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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F :JR ffHE

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ~ - _ ,_~_-_ _ _
Alexandria Division
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ll< US. DISTRICT COURT
gl\NDRIA, VIRGINIA

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Criminal No. l:18-cr-111 (CMH)
Count 1: 18 U.S.C. § 793(g)
Conspiracy To Obtain and Disclose National
Defense Information

V.

JULIAN PAUL ASSANGE,

Count 2: 18 U.S.C. § 371
Conspiracy to Commit Computer Intrusions

Defendant.

Counts 3, 4: 18: 18 U.S.C §§ 793(b) and2
Obtaining National Defense Infmmation
Counts 5-8: 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(c) and 2
Obtaining National Defense Information
Counts 9-11: 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d) and2
Disclosure of National Defense Inf01mation
Counts 12-14: 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(e) and 2
Disclosure of National Defense Information
Counts 15-17: 18 U.S.C. § 793(e)
Disclosure of National Defense Information

SECOND SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT
June 2020 Term - at Alexandria, Virginia .
THE GRAND JURY CHARGES THAT:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

A.

ASSANGE and WikiLeaks
1.

1

From at least 2007, 1 JULIAN PAUL ASSANGE ("AS SAN GE"} was the public

When the Grand Jury alleges in this Superseding Indictment that an event occurred on a
particular date, the Grand Jury means to convey that the event occmTed "on or about" that date.

 face of "WikiLeaks," a website he founded with others as an "intelligence agency of the people."
To obtain information to release on the WikiLeaks website, ASSANGE recruited sources and
predicated the success of WikiLeaks in paii upon the recruitment of sources to (i) illegally
circumvent legal safeguards on infonnation, including classification restrictions and computer
and network access restrictions; (ii) provide that illegally obtained information to WikiLeaks for
public dissemination; and (iii) continue the pattern of illegally procuring and providing classified
and hacked information to WikiLeaks for distribution to the public.
2.

ASSANGE and WikiLeaks repeatedly sought, obtained, and disseminated·

info1mation that the United States classified due to the serious risk that unauthorized disclosure
could harm the national security of the United States. ASSANGE designed WikiLeaks to focus
on information restricted from public disclosure by law, precisely because of the value of that
information.

WikiLeaks's website explicitly solicited censored, otherwise restricted, and

"classified" materials.

As the website stated, "WikiLeaks accepts classified, censored, or

otherwise restricted material of political, diplomatic, or ethical significance."
3.

To recruit individuals to hack into computers and/or illegally obtain and disclose

classified info1mation to WikiLeaks, the WikiLeaks website posted a detailed list of "The Most
Wanted Leaks of 2009," organized by country. The post stated that documents or materials
nominated to the list must "[bJe likely to have political, diplomatic, ethical or historical impact
on release ... and be plausibly obtainable to a well-motivated insider or outsider," and must be
"described in enough detail so that ... a visiting outsider not already familiai- with the material
or its subject matter may be able to quickly locate it, and will be motivated to do so."
4.

In August 2009, ASSANGE and a WikiLeaks associate (WLA-2) spoke at the

"Hacking at Random" conference in the Netherlands. ASSANGE sought to recruit those who

2

 had or could obtain authorized access to classified information and hackers to search for, steal
and send to WikiLeaks the items on the "Most Wanted Leaks" list that was posted on WikiLeaks' s
website. To embolden potential recruits, ASSANGE told the audience that, unless they were "a
serving member of the United States military," they would have no legal liability for stealing
classified infonnation and giving it to WikiLeaks because "TOP SECRET" meant nothing as a
matter of law.
5.

At the Hacking at Random conference, WLA-2 invited members of the audience

who were interested in helping WikiLeaks to attend a follow-on session, where they could discuss
where the items on the Most Wanted Leaks list could be found and how they could be obtained.
At that follow-on session, ASSANGE explained how WikiLeaks had exploited "a small
vulnerability" inside the document distribution system of the United States Congress to obtain
reports of the Congressional Research Service that were not available to the public, and he
asserted that "[t]his is what any one of you would find if you were actually looking."
6.

In October 2009, ASSANGE spoke at the "Hack in the Box Security Conference';

in Malaysia. AS SAN GE told the audience, "I was a famous teenage hacker in Australia, and I've
been reading generals' emails since I was 17." ASSANGE referenced the conference's "capture
the flag" hacking contest, and noted that WikiLeaks had its own list of "flags" that it wanted
captured-namely, the list of"Most Wanted Leaks" posted on the WikiLeaks website. To recruit
sources to engage in computer hacking and steal classified information for publication by
WikiLeaks, AS SAN GE encouraged his audience to obtain and provide to WikiLeaks information
responsive to that list.
7.

As of November 2009, WikiLeaks's "Most Wanted Leaks" for the United States

included the following:

3

 a.

"Bulk Databases," including an encyclopedia used by the United States
intelligence community, called "Intellipedia," and the unclassified, but
non-public, CIA Open Source Center database; and

b.

"Military and Intelligence" documents, including documents that the list
described as classified up to the SECRET level, for example, "Iraq and
Afghanistan Rules of Engagement 2007-2009 (SECRET)"; operating and
interrogation procedures at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; documents relating to
Guantanamo

detainees;

CIA

detainee

intenogation videos;

and

info1mation about certain weapons systems.
B.

Chelsea Manning

8.

From 2009 to 2010, Chelsea Manning, then known as Bradley Manning, was an

intelligence analyst in the United States Army who was deployed to Forward Operating Base
Hammer in Iraq.
9.

In connection with the duties of an intelligence analyst, Manning had access to

United States Department of Defense computers connected to the Secret Internet Protocol
Network, a United States government network used for classified documents and
communications. As explained below, Manning also was using the computers to download
classified records to transmit to WikiLeaks.

Army regulations prohibited Manning from

attempting to bypass or circumvent security mechanisms on government-provided information
systems aml from sharing personal accounts and authenticators, such as passwords.
10.

Manning held a "TOP SECRET" security clearance, and signed a classified

info1mation nondisclosure agreement, acknowledging that the unauthorized disclosure or
retention or negligent handling of classified info1mation could cause irreparable injury to the
United States or be used to the advantage of a foreign nation.
4

 i. lvianning and the 1'1ost -wanted Leaks

11.

Beginning by at least November 2009, Manning responded to ASSANGE's

solicitation of classified infonnation made through the WikiLeaks website.

For example,

WikiLeaks's "Military and Intelligence" "Most Wanted Leaks" category, as described above,
solicited CIA detainee interrogation videos. On November 28, 2009, Manning in turn searched
the classified network search engine, "Intelink," for "retention+of+interrogation+videos." The
next day, Manning searched the classified network for "detainee+abuse," which was consistent
with the "Most Wanted Leaks" request for "Detainee abuse photos withheld by the Obama
administration" under WikiLeaks's "Military and Intelligence" category.
12.

On November 30, 2009, Manning saved a text file entitled "wl-press.txt" to an

external hard drive and to an encrypted container on Manning's computer. ·The file stated, "You
can cmTently contact our investigations editor directly in Iceland +354 862 3481; 24 hour service;
ask for 'Julian Assange."' Similarly, on December 8 and 9, 2009, Manning ran several searches
on Intelink relating to Guantanamo Bay detainee operations, interrogations, and standard
operating procedures or "SOPs." These search terms were yet again consistent with WikiLeaks's
"Most Wanted Leaks," which sought Guantanamo Bay operating and interrogation SOPs under
the "Military and Intelligence" category.
ii. lvianning Steals and Provides to WikiLeaks Classified
Information about Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay

13.

Between January 2010 and May 2010, consistent with WikiLeaks's "Most Wanted

Leaks" solicitation of bulk databases and military and intelligence categories, Manning
downloaded four nearly complete databases from depmiments and agencies of the United States.
These databases contained approximately 90,000 Afghanistan war-related significant activity
reports, 400,000 Iraq war-related significant activity reports, 800 Guantanamo Bay detainee

5

 assessment briefs, and 250,000 U.S. Department of State cables. The United States had classified
many of these records up to the SECRET level pursuant to Executive Order No. 13526 or its
predecessor orders.

