CAUSE NO. _________________

STEVEN HOTZE, MD,
HON. JOSH FLYNN, Delegate and
Secretary for Republican Party of Texas,
HON. CATHIE ADAMS, Former Chairperson
Republican Party of Texas,
RICK HOTZE, and
GREG BLUME,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MAYOR SYLVESTER TURNER,
in his official capacity as Mayor of
the City of Houston, Texas, and
HOUSTON FIRST CORPORATION,
Defendants.

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT

______ DISTRICT COURT

HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

PLAINTIFFS’ ORIGINAL PETITION, VERIFIED APPLICATIONS FOR
EMERGENCY TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, TEMPORARY INJUNCTION,
AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION
COME NOW Plaintiffs, Steven Hotze, MD, Hon. Josh Flynn, Hon. Cathie Adams, Rick
Hotze, and Greg Blume (“Plaintiffs”) file their Original Petition, Verified Applications for
Emergency Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction, and
for cause would show as follows:
DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN
Plaintiffs intend to conduct discovery under Level 2 of the rules set forth in Rule 190 of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
DISCLOSURES
Plaintiffs request Defendant provide disclosures in accordance with Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 194, including relevant documents.
TRCP 47 STATEMENT
Page 1 of 19

 Plaintiffs are suing for injunctive relief and declaratory relief.
Plaintiffs are seeking monetary relief of less than $100,000.00.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under the Texas constitution, Article V, § 8, as
the amount in controversy exceeds the minimum jurisdictional limits of the court exclusive of
interest. The Plaintiff seeks relief that can be granted by courts of law or equity.
The Court has jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief against
Defendant, Mayor Turner, because the Declaratory Judgment Act waives governmental immunity
when the plaintiff is challenging the validity of an ordinance or order. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code §§ 37.004, 37.006; Texas Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628
(2010; Texas Ed. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 446 (Tex. 1994).
The Court has jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief against
Defendant, Mayor Turner, because the mayor is acting ultra vires by imposing restrictions of the
Texas Republican Convention. See City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366-368-69 (Tex.
2009).
Plaintiffs have standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief.
The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant.
Venue is proper because a substantial portion of the events giving rise to the claims
occurred in Harris County, Texas. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 15.002, 15.008, 15.035.
Plaintiffs request the Court provide notice of this lawsuit to the Texas Attorney General as
required by Texas Government Code §402.010.
PARTIES
Plaintiff Steven Hotze is a citizen and resident of Harris County, Texas.
Plaintiff Hon. Josh Flynn is a citizen and resident of Harris County, Texas
Page 2 of 19

 Plaintiff Hon. Cathie Adams is a citizen and resident of Collin County, Texas
Plaintiff Rick Hotze is a citizen and resident of Harris County, Texas.
Plaintiff Greg Blume is a citizen and resident of Harris County, Texas.
Defendant Sylvester Turner is the elected mayor of Houston, Texas and is being sued in
his official capacity as mayor. He may be served with process wherever he may be found.
Defendant Houston First Corporation is a Texas corporation doing business in Harris
County, Texas. It may be served with process through its registered agent.
The facts below are supported or proved by the attached Exhibits, which are incorporated
herein for all purposes.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The Republican Party of Texas (“the RPT”) has been preparing to host the 2020 State
Republican Convention (the “Convention”) for almost 2 years. See Ex. A (Declaration of J. Flynn)
at ¶ 7. It was set to take place from July 16–18 at the George R. Brown Convention Center (the
“GRB”) in Houston, Texas. See Ex. A (Declaration of J. Flynn) at ¶ 7. However, on the evening
of July 8, 2020, just eight days before the Convention’s first day, the GRB’s landlord, the Houston
First Corporation (“HFC”), terminated its License Agreement with the RPT—capitulating to the
political pressure from Houston’s Mayor, Sylvester Turner, effectively cancelling the RPT’s
Convention, and denying each Republican attendee the right to voice their support in-person.
A. Mayor Turner’s Ultimatum
Over the weeks leading up to the Convention’s cancellation, Mayor Turner, a member of
the Democratic party, demonstrated that he would use his office’s power to stifle the speech and
association of the RPT and its members. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 hysteria, Mayor
Turner has issued formal orders from his office that, amongst other things, purported to restrict
“large” gatherings but, ultimately went unenforced, ignored, or even circumvented. See Ex. B (4th
Page 3 of 19

