new heavy polar icebreaker in 2021 and have it enter service in 2024.

See, for example, Richard Read, “Meet the Neglected 43-Year-Old Stepchild of the U.S. Military-Industrial
Complex,” Los Angeles Times, August 2, 2019; Melody Schreiber, “The Only Working US Heavy Icebreaker Catches
Fire Returning from Antarctica,” Arctic Today, March 2, 2019; Calvin Biesecker, “Fire Breaks Out On Coast Guard’s
Aging, and Only, Heavy Icebreaker,” Defense Daily, March 1, 2019.
13 Testimony of Admiral Charles W. Ray, Coast Guard Vice Commandant, on “Arctic Security Issues,” before the
House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation & Maritime Security, February 5, 2020, p. 9.
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Program Name
The PSC program was previously known as the polar icebreaker (PIB) program. Changing the
program’s name to the PSC program is intended to call attention to the fact that the Coast Guard’s
polar icebreakers perform a variety of missions relating to national security, not just
icebreaking.14 Although it is now called the PSC program, observers as a matter of convenience
might refer to it as the polar icebreaker program.

Coast Guard-Navy Integrated Program Office (IPO)
The PSC program is managed by a Coast Guard-Navy Integrated Program Office (IPO). A key
aim in establishing the IPO was to permit the Navy to share its ship-procurement best practices
with the Coast Guard so as to help the Coast Guard reduce the time and cost needed to design and
procure the PSCs.

Parent Design Approach
The PSC program is using the parent design approach, meaning that the design of the PSC is to
be based on an existing icebreaker design. A key aim in using the parent design approach is to
reduce cost, schedule, and technical risk in the PSC program.

Program Schedule
The PSC program’s schedule calls for delivering the three PSCs at 12-month intervals, at the end
of the third quarters of FY2024, FY2025, and FY2026, respectively.

Procurement Cost
As shown in Table 1, the Coast Guard estimates the total procurement costs of the three heavy
polar icebreakers as $1,039 million (i.e., about $1.0 billion) for the first ship, $792 million for the
second ship, and $788 million for the third ship, for a combined estimated cost of $2,619 million
(i.e., about $2.6 billion). As also shown in Table 1, within those figures, the shipbuilder’s portion
of the total procurement cost is $746 million for the first ship, $544 million for the second ship,
and $535 million for the third ship, for a combined estimated shipbuilder’s cost of $1,825 million
(i.e., about $1.8 billion). The shipbuilder’s contract-award cost for the first ship is $745.9 million,
with options for the second and third ships that, if exercised, would increase the total value of the
contract to $1,942.8 million (i.e., about $1.9 billion).

Program Funding
The PSC program has received a total of $1,169.6 million (i.e., about $1.2 billion) in procurement
funding through FY2020. In FY2020, Congress provided $135 million for the program, which
was $100 million more than the $35 million that the Coast Guard had requested. The figure of
$1,169.6 million includes $300 million that was provided through the Navy’s shipbuilding
account in FY2017 and FY2018 ($150 million each year). With the funding it has received
through FY2020, the first PSC is now fully funded and the second PSC has received initial
funding.

See, for example, Ben Werner and Sam LaGrone, “Coast Guard Renames New Icebreaker Program ‘Polar Security
Cutter,’” USNI News, September 27, 2018. See also Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “With Funding In Peril, Coast Guard
Pushes Icebreaker As ‘Polar Security Cutter,’” Breaking Defense, October 29, 2018.
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For additional background information on funding for the PSC program, see Appendix C.
Table 1. Estimated PSC Procurement Costs
In millions of then-year dollars
Cost element

1st PSC

2nd PSC

3rd PSC

Total

Target contract price

746

544

535

1,825

Program costs (including GFE)

213

165

168

546

Post-delivery costs

45

47

48

140

Costs for Navy-Type, Navy-Owned (NTNO) equipment

35

36

37

108

1,039

792

788

2,619

TOTAL

Source: U.S. Navy information paper on PSC program, undated, received from Navy Office of Legislative
Affairs, June 14, 2019.
Notes: Target contract price includes detail design, construction, and long lead-time materials (LLTM), and does
not reflect potential costs rising to the contract ceiling price. GFE is government-furnished equipment—
equipment that the government procures and then provides to the shipbuilder for installation on the ship.
NTNO equipment is GFE that the Navy provides—such as combat weapons systems, sensors and
communications equipment and supplies—for meeting Coast Guard/Navy naval operational capabilities wartime
readiness requirements. (For additional discussion, see Coast Guard Commandant Instruction (COMDTINST)
7100.2G, May 16, 2013, accessed June 24, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2017/Mar/15/2001716816/-1/-1/0/
CI_7100_2G.PDF.) The Navy information paper states that program costs, post-delivery costs, and NTNO costs
were taken from the Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate (PLCCE) and were in the process of being updated based
on the contract award, the contractor’s schedule, and refined cost estimates.

Contract Award
On April 23, 2019, the Coast Guard-Navy Integrated Program Office for the PSC program
awarded a $745.9 million fixed-price, incentive-firm contract for the detail design and
construction (DD&C) of the first PSC to VT Halter Marine of Pascagoula, MS, a shipyard owned
by Singapore Technologies (ST) Engineering. VT Halter was the leader of one of three industry
teams that competed for the DD&C contract; the other two bidders reportedly were Bollinger
Shipyards of Lockport, Louisiana, and a partnership between Philly Shipyard of Philadelphia and
Fincantieri/Marinette Marine, of Marinette, WI.15
The first PSC is scheduled to begin construction in 2021 and be delivered in 2024, though the
DD&C contract includes financial incentives for earlier delivery. The DD&C contract includes
options for building the second and third PSCs. If these options are exercised, the total value of
the contract would increase to $1,942.8 million (i.e., about $1.9 billion).16 The figures of $745.9
million and $1,942.8 million cover the shipbuilder’s costs; they do not include the cost of
government-furnished equipment (GFE), which is equipment for the ships that the government
purchases and then provides to the shipbuilder for incorporation into the ship, or government
program-management costs.

“Mississippi Shipyard Gets $746M Contract for Icebreaker,” Associated Press, April 23, 2019.
See Naval Sea Systems Command, “Polar Security Cutter Contract Awarded to Recapitalize Nation’s Arctic
Capabilities,” April 23, 2019; Department of Defense, “Contracts for April 23, 2019” (Release No. CR-076-19); Sam
LaGrone, “VT Halter Marine to Build New Coast Guard Icebreaker,” USNI News, April 23, 2019; Maria Armental,
“U.S. Orders First heavy Icebreaking Vessel in Decades, as Rivals Expand Arctic Presence,” Wall Street Journal, April
23, 2019; “Mississippi Shipyard Gets $746M Contract for Icebreaker,” Associated Press, April 23, 2019.
15
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Ship Design
Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4 show renderings of VT Halter’s design for the PSC.
An April 25, 2019, press report states that “the Coast Guard and Navy said VT Halter Marine’s
winning design for the new Polar Security Cutter (PSC) ‘meets or exceeds all threshold
requirements’ in the ship specification” for the PSC program.17
Figure 1. Rendering of VT Halter Design for PSC

Source: Illustration accompanying Sam LaGrone, “UPDATED: VT Halter Marine to Build New Coast Guard
Icebreaker,” USNI News, April 23, 2019, updated April 24, 2019. The caption to the illustration states “An
artist’s rendering of VT Halter Marine’s winning bid for the U.S. Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter. VT Halter
Marine image used with permission.”

A May 7, 2019, press release from VT Halter about its design for the PSC (which VT Halter
updated on May 29 to provide a corrected figure for the design’s full load displacement) stated
the following:
VT Halter Marine is teamed with Technology Associates, Inc. [TAI] as the ship designer
and, for over two years, has participated in the U.S. Coast Guard’s Heavy Polar Icebreaker
Industry Study. The ship design is an evolution from the mature ”Polar Stern II” [German
icebreaker] currently in design and construction; the team has worked rigorously to
demonstrate its maturity and reliability. During the study, TAI incrementally adjusted the
design and conducted a series of five ship model tank tests to optimize the design. The
vessels are 460 feet in length with a beam of 88 feet overall, a full load displacement of
approximately 22,900 long tons at delivery. The propulsion will be diesel electric at over
45,200 horse power and readily capable of breaking ice between six to eight feet thick. The
vessel will accommodate 186 personnel comfortably for an extended endurance of 90 days.
In addition to TAI, VT Halter Marine has teamed with ABB/Trident Marine for its Azipod
propulsion system,18 Raytheon for command and control systems integration, Caterpillar
Rich Abott, “Polar Icebreaker Winner Meets Threshold Requirements, Has Incentives For Early Delivery,” Defense
Daily, April 25, 2019.
18 ABB is ASEA Brown Boveri, a multinational corporation headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland, that is, among other
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for the main engines, Jamestown Metal Marine for joiner package, and Bronswerk for the
HVAC system. The program is scheduled to bring an additional 900 skilled craftsman and
staff to the Mississippi-based shipyard.19

Figure 2. Rendering of VT Halter Design for PSC

Source: Illustration posted by Robert A. Socha, Senior Vice President, VT Halter Marine, accessed May 6, 2019,
at https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6526621529113976832.

Figure 3. Rendering of VT Halter Design for PSC

Source: Technology Associates, Inc. (cropped version of rendering posted at
http://www.navalarchitects.us/pictures.html, accessed June 10, 2020). A similar image was included in VT Halter
press release, “VT Halter Marine Awarded the USCG Polar Security Cutter,” May 7, 2019, accessed May 8,
2019, at http://www.vthm.com/public/files/20190507.pdf.

things, a leading maker of electric-drive propulsion systems for ships. (ASEA is an acronym for Allmänna Svenska
Elektriska Aktiebolaget [i.e., General Swedish Electrical Limited Company], which merged with Brown, Boveri & Cie
[BBC] in 1988 to create ABB.) Azipod is ABB’s term for its azimuthing (i.e., swiveling) podded propulsors.
19 VT Halter press release, “VT Halter Marine Awarded the USCG Polar Security Cutter,” May 7, 2019, updated May
29, accessed June 12, 2019, at http://vthm.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Press-Release_USCG-PSC_SingaporeExchange-FINAL_updatedMay29.pdf. The original (May 7) version of the press release stated that the design’s full
load displacement at delivery would be approximately 33,000 tons.

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Figure 4. Rendering of VT Halter Design for PSC

Source: Photograph accompanying Connie Lee, “New Coast Guard Icebreaker Remains on Tight Schedule,”
National Defense, May 21, 2020. The article credits the photograph to Technology Associated, Inc.

The German icebreaker design referred to in VT Halter’s press release, Polar Stern II (also
spelled Polarstern II) (Figure 5),20 was to be built as the replacement for Polarstern, Germany’s
current polar research and supply icebreaker. On February 14, 2020, however, the Alfred Wegener
Institute, Helmholtz Centre for Polar and Marine Research, announced that “the [German]
Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) today cancelled the Europe-wide call for
tenders for the procurement of a new polar research vessel, Polarstern II, for legal reasons.”21
A May 9, 2019, press report states that Polarstern II was designed by Germany’s Ship Design &
Consult (SDC), a firm based in Hamburg, Germany.22 SDC states that its concept design for
Polarstern II has a length of 133 meters (about 436.4 feet) long, a beam of 27 meters (about 88.6
feet), and a draft of 10.5 meters (about 34.4 feet), but does not provide the design’s
displacement.23 A briefing on a preliminary version of the ship’s design stated that the design at
that point was somewhat larger, with a length of 145 meters (about 476 feet), a beam of 27.3
meters (about 89.6 feet), a draft of about 11 meters (about 36.1 feet), and a displacement
(including payload) of about 26,000 tons.24 These figures suggest that SDC’s somewhat smaller
Polarstern is the German word for Polar Star—coincidentally, the same name as the U.S. Coast Guard’s operational
heavy polar icebreaker.
21 Alfred Wegener Institute, Helmholtz Centre for Polar and Marine Research, “Call for tender procedure for the
construction of a successor to the icebreaker Polarstern has been cancelled.,” February 14, 2020, accessed March 12,
2020, at: https://www.awi.de/en/about-us/service/press/press-release/call-for-tender-procedure-for-the-construction-ofa-successor-to-the-icebreaker-polarstern-has-been.html .
22 Calvin Biesecker, “Long-Lead Funding In FY ‘20 For Second Polar Security Cutter Would Help With Planning,
Shipbuilder Says,” Defense Daily, May 9, 2019.
23 SDC Ship Design & Consult GmbH, design SDC2187, 133m Research Vessel, accessed May 9, 2019, at
http://www.shipdesign.de/html/index.php?navi=3&navi2=80&navi3=115.
24 Briefing entitled “Shipboard Polar Research, 32 Years Polarstern and the requirement for Polarstern II,” accessed
20

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concept design for Polarstern II might have a displacement (including payload) of something less
than 26,000 tons, and perhaps closer to 23,000 tons.
Figure 5. Rendering of SDC Concept Design for Polarstern II

Source: SDC Ship Design & Consult GmbH, design SDC2187, 133m Research Vessel, accessed May 9, 2019, at
http://www.shipdesign.de/html/index.php?navi=3&navi2=80&navi3=115. The image is enlarged at
http://www.shipdesign.de/html/detail.php?id=396.

The above-mentioned May 9, 2019, press report states that
VT Halter’s teammates on the PSC include ship designer Technology Associates, Inc.
(TAI), which has been involved in the design for over two years and has made “a lot of
modifications” in a number of areas to meet Coast Guard requirements, [Ronald
Baczkowski, president and CEO of VT Halter Marine] said. The team went through six
design spirals to refine the design and the major modifications include changes in the hull
form to enhance the ship’s icebreaking capabilities and keep the ice clear from the
propulsors and sensors, habitability improvements for comfort particularly in open water,
easier access to different areas of the ship, and maintenance and endurance capabilities….
Raytheon [RTN] is the integrator for C5I capabilities 25 on the ship and the main engines
will be supplied by Caterpillar [CAT]. Switzerland-based ABB and Netherlands-based
May 8, 2019, at http://www.ervo-group.eu/np4/np4/%7B$clientServletPath%7D/?newsId=43&fileName=
Pr_sentation_Markterkundung_09.09.14_fin.pdf. The briefing is undated but includes a statement on one of its slides
that refers in the past tense to an event that took place in January 2016.
25 C5I stands for command, control, communications, computers, collaboration, and intelligence.

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Trident are supplying the Azipod propulsion system, Florida-based Jamestown Metal
Marine is supplying the joiner package, and Netherlands-based Bronswerk the heating,
ventilation and cooling system.26

VT Halter’s 22,900-ton design for the PSC is considerably larger than the Coast Guard’s current
polar icebreakers. As shown in tons Table A-1, the Coast Guard’s largest polar icebreaker, Healy,
is 420 feet long and has a full load displacement of 16,000 tons. VT Halter’s 460-foot design for
the PSC is 40 feet longer than Healy, and its 22,900-ton displacement is about 43% greater than
Healy’s.
The horsepower generated by the propulsion plant in VT Halter’s design—more than 45,200,
according to the earlier-quoted May 7, 2019 press release from VT Halter—is roughly onequarter less than the 60,000 shaft horsepower of the propulsion plant in the Coast Guard’s heavy
polar icebreaker, Polar Star. A shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, however, VT Halter’s design
includes a centerline shafted propeller flanked by two azimuthing (i.e., swiveling) podded
propulsors—an arrangement that, along with other modern icebreaker hull design features, is
expected to give VT Halter’s design a capability for breaking ice comparable to that of Polar
Star. A May 8, 2019, press report states the following:
“We picked the most modern icebreaker that was on the market, soon to be productionlevel design that roughly met the Coast Guard’s requirements, and we took it and modified
it,” Baczkowski said.
“It has a contoured shape. The shape of the hull does the icebreaking. Instead of being a
mass breaking ice, this actually slices the ice. The shape of the hull pushed the broken ice
aside, so it doesn’t interfere with your propulsion systems, with your instrumentation that’s
on the other side of the ship.”
The design of the cutter is optimized for seakeeping to support the long voyage from its
homeport in Washington state to as far away as the Antarctic, he said.
“It’s an optimum design between icebreaking and seakeeping.”
“With the propulsors, with one fixed and two steerable, we were able to optimize the
seakeeping capability so when you’re going on long transits from Washington to Antarctica
the crew is not beat to a pulp or heavily fatigued because of the stability characteristics in
open water.”27

Home Port
On June 17, 2019, the Coast Guard announced that it intends to homeport its PSCs at Seattle,
WA, where the Coast Guard’s current polar icebreakers are homeported.28

FY2021 Funding Request
The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2021 budget requests $555 million in procurement funding for
the PSC program. It also proposes a rescission of $70 million in FY2020 funding that Congress
had provided for the procurement of long lead time materials (LLTM) for a 12th National Security
Cutter (NSC), with the intent of reprogramming that funding to the PSC program. The Coast
Calvin Biesecker, “Long-Lead Funding In FY ‘20 For Second Polar Security Cutter Would Help With Planning,
Shipbuilder Says,” Defense Daily, May 9, 2019. Abbreviations for firm names in brackets as in original.
27 Sam LaGrone, “VT Halter Marine Details Coast Guard Icebreaker Bid,” USNI News, May 8, 2019.
28 See, for example, Ben Werner, “Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter Will Be Homeported in Seattle,” USNI News,
June 17, 2019; Navy Times Staff, “Coast Guard Picks Homeport for New Icebreaker Fleet,” Navy Times, June 17,
2019.
26

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Guard states that its proposed FY2021 budget, if approved by Congress, would fully fund the
second PSC.

Service Life Extension for Polar Star
The Coast Guard plans to extend the service life of Polar Star until the delivery of at least the
second PSC. In February 2020, for example, the Coast Guard testified that
The Coast Guard also understands that we must maintain our existing heavy and medium
icebreaking capability while proceeding with recapitalization. Construction on the first
PSC is planned to begin in 2021 with delivery planned for 2024; however, the contract
includes financial incentives for earlier delivery. Maintenance of POLAR STAR will be
critical to sustaining this capability until the new PSCs are delivered. Robust planning
efforts for a service life extension project on POLAR STAR are already underway and
initial work for this project will begin in 2020, with phased industrial work occurring
annually from 2021 through 2023. The end goal of this process will be to extend the
vessel’s service life until delivery of at least the second new PSC.29

The Coast Guard estimates the cost of Polar Star’s service life extension work at $75 million.
The work is being funded at a rate of $15 million per year; the $15 million requested in the
FY2021 budget is the third of five planned annual funding increments. This funding is included in
the vessels portion of the Coast Guard’s PC&I account, in a line item called “Polar Sustainment”
that is separate from the line item for the PSC program.