Manning neve1iheless provided the documents to WikiLeaks, so that

WikiLeaks could publicly, disclose them on its website.
14.

No later than January 2010, Manning repeatedly used an online chat service,

Jabber.ccc.de, to chat with ASSANGE, who used multiple monikers attributable to him. 2
15.

On March 7, 2010, Manning askedASSANGE how valuable the Guantanamo Bay

detainee assessment briefs would be. After confirming that ASSANGE thought they had value,
on March 8, 2010, Manning told ASSANGE that Manning was "throwing everything [Manning
had] on JTF GTMO [Joint Task Force, Guantanamo] at [ASSANGE] now."

ASSANGE

responded, "ok, great!"
16.

On March 8, 2010, when Manning brought up the "osc," meaning the CIA Open

Source Center, ASSANGE replied, "that's something we want to mine entirely, btw," which was
consistent with WikiLeaks's list of "Most Wanted Leaks," which solicited "the complete CIA
Open Source Center analytical database," an unclassified (but non-public) database.
17.

On March 8, 2010, Manning used a Secure File Transfer Protocol ("SFTP")

connection to transmit the detainee assessment briefs, classified SECRET, to a cloud drop box
operated by WikiLeaks, with an X directory that WikiLeaks had designated for Manning's use.
18.

On March 8, 2010, in response to Manning's comment that, after transmitting the

detainee assessment briefs to ASSANGE and WikiLeaks, "thats all i really have got lefl," and to

2

The Grand Jury will allege that the person using these monikers is AS SAN GE without
reference to the specific moniker used.

6

 encourage Manning to continue to steal classified documents from the United States and provide
them to WikiLeaks, ASSANGE replied, "curious eyes never run dry in my experience."
iii. ASSANGE Agrees to Help lvlanning Crack a Pass-word

19.

On March 8, 2010, ASSANGE told Manning that ASSANGE would have

someone try to crack a password hash to enable Manning to hack into a U.S. government
computer. Specifically, ASSANGE agreed to assist Manning in cracking a password hash stored
on United States Department of Defense computers connected to the Secret Internet Protocol
Network.
20.

The encrypted password hash that Manning gave to ASSANGE to crack --

following ASSANGE's "curious eyes never run dry" comment -- was stored as a "hash value" in
a computer file that was accessible only by users with administrative-level privileges. Manning
did not have- administrative-level privileges, and used special software, namely a Linux operating
system, to access the coinputer file and obtain the encrypted password hash that Manning then
provided to ASSANGE.
21.

On March 10, 2010, ASSANGE requested more information from Manning

related to the encrypted password hash, because he had so far been unable to crack it. Had
ASSANGE and Manning successfully cracked the encrypted password hash, Manning may have
been able to log onto computers under a usemame that did not belong to Manning. Such a
measure would have made it more difficult for investigators to identify Manning as the source of
unauthorized disclosures of classified information. ·
22.

On March 10, 2010, after ASS ANGE told Manning that there was "a usemame in

the gitmo docs," Manning told AS SANGE, "any usemames should probably be filtered, period."

7

 23.

On March 10, 2010, in response to Mam1ing's question whether there was

"anything useful" in the "gitmo docs," AS SAN GE responded, in part, that "these sorts of things
are always motivating to other sources too." ASSANGE stated, "Hence the feeling is people can
give us stuff for anything not as 'dangerous as gitmo' on the one hand, and on the other, for people
who know more, there's a desire to eclipse."
24.

Following ASSANGE's "curious eyes never run dry" c01mnent, on March 22,

2010, Manning downloaded from the Secret Internet Protocol Network multiple Iraq rules of
engagement files (consistent with WikiLeaks's "Most Wanted Leaks" solicitation), and provided
them to AS SAN GE and WikiLeaks. The rules of engagement files delineated the circumstances
and limitations under which United States forces would initiate or continue combat engagement
upon encountering other forces. WikiLeaks's disclosure of this inf01mation would allow enemy
forces in Iraq and elsewhere to anticipate certain actions or responses by U.S. armed forces and
to cmTy out more effective attacks.
25.

Following ASSANGE's "curious eyes never run dry" comment, between March

28, 2010, and April 9, 2010, and consistent with WikiLeaks's solicitation of bulk databases and
classified materials of diplomatic significance, Manning further used a U.S. Department of
Defense computer to download over 250,000 U.S. Department of State cables, which were
classified up to the SECRET level.

Manning uploaded these cables to ASSANGE and

WikiLeaks through an SFTP connection to a cloud drop box operated by WikiLeaks, with an X
directory that WikiLeaks had designated for Manning's use.
26.

At the time ASSANGE agreed to receive and received from Mam1ing for the

purpose of public disclosure on WikiLeaks the classified Guantanamo Bay detainee assessment
briefs, the U.S. Depmiment of State Cables, and the Iraq rules of engagement files, ASSANGE

8

 knew that Manning was unlawfully taking and disclosing them, and at the time AS SAN GE agreed
to assist Manning in cracking the encrypted password hash, AS SAN GE knew that Manning was
taking and illegally providing WikiLeaks with classified documents and records containing
national defense information from classified databases. For example, not only had ASSANGE
already received thousands of military-related documents, including the Afghanistan war-related
significant activity reports and Iraq war-related significant activity rep01is, classified up to the
SECRET level from Manning, but Manning and ASSANGE also had chatted about (i) military

jargon and references to current events in Iraq, which showed that Manning was a government or
military source; (ii) the "releasability" of ce1iain information by ASSANGE; (iii) measures to
prevent the discovery of Manning as ASSANGE's source, such as clearing logs and use of a
"cryptophone"; and (iv) a code phrase to use ifsomething went wrong.
27.

On April 5, 2010, WikiLeaks released on its website the rules of engagement files

that Manning provided. It entitled four of the documents as follows: "US Rules of Engagement
for Iraq; 2007 :flowchart," "US Rules of Engagement for Iraq; Refcard 2007," "US Rules of
Engagement for Iraq, March 2007," and "US Rules of Engagement for Iraq, Nov 2006." All of
these documents had been classified as SECRET, except for the "US Rules of Engagement for
Iraq; Refcard 2007," which was unclassified but for official use only.
28.

Manning was arrested on May 27, 2010.

29.

In July 2010, at a conference in New York City of "Hackers on Planet Ea1ih," a

WikiLeaks associate urged attendees to leak to WikiLeaks. That WikiLeaks associate (WLA-3)
said that WikiLeaks had "never lost a source," told the audience that it should reject the thought
that someone else was more qualified than them to determine whether a document should be kept
secret, and urged attendees to assist WikiLeaks and emulate others who had broken the law to

9

 disseminate classified info1111ation. WLA-3 ended his request for assistance with the slogan,
"Think globally, hack locally."
30.

In July 2010, WikiLeaks published approximately 75,000 significant activity

reports related to the war in Afghanistan, classified up to the SECRET level, illegally provided
to WikiLeaks by Manning.
31.

In October 2010, WikiLeaks published approximately 400,000 significant activity

repo1is related to the war in Iraq, classified up to the SECRET level, illegally provided to
WikiLeaks by Manning.
32..

In November 2010, WikiLeaks started publishing redacted versions of U.S. State

Department cables, classified up to the SECRET level, illegally provided to WikiLeaks by
Manning.
33.

In April 2011, WikiLeaks published approximately 800 Guantanamo Bay detainee

assessment briefs, classified up to the SECRET level, illegally provided to WikiLeaks by
Manning.
34.

In August and September 2011, WikiLeaks published umedacted versions of

approximately 250,000 U.S. State Department Cables, classified up to the SECRET level, which
- were illegally provided to WikiLeaks by Manning.

C.

Teenager, Manning, and NATO Country-1

35.

In early 2010, around the same time that ASSANGE was working with Manning

to obtain classified information, AS SAN GE met a 17-year old in NATO Country-I ("Teenager"),
who provided ASSANGE with data stolen from a bank.
36.