 Amended City Order). As the Convention drew near, Mayor Turner began to indicate that such
orders would no longer be ignored, at least as it pertained to the RPT and its Convention. Mayor
turned held press conferences and contacted the RPT, attempting to compel the cancellation of the
Convention but, despite, these numerous advances by Turner to cancel the Convention, the State
Republic Executive Committee, a 64-member body that serves as the governing board of the state
party, voted overwhelmingly (40-20) to proceed in-person. See Ex. A (Declaration of J. Flynn) at
¶ 10.
On July 7, 2020, under the guise of advice and encouragement, Mayor Turner sent a letter
to the RPT’s leaders, requesting they cancel the in-person component of the Convention and “hold
a virtual convention.” See Ex. A (Declaration of J. Flynn) at ¶ 12; Ex. A-1 (June 6 Turner Letter).
This letter also attached a document the letter titled “Requirements for events and gatherings
during the COVID-19 pandemic” (the “Requirement List”) and instructed that these “operational
requirements” were necessary. Ex. A-1 (June 6 Turner Letter) (emphasis in original). However,
the attached Requirements List was not an order from the Mayor’s office but, rather, a document
from the Houston Health Department that, at numerous different times, contradicts itself by
identifying points as “recommendations” and then as “requirements.” Compare Ex. A-1 (June 6
Turner Letter) (“The recommendations below are intended to reduce the risk of COVID-19
infection and spread . . . Even with intense recommendations, the convention remains at best a in
[sic] the Higher Risk category”) with (the very next line, which titles the remnants of the document
“Requirements for Event Organizers”) (emphasis in original). Mayor Turner warned that if the
RPT failed to comply and cancel the in-person Convention then it would be required to comply,
instead, with the Requirements List. See A-1 (June 6 Turner Letter).

Page 4 of 19

 The Requirements List was not only mischaracterized and deceitfully passed off as law, it
also sought to impose an excessively strict, haphazardly assembled list of bulleted “requirements”
that spanned five, single-spaced pages. See A-1 (June 6 Turner Letter). This Requirements List,
demanding executive compliance, included a number of items of serious constitutional concern,
including demands to:







“enforce the Governor’s executive order on the use of face coverings (masks) or face
shields if face covering are not possible. Those who do not comply will be removed;”
“limit attendance, seating capacity, or host smaller events in larger rooms”
“Maintain a contact list of all convention attendees including name, home, address, home,
or cell phone, and email address. Be prepared to share that list with local public health;”
“Have a plan to isolate and safely transport those who are sick . . . Attendees who develop
symptoms or test positive for COV-19 during the convention or in the two weeks following
the convention must notify convention organizers who will then coordinate with local
public health in Houston and in the attendee’s local jurisdiction;” and
“After the event. Attendees should be advised to quarantine for 14 day and self-monitor
for symptoms and follow CDC guidance if symptoms develop.”

Ex. A-1 (June 6 Turner Letter).
In effect, Mayor Turner posed his rival political party with an ultimatum—cancel the in-person
Convention or submit to drastic and unwarranted oversight from the City of Houston, including
mandatory, detailed recordation of the Republican attendees and the removal of non-compliant
attendees. See Ex. A-1 (June 6 Turner Letter).
B. The Cancellation
Despite Mayor Turner’s July 7, 2020 ultimatum, the RPT did not succumb to the pressure.
Dissatisfied with that result, Mayor Turner sought further legal footing for cancelling the in-person
Convention. See Ex. C (July 8 Media Coverage) (“During a virtual City Council meeting
Wednesday, Turner said he asked the city's legal department to work with the Houston First
Corporation, which operates the George R. Brown Convention Center, to review the contract with
the state party.”). Mayor Turner’s legal basis became unnecessary when the GRB’s landlord, HFC,
Page 5 of 19

