Holding a Pen in One Hand, Gripping a Gun in the Other: China’s Exploitation of
Civilian Channels for Military Purposes in New Zealand
Anne-Marie Brady, with Jichang Lulu and Sam Pheloung
In 2017, a Chinese military company proudly announced production of an innovative cargo
drone, marketed as suitable as an armed one-use military cargo plane which could drop off
supplies in difficult mountainous terrain. 1 China’s contested mountainous border with India
would be one such location. The plane’s technology originated from a well-known New
Zealand company that had once been owned by New Zealand taxpayers. The technology
had been transferred in a deal that was endorsed by the 2008-2017 New Zealand National
Party government. Praising the BAIC-Pacific Aerospace partnership in 2014, then Minister of
Trade, Tim Groser, remarked—without any trace of irony—“Relationships like this
demonstrate that we don’t just export dairy and lamb to China, but also our technology.” 2
New Zealand has indeed increasingly been exporting our innovative and sensitive
technology to China. As this paper outlines, some of these exchanges appear to breach our
domestic laws and international commitments. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is
using civilian links with Western countries to access cutting-edge scientific expertise with
military-end-use. China’s exploitation of civilian channels for military purposes raises national
security, as well as reputational, ethical, and intellectual property risks for New Zealand. New
Zealand’s experience of grappling with China’s covert military links may be relevant for other
nations as they too re-assess their scientific, commercial, and educational relations with the
PRC.

Massey University Vice Chancellor Jan Thomas at the PLA Institute of Military Culture in 2017
http://www.81.cn/zggcdsjd/2017-10/23/content_7796547.htm

Key Points
 The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) rapid militarisation program is accelerating via
an international technology transfer strategy, which includes academic exchanges,
investment in foreign companies, espionage and hacking. Scientists work globally, so
by accessing universities or tech companies in states with an advanced technology
sector like New Zealand, the PLA can get a foothold within the international network of
scholars working on a given subject area.

 





New Zealand commercial and educational links with PLA-affiliated organisations and
individuals raise national security, as well as reputational, ethical and intellectual
property risks. Some of these links potentially breach New Zealand’s international
commitments and domestic laws.
The Covid-19 crisis provides New Zealand with an opportunity to reassess relations
with China, and set better boundaries around problem areas. China’s aggressive
foreign and military policy, disinformation activities and cyber attacks threaten New
Zealand security. China is the main source of cyber attacks against New Zealand.
In the words of Mao Zedong, the CCP under Xi Jinping is “holding a pen in one hand
and gripping a gun in the other”, 3 it is preparing China for what the Chinese
leadership believes is an inevitable war. New Zealand entities should not be assisting
in the strengthening of China’s military capacities. The New Zealand government
needs to work with businesses and universities to devise a strategy to prevent the
transfer of military-end-use technology to China.

Executive summary
How can we stop our companies and universities from being used to boost China's military
development? This is the question many governments around the world are grappling with,
and now New Zealand is too.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government has promoted the merger of military-civil
relations in order to expand its defence sector and leap-frog ahead in technology. The
General Secretary of the CCP, Xi Jinping, declared China’s new military-civil fusion policy in
March 2015. Official documents issued in December 2017 codified the strategy. 4 Many
foreign universities, research institutes, and corporations who partner with Chinese entities
have been unwittingly drawn in to the PLA’s technology transfer project.
The New Zealand government’s stance on the transfer of military technology and information
is clear. As a signatory to the Wassenaar Arrangement as well as several other nonproliferation treaties, New Zealand has made an obligation not to export military or dual use
technology to any nation that is not also a signatory to these agreements. 5 China is not a
member of the Wassenaar Arrangement. 6 The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls
for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies entered into force on 1
November 1996. 41 states are members including Argentina, Australia, Canada, Croatia,
Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, South Africa,
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the USA and all EU states (except Cyprus). The objective of
the Wassenaar Arrangement is to “prevent destabilising accumulations of arms by
establishing effective and reliable national export controls and to improve transparency in the
export of conventional weapons and dual-use goods by agreeing on reporting duties”. 7 In
signing on to this agreement New Zealand must, through its own national policies, make
sure that the terms of the agreement are upheld and it is their sole responsibility to ensure
that they adhere to those policies.8
New Zealand is also a signatory to the Arms Trade Treaty, 9 and in 2018, passed legislation to
regulate the brokering of weapons and related items .10 Yet current legislation appears to be
insufficient to deal with the broad means that the CCP government is employing to access
strategic technology and information, as well as the national security, ethical, reputational
and intellectual property risks of these connections.
The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) international technology transfer strategy includes
international academic links,11 investment in foreign companies,12 espionage and hacking,13
and ultimately, elite capture. The PLA benefits from talent-scouting initiatives such as the

 CCP Organisation Department’s Thousand Talents Plan ( 千 人 计 划 ), which has poured
billions of dollars into drawing in tens of thousands of foreign specialists to China and sends
out thousands of Chinese scientists overseas to access the latest technology and
knowhow.14 The CCP’s military-civil fusion strategy has helped the PLA acquire a variety of
innovative technologies ranging from next generation fighter jets, advanced missile systems,
and foundational technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI). 15
The PRC is currently New Zealand’s largest export market, absorbing close to 30 percent of
all exports. More than 50 percent of New Zealand imports come from China. Economists
classify trade dependency as being 50 percent dependent on one source. New Zealand is
dependent on the PRC for 513 categories of goods, and 144 of them have applications in
critical infrastructure.16 Until the Covid-19 pandemic, the PRC was also New Zealand’s
largest market for foreign students, largest tourism market, and sixth largest foreign scientific
research partner.17 New Zealand signed a Comprehensive Cooperative Relationship
Agreement with China in 2003 and a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement in
2014.18
New Zealand receives significant economic benefits from the China relationship, but it also
brings serious national security concerns. The New Zealand government has publicly
acknowledged that China's Ministry of State Security (along with Russian military
intelligence, and North Korean-organisations) has launched malicious cyber activity against
New Zealand on numerous occasions.19 What the New Zealand government does not
publicly state, but which cyber experts confirm: China is the main source of nation-state
cyber attacks against New Zealand. The 2019 cyber attack on health providers in the wider
Wellington region, which affected more than a million New Zealanders, demonstrated that
the cyber risk to the New Zealand government is about more than state secrets. 20 China was
the chief suspect in the attack. The private information available on health files could be
used by China to blackmail prominent individuals. It could also be used to establish a profile
on people in Wellington who have security clearance, to determine their personal habits,
health weaknesses, home addresses and phone numbers. 21
In addition to sustained cyber attacks, the CCP government has targeted New Zealand—
along with other nations—with a concerted political interference effort. The New Zealand
Parliament Justice Select Committee held a one year Inquiry into Foreign Interference from
2018-2019, leading to the passing of new legislation on electoral financing. 22 In testimony to
the Inquiry, Director-General of Security NZSIS, Rebecca Kitteridge, highlighted foreign
interference via the vector of “relationship-building and donation activity by state actors and
their proxies”. She said “This activity spans the political spectrum and occurs at a central
and local government level.”23 In late 2019, the Committee announced a second Inquiry,
focused on political interference into local government, including matters of cyber security.
This paper seeks to add further information to that Inquiry, and to assist in New Zealand
government deliberations about how to deal with China’s efforts to access military-related
technology and knowhow from New Zealand enterprises and universities.
CCP political interference activities draw on the resources of the Party, the Chinese state,
the PLA, and the private sector in China, as well as Chinese companies abroad—what I refer
to in toto as the Party-State-Military-Market nexus. As this paper demonstrates, the risk
factors in New Zealand-China relations feature all aspects of that nexus and the close corelationship between all four.
Separate from the covert PLA activities outlined in this paper, New Zealand does have
official military exchanges with China. New Zealand Defence Force-PLA formal links stepped
up in 2012, as part of New Zealand’s China Strategy, launched in the same year. In 2014,

 the former head of the NZ Defence Force’s International Defence Relations wrote, “New
Zealand does not intend to place all its military relationship eggs in a single ‘Five Eyes’
basket. Diversification of military links makes absolute sense in a fluid strategic
environment.”24 In 2019, a PLA-Navy training vessel conducted unannounced training
exercises in New Zealand’s internal waters, the Cook Strait, then paid a 5-day courtesy call
in Wellington hosted by the NZ Defence Force and Victoria University of Wellington’s
Confucius Institute.25 The visit may also have been used to intercept communications at New
Zealand’s satellite ground station at Waihopai, which forms part of the Five Eyes network of
signals intelligence.
A New Zealand academic who was present at one of the functions on board the PLA-Navy
vessel during the port stay, said he was there because it was an “opportunity” to observe the
"theatre of shifting power". 26 The Covid-19 crisis provides New Zealand with another
“opportunity”: to reassess our relationship with China, and to set better boundaries around
problem areas within the relationship.
This paper focuses on a swathe of covert Chinese military links with New Zealand entities,
many of them facilitated via New Zealand’s science diplomacy with China. The majority of
New Zealand-China scientific partnerships are benign. However, some New Zealand-China
educational and industry linkages are with PLA-affiliated organisations and involve projects
with military-end-use application. Seemingly benign PLA-New Zealand links have also led to
military-end-use related activities. Some of China’s corporate activities in New Zealand
connect back to military interests. New Zealand taxpayer-funded research supports many of
these non-official New Zealand-China military links.
PLA institutions, including PLA-affiliated and linked universities, work closely with nonmilitary universities and companies in China. Through their contacts abroad, Chinese
universities and companies provide a channel that permits the PLA to benefit from research
conducted outside China. Most of New Zealand’s universities have partnerships with
Chinese universities linked to the PLA. These range from the PLA Institute of Military Culture
(Massey); the National University of Defence Technology (Auckland, Massey); North-western
Polytechnical University (Canterbury), Shenyang Aerospace University (UNITEC), to Xidian
University (Otago, VUW). New Zealand academics supervise doctoral students working at
PLA-linked universities and students who have come from such institutions to study in New
Zealand, and they host graduate students and staff currently working at PLA-affiliated
institutions on short term fellowships. Some New Zealand academics have joint
appointments or advisory roles at PLA-linked universities.27 Several New Zealand
universities and companies have strategic partnerships with Chinese companies such as
Iflytek, Huawei, and Kuangchi Science who work closely with the Chinese military and state
security sector.28 Several PLA-linked universities have set up alumni associations in New
Zealand29 which are used to draw in former staff and students to contribute to the PLA’s
modernisation as well as participate in CCP united front work/political interference activities.
This paper details a representative sample of these connections and puts forward
suggestions for what the New Zealand government should do to deal with the problem.

 The PLA’s International Military Modernisation Programme and New Zealand
The PLA is moving from becoming a land-based military to a multi-faceted global military
force, capable of projecting China’s power well beyond its borders. China’s military
modernisation has always been reliant on foreign technology, In the Mao years, the CCP
government could only purchase weapons from the Soviet Union. In the Deng years, from
the early 1980s, China was able to purchase technology ranging from French submarines 30
to US nuclear technology.31 The US rationale for this was that it would help keep the PRC out
of the Soviet orbit and encourage China to expand its ties with major industrialised
democracies.32 In 1991, a senior US Department of Defence official commented to LA Times
journalist Jim Mann that from the mid-1980s, 60 to 70 percent of the US-China relationship
was based on an arms sale relationship. Other US officials admitted that China’s interest in
obtaining US military technology was one of the driving forces in the developing ties between
the United States and China in the 1980s.33
After the violent crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in China in 1989 and the end
of the Cold War in Europe, the EU and US put in place bans on military technology sales to
China. However, after intense lobbying by former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger,
among others, the US eased sanctions to allow sales of civil-military use technology. 34 China
turned to Israel and post-Soviet Russia to purchase military equipment, and continued to
acquire military technology from the U.S. where it could, 35 but the long-standing goal was
self-sufficiency.
China has followed an increasingly assertive foreign policy under Xi Jinping, but even more
so since the 19th Party Congress when Xi announced that Chinese politics had entered a
“New Era.” The Covid-19 pandemic has strengthened the relative hard power of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). The Chinese military has taken advantage of the weakness of
other states to assert its position in the South China Sea, India, and Taiwan with shows of
force. China’s cyber-attacks against Taiwan and other vulnerable states have also increased.
China’s political interference against various foreign governments’ activities have become
increasingly brazen. Xi Jinping has frequently said that China must prepare for war. Under
Xi, the PLA has gone from being a land-based defensive force to one optimised for warfare.
In the light of these developments, many countries are reassessing their relations with China
and seeking closer partnerships with like-minded states, New Zealand among them.
China aspires to become a global military power with fully self-sufficient air, land, and sea
forces.36 The current plan is to reach 70 percent self-sufficiency in high-tech industries by
2025 and continue that trend up until 2049, the hundredth anniversary of the People’s
Republic of China.37 China’s military scientific capacities have developed significantly since
the Deng years, assisted by a generous research and development programme. Hundreds
of thousands of Chinese scientists have been sent abroad to acquire the latest militaryrelated technology. Chinese scientists have also long used reverse engineering and
espionage to speed up innovation. Until recently, PLA equipment was assessed as low tech
and lagging behind that of other major weapons-producing states. However, in the last ten
years, the PLA’s military modernisation programme has accelerated. China now leads the
world in a number of new military fields and is close to being on a par with the US in some
domains.
In March 2015, Xi Jinping announced China’s new military-civil fusion policy, which built on
the military-civil integration strategies of the Hu Jintao era. 38 Official documents issued in
December 2017 codified the strategy. 39 In 2017, China also passed a new National
Intelligence Law, which states: “All organizations and citizens shall support, assist and
cooperate with national intelligence efforts...[China’s national intelligence organisations]
“may demand that…organisations and citizens provide necessary support, assistance and

 cooperation.”40 Since 2019, China’s ICT companies are now required to host government
officials who will help out with “project implementations”. 41
In 2008, the CCP Organisation Department launched the Plan to Attract Overseas High-level
Talent (Thousand Talents Plan) 海外高层次人才引进计划 , expanding it in 2011 to include
foreigners. The Thousand Talents Plan recruits top foreign and Overseas Chinese experts to
affiliate with universities in China, by offering them lucrative financial rewards. 4243 In January
2018, the prestigious Nature journal published a paid content article about the Thousand
Talents Plan, which stated, “All successful applicants can expect a 1 million yuan
(US$151,000) starting bonus, and the opportunity to apply for a research fund of 3–5 million
yuan. Foreign scientists receive additional incentives, such as accommodation subsidies,
meal allowances, relocation compensation, paid-for visits home and subsidized education
costs. Employers are also obliged to find jobs for foreign spouses, or provide an equivalent
local salary.”44 What was not mentioned, is that copyright for any research connected with
the programme is required to be registered in China, even if it is part of a research
programme funded elsewhere.
In October 2018, a few months after the US government raised concerns about the
Thousand Talents Plan, Chinese government and university sites removed public information
about the programme, including lists of scholars affiliated with it.45 Nonetheless, Thousand
Talents continues,46 as do around 200 similar recruitment plans aimed at transmitting foreign
research expertise to China. A 2019 US Senate Report highlights the concerns with this
activity: “China unfairly uses the American research and expertise it obtains for its own
economic and military gain. In recent years, federal agencies have discovered talent
recruitment plan members who downloaded sensitive electronic research files before leaving
to return to China, submitted false information when applying for grant funds, and wilfully
failed to disclose receiving money from the Chinese government on U.S. grant applications.”
47
A 2018 Chinese study found that more than 7000 foreign experts had been recruited to
work for the Thousand Talents Plan, most of them, from the US, however this is believed to
underestimate the true figures.4849
The China Association for International Exchange of Personnel (CAIEP) is a front group for
State Administration for Foreign Experts Administration (SAFEA) which formerly ran the 1000
Talents Programme.50 CAIEP recruits foreign scientists, academics, engineers, and other
experts to support China's military modernisation. 51 In 2018, SAFEA was merged into
China’s Ministry of Science and Technology and the foreign talent recruitment programme
was given additional resources.52 CAIEP has been active in New Zealand since 2014.53
The PLA also uses academic events, such as Horizon 2020, 54 to gain access to international
military technology. A programme called Project 111 recruited 1000 academics doing dualuse research from the top 100 universities in the world. 55 The Shenzhen government runs
the Peacock Plan 孔雀计划,56 which seeks to attract global talent ranging from Nobel Prize
winners and other winners of other major academic prizes, senior executives of the world’s
top 500 companies, or of international financial organisations, members of the International
Standardization Organization (ISO) Standards Committee, university presidents, heads of
academic associations such as the Royal Society, foreign experts who have won a
Friendship Award, editors of leading scientific journals, actuaries, medical specialists, and
Olympic coaches. New Zealand academics and experts—from AI specialists, to an expert on
war reporting—have been invited to join China’s foreign talent programmes,
The PLA is a major beneficiary of China’s international talents programmes. 57 Foreign
researchers have been added in to projects such as the National Key Innovation Projects,
National Key Laboratories, and a variety of different state-owned commercial and financial