In early 2010, ASSANGE asked Teenagei-to commit computer intrusions and steal

additional inf01mation, including audio recordings of phone conversations between high-ranking

10

 officials of the government ofNATO Country-I, including members of the Parliament ofNATO
Country-I.
37.

Beginning in January 2010, Manning repeatedly searched for classified

info1mation about NATO Country-I.
38.

On February 14, 2010, Manning downloaded classified State Department

materials regarding the governn1ent of NATO Country-I. On February 18, 2010, WikiLeaks
posted to its website a classified cable from the U.S. Embassy in NATO Country-I, that
WikiLeaks received from Manning.
39.

On March 5, 2010, AS SANGE told Manning about having received stolen banking

documents from a source who, in fact, was Teenager.
40.

On March 10, 2010, after ASSANGE told Manning that ASSANGE had given an

"intel source" a· "list of things we wanted" and the source had agreed to provide and did provide
four months of recordings of all phones in the Parliament of the government of NATO Country1, ASSANGE stated, "So, that's what I think the future is like;)," referring to how he expected
WikiLeaks to operate.
41.

In early 201 0; a source provided AS SAN GE with credentials to gain unauthorized

access into a website that was used by the government of NATO Country- I to track the location
of police and first responder vehicles, and agreed that AS SAN GE should use those credentials to
gain unauthorized access to the website.
42.

On March 17, 2010, ASSANGE told Manning that ASSANGE used the

unauthorized access to the website of the government of NATO Country-I for tracking police
vehicles (provided to ASSANGE by a source) to determine that NATO Country-I police were
monitoring ASSANGE.

11

 43.

On March 29, 2010, WikiLeaks posted to its website classified State Department

materials regarding officials in the government of NA TO Country-1, which Manning had
downloaded on February 14, 2010.
44.

On July 21, 2010, after ASSANGE and Teenager failed in their joint attempt to

decrypt a file stolen from a NATO Country-1 bank, Teenager asked a U.S. person to try to do so.
In 2011 and 2012, that individual, who had been an acquaintance of Manning since early 2010,
became a paid employee ofWikiLeaks, and reported to ASSANGE and Teenager.
45.

No later than the summer of 2010, ASSANGE put Teenager in charge of operating,

administering, and monitoring WikiLeaks's Internet Relay Chat ("IRC") channel. Because
WikiLeaks's IRC channel was open to the public, ASSANGE regarded it as both a means of
contacting new sources and a potential "den of spies." ASSANGE warned Teenager to beware
of spies, and to refer to ASSANGE sources with "national security related information."
46.

In September 2010, ASSANGE directed Teenager to hack into the computer of an

individual formerly associated with WikiLeaks and delete chat logs containing statements of
ASSANGE. When Teenager asked how that could be done, ASSANGE wrote that the former
WikiLeaks associate could "be fooled into downloading a trojan," referring to malicious software,
and then asked Teenager what operating system the former-WikiLeaks associate used.

D.

Anonymous, Gnosis, AntiSec, and LulzSec
47.

In December 2010, media outlets reported that hackers affiliated with a group

known as "Anonymous" launched distributed denial of service attacks ("DDoS" attacks) against
PayPal, Visa, and MasterCard in retaliation for their decisions to stop processing payments for
WikiLeaks. Anonymous called these attacks "Operation Payback."

12

 48.

Later in December 2010, "Laurelai," a hacker affiliated with Anonymous, who

identified herself as a member of the hacking group "Gnosis," contacted Teenager. Laurelai
subsequently introduced Teenager to another member of Gnosis, who went by the online moniker
"Kayla."

Teenager told Laurelai that he [Teenager] was "in charge of recruitments" for

WikiLeaks and stated, "I am under JULIAN ASSANGE's authority and report to him and him
only." First Laurelai and later Kayla indicated to Teenager their willingness to commit computer
intrusions on behalf of WikiLeaks.
49.

In January 2011, Teenager told ASSANGE, "a group of Hackers offered there

servicses [sic] to us called Gnosis." ASSANGE approved of the arrangement and told Teenager
to meet with Gnosis.
50.

On February 6, 2011, Laurelai told Kayla that they should show to Teenager

materials that Kayla had obtained by hacking a U.S. cybersecurity company ("U.S. Cybersecurity
Company").
51.

On February 7, 2011, TeenagermessagedASSANGE that Gnas.is had hacked U.S.

Cybersecurity Company.
52.

On February 11, 2011, Teenager provided ASSANGE with computer code that

Kayla had hacked from U.S. Cybersecurity Company and told ASSANGE it came from Gnosis's
hack of that company.
53.

On February 15, 2011, in a chat with a hacker with the moniker "elChe," Laurelai

· characterized herself as "part o.f WikiLeaks staff ... hacker part."
54.

On February 16, 2011, Laurelai asked Kayla whether Laurelai could tell Teenager

about Kayla's penetration of a hosting service, so that WikiLeaks could determine if WikiLeaks
needed information hosted there.

13

 55.

On February 17, 2011, Teenager told Laurelai that WikiLeaks was the world's

largest hacking organization.
56.

On March 1, 2011, Laurelai told Kayla to let Laurelai know if Kayla found any

"@gov" passwords" so that Laurelai could then send them to WikiLeaks (through Teenager).
57.

On March 6, 2011, Laurelai offered WikiLeaks (through Teenager) "unpublished

zero days" (vulnerabilities that can be used to hack computer systems).
58.

On March 15, 2011, Laurelai emailed WikiLeaks (through Teenager) a list of

approximately 200 purported passwords to U.S. and state government email accounts, including
passwords (hashed and plaintext) that purported to be for accounts associated with information
technology specialists at government institutions.
59.

In May 2011, members of Anonymous, including several who were involved in

"Operation Payback" from December 2010, formed their own hacking group, which they publicly
called "LulzSec." These members included Kayla, "Sabu," and "Topiary."
60.

On May 24, 2011, a television network (the "Television Network") aired a

documentary about WikiLeaks that included. an allegation that ASSANGE intentionally risked
the lives of the sources named in WikiLeaks publications. Approximately five days later, on May
29, 2011, LulzSec members claimed that, as retaliation for the Television Network's negative
coverage of WikiLeaks, they hacked into the Television Network's computers and published
passwords used by its journalists, affiliates, and employees.
61.

On June 7, 2011, Sabu was anested. Shortly thereafter, Sabu began cooperating

with the FBI.
62.

In June 2011, after LulzSec took credit for a purported DDoS attack against the

CIA's public-facing website, ASSANGE decided that WikiLeaks should publicly support

14

 LulzSec.

From the official WikiLeaks Twitter account, WikiLeaks tweeted: "WikiLeaks

supporters, LulzSec, take down CIA ... who has a task force into WikiLeaks," adding, "CIA
finally learns the real meaning of WTF."
63.

After receiving ASSANGE's approval to establish a relationship between

WikiLeaks and LulzSec, Teenager made contact with Topiary on June 16, 2011, by going through
Laurelai. To show Topiary that Teenager spoke for WikiLeaks so that an agreement could be
reached between WikiLeaks and LulzSec, Teenager posted to YouTube (and then quickly
deleted) a video of his computer screen that showed the conversation that he was then having with
Topiary.

The video turned from Teenager's computer screen and showed ASSANGE sitting

nearby.
64.

Teenager told Topiary, "[m]y main purpose here is mainly to create some kind of

a connection between lulzsec and wikileaks." Topiary agreed to this partnership, stating, "if we
do get a /massive/ cache of information, we'd be happy to supply you with it." Teenager later
added, "WikiLeaks cannot publicly be taking down websites, but we might give a suggestion of
something or something similar, if that's acceptable to LulzSec."
65.

On June 19, 2011, LulzSec posted a release, stating that it was launching a

movement called "AntiSec" that would engage in cyberattacks against government agencies,
banks, and cybersecurity firms. From this point forward, people affiliated with the groups often
used the names LulzSec and AntiSec· interchangeably.
66.

In the fall of 2011, Teenager left WikiLeaks.