 with whom the RPT signed its License Agreement to host the Convention became complicit in the
efforts to cancel the in-person Convention.
On July 8, 2020, HFC, first sent the RPT a letter mirroring the sentiment of Mayor Turner’s
letter the day before. See Ex. A-1 (Declaration of J. Flynn) at ¶ 12; Ex. A-2 (HFC’s Advisory
Letter). Just hours later, though, HFC sent a second letter to the RPT terminating its License
Agreement to host the Convention, alleging the occurrence of a force majeure event. See Ex. A-3
(HFC’s Termination Letter). HFC even cites a letter to itself and Mayor Turner, from Dr. David
Persse (the physician director for the Houston Fire Department) as a basis for cancellation but does
not disclose what prompted the doctor’s letter. See Ex. A-1 (Declaration of J. Flynn) at ¶ 12; Ex.
A-3 (HFC’s Termination Letter).
C. Selective Enforcement
While Mayor Turner has taken efforts to disguise his effort, his choices with regard to the
RPT’s Convention are simply opportunistic and are in stark contrast to the treatment of other
peaceful, political assemblies during this same pandemic. For example, for Houston’s June 2
organized march to protest the death of George Floyd,, Turner gave a press conference to the City
of Houston supporting the marches, personally attended, and gave speeches to large crowds,
stating only that people “should wear a mask, carry hand sanitizer, and attempt to maintain social
distance.” See Ex. D (June 1 Media); Ex. E (Press Release). Moreover, the June 2 march was of
such a size that the City of Houston shut down roads and shut down municipal buildings to
facilitate the crowded march. See Ex. F (June 2 Media).
In short, just one month ago, Mayor Turner not only allowed, but advocated for the exercise
of Houston’s citizens’ constitutional rights and promoted high levels of attendance. However,
when the RPT, an organization rivaling Mayor Turner’s political party, sought to convene and
exercise those same rights, he chooses to quash them.
Page 6 of 19

 CAUSES OF ACTION
“The Constitution is not suspended when the government declares a state of disaster.” In
re Abbott, No. 20-0291, 2020 WL 1943226, at *1 (Tex. Apr. 23, 2020). “All government power
in this country, no matter how well-intentioned, derives only from the state and federal
constitutions.” In re Salon A La Mode et al., No. 20-0340 (concurring opinion, J. Blacklock) (Tex.
May 5, 2020). During a pandemic “the judiciary, the other branches of government, and our fellow
citizens—must insist that every action our governments take complies with the Constitution,
especially now. If we tolerate unconstitutional government orders during an emergency, whether
out of expediency or fear, we abandon the Constitution at the moment we need it most.” Id.
A. Requests for Declaratory Relief
The Plaintiffs brings their claims for relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act.
They also bring suit under City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d, 366, 368-369 (Tex. 2009),
which authorizes ultra vires claims against public officials who act in violation of state law.
Plaintiffs are seeking relief entirely under state law and are not asserting any claims that
arise under federal law.
1. Declaratory Relief: Declaration that Defendants’ actions in canceling the TRC
violate article 1, section 8 of the Texas Constitution.
Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the foregoing paragraphs here as if fully set forth herein.
Plaintiffs seek a declaration stating that Defendants’ actions in canceling the Texas Republican
Convention violate the Texas Constitution because the actions violate Plaintiffs’ freedom of
expression.
On July 8, 2020, Defendant Houston First Corporation sent a letter to State Chairman of
the Republican Party, James Dickey, informing Dickey that Houston First Corporation was
canceling its contract to host the Texas Republican Convention. Canceling the Texas Republican
Page 7 of 19

