UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

20 February 2020

(U) Cyber Mission Center
(U//FOUO) Overt Chinese Influence Targeting the Homeland
(U//FOUO) Scope. This Reference Aid provides federal, state, local, and private sector stakeholders an
overview of overt Chinese influence targeting the Homeland. It identifies tactics used against federal, state,
and local governments; US businesses; think tanks and academia; and the public─including ethnic Chinese
diaspora. This Reference Aid also provides descriptions of facilitators of Chinese influence in the United
States and China’s influence campaign narratives. The information cutoff date for this Reference Aid is
28 January 2020.
(U) Prepared by the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (DHS IE) Cyber Mission Center (CYMC). Coordinated with CBP, CISA,
CWMD, FEMA, ICE, S&T, TSA, USCG, USSS, CIA, DIA, Department of Energy, Department of State, Department of the
Treasury, FBI, NASIC, NGA, NIC, and NSA.

IA-37174-20
(U) Warning: This document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/REL TO USA, FVEY. It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of
Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is
not to be released to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need to know without prior approval of an authorized DHS official. State and local homeland
security officials may share this document with critical infrastructure personnel or private sector security officials without further approval from DHS.
(U) This product contains US person information that has been deemed necessary for the intended recipient to understand, assess, or act on the information provided. It has been
highlighted in this document with the label USPER and should be handled in accordance with the recipient's intelligence oversight and/or information handling procedures. All
other US person information has been minimized. Should you require the minimized US person information on weekends or after normal weekday hours during exigent and timesensitive circumstances, contact the Current and Emerging Threat Watch Office at 202-447-3688, CETC.OSCO@hq.dhs.gov. For all other inquiries, please contact the Homeland
Security Single Point of Service, Request for Information Office at DHS-SPS-RFI@hq.dhs.gov, DHS-SPS-RFI@dhs.sgov.gov, DHS-SPS-RFI@dhs.ic.gov.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE
FEBRUARY 2020

(U//FOUO) Overt Chinese Influence Targeting the Homeland
(U//FOUO) The following graphic provides an overview of Chinese overt influence in the United States by target. Chinese diplomatic personnel in the United States are involved in overt influence
activities against all US targets identified in this Reference Aid. This information is not an exhaustive list of all Chinese influence activities in the United States; rather, it provides examples we
consider to be representative of China’s overall activity against targets in the United States. Appendices to this Reference Aid also describe China influence tactics and facilitators.

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(U) CHINA’S INFLUENCE CAMPAIGN NARRATIVES
(U) China Model

(U) China seeks to portray its governing system as a superior “China
Model,” an alternative to the Western liberal democratic framework.1,2,3

(U) One China

(U) China demands other countries not recognize Taiwan as independent
from China and not comment on or criticize Beijing's policies toward
Taiwan, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Chinese Muslims.4

(U) Trade

(U) China strives to achieve its economic goals by presenting itself as a
responsible global power and trading partner.5,6

LEGEND

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Investment in United States

Lure of Chinese Market

Approval of Visits

Use of State Media

Use of United Front Entities

Use of US Lobbying Firms

20-054-IA

 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U) Appendix A: China’s Influence Tactics
(U) US Target

(U) Congress and
Executive Branch

(U) State and Local
Governments

(U) Chinese Actor

(U) Tactics
(U) Diplomats, National (U) Lobby members of Congress and staff; host visits of congressional staff to
China.7
People’s Congress
(U) Use US lobbying firms to represent their interests with federal officials. 8
Lobbyists representing foreign commercial interests can secure an exemption from
(U) Chinese
the Foreign Agents Registration Act, provided they register under the
Companies
less-demanding Lobbying Disclosure Act.9 The largest expenditures on federal
lobbying in 2017 came from Alibaba, followed by ZTE, Sinopec, and Wanda
America Group.10,11,a-e
(U) United Front Work (U) Use sister-city agreements in the United States to cultivate relations with local
officials, businesses, and media leaders through party-linked groups like the China
Department (UFWD)People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries.12,f China maintains 200
Affiliated Entities
sister-city relationships in the United States.13,14
(U) Chinese
(U) Conduct state and local lobbying for commercial or economic gain. 15,g The largest
Companies
expenditures on state-level lobbying over the last decade were from BYD Motors (a
public bus manufacturer in the United States), Huawei, and Wanda America Group. 16
(U) UFWD- Affiliated
(U) Use UFWD-affiliated entities to call for a loosely defined cultural, and even
Entities
political allegiance, to Beijing that includes China’s policies on Taiwan and Tibet.17
(U) Chinese State- or Affiliated Media