15

 Sabu, Hammond, and ASSANGE

E.

67.

On December 25, 2011, media outlets reported that hackers claiming an affiliation

with Anonymous and LulzSec announced they had hacked the servers of a private intelligence
consulting company ("Intelligence Consulting Company").
68.

On December 29, 2011, in a chat with other hackers on an IRC channel called

"#Lulzxmas," a hacker affiliated with LulzSec/AntiSec, Jeremy Hammond, told the others that
info1mation hacked from Intelligence Consulting Company was being sent to Wikileaks.
69.

On December 29, 2011, in a chat with other hackers on the "#Lulzxmas" IRC

channel, Hammond informed elChe and others in the group, "JA almost done copying the files."
Hammond also told elChe that there should be "no leaks about this partnering."
70.

In December 2011, Hammond told Sabu that he had been partnering with an

individual at WikiLeaks who Hammond believed to be ASSANGE. Hammond explained that
he had (a) received from that individual a message that WikiLeaks would tweet a message in
code; (b) seen that shortly thereafter, the WikiLeaks Twitter account tweeted, "rats for Donavon";
(c) received another message from that individual believed to be ASSANGE, explaining that the·
tweet contained an anagram for a paiiicular term that such individual specified; and (d) the teim
specified contained a reference to the name ofintelligence Consulting Company.
71.

On December 31, 2011, WikiLeaks tweeted "#antisec owning Law enforcement

in 2012," as well as links to emails and databases that Hammond and AntiSec had obtained from
hacking two U.S. state police associations. On January 3, 2012, WikiLeaks tweeted a link to
inf01mation

that

LulzSec/Anti Sec

had

hacked

and

published

111

2011,

stating,

. "Anonymous/Antisec/Luzsec releases in 2011." On January 6, 2012, WikiLeaks tweeted a link
to a spoofed email sent by Hammond to the clients of Intelligence Consulting Company,

16

 purporting to be the CEO of that company, stating, "AnonymousIRC email sent by #Anti Sec to
[Intelligence Consulting Company]'s customers #Anonymous #LulzSec."
72.

In January 2012, Hammond told Sabu that "JA" provided to Hammond a script to

search the emails stolen from Intelligence Consulting Company, and that "JA" would provide that
script to associates of Hammond as well. Hammond also introduced Sabu via Jabber to "JA." In
January and February 2012, Sabu used Jabber to chat with this WikiLeaks leader, who used
various monikers on Jabber.ccc.de that are attributed to ASSANGE for reasons including but not
limited to the following 3 :
a. When Sabu suggested that it had to be "boring" to stay at Ellingham Hall "every
day with an ankle bracelette [sic] to look at all day," ASSANGE responded that
he was involved in "supreme court strategy, fowl theory, new crypto-systems for
our guys, talking to sources, coordinating new releases, another 5 law suits, pr, tv
series, press complaints, trying to get money back form [sic] old lawyers, working
on new books, censorship projects, moving $/people around ... about the same as
any CEO of a medium sized international company with a lot of law suits .... "
ASSANGE said that he was very busy, but trusted only himself to deal with
sources. He said that the others who worked at WikiLeaks were good people, but
indicated that he lacked confidence that anyone at WikiLeaks other than himself
could survive prosecution and prison without talking to law enforcement.

3

For the remainder of the Second Superseding Indictment, the Grand Jury will allege that
the person using these monikers is AS SAN GE without reference to ·the specific moniker used.

17

 b. On January 16, 2012, Sabu asked ASSANGE how "the case [was] going." In
response, ASSANGE said, "[i]t's a huge legal-political quagmire" and also said,
"[i]fI'm going down it sure hasn't been without a fight."
c. On January 16, 2012, ASSANGE told Sabu that he was making a television show
in which he would be interviewing "ultimate insiders and outsiders on the fate of
the world." ASSANGE told Sabu that, on his show, he would interview guests
including presidents, the leader of Hezbollah, and participants in the Occupy
Movement. On February 21, 2012, ASSANGE told Sabu that he had, the previous
day, interviewed a former Guantanamo Bay prisoner who now ran the website
cageprisoners.org. 4
73.

On January 16, 2012, and in response to a message from Sabu that stated, "If you

have any targets in mind by all means let us know," ASSANGE initially responded that he could
not "give target suggestions for the obvious legal reasons," but approximately 44 seconds later
added, "But, for people that do bad things, and probably have that documented, there's ['Research
and Investigative Firm']" and "lots of the companies" listed on a website whose address
ASSANGE provided.
74.

On January 21, 2012, ASSANGE suggested that, in the course of hacking

Research and Investigative Film, Sabu and other members of LulzSec/Anti Sec should look for
and provide to WikiLeaks mail and documents, databases and pdfs.

4

On January 23, 2012, WikiLeaks announced a new television series that would start in
March 2012, in which ASSANGE would host conversations with key political players over the
course of approximately ten weekly episodes. Airing on the Russia Today network, the guests
interviewed by ASSANGE included the Presidents of Tunisia and Ecuador, the leader of
Hezbollah, representatives of the Occupy Movement, and an individual who claimed to be a
former Guantanamo Bay prisoner who ran the website cageprisoners.org in 2012.

18

 75.

On February 21, 2012, and in response to Sabu's request, ASSANGE provided

Sabu with a computer script to search for emails hacked from Intelligence Consulting Company.
76.

On February 21, 2012, to focus the hacking efforts of the hackers associated with

Sabu, AS SAN GE told Sabu that the most impactful release of hacked materials would be from
the CIA, NSA, or the New York Times.
77.

On February 22, 2012, Hammond told Sabu that, at ASSANGE's "indirect"

request, Hammond had spammed the Intelligence Consulting Company again.
78.

On February 27, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing emails that Hammond and

others hacked from Intelligence Consulting Company.
79.

On February 27, 2012, Hammond told Sabu, "we started giving JA" materials that

had been.obtained from other hacks.
80.

On February 27, 2012, Hammond told Sabu that ASSANGE was talking to elChe.

81.

On February 28, 2012, Hammond complained to Sabu that the incompetence of

his fellow hackers was causing him to fail to meet estimates he had given to ASSANGE for the
volume of hacked information that Hammond expected to provide WikiLeaks, writing, "can't sit
on all these targets. dicking around when the booty is sitting there ... especially when we are asked
to make it happen with WL. We repeated a 2TB number to JA. Now turns out it's like maybe
100GB.

Would have been 40-S0GB if I didn't go and reget all the mail from [foreign

cybersecurity company]." Hammond then stated that he needed help with ongoing hacks that his
associates were committing against victims that included a U.S. law enforcement entity, a U.S.
political organization, and a U.S. cybersecurity company.
82.

In March 2012, Hammond was anested.

19

 F.

ASSANGE's Efforts to Recruit System Administrators

83.

In June 2013, media outlets reported that Edward J. Snowden had leaked numerous

documents taken from the NSA and was located in Hong Kong. Later that month, an arrest
wanant was issued in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, for the
anest of Snowden, on charges involving the theft of infonnation from the United States
government.
84.

To encourage leakers and hackers to provide stolen materials to WikiLeaks in the

future, ASSANGE and others at WikiLeaks openly displayed their attempts to assist Snowden in
evading arrest.
85.

In June 2013, a WikiLeaks associate ("WLA-4") traveled with Snowden from

Hong Kong to Moscow.
86.

On December 31, 2013, at the annual conference of the Chaos Computer Club

("CCC") in Germany, ASSANGE, WLA-3 and WLA-4 gave a presentation titled "Sysadmins of
the World, Unite! A Call to Resistance." On its website, the CCC promoted the presentation by
writing, "[t]here has never been a higher demand for a politically-engaged hackerdom" and that
ASSANGE and WLA-3 would "discuss what needs to be done if we are going to
win." ASSANGE told the audience that "the famous leaks that WikiLeaks has done or the recent
Edward Snowden revelations" showed that "it was possible now for even a single system
administrator to ... not merely wreck[] or disabl[e] [organizations] ... but rather shift[]
infmmation from an information apartheid system ... into the knowledge commons." AS SAN GE
exhorted the audience to join the CIA in order to steal and provide information to WikiLeaks,
stating, "I'm not saying don't join the CIA; no, go and join the CIA. Go in there, go into the
ballpark and get the ball and bring it out."