 Convention is a severe limitation of Plaintiffs’ political speech. Defendant Turner directed his legal
team to look for any way possible to cancel the Convention, ostensibly as a result of the novel
coronavirus. Defendant Turner’s statements indicate that he was concerned about allowing the
Texas Republican Convention to proceed because Turner claimed the gathering would threaten
the City of Houston. The actions of Defendant Houston First Corporation, acting at Turner’s behest
to cancel the Texas Republican Convention at the last minute, deprive Plaintiffs of their right to
express their political beliefs, and make core political determinations.
Article 1, section 8 of the Texas Constitution provides that “no law shall ever be passed
curtailing the liberty of speech. . . .” Tex. Const. art. 1, § 8. The Supreme Court has noted that
article 1, section 8 of the Texas Constitution “demonstrates Texas’s strong and longstanding
commitment to free speech” including the constitution’s mandate that the liberty is fundamental
and shall “‘remain forever inviolate.’” Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Tex. 1992) (quoting
Tex. Const. art. 1 § 29). Texas courts have noted that article 1, section 8 of the Texas Constitution
affords at least the same protections afforded by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See Kinney v Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 91–92 (Tex. 2014). The Supreme Court of
Texas has noted that a prior restraint on speech is permissible only when essential to avoid an
impending danger. Davenport, 834 S.W.2d at 9.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits regulating speech in ways
that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others. Tex. Dept. Of Transp. v. Barber, 111
S.W.3d 86, 92 (Tex. 2003). Regulations that impose different burdens on expression because of
its content are presumed invalid and subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 92. Content-based regulations
are constitutional only if the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Id.
at 92–93.
Page 8 of 19

 In circumstances in which the regulations are content neutral, the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution allows reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of written
and oral expression. See id. at 92. Content neutral regulations are subject to an intermediate level
of scrutiny and are valid if they are narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest
and do not unreasonably limit alternative channels for communicating the information. Id. at 93.
The divergence between Mayor Turner’s statements and actions in response to the protests
of the death of George Floyd and his response to the Texas Republican Party’s plan to host the
TRC suggest that the true reasons behind Mayor Turner’s actions in forcing Houston First
Corporation to cancel the TRC are not content-neutral regulations. Both events occurred during
the COVID-19 pandemic and both events have the potential for virus transmission because they
involve large groups of people gathering together. But Mayor Turner’s actions in canceling the
TRC while encouraging the protests suggests that Mayor Turner valued the expression at the
protests more than he values the expression of Republicans. The fact that Mayor Turner
encouraged large protests while canceling the TRC suggests that Mayor Turner’s regulation of
speech was motivated by the viewpoint and content of the speech. Accordingly, Defendants’
actions are presumptively unconstitutional. See id. at 92. Mayor Turner’s actions in compelling
Houston First to cancel the TRC are not narrowly tailored. Even presuming for the sake of
argument that Mayor Turner and Houston First are acting on a compelling government interest,
their actions are not narrowly tailored. Defendants canceled the entire convention rather than
attempting to find a way to facilitate the freedom of expression while limiting virus transmission.
In the alternative, even presuming for the sake of argument that Mayor Turner and Houston
First Corporation’s reasons for canceling the TRC are content neutral, canceling the event at the
last minute is not a reasonable restriction on the time, place, and manner of this core political
Page 9 of 19

 expression. Canceling the event is not narrowly tailored to achieve a substantial government
interest. As stated above, Defendants canceled the entire convention rather than attempting to find
ways to allow it to proceed while limiting virus transmission. Further, there are no reasonable
alternative means for communicating the information that Plaintiffs intended to communicate at
the TRC. At the convention, Plaintiffs would take part in choosing delegates, electors, party chairs
and would rally and encourage each other entering election season. Plaintiffs have been planning
the TRC are unable at the last minute to find an alternative that will allow them to accomplish their
goals. Accordingly, canceling the TRC violates article 1, section 8 of the Texas Constitution
because the action prohibits core political speech and is not narrowly tailored to serve a substantial
government interest.
2. Declaratory Relief: Declaration that Defendants Actions Violate Plaintiffs’
Freedom of Association
Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the foregoing paragraphs here as if fully set forth herein.
Plaintiffs seek a declaration stating that Defendants’ actions in canceling the Texas Republican
Convention violate the Texas Constitution because the actions violate Plaintiffs’ freedom of
association. Article 1, section 27 of the Texas Constitution provides: “The citizens shall have the
right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble together for their common good; and apply to those
invested with the powers of government for redress of grievances or other purposes, by petition,
address or remonstrance.” Tex. Const. Art. 1, § 27.
Freedom of association for the purpose of advancing ideas and airing grievances is a
fundamental liberty guaranteed by the First Amendment. In re Maurer, 15 S.W.3d 256, 260 (Tex.
App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, orig. proceeding). An action abridging the freedom of association is
subject to strict scrutiny and is valid only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. See

Page 10 of 19

 In re Houstonian Campus, L.L.C., 312 S.W.3d 178, 189 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, orig.
proceeding); Ex parte Morales, 212 S.W.3d 483, 490 (Tex. App.— Austin, 2006).
The TRC is an event where Texas Republicans gather together to choose delegates, electors, and
party chairs for their political party. The right to associate for these purposes is core Article 1, section 27
of the Texas Constitution. Accordingly, the right can be abridged only if the regulation on the right is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. As explained above, Defendants actions in canceling
the TRC are not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Accordingly, Defendants actions
violate the Texas Constitution.