Issues for Congress
Potential Impact of COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Situation
One issue for Congress concerns the potential impact of the COVID-19 (coronavirus) situation on
the execution of U.S. military shipbuilding programs, including the PSC program. For additional
discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

FY2021 Funding
Another issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Coast Guard’s $555million FY2021 procurement funding request for the PSC program and the Coast Guard’s
proposal in its FY2021 budget submission for a rescission of $70 million in FY2020 funding
provided for the procurement of LLTM for a 12th NSC, with the intent of reprogramming that
funding to the PSC program. In considering this issue, Congress may consider, among other
things, whether the Coast Guard has accurately priced the work it is proposing to do in the PSC
program in FY2021, and whether a 12th NSC is to be procured. (The question of whether a 12th
NSC is to be procured is discussed further in the CRS report that tracks the Coast Guard’s
general-purpose cutter procurement programs.30)

Testimony of Admiral Charles W. Ray, Coast Guard Vice Commandant, on “Arctic Security Issues,” before the
House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation & Maritime Security, February 5, 2020, p. 9.
30 See CRS Report R42567, Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
29

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Contract with Options vs. Block Buy Contract
Another potential issue for Congress is whether to use a contract with options or a block buy
contract to acquire at least some of the PSCs. As noted earlier, the DD&C contract that the Coast
Guard awarded to VT Halter is a contract with options. Coast Guard and Navy officials, however,
have expressed openness to the idea of using a block buy contract to acquire at least some of the
ships (particularly the second and third PSCs), and requested information on the possibility of
using block buy contracting as part of the request for proposals (RFP) for the PSC program that
the Coast Guard released on March 2, 2018. Section 311 of the Frank LoBiondo Coast Guard
Authorization Act of 2018 (S. 140/P.L. 115-282 of December 4, 2018) provides permanent
authority for the Coast Guard to use block buy contracting with economic order quantity (EOQ)
purchases (i.e., up-front batch purchases) of components in its major acquisition programs. The
authority is now codified at 14 U.S.C. 1137.
Although a contract with options covers multiple years, it operates more like a form of annual
contracting, and it does not generate the kinds of savings that are possible with a block buy
contract. Compared to a contract with options, a block buy contract would reduce the
government’s flexibility regarding whether and when to acquire the second and third ships, and
what design to build them to,31 and in return reduce the combined acquisition cost of the ships
covered by the contract. The Navy has used block buy contracts to reduce procurement costs of
Virginia-class attack submarines and (in more recent years) Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) and
John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers.32 CRS estimates that compared to costs using a contract with
options, using a block buy contract that included economic order quantity (EOQ) purchases (i.e.,
up-front batch purchases) of materials and components for three heavy polar icebreakers could
reduce the combined acquisition cost of the three ships by upwards of 7%, which could equate to
a savings of upwards of $150 million.
A congressionally mandated July 2017 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and
Medicine (NASEM) report on acquisition and operation of polar icebreakers states the following
(emphasis as in original):
3. Recommendation: USCG should follow an acquisition strategy that includes block
buy contracting with a fixed price incentive fee contract and take other measures to
ensure best value for investment of public funds.
Icebreaker design and construction costs can be clearly defined, and a fixed price incentive
fee construction contract is the most reliable mechanism for controlling costs for a program
31

Stated more fully, from a congressional perspective, trade-offs in using block buy contracting include the following:
—reduced congressional control over year-to-year spending, and tying the hands of future Congresses;
—reduced flexibility for making changes in Coast Guard acquisition programs in response to unforeseen changes
in strategic or budgetary circumstances (which can cause any needed funding reductions to fall more heavily on
acquisition programs not covered by multiyear contracts);
—a potential need to shift funding from later fiscal years to earlier fiscal years to fund economic order quantity
(EOQ) purchases (i.e., up-front batch purchases) of components;
—the risk of having to make penalty payments to shipbuilders if multiyear contracts need to be terminated due to
unavailability of funds needed to the continue the contracts; and
—the risk that materials and components purchased for ships to be acquired in future years might go to waste if
those ships are not eventually acquired.
32 See CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in Defense Acquisition:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke; CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke; and CRS Report R43546, Navy John Lewis
(TAO-205) Class Oiler Shipbuilding Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

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of this complexity. This technique is widely used by the U.S. Navy. To help ensure best
long-term value, the criteria for evaluating shipyard proposals should incorporate explicitly
defined lifecycle cost metrics....
A block buy authority for this program will need to contain specific language for economic
order quantity purchases for materials, advanced design, and construction activities. A
block buy contracting program with economic order quantity purchases enables series
construction, motivates competitive bidding, and allows for volume purchase and for the
timely acquisition of material with long lead times. It would enable continuous production,
give the program the maximum benefit from the learning curve, and thus reduce labor hours
on subsequent vessels....
If advantage is taken of learning and quantity discounts available through the
recommended block buy contracting acquisition strategy, the average cost per heavy
icebreaker is approximately $791 million, on the basis of the acquisition of four ships. 33

Funding Coast Guard Polar Icebreakers through Navy’s
Shipbuilding Account
Another potential issue for Congress is whether to continue providing at least some of the
procurement funding for the PSC program through the Navy’s shipbuilding account, known
formally as the Shipbuilding and Conversion Navy (SCN) appropriation account. As noted
earlier, $300 million of the funding that the PSC program has received through FY2020 was
provided through the SCN account in FY2017 and FY2018 ($150 million each year). A May 2018
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report states that agreements between DHS, the Coast
Guard, and the Navy that were made following the establishment of the Coast Guard-Navy
integrated program office for the PSC program “state that the program’s contracting actions could
be funded by either USCG or Navy appropriations, and the source of the appropriations will
award the contract.”34
Although providing funding for Coast Guard ships through the SCN account creates some
complexity in tracking and executing funding for Coast Guard ship acquisition, and can raise a
question as to whether that funding would otherwise go toward the acquisition of Navy ships, it
has been used in the past for funding Coast Guard ships other than heavy polar icebreakers:


Healy was funded largely (about 89%) through the SCN account.35

33

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Division on Earth and Life Studies and Transportation
Research Board, Acquisition and Operation of Polar Icebreakers: Fulfilling the Nation’s Needs, Letter Report, with
cover letter dated July 11, 2017, pp. 14, 15.
34 Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security Acquisitions[:] Leveraging Programs’ Results Could Further
DHS’s Progress to Improve Portfolio Management, GAO-18-339SP, May 2018, p. 86.
35 The somewhat complicated funding history for the ship is as follows: The Coast Guard’s proposed FY1990 budget
requested $244 million for the acquisition of an icebreaker. The FY1990 DOD appropriations act (H.R. 3072/P.L. 101165 of November 21, 1989) provided $329 million for the ship in the SCN account. (See pages 77 and 78 of H.Rept.
101-345 of November 13, 1989.) This figure was then reduced by $4.2 million by a sequester carried out under the
Balanced Budget And Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act
(H.J.Res. 372/P.L. 99-177 of December 12, 1985). Another $50 million was rescinded by the Dire Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Assistance, Food Stamps, Unemployment Compensation Administration,
and Other Urgent Needs, and Transfers, and Reducing Funds Budgeted for Military Spending Act of 1990 (H.R.
4404/P.L. 101-302 of May 25, 1990). An additional $59 million for the ship was then appropriated in the FY1992 DOD
Appropriations Act (H.R. 2521/P.L. 102-172 of November 26, 1991). Also, an additional $40.4 million in procurement
funding for the ship was provided through a series of annual appropriations in the Coast Guard’s Acquisition,
Construction, and Improvements (AC&I) account (as it was known prior to FY2019) from FY1988 through FY2001.

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

Thirty-three of the Coast Guard’s 49 Island-class 110-foot patrol boats (i.e.,
about 67% of the boats) were procured under a Navy contract. The contract was
for the construction of 21 of the boats, and included FY1990 SCN funds and
prior year DOD nonexpiring funding. During the construction phase of the
contract, the Navy exercised options under the contract for the construction 12
additional boats using FY1990 SCN funding.36

Subsections (a), (b), and (c) of Section 122 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act
(H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-91 of December 12, 2017) state the following:
SEC. 122. Icebreaker vessel.
(a) Authority to procure one polar-class heavy icebreaker.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be procured for the Coast Guard one polarclass heavy icebreaker vessel.
(2) CONDITION FOR OUT-YEAR CONTRACT PAYMENTS.—A contract entered into
under paragraph (1) shall provide that any obligation of the United States to make a
payment under the contract for a fiscal year after fiscal year 2018 is subject to the
availability of appropriations or funds for that purpose for such later fiscal year.
(b) Limitation on availability of funds for procurement of icebreaker vessels.—None of the
funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for the
Department of Defense for any fiscal year that are unobligated as of the date of the
enactment of this Act may be obligated or expended for the procurement of an icebreaker
vessel other than the one polar-class heavy icebreaker vessel authorized to be procured
under subsection (a)(1).
(c) Contracting authority.—
(1) COAST GUARD.—If funds are appropriated to the department in which the Coast
Guard is operating to carry out subsection (a)(1), the head of contracting activity for the
Coast Guard shall be responsible for contracting actions carried out using such funds.
(2) NAVY.—If funds are appropriated to the Department of Defense to carry out
subsection (a)(1), the head of contracting activity for the Navy, Naval Sea Systems
Command shall be responsible for contracting actions carried out using such funds.
(3) INTERAGENCY ACQUISITION.—Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the head
of contracting activity for the Coast Guard or head of contracting activity for the Navy,
Naval Sea Systems Command (as the case may be) may authorize interagency acquisitions
that are within the authority of such head of contracting activity. 37

Regarding Section 122, the conference report (H.Rept. 115-404 of November 9, 2017) on H.R.
2810/P.L. 115-91 states the following:
Icebreaker vessel (sec. 122)
The House bill contained provisions (sec. 122, 123, and 1012) that would authorize the
Secretary of the Navy to act as a general agent for the Secretary of the Department in which
the Coast Guard is operating and enter into a contract for icebreaker vessels; prohibit funds
The resulting net funding for the ship was thus $374.2 million, of which $333.8 million, or 89.2%, was DOD funding,
and $40.4 million, or 10.8%, was Coast Guard procurement funding. (Source: Undated Coast Guard information paper
provided to CRS by Coast Guard legislative liaison office, March 3, 2016.)
36 Source: Navy information paper dated August 15, 2017, provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on
August 23, 2017.
37 Section 122 also includes a subsection (d) that requires a GAO report assessing the cost of, and schedule for, the
procurement of new icebreakers.

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for the Department of Defense from being used for the procurement of an icebreaker vessel;
and amend section 2218 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize funds associated with
the National Defense Sealift Fund for the construction of icebreaker vessels.
The Senate amendment contained a similar provision (sec. 1048).
The Senate recedes with an amendment that would authorize one polar-class heavy
icebreaker vessel, prohibit funds for the Department of Defense from being used for the
procurement of an icebreaker vessel other than this one polar-class heavy icebreaker vessel,
clarify contracting authorities, and require a Comptroller General report.
The conferees recognize the national importance of recapitalizing the U.S. icebreaker fleet
and the extraordinary circumstances that necessitated use of Department of Defense
funding to procure the first polar-class heavy icebreaker, as partially provided in the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2017. Accordingly, the
conferees support the authorization of this icebreaker in this Act.
The conferees note the Undersecretary of Management in the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) serves as the Acquisition Decision Authority for the Polar Icebreaker
Program and that this program is governed in accordance with DHS Acquisition
Management Directive 102–01 and Instruction 102–01–001.
The conferees believe maintaining clear lines of authority, responsibility, accountability,
and resources with the Secretary and Acquisition Decision Authority of the department in
which the U.S. Coast Guard is operating are essential to delivering icebreakers on cost and
schedule.
Accordingly, the conferees believe the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
and the Undersecretary of Management in the DHS should be the officials provided with
authorities and resources related to the Polar Icebreaker Program.
Therefore, the conferees expect subsequent icebreakers to be authorized by the
congressional committees with jurisdiction over the Coast Guard and funded using Coast
Guard appropriations. (Pages 765-766)

Technical, Schedule, and Cost Risk for PSC Program
Another potential issue for Congress concerns technical, schedule, and cost risk in the PSC
program.

Parent Design and PSC Design
One potential aspect of the issue of technical, schedule, and cost risk in the PSC program relates
to the parent design for the PSC design. As mentioned earlier, a key aim in using the parent
design approach is to reduce cost, schedule, and technical risk in the PSC program. As also
mentioned earlier, VT Halter states that its winning design for the PSC “is an evolution from the
mature ‘Polar Stern II’ [German icebreaker] currently in design and construction; the team has
worked rigorously to demonstrate its maturity and reliability.” As also mentioned earlier, VT
Halter and ship designer Technology Associates, Inc. reportedly made “a lot of modifications”
and went through six design spirals to refine the PSC’s design. Potential oversight questions for
Congress include the following:




To what degree was Polarstern II’s design developed at the time it was used as
the parent design for developing the PSC design? How much of Polarstern II’s
detail design and construction plan was completed at that time?
How closely related is the PSC’s design to Polarstern II’s design? How many
changes were made to Polarstern II’s design to develop the PSC design? What

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were these changes, and what technical, schedule, and cost risks, if any, might
arise from them?

February 2020 GAO Testimony
February 2020 GAO testimony on Coast Guard Arctic capabilities states:
The Coast Guard Has Taken Steps to Address Technology, Design, Cost, and
Schedule Risks for the Polar Security Cutters
In September 2018, we found that the Coast Guard did not have a sound business case
when it established the acquisition baselines for the Polar Security Cutter program in March
2018 due to risks in four key areas: technology, design, cost, and schedule. Our prior work
has found that successful acquisition programs start with solid, executable business cases
before setting program baselines and committing resources. A sound business case requires
balance between the concept selected to satisfy operator requirements and the resources—
design knowledge, technologies, funding, and time—needed to transform the concept into
a product, which in this case is a ship with polar icebreaking capabilities. Without a sound
business case, acquisition programs are at risk of breaching the cost, schedule, and
performance baselines set when the program was initiated—in other words, experiencing
cost growth, schedule delays, and reduced capabilities.
To address the key risks we identified and help establish a sound business case for the Polar
Security Cutter program, we made six recommendations to DHS, Coast Guard, and the
Navy in our September 2018 report. The agencies concurred with all six recommendations
and have taken steps to address some of the risks, as noted below.
• Technology. The Coast Guard planned to use proven technologies for the program, but
did not conduct a technology readiness assessment to determine the maturity of key
technologies prior to setting baselines. As a result, the Coast Guard did not have full insight
into whether these technologies were mature and was potentially underrepresenting the
technical risk of the program. We recommended that the program conduct a technology
readiness assessment, which DHS completed in June 2019. DHS determined that two of
the three key technologies were mature and the remaining technology was approaching
maturity. The Coast Guard now has plans in place to use testing results to increase the
maturity and reduce risks for the remaining technology—the hull form.
• Design. The Coast Guard set program baselines before conducting a preliminary design
review. This review is a systems engineering event intended to verify that the contractor’s
design meets the requirement of the ship specifications and is producible. By not
conducting this review before establishing program baselines, the program is at risk of
having an unstable design, thereby increasing the program’s cost and schedule risks. We
recommended that the program update its baselines prior to authorizing lead ship
construction and after completion of the preliminary design review. DHS and the Coast
Guard agreed and plan to take these steps by fiscal year 2022.
• Cost. The cost estimate that informed the program’s $9.8 billion cost baseline—which
includes life cycle costs for the acquisition, [and 30 years of] operations, and maintenance
of three polar icebreakers—substantially met our best practices for being comprehensive,
well-documented, and accurate. But the estimate only partially met best practices for being
credible. The cost estimate did not quantify the range of possible costs over the entire life
of the program, such as the period of operations and support. As a result, the cost estimate
was not fully reliable and may underestimate the total funding needed for the program. We
recommended that the program update its cost estimate to include risk and uncertainty
analysis on all phases of the program life cycle, among other things. Subsequently, in
December 2019, we found that while the Coast Guard updated the cost estimate in June
2019 to inform the budget process, the estimate did not reflect cost changes resulting from
the contract award two months prior. Coast Guard officials acknowledged these cost risks

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and plan to address them as part of the next update to the program’s cost estimate. Coast
Guard officials told us that they plan to update the cost estimate by the end of February
2020.
• Schedule. The Coast Guard’s initial planned delivery dates of 2023, 2025, and 2026 for
the three ships were not informed by a realistic assessment of shipbuilding activities.
Rather, these dates were primarily driven by the potential gap in icebreaking capabilities
once the Coast Guard’s only operating heavy polar icebreaker—the Polar Star—reaches
the end of its service life. In addition, our analysis of selected lead ships for other Coast
Guard and Navy shipbuilding programs found the icebreaker program’s estimated
construction time of 3 years to be optimistic. An unrealistic schedule puts the Coast Guard
at risk of not delivering the icebreakers when promised. As a result, the potential gap in
icebreaking capabilities could widen. We recommended that the program develop a
realistic schedule, including delivery dates, and determine schedule risks during the
construction phase of the program. In response, the Coast Guard is now tracking additional
schedule risks for the program and is in the process of updating its program schedule.
Further, in December 2019, we found that the contract delivery date for the lead ship, May
2024, is 2 months after the delivery date in the program’s schedule baseline. Coast Guard
officials said they plan to address this risk when they update the program’s schedule by the
end of March 2020.38

Common Design for Heavy and Medium Polar Icebreakers
Another potential issue for Congress is whether to procure the Coast Guard’s envisioned fleet of
PSCs (i.e., heavy polar icebreakers) and medium polar icebreakers to a common basic design. A
congressionally mandated July 2017 report from the National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) on the acquisition and operation of polar icebreakers
concluded that notional operational requirements for new medium polar icebreakers would result
in ships that would not be too different in size from new heavy polar icebreakers. (As shown in
Table A-1, the Coast Guard’s current medium polar icebreaker, Healy, is actually somewhat
larger than the Coast Guard’s heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Star.) Given what it concluded as the
probable similarity in size between future U.S. heavy and medium polar icebreakers, the NASEM
report recommended building a single medium polar icebreaker to the same common design as
three new heavy polar icebreakers. This approach, the report concluded, would reduce the cost of
the medium icebreaker by avoiding the cost of developing a new design and by making the
medium polar icebreaker the fourth ship on an existing production learning curve rather than the
first ship on a new production learning curve. The NASEM report stated the following (emphasis
as in original):
2. Recommendation: The United States Congress should fund the construction of four
polar icebreakers of common design that would be owned and operated by the United
States Coast Guard (USCG).
The current Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Mission Need Statement...
contemplates a combination of medium and heavy icebreakers. The committee’s
recommendation is for a single class of polar icebreaker with heavy icebreaking capability.
Proceeding with a single class means that only one design will be needed, which will
provide cost savings. The committee has found that the fourth heavy icebreaker could be
built for a lower cost than the lead ship of a medium icebreaker class....