(U) Chinese Diaspora

(U) Diplomats
(U) US Public

(U) US Businesses

(U) Chinese State- or
Affiliated Media
(U) Diplomats,
Chinese Government,
China General
Chamber of
Commerce
(U) Diplomats

(U) Think Tanks/
Academia

(U) Chinese
Communist Party
Propaganda
Department, Ministry
of Education,
Diplomats

(U) Use China’s state and affiliated media in the United States to echo Chinese
Government and party narratives.18 China’s cable offerings include China Global
Television Network, which dominates Chinese-language cable offerings in the
United States and is available in 90 million US households. 19 Additional cable
offerings include the semi-official Phoenix TV and Xinhua News Service. Qiaobao
is the flagship pro-China newspaper published in the United States.20 China Radio
International maintains US stations that echo China’s state-owned media. China
in March 2018 announced plans to merge its individual foreign broadcasting
efforts into one propaganda organ known as the Voice of China.21
(U) Use public statements, including on US social media platforms, to amplify
Chinese messaging and, push back on US criticism of China’s human rights policies
and US actions that it views as anti-China.22
(U) Publish English-language media and run ads in US national, state, and local
newspapers, such as ads on the mutual benefits of US-China trade intended to
undermine support for US trade policy.23
(U) Use carrot-and-stick tactics, such as promising or withdrawing access to
Chinese markets, to try to compel US companies to refrain from identifying Taiwan
as a country.24,25 Use the China General Chamber of Commerce to enhance
cooperation between US and Chinese business communities.26,27 Cultivate and
leverage US companies to lobby against policies China opposes, and, if not
successful, threaten economic retaliation.28,29,30
(U) Leverage access to China by denying visas to scholars and students seeking
access to China for research or training purposes to compel adherence to Chinese
preferences and encourage self-censorship on sensitive issues. US think tanks and
research institutes are targets for Chinese influence activities due to their importance
in shaping US policy, media narratives, and public opinion. 31
(U) Provide funds and guidance to Chinese student associations and Confucius
Institutes in US universities.32,33,34,h

(U) China total non-government spending on foreign lobbying in the United States in 2017 totaled $16.32 million, and
governmental spending was $1.76 million.35 China between 2017 and 2018 was ranked sixth in total government and
non-government spending on foreign lobbying in the United States.36
b (U) Alibaba is a Chinese e-commerce company. Its three main sites—Taobao, Tmall, and Alibaba.com— host millions of
users, merchants, and businesses.37
c (U) ZTE is a Chinese multinational corporations specializing in telecommunications equipment and systems.38
d (U) Sinopec, or China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation, is a Beijing-based oil and gas enterprise.39
a

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(U) Dalian Wanda Group develops commercial property including commercial centers, urban pedestrian streets, hotels,
office buildings, and apartments. Dalian Wanda Group also operates tourism investment, cultural, and department store
businesses.40
f (U) Sister-Cities, also known as twin towns, are long-term partnerships between two communities from two countries,
where cultural, technical, educational, and business exchanges are made.41
g (U) US subsidiaries of foreign companies are exempt from Federal Election Commission rules on campaign contributions
to state and local elections.42
h (U) China as of late February 2019 maintained 96 Confucius Institutes in the United States. 43
e

(U) Appendix B: Facilitators of Chinese Influence in the United States
(U) Facilitators of Chinese (U) Target US Sector
Influence

(U) Description

(U) China Council for the
Promotion of Peaceful
Reunification

(U) Promotes China’s unification with Taiwan, and is subordinate to the UFWD. The
organization has 33 chapters in the United States, and is registered as the National
Association for China’s Peaceful Unification. The group mobilizes Chinese diaspora
communities in support of Beijing’s preferred policies.44

(U) Chinese Diaspora

(U) China Overseas
(U) Chinese Diaspora
Exchange Association and
China Overseas Friendship
Association

(U) Serve as nongovernmental fronts to manage “united front” activities abroad; the
Chinese Communist Party is involved in supervising these organizations.45

(U) China People’s
Association for Friendship
with Foreign Countries

(U) State and Local
Governments

(U) China uses the organization to establish sister-city relationships with US state
and local governments to increase China’s global influence.46

(U) National People’s
Congress

(U) Congress

(U) The National People’s Congress has hosted over 1,000 US congressional staff
members in China, during which it advocates for Chinese positions.47,48

(U) China General
Chamber of Commerce

(U) US Business

(U) Seeks to build favorable investment conditions for Chinese companies through
local corporate citizenship programs. The chamber of commerce maintains close
relations with China’s diplomatic missions in the United States and often coordinates
with training or “cultural exchange” companies that host tours for Chinese
delegations of experts and party members to US cities and states.49

