Policy Advisory Report on #8cantwait Use of Force
Policy Recommendations

Issued by the Community Oversight Board on June 24, 2020

 Table of Contents
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 3
#8cantwait: Nashville.................................................................................................................. 3
MNPD Policy Revisions ............................................................................................................. 8
Critiques of #8cantwait ............................................................................................................... 8
#1: Ban Choke Holds and Strangle Holds ................................................................................ 10
Background ............................................................................................................................... 10
MNPD Policies Related to Choke Holds .................................................................................. 11
MNPD Policy Change Effective June 11, 2020.................................................................... 11
Legal Context of Police Use of Choke Holds ........................................................................... 12
National Best Practices ............................................................................................................. 12
Model Policies ...................................................................................................................... 13
Policy Recommendation ........................................................................................................... 13
Example Neck Restraint Policy for Nashville ...................................................................... 14
#2: Requiring De-escalation Before Use of Force .................................................................... 15
Background ............................................................................................................................... 15
MNPD Policies Related to De-escalation ................................................................................. 15
Legal Context for Policies on De-escalation ............................................................................ 16
National Best Practices ............................................................................................................. 17
Model Policies ...................................................................................................................... 18
Policy Recommendation ........................................................................................................... 19
Example De-escalation Policy for Nashville: ....................................................................... 20
#3: Require Warning Before Shooting [Already Implemented]............................................. 21
Background ............................................................................................................................... 21
MNPD Policies Related to Warning Before Shooting .............................................................. 21
Policy Recommendation ........................................................................................................... 21
#4: Require Exhausting All Alternatives Before Shooting [Already Implemented]............. 22
Background ............................................................................................................................... 22
MNPD Policies Related to Exhausting All Alternatives .......................................................... 22
Policy Recommendation ........................................................................................................... 22
ii

 #5: Duty to Intervene [Implemented on June 11, 2020] .......................................................... 23
Background ............................................................................................................................... 23
MNPD Policies Related to Excessive Force and Duty to Intervene ......................................... 23
MNPD Policy Change Effective June 11, 2020.................................................................... 24
Legal Context for Failing to Intervene in Excessive Force ...................................................... 25
National Best Practices ............................................................................................................. 25
Model Policies ...................................................................................................................... 26
Policy Recommendation ........................................................................................................... 27
#6 Ban Shooting at Moving Vehicles ......................................................................................... 28
Background ............................................................................................................................... 28
MNPD Policies Related to Shooting at Moving Vehicles ........................................................ 28
Legal Context for Policies on Shooting at Moving Vehicles ................................................... 28
National Best Practices ............................................................................................................. 29
Model Policies ...................................................................................................................... 29
Policy Recommendation ........................................................................................................... 30
Example Policy for Nashville on Shooting at Moving Vehicles: ......................................... 31
#7 Use of Force Continuum [Already Implemented]............................................................... 32
Background ............................................................................................................................... 32
MNPD Policies Related to the Use of Force Continuum ......................................................... 32
Policy Recommendation ........................................................................................................... 32
#8: Require Comprehensive Reporting [Already Implemented] ........................................... 33
Background ............................................................................................................................... 33
MNPD Policies Related to Reporting Use of Force ................................................................. 33
Policy Recommendation ........................................................................................................... 34
References .................................................................................................................................... 35
Appendices ................................................................................................................................... 36
A. Roll Call Training: Chokehold or Similar Neck Restraint Techniques ............................... 36
B. Roll Call Training: Duty to Intervene .................................................................................. 37

iii

 Executive Summary
The organization Campaign Zero analyzes policing practices across the country and researches
effective solutions to end police violence. They also develop model legislation to help end police
violence nationwide and provide technical assistance to organizers leading police accountability
campaigns.1
The #8cantwait campaign includes eight policies that may be effective at decreasing police
killings:
1. Ban choke holds and strangle holds
2. Require de-escalation
3. Require warning before shooting [Already Implemented]
4. Require officers to exhaust all alternatives before shooting [Already Implemented]
5. Duty to intervene [Implemented on June 11, 2020]
6. Ban shooting at moving vehicles
7. Require a use of force continuum [Already Implemented]
8. Require comprehensive reporting [Already Implemented]
Research from Campaign Zero shows that each of these policies is correlated with fewer police
killings.2 Additionally, most of these policies have broad support among national policing
organizations and are implemented at many police departments across the nation. Many
Nashville residents have reached out to Metro Council members and the Mayor’s Office asking
for the implementation of these policies.
In this policy advisory report, Metro Nashville Community Oversight (MNCO) reviews these
policy recommendations and relevant policies in the Metro Nashville Police Department
(MNPD) Manual. In cases where the MNPD Manual does not include the recommendations,
nationwide best practices are reviewed, policy recommendations are issued, and example policy
language is proposed.
On June 11th, 2020, MNPD released two roll call training documents (see appendices) that
included changes to MNPD policy regarding choke holds and neck restraints as well as the duty
to intervene that are based on the #8cantwait campaign policy recommendations. These MNPD
policy changes and the resulting COB recommendations are addressed in the relevant sections of
this report.

“Campaign Zero - Vision” (Campaign Zero, n.d.), https://www.joincampaignzero.org/#vision.
Samuel Sinyangwe, “Examining the Role of Use of Force Policies in Ending Police Violence,” SSRN, September
20, 2016, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2841872; DeRay McKesson et al., “Police Use of Force Policy Analysis”
(Campaign Zero, September 20, 2016), http://useofforceproject.org/#review.
1
2

1

 According to the analysis by Campaign Zero, Nashville had three of the eight policies. Analysis
from MNCO finds that four of the eight recommendations were already implemented by MNPD
prior to the June 11th policy changes. Following the changes, five of the eight policies are fully
implemented while three require revision to align them with nationally recognized best practices.

The Community Oversight Board makes the following recommendations regarding policy
changes and provides example policies that can be adopted by the MNPD for the remaining
four recommendations made by Campaign Zero:
Recommendation on #1. Ban choke holds and strangle holds: “The COB recommends
that MNPD policy define “neck restraints” to include choke holds, carotid restraints, lateral
vascular restraints, and holds with a knee or other object on the neck while an individual is
prone.”
Recommendation on #2. Require de-escalation: “The COB recommends that deescalation tactics be required before an officer uses force, be it non-deadly and/or deadly,
and that failing to use reasonable de-escalation techniques when circumstances permit
should make the officer subject to disciplinary action. Policy should state that physical
force should only be used as a last resort. The MNPD Manual should also explicitly define
common de-escalation tactics that are available to officers.”
Recommendation on #6. Ban shooting at moving vehicles: “The COB recommends that
MNPD amend the policy prohibiting shooting of firearms at moving vehicles to specify that
the only circumstance where shooting at vehicles is allowed is when an occupant of the
vehicle is using deadly force, other than the vehicle itself, against the officer or another
person. We recommend that shooting at moving vehicles be prohibited except for in the
specified circumstances and that the disciplinary category for shooting at a moving vehicle is
included.”

2

 Introduction
The organization Campaign Zero analyzes policing practices across the country and researches
effective solutions to end police violence. They also develop model legislation to help end police
violence nationwide and provide technical assistance to organizers leading police accountability
campaigns.3
The #8cantwait campaign includes eight policies that may be effective at decreasing police
killings:
1. Ban choke holds and strangle holds
2. Require de-escalation
3. Require warning before shooting
4. Require officers to exhaust all alternatives before shooting
5. Duty to intervene
6. Ban shooting at moving vehicles
7. Require a use of force continuum
8. Require comprehensive reporting
Research from Campaign Zero shows that each of these policies is correlated with fewer police
killings.4 Additionally, most of these policies have broad support among national policing
organizations and are implemented at many police departments across the nation.
In this policy advisory report, Metro Nashville Community Oversight (MNCO) reviews these
policy recommendations and relevant policies in the Metro Nashville Police Department
(MNPD) Manual. In cases where the MNPD Manual does not include the recommendations,
nationwide best practices are reviewed, and policy recommendations are issued.
#8cantwait: Nashville
According to the analysis by Campaign Zero, Nashville had three of the eight policies (Figure 1).
Analysis from MNCO finds that four of the eight recommendations were already implemented
by MNPD prior to the June 11th, 2020 policy changes. Following the changes, five of the eight
policies are fully implemented while three require revision to align them with nationally
recognized best practices.
Many Nashville residents have reached out to Metro Council members and the Mayor’s office
asking for the implementation of these policies.