38

Government Accountability Office, Arctic Capabilities[:] Coast Guard Is Taking Steps to Address Key Challenges,
but Additional Work Remains, GAO-20-347T, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime
Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, Statement of Marie A. Mak, Director,
Contracting and National Security Acquisitions, February 5, 2020, pp. 7-9.

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The DHS Mission Need Statement contemplated a total fleet of “potentially” up to six ships
of two classes—three heavy and three medium icebreakers. Details appear in the High
Latitude Mission Analysis Report. The Mission Need Statement indicated that to fulfill its
statutory missions, USCG required three heavy and three medium icebreakers; each vessel
would have a single crew and would homeport in Seattle. The committee’s analysis
indicated that four heavy icebreakers will meet the statutory mission needs gap identified
by DHS for the lowest cost....
4. Finding: In developing its independent concept designs and cost estimates, the
committee determined that the costs estimated by USCG for the heavy icebreaker are
reasonable. However, the committee believes that the costs of medium icebreakers
identified in the High Latitude Mission Analysis Report are significantly
underestimated....
Although USCG has not yet developed the operational requirements document for a
medium polar icebreaker, the committee was able to apply the known principal
characteristics of the USCG Cutter Healy to estimate the scope of work and cost of a similar
medium icebreaker. The committee estimates that a first-of-class medium icebreaker will
cost approximately $786 million. The fourth ship of the heavy icebreaker series is
estimated to cost $692 million. Designing a medium-class polar icebreaker in a second
shipyard would incur the estimated engineering, design, and planning costs of $126 million
and would forgo learning from the first three ships; the learning curve would be restarted
with the first medium design. Costs of building the fourth heavy icebreaker would be less
than the costs of designing and building a first-of-class medium icebreaker....
6. Recommendation: USCG should ensure that the common polar icebreaker design
is science-ready and that one of the ships has full science capability.
All four proposed ships would be designed as “science-ready,” which will be more costeffective when one of the four ships—most likely the fourth—is made fully science
capable. Including science readiness in the common polar icebreaker design is the most
cost-effective way of fulfilling both the USCG’s polar missions and the nation’s scientific
research polar icebreaker needs.... The incremental costs of a science-ready design for each
of the four ships ($10 million to $20 million per ship) and of full science capability for one
of the ships at the initial build (an additional $20 million to $30 million) are less than the
independent design and build cost of a dedicated research medium icebreaker.... In
briefings at its first meeting, the committee learned that the National Science Foundation
and other agencies do not have budgets to support full-time heavy icebreaker access or the
incremental cost of design, even though their science programs may require this capability.
Given the small incremental cost, the committee believes that the science capability cited
above should be included in the acquisition costs.
Science-ready design includes critical elements that cannot be retrofitted cost-effectively
into an existing ship and that should be incorporated in the initial design and build. Among
these elements are structural supports, appropriate interior and exterior spaces, flexible
accommodation spaces that can embark up to 50 science personnel, a hull design that
accommodates multiple transducers and minimizes bubble sweep while optimizing
icebreaking capability, machinery arrangements and noise dampening to mitigate
interference with sonar transducers, and weight and stability latitudes to allow installation
of scientific equipment. Such a design will enable any of the ships to be retrofitted for full
science capability in the future, if necessary....
Within the time frame of the recommended build sequence, the United States will require
a science-capable polar icebreaker to replace the science capabilities of the Healy upon her
retirement. To fulfill this need, one of the heavy polar icebreakers would be procured at the
initial build with full science capability; the ability to fulfill other USCG missions would
be retained. The ship would be outfitted with oceanographic overboarding equipment and
instrumentation and facilities comparable with those of modern oceanographic research

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vessels. Some basic scientific capability, such as hydrographic mapping sonar, should be
acquired at the time of the build of each ship so that environmental data that are essential
in fulfilling USCG polar missions can be collected.39

If policymakers decide to procure a second new medium polar icebreaker or a third new medium
polar icebreaker, the same general approach recommended by the NASEM report could be
followed—a second medium polar icebreaker and third medium polar icebreaker could be built to
the same common design used for the three new heavy polar icebreakers and the first new
medium polar icebreaker.
An April 12, 2018, press report states the following:
As the Coast Guard prepares to review industry bids for a new heavy polar icebreaker, the
service is keeping its options open for the right number and mix of polar icebreakers it will
need in the future, Adm. Paul Zukunft, the [then-]commandant of the Coast Guard, said on
Wednesday [April 11].
The Coast Guard’s program of record is for three heavy and three medium polar icebreakers
but Zukunft said the “jury is still out” whether that will remain so. Right now, the service
is aiming toward building three new heavy icebreakers, but it might make sense just to
keep building these ships, he told reporters at a Defense Writers Group breakfast in
Washington, D.C.
Zukunft said that “when you start looking at the business case after you build three, and
then you need to look at what is the economy of scale when you start building heavy
icebreakers, and would it be less expensive to continue to build heavies and not mediums.”
He added that the heavy icebreakers provide more capability, and if the price is
“affordable” and in “the same range” as building medium icebreakers, then “maybe you
end up with one class of heavy icebreakers.”
Building only one class of ships has a number of advantages in terms of maintenance, crew
familiarity, configuration management, and more, he said. A decision on what the future
icebreaker fleet will consist of is “still probably several years out .... but that’s one option
that we want to keep open going forward,” Zukunft said. 40

Legislative Activity for FY2021
Summary of Appropriation Action on FY2021 Funding Request
The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2021 budget requests $555 million in procurement funding for
the PSC program. It also proposes a rescission of $70 million in FY2020 funding that Congress
had provided for the procurement of long lead time materials (LLTM) for a 12th National Security
Cutter (NSC), with the intent of reprogramming that funding to the PSC program. Table 2
summarizes congressional appropriation action on the program’s FY2021 funding request.

39

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Division on Earth and Life Studies and Transportation
Research Board, Acquisition and Operation of Polar Icebreakers: Fulfilling the Nation’s Needs, Letter Report, with
cover letter dated July 11, 2017, pp. 2, 4-6.
40 Calvin Biesecker, “Coast Guard Leaving Options Open For Future Polar Icebreaker Fleet Type,” Defense Daily,
April 12, 2018. Ellipse as in original.

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Table 2. Summary of Congressional Appropriations Action on
FY2021 Procurement Funding Request
(millions of dollars)
Request
Procurement funding

HAC

SAC

Conf.

555

Source: Table prepared by CRS, based on Coast Guard’s FY2021 budget submission, HAC and SAC committee
reports, and conference report on FY2021 DHS Appropriations Act. HAC is House Appropriations Committee;
SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee; Conf. is conference agreement.

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Appendix A. Current U.S. Polar Icebreakers and
Polar Research Ships
This appendix provides background information on current U.S. polar icebreakers and polar
research ships.

Three Coast Guard Polar Icebreakers
Two Heavy Polar Icebreakers—Polar Star and Polar Sea
Polar Star (WAGB-10) and Polar Sea (WAGB-11),41 sister ships built to the same general design
(Figure A-1 and Figure A-2), were acquired in the early 1970s as replacements for earlier U.S.
icebreakers. They were designed for 30-year service lives, and were built by Lockheed
Shipbuilding of Seattle, WA, a division of Lockheed that also built ships for the U.S. Navy, but
which exited the shipbuilding business in the late 1980s.
Figure A-1. Polar Star and Polar Sea
(Side by side in McMurdo Sound, Antarctica)

Source: Coast Guard photograph that was accessed on April 21, 2011, at http://www.uscg.mil/pacarea/
cgcpolarsea/history.asp (link no longer active). The photograph accompanies Kyung M. Song, “Senate Passes
Cantwell Measure to Postpone Scrapping of Polar Sea Icebreaker,” Seattle Times, September 22, 2012, posted at
http://blogs.seattletimes.com/politicsnorthwest/2012/09/22/senate-passes-cantwell-measure-to-postponescrapping-of-polar-sea-icebreaker/.
41

The designation WAGB means Coast Guard icebreaker. More specifically, W means Coast Guard ship, A means
auxiliary, G means miscellaneous purpose, and B means icebreaker.

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Figure A-2. Polar Sea

Source: Coast Guard photograph that was accessed April 21, 2011, at http://www.uscg.mil/pacarea/cgcpolarsea/
img/PSEApics/FullShip2.jpg (link no longer active). The photograph accompanies Associated Press, “Reprieve for
Seattle-Based Icebreaker Polar Sea,” KOMO News, June 15, 2012, posted at https://komonews.com/news/local/
reprieve-for-seattle-based-icebreaker-polar-sea.

The ships are 399 feet long and displace about 13,200 tons.42 They are among the world’s most
powerful nonnuclear-powered icebreakers, with a capability to break through ice up to 6 feet
thick at a speed of 3 knots. Because of their icebreaking capability, they are considered (in U.S.
parlance) heavy polar icebreakers. In addition to a crew of 134, each ship can embark a scientific
research staff of 32 people.
Polar Star was commissioned into service on January 19, 1976, and consequently is now more
than 10 years beyond its originally intended 30-year service life. Due to worn-out electric motors
and other problems, the Coast Guard placed the ship in caretaker status on July 1, 2006.43
Congress in FY2009 and FY2010 provided funding to repair Polar Star and return it to service
for 7 to 10 years; the repair work, which reportedly cost about $57 million, was completed, and
the ship was reactivated on December 14, 2012.44
Polar Sea was commissioned into service on February 23, 1978, and consequently is also more
than 10 years beyond its originally intended 30-year service life. In 2006, the Coast Guard
completed a rehabilitation project that extended the ship’s expected service life to 2014. On June
25, 2010, however, the Coast Guard announced that Polar Sea had suffered an engine casualty,
and the ship was unavailable for operation after that.45 The Coast Guard placed Polar Sea in
By comparison, the Coast Guard’s new National Security Cutters—its new high-endurance cutters—are about 418
feet long and displace roughly 4,000 tons.
43 Source for July 1, 2006, date: U.S. Coast Guard email to CRS on February 22, 2008. The Coast Guard’s official term
for caretaker status is “In Commission, Special.”
44 See, for example, Kyung M. Song, “Icebreaker Polar Star Gets $57 Million Overhaul,” Seattle Times, December 14,
2012.
45 “Icebreaker POLAR SEA Sidelined By Engine Troubles,” Coast Guard Compass (Official Blog of the U.S. Coast
Guard), June 25, 2010. See also “USCG Cancels Polar Icebreaker’s Fall Deployment,” DefenseNews.com, June 25,
2010; Andrew C. Revkin, “America’s Heavy Icebreakers Are Both Broken Down,” Dot Earth (New York Times blog),
June 25, 2010.
42

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commissioned, inactive status on October 14, 2011. The Coast Guard transferred certain major
equipment from Polar Sea to Polar Star to facilitate Polar Star’s return to service.46
Although the Coast Guard in recent years has invested millions of dollars to overhaul, repair, and
extend the service life of Polar Star, the ship’s material condition, as a result of its advancing age,
has nevertheless become increasingly fragile, if not precarious. During its annual deployments to
McMurdo Station in Antarctica, shipboard equipment frequently breaks, and shipboard fires
sometimes occur.47 Replacements for many of the ship’s components are no longer commercially
available. To help keep Polar Star operational, the Coast Guard continues to use Polar Sea as a
source of replacement parts.

One Medium Polar Icebreaker—Healy
Healy (WAGB-20) (Figure A-3) was funded in the early 1990s as a complement to Polar Star
and Polar Sea, and was commissioned into service on August 21, 2000.
Figure A-3. Healy

Source: Coast Guard photograph accessed August 12, 2019, at https://www.history.uscg.mil/US-Coast-GuardPhoto-Gallery/igphoto/2002136680/.

46

Source: October 17, 2011, email to CRS from Coast Guard Congressional Affairs office. Section 222 of the Coast
Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2012 (H.R. 2838/P.L. 112-213 of December 20, 2012) prohibited the Coast
Guard from removing any part of Polar Sea and from transferring, relinquishing ownership of, dismantling, or
recycling the ship until it submitted a business case analysis of the options for and costs of reactivating the ship and
extending its service life to at least September 30, 2022, so as to maintain U.S. polar icebreaking capabilities and fulfill
the Coast Guard’s high latitude mission needs, as identified in the Coast Guard’s July 2010 High Latitude Study. The
business case analysis was submitted to Congress with a cover date of November 7, 2013. For more on the High
Latitude Study, see Appendix B.
47 See, for example, Richard Read, “Meet the Neglected 43-Year-Old Stepchild of the U.S. Military-Industrial
Complex,” Los Angeles Times, August 2, 2019; Melody Schreiber, “The Only Working US Heavy Icebreaker Catches
Fire Returning from Antarctica,” Arctic Today, March 2, 2019; Calvin Biesecker, “Fire Breaks Out On Coast Guard’s
Aging, and Only, Heavy Icebreaker,” Defense Daily, March 1, 2019.

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The ship was built by Avondale Industries, a shipyard located near New Orleans, LA, that built
numerous Coast Guard and Navy ships, and which eventually became part of Huntington Ingalls
Industries (HII). (HII subsequently wound down shipbuilding activities at Avondale, and the
facility is no longer building ships.)
Although it is referred to (in U.S. parlance) as a medium polar icebreaker, Healy is actually larger
than Polar Star and Polar Sea—it is 420 feet long and displaces about 16,000 tons. Compared to
Polar Star and Polar Sea, Healy has less icebreaking capability (which is why it is referred to as
a medium polar icebreaker rather than a heavy polar icebreaker), but more capability for
supporting scientific research. The ship can break through ice up to 4½ feet thick at a speed of 3
knots, and embark a scientific research staff of 35 (with room for another 15 surge personnel and
2 visitors). The ship is used primarily for supporting scientific research and conducting other
operations in the Arctic.

Three National Science Foundation (NSF) Polar Research Ships
Nathaniel B. Palmer
Nathaniel B. Palmer (Figure A-4) was built for the NSF in 1992 by North American
Shipbuilding, of Larose, LA.
Figure A-4. Nathaniel B. Palmer

Source: Photograph accompanying Peter Rejcek, “System Study, LARISSA Takes Unique Approach for Research
on Ice Shelf Ecosystem,” Antarctic Sun (Untied States Antarctic Program), September 18, 2009. A caption to the
photograph states “Photo Courtesy: Adam Jenkins.”

Called Palmer for short, it is operated for NSF by Edison Chouest Offshore (ECO) of Galliano,
LA, a firm that owns and operates research ships and offshore deepwater service ships.48 Palmer
is 308 feet long and has a displacement of about 6,500 tons. It has a crew of 22 and can embark a

48

For more on ECO, see the firm’s website at http://www.chouest.com/.

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scientific staff of 27 to 37.49 It was purpose-built as a single-mission ship for conducting and
supporting scientific research in the Antarctic. It is capable of breaking ice up to 3 feet thick at
speeds of 3 knots, which is sufficient for breaking through the ice conditions found in the vicinity
of the Antarctic Peninsula, so as to resupply Palmer Station, a U.S. research station on the
peninsula. The ship might be considered less an icebreaker than an oceanographic research ship
with enough icebreaking capability for the Antarctic Peninsula. Palmer’s icebreaking capability is
not considered sufficient to perform the McMurdo resupply mission.

Laurence M. Gould
Like Palmer, the polar research and supply ship Laurence M. Gould (Figure A-5) was built for
NSF by North American Shipping. It was completed in 1997 and is operated for NSF on a longterm charter from ECO. It is 230 feet long and has a displacement of about 3,800 tons. It has a
crew of 16 and can embark a scientific staff of 26 to 28 (with a capacity for 9 more in a berthing
van). It can break ice up to 1 foot thick with continuous forward motion. Like Palmer, it was built
to support NSF operations in the Antarctic, particularly operations at Palmer Station on the
Antarctic Peninsula.
Figure A-5. Laurence M. Gould

Source: Photograph accompanying Alchetron, “RV Laurence M. Gould,” updated August 25, 2018, accessed
August 7, 2019, at https://alchetron.com/RV-Laurence-M.-Gould#-.

49

Sources vary on the exact number of scientific staff that can be embarked on the ship. For some basic information on
the ship, see http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/support/nathpalm.jsp;
http://www.usap.gov/vesselScienceAndOperations/documents/prvnews_june03.pdfprvnews_june03.pdf;
http://nsf.gov/od/opp/antarct/treaty/pdf/plans0607/15plan07.pdf;
http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/1996/nsf9693/fls.htm; and
http://www.hazegray.org/worldnav/usa/nsf.htm.

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Sikuliaq
Sikuliaq (see-KOO-lee-auk; Figure A-6), which is used for scientific research in polar areas, was
built by Marinette Marine of Marinette, WI, and entered service in 2015. It is operated for NSF
by the College of Fisheries and Ocean Sciences at the University of Alaska Fairbanks as part of
the U.S. academic research fleet through the University National Oceanographic Laboratory
System (UNOLS). Sikuliaq is 261 feet long and has a displacement of about 3,600 tons. It has a
crew of 22 and can embark an additional 26 scientists and students. The ship can break ice 2½ or
3 feet thick at speeds of 2 knots. The ship is considered less an icebreaker than an ice-capable
research ship.
Figure A-6. Sikuliaq

Source: Photograph accompanying Lauren Frisch, “UAF Joins International Consortium of Icebreaker
Operators,” UAF [University of Alaska Fairbanks] News and Information, February 6, 2018. A caption to the
photograph states in part: “Photo by Mark Teckenbrock. The research vessel Sikuliaq navigates through Arctic
ice in summer 2016.”