(U) China Watch

(U) US Public

(U) Is the marketing arm of state-run, English-language newspaper China Daily. The
organization publishes paid newspaper ads in leading US newspapers, including the
New York TimesUSPER and the Washington PostUSPER, to promote Chinese narratives,
including the mutual benefits of US-China trade.50

(U)
Chinese
Student
Scholar
Association

(U) Academia

(U) China-US Exchange
Foundation

(U) Academia

(U) Frequently alert Chinese diplomatic staff about events on campuses that
offend China’s political sensitivities, and denounce those critical of Chinese policy
and governance at US universities, including guest speakers deemed opponents
of the Chinese Communist Party.51 Chinese diplomats may provide guidance to the
associations but not necessarily give direct orders. Coordination between Chinese
diplomatic officials and student association leaders, is frequently conducted over
the popular Chinese messaging app WeChat.52
(U) Located in Hong Kong, this foundation has close-ties to the CCP that sponsors
all-expenses-paid tours of China for delegations of what the foundation refers to as
“thought leaders,” including think-tank specialists. The foundation is registered
under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.53

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(U); The Diplomat; “Exploring China’s New Narrative on Democracy”; 06 DEC 2019;
https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/exploring-chinas-new-narrative-on-de..; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019.
2 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p. 2, 5; 29 NOV
2018; https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019.
3 (U); PBS Frontline; What is the China Model? Understanding the Country’s State-Led Economic Model.” 17 MAR 2019;
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/china-trade-war-trump-tariff/; Accessed on 05 DEC 2019.
4 (U) BBC; “What is the ‘One China’ Policy?”; 10 FEB 2017; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38285354;
Accessed on 05 DEC 2019.
5 (U); Brookings; “Protect the Party: China’s Growing Influence in the Developing World.”; 22 JAN 2019;
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/protect-the-party-chinas-growing-inf...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019.
6 (U); Des Moines Register; "Chinese-backed newspaper insert tries to undermine Iowa farm support for Trump, trade war;"
24 SEP 2018; https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/money/agriculture/2018/09/24/..; Accessed on 06 DEC
2019.
7 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p. 12; 29 NOV 2018;
https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019.
8 U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p. 106-107; 29 NOV
2018; https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019.
9 (U) Associated Press; “Objections blunt momentum for foreign lobbying law overhaul”; 09 OCT 2018;
https://apnews.com/18afa15dfaba415ca6eb23102d5c410b/Objections-blunt-momentum-for-foreign-lobbying-lawoverhaul; Accessed on 009 Dec 2019.
10 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p. 106-107; 29 NOV
2018; https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019.
11 (U); Politico; “Chinese companies spend big to fend off trump”; 20 JUN 2019;
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/20/trump-china-zte-huawei-lobby-1371456; Accessed on 09 Dec 2019.
12 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p 20-21, 187; 29
NOV 2018; https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019
13 (U) CGTN America; “Sister Cities: Linking communities in China and the US”; 07 APR 2017;
https://america.cgtn.com/2017/04/07/china-us-sister-cities; Accessed on 09 Dec 2019.
14 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p 20-21; 29 NOV
2018; https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019
15 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p 106-107; 29 NOV
2018; https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 201
16 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p.108; 29 NOV 2018;
https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019.
17 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p 5, 138; 29 NOV
2018; https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019.
18 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p 187-189; 29 NOV
2018; https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019.
19 (U); Christian Science Monitor; “China is ramping up its media abroad-and not just in Chinese”; 03 JUL 2019;
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2019/0703/China-is-ramping-up-its-media-abr..; Accessed on 09 Dec
2019.
20 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p 189; 29 NOV 2018;
https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019.
21 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p 82, 84; 29 NOV
2018; https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019..
22 (U); Reuters; “Move Over Trump, China’s Tweeting Diplomats Open Fresh Front in Propaganda Fight; 16 JUL 2019;
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-diplomacy-internet/move-over-..; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019;
23 (U); Des Moines Register; “Chinese-backed newspaper insert tries to undermine Iowa farm support for Trump, trade
war”; 24 SEP 2018; https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/money/agriculture/2018/09/24/...; Accessed on 09
Dec 2019.
24 (U); Forbes; “China Demands Companies Stop Calling Taiwan a Country—Here’s What They’ll Do; 17 JAN 2018;
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2018/01/17/corporations-will-quickly-comply-as-china-pressures-them-tostop-calling-taiwan-a-country/#638aa6d19bf4; Accessed on 09 Dec 2019.
25 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p 19-22, 109-111;
29 NOV 2018; https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019.
26 (U); China General Chamber of Commerce—USA; “About us”; https://www.cgccusa.org/en/about-us/; Accessed on 09
Dec 2019.
27 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p 104; 29 NOV 2018;
https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019.
28 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p 103-104, 109-110;
29 NOV 2018; https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019.
1