3. Declaratory Relief: Defendants’ Actions Deny Plaintiffs Equal Protection
Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the foregoing paragraphs here as if fully set forth herein.
Defendants seek a declaration that Defendants actions are invalid because they violate Article I,
section 3 of the Texas Constitution. As described above, Defendant Turner embraced and
participated in protests that expressed anger over the killing of George Floyd. These protests
involved over sixty thousand people who spent hours in close proximity and did not undertake
systemic precautions to avoid virus transmission. At the same time, Defendant Turner has canceled
the TRC, an event that would be much smaller than the protests and where Party officials could
ensure safety through undertaking precautions to avoid virus transmission.
Article I, § 3 of the Texas constitution prohibits the government from treating differently
similarly situated individuals. See Tex. Const. art. 1 § 3; Klumb v. Houston Municipal Employees
Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2015). To prevail on an equal protection claim under Article
I, § 3, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants’ decision to cancel the TRC is not rationally related to
a legitimate governmental purpose. See id.; Cadena Comm. USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage
Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318, 365 (Tex. 2017). Defendants’ actions canceling the TRC are not

Page 11 of 19

 rationally related to a legitimate government purpose, but instead are motivated by bias against the
TRP. There is no need to shut down the TRC in order promote public health.
4.

Declaratory Relief: Section 418.101 Violates Article II, section 1 of the Texas
Constitution.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the foregoing paragraphs here as if fully set forth herein.
Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Section 418.101(b) et seq. violate Article II, section 1 of the Texas
Constitution. Section 418.101(b) allows mayors or county judges to issue local disaster
declarations. Section 418.101(g) of the Texas Government Code gives mayors the authority to
"control ingress and egress from a disaster area under the jurisdiction and authority of the county
judge or mayor and control the movement of persons and the occupancy of premises in that area.”
Tex. Gov. Code §418.101(g). Before canceling the TRC, Mayor Turner has demanded that the
TRC meet certain demands in order to host the convention. The restrictions related to COVID-19.
To the extent Mayor Turner compelled Houston First Corporation to cancel the Republican
Convention under authority stemming from Texas Government Code section 418.101(g), Mayor
Turner’s action violates the Texas Constitution because Texas Government Code section
418.101(g) is an impermissible delegation of legislative authority.
Article II, section 1 of the Texas Constitution provides that “The powers of the
Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of which
shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are Legislative to one;
those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial to another; and no person, or
collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly
attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.” Tex. Const.
art. 2, §1. The Texas Constitution vests the Legislature with “legislative power, i.e., the lawmaking power of the people.” Tex. Const. art. 3, § 1.
Page 12 of 19

 Only the Legislature can exercise law-making power, subject to restrictions imposed by
the constitution. Tex. Const. art. II, § 1. Because of the Texas Constitution’s “explicit prohibition
against one government branch exercising a power attached to another,” Perry v. Del Rio, 67
S.W.3d 85, 91 (Tex. 2001), exceptions to the constitutionally-mandated separation of powers may
“never be implied in the least; they must be ‘expressly permitted’ by the Constitution itself.” Fin.
Comm'n of Texas v. Norwood, 418 S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tex. 2013). These restrictions must be
expressed or clearly implied. Jones v. State, 803 S.W.2d 712, 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (citing
Gov’t Servs. Ins. Underwriters v. Jones, 368 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Tex. 1963)). The Legislature may
enact laws that enhance the general welfare of the state and resolve political questions, such as the
boundaries of political subdivisions, subject to constitutional limits. Carter v. Hamlin Hosp. Dist.,
538 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976); see also Hunter v. Cty of Pittsburgh, 207
U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907).
The Legislature may delegate some of its powers to another branch, but only if those
powers are not more properly attached to the legislature by Constitutional mandate. For example,
Legislative power cannot be delegated to the executive branch, either directly or to an executive
agency. State v. Rhine, 297 S.W.3d 301, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The issue becomes a
question of the point at which delegation becomes unconstitutional. Id. The Texas Supreme Court
has described the problem: "the debate over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over
a point of principle but over a question of degree." Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc., 952
S.W.2d 454, 466 (Tex. 1997).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim.
App 1978), stated that sufficient standards are necessary to keep the degree of delegated discretion
below the level of legislating. The existence of an area for exercise of discretion by the executive
Page 13 of 19