Summary
Table A-1 summarizes the above six ships. In addition to the ships shown in Table A-1, another
U.S.-registered polar ship with icebreaking capability—the Arctic oil-exploration support ship
Aiviq—was used by Royal Dutch Shell oil company to support an oil exploration and drilling
effort (now ended) in Arctic waters off Alaska. The ship, which completed construction in 2012,
is owned by ECO and chartered by Royal Dutch Shell. It was used primarily for towing and
laying anchors for drilling rigs, but is also equipped for responding to oil spills.

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Table A-1. Coast Guard and NSF Polar Ships
Coast Guard

NSF

Polar Star

Polar Sea

Healy

Palmer

Laurence
M. Gould

Sikuliaq

Currently operational?

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Entered service

1976

1978

2000

1992

1997

2015

Length (feet)

399

399

420

308

230

261

Displacement (tons)

13,200

13,200

16,000

6,500

3,780

3,665

Icebreaking capability
(ice thickness in feet) at
3 knots or other speed

6 feet

6 feet

4.5 feet

3 feet

1 foot at
continuous
forward
motion

2.5 or 3
feet at 2
knots

Icebreaking capability
using back and ram (ice
thickness in feet)

21 feet

21 feet

8 feet

n/a

n/a

n/a

Operating temperature

-60o Fahrenheit

-60o
Fahrenheit

-50o
Fahrenheit

n/a

n/a

n/a

Crew (when operational)

155a

155a

85b

22

16

22

Additional scientific staff

32

32

35c

27-37

26 to 28d

26

Sources: Prepared by CRS using data from U.S. Coast Guard, National Research Council, National Science
Foundation, DHS Office of Inspector General, and (for Palmer) additional online reference sources. n/a is not
available.
a. Includes 24 officers, 20 chief petty officers, 102 enlisted, and 9 in the aviation detachment.
b. Includes 19 officers, 12 chief petty officers, and 54 enlisted.
c. In addition to 85 crew members 85 and 35 scientists, the ship can accommodate another 15 surge
personnel and 2 visitors.
d. Plus 9 more in a berthing van.

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Appendix B. Required Numbers of U.S. Polar
Icebreakers
This appendix provides additional background information on required numbers of U.S. polar
icebreakers.

June 9, 2020, Presidential Memorandum
On June 9, 2020, President Trump issued a memorandum, “Memorandum on Safeguarding U.S.
National Interests in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions,” which states:
Memorandum for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
Commerce, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, [and] the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Subject: Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions
To help protect our national interests in the Arctic and Antarctic regions, and to retain a
strong Arctic security presence alongside our allies and partners, the United States requires
a ready, capable, and available fleet of polar security icebreakers that is operationally tested
and fully deployable by Fiscal Year 2029. Accordingly, by the authority vested in me as
President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby direct
the following:
Section 1. Fleet Acquisition Program. The United States will develop and execute a polar
security icebreaking fleet acquisition program that supports our national interests in the
Arctic and Antarctic regions.
(a) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), shall lead a review of requirements for a polar security
icebreaking fleet acquisition program to acquire and employ a suitable fleet of polar
security icebreakers, and associated assets and resources, capable of ensuring a persistent
United States presence in the Arctic and Antarctic regions in support of national interests
and in furtherance of the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, as
appropriate. Separately, the review shall include the ability to provide a persistent United
States presence in the Antarctic region, as appropriate, in accordance with the Antarctic
Treaty System. The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of OMB, in
executing this direction, shall ensure that the United States Coast Guard’s (USCG)
Offshore Patrol Cutter acquisition program is not adversely impacted.
(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Commandant of the Coast
Guard, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Secretary of the
Navy, and the Secretary of Energy, as appropriate, shall conduct a study of the comparative
operational and fiscal benefits and risks of a polar security icebreaking fleet mix that
consists of at least three heavy polar-class security cutters (PSC) that are appropriately
outfitted to meet the objectives of this memorandum. This study shall be submitted to the
President, through the Director of OMB and the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, within 60 days from the date of this memorandum and at a minimum shall
include:
(i) Use cases in the Arctic that span the full range of national and economic security
missions (including the facilitation of resource exploration and exploitation and undersea
cable laying and maintenance) that may be executed by a class of medium PSCs, as well
as analysis of how these use cases differ with respect to the anticipated use of heavy PSCs

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for these same activities. These use cases shall identify the optimal number and type of
polar security icebreakers for ensuring a persistent presence in both the Arctic and, as
appropriate, the Antarctic regions;
(ii) An assessment of expanded operational capabilities, with estimated associated costs,
for both heavy and medium PSCs not yet contracted for, specifically including the
maximum use of any such PSC with respect to its ability to support national security
objectives through the use of the following: unmanned aviation, surface, and undersea
systems; space systems; sensors and other systems to achieve and maintain maritime
domain awareness; command and control systems; secure communications and data
transfer systems; and intelligence-collection systems. This assessment shall also evaluate
defensive armament adequate to defend against threats by near-peer competitors and the
potential for nuclear-powered propulsion;
(iii) Based on the determined fleet size and composition, an identification and assessment
of at least two optimal United States basing locations and at least two international basing
locations. The basing location assessment shall include the costs, benefits, risks, and
challenges related to infrastructure, crewing, and logistics and maintenance support for
PSCs at these locations. In addition, this assessment shall account for potential burdensharing opportunities for basing with the Department of Defense and allies and partners, as
appropriate; and
(iv) In anticipation of the USCGC POLAR STAR’s operational degradation from Fiscal
Years 2022-2029, an analysis to identify executable options, with associated costs, to
bridge the gap of available vessels as early as Fiscal Year 2022 until the new PSCs required
to meet the objectives of this memorandum are operational, including identifying
executable, priced leasing options, both foreign and domestic. This analysis shall
specifically include operational risk associated with using a leased vessel as compared to a
purchased vessel to conduct specified missions set forth in this memorandum.
(c) In the interest of securing a fully capable polar security icebreaking fleet that is capable
of providing a persistent presence in the Arctic and Antarctic regions at the lowest possible
cost, the Secretary of State shall coordinate with the Secretary of Homeland Security in
identifying viable polar security icebreaker leasing options, provided by partner nations, as
a near- to mid-term (Fiscal Years 2022-2029) bridging strategy to mitigate future
operational degradation of the USCGC POLAR STAR. Leasing options shall contemplate
capabilities that allow for access to the Arctic and Antarctic regions to, as appropriate,
conduct national and economic security missions, in addition to marine scientific research
in the Arctic, and conduct research in Antarctica in accordance with the Antarctic Treaty
System. Further, and in advance of any bid solicitation for future polar security icebreaker
acquisitions, the Secretary of State shall coordinate with the Secretary of Homeland
Security to identify partner nations with proven foreign shipbuilding capability and
expertise in icebreaker construction.
(d) The Secretary of Defense shall coordinate with the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Homeland Security to continue to provide technical and programmatic support to the
USCG integrated program office for the acquisition, outfitting, and operations of all classes
of PSCs.
Sec. 2. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair
or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof;
or
(ii) the functions of the Director of OMB relating to budgetary, administrative, or
legislative proposals.

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(b) This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to
the availability of appropriations.
(c) This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United
States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other
person.50

June 2013 DHS Polar Icebreaker Mission Need Statement
DHS in June 2013 approved a Mission Need Statement (MNS) for the polar icebreaker
recapitalization project. The MNS states the following (emphasis added):
This Mission Need Statement (MNS) establishes the need for polar icebreaker capabilities
provided by the Coast Guard, to ensure that it can meet current and future mission
requirements in the polar regions....
Current requirements and future projections based upon cutter demand modeling, as
detailed in the HLMAR [High Latitude Mission Analysis Report], indicate the Coast
Guard will need to expand its icebreaking capacity, potentially requiring a fleet of up
to six icebreakers (3 heavy and 3 medium) to adequately meet mission demands in the
high latitudes.... The analysis took into account both the Coast Guard statutory mission
requirements and additional requirements for year-round presence in both polar regions
detailed in the Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2010.... The analysis also evaluated
employing single and multi-crewing concepts.... Strategic home porting analysis based
upon existing infrastructure and distance to operational areas provided the final input to
determine icebreaker capacity demand. 51

While the MNS can be viewed as an authoritative U.S. government statement regarding required
numbers of U.S. polar icebreakers, it can be noted that the key sentence in the above-quoted
passage from the MNS (i.e., the sentence in bold) includes the terms “potentially” and “up to.”
These terms, which are often overlooked in discussions of required numbers of U.S. polar
icebreakers, make the key sentence less ironclad as a requirements statement than it would have
been if the terms had not been included, and could be interpreted as an acknowledgment that the
requirement might amount to something less than three heavy and three medium polar
icebreakers.
It can also be noted, as stated in the above-quoted passage from the MNS, that the MNS was
informed by the High Latitude Mission Analysis Report (HILMAR), and that the HLMAR took
into account not only Coast Guard statutory mission requirements, but additional DOD
requirements for year-round presence in both polar regions as detailed in the 2010 Naval
Operations Concept (NOC). This is potentially significant, because DOD appears to have
subsequently dropped its 2010 requirement for year-round presence in the polar regions.52
White House, “Memorandum on Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions,” June 9,
2020, accessed June 10, 2020, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-safeguarding-u-snational-interests-arctic-antarctic-regions/. For press reports about the memorandum, see, for example, David B. Larter,
Joe Gould, and Aaron Mehta, “Trump Memo Demands New Fleet of Arctic Icebreakers Be Ready by 2029,” Defense
News, June 9, 2020; Paul McLeary, “White House Orders New Icebreaker Strategy For Coast Guard,” Breaking
Defense, June 9, 2020; Cal Biesecker, “Trump Wants Review Of Polar Security Cutter Needs In Arctic, Antarctic,”
Defense Daily, June 9, 2020.
51 Department of Homeland Security, Polar Icebreaking Recapitalization Project Mission Need Statement, Version 1.0,
approved by DHS June 28, 2013, pp. 1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12.
52 A September 25, 2017, GAO report on polar icebreakers states the following (emphasis added):
50

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The use in the MNS of the terms “potentially” and “up to,” combined with DOD’s decision to
drop its requirement for year-round presence in the polar regions, together raise a question, other
things held equal, as to whether required numbers of U.S. polar icebreakers might be something
less than three heavy and three medium polar icebreakers. It is also possible, however, that there
have been other changes since the MNS was issued in 2013 that would have the effect, other
things held equal, of increasing U.S. requirements for polar icebreakers. The net result of this
situation appears uncertain.
In recent years, Coast Guard officials have tended to refer simply to a total Coast Guard
requirement for three heavy and three medium polar icebreakers. For example, in the October 25,
2016, summary of a request for information (RFI) that the Coast Guard released the next day to
receive industry feedback on its notional polar icebreaker acquisition approach and schedule, the
Coast Guard states that “the United States Coast Guard has a need for three Heavy Polar
Icebreakers and three Medium Polar Icebreakers with the priority being Heavy Polar
Icebreakers.”53 A requirement for three heavy and three medium polar icebreakers is often
abbreviated as 3+3.
Short of a 3+3 requirement, Coast Guard officials in the past have sometimes stated that, as a bare
minimum number of heavy polar icebreakers, the Coast Guard needs two such ships. For
example, at a November 17, 2015, hearing before the Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats
subcommittee and the Western Hemisphere subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, then-Vice Admiral Charles Michel, the Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard, stated
during the discussion portion of the hearing that the “Coast Guard needs at least two heavy
icebreakers to provide year-round assured access and self-rescueability in the polar regions.”54
Similarly, at a June 14, 2016, hearing before the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Admiral Michel
testified that “our commandant also testified that we need self-rescue capability for our heavy
icebreaker and that includes the existing Polar Star that we have out there now. So that means at
least two [ships], [and] the High Latitude study says three heavy polar icebreakers is what the

In December 2016, DOD reported to Congress that it had no specific defense requirement for
icebreaking capability because Navy Arctic requirements are met by undersea and air assets which
can provide year-round presence.
—DOD reported in April 2017 that its only potential defense requirement—for the Thule Air Force
Base resupply [mission] in Greenland—is met by the Canadian Coast Guard through a
Memorandum of Understanding with USCG.
—USCG’s 2013 Polar Icebreaker Mission Needs Statement identified polar icebreaker capacity
needs as partly based on the 2010 Naval Operations Concept—[a document that provides] joint
maritime security strategy implementation guidance for the Navy, Marine Corps, and USCG—
which stated that U.S. naval forces had a demand for year-round polar icebreaking presence in the
Arctic and Antarctic.
—In April 2017, DOD joint staff officials confirmed that DOD and Naval defense strategy had
been updated and does not include icebreaking requirements. DOD officials in charge of operations
in the Pacific said that although they do not have a requirement for a heavy icebreaker, icebreakers
play a key role in aiding the icebreaking mission to McMurdo.
(Government Accountability Office, Coast Guard: Status of Polar Icebreaking Fleet Capability
and Recapitalization Plan, GAO-17-698R, September 25, 2017, p. 20 (briefing slide 11).)
53 Summary of RFI, October 25, 2016, page 2, accessed November 10, 2016, at https://www.uscg.mil/acquisition/
icebreaker/pdf/Acquisition-Strategy-RFI.pdf.
54 Transcript of hearing.

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Coast Guard’s requirement is. So that’s kind of where we’re talking about for heavy
icebreakers.”55
A September 25, 2017, GAO report on polar icebreakers states that
the Coast Guard has been unable to address all polar icebreaking requests since 2010. For
example, the Coast Guard reported fulfilling 78 percent (25 of 32) of U.S. government
agency requests for polar icebreaking services during fiscal year 2010 through 2016. Coast
Guard officials cited various factors affecting the Coast Guard’s ability to meet all requests,
particularly the unavailability of its heavy polar icebreakers.56

A July 2018 GAO report stated that
the Coast Guard operates one medium icebreaker, the Healy, which has an expected end of
service life in 2029. Despite the requirement for three medium icebreakers, Coast Guard
officials said they are not currently assessing acquisition of the medium polar icebreakers
because they are focusing on the heavy icebreaker acquisition and plan to assess the costs
and benefits of acquiring medium polar icebreakers at a later time. 57

In addition to the HILMAR, a number of other studies have been conducted in recent years to
assess U.S. requirements for polar icebreakers and options for sustaining and modernizing the
Coast Guard’s polar icebreaker fleet.

Polar Icebreakers Operated by Other Countries
In discussions of U.S. polar icebreakers, observers sometimes note the size of the polar
icebreaking fleets operated by other countries. Table B-1 shows a Coast Guard summary of major
icebreakers around the world; the figures in the table include some icebreakers designed for use
in the Baltic Sea.
Observers sometimes highlight the difference between the number of U.S. polar icebreakers and
the much larger number of Russian polar icebreakers. In considering these relative numbers, it
can be noted that Russia’s Arctic coastline is much longer than the U.S. Arctic coastline, that
many more people live in Russia’s Arctic (about roughly 2 million) than in the U.S. Arctic (fewer
than 68,000 as of July 1, 2017),58 and that maritime transportation along Russia’s Arctic coast is
critical for supporting numerous Russian Arctic communities. Countries with interests in the polar
regions have differing requirements for polar icebreakers, depending on the nature and extent of
their polar interests and activities.

55

Transcript of hearing.
Government Accountability Office, Coast Guard: Status of Polar Icebreaking Fleet Capability and Recapitalization
Plan, GAO-17-698R, September 25, 2017, pp. 2-3. A similar statement appears on page 4.
57 Government Accountability Office, Coast Guard Acquisitions[:] Actions Needed to Address Longstanding Portfolio
Management Challenges, GAO-18-454, July 2018, p. 13.
58 For additional discussion, see the Background section of CRS Report R41153, Changes in the Arctic: Background
and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Table B-1. Major Icebreakers of the World as of May 1, 2017
(Includes some icebreakers designed for Baltic use)

Russia

Total all
types, in
inventory (+
under
construction
+ planned)
46 (+11 + 4)

Finland

10

Canada
Sweden

7 (+2 +5)
7 (+0 +3)

United States

5 (+0 +3)

Denmark

45,000 or
more BHP
6 (all nuclear
powered; 2
not
operational)

2 (Polar Star
and Polar
Sea; Polar
Sea not
operational)

20,000 to
44,999 BHP
16 (1 nuclear
powered; 5
designed for
Baltic use)
7 (4 designed
for Baltic
use)
2
4 (3 designed
for Baltic
use)
1 (Healy)

10,000 to
19,999 BHP
7

3 (+1 +0)
2

Norway
Germany
Chile
Australia
Latvia

1 (+1 +0)
1 (+0 +1)
1 (+0 +1)
1 (+0 +1)
1

Japan
South Korea
South Africa
Argentina

1
1
1
1

In inventory, privately owned and
operated
45,000 or
more
BHP

20,000 to
44,999
BHP
9

1

10,000 to
19,999
BHP
8

2

5
3

1 (Aiviq)

1 (Palmer)

4 (all 4
designed for
Baltic use)

4

China
Estonia

United
Kingdom

In inventory, government owned or
operated

3
2 (both
designed for
Baltic use)
1
1
1
1
1 (designed
for Baltic use)
1
1
1
1 (not
operational)

0 (+1 +0)
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Coast Guard chart showing data compiled by the Coast Guard as
of May 1, 2017, accessed September 14, 2017, at http://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/
Office%20of%20Waterways%20and%20Ocean%20Policy/20170501%20major%20icebreaker%20chart.pdf?ver=
2017-06-08-091723-907.
Notes: BHP = the brake horsepower of the ship’s power plant. A ship with 45,000 or more BHP might be
considered a heavy polar icebreaker, a ship with 20,000 to 44,999 BHP might be considered a medium polar
icebreaker, and a ship with 10,000 to 19,999 BHP might be considered a light polar icebreaker or an ice-capable
polar ship.