 institutions as well high-tech industrial parks, while still continuing their original roles in their
home countries.58 Between getting PLA-backed Chinese experts into overseas institutes and
bringing international experts to China, the PLA has gained access to some of the most
advanced research in the world to use for their military development.
One of the PLA’s core goals has been to improve their ability to conduct anti-access, area
denial and power projection within China’s sphere of influence in the Asia-Pacific. 59 The PLA
technology transfer strategy is one of the main reasons for the PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF)
recent technological advancements. 60 Chinese theft of plans for the F35 fighter jet allowed
the PLA to create the FC-31 Gyrfalcon. 61 Chinese hackers stole top secret information on
submarine warfare from an American Navy contractor. 62 China aspires to become a world
leader in AI by 2030.63 Partnerships between China’s State-run enterprises and defence
conglomerates are conducting research into how civilian foundational technology such as AI
and big data can be used for military purposes.64
Since the announcement of the military-civil fusion policy, China has sent out thousands of
students to overseas universities to conduct civilian research that is repurposed for military
use.65 PLA researchers sometimes go to great lengths to obscure their connections to the
military. This can mean changing the names of their institution, claiming to be from a different
non-military institution from the same region, or omitting their military studies from their
academic record.6667
The PLA is also using Chinese corporations to develop new foundational technologies that
assist in the development of the next generation of weapons systems. 68 Despite, legal
restrictions on accessing strategic technology, Chinese corporations have been able to
purchase or acquire shares in Western technology companies whose products have both
civil and military application.69
China is also using espionage to acquire information that cannot be bought or learned from
overseas sources.70 Military grade technology such as M60 carbon fiber, microchips and jet
engine parts are being smuggled to China. 71 Chinese cyber espionage is on the rise, 72 and it
has been used to aid the PLA’s military modernisation program. 73
Public research on the PLA’s military-civil technology transfer policies has focused on
Australia and the USA, both of them nations with a large tertiary and industrial sector.
However, even small states such as New Zealand are being targeted by the PLA’s militarycivil fusion strategy. Using Scopus, Alex Joske’s research on links between the PLA and
researchers in Five Eyes states, found that between 1998-2020 New Zealand scientists
published 70 research papers with research partners at PLA-affiliated universities. 16 papers
were published in 2018, 9 in 2019, and so far, 7 were published in 2020. 74 This number of
papers published pales in comparison to Alex Joske’s finding that 1779 joint papers were
published by US scientists with PLA counterparts from 1995 to 2020, or the numbers
published by scientists of other Five Eyes partners, but it is still of concern. New Zealand has
8 universities. 70 joint papers published with PLA-affiliated authors is a ratio of around 8
PLA-connected papers per New Zealand university. Meanwhile, the USA has 1200
accredited universities offering at least a four-year undergraduate programme. 1779 papers
published by US scholars with PLA-affiliated scholars equals a ratio of about one PLAconnected paper per US university.75
New Zealand and PLA-affiliated researchers also exchange information with that has dual
military and civil use via doctoral supervisions and visiting fellowships. The China-New
Zealand scholar exchange scheme is advertised in PLA-affiliated universities, 76 as well as

 other universities in China, and participants from some of the PLA-linked universities listed in
this paper have participated in that exchange.
Scientists work globally, so by accessing universities or tech companies in states with an
advanced technology sector like New Zealand, the PLA can get a foothold within the
international network of scholars working on a given subject area. Foreign university degree
programmes can provide cover for PLA sleeper agents, enabling them to launch from there
to the US, UK, or other states. Similarly, a Chinese company’s purchase of a New Zealand
technology company could allow them to acquire a local identity, which they could then use
to operate internationally.
New Zealand has a high-tech industrial sector and a small, but world-class scientific
community. New Zealand government contributed 1.6 percent of its GDP to universities in
2018, a total of NZD4.56 billion dollars. 77 This is significantly higher than the 1.16 percent of
GDP spent on the New Zealand Defense Force. 78 Government investment into New Zealand
universities accounts for 33 percent of their funding. 79
New Zealand is a Five Eyes member and a NATO partner state. New Zealand companies
make products with military applications, and some of New Zealand’s academic research is
military-oriented. Some New Zealand academics are funded via military cooperation
projects, and some of it is contracted to US government agencies such as NSF, DARPA and
the US Navy.80 One New Zealand company supplies components for US missiles. New
Zealand is useful for near-space research; which is an important new area of research for
the PLA as it expands its long range precision missiles, as well as having civilian
applications. New Zealand is close to Antarctica and has an advanced Antarctic science
programme, which partners closely with the US Antarctic Programme. China, and Russia,
are developing global navigation systems Beidou, and Glonass, in rivalry with the US’s GPS,
and these require polar ground stations. China already has three Beidou ground stations in
Antarctica and has recently set up a fourth one in the Ross Sea area, where New Zealand
claims territory. Global navigation systems are crucial for C 4ISR (Command, Control,
Communications, Computers Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance), as well as
being useful in the civilian world. New Zealand’s clear skies are also excellent for
astronomical research and spotting missile launches.
New Zealand’s Private Sector Links to the PLA’s Military Modernisation Agenda
New Zealand has a small, but advanced export-focused industrial sector. China is an
important market for these companies, China is also a source of investment, and Chinese
companies provide cheap products and services that bring prices down for New Zealand
consumers. The New Zealand government has to manage the security risk of some of these
links, against the economic advantages. Yet there are deep vested interests in getting the
New Zealand government to turn a blind eye to these links.
In 2012, Huawei Technologies NZ signed a deal with Auckland-based technology company
Rakon to use their frequency control products in its handsets, smart devices, and
infrastructure programmes. The deal formalised a relationship that had built up over several
years.81 Rakon also sells to ZTE. 82 Huawei has close links to the PLA and the Chinese
Ministry of State Security. Its ownership structure links it in to the CCP United Front Work
Department.83 Intelligence-gathering and running assets is one of the core activities of the
CCP United Front Work Department.84 ZTE also has very close PLA links.85 Rakon is an
Auckland-based maker of crystal oscillators used in GPS, telecommunications gear, missiles
and satellites.86 Rakon have developed crystal oscillators specifically for military use,
including the navigation systems of smart bombs and a radiation-hardened product which is

 used in the United States nuclear weapons industry .87 Rakon crystals are used in the US
JDAM smart bomb guidance system as well as civilian and military-use DAGR [Defence
Advanced GPS Receivers].88
Rakon’s core markets are space, defence, as well as civil and military-related global
positioning, which puts them right in the sights of the PLA’s priorities. 5G networks could be
used as a weapon, or a point of attack, in a time of military conflict. China has a dominant
position in network infrastructure and is now expanding this via the Digital Silk Road; part of
the globe-spanning Belt and Road Initiative. The Digital Silk Road will
provide enhanced missile positioning, timing and enhanced C 4ISR capabilities for the
Chinese military.
In 2006, questions were raised as to whether Rakon’s products breached New Zealand’s
military export control commitments. A New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
official stated that, although Rakon's crystals and oscillators could be used in military items,
“export controls did not apply to goods assembled overseas”. 89 In 2011, Rakon set up a
manufacturing factory in China, a joint venture between Rakon Chengdu Crystal (RCC) and
Timemaker, in which Rakon had a 40 per cent stake. They also set up a factory in India. 90 In
2013, Rakon sold 80 percent shares in their China factory to ZheJiang East Crystal
Electronic (ECEC).91 Rakon now also have design workshops and manufacturing factories in
the UK, and France. Rakon have developed 5G network technology that offers very high
internet speeds and systems for near space/low earth satellites, useful for C 4ISR. The New
Zealand government has not yet taken a position on whether Rakon’s sales to Huawei and
ZTE break export controls under the Wassenaar Arrangement.
Huawei Technologies NZ holds 40 percent market share of New Zealand’s mobile network
equipment. Huawei entered the New Zealand telecoms market in 2005, as the main financial
backer of start-up mobile network 2degrees, who are majority owned by a Māori
consortium.92 In 2018, acting on the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and
Security) Act 2013, New Zealand’s Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB)
rejected New Zealand telecoms company Spark’s proposal to involve Huawei in their roll out
of 5G. 5G poses new technological challenges that, unlike 3G and 4G, cannot be mitigated
against. There has been marked continuity between how the National-led government (20082017) and the current Labour-NZ First-Greens Coalition government have handled the
involvement of Huawei in NZ’s cellular mobile technology. Under National Party governments
(2008-2017), Huawei was only allowed to be involved in the edge networks of various 3G
and 4G projects (though they are in the core of 2degrees networks). GCSB’s 2018
recommendation to block Huawei from Spark’s 5G (and the Coalition government’s support
of this decision) is crucially related to the technological shift that 5G presents in the high level
of integration of edge and core networks.
The New Zealand government is very careful to say they do not have a ban on Huawei and
5G and that decisions are being made on a case-by-case basis. 93 Huawei, and the CCP
government, have pushed back hard against the New Zealand government’s “case-by-case”
restrictions on Huawei in 5G, it is interesting to note they did not complain publicly about
having been restricted as to how much they were allowed to contribute to New Zealand’s 3G
and 4G networks. Several Chinese media reports have claimed that the ruling has been
reversed, but this is not correct. The New Zealand government has not budged. Prime
Minister Ardern and her ministers insist that the decision is GCSB’s to make. GCSB pass the
buck by putting the onus on network operators, who have to “assess…options to mitigate the
risks”.94 Spark and Vodaphone New Zealand are now working with Nokia for their 5G roll out.

 Huawei also has close links with New Zealand universities. Victoria University of Wellington,
Massey University, and Lincoln University are all “Huawei partners”, Huawei provides the
wireless internet infrastructure across their multiple campuses and also provides research
funding. Massey University told TVNZ they had informed GCSB about Huawei involvement
in their IT structure, and that GCSB did not try to block it. 95 96 Huawei have a research lab at
Victoria University of Wellington, where researchers investigate technologies such as 5G
cellphone networks, "big data" and the potential of internet-connected devices. 97 Huawei built
data capacity well in excess of their needs for the VUW, Lincoln and Massey projects.
According to a 2017 report, “Huawei sees New Zealand as a potential safe haven for data
storage. Political stability is part of the attraction for overseas companies wanting to keep
data safe. So is distance from the rest of the world.” 98 In April 2020, Huawei Technologies NZ
CEO Yanek Fan, 范岩, said Huawei had made preparations to deal with Covid-19, “two to
three months earlier”—before the pandemic exploded. Among Huawei’s preparations for
Covid-19 was a massive network expansion. One of their projects was a New Zealand-China
intranet between VUW, Massey, Lincoln and Huawei. 99 This should surely raise alarm bells
about the intellectual property of researchers at these universities.
Huawei Technologies NZ have put considerable resources into marketing their company in
New Zealand. In 2017, Huawei made a big media splash when they promised to spend
NZ$400 million to build a cloud data center and innovation labs in Christchurch and
Wellington. In an interview with NZ Herald, Huawei director of public affairs, Andrew Bowater
said "We've asked NZTE (New Zealand Trade and Enterprise) to help us find suitable
potential partners. We're looking for everything from phone apps to chip sets.” 100 However, in
an interview in New Zealand’s Stuff website, Bowater admitted Huawei’s New Zealand
spending plans were in part "aspirational". He acknowledged $250 million of the proposed
increase in spending would be accounted for by Huawei’s intention to source more products
and services locally. Bowater said plans to build a cloud-computing data centre–possibly in
connection with a local partner–would happen in New Zealand “in about two years”. 101 Three
years on, the plans have not eventuated.
Huawei Technologies NZ sponsor the Seeds of the Future Scholarships, which offer 20 allexpenses-paid scholarships per annum to New Zealand ICT students to travel to China.
Students spend one week in Beijing then a second week at the Huawei Shenzhen campus
learning about Huawei products.102 Huawei are big sponsors of New Zealand media
companies Stuff and NZME (owner of the NZ Herald), amounting to significant subsidies in
an economically-straightened market. Huawei have also sponsored New Zealand journalists
to visit Huawei’s Shenzhen campus. Since 2017, Huawei has been a lead sponsor of New
Zealand’s Voyager Media Awards. Since 2018, they have had naming rights on New
Zealand’s television awards, now known as the Huawei Mate30 Pro Television Awards. 103 In
2017, Huawei sponsored the New Zealand China Mayoral Forum, which meets annually to
discuss New Zealand’s involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative. 104
New Zealand has also attracted the attention of another controversial PRC company,
KuangChi Science. KuangChi Science is infamous as the company which was allegedly
founded on technology stolen from Duke University by KuangChi’s founder, Liu Ruopeng,
when he studied for his PhD. 105 Liu persuaded his supervisor Professor David Smith to allow
him to bring his former Chinese colleagues into the lab as visiting fellows. Smith was working
on a prototype for a metamaterial that makes objects invisible to microwave signals. His
research had been funded by the US military. When Smith was away from the lab, Liu’s
Chinese colleagues took photos of the lab and its contents, and measured Smith’s
equipment. KuangChi’s focus started out in metamaterials that can be used to improve
aviation and wireless technology. 106 Liu benefited from funding from the Shenzhen
government’s Peacock Plan, to set up his company. 107 KuangChi Science website claims that

 it has 13 research and distribution centers all over the world, including the United States,
Africa, Europe, as well as two centers in New Zealand. 108
In 2014, Christchurch-based firm Martin Aircraft signed an investment deal with KuangChi
Science. Martin Aircraft was set up in 1981, when founder Glenn Martin conceived the idea
of a personal jetpack. With help from private investors, New Zealand’s Ministry of Business,
Innovation and Employment (MBIE), and the Callaghan Institute, prototype 12 of the Martin
Jetpack finally received authorization from the New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority for a test
flight in 2013.109 The first manned test flight of a Martin Jetpack took place in Shenzhen,
China in 2015.110 In 2016, KuangChi Science became the main shareholder of Martin Aircraft
NZ.214 The KuangChi website states that the Martin Jetpack has potential military applications
as well as search and rescue and recreational uses. 111 A 2016 article in China Daily stated
that KuangChi planned to move all production of Martin Jetpacks to China. Their Shenzhen
factory had already begun production and had orders for 200. 112 In 2017, Martin Aircraft NZ
Limited posted a NZD 24-million-dollar loss and operations had to be subsidised by
KuangChi Science.113 In 2018, company staff were reduced to 10, down from 100
employees,114 raising concerns about the future of the intellectual property of the company. 115
Martin Aircraft’s New Zealand factory was finally closed down in 2019. The Hong Kong
branch of the company KuangChi Martin Jetpack, established in 2015, lives on as a limited
liability company, as does Martin Jetpack USA, based in Delaware. 116
In 2014, KuangChi Science, Pengxin International Mining Company Limited (known in New
Zealand as Shanghai Pengxin), and Airways New Zealand signed an MOU to develop nearspace launches in New Zealand. 117 Airways New Zealand manages all military and civil air
traffic operating within New Zealand airspace. KuangChi agreed to use its near-space
technology to assist Pengxin with broadcasting of telecommunications, mineral exploration,
satellite television, meteorological surveillance, space tourism, disaster detection and forest
protection. In 2016, KuangChi Science launched a near space balloon named Traveler from
a farm in Ashburton owned by Shanghai Pengxin. 118 The KuangChi website claimed that the
Traveler is capable of high precision monitoring off the ground, 119 with potential use as a suborbital spy satellite.
Pacific Aerospace is a New Zealand-based company which famously, illegally exported a
plane to North Korea in 2015, breaking UN sanctions and New Zealand’s Wassenaar
Arrangement commitments.120 Pacific Aerospace was once fifty percent owned by the New
Zealand government and made training planes for the Royal Australian Airforce. 121 The
company is now 50 percent owned by a subsidiary of BAIC ( 北京汽车),122 a Chinese Stateowned enterprise that specialises in making military vehicles 123 and exports military vehicles
to Iran and North Korea. In 2011, BAIC partnered with Beihang University in a joint venture
company Beijing General Aviation, aimed at launching an aviation industry in the BeijingTianjin area. Beihang University (Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 北京航
空 航 天 大 学 ) specialises in military research, notably on UAV technology and missiles. In
2014, BAIC bought 50 percent of Pacific Aerospace through their subsidiary BAIC
International (Hong Kong) to bring their airplane technology back to China, as developing a
plane from scratch would take too long. 124 Two of the directors of BAIC (Hong Kong) are
affiliated with Beijing General Aviation Company (北京通航 BGAC), BAIC’s subsidiary which
is part of the CCP government’s China National Defense Industry Association Unmanned
Systems Branch, a military-civil integration project to build UAVs. 125
BAIC have now adopted Pacific Aerospace’s P-750-XSTOL as the model for China’s first
ever drone cargo plane. Pacific Aerospace market the P-750-XSTOL as excelling on rough,
unpaved airstrips. One version of the P-750-XSTOL is for military use, specifically, counterinsurgency (COIN) and light attack.126 The original plane design was a light attack aircraft for