20

 87.

At the same presentation, in responding to the audience's question as to what they

could do, WLA-3 said "Edward Snowden did not save himself. ... Specifically for source
protection, [WLA-4] took actions to protect [Snowden] .... [l]f we can succeed in saving Edward
Snowden' s life and to keep him free, then the next Edward Snowden will have that to look forward
to. And if we look also to what has happened to Chelsea Manning, we see additionally that
Snowden has clearly learned .... "
ASSANGE and WikiLeaks Continue to Recruit

G.

88.

On May 6, 2014, at a re:publica conference in Germany, WLA-4 sought to recruit

those who had or could obtain authorized access to classified information and hackers to search
for and send the classified or otherwise stolen information to WikiLeaks by explaining, "[f]rom
the beginning our mission has been to publish classified or in any other way censored information
that is of political, historical imp01iance."
89.

On May 15, 2015, WikiLeaks tweeted a request for nominations for the 2015

"Most Wanted Leaks" list, and as an example, linked to one of the posts of a "Most Wanted
Leaks" list from 2009 list that remained on WikiLeaks's website.
90.

In an interview on May 25, 2015, ASSANGE claimed to have arranged distraction

operations to assist Snowden in avoiding arrest by the United States:
Let's go back to 2013. There was a worldwide manhunt for Edward Snowden ..
. vast resources were put into trying to grab Edward Snowden or work out where
he might go, if he was leaving Hong Kong, and grab him there.
So we worked against that, and we got him out of Hong Kong and got him to
Russia, and we were going to transit through Russia to get him to Latin America.
Now, the U.S. government canceled his passp01i as he was en route, it seems, to
Moscow, meaning that he then couldn't take his next flight, which had been
booked through Cuba. And at that point, there became a question of, well, how
else can he proceed? If he can't proceed by a commercial airline, are there other
alternatives? And so, we looked into private flights, private jets, other unusual
routes for commercial jets, and presidential jets ....

21

 There was an oil conference on in-there was an international oil conference in
Moscow that week. Edward Snowden and our journalist, [WLA-4], still in the
Moscow airpmi in the transit lounge, and so we thought, well, this is an
oppmiunity, actually, to send Edward Snowden to Latin America on one of these
jets ....
We had engaged in a number of these distraction operations in the asylum
maneuver from Hong Kong, for example, booking him on flights to India through
Beijing and other forms of distraction, like Iceland, for example.
91.

On June 18, 2015, at an event sponsored by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation in

Gennany, WLA-3 and WLA-4 sought to recrnit individuals td search for, steal, and send to
WikiLeaks classified information by promising their audience that, if anyone in the audience
could infiltrate organizations supporting the military, find the right "infonnational way to strike,"
and emulate Snowden, WikiL~aks would publish their information.
92.

In June 2015, to continue to encourage individuals to hack into computers and/or

illegally obt~in and disclose classified information to WikiLeaks, WikiLeaks maintained on its
website a list of "The Most Wanted Leaks of 2009," which stated that documents or materials
nominated to the list must "[b]e likely to have political, diplomatic, ethical or historical impact
on release ... and be plausibly obtainable to a well-motivated insider or outsider," and must be
"described in enough detail so that ... a visiting outsider not already familiar with the material
or its subject matter may be able to quicldy locate it, and will be motivated to do so."
ASSANGE Revealed the Names of Human Sources and.
Created a Grave and Imminent Risk to Human Life.

H.

93.

During 2010 and 2011, AS SAN GE disseminated and published via the WikiLeaks

website the documents classified up to the SECRET level that he had obtained from Manning,
as described above, including approximately 75,000 Afghanistan war-related significant activity

22

 reports, 400,000 Iraq war-related significant activity rep01is, 800 Guantanamo Bay detainee
assessment briefs, and 250,000 U.S. Depmiment of State cables.
94.

The significant activity reports from the Afghanistan and Iraq wars that

ASSANGE disseminated and published included names of local Afghans and Iraqis who had
provided information to U.S. and coalition forces. The State Depmiment cables that WikiLeaks
disseminated and published included names of persons throughout the world who provided
information to the U.S. government in circumstances in which they could reasonably expect that
their identities would be kept confidential. These sources included journalists, religious leaders,
human rights advocates, and political dissidents who were living in repressive regimes and
rep01ied to the United States the abuses of their own government, and the political conditions
within their countries, at great risk to their own safety. By disseminating and publishing these
documents without redacting the human sources' names or other identifying information,
ASSANGE created a gr~ve and imminent risk that the innocent people he named would suffer ·
serious physical harm and/or arbitrary detention.
95.

On July 30, 2010, the New York Times published an article entitled "Taliban Study

WikiLeaks to Hunt Informants." The article stated that, after the release of the Afghanistan war
significant activity reports, a member of the Taliban contacted the New York Times and stated,
"We are studying the report. We knew about the spies and people who collaborate with U.S ..
forces. We will investigate through our own secret service whether the people mentioned are
really spies working for the U.S. If they are U.S. spies, then we know how to punish them."
When confronted about such reports, ASSANGE said, "The Taliban is not a coherent outfit, but
we don't say that it is absolutely impossible that anything we ever publish will ever result in
harm-we cannot say that."

23

 96.

On May 2, 2011, United States anned forces raided the compound of Osama bin

Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan. During the raid, they collected a number of items of digital media,
which included the following: (1) a letter from bin Laden to another member of the tenorist
organization al-Qaeda in which bin Laden requested that the member gather the Depaiiment of
Defense material posted to WikiLeaks, (2) a letter from that same member of al-Qaeda to bin
Laden with information from the Afghanistan War Documents provided by Manning to
WikiLeaks and released by WikiLeaks, and (3) Department of State information provided by
Manning to WikiLeaks and released by WikiLeaks.
97.

The following are exainples of significant activity rep01is related to the

Afghanistan and Iraq wars that ASSANGE disseminated and published without redacting the
naines of human sources who were vulnerable to retribution by the Taliban in Afghanistan or the
insurgency in Iraq:
a. Classified Document Cl was a 2007 threat report containing details of a planned
anti-coalition attack at a specific location in Afghanistan. Classified Document
Cl named the local human source who reported the planned attack. Classified
Document Cl was classified at the SECRET level.
b. Classified Document C2 was a 2009 threat report identifying a person who
supplied weapons at a specific location in Afghanistan. Classified Document C2
named the local human source who rep01ied information. Classified Document
C2 was classified at the SECRET level.
c. Classified Document Dl was a 2009 report discussing an improvised explosive
device ("IED") attack in Iraq.

Classified Document Dl named local human

24

 sources who provided information on the attack. Classified Document D 1 was
classified at the SECRET level.
d. Classified Document D2 was a 2008 repmi that named a local person in Iraq who
had turned in weapons to coalition forces and had been threatened afterward.
Classified Document D2 was classified at the SECRET level.
98.

The following are examples of State Department cables that ASSANGE

disseminated and published without redacting the names of human sources who were vulnerable
to retribution.
a. Classified Document Al was a 2009 State Depmiment cable discussing a political
situation in Iran. Classified Document Al named a human source of information
located in Iran and indicated that the source's identity needed to be protected.
Classified Document Al was classified at the SECRET level.
b. Classified Document A2 was a 2009 State Department cable discussing political
dynamics in Iran. Classified Document A2 named a human source. of information
who regularly traveled to Iran and indicated that the source's identity needed to be
protected. Classified Document A2 was classified at the SECRET level.
c. Classified Document A3 was a 2009 State Department cable discussing issues
related to ethnic conflict in China. Classified Document A3 named a human
source of information located in China and indicated that the source's identity
needed to be protected. Classified Document A3 was classified at the SECRET
level.
d. Classified Document A4 was a 2009 State Department cable discussing relations
between Iran and Syria.