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July 2017 National Academies (NASEM) Report
A July 2017 report on the acquisition and operation of polar icebreakers by the National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) that was directed by Congress in
Section 604 of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2015 (H.R. 4188/P.L. 114-120 of February
8, 2016) concluded the following:
INTRODUCTION
The United States has strategic national interests in the polar regions. In the Arctic, the
nation must protect its citizens, natural resources, and economic interests; assure
sovereignty, defense readiness, and maritime mobility; and engage in discovery and
research. In the Antarctic, the United States must maintain an active presence that includes
access to its research stations for the peaceful conduct of science and the ability to
participate in inspections as specified in the Antarctic Treaty. The committee’s charge...
was to advise the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate on an assessment of
the costs incurred by the federal government in carrying out polar icebreaking missions
and on options that could minimize lifecycle costs. The committee’s consensus findings
and recommendations are presented below. Unless otherwise specified, all estimated costs
and prices for the future U.S. icebreakers are expressed in 2019 dollars, since that is the
year in which the contracts are scheduled to be made. Supporting material is found in the
appendices.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Finding: The United States has insufficient assets to protect its interests, implement
U.S. policy, execute its laws, and meet its obligations in the Arctic and Antarctic
because it lacks adequate icebreaking capability.
For more than 30 years, studies have emphasized the need for U.S. icebreakers to maintain
presence, sovereignty, leadership, and research capacity—but the nation has failed to
respond.... The strong warming and related environmental changes occurring in both the
Arctic and the Antarctic have made this failure more critical. In the Arctic, changing sea
ice conditions will create greater navigation hazards for much of the year, and expanding
human industrial and economic activity will magnify the need for national presence in the
region. In the Antarctic, sea ice trends have varied greatly from year to year, but the annual
requirements for access into McMurdo Station have not changed. The nation is ill-equipped
to protect its interests and maintain leadership in these regions and has fallen behind other
Arctic nations, which have mobilized to expand their access to ice-covered regions. The
United States now has the opportunity to move forward and acquire the capability to fulfill
these needs....
2. Recommendation: The United States Congress should fund the construction of four
polar icebreakers of common design that would be owned and operated by the United
States Coast Guard (USCG).
The current Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Mission Need Statement (DHS
2013) contemplates a combination of medium and heavy icebreakers. The committee’s
recommendation is for a single class of polar icebreaker with heavy icebreaking capability.
Proceeding with a single class means that only one design will be needed, which will
provide cost savings. The committee has found that the fourth heavy icebreaker could be
built for a lower cost than the lead ship of a medium icebreaker class....
The DHS Mission Need Statement contemplated a total fleet of “potentially” up to six ships
of two classes—three heavy and three medium icebreakers. Details appear in the High
Latitude Mission Analysis Report. The Mission Need Statement indicated that to fulfill its
statutory missions, USCG required three heavy and three medium icebreakers; each vessel
would have a single crew and would homeport in Seattle. The committee’s analysis

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indicated that four heavy icebreakers will meet the statutory mission needs gap identified
by DHS for the lowest cost. Three of the ships would allow continuous presence in the
Arctic, and one would service the Antarctic.
As noted in the High Latitude Report, USCG’s employment standard is 185 days away
from home port (DAFHP) for a single crew. Three heavy icebreakers in the Arctic provide
555 DAFHP, sufficient for continuous presence. In addition, the medium icebreaker USCG
Cutter Healy’s design service life runs through 2030. If greater capacity is required, USCG
could consider operating three ships with four crews, which would provide 740 DAFHP.
The use of multiple crews in the Arctic could require fewer ships while providing a
comparable number of DAFHP. For example, two ships (instead of the recommended
three) operating in the Arctic with multiple crews could provide a similar number of annual
operating days at a lower cost, but such an arrangement may not permit simultaneous
operations in both polar regions and may not provide adequate redundancy in capability.
More important, an arrangement under which fewer boats are operated more often would
require more major maintenance during shorter time in port, often at increasing cost. In
addition, if further military presence is desired in the Arctic, USCG could consider icestrengthening the ninth national security cutter.
One heavy icebreaker servicing the Antarctic provides for the McMurdo breakout and
international treaty verification. The availability of the vessel could be extended by
homeporting in the Southern Hemisphere. If the single vessel dedicated to the Antarctic is
rendered inoperable, USCG could redirect an icebreaker from the Arctic, or it could rely
on support from other nations. The committee considers both options to be viable and
believes it difficult to justify a standby (fifth) vessel for the Antarctic mission when the
total acquisition and lifetime operating costs of a single icebreaker are projected to exceed
$1.6 billion. Once the four new icebreakers are operational, USCG can reasonably be
expected to plan for more distant time horizons. USCG could assess the performance of
the early ships once they are operational and determine whether additional capacity is
needed.
USCG is the only agency of the U.S. government that is simultaneously a military service,
a law enforcement agency, a marine safety and rescue agency, and an environmental
protection agency. All of these roles are required in the mission need statement for a polar
icebreaker. USCG, in contrast to a civilian company, has the authorities, mandates, and
competencies to conduct the missions contemplated for the polar icebreakers. Having one
agency with a multimission capability performing the range of services needed would be
more efficient than potentially duplicating effort by splitting polar icebreaker operations
among other agencies.
The requirement for national presence is best accomplished with a military vessel. In
addition, USCG is fully interoperable with the U.S. Navy and the nation’s North Atlantic
Treaty Organization partners. USCG is already mandated to operate the nation’s domestic
and polar icebreakers. Continuing to focus this expertise in one agency remains the logical
approach....
Government ownership of new polar icebreakers would be less costly than the use of lease
financing (see Appendix C). The government has a lower borrowing cost than any U.S.based leasing firm or lessor. In addition, the lessor would use higher-cost equity (on which
it would expect to make a profit) to cover a portion of the lease financing. The committee’s
analysis shows that direct purchase by the government would cost, at a minimum, 19
percent less than leasing on a net present value basis (after tax). There is also the risk of
the lessor going bankrupt and compromising the availability of the polar icebreaker to
USCG. For its analysis, the committee not only relied on its extensive experience with
leveraged lease financing but also reviewed available Government Accountability Office
reports and Office of Management and Budget rules, examined commercial leasing

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economics and current interest rates, and validated its analysis by consulting an outside
expert on the issue....
Chartering (an operating lease) is not a viable option.... The availability of polar icebreakers
on the open market is extremely limited. (The committee is aware of the sale of only one
heavy icebreaker since 2010.) U.S. experience with chartering a polar icebreaker for the
McMurdo resupply mission has been problematic on two prior charter attempts. Chartering
is workable only if the need is short term and mission specific. The committee notes that
chartering may preclude USCG from performing its multiple missions....
In the committee’s judgment, an enlarged icebreaker fleet will provide opportunities for
USCG to strengthen its icebreaking program and mission. Although the number of billets
that require an expert is small compared with the overall number of billets assigned to these
icebreakers, more people performing this mission will increase the pool of experienced
candidates. This will provide personnel assignment officers with a larger pool of candidates
when the more senior positions aboard icebreakers are designated, which will make
icebreaking more attractive as a career path and increase the overall level of icebreaking
expertise within USCG. Importantly, the commonality of design of the four recommended
heavy icebreakers will reduce operating and maintenance costs over the service life of these
vessels through efficiencies in supporting and crewing them. Having vessels of common
design will likely improve continuity of service, build icebreaking competency, improve
operational effectiveness, and be more cost-efficient....
3. Recommendation: USCG should follow an acquisition strategy that includes block
buy contracting with a fixed price incentive fee contract and take other measures to
ensure best value for investment of public funds.
Icebreaker design and construction costs can be clearly defined, and a fixed price incentive
fee construction contract is the most reliable mechanism for controlling costs for a program
of this complexity. This technique is widely used by the U.S. Navy. To help ensure best
long-term value, the criteria for evaluating shipyard proposals should incorporate explicitly
defined lifecycle cost metrics....
A block buy authority for this program will need to contain specific language for economic
order quantity purchases for materials, advanced design, and construction activities. A
block buy contracting program with economic order quantity purchases enables series
construction, motivates competitive bidding, and allows for volume purchase and for the
timely acquisition of material with long lead times. It would enable continuous production,
give the program the maximum benefit from the learning curve, and thus reduce labor hours
on subsequent vessels.
The acquisition strategy would incorporate (a) technology transfer from icebreaker
designers and builders with recent experience, including international expertise in design,
construction, and equipment manufacture; (b) a design that maximizes use of commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment, applies Polar Codes and international standards, and only
applies military specifications (MIL-SPEC) to the armament, aviation, communications,
and navigation equipment; (c) reduction of any “buy American” provisions to allow the
sourcing of the most
suitable and reliable machinery available on the market; and (d) a program schedule that
allows for completion of design and planning before the start of construction. These
strategies will allow for optimization of design, reduce construction costs, and enhance
reliability and maintainability....
4. Finding: In developing its independent concept designs and cost estimates, the
committee determined that the costs estimated by USCG for the heavy icebreaker are
reasonable. However, the committee believes that the costs of medium icebreakers
identified in the High Latitude Mission Analysis Report are significantly
underestimated.

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The committee estimates the rough order-of-magnitude (ROM) cost of the first heavy
icebreaker to be $983 million. (See Appendix D, Table D-6.) Of these all-in costs, 75 to 80
percent are shipyard design and construction costs; the remaining 20 to 25 percent cover
government-incurred costs such as government-furnished equipment and governmentincurred program expenses. If advantage is taken of learning and quantity discounts
available through the recommended block buy contracting acquisition strategy, the average
cost per heavy icebreaker is approximately $791 million, on the basis of the acquisition of
four ships. The committee’s analysis of the ship size to incorporate the required
components (stack-up length) suggests an overall length of 132 meters (433 feet) and a
beam of 27 meters (89 feet). This is consistent with USCG concepts for the vessel.
Costs can be significantly reduced by following the committee’s recommendations.
Reduction of MIL-SPEC requirements can lower costs by up to $100 million per ship with
no loss of mission capability.... The other recommended acquisition, design, and
construction strategies will control possible cost overruns and provide significant savings
in overall life-cycle costs for the program.
Although USCG has not yet developed the operational requirements document for a
medium polar icebreaker, the committee was able to apply the known principal
characteristics of the USCG Cutter Healy to estimate the scope of work and cost of a similar
medium icebreaker. The committee estimates that a first-of-class medium icebreaker will
cost approximately $786 million. The fourth ship of the heavy icebreaker series is
estimated to cost $692 million. Designing a medium-class polar icebreaker in a second
shipyard would incur the estimated engineering, design, and planning costs of $126 million
and would forgo learning from the first three ships; the learning curve would be restarted
with the first medium design. Costs of building the fourth heavy icebreaker would be less
than the costs of designing and building a first-of-class medium icebreaker... . In
developing its ROM cost estimate, the committee agreed on a common notional design and
basic assumptions.... Two committee members then independently developed cost
estimating models, which were validated internally by other committee members. These
analyses were then used to establish the committee’s primary cost estimate....
5. Finding: Operating costs of new polar icebreakers are expected to be lower than
those of the vessels they replace.
The committee expects the operating costs for the new heavy polar icebreakers to be lower
than those of USCG’s Polar Star. While USCG’s previous experience is that operating
costs of new cutters are significantly higher than those of the vessels they replace, the
committee does not believe this historical experience applies in this case. There is good
reason to believe that operating costs for new ships using commercially available modern
technology will be lower than costs for existing ships.... The more efficient hull forms and
modern engines will reduce fuel consumption, and a well-designed automation plant will
require fewer operation and maintenance personnel, which will allow manning to be
reduced or freed up for alternative tasks. The use of COTS technology and the
minimization of MIL-SPEC, as recommended, will also reduce long-term maintenance
costs, since use of customized equipment to meet MIL-SPEC requirements can reduce
reliability and increase costs. A new vessel, especially over the first 10 years, typically has
significantly reduced major repair and overhaul costs, particularly during dry-dock periods,
compared with existing icebreakers—such as the Polar Star—that are near or at the end of
their service life.... The Polar Star has many age-related issues that require it to be
extensively repaired at an annual dry-docking. These issues will be avoided in the early
years of a new ship. However, the committee recognizes that new ship operating costs can
be higher than those of older ships if the new ship has more complexity to afford more
capabilities. Therefore, any direct comparisons of operating costs of newer versus older
ships would need to take into account the benefits of the additional capabilities provided
by the newer ship.

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USCG will have an opportunity to evaluate the manning levels of the icebreaker in light of
the benefits of modern technology to identify reductions that can be made in operating
costs....
6. Recommendation: USCG should ensure that the common polar icebreaker design
is science-ready and that one of the ships has full science capability.
All four proposed ships would be designed as “science-ready,” which will be more costeffective when one of the four ships—most likely the fourth—is made fully science
capable. Including science readiness in the common polar icebreaker design is the most
cost-effective way of fulfilling both the USCG’s polar missions and the nation’s scientific
research polar icebreaker needs.... The incremental costs of a science-ready design for each
of the four ships ($10 million to $20 million per ship) and of full science capability for one
of the ships at the initial build (an additional $20 million to $30 million) are less than the
independent design and build cost of a dedicated research medium icebreaker.... In
briefings at its first meeting, the committee learned that the National Science Foundation
and other agencies do not have budgets to support full-time heavy icebreaker access or the
incremental cost of design, even though their science programs may require this capability.
Given the small incremental cost, the committee believes that the science capability cited
above should be included in the acquisition costs.
Science-ready design includes critical elements that cannot be retrofitted cost-effectively
into an existing ship and that should be incorporated in the initial design and build. Among
these elements are structural supports, appropriate interior and exterior spaces, flexible
accommodation spaces that can embark up to 50 science personnel, a hull design that
accommodates multiple transducers and minimizes bubble sweep while optimizing
icebreaking capability, machinery arrangements and noise dampening to mitigate
interference with sonar transducers, and weight and stability latitudes to allow installation
of scientific equipment. Such a design will enable any of the ships to be retrofitted for full
science capability in the future, if necessary....
Within the time frame of the recommended build sequence, the United States will require
a science-capable polar icebreaker to replace the science capabilities of the Healy upon her
retirement. To fulfill this need, one of the heavy polar icebreakers would be procured at the
initial build with full science capability; the ability to fulfill other USCG missions would
be retained. The ship would be outfitted with oceanographic overboarding equipment and
instrumentation and facilities comparable with those of modern oceanographic research
vessels. Some basic scientific capability, such as hydrographic mapping sonar, should be
acquired at the time of the build of each ship so that environmental data that are essential
in fulfilling USCG polar missions can be collected.
7. Finding: The nation is at risk of losing its heavy polar icebreaking capability—
experiencing a critical capacity gap—as the Polar Star approaches the end of its
extended service life, currently estimated at 3 to 7 years.
The Polar Star, built in 1976, is well past its 30-year design life. Its reliability will continue
to decline, and its maintenance costs will continue to escalate. Although the ship went
through an extensive life-extending refit in 2011–2012, the Polar Star’s useful life is
estimated to end between 2020 and 2024. As USCG has recognized, the evaluation of
alternative arrangements to secure polar icebreaking capacity is important, given the
growing risks of the Polar Star losing its capability to fulfill its mission....
8. Recommendation: USCG should keep the Polar Star operational by implementing
an enhanced maintenance program (EMP) until at least two new polar icebreakers
are commissioned.
Even if the committee’s notional schedule for new polar icebreakers is met, the second
polar icebreaker would not be ready until July 2025.... The committee’s proposed EMP
could be designed with planned—and targeted—upgrades that allow the Polar Star to

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operate every year for its Antarctic mission. The necessary repairs could be performed in
conjunction with the ship’s current yearly dry-docking schedule within existing annual
expenditures, estimated to average $5 million. In particular, the EMP would require
improvements in the ship’s operating systems, sanitary system, evaporators, main
propulsion systems, and controllable pitch propellers. In the committee’s judgment, the
EMP could be accomplished within USCG’s average annual repair expenditures for the
Polar Star, which currently range between $2 million and $9 million. 59

Coast Guard High Latitude Study Provided to Congress in
July 2011
In July 2011, the Coast Guard provided to Congress a study on the Coast Guard’s missions and
capabilities for operations in high-latitude (i.e., polar) areas. The study, commonly known as the
High Latitude Study, is dated July 2010 on its cover. The High Latitude Study concluded the
following:
[The study] concludes that future capability and capacity gaps will significantly impact
four [Coast Guard] mission areas in the Arctic: Defense Readiness, Ice Operations, Marine
Environmental Protection, and Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security. These mission
areas address the protection of important national interests in a geographic area where other
nations are actively pursuing their own national goals....
The common and dominant contributor to these significant mission impacts is the gap in
polar icebreaking capability. The increasing obsolescence of the Coast Guard’s icebreaker
fleet will further exacerbate mission performance gaps in the coming years....
The gap in polar icebreaking capacity has resulted in a lack of at-sea time for crews and
senior personnel and a corresponding gap in training and leadership. In addition to
providing multi-mission capability and intrinsic mobility, a helicopter-capable surface unit
would eliminate the need for acquiring an expensive shore-based infrastructure that may
only be needed on a seasonal or occasional basis. The most capable surface unit would be
a polar icebreaker. Polar icebreakers can transit safely in a variety of ice conditions and
have the endurance to operate far from logistics bases. The Coast Guard’s polar icebreakers
have conducted a wide range of planned and unscheduled Coast Guard missions in the past.
Polar icebreakers possess the ability to carry large numbers of passengers, cargo, boats,
and helicopters. Polar icebreakers also have substantial command, control, and
communications capabilities. The flexibility and mobility of polar icebreakers would assist
the Coast Guard in closing future mission performance gaps effectively....
Existing capability and capacity gaps are expected to significantly impact future Coast
Guard performance in two Antarctic mission areas: Defense Readiness and Ice Operations.
Future gaps may involve an inability to carry out probable and easily projected mission
requirements, such as the McMurdo resupply, or readiness to respond to less-predictable
events. By their nature, contingencies requiring the use of military capabilities often occur
quickly. As is the case in the Arctic, the deterioration of the Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet
is the primary driver for this significant mission impact. This will further widen mission
performance gaps in the coming years. The recently issued Naval Operations Concept 2010
requires a surface presence in both the Arctic and Antarctic. This further exacerbates the
capability gap left by the deterioration of the icebreaker fleet....

59

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Division on Earth and Life Studies and Transportation
Research Board, Acquisition and Operation of Polar Icebreakers: Fulfilling the Nation’s Needs, Letter Report, with
cover letter dated July 11, 2017, pp. 9-20.