“Campaign Zero - Vision.”
Sinyangwe, “Examining the Role of Use of Force Policies in Ending Police Violence”; McKesson et al., “Police
Use of Force Policy Analysis.”
3
4

3

 Figure 1: Graphic from #8cantwait campaign

On Friday, June 5, 2020, Deputy Chief Hagar responded to an inquiry from Council Member
Withers asking about the eight policy recommendations and whether MNPD policy already
addresses these recommendations. His response stated:
As an internationally accredited law enforcement agency, who for 26 years has met
rigorous standards of independent review and evaluation of policies and practices - to the
Gold Standard of the accrediting body (CALEA), the MNPD recognizes that the use of
evidence informed standards and limitations on police use of force continue to demonstrate
that they can significantly reduce the need to use of force. Similarly, the value of a process to
ensure continuous review of use of force policy, training and reporting practices regarding
use of force remains an essential element of not only maintaining compliance with standards,
but also our goal to maintain community confidence in all that we do.
The strategies recommended by the #8cantwait are well received and are fully
endorsed by the MNPD. A review of the MNPD Manual would indicate that these
underlying elements of these principles are not new to the MNPD. They are consistent with

4

 the CALEA standards the MNPD continues to follow, the recommendations of industry
leaders in law enforcement best practices, and advocacy groups.
The MNPD has for several years made its entire department manual online for public
review at https://www.nashville.gov/Police-Department/Department-Manual.aspx
Within the Manual is the primary use of force policy. This policy is supplemented by
basic and ongoing training. The guiding principles of the MNPD use of force policy state:
The Metropolitan Nashville Police Department recognizes and respects the
value and special integrity of each human life. When investing police
employees with the lawful authority to use force to protect the public welfare,
a careful balancing of all human interests is required.
It is the policy of the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department that
authorized employees shall use only that force that is reasonably necessary to
effect lawful objectives. Therefore, intentional misuse of the authority granted
under this policy is grounds for disciplinary action up to and including those
outlined in category A (meaning discipline up to and including termination of
employment) of established policy for Discipline and Corrective Action.
A brief comparison of MNPD policy to the #8cantwait principles includes:
1. Require De-escalation
A basic, underlying, principle in the MNPD Policy Manual is (emphasis added):
When the use of force is needed, if feasible, authorized employees will identify
themselves and determine which options in the force continuum will best deescalate the situation in the most safe, reasonable, and prudent manner possible.
As recent as January 2019 training for all officers, included:
Officers should attempt to use non-confrontational verbal skills, empathy and/or
active listening to stabilize a person in crisis or when confronted with a situation
where control is required to effect an arrest or protect the public’s safety. The suspect
should be allowed to comply before force is used unless this causes unnecessary
danger to the officer or others.
De-escalation may also incorporate the use of additional time, distance and
resources as well as persuasion, command presence, repositioning, and warnings, to
reduce the intensity of a potentially violent situation to decrease the potential need to
use force. Application of these skills increases the potential for resolving the situation
with minimal force or no force at all, which reduces the likelihood of injury to the

5

 public, increases officer safety and mitigates the immediacy of potential or ongoing
threats.
A reduction in use-of-force incidents also reduces community complaints, promotes
the perception of procedural justice and, most importantly, promotes resolution of
events with the public’s compliance. Proportionality and de-escalation are both
critical pieces of the larger concepts of use of force and police legitimacy. Essential
to this is the force continuum and proportionality of response.
De-escalation is and remains a fundamental element of MNPD training and policy.
2. Ban chokeholds and strangleholds as a means to subduing alleged perpetrators.
Chokeholds are essentially prohibited under Tennessee law, unless certain elements are
included in the training. The MNPD does not train nor allow the use of choke holds or
neck restraints.
3. Promote a "Duty to Intervene" for any officer witnessing what they believe to be
an unjustified use of force.
Multiple provisions of existing department policy mandate that employees report and
intercede in situations where they become aware of other employees engaged in unlawful
acts, or those that otherwise violate department policy.
4. Ban shooting at moving vehicles.
The MNPD Policy Manual provides:
Employees shall not discharge their firearm at or from a moving vehicle unless
absolutely necessary to protect the life of the employee or others.
5. Require comprehensive reporting of ALL uses of force.
The MNPD Policy Manual mandates and creates a comprehensive process for reporting
force, or threatened force, force investigation, and numerous levels of review, beginning
with the requirement:
Personnel shall report all use of force incidents.
6. Exhaust all other means before shooting.
As noted above, MNPD policy emphasizes the use of de-escalation techniques and trains
officers to utilize measures available in order to peacefully resolve situations, when
possible. The discharging of a firearm is considered deadly force, and in order to utilize
deadly force, officers must have a reasonable belief the action is immediately necessary
to prevent imminent death or serious bodily injury of a human being, including the

6

 employee. The element of necessity requires the officer to have no other reasonable
means available before resorting to the use of deadly force.
7. Require warning before shooting
Consistent with state and federal law, MNPD policy requires:
Where feasible, the employee has identified himself/herself as a police employee and
given warning such as, “STOP--POLICE--I'LL SHOOT,” that deadly force is about
to be used unless flight ceases;…
8. Require use of force continuum
The MNPD Policy Manual mandates and creates a comprehensive force continuum
process by first requiring its use (emphasis added):
When the use of force is needed, if feasible, authorized employees will identify
themselves and determine which options in the force continuum will best deescalate the situation in the most safe, reasonable, and prudent manner possible.
The force-continuum is defined as:
Broad categories of force, in identifiable escalating/de-escalating stages of intensity,
in response to a subject's action. They are commonly identified as official presence,
verbal direction, soft empty-hand control, hand-held chemical spray/conducted
energy device, hard empty-hand control, batons, and firearms. A subject's action may
be defined in broad categories including full compliance to commands, verbal
uncooperativeness, passive resistance, active resistance, active aggression, and
aggravated active aggression (deadly force).
The MNPD Manual also provides for a process to ensure that the MNPD “shall conduct
such review as may be necessary to ensure that provisions remain relevant and any
necessary revisions are made”.
The MNPD remains committed to an ongoing use of force policy, training, and
reporting review process.
If you have additional questions, please let me know.
Mike Hagar
Deputy Chief
Executive Services Bureau
Metropolitan Nashville Police Department
PO Box 196399
Nashville, TN 37219-6399
(615) 862-7790
7

 MNPD Policy Revisions
On June 11th, 2020, MNPD released two roll call training documents (see appendix) that
included changes to MNPD policy regarding choke holds and neck restraints as well as the duty
to intervene that are based on the #8cantwait campaign policy recommendations. These MNPD
policy changes and the resulting COB recommendations are addressed in the relevant sections of
this report.
Critiques of #8cantwait
Several critiques of the #8cantwait campaign have been made since its launch after George Floyd
was murdered by police officers in Minneapolis. Generally, these critiques fall along two lines;
methodology and strategy.
The methodological critiques have primarily focused on two main areas, the outcome—fatal use
of force—and the conclusion that, “police departments that implement all eight use of force
policies would kill 72% fewer people on average than departments with none of these policies in
place.”5 Several other critiques have been made related to methodology but the two above are the
most prominent.
The outcome critique argues that fatal uses of force are less common than non-fatal uses of force
and that the study does not address whether the policies affect other non-fatal force. This is an
accurate critique but reliable data on non-fatal uses of force does not exist. In fact, no database of
police killings was available until The Washington Post, The Guardian, Mapping Police
Violence, and Fatal Encounters began collecting data in 2015. Federal reporting of police
shootings to the FBI is optional and only began in 2019.6 The data used by Campaign Zero was
the best available data on use of force across departments in the United States.
The critique of the conclusion that departments with all eight policies would kill 72% fewer
people than a department without any policies suggests that the figure is misleading. There are
departments with all eight policies that have high rates of police killings and departments with
few policies that have low rates. Additionally, the coding of the number of policies implemented
as a count from 0-8 assumes that each of the policies would have an equal impact on the number
of police killings, which is unlikely. Based on the results of the regression model, estimates are
calculated to predict the number of police killings. The 72% figure is the result of these
calculations. The figure is often presented by advocates as causal when the study was
correlational. It is incorrect to say that implementing all eight policies will cause the number of
killings to decline 72%. It is correct to say that, based on the model, departments with all eight
policies would, on average, have 72% fewer police killings than departments without any of the

Sinyangwe, “Examining the Role of Use of Force Policies in Ending Police Violence,” 4.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, “National Use-of-Force Data Collection,” 2019,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/use-of-force.
5
6

8

 eight policies. These critiques are all research limitations of linking the policies to the number of
police killings, not critiques of the policies themselves.
The second set of critiques on strategy argue that the #8cantwait proposals distract from systemic
critiques of police and some have responded with an #8toabolition campaign. The organizers of
the #8cantwait posted the following statement about this criticism:
Over the past week, we’ve heard from communities across the country who, like
us, have demanded radical transformative change that moves beyond policing as
key to public safety. We’ve seen dozens of cities adopt the goals of #8CANTWAIT,
policies that can reduce the harm caused by police in the short-term. And while we
are proud of the impact we were able to make, we at Campaign Zero acknowledge
that, even with the best of intentions, the #8CANTWAIT campaign unintentionally
detracted from efforts of fellow organizers invested in paradigmatic shifts that are
newly possible in this moment. For this we apologize wholeheartedly, and without
reservation. Our organization was founded on utilizing a data-driven approach to
creating solutions, and we are building processes to ensure our future projects are
bolder, more transparent and accountable to communities.
While we do not consider these adoptions a sole victory, we believe that they are
useful steps on the path towards a collective goal. We needed to be in further
conversation with the rest of our community, and are committed to this moving
forward.
While we stand by the idea that any political leaders truly invested in protecting
black lives should adopt the #8CANTWAIT policies, we also believe the end goal
for all of us should be absolute liberation from policing, and encourage visitors to
the site to support the range of organizers who are making progress in employing
other strategies towards abolition: defunding the police and reinvesting in
community.
If you are from a place where #8CANTWAIT is being considered, demand steps
towards defunding and abolition. If you are a legislator who has adopted these
policies or are considering it, please know that it will take many strategies to move
beyond policing and use this time to learn more and listen to the needs of your
community.7
The methodological and strategic critiques are important to consider but do not change the fact
that the eight use of force restrictions are good policies that have the potential to reduce the
number of police killings.