 military purposes. P-750-XSTOL is unique in being able to carry more than its actual weight
in goods.
The arrangement to make these planes in China gets around New Zealand’s obligations
under the Wassenaar Arrangement of not exporting military technology to China, North
Korea and other non-signatories of Wassenaar. In 2017, the Chinese media reported that
BGAC’s P-720 modified UAV was being pitched for military use as an armed military cargo
plane to drop off supplies in difficult mountainous terrain. 127 China’s contested mountainous
border with India would be one such location. Praising the BAIC-Pacific Aerospace
technology transfer in 2014, then Minister of Trade Tim Groser crowed, “Relationships like
this demonstrate that we don’t just export dairy and lamb to China, but also our
technology.”128 The Coalition government (2017-2020) recognised the folly of this policy, but
the damaged caused is proving hard to undo.

Right Hon Tim Groser at the throttle of a P-750-XSTOL at a ceremony to launch it being delivered to China
https://www.aerospace.co.nz/news/minister-witnesses-120-million-deal-to-pacific-aerospace

Chinese company Iflytek is an artificial intelligence start-up famous for voice recognition
technology. They are partnered with the Harbin Institute of Technology, which is active in
military research. Iflytek have a weapons and military equipment licence, and are understood
to be cooperating on speech recognition technology with the PLA. 129 Iflytek have an MOU
with New Zealand business incubator The Icehouse, and they sponsor some of their
events.130 In 2019, Iflytek signed a strategic cooperation agreement with New Zealand
company Rocos Global, a robot cloud platform enterprise that is 54 percent owned by The
Icehouse, which is in turn funded by the New Zealand government. Iflytek and Rocos plan to
partner on creating an intelligent speech interaction platform for robots, featured content and
applications, and intelligent hardware,131 all of which have military-use applications.
Weta Workshop’s Sir Richard Taylor has quite a few links with PLA entities and affiliates.
According to Taylor, Weta has had a “special partnership with China” since 1998. 132
“National-level support” reportedly aided the introduction of Weta products into China after Xi
Jinping’s visit to New Zealand in 2014. 133 Taylor read the citation when Xi Jinping’s wife,
Peng Liyuan, received an honorary doctorate from his alma mater Massey University. After
the award Taylor gave her “a gift of works and souvenirs” from Weta. 134 Taylor visited China’s
National Defence University in 2016 and according to a PRC embassy account, his
“demonstration” there “broadened the views” of the military academy's students. 135136 In
2016, Taylor praised Peng, whose husband Xi Jinping is overseeing the strictest control of

 the Chinese public sphere seen since the Mao era, as a “wonderful champion for the
creative future of China’s youth”.137
Weta Workshop does some of its manufacturing in China. 138 Weta Workshop has worked on
Chinese films and a US-China coproduction The Great Wall,139 starring Matt Damon and
directed by director Zhang Yimou 张艺谋.140 Weta Workshop have forged a close relationship
with Culture Wuzhen Co., Ltd (文化乌镇股份有限公司).141 In 2017 the two companies held a
joint exhibition.142 Wuzhen is best known for hosting the World Internet Conference (世界互联
网大会), a yearly event that showcases the Chinese government’s advances in surveillance
technology and advocates the concept of “Internet sovereignty”. 143
In 2017, Park Road Productions, a company owned by Weta Group co-founder, largest
shareholder and former director Peter Jackson was involved, 144 with the help of substantial
New Zealand taxpayer subsidies in the production of China’s highest grossing film Wolf
Warrior 2.145 Wolf Warrior 2 ( 战 狼 II) is a patriotic action film promoted with the slogan
“Whoever assails our China, even though they be far away, will certainly be executed” ( 犯我
中 华 者 ， 虽 远 必 诛 ), a phrase which alludes to a passage in the Book of Han on the
destruction of the Xiongnu. 146 In the last ten years, the PLA has made a major investment in
military propaganda（军事宣传）, studying the experience of the US military’s relationship
with Hollywood,147 among other influences. China’s military propaganda is targeted at both
domestic and foreign audiences. Chinese language products focus on preparedness to fight.
For foreigners, PLA military propaganda emphasizes China’s “peaceful rise” [ 和 平 崛 起 ] to
international power. The CCP government has instructed Chinese media companies to
engage in strategic mergers and acquisitions of foreign media and cultural enterprises in
order to control the global China narrative. This policy is known as “buying a boat to go out
on the ocean” (买船出海).148
Weta Workshop subsidiary Pukeko has worked on one of three co-production films between
China and New Zealand.149 New Zealand and the PRC signed a film coproduction
agreement in 2010 and a television coproduction agreement 2014, 150 China's first with any
country.151 In 2017, New Zealand and China signed a joint film production agreement, which
states that joint films will be eligible for any government subsidy available in each country. 152
The agreements were signed by the CCP government’s agency in charge of censoring the
Chinese media. Also in 2017, Hengxin Shambala 恒信东方文化股份有限公司 bought a 25
percent stake in Pukeko, citing the advantages of the 40 percent subsidies provided to filmmakers by the New Zealand government. 153 Hengxin Shambala is led by its cofounder and
biggest shareholder Meng Xianmin 孟 宪 民 .154 Meng Xianmin worked at the 54th Institute,
now part of China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC, 中国电子科技集团), in
the early 1990s.155 CETC is one of the PRC's main defence conglomerates. The 54th
Institute is focused on military communications. 156 A former director of Hengxin Shambala
has a military background.157 Taylor's “relationships in China” helped Pukeko get a deal
allowing it to be featured in a theme park in Beijing. 158 A Hengxin Shambala subsidiary leads
the joint project with Pukeko Pictures “under the guiding thought and basic principles of
Beijing Municipality's Cultural and Creative Industry Development Programme for the Period
of the 13th Five-Year Plan”, in order to “respond to the central Belt and Road strategy”. 159
Wellywood's partnership with Chinese film and television will require strict observance of
CCP censorship guidelines, which means no China-critical plots and exclusion of actors and
crew who espouse critical views on Hong Kong, the CCP government, the situation in
Xinjiang or other sensitive topics.

 New Zealand’s University Links to the PLA’s Military Modernisation Agenda
New Zealand’s earliest scientific links with the PRC date to the 1970s, soon after New
Zealand established diplomatic relations in 1972. Soon after New Zealand switched relations
from the Republic of China (ROC) to the PRC, New Zealand officials acknowledged that the
reasons for doing so were primarily “political”. The majority of New Zealand’s trade was with
the ROC and New Zealand had a strong political relationship with Taipei.
In order to broaden NZ-PRC relations, New Zealand diplomats recommended the expansion
of scientific, cultural, and sporting links with the PRC. 160 In 1975, China sent an exploratory
scientific team to New Zealand and New Zealand was quick to reciprocate. 161 In 1984, New
Zealand and China signed a joint technology agreement to facilitate the exchange of
information and experts between the two countries. 162 In 1987, New Zealand and China
signed a Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement, then updated it in 2003. In 2009,
New Zealand and China set up a scientist exchange programme, to support short-term
research visits for up to five researchers a year from China to institutions in New Zealand
and vice versa.163 Then in 2010, the New Zealand-China Strategic Research Alliance (SRA)
was launched. The SRA aimed to increase scientific research partnerships and greater
commercialisation of science between China and New Zealand, and set out a five year plan
to achieve this.164 In 2018, New Zealand and China signed a further five-year arrangement
for science and technological cooperation. High technology platforms, including
nanotechnology and superconductivity were one of four priority areas of the 2018
agreement,165 all of these have military-civil use. However, in the 2020 call for visiting
scholars, these topics had been dropped. Instead, food science, health and biomedicine, and
environmental science were prioritised.166 Below I will outline some examples of links
between PLA-affiliated universities and New Zealand universities and academics.

PLA soldier during a visit to Massey campus in 2016
http://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/about-massey/news/article.cfm?mnarticle=massey-cements-relationshipwith-pla-arts-academy-08-11-2016

Massey University

 Massey University has extensive connections with PLA-affiliated organisations and
universities. These links have developed over many years. In 2005, Massey established a
partnership with Shihezi University, a university within the Xinjiang Production and
Construction Corps ( 新疆生产建设兵团 , or Bingtuan 兵团). The Bingtuan is a paramilitary
body with a special administrative system that merges Party, government, military and
business functions. It has settlements throughout Xinjiang Autonomous Region. The
Bingtuan was set up in 1954 to assist with the CCP government’s pacification of Xinjiang
after the end of the Chinese civil war. In the 1950s and 1960s, thousands of demobilised
PLA soldiers and young people were sent to the Bingtuan areas to colonise Xinjiang. Twelve
percent of the Xinjiang workforce now work for the Bingtuan, which is effectively a separate
government system for Han settlers within the Xinjiang Autonomous Region. 167 Shihezi is the
capital city of the Bingtuan, and Shihezi University is the Bingtuan university.
The core aspect of the Bingtuan's cooperation with Massey University, is intrinsically linked
to the Bingtuan’s military function. The 2014 Bingtuan White Paper highlights the Bingtuan
role in using the 屯 垦 'station [troops] to reclaim [wasteland]' so as to promote Xinjiang's
"ethnic unity" ( 民 族 团 结 ).168 The White Paper stresses the Bingtuan's role in preserving
Xinjiang's "social stability" and fighting the "three evils" ( 三股势力: terrorism, "splittism" and
"religious extremism", the latter is defined to include most open and private manifestations of
Muslim faith). In its militia function, the Bingtuan works with the PLA and the People’s Armed
Police (武警).
Massey University, Beijing University and Shihezi University are partnered via the Three
Brothers Cooperation Project ( 三 兄 弟 合 作 计 划 ) to develop sheep genetics. 169 Massey
scientists also cooperate with Xinbao Farming Group ( 鑫 宝 牧 业 集 团 ), a Bingtuan-owned
sheep-farming company.170 In 2015, the pioneering partnership between Massey, Beijing, and
Shihezi universities was praised by then-ambassador Wang Lutong as one of the many
"firsts" that characterise China’s relationship with New Zealand. 171
The Bingtuan has a crucial role in the CCP government’s mass detention of the Uighur
people, building and administering detention camps in areas under their jurisdiction. 172 At a
time when an estimated 1.5 million Xinjiang Uighurs are held in detention centers and their
children housed in orphanages,173 it is questionable that New Zealand-taxpayer funded
bodies should be involved in partnering with organisations engaged in mass repression and
human rights abuses. The origin and paramilitary nature of their partner institution is
understood by the Massey scientists involved. Massey Professor Hugh Blair says the
Bingtuan, "has similarities to the New Zealand Army Reserve" and writes that Shihezi
University is "military-related".174
In 2014, during CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping's visit to New Zealand, Massey University
awarded Xi’s wife, Peng Liyuan 彭 丽 媛 an honorary doctorate for her "international
contributions to the performing arts and health and education programmes". 175 Many of the
subsequent intensive contacts between Massey and Chinese institutions, including the PLA,
appear to have been facilitated by the bestowal of that honour.
Peng is the head of the PLA Academy of Art (解放军艺术学院, in 2017 renamed the Institute
of Military Culture (军事文化学院), at the National Defence University of the PLA (NDU, 国防
大 学 ).176 Peng Liyuan has worked in the PLA since she was 18. Peng’s "performing
contributions to the performing arts" that were recognised by Massey with an honorary
doctorate consist of her career as a PLA singer, which include singing, in full uniform, for the
troops in Tian'anmen Square in 1989, days after the June 4 massacre. 177 The Chinese media
describe Peng as "a military singer who has received the deep appreciation of the public

 within and outside the Army". She is the youngest PLA civilian officer with the rank of major
general.178
Since the bestowal of Peng’s doctorate, representatives from Massey, including vicechancellor Steve Maharey and his successor Jan Thomas, as well as Weta Workshop, led
by Sir Richard Taylor, have frequently visited National Defence University, at Peng's
invitation.179 On a 2017 visit, Massey academics, accompanied by Weta Workshop staff were
hosted by Peng at the Great Hall of the People. 180 Maharey has described Massey’s
relationship with the PLA Academy of Art at National Defence University as “the jewel in the
crown” of Massey’s China partnerships. 181 During Massey staff’s third visit to National
Defence University in 2017, VC Thomas, was described as "revelling" ( 陶 醉 ) in the
Academy’s "military culture of unique characteristics".182

Members of the PLA Academy of Art visited Massey’s three campuses in 2016 to identify mutual areas of
collaboration. Source: http://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/about-massey/news/article.cfm?mnarticle=masseycements-relationship-with-pla-arts-academy-08-11-2016

The main goal for the university of these exchanges appears to have been to increase
Chinese postgraduate student numbers, obtain greater access to research funds from the
Chinese state, and to garner business opportunities for Massey partners like Weta, 183
facilitated by Peng's patronage and the link to PLA organisations. The PLA has a central role
in the relationship, and further contacts soon developed with other PLA-linked universities.
Weta Workshop sponsors a Masters in Design at Massey University, focused on
entertainment design for film, television and gaming—the kind of business activities that
Weta and its affiliate Pukeko, are pitching in China. Unusually, the degree follows the
northern hemisphere timetable, starting in September each year. 184 The degree is targeted at
PRC students.185
In October 2017, Massey University scientists visited Iflytek in Hefei to sign an agreement
providing funding for a professor position at Massey. 186 As noted, Iflytek, an artificial
intelligence start-up famous for voice recognition technology are partnered with the Harbin

