IN RE: PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT
ASSOCIATION OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK
Court of Appeals of New York.
IN RE: PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK, INC., Appellant, v. NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD et al., Respondents.
IN RE: Town of Orangetown et al., Respondents, v. Orangetown Policemen's
Benevolent Association et al., Appellants.
Decided: March 28, 2006
Kaye Scholer LLP, New York City (Peter M. Fishbein, Jay W. Waks, John D. Geelan and
Christine A. Neagle of counsel), Gleason, Dunn, Walsh & O'Shea, Albany (Ronald G. Dunn of
counsel), and Office of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of City of New York, Inc.
General Counsel, New York City (Michael T. Murray of counsel), for appellant in the first aboveentitled proceeding. Sandra M. Nathan, Albany, and William L. Busler for New York State Public
Employment Relations Board, respondent in the first above-entitled proceeding. Michael A.
Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Edward F.X. Hart, Leonard Koerner and Spencer
Fisher of counsel), for City of New York, respondent in the first above-entitled proceeding.
Donna M.C. Giliberto, Albany, for New York State Conference of Mayors and Municipal
Officials, amicus curiae in the first above-entitled proceeding. Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler,
LLP, New York City (Anthony P. Coles and Walter M. Luers of counsel), for Sergeants
Benevolent Association of the City of New York, amicus curiae in the first above-entitled
proceeding. Certilman Balin Adler & Hyman, LLP, East Meadow (Wayne J. Schaefer and
Michael C. Axelrod of counsel), for Police Benevolent Association of the New York State
Troopers, Inc. and another, amici curiae in the first above-entitled proceeding. Bunyan &
Baumgartner, LLP, Blauvelt (Joseph P. Baumgartner and Richard P. Bunyan of counsel), for
appellants in the second above-entitled proceeding. Keane & Beane, P.C., White Plains (Lance
H. Klein and Edward J. Phillips of counsel), for respondents in the second above-entitled
proceeding. Donna M.C. Giliberto, Albany, for New York State Conference of Mayors and
Municipal Officials, amicus curiae in the second above-entitled proceeding.
 OPINION OF THE COURT

1

  We hold that police discipline may not be a subject of collective bargaining under the Taylor
Law when the Legislature has expressly committed disciplinary authority over a police
department to local officials.
Facts and Procedural History
Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Pub. Empl.
Relations Bd.
The Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York (N.Y.CPBA) seeks to annul a
decision by the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) that the City need not bargain with
the NYCPBA over five subjects, even though those subjects had been dealt with in an expired
collective bargaining agreement.   The expired agreement had provided:  (1) that police officers
being questioned in a departmental investigation would have up to four hours to confer with
counsel;  (2) that certain guidelines for interrogation of police officers would remain unchanged;
 (3) that a “joint subcommittee” would “develop procedures” to assure the timely resolution of
disciplinary charges;  (4) that a pilot program would be established to refer disciplinary matters
to an agency outside the police department;  and (5) that employees charged but not found guilty
could petition to have the records of disciplinary proceedings expunged.   PERB found that all
these provisions concerned “prohibited subjects of bargaining.”
Supreme Court upheld PERB's decision on the ground that the New York City Charter and
Administrative Code, as interpreted in Matter of City of New York v. MacDonald, 201 A.D.2d
258, 259, 607 N.Y.S.2d 24 [1st Dept.1994], required that the discipline of New York City police
officers be left to the discretion of the Police Commissioner.   The Appellate Division affirmed,
as do we.
 Matter of Town of Orangetown v Orangetown Policemen's Benevolent Assn.
The Town of Orangetown and its Town Board brought this proceeding against the Orangetown
Policemen's Benevolent Association (Orangetown PBA) and a police officer, seeking to stay
arbitration of a dispute between the Town and the officer over a disciplinary issue.   The
Orangetown PBA and the officer had sought arbitration pursuant to article 15 of the collective
bargaining agreement between the Town and the union, which prescribed detailed procedures,
culminating in an arbitration, for any “dispute concerning the discipline or discharge” of an
Orangetown police officer.   Supreme Court granted the application to stay arbitration.   Relying
on Matter of Rockland County Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. v. Town of Clarkstown, 149 A.D.2d
516, 539 N.Y.S.2d 993 [2d Dept.1989] and Matter of Town of Greenburgh (Police Assn. of Town
of Greenburgh ), 94 A.D.2d 771, 772, 462 N.Y.S.2d 718 [2d Dept.1983], Supreme Court held
that article 15 is invalid under the Rockland County Police Act, because that act commits police
discipline to the discretion of local authorities.   The Appellate Division affirmed.
The specific issue that gave rise to this case is now moot, because the Town and the officer have
settled their differences, but the Town and the Orangetown PBA continue to disagree about
article 15's validity, and both sides have asked us to decide that question.   We therefore convert