7

https://8cantwait.org/

9

 #1: Ban Choke Holds and Strangle Holds
Background
Choke holds and neck restraints are a controversial police tactic. On July 17, 2014, Eric Garner
was killed by an NYPD officer while saying: “I can’t breathe.” The officer who applied the
choke hold, Daniel Pantaleo, was fired five years after he killed Eric Garner because he used a
choke hold which was against NYPD policy but none of the officers involved in his death were
charged with a crime.
Choke holds are a type of neck restraint where an arm is placed around an individual’s neck in a
way that restricts breathing. Other forms of neck restraints are also used by police. New Orleans
Police Department defines neck holds as:
One of the following types of holds: (1) arm-bar control hold, a hold that inhibits
breathing by compression of the airway in the neck; (2) carotid restraint hold, a
hold that inhibits blood flow by compression of the blood vessels in the neck; (3)
lateral vascular neck constraint; or (4) a hold with a knee or other object to the back
of a prone subject's neck. A neck hold is considered lethal force.8
A 2006 report from the Canadian Police Research Centre defines the distinction between a
choke hold and a lateral vascular neck restraint:
The Lateral Vascular Neck Restraint is a police defense tactic used to restrain
violent individuals. Typically, the officer applying the technique will be at the rear
of the subject and will encircle the subject’s neck with his/her arm, with the radial
surface of the forearm on one side and the upper bicep/anterior deltoid on the other.
The throat of the subject rests in the elbow fold of the officer. Pressure is applied
equally to either side of the neck with the intention of creating transient
unconsciousness. The LVNR has been called by many names including the carotid
hold, the upper body control hold, and the sleeper hold. It is sometimes confused
with a choke hold, although the two techniques are quite different. Choke holds
work by impeding the flow of oxygen to the lungs as pressure is applied across the
front of the neck. Carotid holds, on the other hand, do not put pressure on the
windpipe.9
All neck restraints carry the risk of death.10 In Campaign Zero’s analysis of the largest 100
police departments’ policies, only 28 explicitly banned both choke holds and strangle holds
New Orleans Police Department, “Use of Force,” in New Orleans Police Department Operations Manual, Chapter
1.3, 2015, https://www.nola.gov/getattachment/NOPD/Policies/Chapter-1-3-Use-of-Force-EFFECTIVE-4-0118.pdf/.
9
Noreen Barros, “Calgary Police Service Neck Restraint Literature Review : A Review of Medical, Legal, and
Police Literature on Carotid Neck Restraint Techniques,” Technical report (Ottawa: Canadian Police Research
Centre, 2006).
10
Barros.
8

10

 (carotid restraints).11 Departments that banned both neck restraints had 22% fewer police
killings, on average, than departments without the policy.
A related concern to choke holds is positional asphyxia. Placement of individuals—especially
while restrained—in positions that inhibit breathing can cause unconsciousness or death. For
instance, a handcuffed individual should not be left face-down since that position can put
pressure on the chest inhibiting breathing, especially if weight is placed on the person’s neck or
back.
MNPD Policies Related to Choke Holds
MNPD’s use of force policy did not explicitly mention choke holds and made only one reference
to neck restraints prior to the June 11th, 2020 update. In the MNPD Manual §11.10.020 (S),
“restraining force” was defined as: “Force which is limited to holding and restraining persons,
which shall include arm-lock and takedown holds, but shall not include neck restraints.” The
term “neck restraints” is not defined in the policy.
MNPD Manual §11.10.030 (C) restricts officers from “us[ing] hobble restraints, leg shackles,
plastic ties, or any other device to place any subject in a manner which is likely to produce
positional asphyxia.” Presumably, this section prohibits a knee on the back or neck of a prone
individual since the action is high-risk for positional asphyxia.
Deputy Chief Hagar’s email to Metro Council members stated that, “Chokeholds are essentially
prohibited under Tennessee law, unless certain elements are included in the training. The MNPD
does not train nor allow the use of choke holds or neck restraints.”
MNPD Policy Change Effective June 11, 2020
MNPD issued a roll call training (Appendix A) informing officers of a policy change related to
choke holds. The change adds a definition to the Manual and restricts usage of the choke holds:12
Definitions
Chokehold or Similar Neck Restraint: any pressure or constriction to the neck,
throat or windpipe that may inhibit breathing.
Chokehold or Similar Neck Restraint Technique
A member of the MNPD shall not use a choke hold or other similar neck restraint
technique on any suspect, arrestee, defendant, or other person.

McKesson et al., “Police Use of Force Policy Analysis.”
“Roll Call Training: Policy Briefing - Chokehold or Similar Neck Restraint Techniques” (Metropolitan Police
Department, 2020).
11
12

11

 Legal Context of Police Use of Choke Holds
Tennessee law restricts law enforcement officers’ use of choke holds as cited in Deputy Chief
Hagar’s email to Metro Council members. Tennessee Code § 38-3-121—"Choke holds;
restrictions on use”—states:
No law enforcement officer shall use a choke hold or other similar respiratory
restraining maneuver, with or without the use of a police baton, on any suspect,
defendant or other person unless other methods of restraint are ineffective. Nothing
in this section shall be construed to prohibit the use of the lateral vascular maneuver.
Tennessee Code §38-8-113—“Choke hold and restraining maneuver training”—continues:
Use of choke holds and other similar restraining maneuvers, with or without the use
of a police baton, if included in the training curriculum, shall be taught to candidates
at state law enforcement training facilities as an alternative method of restraint to
be used after mace or other less dangerous methods of restraint have failed to be
effective or are unavailable.
According to Tennessee law, law enforcement may not block the airway of an individual but may
use lateral vascular neck restraints that block blood flow to the brain. If neck restraints are taught,
Tennessee law specifies that they are higher risk than other defensive techniques such as chemical
spray or Tasers.
National Best Practices
National police organizations have developed several different recommendations related to neck
restraints and choke holds. A 2017 consensus policy led by the International Association of
Chiefs of Police (IACP) and supported by 11 law enforcement leadership and labor organizations
including the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), the
Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), and other organizations states that choke holds should be
prohibited unless deadly force is authorized.13 The consensus recommendation does not extend
to other neck restraints including carotid holds or lateral vascular restraints. Previously, IACP
provided testimony to President Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing that said:
The use of choke holds—or similar procedures such as carotid control holds—has
long been a topic of debate. The purpose of the technique is to incapacitate an
aggressive subject temporarily to gain control of the situation. But because of the
risk involved with these techniques—they are intended to restrict the airflow
through the windpipe or flow of blood to the brain—some departments have
prohibited them outright, while others have narrowly defined the circumstances
under which they can be used. Most departments that allow this option classify the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, “National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force,”
October 2017, https://www.theiacp.org/resources/document/national-consensus-discussion-paper-on-use-of-forceand-consensus-policy.
13

12

 choke hold as deadly force. Federal agreements underscore this definition and
advocate the restrictive use of choke holds. In relevant consent decrees and MOAs,
the Department of Justice states that departments’ policies should “explicitly
prohibit the use of choke holds and similar carotid holds except where deadly force
is authorized.”14 [emphasis added]
The Police Executive Research Forum stated in an organization review of the Winslow, Arizona
Police Department that “PERF has traditionally recommended the prohibition of any type of neck
restraint due to the limited occasions in which it is generally used and the extensive training and
skill required to perform it effectively.”15 PERF added that if carotid holds are authorized only in
situations where lethal force is authorized, the department “must ensure all officers are trained and
tested yearly on the technique.”
Campaign Zero recommends that the best practice for choke holds and carotid restraints is to
prohibit them altogether.16
Model Policies
Campaign Zero recommends the following model policy: “Law enforcement officers shall not
use chokeholds, strangleholds, Lateral Vascular Neck Restraints, Carotid Restraints, chest
compressions, or any other tactics that restrict oxygen or blood flow to the head or neck.”
Campaign Zero also points to New Orleans Police Department’s (NOPD) policy that was issued
following the consent decree with the Department of Justice. NOPD’s policy defines neck holds
(as quoted above) and states: “Officers shall not use neck holds, except when lethal force is
authorized.”17
Policy Recommendation
Tennessee state law banning choke holds (but not other neck restraints) is insufficient. MNPD’s
policy revision on June 11th, 2020 strengthens departmental policy related to choke holds and
related neck restraints but requires additional specificity. The definition of “choke hold or similar
neck restraint” is focused on breathing but blood flow to the brain is also a central concern.
While the new policy definition would likely prohibit carotid restraints and lateral vascular neck
restraints because they may inhibit breathing if applied incorrectly, the policy should be explicit
about the restriction. The COB recommends that MNPD policy define “neck restraints” to
include choke holds, carotid restraints, lateral vascular restraints, and holds with a knee or other
object on the neck while an individual is prone.
International Association of Chiefs of Police, “Testimony of the International Association of Chiefs of Police:
Task Force on 21st Century Policing Listening Session on Policy and Oversight,” January 30, 2015, 129,
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/IACPTestimonyListeningSessionPolicyandOversight.pdf.
15
Police Executive Research Forum, “Winslow, AZ Police Department Review and Assessment” (Washington, DC,
April 2017), 15.
16
McKesson et al., “Police Use of Force Policy Analysis.”
17
New Orleans Police Department, “Use of Force.”
14

13

 Example Neck Restraint Policy for Nashville
Neck restraints are defined as one of the following types of holds: (1) arm-bar
control hold, a hold that inhibits breathing by compression of the airway in the
neck; (2) carotid restraint hold, a hold that inhibits blood flow by compression of
the blood vessels in the neck; (3) lateral vascular neck constraint; or (4) a hold with
a knee or other object to the back of a prone subject's neck.
Law enforcement officers shall not use neck restraints.