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The significant deterioration of the Coast Guard icebreaker fleet and the emerging mission
demands to meet future functional requirements in the high latitude regions dictate that the
Coast Guard acquire material solutions to close the capability gaps....
To meet the Coast Guard mission functional requirement, the Coast Guard icebreaking
fleet must be capable of supporting the following missions:


Arctic North Patrol. Continuous multimission icebreaker presence in the Arctic.



Arctic West Science. Spring and summer science support in the Arctic.



Antarctic, McMurdo Station resupply. Planned deployment for break-in, supply
ship escort, and science support. This mission, conducted in the Antarctic summer,
also requires standby icebreaker support for backup in the event the primary vessel
cannot complete the mission.



Thule Air Base Resupply and Polar Region Freedom of Navigation Transits.
Provide vessel escort operations in support of the Military Sealift Command’s
Operation Pacer Goose; then complete any Freedom of Navigation exercises in the
region.

In addition, the joint Naval Operations Concept establishes the following mission
requirements:


Assured access and assertion of U.S. policy in the Polar Regions. The current
demand for this mission requires continuous icebreaker presence in both Polar
Regions.

Considering these missions, the analysis yields the following findings:


The Coast Guard requires three heavy and three medium icebreakers to fulfill
its statutory missions. These icebreakers are necessary to (1) satisfy Arctic winter
and transition season demands and (2) provide sufficient capacity to also execute
summer missions. Single-crewed icebreakers have sufficient capacity for all current
and expected statutory missions. Multiple crewing provides no advantage because the
number of icebreakers required is driven by winter and shoulder season requirements.
Future use of multiple or augmented crews could provide additional capacity needed
to absorb mission growth.



The Coast Guard requires six heavy and four medium icebreakers to fulfill its
statutory missions and maintain the continuous presence requirements of the
Naval Operations Concept. Consistent with current practice, these icebreakers are
single-crewed and homeported in Seattle Washington.



Applying crewing and home porting alternatives reduces the overall requirement
to four heavy and two medium icebreakers. This assessment of nonmaterial
solutions shows that the reduced number of icebreakers can be achieved by having all
vessels operate with multiple crews and two of the heavy icebreakers homeporting in
the Southern Hemisphere.

Leasing was also considered as a nonmaterial solution. While there is no dispute that the
Coast Guard’s polar icebreaker fleet is in need of recapitalization, the decision to acquire
this capability through purchase of new vessels, reconstruction of existing ships, or
commercial lease of suitable vessels must be resolved to provide the best value to the
taxpayer. The multi-mission nature of the Coast Guard may provide opportunities to
conduct some subset of its missions with non government-owned vessels. However,
serious consideration must be given to the fact that the inherently governmental missions
of the Coast Guard must be performed using government-owned and operated vessels. An
interpretation of the national policy is needed to determine the resource level that best
supports the nation’s interests....

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The existing icebreaker capacity, two inoperative heavy icebreakers and an operational
medium icebreaker, does not represent a viable capability to the federal government. The
time needed to augment this capability is on the order of 10 years. At that point, around
2020, the heavy icebreaking capability bridging strategy expires. 60

At a July 27, 2011, hearing on U.S. economic interests in the Arctic before the Oceans,
Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard subcommittee of the Senate Commerce, Science, and
Transportation Committee, the following exchange occurred:
SENATOR OLYMPIA J. SNOWE: On the high latitude study, do you agree with—and
those—I would like to also hear from you, Admiral Titley, as well, on these requirements
in terms of Coast Guard vessels as I understand it, they want to have—I guess, it was a
three medium ice breakers. Am in correct in saying that? Three medium ice breakers.
ADMIRAL ROBERT PAPP, COMMANDANT OF THE COAST GUARD: I agree with
the mission analysis and as you look at the requirements for the things that we might do up
there, if it is in the nation’s interest, it identifies a minimum requirement for three heavy
ice breakers and three medium ice breakers and then if you want a persistent presence up
there, it would require—and also doing things such as breaking out (inaudible) and other
responsibilities, then it would take up to a maximum six heavy and four medium.
SNOWE: Right. Do you agree with that?
PAPP: If we were to be charged with carrying out those full responsibilities, yes, ma’am.
Those are the numbers that you would need to do it.
SNOWE: Admiral Titley, how would you respond to the high latitude study and has the
Navy conducted its own assessment of its capability?
REAR ADMIRAL DAVID TITLEY, OCEANORGRAPHER AND NAVIGATOR OF
THE NAVY: Ma’am, we are in the process right now of conducting what we call a
capabilities based assessment that will be out in the summer of this year.
We are getting ready to finish that—the Coast Guard has been a key component of the
Navy’s task force on climate change, literally since day one when the Chief of Naval
Operations set this up, that morning, we had the Coast Guard invited as a member of our
executive steering committee.
So we have been working very closely with the Coast Guard, with the Department of
Homeland Security, and I think Admiral Papp—said it best as far as the specific comments
on the high latitude study but we have been working very closely with the Coast Guard. 61

January 2011 DHS Office of Inspector General Report
A January 2011 report on the Coast Guard’s polar icebreakers from the DHS Office of the
Inspector General stated the following:
The Coast Guard does not have the necessary budgetary control over its [polar] icebreakers,
nor does it have a sufficient number of icebreakers to accomplish its missions in the Polar
Regions. Currently, the Coast Guard has only one operational [polar] icebreaker [i.e.,
Healy], making it necessary for the United States to contract with foreign nations to
perform scientific, logistical, and supply activities. Without the necessary budgetary
control and a sufficient number of icebreaking assets, the Coast Guard will not have the
capability to perform all of its missions, will lose critical icebreaking expertise, and may

60
61

United States Coast Guard High Latitude Region Mission Analysis Capstone Summary, July 2010, pp. 10-13, 15.
Source: Transcript of hearing.

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be beholden to foreign nations to perform its statutory missions. The Coast Guard should
improve its strategic approach to ensure that it has the long-term icebreaker capabilities
needed to support Coast Guard missions and other national interests in the Arctic and
Antarctic regions.62

Regarding current polar icebreaking capabilities for performing Arctic missions, the report states
the following:
The Coast Guard’s icebreaking resources are unlikely to meet future demands. [The table
below] outlines the missions that Coast Guard is unable to meet in the Arctic with its
current icebreaking resources.
Arctic Missions Not Being Met
Requesting Agency
United States Coast Guard

Missions Not Being Met
—Fisheries enforcement in Bering Sea
to prevent foreign fishing in U.S.
waters and overfishing
—Capability to conduct search and
rescue in Beaufort Sea for cruise line
and natural resource exploration ships
—Future missions not anticipated to
be met: 2010 Arctic Winter Science
Deployment

NASA

Winter access to the Arctic to conduct
oceanography and study Arctic
currents and how they relate to
regional ice cover, climate, and
biology

NOAA and NSF

Winter research

Department of Defense

Assured access to ice-impacted waters
through a persistent icebreaker
presence in the Arctic and Antarctic63

The report also states the following:
Should the Coast Guard not obtain funding for new icebreakers or major service life
extensions for its existing icebreakers with sufficient lead-time, the United States will have
no heavy icebreaking capability beyond 2020 and no polar icebreaking capability of any
kind by 2029. Without the continued use of icebreakers, the United States will lose its
ability to maintain a presence in the Polar Regions, the Coast Guard’s expertise to perform
ice operations will continue to diminish, and missions will continue to go unmet. 64

Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, The Coast Guard’s Polar Icebreaker Maintenance,
Upgrade, and Acquisition Program, OIG-11-31, January 2011, p. 1 (Executive Summary). Report accessed September
21, 2011, at https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-31_Jan11.pdf.
63 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, The Coast Guard’s Polar Icebreaker Maintenance,
Upgrade, and Acquisition Program, OIG-11-31, January 2011, p. 9.
64 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, The Coast Guard’s Polar Icebreaker Maintenance,
Upgrade, and Acquisition Program, OIG-11-31, January 2011, p. 10.
62

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Regarding current polar icebreaking capabilities for performing Antarctic missions, the report
states the following:
The Coast Guard needs additional icebreakers to accomplish its missions in the Antarctic.
The Coast Guard has performed the McMurdo Station resupply in Antarctica for decades,
but with increasing difficulty in recent years. The Coast Guard’s two heavy-duty
icebreakers [i.e., Polar Star and Polar Sea] are at the end of their service lives, and have
become less reliable and increasingly costly to keep in service....
In recent years, the Coast Guard has found that ice conditions in the Antarctic have become
more challenging for the resupply of McMurdo Station. The extreme ice conditions have
necessitated the use of foreign vessels to perform the McMurdo break-in....
As ice conditions continue to change around the Antarctic, two icebreakers are needed for
the McMurdo break-in and resupply mission. Typically, one icebreaker performs the breakin and the other remains on standby. Should the first ship become stuck in the ice or should
the ice be too thick for one icebreaker to complete the mission, the Coast Guard deploys
the ship on standby. Since the Polar Sea and Polar Star are not currently in service, the
Coast Guard has no icebreakers capable of performing this mission. [The table below]
outlines the missions that will not be met without operational heavy-duty icebreakers.
Arctic Missions Not Being Met
Requesting Agency

Missions Not Being Met

NSF

Missions not anticipated to be met: 2010-2011
Operation Deep Freeze – McMurdo Station
Resupply

Department of State

Additional inspections of foreign facilities in
Antarctica to enforce the Antarctic Treaty and
ensure facilities’ environment compliance 65

The report’s conclusion and recommendations were as follows:
Conclusion
With an aging fleet of three icebreakers, one operational and two beyond their intended 30year service life, the Coast Guard is at a critical crossroads in its Polar Icebreaker
Maintenance, Upgrade, and Acquisition Program. It must clarify its mission requirements,
and if the current mission requirements remain, the Coast Guard must determine the best
method for meeting these requirements in the short and long term.
Recommendations
We recommend that the Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security, and
Stewardship:
Recommendation #1: Request budgetary authority for the operation, maintenance, and
upgrade of its icebreakers.
Recommendation #2: In coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, request
clarification from Congress to determine whether Arctic missions should be performed by
Coast Guard assets or contracted vessels.

Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, The Coast Guard’s Polar Icebreaker Maintenance,
Upgrade, and Acquisition Program, OIG-11-31, January 2011, pp. 10-11.
65

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Recommendation #3: In coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, request
clarification from Congress to determine whether Antarctic missions should be performed
by Coast Guard assets or contracted vessels.
Recommendation #4: Conduct the necessary analysis to determine whether the Coast
Guard should replace or perform service-life extensions on its two existing heavy-duty
icebreaking ships.
Recommendation #5: Request appropriations necessary to meet mission requirements in
the Arctic and Antarctic.66

The report states that
The Coast Guard concurred with all five of the recommendations and is initiating corrective
actions. We consider the recommendations open and unresolved. The Coast Guard
provided information on some of its ongoing projects that will address the program needs
identified in the report.67

2010 U.S. Arctic Research Commission Report
A May 2010 report from the U.S. Arctic Research Commission (USARC) on goals and objectives
for Arctic research for 2009-2010 stated the following:
To have an effective Arctic research program, the United States must invest in human
capital, research platforms, and infrastructure, including new polar class icebreakers, and
sustained sea, air, land, space, and social observing systems.... The Commission urges the
President and Congress to commit to replacing the nation’s two polar class icebreakers. 68

2007 National Research Council Report
A 2007 National Research Council (NRC) report, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An
Assessment of U.S. Needs, assessed roles and future needs for Coast Guard polar icebreakers.69
The study was required by report language accompanying the FY2005 DHS appropriations act
(H.R. 4567/P.L. 108-334).70 The study was completed in 2006 and published in 2007. Some
Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, The Coast Guard’s Polar Icebreaker Maintenance,
Upgrade, and Acquisition Program, OIG-11-31, January 2011, p. 12.
67 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, The Coast Guard’s Polar Icebreaker Maintenance,
Upgrade, and Acquisition Program, OIG-11-31, January 2011, p. 13.
68 U.S. Arctic Research Commission, Report on Goals and Objectives for Arctic Research 2009-2010, May 2010, p. 4.
Accessed online December 5, 2011, at https://storage.googleapis.com/arcticgov-static/publications/goals/
usarc_goals_2009-10.pdf.
69 National Research Council, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World, An Assessment of U.S. Needs, Washington,
2007, 122 pp.
70 H.R. 4567/P.L. 108-334 of October 18, 2004. The related Senate bill was S. 2537. The Senate report on S. 2537
(S.Rept. 108-280 of June 17, 2004) stated the following:
The Committee expects the Commandant to enter into an arrangement with the National Academy
of Sciences to conduct a comprehensive study of the role of Coast Guard icebreakers in supporting
United States operations in the Antarctic and the Arctic. The study should include different
scenarios for continuing those operations including service life extension or replacement of existing
Coast Guard icebreakers and alternative methods that do not use Coast Guard icebreakers. The
study should also address changes in the roles and missions of Coast Guard icebreakers in support
of future marine operations in the Arctic that may develop due to environmental change, including
the amount and kind of icebreaking support that may be required in the future to support marine
operations in the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage; the suitability of the Polar Class
icebreakers for these new roles; and appropriate changes in existing laws governing Coast Guard
66

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sources refer to the study as the 2006 NRC report. The report made the following conclusions and
recommendations:
Based on the current and future needs for icebreaking capabilities, the [study] committee
concludes that the nation continues to require a polar icebreaking fleet that includes a
minimum of three multimission ships [like the Coast Guard’s three current polar
icebreakers] and one single-mission [research] ship [like Palmer]. The committee finds that
although the demand for icebreaking capability is predicted to increase, a fleet of three
multimission and one single-mission icebreakers can meet the nation’s future polar
icebreaking needs through the application of the latest technology, creative crewing
models, wise management of ice conditions, and more efficient use of the icebreaker fleet
and other assets. The nation should immediately begin to program, design, and construct
two new polar icebreakers to replace the POLAR STAR and POLAR SEA.
Building only one new polar icebreaker is insufficient for several reasons. First, a single
ship cannot be in more than one location at a time. No matter how technologically advanced
or efficiently operated, a single polar icebreaker can operate in the polar regions for only a
portion of any year. An icebreaker requires regular maintenance and technical support from
shipyards and industrial facilities, must reprovision regularly, and has to effect periodic
crew changeouts. A single icebreaker, therefore, could not meet any reasonable standard
of active and influential presence and reliable, at-will access throughout the polar regions.
A second consideration is the potential risk of failure in the harsh conditions of polar
operations. Despite their intrinsic robustness, damage and system failure are always a risk
and the U.S. fleet must have enough depth to provide backup assistance. Having only a
single icebreaker would necessarily require the ship to accept a more conservative
operating profile, avoiding more challenging ice conditions because reliable assistance
would not be available. A second capable icebreaker, either operating elsewhere or in
homeport, would provide ensured backup assistance and allow for more robust operations
by the other ship.
From a strategic, longer-term perspective, two new Polar class icebreakers will far better
position the nation for the increasing challenges emerging in both polar regions. A second
new ship would allow the U.S. Coast Guard to reestablish an active patrol presence in U.S.
waters north of Alaska to meet statutory responsibilities that will inevitably derive from
increased human activity, economic development, and environmental change. It would
allow response to emergencies such as search-and-rescue cases, pollution incidents, and
assistance to ships threatened with grounding or damage by ice. Moreover, a second new
ship will leverage the possibilities for simultaneous operations in widely disparate
geographic areas (e.g., concurrent operations in the Arctic and Antarctic), provide more
flexibility for conducting Antarctic logistics (as either the primary or the secondary ship
for the McMurdo break-in), allow safer multiple-ship operations in the most demanding
ice conditions, and increase opportunities for international expeditions. Finally, an up-front
decision to build two new polar icebreakers will allow economies in the design and
construction process and provide a predictable cost reduction for the second ship....
The [study] committee finds that both operations and maintenance of the polar icebreaker
fleet have been underfunded for many years, and the capabilities of the nation’s icebreaking
icebreaking operations and the potential for new operating regimes. The study should be submitted
to the Committee no later than September 30, 2005.
The conference report on H.R. 4567 (H.Rept. 108-774 of October 9, 2004) stated the following:
As discussed in the Senate report and the Coast Guard authorization bill for fiscal year 2005, the
conferees require the National Academy of Sciences to study the role of Coast Guard icebreakers.
The earlier House report on H.R. 4567 (H.Rept. 108-541 of June 15, 2004) contained language directing a similar
report from the Coast Guard rather than the National Academies. (See the passage in the House report under the header
“Icebreaking.”)

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fleet have diminished substantially. Deferred long-term maintenance and failure to execute
a plan for replacement or refurbishment of the nation’s icebreaking ships have placed
national interests in the polar regions at risk. The nation needs the capability to operate in
both polar regions reliably and at will. Specifically, the committee recommends the
following:


The United States should continue to project an active and influential presence in the
Arctic to support its interests. This requires U.S. government polar icebreaking
capability to ensure year-round access throughout the region.



The United States should continue to project an active and influential presence in the
Antarctic to support its interests. The nation should reliably control sufficient
icebreaking capability to break a channel into and ensure the maritime resupply of
McMurdo Station.



The United States should maintain leadership in polar research. This requires
icebreaking capability to provide access to the deep Arctic and the ice-covered waters
of the Antarctic.



National interests in the polar regions require that the United States immediately
program, budget, design, and construct two new polar icebreakers to be operated by
the U.S. Coast Guard.



To provide continuity of U.S. icebreaking capabilities, the POLAR SEA should remain
mission capable and the POLAR STAR should remain available for reactivation until
the new polar icebreakers enter service.



The U.S. Coast Guard should be provided sufficient operations and maintenance
budget to support an increased, regular, and influential presence in the Arctic. Other
agencies should reimburse incremental costs associated with directed mission tasking.



Polar icebreakers are essential instruments of U.S. national policy in the changing
polar regions. To ensure adequate national icebreaking capability into the future, a
Presidential Decision Directive should be issued to clearly align agency
responsibilities and budgetary authorities. 71

The Coast Guard stated in 2008 that it “generally supports” the NRC report, and that the Coast
Guard “is working closely with interagency partners to determine a way forward with national
polar policy that identifies broad U.S. interests and priorities in the Arctic and Antarctic that will
ensure adequate maritime presence to further these interests. Identification and prioritization of
U.S. national interests in these regions should drive development of associated USCG [U.S. Coast
Guard] capability and resource requirements.” The Coast Guard also stated the following: “Until
those broad U.S. interests and priorities are identified, the current USG [U.S. Government] polar
icebreaking fleet should be maintained in an operational status.”72

71

National Research Council, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World, An Assessment of U.S. Needs, Washington,
2007, pp. 2-3.
72 Coast Guard point paper provided to CRS on February 12, 2008, and dated with the same date, providing answers to
questions from CRS concerning polar icebreaker modernization.