 branch requires that standards are formulated for guidance and there is limited discretion. Ex parte
Granviel, 561 S.W.2d at 514. The statute must be sufficiently complete to accomplish the
regulation of the particular matters falling within the legislature's jurisdiction, the matters of detail
that are reasonably necessary for the ultimate application, operation and enforcement of the law
may be expressly delegated to the authority charged with the administration of the statute. Ex parte
Granviel, 561 S.W.2d at 514. Therefore, if the Legislature has not provided sufficient standards to
guide the executive’s discretion and the delegated power is legislative, that executive has been
granted a power that is more properly attached to the Legislature and the delegation is an
unconstitutional violation of separation of powers. State v. Rhine, 297 S.W.3d 306 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2019).
Chapter 418 of the Texas Government Code contains several sections that provide
executives including governors, county judges, and mayors the authority to issue orders and
proclamations that have the force and effect of law. See, e.g., Tex. Gov. Code § 418.012. This
delegation of power violates Article II, section 1 of the Texas Constitution. Because the delegation
of power violates Article II, section 1 of the Texas Constitution, Section 418.101(b) et. seq. of the
Texas Government Code are null and void.
In his Order, Mayor Turner cites Texas Government Code section 418.108 asserting,
among other things, he has the ability to control ingress and egress, thereby suspending laws.
(Exhibit “B”).
B. Promissory Estoppel
Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the foregoing paragraphs and incorporate them here as
if fully set forth herein.
Defendant HRC made a promise to allow Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs’ related organization,
the RPT, to use its facilities at GRB to conduct all activities related to the Convention from July
Page 14 of 19

 16, 2020 to July 18, 2020. Plaintiffs, as deeply involved members of the RPT, reasonably and
substantially relied on HRC’s promise to grant Plaintiffs’ license to use its facilities for the
Convention.
However, acting complicity with Mayor Turner, HRC determined that its political interests
were better served were more important than its legal obligations to Plaintiffs and, with only eight
days remaining before the Convention, terminated the license agreement, prevented Plaintiffs from
attending the Convention in-person and from exercising their constitutional rights. HRC knew, or
reasonably should have known, that Plaintiffs would rely on its promise and that their baseless
termination would cause Plaintiffs harm. Accordingly, injustice to Plaintiffs can only be avoided
by enforcing Defendant HRC’s promise to license Plaintiffs’ use of the GRB facilities for the
Convention from July 16, 2020 to July 18, 2020.
APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the foregoing paragraphs and incorporate them here as
if fully set forth herein.
Plaintiffs seek a temporary restraining order preventing Defendants from canceling the
TRC. A temporary restraining order serves to provide emergency relief and preserve the status quo
until a hearing may be had on a temporary injunction. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198,
204 (Tex. 2002). To obtain injunctive relief, “the applicant must plead and prove three specific
elements: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and
(3) a probable, imminent, and irreparably injury in the interim.” See Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204.
An applicant must plead a cause of action and present some evidence that tends to sustain it to
show a probable right of recovery. Intercontinental Terminals Co., LLC v. Vopak N. Am., Inc., 354
S.W.3d 887, 897 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). “[T]he applicant is not required
Page 15 of 19