14

 #2: Requiring De-escalation Before Use of Force
Background
De-escalation tactics are actions that officers can take in potential force encounters in order to
reduce the chance that the encounter will require physical force.18 De-escalation may include
active listening, empathy, verbal persuasion, and warnings with the aim of resolving the situation
without use of physical force or minimal physical force. A core principle of police agencies is to
use only the force necessary to achieve lawful objectives. De-escalation is an effective method
for reducing the need for physical force, both deadly and non-deadly. While most police agencies
encourage de-escalation, only 44 out of 100 policies from the largest 100 police departments in
the United States require de-escalation whenever possible before using force.19
De-escalation is included in MNPD policy and training as a guiding principle to interactions that
might lead to physical force. Officers are trained to use verbal and non-verbal strategies to defuse
tense situations before force is needed. However, the MNPD Manual does not explicitly require
officers to attempt non-physical de-escalation tactics whenever possible.
MNPD Policies Related to De-escalation
The MNPD Manual defines physical force as, “the application of a technique, action, or device
to compel a change in the actions of another person; usually compliance with a desired behavior,
submission to authority, or to de-escalate a threatening behavior.20” Officers are authorized to
only use force that is “reasonable and necessary under the particular circumstances to protect
themselves or others from bodily injury, and only after other reasonable alternatives have been
exhausted or it is determined that such alternative action(s) would be ineffective under the
circumstances.21” Officers receive training on assessing resistance and applying reasonable force
based on the resistance of a suspect. Officers are trained to apply a force continuum that can
assist in determining what de-escalation tactics and physical force actions are necessary and
proportionate to the situation.
MNPD Manual §11.10.030 (A) outlines the parameters for the use of non-deadly force where the
Manual mentions de-escalation. The section states, “When the use of force is needed, if feasible,
authorized employees will identify themselves and determine which options in the force
continuum will best de-escalate the situation in the most safe, reasonable, and prudent manner.”22
MNPD Manual §11.10.020 outlines the “Definitions Specific to Use of Force” and defines the
“Force-Continuum” as:

International Association of Chiefs of Police, “National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force.”
McKesson et al., “Police Use of Force Policy Analysis.”
20
§11.10.020 (P) Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, Department Manual, 2018, 699,
https://www.nashville.gov/Police-Department/Department-Manual.aspx.
21
11.10.030 (E) Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, 700.
22
Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, Department Manual, 2018, https://www.nashville.gov/PoliceDepartment/Department-Manual.aspx.
18
19

15

 Broad categories of force, in identifiable escalating/de-escalating stages of
intensity, in response to a subject’s action. They are commonly identified as official
presence, verbal direction, soft empty-hand control, hand-held chemical
spray/electronic immobilization device, hard empty-hand control, batons, and
firearms. A subject’s action may be defined in broad categories including full
compliance to commands, verbal uncooperativeness, passive resistance, active
resistance, active aggression, and aggravated active aggression (deadly force).
When asked about de-escalation policies, MNPD Deputy Chief Mike Hagar provided the
following language in an email that he indicated was included in training for all officers as recent
as January 2019:
Officers should attempt to use non-confrontational verbal skills, empathy and/or
active listening to stabilize a person in crisis or when confronted with a situation
where control is required to effect an arrest or protect the public’s safety. The
suspect should be allowed to comply before force is used unless this causes
unnecessary danger to the officer or others.
De-escalation may also incorporate the use of additional time, distance and
resources as well as persuasion, command presence, repositioning, and warnings,
to reduce the intensity of a potentially violent situation to decrease the potential
need to use force. Application of these skills increases the potential for resolving
the situation with minimal force or no force at all, which reduces the likelihood of
injury to the public, increases officer safety and mitigates the immediacy of
potential or ongoing threats.
A reduction in use-of-force incidents also reduces community complaints,
promotes the perception of procedural justice and, most importantly, promotes
resolution of events with the public’s compliance. Proportionality and deescalation are both critical pieces of the larger concepts of use of force and police
legitimacy. Essential to this is the force continuum and proportionality of
response.
De-escalation is and remains a fundamental element of MNPD training and
policy.
Legal Context for Policies on De-escalation
Generally, courts have afforded law enforcement officers a significant amount of leeway in
determining whether force is warranted. The United States Supreme Court has routinely held that
a law enforcement officer’s use of force will be judged based on a “reasonableness” standard.
The review of an officer’s actions is not judged in hindsight in a vacuum but is instead based on
the judgment of an objectively reasonable officer on the scene.23

23

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).

16

 Similarly, courts have stated that officers are not required to engage in de-escalation tactics prior
to the use of force. For example, the Sixth Circuit has said, “no caselaw supports [an] assertion
[that] the deputies were prohibited from using any physical force . . .before first attempting
alternative de-escalation techniques.”24 Although de-escalation tactics may not be required by
law, the objective reasonableness standard put forth in cases like Tennessee v Garner may
necessitate the use of alternative means to resolve a conflict, which may include de-escalation
techniques, depending on the circumstances at a scene.
National Best Practices
Many police departments across the country have policies regarding the use of de-escalation. The
Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), a nationally recognized leader in police policy where
Nashville’s Chief of Police serves on the Board of Directors, recommends the adoption of a
formal de-escalation agency policy that includes discussion of proportionality, using distance and
cover, and tactical repositioning, “slowing down” situations that do not pose an immediate threat,
and calling for supervisory and other resources.25
IACP’s consensus policy with 11 national policing organizations recommends the following deescalation policy:
1. An officer shall use de-escalation techniques and other alternatives to higher
levels of force consistent with his or her training whenever possible and appropriate
before resorting to force and to reduce the need for force.
2. Whenever possible and when such delay will not compromise the safety of the
officer or another and will not result in the destruction of evidence, escape of a
suspect, or commission of a crime, an officer shall allow an individual time and
opportunity to submit to verbal commands before force is used.26
IACP’s consensus policy reflects two important points. First, that policy should explicitly require
alternatives to physical force whenever possible. Second, that—whenever possible—officers
should allow time for individuals to consider their situation and comply with verbal directions
prior to escalating up the force continuum.
Campaign Zero endorses a policy requiring de-escalation and found that the agencies that require
de-escalation have 15% fewer people killed by police than agencies without the requirement.27

24

Roell v. Hamilton Cty., 870 F.3d 471, 482 (6th Cir. 2017).
“Guiding Principles on Use of Force” (Police Executive Research Forum, 2016),
https://www.policeforum.org/assets/guidingprinciples1.pdf.
26
International Association of Chiefs of Police, “National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force,”
3.
27
Sinyangwe, “Examining the Role of Use of Force Policies in Ending Police Violence”; McKesson et al., “Police
Use of Force Policy Analysis.”
25

17

 Model Policies
PERF highlights the de-escalation policy from the Seattle Police Department in their Guiding
Principles on Use of Force document. The Seattle Police Department Policy states: “When safe
under the totality of the circumstances and time and circumstances permit, officers shall use deescalation tactics in order to reduce the need for force.”28
Campaign Zero also proposes a model policy for de-escalation.29 The Campaign Zero model
policy states:
DE-ESCALATION. Prior to using physical, non-deadly and/or deadly force, all
law enforcement officers must use proper de-escalation techniques to decrease the
likelihood that law enforcement officers will resort to force and to increase the
likelihood of cooperation between law enforcement officers and members of the
public.
Law enforcement officers shall employ effective communication techniques to
engage with individuals who are not compliant with orders by establishing rapport,
using the appropriate voice intonation, asking questions and providing advice to
defuse conflict and achieve voluntary compliance before resorting to force options.
MNCO researchers also reviewed the de-escalation policy from Camden County, New Jersey
which was developed in consultation with The Policing Project at NYU.30 The Camden County
de-escalation policy states:
CORE PRINCIPLE #2: Whenever feasible, officers should attempt to deescalate confrontations with the goal of resolving encounters without force.
Officers may only use force that is objectively reasonable, necessary, and as a
last resort.
“Guiding Principles on Use of Force.”
“Model Use Of Force Policy” (Campaign Zero, n.d.),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56996151cbced68b170389f4/t/5defffb38594a9745b936b64/1576009651688/C
ampaign+Zero+Model+Use+of+Force+Policy.pdf.
30
Camden County, NJ provides an interesting case example of police reform. In 2013, Camden City police
department was dissolved, and the Camden County police force took over policing responsibilities in Camden. A
motivating factor for the change was to circumvent the existing police union contract which financially prevented
the department from hiring more officers. The new county police department is double the size of the city
department. Serious crime fell in the years after the change; however, other New Jersey cities saw similar declines in
serious crime. Notably, there was a spike in summonses and low-level arrests in the year following the transition and
uses of force increased. In 2019, Camden County Police Department instituted a new use of force policy in
consultation with The Policing Project from NYU. The revised use of force policies require de-escalation. For more
information about Camden County Police Department reforms, see: https://www.inquirer.com/news/camden-policedefund-minneapolis-george-floyd-protest-20200609.html; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0604/how-camden-new-jersey-reformed-its-police-department;
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/06/16/camden-nj-police-reboot-is-being-misused-debate-overpolice-reform/; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/06/camden-nj-model-change-police-forces200609200444590.html; https://www.nj.com/camden/2019/08/camden-police-launch-strict-last-resort-use-of-forcepolicy-chief-wants-it-to-be-national-model.html
28
29