 Institute of Technology, which is active in military research,. 187 Iflytek's speech recognition
technology is being used for a domestic surveillance project led by the Ministry of Public
Security. In November 2017, Iflytek sent senior Vice President Du Lan 杜兰 to give a talk at
the 3rd New Zealand-China Youth Leaders Forum, hosted by the University of Auckland. Hu
Guoping 胡 国 平 , head of AI research at Iflytek, has co-authored papers with Ministry of
Public Security affiliated scientists.188 In 2017, Hu Guoping was present at a meeting
organised at the residence of then New Zealand ambassador to China John McKinnon for
the signature of an MoU between the China Scholarship Council and Massey University.
Professor Wang Ruili 王 睿 俐 was appointed to the Iflytek-funded professorship, 189 and
receives research funding from Iflytek. 190 His job is split equally between working for Massey
and working for Iflytek.191 Wang is also a distinguished professor at Zhejiang Gongshang
University ( 浙江工商大学 ) under Zhejiang Province's 1000 Talents Plan. Wang Ruili is the
international doctoral supervisor for at least seven National University of Defence and
Technology (NUDT, 中国人民解放军国防科技大学) students at the same time as working at
Massey University.192 NUDT is a PLA institution with a very high profile in China’s external
military exchanges.193 All of Wang’s NUDT students are engaged in military-related research,
five of the students have graduated and all are now working in PLA universities, a further two
continue to study with Professor Wang.
At least one of the PhD students Wang is currently supervising at Massey, Qiu Yuanhuang,
is engaged in research with a military application, Qiu is researching speech recognition in
noisy environments and has published on AI recognition of Chinese dialects. 194 Wang has
been recruiting for doctoral students to work with him with backgrounds in Computer
Science, Information Technology/Science, Electronic or Electrical Engineering, Mechatronic
Engineering, Physics, Mathematics, Biology (e.g., Bio-physics, Bio-chemistry), Finance, or
other Engineering (e.g., Bio-engineering, Mechanical, Civil). Wang is able to offer generous
funding to students who work with him.195
Wang Ruili is an AI specialist whose research includes autonomous vehicles and speech
processing. One of Professor Wang’s students is Dai Bin 戴斌, a senior NUDT unmannedsystems expert, who is also an “international collaborator” of Massey's Language and
Speech Processing group, led by Wang. Dai has also supervised the graduate theses of
most of Wang's other NUDT students. He Han'gen 贺汉根, a senior NUDT scientist, has also
supervised some of the theses of Wang's students, including the doctoral dissertation of
Fang Yuqiang 方宇强, who is listed as an international collaborator of Wang's group. Wang
has co-authored papers with these and other members of the NUDT unmanned systems
institute, such as Song Jinze 宋金泽. Other senior members of the institute are co-authors
with one of Wang's NUDT students, Sun Zhenping 孙振平.
Unmanned combat systems are a top priority of PLA military modernisation project. 196 In
2016, Lt Gen Yang Xuejun 杨学军, then NUDT president predicted that “unmanned combat
platforms” would become “the core of weapon equipment” and urged NUDT faculty to “seize
the historical opportunity of intelligent unmanned combat.” 197 The PLA’s focus on unmanned
combat includes unmanned ground vehicles (UGV). NUDT's three-decades-old unmanned
systems group play a leading role in the country's autonomous-vehicle research. In 2000,
they developed China's first self-driving car for highway environments. 198 The civilian aspect
of this research is directly linked to its military applications. In Sun Zhenping's words, the
cumulative experience in developing driverless cars provides “a solid foundation for
accelerating the development of military intelligentisation”. 199

 In 2016, Dai Bin and three other NUDT scientists, including Wang Ruili's co-author Wu Tao 200
received an award from the Chinese Society of Academic Degrees and Graduate Education
(中国学位与研究生教育学会 ) for their work in the previous decade of NUDT's unmanned
systems graduate training programme, 201 thus including at least part of each of the NUDT
doctorates Wang Ruili co-supervised, and the entirety of Fang Yuqiang's work. 202 The
application for the award describes NUDT's training on unmanned systems focused on its
military aspect, “unmanned systems have become the engine of military transformation”,[in
the role Xi Jinping assigned to NUDT in training “new style” military talent and developing
defence technology,203 and that the group had “trained a great number of specialists in the
domain of unmanned systems, urgently needed among the troops, leading and supporting
our army's building and development of unmanned combat forces”. 204
The dual-use nature of NUDT's USV group is further evidenced in its participation in civilian
and military vehicle competitions. The detection and tracking techniques described in the
doctoral thesis of one of Wang Ruili's NUDT co-supervised students was used in an
intelligent car competition that regularly includes participants from dual-use research
institutions.205 An Xiangjing 安向京, the director of NUDT's Unmanned Systems Institute, won
the 2014 military UGV competition,206 organised by the PLA Equipment Department.
The National University of Defence Technology has an Unmanned Military Systems
Laboratory ( 无 人 作 战 系 统 实 验 室 ) at the same department where Massey University's
unmanned systems collaborators work. The precise administrative status of the Laboratory
cannot be established from scarce open-source references, but its proximity to the
Unmanned Systems Institute ( 无人系统研究所 ) in the College of Mechatronic Engineering
and Automation (机电工程与自动化学院 ) is clear. The College has an “unmanned combat
systems” platform under China’s national 985 plan. The Unmanned Combat Systems Lab is
mentioned in a 2014 article by scientists affiliated with the College, one of whom spoke with
CCTV standing in front of the Unmanned Military Systems Lab sign. 207 It is also mentioned in
a 2008 undergraduate thesis supervised by a scientist affiliated to the Unmanned Systems
Institute.208 In March 2018, CCTV aired footage of an unmanned tank; 209 saying that they
were “lifting the veil”210 over “China's Unmanned Systems Laboratory”, whose location was
not identified. The sign displayed in the report was the NUDT laboratory. 211
Dai Bin works on military unmanned ground vehicles. 212 A 2013 paper on “speeding up the
construction of our Army's unmanned combat forces”, 213 is co-authored with PLA Senior
Colonel Shen Lincheng 沈 林 成 . A 2016 Xinhua story on Shin Lincheng stressed the
importance of training specialists in unmanned combat and related disciplines, and links
between universities, research institutes, industry and the PLA. Dai Bin was listed as “chief
scientist” on a PLA Central Military Commission expert group for intelligent unmanned
systems.214215216 Dai's work on military UGVs has been cited by authors from the PLA Army
Officer Academy (陆军军官学院).217 Dai has taught on autonomous land combat platforms at
NUDT.218
Other collaborators of Wang and his students have also published on unmanned combat
platforms.219 In 2017, the official website of the China Society of Image and Graphics (中国图
象图形学学会) gave Fang Yuqiang's affiliation as the PLA Academy of Equipment Command
and Technology (装备指挥技术学院).220
Wang's co-authored research with his NUDT students focuses on environment recognition
and navigation. Environment recognition is an important area of research for the
development of military UGVs. Dai Bin has co-authored a study on unstructured environment

 recognition and detection is a current area of research in unmanned combat platforms. The
military application of Dai’s research is mentioned in publications by Wang Ruili and his
NUDT students and collaborators,221 including the thesis of a student he co-supervised. 222
Between 2011 and 2013, several NUDT unmanned-vehicle specialists led by Dai Bin and
including two of Wang Ruili's co-supervised PhD students and other of his co-authors held a
Hunan Province grant for research on Projection Trajectory Planning and Adaptive Tracking
Control Method of Ground Unmanned Combat Platform in Uncertain Environments. 223 The
director of NUDT's Unmanned Systems Institute has had support from China’s Weaponry
Seed Fund ( 武 器 装 备 预 研 基 金 ).224 A further research grant for NUDT unmanned-vehicle
scientists supported papers co-authored with Massey's Wang Ruili as well as one coauthored with a scientist affiliated with a research institute under the PLA's General Logistics
Department.225
Liu Mingzhe 刘明哲 worked for seven years at the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics
(CAEP, 中 国 工 程 物 理 研 究 院 ) before coming to Massey to study for a master's and PhD
under Wang Ruili.226 CAEP is responsible for the research and development of the PRC's
nuclear warheads and is intimately linked to the PLA. 227 CAEP is on the US Department of
Commerce Entity List.228 It participated in the US-China Arms Control Exchange (CACE). 229
The 1999 Cox Commission Report accused CAEP of conducting espionage. 230 Liu returned
to China after finishing his doctorate at Massey University and is now affiliated with the State
Key Laboratory of Geo-hazard Prevention and Geo-environment Protection and the College
of Nuclear Technology and Automation Engineering ( 核 技 术 与 自 动 化 工 程 学 院 ), both at
Chengdu University of Technology (成都理工大学).231
University of Auckland
Auckland University has eleven formal exchange partners in China. 232 Separate to this, some
staff and departments also have research partnerships with Chinese universities and some
of these organisations are affiliated with the PLA. Here I will highlight two: the links between
the University of Auckland’s Faculty of Engineering, Northwestern Polytechnical University
(NWPU, 西北工业大学) and the National University of Defence Technology.
Northwestern Polytechnic University in Xi'an is a major research university specialising in
aerospace and maritime navigation. It is not a PLA university (it is currently under the
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (工业和信息化部)), but it does have a strong
connection to the PLA. One of its predecessor institutions is the Department of Aeronautics
of the PLA's Military Engineering Institute in Harbin, merged into NWPU in 1970. 233 Its other
predecessor, the Northwestern Engineering Institute (西北工学院), was also closely linked to
the PLA. Its directors included Red Army veteran Liu Haibin 刘海滨, and Zhang Xiaojiang 刘
晓 江 , political commissar of the Navy until 2014. 234 In 2014, a NWPU talent-spotting team
visited Auckland University and Auckland University of Technology and met with staff and
students.235
Northwestern Polytechnic University is partnered with China’s State Administration of
Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (SASTIND, 国家 国防 科技 工业 局 )
under MIIT, whose responsibilities include the regulation of research, development and
production of weapons and military equipment. 236 SASTIND plays a leading role in the PLA’s
military-civil fusion project.237 A recent State Council directive stresses SASTIND must work
towards increasing military exports and foster "international cooperation". 238 NWPU's Party
secretary, Zhang Wei 张炜, was previously in charge of the SASTIND Systems Engineering
Bureau (系统工程司).239

 In September 2017, Northwestern Polytechnic University organised "high-level talent"
recruiting events at the Universities of Sydney, Melbourne and Auckland, attended by
"almost 200 PhD holders, postdocs and specialists". NWPU Vice President outlined China's
"military-civil fusion strategy" to audiences at the three universities. 240 In Auckland, the
NWPU delegation met renowned Auckland University materials scientist Gao Wei, a scholar
who "lives abroad, but whose heart is concerned with the development of the Ancestral
Land".241 Officials from the education section of the PRC Consulate attended the event.
In 2014, Gao Wei was appointed as a distinguished professor at the National University of
Defence Technology .242 In 2015, Chinese state media reported that the PLA was establishing
its first Interdisciplinary Quantum Information Centre at NUDT. Quantum computing is crucial
to the development of unbreakable encryption systems. The report listed "scientific areas of
national or military priority" for research at the Quantum Information Centre and that top
international talent had been recruited for this project. Two of these international talents are
listed by name: University of Science and Technology of China physicist Jian-Wei Pan 潘建
伟 , noted for his work on quantum entanglement, 243 and the University of Auckland’s Gao
Wei.244 Gao Wei was named Officer of the New Zealand Order of Merit in 2016, he is also a
Fellow of the Royal Society of New Zealand.
An example of what can be expected of NUDT staff is provided by Zhang Jiaqi 张 家 奇 :
“Although I'm a civilian staff member, no one, from superiors to colleagues, has treated me
as an outsider. We are soldiers [comrades-in-arms] in the same trench.” 245 Zhang, a
graduate of Central South University (中南大学), was hired at NUDT's Institute of Aerospace
Science and Engineering in 2011. While studying for his doctorate, Zhang spent a year at
the University of Auckland. Li Huaxing 李华星, a professor at NWPU who has received Air
Force and National Defence Key Lab funding, was also a visiting professor at the University
of Auckland from 2015 to 2016.246
NUDT strives to instil in its students and staff a sense of mission and loyalty to the CCP and
PLA. In 2013, state media reported that NUDT students or staff pursuing degrees or on
academic visiting fellowships had established CCP cells abroad.247 The scientists NUDT
sends overseas will likely be both CCP members as well as PLA technical personnel (文职干
部).248 Chinese media have circulated the testimonials of NUDT graduate students studying
abroad praising the military aspects of Xi Jinping's 19th Party Congress report. 249 In the past,
when ordinary CCP members left China, they lost contact with the Party organisation. In the
Xi era, CCP members living abroad are now kept in contact with the Party via foreign Party
cells, online study sessions and requirements to make regular reports on their political
thinking.
Gao Wei attended a 2017 meeting at the Auckland consulate with National Party MP Jian
Yang and representatives from the New Zealand Chinese Scientist Association ( 新西兰华人
科学家协会) as well as researchers and entrepreneurs from Shenzhen. 250 Gao Wei has also
supported talent-recruitment efforts. He was at a 2017 Auckland event organised by the
Thousand-Talent and Guangdong Province talent-recruitment plans, part of a larger event
attended by PRC consular authorities, and National Party list MP Jian Yang 杨 建 and the
Labour Party’s Raymond Huo 霍建强.251 Gao Wei is a member of the Expert Committee of
the Center for China and Globalization, a think tank linked to CCP united front/political
interference activities.252

 The University of Auckland has a partnership with Beihang University’s Intelligent Robots
and Measurement and Control Laboratory ( 智能机器人与测控技术实验室).253254 As noted,
Beihang University specialises in military research on UAV technology and missiles. There
are strong alumni links between University of Auckland and Beihang staff. 255 The University
of Auckland has been recruiting Beihang students on PRC publicly-funded scholarships for
years.256257 In 2017, a Beihang alumni association was launched in New Zealand. MPs Jian
Yang and Raymond Huo attended the launch. 258 The ACT Party’s ethnic Chinese list
candidate for the 2020 election, Ms Ada Wen Xiao ( 肖文), is a member of the Beihang New
Zealand alumni association.259 Ms Xiao worked in China as a PLA missile specialist, then
worked on plane design for the afore-mentioned Pacific Aerospace/BAIC (Hong Kong) joint
venture from 2012-2019.
VUW
Victoria University in Wellington (VUW) hosts the Evolutionary Computation Research
Centre at Victoria University in Wellington (VUW), headed by Zhang Mengjie 张 孟 杰 .260
Zhang has co-authored with an AI researcher at Xidian University ( 西 安 电 子 科 技 大 学 ) in
Xi'an, Liu Jing 刘静.261 Xidian University was established by the PLA. One of the research
areas at the VUW AI centre is Particle Swarm Optimisation (PSO), a swarm intelligence
technique.262 Swarm intelligence has military applications, specifically for UAV. Zhang
Mengjie received $330, 000 in funding from Huawei for the project “Face/Object Recognition
and Feature Extraction/Construction by New Genetic Programming and Deep Transfer
Learning Techniques.” Dr Zhang has also received funding from New Zealand’s Marsden
fund, the Australian Research Council, as well as Nanjing University State Key Lab in
Software Engineering, the Natural Science Foundation of China, and the Hebei Province
Natural Science Foundation.263
In 2017, VUW signed an MoU with Xidian University on joint research and graduate
education.264265 Xidian set up an alumni association in New Zealand in 2017. The event was
attended by Xidian Vice Principal Yang Yintang 杨 银 堂 and PRC diplomats. Speakers
reminded Xidian alumni of their patriotic duties towards "making the country prosperous and
strong" and the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation". 266 The CCP’s interest in ensuring
the continued loyalty of Chinese graduates living abroad, while part of general united front
efforts, is particularly significant in the case of military-linked universities.
Professor Rod Badcock is an electrical engineer and Deputy Director of the Robinson
Institute at VUW. Professor Badcock is a specialist on sensing, control and automation
systems, and embedded intelligence. He is also a NASA/Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers Electric Aircraft roadmap team member on the military-civil project to
develop an electric-powered plane.267 Scientists are competing to develop aircraft that use
electrical motor propulsion, generator power and electrical actuation. This will require new
flight-weight and flight-efficient powertrain components, fault-tolerant power management,
and electromagnetic interference mitigation technologies .268 Professor Badcock has also
worked for the US Department of Energy looking at wave energy converters. 269 In 2016,
Professor Badcock was appointed as a Thousand Talents Plan professor at Beijing Jiaotong
University, while still working at VUW. In a 2017 interview, Professor Badcock commented,
“One of the things we’ve found with the foreign experts programme, is that while they would
like the overall product to be manufactured in China, they don’t care if the technology—the
sub-systems, parts and components—is coming from New Zealand. In fact, they quite like it.”
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang has expressed “heartfelt gratitude” for the work Badcock is
doing in China.270
Auckland University of Technology