 to establish that it will prevail on final trial.” Texas Kidney, Inc. v. ASD Specialty Healthcare, No.
14-13-01106-CV, 2014 WL 3002425, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 1, 2014, no
pet.).
The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act and Heinrich each provide Plaintiffs with a cause
of action to seek declaration and injunctive relief against the Defendants. Plaintiffs have a probable
right to relief because, for the reason described above, the Defendants’ conduct violates the Texas
Constitution. Plaintiffs will suffer probable, imminent, and irreparable injury absent a temporary
restraining order and temporary injunction because canceling the TRC prevents Defendants from
expressing their political beliefs, gathering together to choose delegates, electors and party chairs
and generally participating in Texas politics. Because Defendants seek to cancel the TRC so soon
before the convention is set to take place, Plaintiffs will not be able to organize another convention.
Without immediate relief, Plaintiffs will suffer imminent and irreparable harm.
The harm to Plaintiffs described herein is a direct and proximate result of the acts of
Defendants. The requested temporary restraining order is appropriate to preserve the status quo
until a hearing on Plaintiffs’ application for temporary injunctive relief can be held. For just cause,
Plaintiffs request the entry of a Temporary Restraining Order as follows, and further requests entry
of a Preliminary Injunction following a hearing:
Plaintiffs will provide Defendants’ counsel with notice of this Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and hearing on same.
Plaintiffs file this Verified Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Other
Equitable Relief pursuant to general principles of equity, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 680, et
seq., and Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 65.011. Plaintiff is willing to post a
bond as required by Texas law in an amount determined by the Court.
Page 16 of 19

 GROUNDS FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiffs reallege the foregoing paragraphs and incorporates them here as if fully set forth
herein.
Plaintiffs request this Court to set is Request for Temporary Injunction for hearing and after
hearing issue a temporary injunction against Defendant.
Additionally, Plaintiffs further request that following a trial on the merits of this case, that
the Court enter a permanent injunction against Defendant.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
Plaintiffs request the following relief:
a. a declaration that Defendants’ actions violate Plaintiffs’ right to freedom of
expression;
b. a declaration that Defendants’ actions violate Plaintiffs’ right to freedom of
association;
c. a declaration that Defendants’ action violates Plaintiffs’ right of equal protection;
d. a declaration that Texas Government Code Section 418.101(b) et seq., violate Article
II, section 1 of the Texas Constitution;
e. a declaration that Mayor Turner’s Fourth Amended Order Prohibiting Certain Large
Gatherings and Reopening and Imposing Temporary Restrictions On Certain
Businesses and City Premises by the Mayor of the City of Houston (Exhibit “B")
violates Article I, section 28 of the Texas Constitution;
f. a declaration that Texas Government Code Section 418 et seq. violates Article I,
section 28 of the Texas Constitution;

Page 17 of 19

 g. a temporary and permanent injunction that enjoins Defendants from canceling the
Texas Republican Convention;
h. a temporary restraining order that enjoins Defendants from canceling the Texas
Republican Convention;
i. an order requiring Defendant HRC to fulfill its promise to license Plaintiffs’ use of the
GRB facilities for the Convention from July 16, 2020 to July 18, 2020;
j. an award of nominal and compensatory damages;
k. an award of costs and attorneys’ fees; and
l. all other relief that the Court may deem just, proper, or equitable.

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Jared R. Woodfill
Jared R. Woodfill
State Bar No. 00788715
Woodfill Law Firm, P.C.
3 Riverway, Suite 750
Houston, Texas 77056
Tel: (713) 751-3080
Fax: (713) 751-3058
woodfillservice@gmail.com (service)
jwoodfill@woodfilllaw.com (non-service)

Page 18 of 19

 \a,EBt_{Le_&ilI_{}-.

STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF HARRIS
Before me, the undersigned notary publie in and for said county and state, on this day
personally appeared Josh Flynn and after heing duly swom, stated upon his oath that his secretary

of the Republican Pa*y of Texas and a delegate to the Republican Party Convention, that he has
read plaintiffs' Verified Original Petition and Verified Application for Temporary Restraining

Order, and that the factual statements contained in the Verified Original Petition and Verified

Application for Temporary Restraining Order are true and correct based upon his personal
knowledge.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before methis
witness my hand and seal.

CYNTHIA TAYLOB

Notary Public, State sf
Comm, Expires 1045'2020
Notary l0 1?9153556

Page 19

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