18

 7. Officers will use de-escalation and force-mitigation tactics and techniques
whenever safe and feasible to do so. It should be every officer’s goal to resolve
all situations without using force. To make this more likely, officers must use
de-escalation and force mitigation tactics and techniques whenever doing so
will not put the officer or another person at undue risk.
a) Officers will receive substantial training on the Critical Decision-Making
(CDM) model, as well as when and how to appropriately use de-escalation
and force-mitigation, including but not limited to Tactical Communication,
Tactical Positioning, and Time as a Tactic.
8. Officers will provide clear instructions and warnings whenever feasible
before using force. Whenever safe and feasible, officers should not use force
immediately when encountering noncompliance with lawful verbal directions.
Instead, whenever safe and feasible, before using force: officers should:
a. Provide clear instructions and warnings;
b. Seek to communicate in non-verbal ways when a verbal warning would
be inadequate (such as when the person does not speak English, or is
unable to hear or understand warnings);
c. Indicate the consequences of refusing to comply with a mandatory
order, including that force will be used unless the person complies; and
d. Give the person a reasonable amount of time to comply.
9. Officers must consider an individual’s mental, physical, or other
incapacities. Officers must, when feasible, consider whether a person’s failure
to comply with an officer’s command is due to a medical condition, mental
impairment, physical limitation, developmental disability, language barrier,
drug interaction, behavioral crisis, or other factors beyond the individual’s
control. In these situations, officers should consider whether specific techniques
or resources would help resolve the situation without force.
10. Officers should not exercise force unless it is necessary and as a last resort.
Officers should exhaust all other reasonable means before resorting to the use
of force. Using force only as a last resort means that officers not engage in
unnecessary, overly aggressive, or otherwise improper actions that create a
situation where force becomes needed. Using force only as a last resort also
means that an officer shall not use force if a safe alternative would achieve the
law enforcement objective. [emphasis in original]31
Policy Recommendation
The COB recommends that de-escalation tactics be required before an officer uses force, be it
non-deadly and/or deadly, and that failing to use reasonable de-escalation techniques when
circumstances permit should make the officer subject to disciplinary action. Policy should state
that physical force should only be used as a last resort. The MNPD Manual should also explicitly
define common de-escalation tactics that are available to officers.
“Use of Force” (Camden County Police Department, 2020),
https://policy.camdenpd.com:8443/pdf/CCV3C2%20Use%20of%20Force%20Policy.pdf.
31

19

 Example De-escalation Policy for Nashville:
All law enforcement officers must use proper de-escalation techniques prior to the
use of physical non-deadly and/or deadly force in order to decrease the likelihood
that officers will resort to the use of force and increase the likelihood of voluntary
compliance. Officers may only use force that is objectively reasonable, necessary,
and as a last resort. Officers shall consider whether a person’s failure to comply
with an officer’s command is due to a medical condition, mental impairment,
physical limitation, developmental disability, language barrier, drug interaction,
behavioral crisis, or other factors beyond the individual’s control. In these
situations, officers should consider whether specific techniques or resources would
help resolve the situation without force.

20

 #3: Require Warning Before Shooting [Already Implemented]
Background
Campaign Zero recommends requiring a verbal warning in all situations before using deadly
force. Similarly, IACP consensus policy of 11 policing organizations recommends the following
policy: “Where feasible, the officer shall identify himself or herself as a law enforcement officer
and warn of his or her intent to use deadly force.”32
MNPD Policies Related to Warning Before Shooting
MNPD Manual §11.10.130—“Use of Deadly Force to Effect an Arrest—states:
Authorized employees may use deadly force to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon
only when:
A. The employee has probable cause to believe the individual to be arrested has
committed a felony involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious
bodily injury; AND
B. The employee has probable cause to believe that the individual to be arrested
poses a threat of death or serious bodily injury, either to the employee or to others
unless immediately apprehended; AND
C. Where feasible, the employee has identified himself/herself as a police employee
and given warning such as, “STOP--POLICE--I'LL SHOOT,” that deadly
force is about to be used unless flight ceases; AND
D. If all other means of apprehension available to the employee under the attendant
circumstances have been exhausted.
Policy Recommendation
No recommendation is made since MNPD policy is consistent with model recommendations.

32

International Association of Chiefs of Police, “National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force,”

4.

21

 #4: Require Exhausting All Alternatives Before Shooting [Already
Implemented]
Background
Campaign Zero recommends a policy that requires officers to exhaust all other alternatives,
including non-physical force and less-lethal force options, prior to resorting to deadly force.33
MNPD Policies Related to Exhausting All Alternatives
MNPD Manual §11.10.010 states:
“It is the policy of the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department that
authorized employees shall use only that force that is reasonably necessary to
effect lawful objectives. Therefore, intentional misuse of the authority granted
under this policy is grounds for disciplinary action up to and including those
outlined in category A of established policy for Discipline and Corrective
Action. [emphasis in original]
This policy is for Metropolitan Nashville Police Department use only and does not
apply in any criminal or civil legal proceedings. This department policy should not
be construed as the creation of a higher legal standard of care. Violation of this
directive will only form the basis for departmental administrative sanction.”
MNPD Manual §11.10.130 outlines the Use of Deadly Force to Effect an Arrest. It states:
Authorized employees may use deadly force to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon
only when:
A. The employee has probable cause to believe the individual to be arrested has
committed a felony involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily
injury; AND
B. The employee has probable cause to believe that the individual to be arrested poses
a threat of death or serious bodily injury, either to the employee or to others unless
immediately apprehended; AND
C. Where feasible, the employee has identified himself/herself as a police employee
and given warning such as; “STOP--POLICE--I’LL SHOOT,” that deadly force
is about to be used unless flight ceases; AND
D. If all other means of apprehension available to the employee under the attendant
circumstances have been exhausted. [emphasis in italics added; bold in original]
Policy Recommendation
No recommendation is made since MNPD policy is consistent with model recommendations.

33

“#8cantwait” (Campaign Zero, n.d.), https://8cantwait.org/.

22

 #5: Duty to Intervene [Implemented on June 11, 2020]
Background
Police officers are authorized to use reasonable and necessary force in order to achieve
compliance with a lawful order. Unfortunately, examples of excessive force are abundant and
undermine the legitimacy of police. Accountability after excessive force is important for
rebuilding trust, but policies that can reduce excessive force before they occur are critical. One
such policy is a duty to intervene when officers witness excessive force from their peers.
The murder of George Floyd by police officers in Minneapolis, Minnesota on May 25th, 2020
was an example of when three officers had the opportunity and responsibility to intervene to save
the life of a man who was being suffocated by a police officer kneeling on his neck. All four
officers were quickly fired because one officer used deadly force while Mr. Floyd was restrained
and the other three failed to intervene, which is against the city’s duty to intervene policy
adopted in 2016. Metro Nashville Police Department (MNPD) Police Chief, Steve Anderson, in
a statement about the killing of George Floyd said that the lack of intervention from the other
officers was “intolerable.”
Prior to the June 11, 2020 policy revision, MNPD policy did not state that personnel have a duty
to intervene when fellow officers are using excessive force.
MNPD Policies Related to Excessive Force and Duty to Intervene
The MNPD Manual defines physical force as, “the application of a technique, action, or device
to compel a change in the actions of another person; usually compliance with a desired behavior,
submission to authority, or to de-escalate a threatening behavior.34” Officers are authorized to
only use force that is “reasonable and necessary under the particular circumstances to protect
themselves or others from bodily injury, and only after other reasonable alternatives have been
exhausted or it is determined that such alternative action(s) would be ineffective under the
circumstances.35” Officers receive training on assessing resistance and applying reasonable force
based on the resistance of a suspect. Officers are trained to apply a force continuum that can
assist in determining what de-escalation tactics and physical force actions are necessary in a
situation.
MNPD Manual §4.20 outlines standards of conduct and discipline for the department.36
Applying more force than is reasonable or necessary is considered “abusive treatment.”
§4.20.040 (N) states that “employees shall not treat any person or animal cruelly by the use of
excessive force or failing to act in a humane manner when circumstances justify such action.”
Abusive treatment is a Category B offense carrying a consequence of an 8-13-day suspension for
a first offense, 14-19-day suspension and/or demotion for a second offense, and a 20-day