Classified Document A4 named human sources of

25

 information located in Syria and indicated that the sources' identities needed to be
protected. Classified Document A4 was classified at the SECRET level.
e. Classified Document AS was a 2010 State Department cable discussing human
rights issues in Syria.

Classified Document AS named a human source of

infom1ation located in Syria and indicated that the source's identity needed to be
protected. Classified Document AS was classified at the SECRET level.
99.

ASSANGE knew that his dissemination and publication of Afghanistan and Iraq

war-related significant activity reports endangered sources, whom he named as having provided
information to U.S. and coalition forces.
100.

In an interview in August 2010, ASSANGE called it "regrettable" that sources

disclosed by WikiLeaks "may face some threat as a result."

But, in the same interview,

ASSANGE insisted that "we are not obligated to protect other people's sources, military sources
or spy organization sources, except from unjust retribution," adding that in general "there are
numerous cases where people sell information ... or frame others or are engaged in genuinely
traitorous behavior and actually that is something for the public to know about."
101.

ASSANGE also knew that his dissemination and publication of the State

Department cables endangered sources whom he named as having provided information to the
State Department and other agencies of the United States. In a letter dated November 27, 2010
from the State Depaiiment's legal adviser to ASSANGE and his lawyer, ASSANGE was
informed, among other things, that publication of the State Department cables would "[p ]lace at
risk the lives of countless innocent individuals-from journalists to human rights activists and
bloggers to soldiers to individuals providing information to further peace and security." Prior to
his dissemination and publication of the unredacted State Department cables, AS SAN GE claimed

26

 that he intended "to gradually roll [the cables] out in a safe way" by partnering with mainstream
media outlets and "read[ing] through every single cable and redact[ing] identities accordingly."
Nonetheless, while ASSANGE and WikiLeaks published some of the cables in redacted form
beginning in November 2010, they disseminated and published over 250,000 cables in August
and September 2011, in umedacted form, that is, without redacting the names of the human
sources.

I.

U.S. Law to Protect Classified Information
102.

Executive Order No. 13526 and its predecessor orders define the classification

levels assigned to classified information.

Under the Executive Order, information may be

classified as "SECRET" if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause
serious

damage

to

the

national

security,

and ·infmmation may

be

classified

as

-

"CONFIDENTIAL" if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause
damage to the national security. Further, under the Executive Order, classified information can
generally only be disclosed to those persons who have been granted an appropriate level of United
States government security clearance and possess a need to know the classified information in
connection to their official duties.
103.

At no point was ASS AN GE a citizen of the United States, nor did he hold a United

States security clearance or otherwise have authorization to receive, possess, or communicate
classified information.

27

 COUNTl
(Conspiracy to Obtain and Disclose National Defense Infonnation)
A.

The general allegations of this Superseding Indictment are re-alleged and

incorporated into this Count as though fully set fmih herein.
Illegal Objects of the Conspiracy
B.

Between in or about 2009 and continuing until in or about 2015, in an offense

begun and committed outside of the jurisdiction of any paiiicular state or district of the United
States, the defendant, JULIAN PAUL AS SANGE, who will be first brought to the Eastern District
of Virginia, knowingly and unlawfully conspired with other co-conspirators, known and unknown
to the Grand Jury, to commit the following offenses against the United States:
1.

To obtain documents, writings, and notes connected with the national

defense, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defenseincluding detainee assessment briefs related to detainees who were held at Guantanaino
Bay; U.S. State Department cables; and Iraq rules of engagement files classified up to the
SECRET level-and with reason to believe that the information was to be used to the

injury of the United States and the advantage of any foreign nation, in violation of Title 18,
United States Code, Section 793(b);
2.

To receive and obtain documents, writings, and riotes connected with the

national defense-including detainee assessment briefs related to detainees who were held
at Guantanamo Bay; U.S. State Depaiiment cables; and Iraq rules of engagement files
classified up to the SECRET level-for the purpose of obtaining information respecting
the national defense, and knowing and with reason to believe at the time such materials
were received and obtained, they had been and would be taken, obtained, and disposed of

28

 by a person contrary to the provisions of Chapter 3 7 of Title 18 of the United States Code,
in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 793(c);
3.

To willfully communicate documents relating to the national defense-

namely, detainee assessment briefs related to detainees who were held at Guantanamo Bay;
U.S. State Department cables; Iraq rules of engagement files; and documents containing
the names of individuals in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere around the world, who risked
their safety and freedom by providing information to the United States and our allies, which
were classified up to the SECRET level-from persons having lawful possession of or
access to such documents, to persons not entitled to receive them, in violation of Title 18,
United States Code, Section 793( d); and
4.

To willfully communicate documents relating to the national defense-

namely, (i) for Manning to communicate to AS SAN GE the detainee assessment briefs related
to detainees who were held at Guantanamo Bay, U.S. State Depmiment cables, and Iraq rules
of engagement files classified up to the SECRET level, and (ii) for ASSANGE to
communicate documents classified up to the SECRET level containing the names of
individuals in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere around the world, who risked their safety and
freedom by providing infonnation to the United States and our allies to certain individuals
and the public-from persons in unauthorized possession of such documents to persons not
entitled to receive them, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 793(e).
C.

In :furtherance of the conspiracy, and to accomplish its objects, AS SANGE and his

conspirators committed lawful and unlawful ove1i acts, including but not limited to, those described
in the General Allegations Section of this Superseding Indictment.
(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 793(g))

29

 COUNT2
(Conspiracy To Commit Computer Intrusions)
A.

The general allegations of this Superseding Indictment are re-alleged and

incorporated into this Count as though fully set fo1ih herein.
Illegal Objects of the Conspiracy
B.

Between in or about 2009 and continuing until in or about 2015, in an offense

begun and committed outside of the jurisdiction of any pmiicular state or district of the United
States, the defendant, JULIAN PAUL ASSANGE, who will be first brought to the Eastern District
of Virginia, knowingly and unlawfully conspired with other co-conspirators, known and unknown
to the Grand Jury, to commit the following offenses against the United States:
1.

To lmowingly access a computer, without authorization and exceeding authorized

access, to obtain information that has been determined by the United States Government
pursuant to an Executive order and statute to require protection against unauthorized
disclosure for reasons of national defense and foreign relations, namely, documents relating
to the national defense classified up to the SECRET level, with reason to believe that such
infmmation so obtained could be used to the injury of the United States and the advantage of
any foreign nation, and to willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, and cause to be
communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same, to persons not entitled to receive it, and
willfully retain the same and fail to deliver it to the officer or employee entitled to receive it
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(l) and 1030(c)(l)(A);
2.

To intentionally access a computer, without authorization and exceeding

authorized access, and thereby obtain information from a department and agency of the United .
States and from protected computers; committed in furtherance of criminal and tortious acts

30

 in violation of the'laws of the United States and of any State, and to obtain information that
exceeded $5,000 in value, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2) and 1030( c)(2)(B);
3.

To knowingly cause the transmission of a program, information, code, or

command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally cause damage without authorization
to protected computers resulting in (i) aggregated loss during a one-year period of at least
$5,000 in value, (ii) damage affecting a computer used by or for an entity of the United States
Government in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, and national
security; and (iii) damage affecting 10 or more protected computers during a one-year period,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A) and 1030(c)(4)(B); and
4.

To intentionally access protected computers without authorization, and as a result

of such conduct, recklessly cause damage resulting in (i) aggregated loss during a one-year
period of at least $5,000 in value, (ii) damage affecting a computer used by or for an entity of
the United States Government in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense,
and national security; and (iii) damage affecting 10 or more protected computers during a oneyear period, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(B) and 1030(c)(4)(A).
C.

In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to accomplish its objects, AS SAN GE and his

conspirators committed lawful and unlawful overt acts, including but not limited to, those
described in the General Allegations Section of this Indictment.

(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371)

31

 COUNT3
(Unauthorized Obtaining of National Defense Information)
(State Depmiment Cables)
A.