 In 2018, Hu Bin, a student at Auckland University of Technology’s Engineering Research
Institute,271 was investigated by New Zealand’s Security Intelligence Service (SIS) and the
New Zealand Immigration Service over concerns his work could be used for military
purposes.272 It was a rare intervention by New Zealand government agencies to confront an
example of transfer of military-related technology via education links. Government officials
were concerned his research could breach New Zealand’s international responsibilities in
preventing the proliferation of military technologies, in other words the protocols of the
Wassenaar Arrangement. Hu had been granted a student visa before national security
checks were completed. Hu Bin’s PhD supervisors were Professor Peter Chong and Dr Jack
Xuejun Li. Professor Chong studies machine learning techniques applied to software defined
vehicular networks, while Professor Li’s research is on smart cars. Hu Bin’s work focused on
targeted transmission between a base station and an individual device. 5G networks could
be used as a weapon, or a point of attack, in a time of military conflict. China is linked to
multiple cyber attacks on New Zealand and other nations. As mentioned, China has a
dominant position in network infrastructure and is now expanding this via the Digital Silk
Road.
Yan Weiqi 闫伟齐, an associate professor at Auckland University of Technology, is a "guest
adjunct professor with PhD supervisions" at the State Key Laboratory of Information Security
(SKLOIS, 信息安全国家重点实验室) at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (中国科学学院).
His research areas include security, surveillance and privacy, computational intelligence and
deep learning.273 SKLOIS scientist Liu Feng 刘 峰 co-authored a paper with Yan Weiqi on
encryption of visual information. 274 Liu was a recipient of a 2013 China-New Zealand
Scientist Exchange Programme, where he was based at AUT. 275 Liu Feng is a cryptology
specialist.
Otago University
Staff in Otago University’s Department of Computer Science work with researchers in Xidian
University. Senior lecturers Zhang Haibo 张 海 波 and Chen Yawen 陈 雅 雯 are currently
working on a Marsden-funded joint research project with researchers from Xidian University
studying optical microprocessors 276 The department of Computer Science has hosted two
doctoral students from Xidian on visiting fellowships. 277
Otago also has had a series of connections with NUDT. Wu Wenjian 吴文健, an expert on
bionic biology and biomimetics now at NUDT, has worked on weapons research projects with
PLA funding.278 In 2016, Wu and an NUDT colleague gave a talk on “China's military posture
and the progress of the construction of national defence” 279 at the PLA-linked Third Yunnan
Machine Factory (云南机器三厂, the 9804 Factory) under Yunnan Province's Administration
for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence, 280 where weapons research is
conducted.281 Wu Wenjian was a visiting professor at Otago in 2010. 282 In the same year,
Otago chemist Allan Blackman was invited to come to NUDT to teach chemistry to
undergraduates for six months. 283 In order to make teaching at the military university less
“intimidating”, Blackman reports that his students “would get changed into civilian clothes to
attend” his lectures. A group of NUDT scholars followed up on this to visit Otago's
Department of Chemistry between 2011 and 2012 to study how to teach chemistry
experiments. Their observations were collected in an NUDT publication. 284
University of Canterbury
Canterbury's Human Interface Tech Lab is partnered with Northwestern Polytechnical
University. In October 2017, NWPU Party secretary Zhang Wei visited the University of
Canterbury and signed a memorandum on cooperation. 285 In September 2017, Mark
Billinghurst, an augmented-reality specialist who formerly headed the Human Interface

 Technology Lab at the University of Canterbury, was appointed as a consultant professor at
NWPU. Billinghurst is now a professor at the University of South Australia. 286 Bai Huidong 白
慧东, now a postdoc at the Canterbury HIT, was at the NWPU-Canterbury ceremony. 287
Xu Chao 徐超, an NWPU aerospace engineer who specialises in composite structures, was
a post-doc and later a visiting research associate at Canterbury before returning to NWPU. 288
Xu's research areas includes Structural Health Monitoring (SMH) in aircraft. 289 SMH is used
for “strategic weapons”.290 SMH (with civilian uses, such as the performance evaluation of
buildings during the Christchurch earthquakes) was the topic of Xu's post-doctoral work at
Canterbury.291 Xu studied with University of Canterbury Professor Geoff Chase, an expert in
spacecraft and satellite engineering among other fields, who in 2019 was awarded an
honorary professorship at NWPU and made deputy director of a major new research lab on
Intelligent Monitoring and Maintenance at NWPU Xi’an and NWPU Taicang.292 NWPU Vice
President Zhang Weihong said at the award ceremony: “Since astronautics is the dominant
subject of NWPU, we hope to take this opportunity to deepen the cooperation with Professor
Chase in the field of astronautics.”293
Several of Xu Chao's master's students, both before and after his stay at Canterbury, went
on to work for PLA-linked institutions after graduation. One student, Wang Dong 王东, went
to the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics Fourth Institute, the Institute of Systems
Engineering, 总体工程研究所.294 CAEP is responsible for the development of China's nuclear
warheads, and the Fourth Institute's research comprises the “integrated engineering design
of all models of our country's strategic nuclear weapons”, making “important contributions to
the creation and development of China's nuclear weapon endeavours”. 295 A recent paper with
Wang Dong and Xu Chao as co-authors that discusses modelling of assembled structures
refers to its application in weapon construction. 296
Another of Xu Chao's students, Yan Jun 阎 俊 , went to the Xi'an Electronics Engineering
Institute (西安电子工程研究所, also known as the 206 Institute) of China Ordnance Industries
Group (Norinco Group, 中 国 兵 器 工 业 集 团 有 限 公 司 ).297 Norinco is China's largest arms
manufacturer, active in developing directed energy weapons, missiles, armoured vehicles,
UGVs, drones and anti-riot equipment, 298 and an arms exporter,299 subject to US sanctions
on proliferation between 2003 and 2007, 300 reportedly selling “electronic and optical goods”
to North Korea in 2016.301
Most of Xu's students went to work at China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation
(CASC, 中国航天科技集团).302 CASC is part of the PRC's space and missile sector. 303 CASC
also develops oceanic unmanned combat vessels. 304 For example, Xu's former student Qiu
Qunhai 裘 群 海 went to the Tactical Weapons Division ( 战 术 武 器 事 业 部 ) of CASC's First
Academy, known as the China Academy of Launch Technology (CALT, 中国运载火箭技术研
究院).305 CALT develops ICBMs, SRMBs, launch vehicles, hypersonic vehicles. 306307
A further collaboration between Canterbury and NWPU scientists has resulted in a coauthored paper on scramjets, an area of PLA research where NWPU plays a significant role.
Zhao Dan 赵 丹 of Canterbury was the co-author. 308 Scramjets are an active topic of PLA
development. A military application of the technology is the recently tested hypersonic
missile Lingyun 凌云, developed at NUDT. NWPU is an important centre for hypersonic flight
development.309 NWPU scramjet experts include Guo Yingqing 郭 迎 清 , a PhD in Weapon
Systems and Operation Engineering who has worked on several defence projects. 310 One of
Zhao Dan’s NWPU co-authors, Zheng Longxi 郑 龙 席 , has been a reviewer for several
military projects.311 Zheng Longxi's interest in dual-use technology is evidenced in a recent
lecture he gave on civil and military aircraft propulsion. 312

 University of Canterbury Mechanical Engineering professor Chen Xiaoqi founded the South
Island branch of the New Zealand China Science Association (新西兰－中国科技协会) which
partnered with 1000 Talents Front organization CIEAP in 2014. 313 Chen is a robotics
specialist who is a professor at Shanghai Jiaotong University 314 as well at the University of
Canterbury.315 Chen works on intelligent robots used in the recovery and remanufacturing of
aircraft engine components. Chen supervises students in China as well as New Zealand.
In 2019, Associate Professor Donald Matheson, a mass communications specialist in war
reporting at Canterbury University was invited, but declined, a lucrative offer to join the 1000
Talents Plan at Chongqing Jiaotong University.
New Zealand Legislation Relevant to Military-related, Military-End-Use Activities
The CCP government’s exploitation of civilian channels for military purposes raises national
security, as well as economic, reputational, ethical, and intellectual property risks for New
Zealand. Many other states are now addressing the problem of PLA-connected covert
activities. As illustrated in the case studies above, the CCP government is seeking to exploit
technological know-how from New Zealand entities and individuals that has often been
developed as part of wider international collaborations in the US, Europe, and Australia. If
New Zealand fails to adequately address the problem of transferring military-related
technology to China—illegal under New Zealand’s national laws and international
commitments—then our scientists and technology companies could be shut out of
international collaborations and business opportunities. This already appears to be
happening. In 2020, the D10 grouping was formed of ten democratic states who wish to
partner on technology to deal with the strategic challenge posed by China. 316 New Zealand
appears not to have been invited to join this group. New Zealand universities and senior
academics risk major reputational damage if they are seen to be continuing to participate in
activities to boost the CCP government’s military modernisation programme or to assist in
developing technology, weapons, or propaganda materials which are used to repress the
ordinary people of China or around the world. New Zealand taxpayers’ money has been
used to fund many of these links with PLA-connected entities and individuals. New Zealand
taxpayers are subsidising CCP propaganda films. New Zealand should not in any way be
subsidising China’s military modernisation. New Zealand’s intellectual property is being
exploited as a condition of many of these exchanges, New Zealand must act to protect
intellectual property rights to strategic technology, in order to protect our economic
advantage.
New Zealand is signatory to a range of international treaties, conventions, and agreements,
backed up by domestic legislation, and this could deal with some of the PLA and PLAaffiliated organisations’ non-official activities in New Zealand listed in this study. Nonetheless,
none of these laws completely cover the transfer of military-related knowhow through
academic exchanges and graduate supervisions outlined in this paper. One of the first steps
New Zealand needs to take to address the problem of covert PLA technology transfer
activities via our businesses and universities, is to implement existing laws and promote
awareness of these laws among university academics and business innovators, as well as
the wider public. Universities should also establish an ethics policy and educate staff about
it, and also ensure that New Zealand academics are aware of their legislative obligations and
rights.
Under Strategic Goods Regulations, New Zealand entities—which include universities,
research institutions, and companies—are prohibited from the development, production, or
deployment of any goods or know-how with a military-end-use unless a permit has been

 obtained from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The New Zealand Customs
Service has adequate powers to search and seize strategic goods as they pass over the
border.
New Zealand’s Strategic Goods Regulations are based on the Wassenaar Arrangement, and
the control measures of the Australia Group on chemical and biological weapons, the
Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. 317 New Zealand has
also signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the UN Conventional Arms Register, and
the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.
New Zealand signed the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1991. 318 This international
agreement was formed to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction by targeting the
transfer of technology that assists in the effectiveness of the delivery system. 319 This means
New Zealand entities may not aid in the development of technology that enhances the
tracking and guiding systems of long-range missiles. 320 In 2018, New Zealand passed the
Brokering (Weapons and Related Items) Control Bill to help prevent the export of
conventional military equipment.321
New Zealand’s Strategic Goods List: covers everything from nuclear materials, electronics,
telecommunications and information security, navigation and avionics, and more. 322 The list
also contains a ‘catch-all’ provision under the Customs Export Prohibition Order 2017. 323 This
is to ensure that if non-listed goods, software and technologies are to be exported with the
intent of being used in a military capacity, then New Zealand is able to prevent this. 324
New Zealand’s approach to determining whether goods or technology have military-end-use
application is to ask the entity involved to assess it themselves. 325 The official justification for
this is that many modern day dual-use technologies are highly complex and determining
whether or not they are subject to the Wassenaar Arrangement is best handled by the
experts.326 However this is akin to asking poachers to police themselves. The Australian
Department of Defence has developed an online search tool to help determine whether an
item is controlled or not and they allow New Zealanders to use this tool. 327
Ultimately it is the decision of the Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(MFAT), under the Customs and Excise Act of 2018, to authorize the export of any strategic
goods from New Zealand.328329 After consultation with the Minister, the Secretary of MFAT
may by notice in the Gazette, the official newspaper of the government, prohibit the export of
any good if it is in the public interest. 330 Section 97 of the Act prohibits the export of any
military or dual-use goods without the authorization of the Secretary. 331 The power to prohibit
the import of export of any good also lies with the Governor-General, who by Order in
Council under the recommendation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, may prohibit any good
or class of goods.332
New Zealand passed the Outer Space and High-Altitude Activities Act in 2017, the year after
the KuangChi Science/Shanghai Pengxin near space launch at an Ashburton farm. 333 The
Act specifically prohibits putting any weapons or military bases in space. 334 To launch a highaltitude vehicle an entity must now receive the appropriate license from the Minister, who
must ensure that launch will comply with New Zealand’s international obligations to
agreements such as the Wassenaar Arrangement. 335 There have not been any further near
space launches from KuangChi Science or any other China-based company since the law
was passed.
The Intelligence and Security Act (2017) tasks GCSB and SIS with gathering intelligence on
military-end use activities in New Zealand. However, along with many intelligence agencies

 around the world, both agencies currently have very limited numbers of staff with knowledge
of both Chinese language and the CCP Party-State; hampering their ability to stay on top of
the problem. The Telecommunications (Capability and Security) Act 2013 regulates network
security in New Zealand.
The Brokering (Weapons and Related Items) Control Act prevents New Zealanders from
brokering arms deals between two external parties. 336 The Act came into force on June 1,
2019.337 In the Act, brokering activity is described as arranging, facilitating, or negotiating the
international transfer of military goods from one international entity to another. 338
In May 2020, New Zealand Parliament passed changes to the Overseas Investment Act
under urgency, requiring sales of any businesses involving military and dual use
technologies, critical direct suppliers to security and defence, sensitive data, and media
companies to be referred to the Overseas Investment Office. 339 In future this law could
restrict any further sales of businesses which engage in military-related technologies such as
Pacific Aerospace and Martin Jackpack, but it is a bit like closing the door after the horse has
long bolted.
PLA and CCP security agency-linked covert activities in New Zealand are not solely through
companies and individuals. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, New Zealand has
become infamous as the “heart of global money-laundering”. 340 New Zealand has also
become infamous as the country with a very bad case of CCP political interference activities
in both national and local government. 341 Both problems are causing major reputational
damage to New Zealand which harms our economy. PLA-connected individuals have had a
role in both problems. The New Zealand Coalition government has held two Inquiries into
Foreign Interference to examine CCP political interference activities in New Zealand and
propose measures to address it. Since 2019, foreign interference has been one of the top
priorities of NZSIS. Addressing this problem will require the government to speak frankly
about the national security risk, as well as pass legislation to address the cracks in our
governance measures which are currently being exploited. The Coalition Labour-NZ FirstGreens government has made some progress in this area, but more remains to be done.
New Zealand does not have any legislation similar to the US government’s Magnitsky Act
(2012) or the Global Magnitsky Act (2016) which are designed to penalise human rights
abusers anywhere in the world. Many other countries have adopted similar legislation. New
Zealand also does not have Foreign Agents legislation.
New Zealand universities offer little guidance to researchers on conflict of interest policies.
There is no public discussion of security concerns about academic links with China within
universities, even though sector group Universities New Zealand has been in discussion on
this topic with New Zealand government agencies for more than a year. In November 2019,
the Australian government released a 45-page report into Guidelines to Counter Foreign
Interference in the Australian University Sector, 342 which incorporated the issue of Australian
universities’ military-end-use links with Chinese counterparts. The guidelines stress: “security
must safeguard academic freedom, values and research collaboration; research,
collaboration and education activities [must be] mindful of the national interest; security is a
collective responsibility with individual accountability; security should be proportionate to
organisational risk; and the safety of our university community is paramount”.
Policy Recommendations
The New Zealand government needs to re-examine its policies on encouraging scientific
exchanges with Chinese universities and partnerships with Chinese tech firms in the light of
the CCP government's changed policies to merge military and civil research and China’s
hacking and political interference activities. The Covid-19 crisis provides New Zealand with

 an opportunity to reassess our relationship with China, and to set better boundaries around
problem areas within the relationship.
Connections with Chinese military-affiliated universities and companies expose New Zealand
to security risks. New Zealand companies and researchers should not be assisting the PLA
to modernise.
While many China-New Zealand academic links are not of concern, some potentially breach
New Zealand’s international obligations forbidding the export of military end use goods,
technologies and know-how. They may have a negative impact on other international
sources of funding, if funding providers are uncomfortable with the potential that the
knowledge obtained will be shared with China.
New Zealand university partnership with PLA universities and companies also raises ethical
concerns. It is shameful that the research of some of our researchers may be used to help
improve the Chinese government’s repressive policies in Xinjiang and elsewhere, and that
New Zealand taxpayer funds are being used to subsidise CCP propaganda movies.
New Zealand universities and the business sector must partner with the government to come
up with a solution which will uphold academic freedom and intellectual property rights, at the
same time as dealing with the security and ethical concerns.
New Zealand universities and companies must uphold scientific openness and integrity and
protect information that has an impact on New Zealand’s national security and our economic
competitiveness.
The New Zealand government should review New Zealand’s overall China strategy,
including our science diplomacy. The New Zealand government should determine which
sectors of the economy are at the highest risk of becoming part of the PLA’s technology
transfer strategy. This means determining which corporations are developing technology with
dual-use capabilities and which academic institutions are conducting research that may have
potential military applications.