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(U); DNI OSC; DOW JONES INSTITUTIONAL NEWS; 24 JUN 2018; “China’s Xi Tells CEOs He’ll Strike Back at US”;
(U); WSJ; “China Warns of Corporate Casualties as Trade War Brews”; 15 JUN 2018; https://www.wsj.com/articles/tradefight-squeezes-u-s-companies-working-in-china-1529082957; Accessed on 09 Dec 2019.
31 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p 57; 29 NOV 2018;
https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019.
32 (U); Foreign Policy; “China’s Long Arm Reach into American Campuses”; 07 MAR 2019;
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/07/chinas-long-arm-reaches-into-american-campuses-ch...; Accessed on 06 DEC
2019.
33 (U); Government Accountability Office (GAO); “China: Observations on Confucius Institutional in the United States and US
Universities in China.” 28 Feb 2019; https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/697156.pdf; Accessed on 10 DEC 2019.
34 (U); US Economic and Security Review Commission; “China’s Overseas United Front Work: Background and Implications
for the United States.” p. 12; 24 AUG 2018; https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-overeseas-united-front-workbackground-and-implications-united-states; Accessed on 09 Dec 2019.
35 (U); Open Secrets; “China Total Non-Government Spending in 2017”;
https://www.opensecrets.org/fara/countries/223?cycle=2017. Accessed on 09 Dec 2019.
36 (U); Open Secrets; “Foreign interests have spent over $530 million influencing US policy, public opinion since 2017”;
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2018/08/foreign-interests-fara-lobby. Accessed on 09 Dec 2019.
37 (U); Wall Street Journal; “What is Alibaba”; https://graphics.wsj.com/alibaba; Accessed on 28 Jan 2020.
38 (U); CNN Money; “What is ZTE, and why does the US think it’s a national security threat”;
http://money.cnnn.com/2018/06/07/news/companies/what-is-zte/index.html; Accessed on 28 Jan 2020.
39 (U); Nikkei Asian Review; “China Petroleum and Chemical Corp. Company Background”;
https://asia.nikkei.com/companies/china-petroleum-chemical-corp.
40 (U); Bloomberg; “Dalian Wanda Group Co Ltd Company Profile”;
https://bloomberg.com/profile/company/0489737/D:CH; Accessed on 28 Jan 2020.
41 (U); CGTN America; “Sister Cities: Linking Communities in China and the US;
https://america.cgtn.com/2017/04/07/china-us-sister-cities. Accessed on 09 Dec 2019.
42 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p 107; 29 NOV 2018;
https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019
43 (U); Government Accountability Office (GAO); “China: Observations on Confucius Institutional in the United States and US
Universities in China.” 28 Feb 2019; https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/697156.pdf; Accessed on 10 DEC 2019.
44 (U); US Economic and Security Review Commission; “China’s Overseas United Front Work: Background and Implications
for the United States.” p. 9; 24 AUG 2018; https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-overeseas-united-front-workbackground-and-implications-united-states; Accessed on 09 Dec 2019.
45 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p. 30, 36; 29 NOV
2018; https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019.
46 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p. 20, 166; 29 NOV
2018; https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019.
47 (U); BBC News; “How China is Ruled: National People’s Congress”; 8 OCT 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asiapacific-13908155. Accessed on 14 JAN 2020.
48 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p. 13; 29 NOV 2018;
https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019.
49 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p. 22-23; 29 NOV
2018; https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019
50 (U) Des Moines Register; “Chinese-backed newspaper insert tries to undermine Iowa farm support for Trump, trade war”;
24 SEP 2018; https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/money/agriculture/2018/09/24/...; Accessed on 09 Dec
2019.
51 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p. 43-44; 29 NOV
2018; https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019.
52 (U); Foreign Policy; “China’s Long Arm Reach into American Campuses”; 07 MAR 2019;
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/07/chinas-long-arm-reaches-into-american-campuses-ch...; Accessed on 06 DEC
2019.
53 (U); Hoover Institution; “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance”; p. 45-46; 29 NOV
2018; https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-pr...; Accessed on 06 DEC 2019.
29
30

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Product Title: (U//FOUO) Overt Chinese Influence Targeting the Homeland
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IA-37174-20

REV: 01 August 2017