34

§11.10.020 (P) Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, Department Manual, 2018, 699.
11.10.030 (E) Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, 700.
36
Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, Department Manual, 2018.
35

23

 suspension and/or demotion or dismissal for a third offense. Other disciplinary infractions can be
applied in cases of excessive force which could result in discipline, including dismissal.
Since excessive use of force is police misconduct, all officers who witness it are required by
policy to report it to a supervisor. §4.20.050 (T)—Failure to Report Misconduct—states:
Any department employee who observes or becomes aware of any act of
misconduct by another employee of the government shall immediately report the
incident to their immediate supervisor or the most appropriate Metropolitan
Nashville Police Department (MNPD) supervisor (Violation of this provision may
be charged up to and including the category of the underlying offense not reported.)
The failure to report misconduct policy suggests that officers have a responsibility to report
excessive force to a supervisor when they witness it, but the policy did not require them to
intervene for the welfare of an individual being abused by fellow officers until the June 11th
policy change.
MNPD Policy Change Effective June 11, 2020
MNPD issued a roll call training (Appendix B) informing officers of a policy change related to
the duty to intervene. The change adds a definition to the Manual and outlines multiple points
regarding the duty to intervene:37
Definitions
Intervene: To come between, whether verbally or physically so as to prevent or
alter a result or course of events.
Duty to Intervene
1. All members must recognize and act upon the Duty to Intervene in order to
prevent or stop any member from conducting any act that violates law or policy
(including, but not limited to excessive or unlawful force, unlawful behavior,
abuses of authority or major violations of department policy or procedure).
2. Such interventions shall be reported to an appropriate supervisor without delay.
Successful intervention does not negate a duty to report.
3. Consistent with established policy and training, if medical attention is required
by any individual, ensure that medical attention has been provided and/or
summoned.
4. Failure to intervene or report may subject a member to disciplinary action.
(Category varies by severity of violation)

37

“Roll Call Training: Policy Briefing - Duty to Intervene” (Metropolitan Police Department, 2020).

24

 Legal Context for Failing to Intervene in Excessive Force
The Supreme Court of the United States has found that, under the doctrine of qualified
immunity, a government official that performs a discretionary function is protected from civil
liability as long as their conduct does not violate an established statutory or constitutional right
known to a reasonable person.38 Similarly, Tennessee and its local governments are protected
from liability by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the Tennessee Governmental Tort
Liability Act (TGTLA). However, there are circumstances when a law enforcement officer or the
municipality they represent may be held liable for their failure to protect a person from the
excessive use of force of a fellow officer. The Sixth Circuit has stated “Generally speaking, a
police officer who fails to act to prevent the use of excessive force may be held liable when (1)
the officer observed or had reason to know that excessive force would be or was being used, and
(2) the officer had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring.”39
Similarly, governmental immunity for municipalities may not apply if an injury results from the
negligent acts of its employees acting within the scope of their employment.
Most courts acknowledge that, in many situations, an officer must decide to use force within
fractions of a second. An officer’s failure to prevent the excessive use of force in these moments
typically does not carry civil liability. However, the incident occurring in Minneapolis highlights
a scenario that can arise wherein an officer has an obligation to act to prevent excessive force. In
Minneapolis, an officer left his knee on the throat of George Floyd for several minutes. Under
the requirements in Turner v. Scott, officers in Minneapolis had the opportunity to observe the
excessive force and the opportunity to act to prevent harm from occurring. Had this incident
occurred in Tennessee, these officers could be held liable. The potential liability of an officer and
the Metropolitan Government, if an officer negligently fails to act to prevent excessive force
being used, justifies MNPD adopting both training and policies on the duty of an officer to
intervene.
National Best Practices
Multiple organizations include a duty to intervene as a best practice for police organizations.
PERF, a nationally recognized leader in police policy where Nashville’s Chief of Police serves
on the Board of Directors, includes a duty to intervene as a guiding principle on use of force.40
They state:
Officers should be obligated to intervene when they believe another officer is about
to use excessive or unnecessary force, or when they witness colleagues using
excessive or unnecessary force, or engaging in other misconduct. Agencies should
also train officers to detect warning signs that another officer might be moving
38

See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing see Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d
Cir.1994)).
40
Police Executive Research Forum, Guiding Principles on Use of Force, Critical Issues in Policing Series
(Washington, D.C., 2016), https://www.policeforum.org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf.
39

25

 toward excessive or unnecessary force and to intervene before the situation
escalates.41 [emphasis in original]
Duty to intervene policies have been increasing in departments across the country for decades.
NYPD instituted a duty to intervene policy in 1993 after Rodney King was beaten by LAPD
officers and a sergeant was seen on the video passively watching.42 Citing the former police chief
of San Francisco, Greg Suhr, PERF states that, “when an officer intervenes to stop misconduct,
that can increase community trust.43” Suhr stated, “What we try to tell our officers in San
Francisco is that something like that [intervening in response to excessive force] will be on video
too. It won’t just be the bad stuff; it’ll be the corrective action that somebody took, or the
apology. That’ll be on the video as well.”
Campaign Zero, an organization dedicated to reducing officer involved shootings, also endorses
a duty to intervene policy and has found that agencies with the policy have fewer shootings by
police officers.44 In a 2016 report, the authors analyzed policies from the 100 largest departments
in the United States, including Nashville, and found that 48 out of 100 departments include a
duty to intervene in their use of force policy. Additionally, they found that departments that had a
duty to intervene in their policy had 9% fewer police killings per capita than departments without
a duty to intervene.
Model Policies
PERF highlights policies from Phoenix Police Department and Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department.45
•

The Phoenix policy states: “All sworn employees will intervene, if a reasonable
opportunity exists, when they know or should know another employee is using
unreasonable force.”

•

The Las Vegas Policy states: “Any officer present and observing another officer using
force that is clearly beyond that which is objectively reasonable under the circumstances
shall, when in a position to do so, safely intercede to prevent the use of such excessive
force. Officers shall promptly report these observations to a supervisor.”

Campaign Zero proposes a model policy as well as highlights San Francisco Police Department’s
policy.
•

The Campaign Zero model policy states: “All law enforcement officers must intervene
when they reasonably believe that a law enforcement officer is using or is about to use
unnecessary or excessive force in violation of this mission [minimizing physical harm

41

Police Executive Research Forum, 41.
Police Executive Research Forum, 46.
43
Police Executive Research Forum, 42.
44
McKesson et al., “Police Use of Force Policy Analysis.”
45
Police Executive Research Forum, Guiding Principles on Use of Force, 41–42.
42

26

 and unnecessary use of force], and must report the incident to a supervisor. Failure to
report incidents involving the use of unnecessary or excessive force will result in
disciplinary action.
•

The San Francisco policy states: “When in a position to do so, officers shall intervene
when they know or have reason to know, that another officer is about to use, or is using,
unnecessary force. Officers shall promptly report any use of unnecessary force and the
efforts made to intervene to a supervisor.”

Policy Recommendation
Based on revisions to the MNPD Manual on June 11th, 2020, current MNPD policy is consistent
with the #8cantwait recommendation and national best practices.

27

 #6 Ban Shooting at Moving Vehicles
Background
Police officers are authorized to use reasonable and necessary force in order to achieve
compliance with a lawful order. Policies regarding the use of force can help to reduce excessive
force and ensure that actions taken are safe for officers and all others present at the scene of an
incident. One such policy is to prohibit the shooting of firearms at or from a moving vehicle.
When an officer fires at a vehicle, bystanders are put at heightened risk if the driver loses control
or is incapacitated.
MNPD’s existing policy is very close to several best practice policies recommended by
Campaign Zero and other police organizations. Based on the following review, we recommend a
revision to the current policy.
MNPD Policies Related to Shooting at Moving Vehicles
MNPD Manual §11.10.150 General Provisions Section D states that “Employees shall not
discharge their firearm at or from a moving vehicle unless absolutely necessary to protect the life
of the employee or others.” In bullet E of the same section, it is further stated that, “Employees
shall not knowingly place themselves in a position where they would be in jeopardy of being
struck by a suspect vehicle or knowingly stand and/or step into the path of a vehicle, creating
circumstances where the use of deadly force may be necessary.” [emphasis in original]
Legal Context for Policies on Shooting at Moving Vehicles
In Tennessee v. Garner, the United States Supreme Court said, “The use of deadly force to
prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstance, is constitutionally
unreasonable. It is not better that all felony suspects die than they escape. Where the suspect
poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failure to
apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.”46 Likewise, multiple cases
within the Sixth Circuit have held that law enforcement officers may only use deadly force when
they have probable cause to believe that a suspect poses a serious physical threat either to the
officer or members of the public.47
The important takeaway from these cases is that simply because the suspect is in a motor vehicle
does not mean that force is warranted. Without the threat of imminent danger, discharging a
weapon at a fleeing vehicle is improper.48