The general allegations of this Superseding Indictment are re-alleged and

incorporated into this Count as though fully set forth herein.
B.

Between in or about November 2009 and in or about May 2010, in an offense

begun and committed outside of the jurisdiction of any particular state or district of the United
States, the defendant, JULIAN PAUL AS SAN GE, who will be first brought to the Eastern District
of Virginia, and others unknown to the Grand Jury, knowingly and unlawfully obtained and aided,
abetted, counseled, induced, procured and willfully caused Manning to obtain documents,
writings, and notes connected with the national defense, for the purpose of obtaining information
respecting the national defense-namely, U.S. Department of State cables classified up to the

SECRET level-and with reason to believe that the information was to be used to the injury of
the United States or the advantage of any foreign nation.

(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793(b) and 2)

32

 COUNT4
(Unauthorized Obtaining of National Defense Information)
(Iraq Rules of Engagement Files)

A

The general allegations of this Superseding Indictment are re-alleged and

incorporated into this Count as though fully set forth herein.
B.

Between in or about November 2009 and in or about May 2010, in an offense

begun and committed outside of the jurisdiction of any paiiicular state or district of the United
States, the defendant, JULIAN PAUL AS SAN GE, who will be first brought to the Eastern District
of Virginia, and others unknown to the Grand Jury, knowingly and unlawfully obtained and aided,
abetted, counseled, induced, procured and willfully caused Manning to obtain documents,
writings, and notes connected with the national defense, for the purpose of obtaining information
respecting the national defense-namely, Iraq rules of engagement files classified up to the
SECRET level-and with reason to believe that the information was to be used to the injury of
the United States or the advantage of any foreign nation.

(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793(b) and2)

33

 COUNTS
(Attempted Unauthorized Obtaining and Receiving of National Defense Information)
A.

The general allegations of this Superseding Indictment are re-alleged and

incorporated into this Count as though fully set forth herein.
B.

Between in or about November 2009 and in or about May 2010, in an offense

begun and committed outside of the jurisdiction of any pmiicular state or district of the United
States, the defendant, JULIAN PAUL AS SAN GE, who will be first brought to the Eastern District
of Virginia, and others unknown to the Grand Jury, knowingly and unlawfully attempted to
receive and obtain documents, writings, and notes connect_ed with the national defense-namely,
information stored on the Secret Internet Protocol Network classified up to the SECRET levelfor the purpose of obtaining infmmation respecting the national defense, knowing and having
reason to believe, at the time that he attempted to receive and obtain them, that such materials
would be obtained, taken, made, and disposed ofby a person contrary to the provisions of Chapter
37 ofTitle 18 of the United States Code.

(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793(c) and 2)

34

 COUNT 6
(Unauthorized Obtaining and Receiving of National Defense Infmmation)
(Detainee Assessment Briefs)
A.

The general allegations of this Superseding Indictment are re-alleged and

incorporated into this Count as though fully set fo1ih herein.
B.

Between in or about November 2009 and in or about May 2010, in an offense

begun and committed outside of the jurisdiction of any particular state or district of the United
States, the defendant, JULIAN PAUL AS SAN GE, who will be first brought to the Eastern District
of Virginia, knowingly and unlawfully received and obtained documents, writings, and notes
connected with the national defense-namely, detainee assessment briefs classified up to the

SECRET level related to detainees who were held at Guantanamo Bay-for the purpose of
obtaining information respecting the national defense, knowing and having reason to believe, at
· the time that he received and obtained them, that such materials had been and would be obtained,
taken, made, and disposed of by a person contrary to the provisions of Chapter 37 of Title 18 of
the United States Code.

(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793(c) and 2)

35

 COUNT?
(Unauthorized Obtaining and Receiving ofNational Defense Infonnation)
(State Department Cables)
A.

The general allegations of this Superseding Indictment are re-alleged and

incorporated into this Count as though fully set fo1ih herein.
B.

Between in or about November 2009 and in or about May 2010, in an offense

begun and committed outside of the jurisdiction of any paiiicular state or district of the United
States, the defendant, JULIAN PAUL AS SAN GE, who will be first brought to the Eastern District
.of Virginia, knowingly and unlawfully received and obtained documents, writings, and notes
connected with the national defense-namely, U.S. Depaiiment of State cables classified up to
the SECRET level-for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense,
knowing and having reason to believe, at the time that he received and obtained them, that such
materials had been and would be obtained, taken, made, and disposed of by a person contrary to
the provisions of Chapter 37 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793(c) and 2)

36

 COUNTS
(Unauthorized Obtaining and Receiving of National Defense Information)
(Iraq Rules of Engagement Files)
A.

The general allegations of this Superseding Indictment are re-alleged and

incorporated into this Count as though fully set fmih herein.
B.

Between in or about November 2009 and in or about May 2010, in an offense

begun and committed outside of the jurisdiction of any paiiicular state or district of the United
States, the defendant, mLIAN PAUL AS SAN GE, who will be first brought to the Eastern District
of Virginia, knowingly and unlawfully received and obtained documents, writings, and notes
connected with the national defense-namely, Iraq rules of engagement files classified up to the

SECRET level-for the purpose of obtaining infmmation respecting the national defense,
knowing and having reason to believe, at the time that he received and obtained them, that such
materfo.ls had been and would be obtained, taken, made, and disposed ofby a person contrary to
the provisions of Chapter 37 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793( c) and 2)

37

 COUNT9
(Unauthorized Disclosure of National Defense Info1mation)
(Detainee Assessment Briefs)
A.

The general allegations of this Superseding Indictment are re-alleged and

incorporated into this Count as though fully set fo1ih herein.
B.

Between in or about November 2009 and in or about May 2010, in an offense

begun and committed outside of the jurisdiction of any particular state or district of the United
States, the defendant, JULIAN PAUL AS SAN GE, who will be first brought to the Eastern District
of Virginia, and others unknown to the Grand Jury, aided, abetted, counseled, induced, procured
and willfully caused Manning, who had lawful possession of, access to, and control over
documents relating to the national defense-namely, detainee assessment briefs classified up to
the SECRET level related to detainees who were held at Guantanamo Bay-to communicate,
deliver, and transmit the documents to ASSANGE, a person not entitled to receive them.

(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793(d) and 2)

38

 COUNTl0
(Unauthorized Disclosure of National Defense Information)
(State Depmiment Cables)

A

The general allegations of this Superseding Indictment are re-alleged and

incorporated into this Count as though fully set fo1ih herein.
B.

Between in or about November 2009 and in or about May 2010, in an offense

begun and committed outside of the jurisdiction of any pmiicular state or district of the United
States, the defendant, JULIAN PAUL ASSANGE, who will be first brought to the Eastern District
of Virginia, and others unknown to the Grand Jury, aided, abetted, counseled, induced, procured
and willfully caused Manning, who had lawful possession of, access to, and control over
documents relating to the national defense-namely, U.S. Department of State cables classified
up to the SECRET level-to communicate, deliver, and transmit the documents to ASSANGE,
a person not entitled to receive them.

(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793(d) and 2)

39

 COUNT 11
(Unauthorized Disclosure of National Defense Information)
(Iraq Rules of Engagement Files)
A.

The general allegations of this Superseding Indictment are re-alleged and

incorporated into this Count as though fully set forth herein.
B.

Between in or about November 2009 and in or about May 2010, in an offense

begun and committed outside of the jurisdiction of any particular state or district of the United
States, the defendant, JULIAN PAUL AS SAN GE, who will be first brought to the Eastern District
of Virginia, and others unknown to the Grand Jury, aided, abetted, counseled, induced, procured
and willfully caused Manning, who had lawful possession of, access to, and control over
documents relating to the national defense-namely, Iraq rules of engagement files classified up
to the SECRET level-to communicate, deliver, and transmit the documents to ASSANGE, a
person not entitled to receive them.

(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793(d) and 2)

40

 COUNT 12
(Unauthorized Disclosure of National Defense Information)
(Detainee Assessment Briefs)
A.

The general allegations of this Superseding Indictment are re-alleged and

incorporated into this Count as though fully set fo1th herein.
B.