Establish an independent committee comprised of experts in both science and
technology as well as national security to help make these determinations. Australia’s
University Foreign Interference Taskforce would be a good model for New Zealand to
adopt.343

Conduct visa screenings for foreign nationals from non-Wassenaar states coming to
New Zealand to research in strategic areas to ensure that they do not have any connections
or affiliations to the military and to assess if their projects are military-related.

Provide New Zealand universities with a list of Chinese universities that are known to
be affiliated with the PLA or which have been used to disguise the origins of Chinese military
personnel so they can enter foreign countries undetected. The Australian Strategic Policy
Institute’s China Defence Universities Tracker is designed for this. 344

Generate awareness in both the corporate world and the academic world to the
strategic risk of technology transfer to China and the negative impacts that it could have on
both their business and academic activities as well as New Zealand’s national security.

Create a system of accountability to ensure that all funding from overseas sources for
research into strategic technology is transparent and verifiable that is from only from
Wassenaar signatories.345

Share New Zealand’s experience and generate discussions with partner states
around possible solutions to the problem.

Provide alternative sources of funding for research into strategic technologies.

 
Encourage universities to conduct research in strategic areas with Wassenaar
signatories.346

Pass Magnitsky legislation to prevent New Zealand entities working with human rights
abusers.

Follow international best practice and pass legislation to restrict money laundering via
large cash purchases.

Introduce catch-all controls into New Zealand’s Customs and Excise Act 2018. Amend
the definition of military end-use so that it includes operations and activities of a
military/police nature.347

 1
A note on authorship, funding and sources:
I began researching this topic in late 2017 as an extension of some of the themes explored in my paper Magic
Weapons: China’s Political Influence Activities Under Xi Jinping , and I have been working on it in between other
related projects ever since. It is a complex topic, which poses a problem difficult to solve and it has required
thousands of hours of research and thought. In 2017 I was offered a small NZ$5000 grant from Amiya
Foundation, which enabled me to employ Jichang Lulu as a research assistant for this project. Jichang Lulu
(pseudonym) is a Europe-based blogger and translator. When that funding ran out, Jichang Lulu agreed to do
further research as a co-author, so he is named on the paper to acknowledge this later contribution. This
research collaboration ended in September 2018. Throughout 2018-2019, my graduate student, Sam Pheloung,
worked on the topic under my supervision for his Masters project focusing on legislative solutions and the
international discourse on CCP military-civil fusion project. With his permission, I incorporated some of his
findings into the study, so I have also named him as a co-author. In August 2018, I published an op ed in the
New Zealand Herald on early findings from my research https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12086974, . It was the
first published paper on the topic of PLA-connected university links in a Western country. I am grateful to Alexis
Joske, ASPI, for generously sharing a list of New Zealand-PLA connected papers from his study on the PLA and
technology transfer from the West and for reading the paper in draft form. I am grateful also for feedback offered
by several other expert readers, who provided peer assessment of the research. Anne-Marie Brady, July 21,
2020.
http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2017-09-25/doc-ifymfcih4872266.shtml

2
https://www.aerospace.co.nz/news/minister-witnesses-120-million-deal-to-pacific-aerospace

3
Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Supreme State Council, 1958,
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117013.pdf?v=a27ad8f0d64df7ec64cacf45adf7db4c The phrase
is also used by Mao to celebrate the important role of the propagandist in war.

4
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2015/0313/c64094-26685982.html;
http://english.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2017/12/04/content_281475964615180.htm .

5
https://www.wassenaar.org/about-us/.

6
https://www.wassenaar.org/.

7
https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/aussenwirtschaft/-/231418

8
https://www.wassenaar.org/about-us/.

9
https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf

10
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/government/2017/0280/latest/whole.html#DLM7318220

11
Alex Joske, Picking Flowers, Making Honey: The Chinese military’s collaboration with foreign universities
(Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2018), 6, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/picking-flowers-makinghoney.

12
Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, China’s Technology Transfer Strategy (Silicon
Valley/Boston/Austin/Washington D.C.: Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, 2018),
https://admin.govexec.com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf.

13
Lorand Laskai and Adam Segal, A New Old Threat: Countering the Return of Chinese Industrial Cyber
Espionage, (New York/Washington D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2018) https://www.cfr.org/report/threatchinese-espionage.

14
https://worldview.stratfor.com/horizons/fellows/william-tucker/09022018-china-s-search-thousand-talents.

 15
Elsa B. Kania, Technological Entanglement: Cooperation, Competition and the Dual-Use Dilemma in Artificial
Intelligence (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2018), 3,
https://www.aspi.org.au/report/technological-entanglement.

16
https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Breaking-the-China-Chain.pdf

17
This link has been removed from the website http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/scienceinnovation/performance/document-image-library/science-and-innovation-system-performance-snapshot2016.pdf.

18
https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/joint-statement-between-new-zealand-andpeople%
E2%80%99s-republic-china-establishment-comprehensive-

19
https://vimeo.com/event/20453/videos/384677411

20
https://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/116318497/up-to-1-million-new-zealand-patients-data-breached-incriminal-cyber-hack

21
https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-equifax-data-breach-china-202002104aja7udhyjdalfw6o2f6gzbsmq-story.html

22
https://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-NZ/SCR_93429/5dd1d57eeba54f36bf9f4da96dba12c073ed7ad8

23
https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/news/director-general-remarks-justice-select-committee-inquiry-into-the-2017-generalelection-and-2016-local-elections-august-2019/

24
See Paul Sinclair, “New Zealand Expands Defence Ties with China,” CSS Strategic
48 Background Paper, 2014, https://www.wgtn.ac.nz/strategic-studies/documents/strategic-backgroundpapers/18-new-zealand-expands-defence-ties-with-china.pdf

25
https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/117990295/victoria-university-staff-invited-onto-chinese-naval-ship-duringunannounced-nz-visit; Harrison Christian, NZDF OIA Request, October 23, 2019.

26
https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/117990295/victoria-university-staff-invited-onto-chinese-naval-ship-duringunannounced-nz-visit

27
http://www.nudt.edu.cn/Articleshow.asp?id=6428; http://news.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1002/50988.htm;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923152456/http://www.nudt.edu.cn/Articleshow.asp?id=6428
https://archive.is/eNWrM.

28
http://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/about-massey/news/article.cfm?mnarticle_uuid=5F0D3B84-42F0-4B44-B7382201C6E8632C.

29
http://news.xidian.edu.cn/info/2106/94669.htm.

30
See Anne-Marie Brady, China as a Polar Great Power (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

31
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-mercantilist-trade-practices-could-cripple-us-economy164903

32
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/archives/reference/scanned-nsdds/nsdd120.pdf

33
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-06-30-mn-2555-story.html

 34
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-06-30-mn-2555-story.html

35
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/06/us/lockheed-charged-with-violating-export-laws.html

36
Office of the Secretary of Defence, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2017, (Arlington, 2017), 1,
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Report.PDF.

37
James McBride, 2018. Is ‘Made in China 2025’ a Threat to Global Trade? (New York/Washington D.C.: Council
on Foreign Relations, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/made-china-2025-threat-global-trade.

38
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2015/0313/c64094-26685982.html.

39
http://english.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2017/12/04/content_281475964615180.htm.

40
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/13/opinion/china-canada-huawei-spying-espionage-5g.html.

41
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/09/23/controversial-new-chinese-move-places-officials-insidecompanies-like-alibaba-geely-and-wahaha/#49a9dd8962c3.

42
https://tech.china.com/article/20191016/kejiyuan0129385424.html

43
This link has been removed from the website http://www.1000plan.org/en/plan.html.

44
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-00538-z

45
https://www.natureindex.com/news-blog/china-hides-identities-of-top-scientific-recruits-amidst-growing-usscrutiny

46
https://www.npr.org/2020/01/28/800559393/harvard-chemistry-professor-arrested-and-accused-of-lying-aboutties-to-china

47
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2019-11-18%20PSI%20Staff%20Report%20-%20China's
%20Talent%20Recruitment%20Plans%20Updated.pdf

48
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-00538-z

49
Katherine Koleski and Nargiza Salidjanova, China’s Technonationalism Toolbox: A Primer (Washington D.C.:
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2018),
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%27s%20Technonationalism.pdf.

50
http://www.caiep.net/searchresult.php.

51
https://freebeacon.com/national-security/fbi-arrests-chinese-official-for-visa-fraud/.

52
https://www.natureindex.com/news-blog/chinas-science-ministry-gets-power-to-attract-more-foreign-scientists

53
http://christchurch.chineseconsulate.org/chn/zlgxw/t1150662.htm.

54
http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/horizon-2020-whats-it-china.

55
Koleski and Salidjanova, China’s Technonationalism Toolbox.

56

 https://tech.china.com/article/20191016/kejiyuan0129385424.html

57
https://worldview.stratfor.com/horizons/fellows/william-tucker/09022018-china-s-search-thousand-talents.

58
This link has been removed from the website http://www.1000plan.org/en/plan.html.

59
Defence, Annual Report to Congress, 49.

60
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-air-force-just-paper-tiger-or-ready-war-america-18921.

61
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/report-chinas-military-growing-super-powerful-by-stealing-18677;
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/08/chinese-theft-of-sensitive-us-military-technology-still-huge-problem.html.

62
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/china-hacked-a-navy-contractor-and-secured-a-troveof-highly-sensitive-data-on-submarine-warfare/2018/06/08/6cc396fa-68e6-11e8-bea7c8eb28bc52b1_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5e7f1e7c104f.

63
Kania, Technological Entanglement, 5.

64
Kania, Technological Entanglement, 5-6.

65
Joske, Picking Flowers, Making Honey, 6-8.

66
Joske, Picking Flowers, Making Honey, 11-13.

67
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11937380;
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11932407;
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4112921-Release-Info-Matt-Nippert0409.html#document/p3/a382605

68
Kania, Technological Entanglement, 7.

69
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/22/china-us-tech-companies-cfius-572413.

70
Brown and Singh, China’s Technology Transfer Strategy, 17.

71
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/world/asia/us-technology-smuggling-foreign-weapons.html.

72
Lorand Laskai and Adam Segal, A New Old Threat.

73
Brown and Singh, China’s Technology Transfer Strategy, 18-19.

74
I am grateful to Alex Joske for sharing this information, which comes out of his definitive study Picking Flowers,
Making Honey: The Chinese military’s collaboration with foreign universities.

75
I am grateful to Alex Joske for sharing his research materials with me.

76
https://ord.xidian.edu.cn/info/1037/8444.htm

77
https://www.educationcounts.govt.nz/statistics/indicators/main/resource/government_funding_of_tertiary_educati
on.

78
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS.

 79
https://www.universitiesnz.ac.nz/about-university-sector/how-nz-universities-are-funded.

80
https://www.auckland.ac.nz/en/abi/about-the-institute/our-institute/our-funding.html.

81
https://www.rakon.com/corporate/about/news/42-rak-news-corp/135-rakon-huawei-technology-partnership

82
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10839446

83
https://henryjacksonsociety.org/members-content/who-owns-huawei/; Christopher Balding and Donald C.
Clarke, “Who Owns Huawei?, April 2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3372669

84
Anne-Marie Brady, “An ABC of CCP Spy Agencies,” Australian Foreign Affairs, July 2020.

85
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/19/ztes-ties-to-chinas-military-industrial-complex-run-deep/

86
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=12312033

87
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10383755

88
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10383752

89
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10383755

90
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10736927

91
http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/8883230/Rakon-sells-Chinese-subsidiary-stake

92
https://www.thtt.co.nz/about-hautaki

93
https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2020/07/andrew-little-says-new-zealand-won-t-follow-uk-s-huawei-5gban.html

94
Government Communications Security Bureau, 2019 Annual Report, 8.

95
https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/kiwi-universities-urged-review-contracts-huawei-after-5g-ban.

96
https://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/about-massey/news/article.cfm?mnarticle_uuid=5F0D3B84-42F0-4B44B738-2201C6E8632C.

97
https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/90636313/chinese-giant-huawei-to-build-cloud-computing-datacentre-in-nz

98
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=11826501

99
http://nz.china-embassy.org/chn/zxgx/t1769421.htm

100
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=11826501

101
https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/90636313/chinese-giant-huawei-to-build-cloud-computing-datacentre-in-nz

102

 https://www.huawei.com/nz/about-huawei/sustainability/win-win-development/social-contribution/seeds-for-thefuture.

103
https://www.nztvawards.co.nz/

104
https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/112037325/huawei-piles-pressure-on-govt-with-ads-and-sponsorship-securityexperts-say

105
https://www.businessinsider.com.au/chinese-billionaire-is-accused-of-stealing-research-from-a-duke-lab-20187?op=1&r=US&IR=T

106
https://www.dukechronicle.com/article/2017/10/how-one-graduate-student-allegedly-stole-duke-research-tocreate-a-billion-dollar-chinese-company.

107
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/tech/2016-04/27/content_24877981.htm

108
This link has been removed from the website http://www.kuangchiscience.com/?lang=en.

109
This link has been removed from the website http://www.martinjetpack.com/company/about-us.html.

110
This link has been removed from the website http://www.martinjetpack.com/company/about-us.html.

111
http://www.kuang-chi.com/en/index.php?ac=article&at=list&tid=235.

112
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/tech/2016-04/27/content_24877981.htm

113
https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/97123069/martin-jetpack-posts-big-loss-bolstered-by-chinese-funder.

114
https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/107462785/jetpacks-slimmeddown-operation-in-the-hands-of-kuangchiexecutives.

115
https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/107462785/jetpacks-slimmeddown-operation-in-the-hands-of-kuangchiexecutives.

116
https://opencorporates.com/companies/us_de/4532836

117
Brady, Magic Weapons.

118
Brady, Magic Weapons.

119
This link has been removed from the website http://www.kuangchiscience.com/?lang=en.

120
https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/96724372/pacific-aerospace-guilty-of-unlawful-exports-to-north-korea

121
https://www.aerospace.co.nz/company/history

122
https://app.companiesoffice.govt.nz/companies/app/ui/pages/companies/1870662/directors#

123
https://chejiahao.autohome.com.cn/info/2030707

124
https://auto.163.com/16/1021/17/C3TRVKOL000884ML.html; http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/beijing/201403/19/content_17361913.htm

125
https://www.auvsc.com/page123?article_id=875

 126
http://www.skyplus38.ru/pac-750-flight-manual-performance.html

127
http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2017-09-25/doc-ifymfcih4872266.shtml

128
https://www.aerospace.co.nz/news/minister-witnesses-120-million-deal-to-pacific-aerospace

129
https://www.lawfareblog.com/alphago-and-beyond-chinese-military-looks-future-intelligentized-warfare.

130
https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2019/03/29/512577/chinese-ai-courts-new-zealand;
https://www.iflytek.com/en/news/108.html

131
https://www.iflytek.com/en/news/108.html

132
https://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/about-massey/news/article.cfm?mnarticle_uuid=F5F64AD9-0029-9E05E58C-A441F56E07DF.

133
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/culture/2016-12/22/content_27739859_2.htm.

134
http://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/about-massey/news/article.cfm?mnarticle_uuid=F5F64AD9-0029-9E05-E58CA441F56E07DF.