46

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
See Williams v. City of Grosse Pointe Park, 496 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2007); see Dudley v. Eden, 260 F.3d 722,
726-27 (6th Cir. 2001); see Scott v. Clay County, 205 F.3d 867, 871-73 (6th Cir. 2000).
48
See Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 537 (6th Cir. 2006).
47

28

 National Best Practices
Many police departments across the country have policies regarding the shooting of firearms at
moving vehicles. PERF recommends that “agencies should adopt a prohibition against shooting
at or from a moving vehicle unless someone in the vehicle is using or threatening deadly force by
means other than the vehicle itself.”49
Policies prohibiting law enforcement officers from shooting at moving vehicles are not new.
Many law enforcement agencies across the country have had such policies for years, including
the New York Police Department, which enacted their policy in 1972.50
Campaign Zero, an organization dedicated to reducing officer involved shootings, also endorses
a policy banning shooting at moving vehicles and found that agencies with such policies have
8% fewer police killings than agencies without the policy.51
Model Policies
PERF’s guiding principles state that a prohibition on shooting at moving vehicles has been
recommended to individual agencies for years and that it is also included in the model use of
force policy from the International Association of Chiefs of Police. PERF highlights multiple
cities whose police departments have this policy in effect including New York, Boston, Chicago,
Cincinnati, Denver, Philadelphia, and Washington, DC.52
•

The New York Police Department Policy states: “Members of the service SHALL NOT:
Discharge their firearms at or from a moving vehicle unless deadly physical force is
being used against the member of the service or another person present, by means other
than a moving vehicle.”53 [emphasis in original]

•

The Denver Police Department Policy states: “Firing at moving vehicles: Firing at a
moving vehicle may have very little impact on stopping the vehicle. Disabling the driver
may result in an uncontrolled vehicle, and the likelihood of injury to occupants of the
vehicle (who may not be involved in the crime) may be increased when the vehicle is
either out of control or shots are fired into the passenger compartment. An officer
threatened by an oncoming vehicle shall, if feasible, move out of the way rather than
discharging a firearm. Officer(s) shall not discharge a firearm at a moving vehicle or its
occupant(s) in response to a threat posed solely by the vehicle unless the officer has an
objectively reasonable belief that:

“Guiding Principles on Use of Force.”
“Guiding Principles on Use of Force.”
51
“#8cantwait.”
52
“Guiding Principles on Use of Force.”
53
“Use of Force Policy Database” (Campaign Zero, n.d.), https://useofforceproject.org/database.
49
50

29

 o The vehicle or suspect poses an immediate threat of death or serious physical
injury to the officer or another person and
o The officer has no reasonable alternative course of action to prevent death or
serious physical injury.54
Campaign Zero proposes a model policy as well as highlights the Philadelphia Police
Department’s policy.
•

The Campaign Zero model policy states: “Officers shall not discharge a firearm at or into
a moving vehicle unless the occupants of the vehicle are using deadly force, other than
the vehicle itself, against the officer or another person, and such action is necessary for
self-defense or to protect the other person; shall not intentionally place themselves in the
path of, or reach inside, a moving vehicle; and shall attempt to move out of the path of a
moving vehicle.”55

•

The Philadelphia Police Department policy states: “Police officers shall not discharge
their firearms AT a vehicle unless a person in the vehicle is immediately threatening the
officer or another person with deadly force by means other than the vehicle (e.g., officers
or civilians are being fired upon by the occupants of the vehicle). [emphasis in original]
a) A moving vehicle alone shall not presumptively constitute a threat that justifies an
officer’s use of deadly force.
b) Officers shall not move into or remain in the path of a moving vehicle. Moving
into or remaining in the path of a moving vehicle, whether deliberate or
inadvertent, SHALL NOT be justification for discharging a firearm at the vehicle
or any of its occupants. An officer in the path of an approaching vehicle shall
attempt to move to a position of safety rather than discharging a firearm at the
vehicle or any of the occupants of the vehicle. [emphasis in original]
NOTE: An officer should never place themselves or another person in jeopardy in
an attempt to stop a vehicle.”56

Policy Recommendation
The COB recommends that MNPD amend the policy prohibiting shooting of firearms at moving
vehicles to specify that the only circumstance where shooting at vehicles is allowed is when an
occupant of the vehicle is using deadly force, other than the vehicle itself, against the officer or
another person. We recommend that shooting at moving vehicles be prohibited except for in the

“Use of Force Policy Database.”
“Model Use Of Force Policy.”
56
“Use of Force Policy Database.”
54
55

30

 specified circumstances and that the disciplinary category for shooting at a moving vehicle is
included.
Example Policy for Nashville on Shooting at Moving Vehicles:
MNPD officers shall not discharge a firearm at or into a moving vehicle unless the
occupants of the vehicle are using deadly force, other than the vehicle itself (e.g.,
officers or civilians are being fired upon by the occupants of the vehicle), against
the officer or another person, and such action is necessary for self-defense or to
protect the other person; shall not intentionally place themselves in the path of, or
reach inside, a moving vehicle; and shall attempt to move out of the path of a
moving vehicle.
Moving into or remaining in the path of a moving vehicle, whether deliberate or
inadvertent, SHALL NOT be justification for discharging a firearm at the vehicle
or any of its occupants. An officer in the path of an approaching vehicle shall
attempt to move to a position of safety rather than discharging a firearm at the
vehicle or any of the occupants of the vehicle.

31

 #7 Use of Force Continuum [Already Implemented]
Background
Campaign Zero recommends establishing a “Force Continuum that restricts the most severe
types of force to the most extreme situations and creates clear policy restrictions on the use of
each police weapon and tactic.”57
MNPD Policies Related to the Use of Force Continuum
MNPD Manual §11.10.020 outlines the Definitions Specific to Use of Force and defines the
Force-Continuum as:
Broad categories of force, in identifiable escalating/de-escalating stages of
intensity, in response to a subject’s action. They are commonly identified as official
presence, verbal direction, soft empty-hand control, hand-held chemical
spray/electronic immobilization device, hard empty-hand control, batons, and
firearms. A subject’s action may be defined in broad categories including full
compliance to commands, verbal uncooperativeness, passive resistance, active
resistance, active aggression, and aggravated active aggression (deadly force).
Policy Recommendation
No recommendation is made since MNPD policy is consistent with model recommendations.

57

“#8cantwait.”

32

 #8: Require Comprehensive Reporting [Already Implemented]
Background
Campaign Zero recommends that policies require police officers to report all uses of force
including threats of force and pointing a firearm at someone. Campaign Zero categorized MNPD
as not meeting the policy; however, since the publication of the MNPD Manual in 2018, the
department has revised use of force reporting in a way that meets the recommendation.
MNPD Policies Related to Reporting Use of Force
MNPD Manual §11.10.170—“Reporting Use of Force”—requires reporting of use of force
incidents. The Manual states:
A. Personnel shall report all use of force incidents. However, no MNPD Form 108
is required when official presence, verbal direction, and/or soft empty-hand
control is used by the employee and there is no injury and no allegation of injury.
B. Use of force incidents to be reported shall include but are not limited to:
1. Whenever an employee discharges a firearm, other than for training, or
legal recreational purposes;
2. Whenever an employee takes an action that results in (or is alleged to
have resulted in) injury or death of another person;
3. When force is applied through the use of less lethal weapons, CE devices,
chemical spray, baton, etc.; and/or
4. Whenever an employee uses defensive or physical force other than soft
empty-hand control.
C. The employee involved in a use of force incident shall notify the appropriate
supervisor immediately and complete an MNPD Form 108, Use of Force Report.
D. The employee’s immediate supervisor shall investigate the incident and review
the MNPD Form 108, Use of Force Report and any associated documents
completed by the employee, and document his/her findings on an MNPD Form
104, Supplement Report.
The National Institutes of Justice defines “soft empty hand control” as, “officers us[ing] grabs,
holds and joint locks to restrain an individual.”58 In these cases, a use of force report is not
required.
The published Manual dated August 20th, 2018 would not qualify as comprehensive reporting
because it did not require officers to report when a firearm was pointed at an individual. MNPD
began requiring reporting of firearm displays as of January 2019.59 Several changes to reporting
National Institute of Justice. Office of Justice Programs, “The Use-of-Force Continuum,” August 3, 2009,
https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/use-force-continuum.
59
Deputy Chief Hagar, e-mail message to Dr. Peter Vielehr, MNCO Lead Research Analyst, October 4, 2019.
58

33

 were also made at the end of 2019. A January 2nd, 2020 roll-call training informed officers of
several changes.
The first change is to distinguish between injuries sustained prior to officer arrival, self-inflicted
injuries, and injuries from physical or defensive force from the officer. Only injuries sustained
due to officer force are reportable to the FBI’s National Use-of-Force Data Collection program
so MNPD procedures were updated to streamline reporting.
The second change was to reporting firearm displays. The Manual §11.10.020 was updated
defining “Display of Firearm” as:
Drawing and aiming, or similar un-holstered display indicating potential use,
without discharge, of a firearm in circumstances where any person perceives the
action as a threat of a use of force, whether or not this is accompanied by a verbal
warning, aiming at or illuminating a subject with a weapon mounted light.
Additionally, §11.10.170 on reporting is updated to state:
The display of a firearm when such display has had the effect of reducing or
eliminating the need for additional use of force. Reporting of such displays shall be
by the completion of a Firearm Display Report-MNPD Form 108F (if no other force
is used, a Use of Force Report-MNPD Form 108 is not required). Firearm Displays
are not reported by the MNPD as a Use of Force and are captured for Law
Enforcement Certification purposes only. [emphasis in original]
The language of the firearm display policy mirrors the policy for reporting Taser display which
was already required in the August 2018 version of the MNPD Manual.
Policy Recommendation
No recommendation is made since MNPD policy is consistent with model recommendations.