Between in or about November 2009 and in or about May 2010, in an offense

begun and committed outside of the jurisdiction of any particular state or district of the United
States, the defendant, JULIAN PAUL AS SAN GE, who will be first brought to the Eastern District
of Virginia, and others unknown to the Grand Jmy, aided, abetted, counseled, induced, procured
and willfully caused Manning, who had unauthorized possession of, access to, and control over
documents relating to the national defense-namely, detainee assessment briefs classified up to
the SECRET level related to detainees who were held at Guantanamo Bay-to communicate,
deliver, and transmit the documents to AS SANGE, a person not entitled to receive them.

(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793(e) and 2)

41

 COUNT13
(Unauthorized Disclosure of National Defense Information)
(State Depaiiment Cables)
A

The general allegations of this Superseding Indictment are re-alleged and

incorporated into this Count as though fully set forth herein.
B.

Between in or about November 2009 and in or about May 2010, in an offense

begun and committed outside of the jurisdiction of any pmiicular state or district of the United
States, the defendant, JULIAN PAUL AS SAN GE, who will be first brought to the Eastern District
of Virginia, and others unknown to the Grand Jury, aided, abetted, counseled, induced, procured
and willfully caused Manning, who had unauthorized possession of, access to, and control over
documents relating to the national defense-namely, U.S. Depmiment of State cables classified
up to the SECRET level-to communicate, deliver, and transmit the documents to ASSANGE,
a person not entitled to receive them.

(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793(e) and 2)

42

 COUNT 14
(Unauthorized Disclosure of National Defense Infonnation)
(Iraq Rules of Engagement Files)
A.

The general allegations of this Superseding Indictment are re-alleged and

incorporated into this Count as though fully set forth herein.
B.

Between in or about November 2009 and in or about May 2010, in an offense

begun and committed outside of the jurisdiction of any pmiicular state or district of the United
States, the defendant, JULIAN PAUL AS SAN GE, who will be first brought to the Eastern District
of Virginia, and others unknown to the Grand Jury, aided, abetted, counseled, induced, procured
and willfully caused Manning; who had unauthorized possession of, access to, and control over
documents relating to the national defense-namely, Iraq rules of engagement files classified up
to the SECRET level-.to communicate, deliver, and transmit the documents to ASSANGE, a
person not entitled to receive them.

(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793(e) and 2)

43

 COUNTIS
(Unauthorized Disclosure of National Defense Information)
A.

The general allegations of this Superseding Indictment are re-alleged and

incorporated into this Count as though fully set forth herein.
B.

From in or about July 2010 and continuing until April 2019, in an offense begun

and committed outside of the jurisdiction of any particular state or district of the United States,
the defendant, JULIAN PAUL ASSANGE, who will be first brought to the Eastern District of
Virginia, having unauthorized possession of, access to, and control over documents relating to
the national defense, willfully and unlawfully caused and attempted to cause such materials to be
communicated, delivered, and transmitted to persons not entitled to receive them.
C.

Specifically, as alleged above, ASSANGE, having unauthorized possession of

significant activity repmis, classified up to the SECRET level, from the Afghanistan war
containing the names of individuals, who risked their safety and freedom by providing
information to the United States and our allies, communicated the documents containing names
of those sources to persons not authorized to receive them by distributing them and then by
publishing them and causing them to be published on the Internet.

(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 793(e))

44

 COUNT 16
(Unauthorized Disclosure of National Defense Inforn1ation)
A.

The general all.egations of this Superseding Indictment are re-alleged and

incorporated into this Count as though fully set forth herein.
B.

From in or about July 2010 and continuing until April 2019, in an offense begun

and committed outside of the jurisdiction of any particular state or district of the United States,
the defendant, JULIAN PAUL ASSANGE, who will be first brought to the Eastern District of
Virginia, having unauthorized possession of, access to, and control over documents relating to
the national defense, willfully and unlawfully caused and attempted to cause such materials to be.
communicated, delivered, and transmitted to persons not entitled to receive them.
C.

Specifi.cally, as alleged above, ASSANGE, having unauthorized possession of

significant activity reports, classified up to the SECRET level, from the Iraq war containing the
names of individuals, who risked their safety and freedom by providing information to the United
States and our allies, communicated the documents containing names of those sources to persons
not authorized to receive them by distributing them and then by publishing them and causing them
to be published on the Internet.

(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 793(e))

45

 COUNT 17
(Unauthorized Disclosure of National Defense Information)
A.

The general allegations of this Superseding Indictment are re-alleged and

incorporated into this Count as though fully set forth herein.
B.

From in or about July 2010 and continuing until April 2019, in an offense begun

and committed outside of the jurisdiction of any particular state or district of the United States,
the defendant, JULIAN PAUL ASSANGE, who will be first brought to the Eastern District of
Virginia, having unauthorized possession of, access to, and control over documents relating to
the national defense, willfully and unlawfully caused and attempted to cause such materials to be
communicated, delivered, and transmitted to persons not entitled to receive them.
C.

Specifically, as alleged above, ASSANGE, having unauthorized possession of

State Department cables, classified up to the SECRET level, containing the names of individuals,
who risked their safety and freedom by providing information to the United States and our allies,
communicated the documents containing names of those sources to persons not authorized to
receive them by distributing them and then by publishing them and causing them to be published
on the Internet.

(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 793(e))

46

 COUNT 18
(Unauthorized Obtaining of National Defense Information)
(Detainee Assessment Briefs)
A.

The general allegations of this Superseding Indictment are re-alleged and

incorporated into this Count as though fully set forth herein.
B.

Between in or about November 2009 and in or about May 2010, in an offense

begun and committed outside of the jurisdiction of any pmiicular state or district of the United
States, the defendant, JULIAN PAUL AS SAN GE, who will be first brought to the Eastern District
of Virginia, and others unknown to the Grand Jury, knowingly and unlawfully obtained and aided,
abetted, counseled, induced, procured and willfully caused Manning to obtain documents,
writings, and notes connected with the national defense, for the purpose of obtaining information
· respecting the national defense-namely, detainee assessment briefs classified up to the

SECRET level related to detainees who were held at Guantanmno Bay-and with reason to
believe that the infonnation was to be used to the injury of the United States or the advantage of
any foreign nation.

(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793(b) and 2)

47

 Notice of Forfeiture
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a), the United States of America
gives notice to the defendant, JULIAN PAUL AS SAN GE, that, if convicted of any of the counts
of this Second Superseding Indictment, he shall forfeit to the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§§ 793(h) and 981(a)(l)(C), 28 U.S.C. § 2461, and 21 U.S.C. § 853, anyprope1iy, real or personal,
which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to such violation(s).

A TRUE BILL

2}1 J 1),J lo 20
DATE

FOREPERSON

G. Zachary Terwilliger
Unit . tates Attorney
.

By:

7

l ,(

Tracy Dohe1iy-McCormick
First Assistant United States Attorney
Kellen S. Dwyer
Thomas W. Traxler
Gordon D. Kromberg
Alexander P. BeITang
Assistant United States Attorneys
Adam Small
Nicholas Hunter
Trial Attorneys, National Security Division
U.S. Department of Justice

48

 No.

1:18CR111

. UN1TED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

vs.
JULIAN PAUL ASSANGE
SECOND SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT
Count 1: 18 U.S.C. § 793(g) - ConspiracyTo Obtain and Disclose National Defense Information
Count 2: 18 U.S.C. § 371- Conspiracy to Commit Computer Intrusions
Counts 3-4: 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(b) and 2 - Obtaining National Defense Information
Counts 5-8: 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(c) and 2 - Obtaining National Defense Information
Counts 9-11: 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d) and 2 - Disclosure of National Defense Information
Counts 12-14: 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(e) and 2 - Disclosure of National Defense Information
Count 15-17: 18 JJ.S.C. § 793(e) - DiscJosure of National Defense Information

-------------

--------------------

A true bill.

''Z..!f,H

Filed in open court this

.JJnrday, of June A. D. 2020
Clerk

Bail,$