135
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1273779.shtml.

136
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923151016/http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/culture/201612/22/content_27739859.htm.

137
https://idealog.co.nz/design/2016/07/love-needs-be-present-lack-it-will-diminish-everything-mediocrity-sirrichard-taylors-take-inspiring-creativity.

138
https://www.wetaworkshop.com/services/manufacturing-services/armour-costume-4/.

139
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/culture/2016-12/22/content_27739859.htm.

140
https://www.wetaworkshop.com/news/latest/weta-workshop-reunites-with-legendary-for-the-great-wall/;
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/what-great-walls-box-office-flop-will-cost-studios-981602.

141
http://www.wuzhenfestival.com/newcn/about.aspx?classId=59 ; https://archive.is/ATQqa.

142
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/wuzhen-joins-hands-with-weta-workshop-and-421-studiolaunching-wuzhen-international-project-of-future-visual-arts-to-spark-new-inspirations-300386999.html.

143
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/05/business/china-internet-conference-wuzhen.html;
https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/2017/12/%E3%80%90%E7%9C%9F
%E7%90%86%E9%83%A8%E3%80%91%E4%B9%8C%E9%95%87%E4%B8%96%E7%95%8C%E4%BA
%92%E8%81%94%E7%BD%91%E5%A4%A7%E4%BC%9A%E5%85%B3%E9%94%AE%E8%AF%8D
%E6%A0%B7%E6%9C%AC/;
http://www.wuzhen.com.cn/cn/xinwen_detail.aspx?cid=6&id=5379.

144
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=12079538;
https://www.wetaworkshop.com/about-us/history/; https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/76005042/Why-is-Sir-PeterJackson-retiring-from-Weta-Workshop-directorship.

145
http://www.mad-daily.com/wellingtons-role-in-top-chinese-movie/.

 146
http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=34088;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923151327/https://ctext.org/han-shu/fu-chang-zheng-gan-chen-duan-zhuan.

147
https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-07-05/documents-expose-how-hollywood-promotes-war-behalfpentago-cia-nsa

148
“State Council: "Opinions on Strengthening the Construction of New Type Think Tanks with Chinese
Characteristics," Xinhua, January 20, 2015, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0120/c1001-26419175.html.

149
https://www.nzfilm.co.nz/sites/default/files/2018-06/Official%20Co-productions%202018.pdf.

150
https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/film-co-production-agreement-signed-china.

151
https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-zealand-china-television-co-production-agreement-signed.

152
New Zealand Film Commission, Partnering for Success: China-New Zealand Co-Production (Wellington: Te Aro,
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153
http://www.morningwhistle.com/info/37802.html.

154
http://vip.stock.finance.sina.com.cn/corp/go.php/vCI_CorpInfo/stockid/300081.phtml.

155
https://archive.is/K3uVQ.

156
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923151341/http://wemedia.ifeng.com/58909154/wemedia.shtml;
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157
http://vip.stock.finance.sina.com.cn/corp/view/vISSUE_RaiseExplanationDetail.php?
stockid=300081&id=552147; This link has been removed from the website
http://disclosure.szse.cn/finalpage/2017-08-25/1203865831.PDF.

158
https://issuu.com/totallicensing/docs/total_licensing_january_19.

159
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923151209/http://www.shambala.net.cn/xwzx/gsxw/140.html.

160
Anne-Marie Brady, Friend of China—the Myth of Rewi Alley (Abingdon: Routledge, 2003).

161
Helen Clark, New Zealand and China: Report of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense
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162
Clark, New Zealand and China.

163
https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-china-scientist-exchange-programme-launched

164
https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-alliance-strengthens-nz-china-science-links.

165
https://www.mbie.govt.nz/assets/fa127203c9/china-new-zealand-5-year-roadmap-2018-2022.pdf

166
https://ord.xidian.edu.cn/info/1037/8444.htm

167
https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/08/chinas-vast-strange-and-powerful-farming-militia-turns-60/.

168

 Information Office of the State Council, The History and Development of the Xinjiang Production and
Construction Corps (Beijing: 2014),
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/10/05/content_281474992384669.htm；
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169
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2010-06/15/content_1628385.htm;
http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwfb/s6192/s133/s136/201510/t20151019_214178.html;
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catalog_id=17048&object_id=16248.

170
http://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/about-massey/news/article.cfm?mnarticle_uuid=66DA4E9B-CEF2-E2EC20E8-DB5AAFED040D;
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171
http://www.chinaembassy.org.nz/eng/zxgxs/t1284477; htm; https://archive.is/0mVyN.

172
http://www.shzu.edu.cn/2016/0426/c2a78970/page.html;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923152829/http://www.shzu.edu.cn/2016/0426/c2a78970/page.htm;
https://archive.is/NEYGE; http://edu.qsjxj.cn/xjgx/xj04/13686.html;
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173
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/14/uighur-man-held-after-leaking-letters-from-xinjiang-campinmates-says-family; https://www.ft.com/content/f0d3223a-7f4d-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d.

174
http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/farming/discovery/65181690/mutual-gains-from-china-sheep-project.

175
http://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/about-massey/news/article.cfm?mnarticle=honorary-doctorate-for-chinas-firstlady-18-11-2014.

176
https://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/about-massey/news/article.cfm?mnarticle_uuid=BB2855AA-3B14-4120B091-BCB5EC144EAF.

177
https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/2013/03/%E3%80%90%E5%9B%BE%E8%AF%B4%E5%A4%A9%E6%9C
%9D%E3%80%91%E5%BD%AD%E4%B8%BD%E5%AA%9B%E5%85%AB%E4%B9%9D
%E5%B9%B4%E5%9C%A8%E5%A4%A9%E5%AE%89%E9%97%A8%E5%B9%BF%E5%9C%BA
%E6%85%B0%E9%97%AE%E6%88%92%E4%B8%A5/.

178
http://news.china.com/zh_cn/hd/11127798/20130322/17741273.html.

179
http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2015-06/09/content_113345.htm.

180
https://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/about-massey/news/article.cfm?mnarticle_uuid=BB2855AA-3B14-4120B091-BCB5EC144EAF.

181
https://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/about-massey/news/article.cfm?mnarticle_uuid=9FB2A68D-00AC-1D4CE626-5C1D0323DE60.

182
http://www.81.cn/zggcdsjd/2017-10/23/content_7796547.htm.

183
https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/education/99841618/massey-university-joining-forces-with-weta-workshop-for-afirstofitskind-postgraduate-offering.

 184
https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/education/99841618/massey-university-joining-forces-with-weta-workshop-for-afirstofitskind-postgraduate-offering.

185
http://www.nzliuxue.com/content-0309622.htm.

186
https://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/learning/colleges/college-of-sciences/about/natural-sciences/news.cfm.

187
https://www.lawfareblog.com/alphago-and-beyond-chinese-military-looks-future-intelligentized-warfare.

188
https://www.evernote.com/shard/s244/sh/36114eb5-4e2e-4b5f-9d96-56847ada1074/5beb145e7b066f32;
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/22/china-voice-biometric-collection-threatens-privacy.

189
https://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/learning/colleges/college-of-sciences/about/natural-sciences/inms-staff/inmscomputer-science-staff/inms-computer-science-staff_home.cfm?stref=980830.

190
https://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/learning/colleges/college-of-sciences/about/natural-sciences/news.cfm.

191
https://fyi.org.nz/request/11749-massey-working-with-chinese-firm-blacklisted-over-human-rights-abuses

192
http://www.massey.ac.nz/~rwang/;
http://scie.zjgsu.edu.cn/zh-hans/node/438;
This link has been removed from the website http://www.1000plan.org/qrjh/article/67757; This link has been
removed from the website http://www.1000plan.org/en/.

193
https://www.smh.com.au/world/australian-universities-are-helping-chinas-military-surpass-the-united-states20171024-gz780x.html.

194
https://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/research/higher-research-degrees/phd-student-profiles/doctoral-mystory.cfm?studid=F%2Bgsa1beytI%3D; Qiu Yuanhang, Ma Yong, Jin Yun, Li Shidang and Gu Mingliang, Chinese
Dialects Identification Using Attention-Based Deep Neural Networks (Singapore: Springer, 2018),
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Chinese-Dialects-Identification-Using-Deep-Neural-QiuMa/03e1a191edef635e65ed9dcfc5d7a5c6426f8ebd.

195
https://www.massey.ac.nz/rwang// Note: Professor Wang’s cv has now been deleted from the Massey University
website but we have archived it here:
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923153228/http://www.massey.ac.nz/~rwang/; https://archive.is/wcG57.

196
http://www.csig.org.cn/detail/2503.

197
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?
q=cache:wBIKZfQitOMJ:xy.nudt.edu.cn/contents/10/22689.html+&cd=17&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=au;
http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1108/c1011-28842660.html;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923155926/http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1108/c1011-28842660.html;
https://archive.is/NOSpw.

198
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923153435/http://xy.nudt.edu.cn/contents/10/22726.html.

199
http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2017-12/05/c_129756585.htm; https://archive.is/98yAP；
http://www.huaxia.com/hn-tw/hnsy/xwsc/2017/03/5244415.html.

200
Xiao Liang et al., “Hybrid conditional random field based camera-LIDAR fusion for road detection,”
Information Sciences 1, no. 16 (2017), http://www.massey.ac.nz/~rwang/publications/17-IS-Xiao.pdf; Xiao Liang
et al., “Hybrid conditional random field based camera-LIDAR fusion for road detection,” Information Sciences 1,
no. 16 (2017), https://archive.is/4oKf5.

 201
http://www.csadge.edu.cn/upload_files/file/20161111/1478827270942073957.pdf;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923153812/http://www.csadge.edu.cn/info/hjcg_jj/3044;
https://archive.is/7SZiI; https://archive.is/obx0a.

202
http://www.massey.ac.nz/~rwang/; https://web.archive.org/web/20180923153228/.

203
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?
q=cache:xW2ciRa7W3QJ:opinion.china.com.cn/opinion_80_185980.html+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=au.

204
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?
q=cache:yqWRinV8vp0J:member.hit.edu.cn/e3/81/c9084a189313/page.htm+&cd=2&hl=no&ct=clnk&gl=no.

205
Chen Tongtong, “3D LIDER-based Dynamic Vehicle Detection and Tracking” (PdD diss., National University of
Defense Technology, 2016), https://www.academia.edu/36454997/thesis_doctor.pdf?auto=download;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923154054/; https://archive.is/gmLbT; Kania, Technological Entanglement, 24.

206
Kania, Technological Entanglement, 24.

207
http://xy.nudt.edu.cn/contents/10/22726.html;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923154448/http://xy.nudt.edu.cn/contents/10/22726.html;
https://archive.is/LlSsl; http://hunan.sina.com.cn/news/2017-03-22/detail-ifycnpiu9424311-p2.shtml;
https://www.xueshu.com/kejizixun/201433/21781189.html.

208
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:lgRce41XREJ:https://wenku.baidu.com/view/adcf6df3168884868662d664.html+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=pl;
http://mil.cnr.cn/ztl/gfkdrc/gsj/201309/t20130927_513706974.html/ ;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923154837/http://mil.cnr.cn/ztl/gfkdrc/gsj/201309/t20130927_513706974.html;
https://archive.is/MYd8E.

209
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923154757/https://www.janes.com/article/78756/china-testing-unmannedtanks.

210
http://mil.huanqiu.com/world/2018-03/11677809.html.

211
https://www.icswb.com/h/152/20170321/469301.html.

212
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-13560-1_43;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923153341/http://www.csig.org.cn/detail/2503; https://archive.is/mdhRa.

213
http://www.csig.org.cn/detail/2503 1807142323;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923153341/http://www.csig.org.cn/detail/2503; https://archive.is/mdhRa.

214
https://mini.eastday.com/a/161029100802756-5.html;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923154921/https://mini.eastday.com/a/161029100802756-5.html;
https://archive.is/kWQDy. See also https://jamestown.org/program/swarms-war-chinese-advances-swarmintelligence/.

215
https://mini.eastday.com/a/161029100802756-5.html;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923154921/https://mini.eastday.com/a/161029100802756-5.html.

216
https://www.icswb.com/h/100046/20180716/549143.html 1807251755;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923154954/https://www.icswb.com/h/100046/20180716/549143.html;
https://archive.is/hv8w7; http://news.hnradio.com/f/2018/20186/201861392341828.html;
https://www.icswb.com/h/100046/20180716/549143.html.

 217
http://bgzdh.cnjournals.com/ch/reader/create_pdf.aspx?
file_no=20161018824100&flag=1&journal_id=bgzdh&year_id=2016

218
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:S7E6nG_I_EJ:yjszs.nudt.edu.cn/upLoad/20140616/013f0fc1-c658-455e-ad3b60d4b91c263e.doc+&cd=1&hl=is&ct=clnk&gl=is.

219
Chen Tongtong et al., “Likelihood-Field-Model-Based Dynamic Vehicle Detection and Tracking for Self-Driving,”
IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems 17, no. 11 (2016),
http://www.massey.ac.nz/~rwang/publications/16-ITS-Chen.pdf; Chen Qingyang et al., “Integrating Topological
Map for Autonomous Navigation in Unstructured Environments,” Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference
on Intelligence Control and Information Processing (2011),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/252039414_Integrating_topological_map_for_autonomous_navigation_
in_unstructured_environments; https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Zhenping_Sun2;
https://www.xueshu.com/gfkj/201305/4857580.html; https://www.xueshu.com/gfkj/201305/4857624.html.

220
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923155906/http://www.csig.org.cn/detail/2449.

221
Chen Tongtong et al., “Gaussian-process-based Real-time Ground Segmentation for Autonomous Land
Vehicles,” (n.d.) http://www.massey.ac.nz/~rwang/publications/13-JINT-Chen.pdf;
http://school.freekaoyan.com/hn/nudt/daoshi/20151208/1449581827389547.shtml;
http://www.escience.cn/people/yqfang/index.html;jsessionid=AC6B38B18B85AE652392F2A7EE2DA004-n2.

222
Chen et al., “3D LIDER-based Dynamic Vehicle Detection,” 39.

223
http://yuanjian.cnki.com.cn/Search/Result?author=%E9%AD%8F%E5%B4%87%E9%98%B3;
http://gov.hnedu.cn/c/2011-09-01/781281.shtml ;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923154426/http://gov.hnedu.cn/c/2011-09-01/781281.shtml;
https://archive.is/Hbepz.

224
http://www.wcif.cn/12196/12200/12203/12365/2015/12/03/10228296.shtml.

225
http://npd.nsfc.gov.cn/projectDetail.action?pid=61075043;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923155758/http://npd.nsfc.gov.cn/projectDetail.action?pid=61075043;
https://archive.is/9S0UO; Chen Tongtong et al., “Likelihood-Field-Model-Based Dynamic Vehicle Detection; Chen
et al., “Gaussian-process-based Real-time Ground Segmentation”; Fang Yuqiang, “Graph-oriented Learning via
Automatic Group Sparsity for Data Analysis,” 2012 IEEE 12th International Conference on Data Mining (2012),
http://www.massey.ac.nz/~rwang/publications/12-ICDM-Fang.pdf; LiChuanxiang et al., “Multi-lane Detection in
Urban Driving Environments Employment Omni-directional Camera,” Proceeding of the IEEE International
Conference on Information and Automation (2014),
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Li_Chuanxiang/publication/268215035_Multilane_Detection_in_Urban_Driving_Environments_Employing_Omnidirectional_Camera/links/557f795808aec87640ddfa42/Multi-lane-Detection-in-Urban-Driving-EnvironmentsEmploying-Omni-directional-Camera.pdf.

226
http://www.massey.ac.nz/~rwang/; https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:j_zibCC8noJ:www.cdut.edu.cn/xww/news/141826558223414652.html+&cd=2&hl=is&ct=clnk&gl=is

227
Ian Easton and Randall Schriver, Final Report: Research on PLA Modernization (Arlington: Project 2049
Institute, 2013), https://www.spf.org/media/upload/2_Project2049.pdf;
http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Nov2013-Stokes.pdf.