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Appendix C. PSC Program Funding
This appendix presents additional background information on funding for the PSC program.

Summary of Funding in FY2013-FY2021 Budget Submissions
Table C-1 shows requested and projected funding for the PSC program in the Coast Guard’s
budget submissions from the initiation of the PSC program in the FY2013 submission through the
FY2021 submission.
Table C-1. Funding for PSC Program in FY2013-FY2021 Budget Submissions
(millions of then-year dollars)
Budget

FY
13

FY
14

FY
15

FY
16

FY
17

FY13

8

120

380

270

82

2

8

100

20

100

6

4

100

20

100

4

10

2

100

50

150

0

50

150

430

19

50

150

430

300

750

125

385

345

200

35

385

345

200

350

555

n/a

n/a

n/a

FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19
FY20
FY21

FY
18

FY
19

FY
20

FY
21

FY
22

FY
23

FY
24

FY
25

5-year
total
860
230
230
166
780
949
1,805
1,315

n/a

n/a

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Coast Guard FY2013-FY2021 budget submissions. n/a means not
available.
Notes: For each line in the table, the first figure shown (e.g., $8 million in the case of the FY2013 budget) is the
amount of funding that was requested for that fiscal year. Actual funding figures for FY2013-FY2021 are different.

The reduction in programmed five-year funding for a new polar icebreaker during the FY2014FY2016 budget submissions shown in Table C-1 appears to have been related to the substantial
reduction in the annual funding levels in the Coast Guard’s Procurement, Construction, and
Improvements (PC&I) account73 in those budget submission that is shown in Table C-2. The
Coast Guard testified in 2015 that if annual funding levels in the PC&I account were not
increased from the reduced levels in those budget submissions, the icebreaker would be,
essentially, an unfunded requirement. For example, at an April 28, 2015, hearing on Coast Guard
resources and priorities before the Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard
subcommittee of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Admiral Paul
Zukunft, the then-Commandant of the Coast Guard, testified that
by reactivating Polar Star, we have purchased up to 10 years of decision space to
recapitalize our ice-breaking fleet. Two of those years have expired. And while I'm
exploring several options to reconstitute our nation’s fleet of icebreakers, I will need
topline relief [i.e., an increase] in my acquisition budget to make this requirement a
reality.74
73
74

Prior to FY2019, the PC&I account was called the Acquisition, Construction, and Improvements (AC&I) account.
Source: Transcript of hearing.

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 Table C-2. Funding in Procurement, Construction, and Improvements (PC&I) Account
(millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth)
Budget

FY13

FY14

FY15

FY16

FY17

FY13

1,217.3

1,429.5

1,619.9

1,643.8

1,722.0

951.1

1,195.7

901.0

1,024.8

1,030.3

1,084.2

1,103.0

1,128.9

1,180.4

1,228.7

1,017.3

1,125.3

1,255.7

1,201.0

1,294.6

1,136.8

1,259.6

1,339.9

1,560.5

1,840.8

1,203.7

1,360.9

1,602.7

1,810.6

1,687.5

1,886.8

1,473.0

1,679.8

1,555.5

1,698.5

1,234.7

1,679.8

1,555.5

1,698.5

1,737.0

1,637.1

n/a

n/a

n/a

FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19
FY20
FY21

FY18

FY19

FY20

FY21

FY22

FY23

FY24

FY25

1,526.5
1,020.6
1,145.0
1,178.8
1,427.5
1,533.1
1,658.8
1,581.1
n/a

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Coast Guard FY2013-FY2020 budget submissions. Prior to FY2019, the PC&I account was called the Acquisition,
Construction, and Improvements (AC&I) account. n/a means not available.

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For additional discussion of the issue of the funding level of the Procurement, Construction, and
Improvements (PC&I) account, see Appendix D. Below are some additional details on each of
the budget submissions since the FY2013 submission.

FY2013 Submission
The Administration’s FY2013 budget submission initiated a new project for the design and
construction of a new polar icebreaker, and included $860 million over five years for the
acquisition of the ship (Table C-1)—enough or almost enough to fully fund the acquisition of a
new polar icebreaker. (Any remaining needed funding might have been projected for FY2018 and
perhaps also FY2019, which were beyond the five-year window of the FY2013 budget
submission.) The submission stated that DHS anticipated awarding a construction contract for the
ship “within the next five years” (i.e., by FY2018) and taking delivery on the ship “within a
decade” (i.e., by 2023).75

FY2014 Submission
The Administration’s FY2014 budget submission reduced the five-year funding for a new polar
icebreaker to $230 million (Table C-1)—a 73% reduction from the figure in the FY2013 budget
submission—but still stated that DHS anticipated awarding a construction contract for the ship
“within the next four years” (i.e., by FY2018).76

FY2015 Submission
The Administration’s FY2015 budget submission maintained five-year funding for a new polar
icebreaker at $230 million (Table C-1), but did not state when a construction contract for the ship
might be awarded, creating uncertainty about the timing of the project.77

FY2016 Submission
The Administration’s FY2016 budget submission, submitted to Congress in February 2015,
reduced five-year funding for a new polar icebreaker further, to $166 million (Table C-1)—an
81% reduction from the figure in the FY2013 budget submission—and again did not state when a
construction contract for the ship might be awarded, maintaining the uncertainty about the timing
of the project.78
On September 1, 2015, the White House issued a fact sheet in conjunction with a visit to Alaska
by President Obama indicating that the Administration, in its own internal planning, had at some
point over the past two years deferred acquisition of a new polar icebreaker to FY2022, but that
this had been changed to FY2020.79 The newly announced construction start date of FY2020 was
75

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Annual Performance Report, Fiscal Years 2011-2013, p. CG-AC&I-40
(PDF page 1,777 of 3,134).
76 Department of Homeland Security, United States Coast Guard, Fiscal Year 2014 Congressional Justification, p. CGAC&I-32 (PDF page 204 of 403).
77 Department of Homeland Security, United States Coast Guard, Fiscal Year 2015, Congressional Justification, p. CGAC&I-42 (PDF page 196 of 474).
78 Department of Homeland Security, United States Coast Guard, Fiscal Year 2016 Congressional Justification, p. CGAC&I-36 (PDF page 202 of 518).
79 The White House, “Fact Sheet: President Obama Announces New Investments to Enhance Safety and Security in the
Changing Arctic,” September 1, 2015, accessed September 2, 2015, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/

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a two-year acceleration from the previously unpublicized date of FY2022, and a two-year deferral
from the FY2018 date implied in the FY2013 and FY2014 budget submissions. The fact sheet
states that the Administration will also “begin planning for construction of additional icebreakers”
beyond the one that the Obama Administration proposed to begin building in FY2020.
On January 13, 2016, the Coast Guard announced that it intended to hold an industry day for the
PSC program, followed by one-on-one meetings between the Coast Guard and prospective
shipbuilders and ship designers, as a part of the Coast Guard’s ongoing market research for the
program.80 The industry day was held on March 18, 2016, and the one-on-one meetings between
the Coast Guard and industry officials were scheduled for March 28-31, with industry feedback to
be submitted to the Coast Guard by April 5, 2016.81

FY2017 Submission
The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2017 budget requested $150 million in procurement funding for a
new polar icebreaker. The figure of $150 million included $147.6 million in the polar icebreaker
line of the Coast Guard’s Acquisition, Construction, and Improvements (AC&I) account, and $2.4
million that was embedded in the personnel and management line in the AC&I account.82 The
Coast Guard’s FY2017-FY2021 five-year Capital Investment Plan (CIP) included a total of $780
million in procurement funding for a new polar icebreaker. As shown in Table C-1, the $150
million requested for FY2017 was the first major increment of procurement funding requested
(not just projected for a future fiscal year) for a new polar icebreaker.

2015/09/01/fact-sheet-president-obama-announces-new-investments-enhance-safety-and. Regarding icebreakers, the
fact sheet states the following:
Accelerating the acquisition of new Coast Guard icebreakers. After World War II, the United
States Coast Guard had seven icebreakers in its fleet—four under the U.S. Navy and three under the
U.S. Coast Guard. Today, the United States technically has three icebreakers in its fleet—all under
the command of the U.S. Coast Guard. However, when age and reliability are taken into account,
the fleet is down to the equivalent of two fully functional icebreakers and only one heavy-duty
icebreaker. Russia, on the other hand, has forty icebreakers and another eleven planned or under
construction.
The growth of human activity in the Arctic region will require highly engaged stewardship to
maintain the open seas necessary for global commerce and scientific research, allow for search and
rescue activities, and provide for regional peace and stability. Accordingly, meeting these
challenges requires the United States to develop and maintain capacity for year-round access to
greater expanses within polar regions.
That is why the Administration will propose to accelerate acquisition of a replacement heavy
icebreaker to 2020 from 2022, begin planning for construction of additional icebreakers, and call on
Congress to work with the Administration to provide sufficient resources to fund these critical
investments. These heavy icebreakers will ensure that the United States can meet our national
interests, protect and manage our natural resources, and strengthen our international, state, local,
and tribal relationships.
80 “USCG Polar Class Icebreaker Replacement Program,” accessed January 15, 2016, at https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=
opportunity&mode=form&id=a778c49349c443d2658666e19cc100e9&tab=core&tabmode=list&=.
81 “Heavy Polar Icebreaker Industry Engagement Activities,” accessed April 4, 2016, at http://www.uscg.mil/
ACQUISITION/icebreaker/Industry_Day_031816.asp.
82 Department of Homeland Security, United States Coast Guard, Fiscal Year 2017 Congressional Justification, pp.
CG-AC&I-28 and CG-AC&I-47 (PDF pages 170 and 189 of 407).

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FY2018 Submission
The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2018 budget requested $19 million in procurement funding for a
new polar icebreaker and includes a total of $949 million over the five-year period FY2018FY2022. The Coast Guard states that
This request supports activities to complete and release a Request for Proposal (RFP) for
Detail Design and Construction in FY 2018. Specifically, this funding supports programwide activities including open water and ice tank model testing; review of Industry Studies
contract deliverables; Integrated Program Office (IPO) and Ship Design Team (SDT)
support; logistics and integration development for government furnished information and
equipment; and additional modeling efforts to inform the evaluation and source selection
process for the Detail Design & Construction RFP....
Currently, the Program is maturing the system specification, developing the RFP for Detail
Design & Construction, and completing required documentation to transition to the
“Obtain” phase - planned for early FY 2018. In July 2016, the Coast Guard established an
Integrated Program Office with the Navy to continue efforts to accelerate the construction
timeline and leverage the expertise and best practices from shipbuilding programs in both
services. Based on this collaboration and lessons learned by the Navy, the Program was
able to significantly mature the acquisition approach with the incorporation of Industry
Studies to identify solutions to minimize cost, schedule, production and technology risks.
Industry Studies are focusing on leveraging industry perspectives, existing vessel designs,
and use of mature technology to inform the iterative development of the Heavy Polar
Icebreaker system specification. Future “Obtain” phase activities include award of a
contract for Detail Design & Construction for the heavy polar icebreaker.83

FY2019 Submission
The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2018 budget requested $750 million in procurement funding for
the PSC program and included a total of $1,805 million for the program over the five-year period
FY2019-FY2023. The request for $750 million for the PSC program was a late change to the
FY2019 budget that is not reflected in Coast Guard FY2019 budget-justification documents that
were printed prior to the change. In those earlier documents, the amount of funding requested for
FY2019 shows as $30 million rather than $750 million, and the total amount of funding requested
in the Coast Guard’s PC&I account was correspondingly $720 million less than the figure of
$1,886.8 million shown in Table C-2.

FY2020 Submission
The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2020 budget requested $35 million in procurement funding for
the PSC program, which was enough to cover the PSC program’s FY2020 government programmanagement costs, and included a total of $1,315 million for the program over the five-year
period FY2020-FY2024.

FY2021 Submission
The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2021 budget requests $555 million in procurement funding for
the PSC program. It also proposes a rescission of $70 million in FY2020 funding that Congress
had provided for the procurement of long lead time materials (LLTM) for a 12th National Security
83

Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard, Fiscal Year 2018 Congressional Justification, undated but
released May 2017, pp. AC&I-50 and AC&I-51.

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Cutter (NSC), with the intent of reprogramming that funding to the PSC program. The Coast
Guard states that its proposed FY2021 budget, if approved by Congress, would fully fund the
second PSC.

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Appendix D. Funding Level in PC&I Account
This appendix presents additional discussion of the funding level of the Coast Guard’s
Procurement, Construction, and Improvements (PC&I) account.84

Overview
The Coast Guard has testified that funding the PC&I account at a level of about $1 billion to $1.2
billion per year—the approximate average annual funding level programmed in the FY2014,
FY2015, and FY2016 budget submissions, as shown in Table C-2—would make it difficult to
fund various Coast Guard acquisition projects, including a new polar icebreaker and
improvements to Coast Guard shore installations. Coast Guard plans call for procuring Offshore
Patrol Cutters (OPCs) at an eventual rate of two per year.85 If each OPC costs roughly $400
million, procuring two OPCs per year in an PC&I account of about $1 billion to $1.2 billion per
year would leave about $200 million to $400 million per year for all other PC&I-funded
programs.
Since 2017, Coast Guard officials have been stating more regularly what they stated only
infrequently in earlier years: that executing the Coast Guard’s various acquisition programs fully
and on a timely basis would require the PC&I account to be funded in coming years at a level of
about $2 billion per year. Statements from Coast Guard officials on this issue in past years have
sometimes put this figure as high as about $2.5 billion per year.

Using Past PC&I Funding Levels as a Guide for Future PC&I
Funding Levels
In assessing future funding levels for executive branch agencies, a common practice is to assume
or predict that the figure in coming years will likely be close to where it has been in previous
years. While this method can be of analytical and planning value, for an agency like the Coast
Guard, which goes through periods with less acquisition of major platforms and periods with
more acquisition of major platforms, this approach might not always be the best approach, at least
for the PC&I account.
More important, in relation to maintaining Congress’s status as a co-equal branch of government,
including the preservation and use of congressional powers and prerogatives, an analysis that
assumes or predicts that future funding levels will resemble past funding levels can encourage an
artificially narrow view of congressional options regarding future funding levels, depriving
Congress of agency in the exercise of its constitutional power to set funding levels and determine
the composition of federal spending.

Past Coast Guard Statements About Required PC&I Funding Level
At an October 4, 2011, hearing on the Coast Guard’s major acquisition programs before the Coast
Guard and Maritime Transportation subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee, the following exchange occurred:

84

Prior to FY2019, the PC&I account was called the Acquisition, Construction, and Improvements (AC&I) account.
For more on the OPC program, see CRS Report R42567, Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues
for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
85

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REPRESENATIVE FRANK LOBIONDO:
Can you give us your take on what percentage of value must be invested each year to
maintain current levels of effort and to allow the Coast Guard to fully carry out its
missions?
ADMIRAL ROBERT J. PAPP, COMMANDANT OF THE COAST GUARD:
I think I can, Mr. Chairman. Actually, in discussions and looking at our budget—and I’ll
give you rough numbers here, what we do now is we have to live within the constraints
that we’ve been averaging about $1.4 billion in acquisition money each year.
If you look at our complete portfolio, the things that we’d like to do, when you look at the
shore infrastructure that needs to be taken care of, when you look at renovating our smaller
icebreakers and other ships and aircraft that we have, we’ve done some rough estimates
that it would really take close to about $2.5 billion a year, if we were to do all the things
that we would like to do to sustain our capital plant.
So I’m just like any other head of any other agency here, as that the end of the day, we’re
given a top line and we have to make choices and tradeoffs and basically, my tradeoffs boil
down to sustaining frontline operations balancing that, we’re trying to recapitalize the
Coast Guard and there’s where the break is and where we have to define our spending. 86

An April 18, 2012, blog entry stated the following:
If the Coast Guard capital expenditure budget remains unchanged at less than $1.5 billion
annually in the coming years, it will result in a service in possession of only 70 percent of
the assets it possesses today, said Coast Guard Rear Adm. Mark Butt.
Butt, who spoke April 17 [2012] at [a] panel [discussion] during the Navy League Sea Air
Space conference in National Harbor, Md., echoed Coast Guard Commandant Robert Papp
in stating that the service really needs around $2.5 billion annually for procurement. 87

At a May 9, 2012, hearing on the Coast Guard’s proposed FY2013 budget before the Homeland
Security subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Admiral Papp testified, “I’ve
gone on record saying that I think the Coast Guard needs closer to $2 billion dollars a year [in
procurement funding] to recapitalize—[to] do proper recapitalization.”88
At a May 14, 2013, hearing on the Coast Guard’s proposed FY2014 budget before the Homeland
Security Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Admiral Papp stated the
following regarding the difference between having about $1.0 billion per year rather than about
$1.5 billion per year in the PC&I account:
86

Source: Transcript of hearing.
David Perera, “The Coast Guard Is Shrinking,” FierceHomelandSecurity.com, April 18, 2012, accessed July 20,
2012, at http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/coast-guard-shrinking/2012-04-18.
88 Source: transcript of hearing. Papp may have been referring to remarks he made to the press before giving his annual
state of the Coast Guard speech on February 23, 2012, in which reportedly stated that the Coast Guard would require
about $2 billion per year in procurement funding to fully replace its current assets. (See Adam Benson, “Coast Guard
Cutbacks Will Cost 1,000 Jobs,” Norwich Bulletin, February 23, 2012, accessed May 31, 2012, at
http://www.norwichbulletin.com/x1138492141/Coast-Guard-cutbacks-will-cost-1-000-jobs. See also “Coast Guard
Leader Calls For More Ships,” MilitaryFeed.com, February 24, 2012, accessed May 31, 2012, at
http://militaryfeed.com/coast-guard-leader-calls-for-more-ships-5/; Associated Press, “Coast Guard Commandant Calls
for New Ships,” TheLog.com, March 10, 2012, accessed May 31, 2012, at http://www.thelog.com/SNW/Article/CoastGuard-Commandant-Calls-for-New-Ships-to-Replace-Aging-Fleet; Mickey McCarter, “Congress Poised to Give Coast
Guard More Money Than Requested for FY 2013,” HSToday.us, May 10, 2012, accessed May 31, 2012, at
http://www.hstoday.us/focused-topics/customs-immigration/single-article-page/congress-poised-to-give-coast-guardmore-money-than-requested-for-fy-2013.html.) See also “Interview, Adm. Robert Papp, US Coast Guard
Commandant,” Defense News, November 11, 2013: 30.
87