34

 References
“#8cantwait.” Campaign Zero, n.d. https://8cantwait.org/.
Barros, Noreen. “Calgary Police Service Neck Restraint Literature Review : A Review of
Medical, Legal, and Police Literature on Carotid Neck Restraint Techniques.” Technical
report. Ottawa: Canadian Police Research Centre, 2006.
“Campaign Zero - Vision.” Campaign Zero, n.d. https://www.joincampaignzero.org/#vision.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. “National Use-of-Force Data Collection,” 2019.
https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/use-of-force.
“Guiding Principles on Use of Force.” Police Executive Research Forum, 2016.
https://www.policeforum.org/assets/guidingprinciples1.pdf.
International Association of Chiefs of Police. “National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper
on Use of Force,” October 2017. https://www.theiacp.org/resources/document/nationalconsensus-discussion-paper-on-use-of-force-and-consensus-policy.
———. “Testimony of the International Association of Chiefs of Police: Task Force on 21st
Century Policing Listening Session on Policy and Oversight,” January 30, 2015.
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/IACPTestimonyListeningSessionPolicyandOv
ersight.pdf.
McKesson, DeRay, Samuel Sinyangwe, Johnetta Elzie, and Brittany Packnett. “Police Use of
Force Policy Analysis.” Campaign Zero, September 20, 2016.
http://useofforceproject.org/#review.
Metropolitan Nashville Police Department. Department Manual, 2018.
https://www.nashville.gov/Police-Department/Department-Manual.aspx.
———. Department Manual, 2018. https://www.nashville.gov/Police-Department/DepartmentManual.aspx.
“Model Use Of Force Policy.” Campaign Zero, n.d.
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56996151cbced68b170389f4/t/5defffb38594a9745b
936b64/1576009651688/Campaign+Zero+Model+Use+of+Force+Policy.pdf.
National Institute of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. “The Use-of-Force Continuum,” August
3, 2009. https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/use-force-continuum.
New Orleans Police Department. “Use of Force.” In New Orleans Police Department Operations
Manual. Chapter 1.3, 2015.
https://www.nola.gov/getattachment/NOPD/Policies/Chapter-1-3-Use-of-ForceEFFECTIVE-4-01-18.pdf/.
Police Executive Research Forum. Guiding Principles on Use of Force. Critical Issues in
Policing Series. Washington, D.C., 2016.
https://www.policeforum.org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf.
———. “Winslow, AZ Police Department Review and Assessment.” Washington, DC, April
2017.
“Roll Call Training: Policy Briefing - Chokehold or Similar Neck Restraint Techniques.”
Metropolitan Police Department, 2020.
“Roll Call Training: Policy Briefing - Duty to Intervene.” Metropolitan Police Department, 2020.
Sinyangwe, Samuel. “Examining the Role of Use of Force Policies in Ending Police Violence.”
SSRN, September 20, 2016. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2841872.
“Use of Force.” Camden County Police Department, 2020.
https://policy.camdenpd.com:8443/pdf/CCV3C2%20Use%20of%20Force%20Policy.pdf.
“Use of Force Policy Database.” Campaign Zero, n.d. https://useofforceproject.org/database.
35

 Appendix A

METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

Roll Call Training: Policy Briefing
MNPD FORM 101
Rev. Feb. 2020

SUBJECT:

REVISED:

RESCINDS:

EFFECTIVE DATE:
June 11, 2020

DISTRIBUTION:

CHOKEHOLD OR SIMILAR NECK
RESTRAINT TECHNIQUES
REFERENCE:

TCA 38-8-113 & MNPD Manual 11.10
generally, and 11.10.020(S)

All Personnel

I. PURPOSE
The purpose of this roll call training document is to ensure ongoing compliance and adherence to
the policy regarding the prohibition of chokeholds or similar neck restraint techniques by MNPD
employees.
In accordance with the current requirements, supervisors shall ensure all employees under their
command are aware of this document and that they have received notice of the information and
accept responsibility to follow the directive(s) contained herein.

II. KEY POINTS TO COVER DURING ROLL CALL TRAINING
Recent events have highlighted the need for increased transparency and clarity of mission.
Therefore, to further the goals of police legitimacy, the MNPD seeks to simplify certain policies to
ensure clarity and ensure that any ambiguity is eliminated in those policies.
Under existing MNPD Manual provisions, neck restraints are prohibited as a restraining force
technique. Additionally, the MNPD does not include “chokeholds” or similar neck restraining
maneuvers in our training curriculum; therefore, by application of TCA 38-8-113, the use of those
techniques are also prohibited.
Existing provisions of the MNPD Manual provide that neck restraint techniques are not an
authorized restraining force technique:
MNPD Manual, 11.10.020(S) provides (emphasis added):
Restraining Force: Force which is limited to holding and restraining persons, which
shall include arm-lock and takedown holds, but shall not include neck restraints.
Purpose
It is the purpose of this policy to clarify this prohibition on chokeholds or similar neck restraint
techniques by MNPD employees. The following provision is in effect and shall be inserted into
the Department Manual at an appropriate location:
Policy
Definitions
Chokehold or Similar Neck Restraint: any pressure or constriction to the neck, throat or windpipe
that may inhibit breathing.
Chokehold or Similar Neck Restraint Technique
A member of the MNPD shall not use a choke hold or other similar neck restraint technique on
any suspect, arrestee, defendant, or other person.

Page 1 of 1

 Appendix B

METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

Roll Call Training: Policy Briefing
MNPD FORM 101
Rev. Feb. 2020

SUBJECT:

REVISED:

RESCINDS:

EFFECTIVE DATE:
June 11, 2020

DISTRIBUTION:

DUTY TO INTERVENE
REFERENCE:

Various Provisions MNPD Manual,
1.20, 1.30,4.10, 4.20, et al

All Personnel

I. PURPOSE
The purpose of this roll call training document is to ensure ongoing compliance and
adherence to the policy regarding the duty of MNPD employees, particularly sworn
employees, of their moral, legal and departmental duty to intervene and stop any
other member from committing an unlawful or improper act, including but not limited
to, acts of brutality, abuses of process, abuses of authority, and any other criminal
acts or major violations of department rules and procedures.
In accordance with the current requirements, supervisors shall ensure all employees under their
command are aware of this document and that they have received notice of the information and
accept responsibility to follow the directive(s) contained herein.

II. KEY POINTS TO COVER DURING ROLL CALL TRAINING
Recent events have highlighted the need for increased transparency and clarity of
mission. Therefore, to further the goals of police legitimacy, the MNPD seeks to
simplify certain policies to ensure clarity and ensure that any ambiguity is eliminated in
those policies.
Although, multiple provisions of existing department policy mandate that employees
report and intercede in situations where they become aware of other employees
engaged in unlawful acts, or those that otherwise violate department policy, the
following provision is in effect and shall be inserted into the Department Manual at an
appropriate location:
Duty to Intervene
Purpose
It is the purpose of this policy to explain the legal and moral obligation of MNPD
employees, under the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics, Oath of Office and MNPD
policy to intervene and report any act that violates law or policy. Every member of the
MNPD has the individual responsibility to intervene and stop any other member from
committing an unlawful or improper act, including but not limited to, acts of brutality,
abuses of process, abuses of authority, and any other criminal acts or major violations
Page 1 of 2

 of department rules and procedures. Successful intervention enhances police
legitimacy by preventing misconduct and reducing opportunities for mistakes.
Policy
Definitions
Intervene: To come between, whether verbally or physically, so as to prevent or alter a
result or course of events.
Duty to Intervene

1. All members must recognize and act upon the Duty to Intervene in order to
prevent or stop any member from conducting any act that violates law or policy
(including, but not limited to excessive or unlawful force, unlawful behavior,
abuses of authority or major violations of department policy or procedure).

2. Such interventions shall be reported to an appropriate supervisor without delay.
Successful intervention does not negate a duty to report.

3. Consistent with established policy and training, if medical attention is required by
any individual, ensure that medical attention has been provided and/or
summoned.

4. Failure to intervene or report may subject a member to disciplinary action.
(Category varies by severity of violation)
Types of Intervention
Employees should examine the circumstances surrounding the incident to determine
the appropriate form of Intervention. Intervention may be verbal or physical, depending
on the circumstances.
Preventative: Take a preventive approach, whenever possible, if observing behavior
that suggests that another member is about to conduct or engage in inappropriate
behavior.
Active: Take an active approach to intervene; in order to stop any behavior or
misconduct that violates policy or law, when such conduct is being committed by
another member.
Supervisor Role
Consistent with applicable policy, when an intervention occurs, the supervisor shall
initiate an appropriate inquiry or investigation, consistent with applicable policy.

Page 2 of 2