228
https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?
gp=1&SID=9ae4a21068f2bd41d4a5aee843b63ef1&ty=HTML&h=L&n=15y2.1.3.4.28&r=PART#ap15.2.744_122.
4.

 229
Arian L. Pregenzer, Technical Cooperation on Nuclear Security between the United States and China: Review of
the Past and Opportunities for the Future (Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, 2011),
http://prod.sandia.gov/techlib/access-control.cgi/2011/119267.pdf.

230
Select Committee, United States House of Representatives, U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial
Concerns with the People’s Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CRPT-105hrpt851/pdf/GPO-CRPT-105hrpt851.pdf.

231
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:j_zibCC8noJ:www.cdut.edu.cn/xww/news/141826558223414652.html+&cd=2&hl=is&ct=clnk&gl=is;
http://www.sklgp.cdut.edu.cn/default.aspx?id=9&subid=2&newsid=2038

232
This link has been removed from the website https://www.auckland.ac.nz/en/study/study-options/360international/360-international-overview/exchange-partner-fact-sheets/china.html.

233
http://www.nwpu.edu.cn/xxgk/xxls.htm.

234
http://www.guancha.cn/military-affairs/2017_03_06_397315.shtml;
http://ln.people.com.cn/n/2014/1222/c346247-23300977-4.html;
http://news.china.com.cn/2016-03/13/content_38009863_2.htm.

235
http://news.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1002/28397.htm.

236
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1652858/n1653018/c3780328/content.html;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923163039/http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1652858/n1652930/n3757016/c
5960820/content.html; https://archive.is/h5tES.
http://www.cre.net/announce/?announceid=78;
http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2015-06/05/content_6526899.htm
http://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/781/;
http://english.gov.cn/state_council/2014/10/06/content_281474992893468.htm.

237
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2017-12/07/content_5244986.htm.

238
http://www.sastind.gov.cn/n4235/n6650188/c6798416/content.html.

239
http://www.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1008/1033.htm.

240
http://news.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1002/51180.htm; https://archive.is/EgF2y.

241
http://news.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1002/51180.htm; https://archive.is/EgF2y.

242
This link has been removed from the website http://www.nudt.edu.cn/Articleshow.asp?id=6428.

243
http://time.com/collection/most-influential-people-2018/5238153/jian-wei-pan/.

244
http://military.cnr.cn/jssp/jj/20150414/t20150414_518317358.html;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923152456/http://www.nudt.edu.cn/Articleshow.asp?id=6428;
https://archive.is/eNWrM.

245
http://www.81rc.mil.cn/news/2017-01/04/content_7436159_2.htm.

246
http://teacher.nwpu.edu.cn/lihuaxing.html.

247

 http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2013/01-21/4504243.shtml;
http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2017/2/367263.shtm;
This link has been removed from the website http://xy.nudt.edu.cn/contents/10/22459.html.

248
http://81rc.81.cn/Civilianpost/index.htm

249
http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/n2014/tp/content_7796651.htm;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923150957/http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/n2014/tp/content_7711251.htm;
https://archive.is/.

250
This link has been removed from the website
http://www.aucklandmoe.org/publish/portal57/tab3724/info130778.htm.

251
This link has been removed from the website
http://www.qb.gd.gov.cn/dfqw2010/sz/201709/t20170928_892377.htm;
https://kknews.cc/zh-sg/finance/m3y8qlp.html;
http://www.chinesenzherald.co.nz/news/lifestyle/nz-shenzhen/.

252
http://www.ccg.org.cn/Expert/People.aspx?ClassId=122&keywords=&page=2].

253
http://irmct.buaa.edu.cn/.

254
https://cdn.auckland.ac.nz/assets/central/about/international-strategy/documents/UoA%20%20Network
%20partners%20August%202014.pdf; https://archive.is/0tilt.

255
http://homepages.engineering.auckland.ac.nz/~pxu012/;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923161714/http://homepages.engineering.auckland.ac.nz/~pxu012/;
https://archive.is/WGkeu;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923161721/http://www.me.buaa.edu.cn/szll/qtjg/71870.htm;
https://archive.is/BdDRU; http://www.me.buaa.edu.cn/szll/qtjg/71870.htm;
http://id.buaa.edu.cn/info/1102/3671.htm.

256
http://id.buaa.edu.cn/info/1101/1700.htm.

257
http://news.buaa.edu.cn/info/1002/41522.htm.

258
http://news.buaa.edu.cn/info/1002/41461.htm.

259
https://www.linkedin.com/in/adaxiaonz/; https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6001249?
tp=&arnumber=6001249&url=http:%2F%2Fieeexplore.ieee.org%2Fxpls%2Fabs_all.jsp%3Farnumber
%3D6001249

260
https://www.victoria.ac.nz/news/victorious/2017/autumn-2017/artificial-intelligence;
http://jidian.hebau.edu.cn/news/20170106.html;
http://www.hebau.edu.cn/art/2017/11/28/art_2_18777.html.

261
http://www.xidian.edu.cn/info/1478/29699.htm; Carlton Downey, Mengjie Zhang, and Jing Liu, “Parallel linear
genetic programming for multi-class classification,” Genetic Programming and Evolvable Machines (13) no. 3
(2012), DOI 10.1007/s10710-012-9162-9; http://www.xidian.edu.cn/info/1020/3077.htm.

262
Marco Dorigo et al., “Particle Swarm Optimization,” Scholarpedia 3, no. 11 (2008),
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Particle_swarm_optimization;
http://www.swarmintelligence.org/tutorials.php;
http://mnemstudio.org/particle-swarm-introduction.htm;
http://ecs.victoria.ac.nz/Groups/ECRG/ResearchAreas#Particles_Swarm_Optimisation_40PSO_41.

 263
https://homepages.ecs.vuw.ac.nz/~mengjie/

264
http://www.xidian.edu.cn/info/1478/29699.htm.

265
http://news.xidian.edu.cn/info/2106/198207.htm.

266
http://news.xidian.edu.cn/info/2106/94669.htm;
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_c15e13cc0102wsi0.html.

267
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0219-9570

268
https://tec.ieee.org/newsletter/march-2017/nasa-electric-aircraft-testbed-neat-overview-2

269
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0219-9570

270
https://www.wgtn.ac.nz/news/victorious/2017/autumn-2017/favour-in-china

271
https://eri.aut.ac.nz/research/css/areas/wireless#members.

272
https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2018/07/03/139050/sis-investigates-chinese-engineer-in-auckland.

273
Publications include: Homomorphic Encryption-Based Visual Secret Sharing, the Chinese Academy of
Sciences, 2017-2019, Wang Guangyu, Yan Weiqi, and M. Kankanhalli, "Content Based Authentication of Visual
Cryptography," Multimedia Tools and Applications 76, no. 7 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11042-016-3549-1;
Yan Weiqi, "Surveillance Data Capturing and Compression," in Introduction to Intelligent Surveillance. (Cham:
Springer, 2017), 21-40; Yan Weiqi and Mohan Kankanhalli, "Face Search in Encrypted Domain," in Improved
DSIFT Descriptor Based Copy-Rotate-Move Forgery Detection, eds. Ali Khayeat, Sun Xianfang and Paul L.
Rosin, (Auckland: PSIVT 2015, 2015),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/314923127_Face_Search_in_Encrypted_Domain;
http://sklois.iie.cas.cn/xwdt/sysxw/201506/t20150623_297576.html;
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_78a905d10102wffr.html ; https://archive.is/rAuDv.

274
Liu, Feng et al., “ESSVCS: An Enriched Secret Sharing Visual Cryptography,” Trans. Data Hiding and
Multimedia Security 9 (2014), https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ESSVCS%3A-An-Enriched-SecretSharing-Visual-Liu-Yan/7f6fc7143867f1ef9a16e8f3d77a44808d8b7369.

275
http://sklois.iie.cas.cn/rcdw/fyjy/201501/t20150107_275236.html; http://fengliu.net.cn/publication.html;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923160447/http://fengliu.net.cn/publication.html; https://archive.is/449ge.

276
https://www.royalsociety.org.nz/what-we-do/funds-and-opportunities/marsden/awarded-grants/marsden-fundhighlights/2016-marsden-highlights/energy-efficient-super-chips-for-computers

277
http://www.cs.otago.ac.nz/staffpriv/yawen/

278
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?
q=cache:vF5TwZcsauwJ:old.chem.pku.edu.cn/data/upload/5ZC05paH5YGl566A5LuL_ZwtFCG.pdf+&cd=1&hl=c
s&ct=clnk&gl=pl 1808011940

279
http://www.yngfkgj.gov.cn/%20

280
http://ynjqsc.com/NewsView.aspx?NewsID=a7393105-150c-426a-9766-113e6927caa1

281
https://www.xueshu.com/gfjsjc/201301/14694396.html

 282
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Wenjian_Wu

283
https://www.odt.co.nz/opinion/science-high-priority-chinese-military-university

284
http://gdjyyjxb.nudt.edu.cn/ch/reader/create_pdf.aspx?
file_no=20130Z139&year_id=2013&quarter_id=Z1&falg=1 1808131731

285
http://news.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1002/51238.htm; https://archive.is/jEDWQ.

286
http://news.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1002/50988.htm; https://people.unisa.edu.au/Mark.Billinghurst#About-me.

287
https://www.cosc.canterbury.ac.nz/people/postgrads/huidong.bai ;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923161352/https://www.cosc.canterbury.ac.nz/people/postgrads/huidong.bai;
https://archive.is/FRgfL.

288
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Chao_Xu9; This link has been removed from the website
http://jszy.nwpu.edu.cn/chaoxu.

289
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Chao_Xu9.

290
http://blog.sciencenet.cn/blog-401887-1105134.html.

291
James Geoffrey Chase, Geoffrey W, Rodgers and Xu Chao,
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https://researchprofile.canterbury.ac.nz/UCResearchProfileResources/Researcher/87506/Curriculum%20Vitae
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292
https://www.canterbury.ac.nz/engineering/schools/mechanical/news/2019/uc-engineer-awarded-honoraryprofessorship-in-china.html.

293
http://en.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1175/2971.htm.

294
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Chao_Xu9; Xu Chao, “Nonlinear Mechanics Modelling for Joint Interface of
Assembled Structure,” Chinese Journal of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics 50, no. 1 (2018),
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Chao_Xu9/publication/323656102_Nonlinear_mechanics_modeling_for_join
t_interface_of_assembled_structure/links/5aa23c270f7e9badd9a5e3c4/Nonlinear-mechanics-modeling-for-jointinterface-of-assembled-structure.pdf.

295
http://caep-ise.com/info/2.html; http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Nov2013-Stokes.pdf;
http://gscaep.ac.cn/index.php/news/view?id=147;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923161150/http://gscaep.ac.cn/index.php/news/view?id=147;
https://archive.is/0SJKm. ;

296
Xu, “Nonlinear Mechanics Modelling.”

297
International Peace Information Service (IPIS) & Omega Research Foundation, Working paper on China North
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https://omegaresearchfoundation.org/sites/default/files/uploads/Publications/Working%20paper%20on
%20CNGC%2C%202014.pdf; Evan S. Medeiros et al., A New Direction for China's Defense Industry (Santa
Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005): 257,
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG334.pdf.

298

 Tate Nurkin et al., China’s Advanced Weapons Systems (Jane’s by IHS Markit, 2018): 159, 203,
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Jane%27s%20by%20IHS%20Markit_China%27s
%20Advanced%20Weapons%20Systems.pdf; Medeiros et al., A New Direction: 62, 81, passim; International
Peace Information Service (IPIS) & Omega Research Foundation, Working Paper 2 on China North Industries
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299
Mark Bromley, Mathieu Duchâtel and Paul Holtom, China’s Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons
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300
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/20050527.aspx;
https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/us-imposes-new-sanctions-china; Shirley A. Kan, China and Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service,
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301
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/world/asia/north-korea-sanctions-loopholes-china-united-states-garmentindustry.html.

302
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Chao_Xu9.

303
Medeiros et al., A New Direction: 80ff; Mark A. Stokes and Dean Cheng, China’s Evolving Space Capabilities:
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https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC_China-Space-Program-Report_April-2012.pdf.

304
Kania, Technological Entanglement, 24.

305
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Chao_Xu9.

306
Stokes and Cheng, China’s Evolving Space Capabilities: 17f.

307
http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2014-11/5201984.html; http://www.andrewerickson.com/2014/12/chinasnew-cx-1-supersonic-anti-ship-cruise-missile-wendell-minnicks-after-action-report-from-zhuhai-airshow/.

308
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0376042118301015

309
http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2016-08-04/doc-ifxutfpf1209004.shtml.

310
http://teacher.nwpu.edu.cn/guoyingqing.html.

311
http://teacher.nwpu.edu.cn/zhenglongxi.html.

312
http://www.cauc.edu.cn/siae/315.html;
https://web.archive.org/web/20180923160343/http://www.cauc.edu.cn/siae/315.html; https://archive.is/CCyS9.

313
http://christchurch.chineseconsulate.org/chn/zlgxw/t1150662.htm.

314
http://smse.sjtu.edu.cn/jiaogongdenglu.asp?id=358； https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E9%99%88%E5%B0%8F
%E5%A5%87/19388408.

315
https://www.canterbury.ac.nz/engineering/contact-us/people/xiaoqi-chen.html.

316
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/move-over-g7%E2%80%94were-going-get-democratic-ten-now-163165

 317
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/trading-weapons-and-controlled-chemicals/which-goods-are-controlled/.

318
http://mtcr.info/partners/.

319
http://mtcr.info/guidelines-for-sensitive-missile-relevant-transfers/.

320
http://mtcr.info/guidelines-for-sensitive-missile-relevant-transfers/.

321
https://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-NZ/SCR_77876/d46ff88e7b61d31fc8fb0063311a75b5c468b05e.

322
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Strategic-goods-forms/New-Zealand-Strategic-Goods-List-October-2017.pdf.

323
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Strategic-goods-forms/New-Zealand-Strategic-Goods-List-October-2017.pdf.

324
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Strategic-goods-forms/New-Zealand-Strategic-Goods-List-October-2017.pdf.

325
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/trading-weapons-and-controlled-chemicals/how-to-export-military-and-dualuse-goods/.

326
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/trading-weapons-and-controlled-chemicals/how-to-export-military-and-dualuse-goods/.

327
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/trading-weapons-and-controlled-chemicals/how-to-export-military-and-dualuse-goods/.

328
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/trading-weapons-and-controlled-chemicals/how-to-export-military-and-dualuse-goods/.

329
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2018/0004/latest/DLM7038955.html?src=qs, 74-75.

330
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2018/0004/latest/DLM7038955.html?src=qs, 77.

331
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2018/0004/latest/DLM7038955.html?src=qs, 77.

332
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2018/0004/latest/DLM7038955.html?src=qs, 75.

333
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2017/0029/48.0/DLM6966275.html#DLM6966280, 5.

334
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2017/0029/48.0/DLM6966275.html#DLM6966280, 5.

335
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2017/0029/48.0/DLM6966275.html#DLM6966280, 28.

336
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2018/0009/latest/DLM7318214.html, 3.

337
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2018/0009/latest/DLM7318214.html, 3.

338
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2018/0009/latest/DLM7318214.html, 5.

339
https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/BILL_97805/overseas-investmenturgent-measures-amendment-bill

340
https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/panama-papers/303356/nz-at-heart-of-panama-money-go-round

 341
https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2020/jan/24/new-zealand-needs-to-show-its-serious-aboutaddressing-chinese-interference

342
https://docs.education.gov.au/system/files/doc/other/ed19-0222_-_int_-_ufit_guidelines_acc.pdf

343
https://www.education.gov.au/ufit

344
https://www.aspi.org.au/report/china-defence-universities-tracker

345
Kania, Technological Entanglement, 10.

346
Joske, Picking Flowers, Making Honey, 19.

347
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Strategic-goods-forms/Public-Consultation-Document.pdf . See related
discussions held in 2019 in Australia:
https://www.defence.gov.au/publications/reviews/tradecontrols/Docs/Dept_of_Defence.pdf
https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-releases/defence-trade-controls-act-review