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Well, Madam Chairman, $500 million—a half a billion dollars—is real money for the
Coast Guard. So, clearly, we had $1.5 billion in the [FY]13 budget. It doesn't get everything
I would like, but it—it gave us a good start, and it sustained a number of projects that are
very important to us.
When we go down to the $1 billion level this year, it gets my highest priorities in there, but
we have to either terminate or reduce to minimum order quantities for all the other projects
that we have going.
If we're going to stay with our program of record, things that have been documented that
we need for our service, we're going to have to just stretch everything out to the right. And
when we do that, you cannot order in economic order quantities. It defers the purchase.
Ship builders, aircraft companies—they have to figure in their costs, and it inevitably raises
the cost when you're ordering them in smaller quantities and pushing it off to the right.
Plus, it almost creates a death spiral for the Coast Guard because we are forced to sustain
older assets—older ships and older aircraft—which ultimately cost us more money, so it
eats into our operating funds, as well, as we try to sustain these older things.
So, we'll do the best we can within the budget. And the president and the secretary have
addressed my highest priorities, and we'll just continue to go on the—on an annual basis
seeing what we can wedge into the budget to keep the other projects going. 89

At a March 12, 2014, hearing on the Coast Guard’s proposed FY2015 budget before the
Homeland Security subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, Admiral Papp stated
the following:
Well, that’s what we've been struggling with, as we deal with the five-year plan, the capital
investment plan, is showing how we are able to do that. And it will be a challenge,
particularly if it sticks at around $1 billion [per year]. As I've said publicly, and actually, I
said we could probably—I've stated publicly before that we could probably construct
comfortably at about 1.5 billion [dollars] a year. But if we were to take care of all the Coast
Guard’s projects that are out there, including shore infrastructure that that fleet that takes
care of the Yemen [sic: inland] waters is approaching 50 years of age, as well, but I have
no replacement plan in sight for them because we simply can't afford it. Plus, we need at
some point to build a polar icebreaker. Darn tough to do all that stuff when you're pushing
down closer to 1 billion [dollars per year], instead of 2 billion [dollars per year].
As I said, we could fit most of that in at about the 1.5 billion [dollars per year] level, but
the projections don't call for that. So we are scrubbing the numbers as best we can. 90

At a March 24, 2015, hearing on the Coast Guard’s proposed FY2016 budget before the
Homeland Security subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, Admiral Paul
Zukunft, Admiral Papp’s successor as Commandant of the Coast Guard, stated the following:
I look back to better years in our acquisition budget when we had a—an acquisition budget
of—of $1.5 billion. That allows me to move these programs along at a much more rapid
pace and, the quicker I can build these at full-rate production, the less cost it is in the long
run as well. But there’s an urgent need for me to be able to deliver these platforms in a
timely and also in an affordable manner. But to at least have a reliable and a predictable
acquisition budget would make our work in the Coast Guard much easier. But when we
see variances of—of 30, 40% over a period of three or four years, and not knowing what
the Budget Control Act may have in store for us going on, yes, we are treading water now

89
90

Transcript of hearing. The remarks were made in response to a question from Sen. Mary Landrieu.
Transcript of hearing.

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but any further reductions, and now I am—I am beyond asking for help. We are taking on
water.91

An April 13, 2017, press report states the following (emphasis added):
[Then-]Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Paul Zukunft on Wednesday [April 12] said that
for the Coast Guard to sustain its recapitalization plans and operations the service needs a
$2 billion annual acquisition budget that grows modestly overtime to keep pace with
inflation.
The Coast Guard needs a “predictable, reliable” acquisition budget “and within that we
need 5 percent annual growth to our operations and maintenance (O&M) accounts,”
Zukunft told reporters at a Defense Writers Group breakfast. Inflation will clip 2 to 3
percent from that, but “at 5 percent or so it puts you on a moderate but positive glide slope
so you can execute, so you can build the force,” he said. 92

In an interview published on June 1, 2017, Zukunft said the following (emphasis added):
We cannot be more relevant than we are now. But what we need is predictable funding.
We have been in over 16 continuing resolutions since 2010. I need stable and repeatable
funding. An acquisition budget with a floor of $2 billion. Our operating expenses as I
said, they’ve been funded below the Budget Control Act floor for the past five years. I need
5 percent annualized growth over the next five years and beyond to start growing some of
this capability back.
But more importantly, we [need] more predictable, more reliable funding so we can execute
what we need to do to carry out the business of the world’s best Coast Guard. 93

91

Transcript of hearing. The remarks were made in response to a question from Rep. John Culberson.
Calvin Biesecker, “Zukunft Wants $2 Billion Baseline Acquisition Budget; Sustained Growth In O&M Funding,”
Defense Daily, April 13, 2017: 1.
93 Jill Aitoro, “Interview: Adm. Paul Zukunft Demands Coast Guard Respect,” Defense News, June 1, 2017.
92

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Appendix E. Great Lakes Icebreakers
This appendix provides a brief discussion of the Coast Guard’s Great Lakes icebreakers.94
The Coast Guard’s current Great Lakes icebreaker fleet consists of nine cutters:




one heavy icebreaker—Mackinaw (WLBB-30), a 240-foot ship displacing 3,500
tons (Figure E-1);
six 140-foot Bay-class icebreaking tugs displacing 662 tons each; and
two 225-foot Juniper-class seagoing buoy tenders displacing about 2,000 tons
each that have a light icebreaking capability.95
Figure E-1. Great Lakes Icebreaker Mackinaw

Source: U.S. Coast Guard, “USCGC Mackinaw,” accessed September 11, 2019, at
https://www.atlanticarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/District-9/Ninth-District-Staff/Prevention-Division/Cutters/
MACKINAW/.

Although Mackinaw is referred to as a heavy icebreaker, the word heavy in this instance is being
used in the context of Great Lakes icebreaking—Mackinaw is much larger and has more
icebreaking capability than the eight other ships listed above.96 Mackinaw would not, however,

This appendix includes material originally present in the section entitled “Great Lakes Icebreakers” on pages 7-10 of
CRS Testimony TE10030, Icebreaker Acquisition and the Need for a National Maritime Strategy, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
95 Source: U.S. Coast Guard, “Ninth Coast Guard District Units,” accessed November 19, 2018, at
https://www.atlanticarea.uscg.mil/Atlantic-Area/Units/District-9/Ninth-District-Units/. A total of 10 cutters are
assigned to the Ninth District, which is responsible for the Great Lakes, the Saint Lawrence Seaway, and parts of the
surrounding states. The tenth cutter assigned to the Ninth District is a 100-foot inland buoy tender whose primary
missions do not include icebreaking.
96 At continuous speeds of 3 knots, Mackinaw can break ice up to 32 inches thick, the 140-foot icebreaking tugs can
break ice up to 22 inches thick, and the 225-foot seagoing buoy tenders can break ice up to 14 inches thick.
94

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qualify as a heavy polar icebreaker, as it is much smaller and has much less icebreaking capability
than a heavy polar icebreaker.97
Coast Guard officials have stated that they do not view the procurement of additional Great Lakes
icebreakers as an urgent near-term acquisition need. In support of this assessment, they cite the
capabilities of the current Great Lakes icebreaking fleet, the relatively young age of Mackinaw
(which entered service in 2006), service life extension work being done on the ice-breaking tugs
that is designed to add 15 years to their service lives,98 and Canada’s own Great Lakes
icebreaking capabilities. A 2016 Coast Guard report to Congress on the Great Lakes icebreaking
mission stated the following:
The current mix of heavy and medium [Great Lakes] icebreakers is capable of managing
priorities and requests for icebreaking in Tier 1 and 2 waterways. When a severe ice season
stresses Coast Guard asset capabilities, the existing agreement and partnership with Canada
fills the capability gap and brings in extra heavy-icebreaking resources to manage the ice....
[T]he 2014 and 2015 ice seasons were a 20-year anomaly, consuming almost twice as many
cutter resource hours as in any other year since 2005.
The Coast Guard cannot reliably predict the economic impact of maintaining a single heavy
Great Lakes icebreaker. Additionally, given the extreme conditions when ice coverage
exceeds 90 percent, it is not clear that shipping delays would be significantly mitigated by
an increase in icebreaking capability. Delays can be associated with several factors such as
slow transit speeds, availability of pilots, and simultaneous and competing demand signals
for icebreaking services across the Great Lakes. 99

Supporters of procuring an additional Great Lakes icebreaker argue the following:






The 2014 and 2015 ice seasons were a 20-year anomaly, but the Coast Guard
should have a capability for supporting maritime commerce in above-average ice
seasons. About 24% of recent years (11 out of 46 years) featured 75% or higher
ice coverage.
The Coast Guard’s Great Lakes icebreaking capability is less sufficient for
meeting winter needs than the Coast Guard agues because its cutters are often not
available for duty, the Coast Guard reports restrictions for only some of the area’s
commercial waterways and not others, and the Coast Guard defines a waterway
as restricted or closed when two commercial ships get stuck in the ice in certain
waterways, overlooking instances where commercial ship operators decline to
operate their ships on those waters because they assess a high risk of the ships
getting stuck.
While the Canadian Coast Guard usually assigns one or more additional
icebreakers to the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes in severe ice seasons,

As discussed earlier in this report, the Coast Guard’s two heavy polar icebreakers—the operational Polar Star and
the nonoperational Polar Sea, are 399 feet long and displace about 13,200 tons each. Polar Star can break ice up to six
feet (72 inches) thick at a continuous speed of 3 knots. The Coast Guard states that Mackinaw is equivalent to the
Canadian Coast Guard ship Samuel Risley, a Great Lakes-homeported icebreaker and buoy tender that Canada
classifies as a light icebreaker in a comparison conducted across its entire icebreaking fleet, including its Arctic
icebreakers. (U.S. Coast Guard, Great Lakes Icebreaking Mission Analysis, Fiscal Year 2016 Report to Congress,
August 30, 2016, p. 5.)
98 For more on this service life extension work, see U.S. Coast Guard, “In-Service Vessel Sustainment Program,”
accessed November 19, 2018, at https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Assistant-Commandant-forAcquisitions-CG-9/Programs/Surface-Programs/In-Service-Vessel-Sustainment-Program/.
99 U.S. Coast Guard, Great Lakes Icebreaking Mission Analysis, Fiscal Year 2016 Report to Congress, August 30,
2016, p. 11. The report was required by S.Rept. 114-68 of June 18, 2015, the Senate Appropriations Committee’s
report on S. 1619, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2016 (see page 75).
97

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

Canadian Coast Guard ships operating there provide icebreaking assistance to
U.S. commercial ships only under certain circumstances, resulting in only a small
amount of icebreaking assistance being provided to U.S. commercial ships.
The service life extension work being done on the ice-breaking tugs does not
include the replacement of their main propulsion engines. Breakdowns of these
engines, which are becoming increasingly common, often result in these icebreaking tugs becoming unavailable for icebreaking in winter.

Some Members of Congress in recent years have expressed interest in the possibility of bolstering
the Coast Guard’s Great Lakes icebreaking fleet by procuring a second icebreaker with
capabilities generally similar to those of Mackinaw. Interest in this option was reinforced by the
winters of 2013-2014 and 2014-2015, which featured particularly high levels of ice coverage on
the Great Lakes.100 The committee report language requiring the above-quoted Coast Guard
report to Congress is one example of this interest.101 Another example is Section 820 of the Frank
LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018 (S. 140/P.L. 115-282 of December 4, 2018),
which states the following:
SEC. 820. Great Lakes icebreaker acquisition.
(a) Icebreaking on the Great Lakes.—For fiscal years 2018 and 2019, the Commandant of
the Coast Guard may use funds made available pursuant to section 4902 of title 14, United
States Code, as amended by this Act, for the construction of an icebreaker that is at least
as capable as the Coast Guard Cutter Mackinaw to enhance icebreaking capacity on the
Great Lakes.
(b) Acquisition plan.—Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Commandant shall submit a plan to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of
the House of Representatives for acquiring an icebreaker described in subsections (a) and
(b). Such plan shall include—
100

Although interest in procuring a second heavy Great Lakes icebreaker was reinforced by high levels of ice coverage
in the winters of 2013-2014 and 2014-2015, interest in Congress in procuring such a ship dates back further than 2013.
See, for example, H.R. 1747 of the 111th Congress, the Great Lakes Icebreaker Replacement Act, which was introduced
on March 26, 2009, reported by the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on April 21, 2009 (H.Rept. 11181), and agreed to by the House by voice vote on April 27, 2009. A similar bill, S. 1024, was introduced in the Senate
on May 12, 2009.
101 S.Rept. 114-68 stated the following:
GREAT LAKES ICEBREAKING CAPACITY
The Coast Guard is required by law to maintain a heavy icebreaking capability on the Great Lakes
to assist in keeping channels and harbors open to navigation in response to the reasonable demands
of commerce to meet the winter shipping needs of industry. The Committee is concerned that the
Coast Guard does not possess adequate capacity to meet its statutorily required icebreaking mission
on the Great Lakes, with negative consequences to the regional and national economy as well as to
the safety of local communities. While the Committee fully supports the Coast Guard’s Service
Life Extension Project for its nine-vessel 140-foot icebreaking tugs as part of the In-Service Vessel
Sustainment Program, it notes that additional assets may be necessary to successfully operate in the
heavy ice conditions often experienced by the Great Lakes. The Committee directs the Coast Guard
to undertake an updated mission analysis study to determine the assets necessary to effectively
carry out its icebreaking requirements on the Great Lakes, including consideration of a second
heavy icebreaker for the Great Lakes, consistent with the capabilities of the Mackinaw. The
updated mission analysis should factor in recent historically high levels of ice coverage and the
economic costs of reduced Great Lakes shipping associated with maintaining only one heavy
icebreaker. The updated mission analysis shall be submitted to the Committee not later than 180
days after the date of enactment of this act. (Page 75)

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(1) the details and schedule of the acquisition activities to be completed; and
(2) a description of how the funding for Coast Guard acquisition, construction, and
improvements that was appropriated under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017
(Public Law 115–31) will be allocated to support the acquisition activities referred to in
paragraph (1).102

An examination of procurement costs for Mackinaw, the National Science Foundation’s icecapable research ship Sikuliaq, new oceanographic research ships being procured for NOAA, and
OPCs suggests that a new Mackinaw-sized heavy Great Lakes icebreaker built in a U.S. shipyard
might have a design and construction cost between $175 million and $300 million, depending on
its exact capabilities and the acquisition strategy employed.103 The design portion of the ship’s
cost might be reduced if Mackinaw’s design or the design of some other existing icebreaker were
to be used as the parent design. Depending on the capabilities and other work load of the shipyard

102

In addition, Section 819 of S. 140/P.L. 115-282 states the following:
SEC. 819. Acquisition plan for inland waterway and river tenders and bay-class icebreakers.
(a) Acquisition plan.—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Commandant of the Coast Guard shall submit to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House
of Representatives a plan to replace or extend the life of the Coast Guard fleet of inland waterway
and river tenders, and the Bay-class icebreakers.
(b) Contents.—The plan under subsection (a) shall include—
(1) an analysis of the work required to extend the life of vessels described in subsection (a);
(2) recommendations for which, if any, such vessels it is cost effective to undertake a ship-life
extension or enhanced maintenance program;
(3) an analysis of the aids to navigation program to determine if advances in navigation technology
may reduce the needs for physical aids to navigation;
(4) recommendations for changes to physical aids to navigation and the distribution of such aids
that reduce the need for the acquisition of vessels to replace the vessels described in subsection (a);
(5) a schedule for the acquisition of vessels to replace the vessels described in subsection (a),
including the date on which the first vessel will be delivered;
(6) the date such acquisition will be complete;
(7) a description of the order and location of replacement vessels;
(8) an estimate of the cost per vessel and of the total cost of the acquisition program of record; and
(9) an analysis of whether existing vessels can be used.
103 Source: CRS analysis of cost per weight for Mackinaw (adjusted for inflation), Sikuliaq, new NOAA oceanographic
research ships now being procured, and OPCs.
Some press reports in 2015 and 2016 cited a cost of about $200 million for a new heavy Great Lakes icebreaker. (See,
for example, Todd Spangler, “A New Icebreaker for the Great Lakes? It’s Far from Certain,” Detroit Free Press,
August 7, 2015; “Frozen Commerce: Great Lakes Businesses Need a New Icebreaker,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette,
August 17, 2015; Todd Spangler, “Call for Arctic Icebreakers Could Hurt Great Lakes,” Detroit Free Press, September
1, 2015; Bob Gross, “Congress Authorizes New Icebreaker for Great Lakes,” Times Herald (Port Huron, MI), February
3, 2016; “Task Force Calls Anew for More Great Lakes Icebreakers, Second Poe-Sized Lock,” Professional Mariner,
February 17, 2016 [the article states that it presents the text of a news release from the Great Lakes Maritime Task
Force].) An opinion column in 2016 cited a figure of $240 million. (John Hageman, “Is Winter Great Lakes Shipping
Necessary?” Sandusky Register, February 18, 2016.)
The Great Lakes Maritime Task Force, an organization that states that it “was founded in 1992 in Toledo, Ohio, to
promote waterborne commerce and related industries on the Great Lakes” (see Great Lakes Maritime Task Force,
“About Us,” accessed November 26, 2018, at http://www.glmtf.org/about), states in its annual report for 2017 that a
second heavy Great Lakes icebreaker “is projected to cost $240 million.” (2017 Annual Report of Great Lakes
Maritime Task Force, PDF page 3 of 6, accessed November 26, 2018, at http://www.glmtf.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/05/2017-Annual-Report.pdf.) The same figure is cited in the organization’s annual report for 2016. The
organization’s annual report for 2015 cited a figure of approximately $200 million.

Congressional Research Service

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 Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program

selected to build the ship, the construction time for a new heavy Great Lakes icebreaker might be
less than that of a new heavy polar icebreaker.

Author Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
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Congressional Research Service

RL34391 · VERSION 196 · UPDATED

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