2

 the proceeding to a declaratory judgment action and declare that, as the courts below held, article
15 is invalid.
Discussion
We confront, not for the first time, a tension between the “strong and sweeping policy of the
State to support collective bargaining under the Taylor Law” (Matter of Cohoes City School Dist.
v. Cohoes Teachers Assn., 40 N.Y.2d 774, 778, 390 N.Y.S.2d 53, 358 N.E.2d 878 [1976] ) and a
competing policy-here, the policy favoring strong disciplinary authority for those in charge of
police forces.   We have held that the policy of the Taylor Law prevails, and collective
bargaining is required, where no legislation specifically commits police discipline to the
discretion of local officials (Matter of Auburn Police Local 195, Council 82, Am. Fedn. of State,
County & Mun. Empls., AFL-CIO v. Helsby, 46 N.Y.2d 1034, 416 N.Y.S.2d 586, 389 N.E.2d
1106 [1979], affg. for reasons stated below 62 A.D.2d 12, 404 N.Y.S.2d 396 [3d Dept.1978] ).  
Since Auburn was decided, however, the First, Second and Third departments of the Appellate
Division have held that, where such legislation  is in force, the policy favoring control over the
police prevails, and collective bargaining over disciplinary matters is prohibited (MacDonald,
201 A.D.2d at 259, 607 N.Y.S.2d 24;  Rockland County Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn., 149
A.D.2d at 517, 539 N.Y.S.2d 993;  Town of Greenburgh, 94 A.D.2d at 771-772, 462 N.Y.S.2d
718;  Matter of City of Mount Vernon v. Cuevas, 289 A.D.2d 674, 675-676, 733 N.Y.S.2d 793
[3d Dept.2001] ).   We decide today that these Appellate Division holdings were correct.
The Taylor Law (Civil Service Law art. 14) requires collective bargaining over all “terms and
conditions of employment”:
“Where an employee organization has been certified or recognized ․ the appropriate public
employer shall be, and hereby is, required to negotiate collectively with such employee
organization in the determination of, and administration of grievances arising under, the terms
and conditions of employment of the public employees” (Civil Service Law § 204[2] ).
We have often stressed the importance of this policy, and have made clear that “the presumption
․ that all terms and conditions of employment are subject to mandatory bargaining” cannot easily
be overcome (Matter of City of Watertown v. State of N.Y. Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 95 N.Y.2d
73, 79, 711 N.Y.S.2d 99, 733 N.E.2d 171 [2000];  see also, e.g., Matter of Board of Educ. of City
School Dist. of City of N.Y. v. New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 75 N.Y.2d 660, 667668, 555 N.Y.S.2d 659, 554 N.E.2d 1247 [1990];  Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No.
3 of Town of Huntington v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, 30 N.Y.2d 122, 129, 331
N.Y.S.2d 17, 282 N.E.2d 109 [1972] ).
On the other hand, we have held that some subjects are excluded from collective bargaining as a
matter of policy, even where no statute explicitly says so.   Thus, we have held that local boards
of education may not surrender, in collective bargaining agreements, their ultimate responsibility
for deciding on teacher tenure (Cohoes, 40 N.Y.2d at 778, 390 N.Y.S.2d 53, 358 N.E.2d 878), or
their right to inspect teachers' personnel files (Board of Educ., Great Neck Union Free School
Dist. v. Areman, 41 N.Y.2d 527, 394 N.Y.S.2d 143, 362 N.E.2d 943 [1977] ).   We have held that
a police department may not be required to bargain over the imposition of certain requirements
3

 on officers receiving benefits following injuries in the line of duty (Matter of Schenectady Police
Benevolent Assn. v. New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 85 N.Y.2d 480, 483, 626
N.Y.S.2d 715, 650 N.E.2d 373 [1995] ), and that a city may not surrender, in collective
bargaining, its statutory right to choose among police officers seeking promotion (Matter of
Buffalo Police Benevolent Assn. [City of Buffalo], 4 N.Y.3d 660, 797 N.Y.S.2d 410, 830 N.E.2d
308  [2005] ).   And we have held that public policy bars enforcement of a provision in a
collective bargaining agreement that would limit the power of the New York City Department of
Investigation to interrogate city employees in a criminal investigation (Matter of City of New
York v. Uniformed Fire Officers Assn., Local 854, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 95 N.Y.2d 273, 716
N.Y.S.2d 353, 739 N.E.2d 719 [2000] ).
 In none of these cases did a statute exclude a subject from collective bargaining in so many
words.   In each case, however, we found a public policy strong enough to warrant such an
exclusion.   As we explained in Cohoes, the scope of collective bargaining may be limited by
“ ‘plain and clear, rather than express, prohibitions in the statute or decisional law’ ” or “in some
instances[,] by ‘[p]ublic policy ․ whether explicit or implicit in statute or decisional law, or in
neither’ ” (40 N.Y.2d at 778, 390 N.Y.S.2d 53, 358 N.E.2d 878, quoting Syracuse Teachers Assn.
v. Board of Educ., Syracuse City School Dist., 35 N.Y.2d 743, 744, 361 N.Y.S.2d 912, 320
N.E.2d 646 [1974], and Matter of Susquehanna Val. Cent. School Dist. at Conklin [Susquehanna
Val. Teachers' Assn.], 37 N.Y.2d 614, 616-617, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427, 339 N.E.2d 132 [1975] ).
Is there a public policy strong enough to justify excluding police discipline from collective
bargaining?   It might be thought this question could be answered yes or no, but the relevant
statutes and case law are not so simple.   In general, the procedures for disciplining public
employees, including police officers, are governed by Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76, which
provide for a hearing and an appeal.   In Auburn, a case involving police discipline, the
Appellate Division rejected the argument that these statutes should be interpreted to prohibit
collective bargaining agreements “that would supplement, modify or replace” their provisions
(62 A.D.2d at 15, 404 N.Y.S.2d 396), and we adopted the Appellate Division's opinion (46
N.Y.2d at 1035-1036, 416 N.Y.S.2d 586, 389 N.E.2d 1106).   Thus, where Civil Service Law
§§ 75 and 76 apply, police discipline may be the subject of collective bargaining.
But Civil Service Law § 76(4) says that sections 75 and 76 shall not “be construed to repeal or
modify” preexisting laws, and among the laws thus grandfathered are several that, in contrast to
sections 75 and 76, provide expressly for the control of police discipline by local officials in
certain communities.   Such laws are applicable in the City of New York and in the Town of
Orangetown, and are at the center of these two cases.
Section 434(a) of the New York City Charter provides:  “The [police] commissioner shall have
cognizance and control of the government, administration, disposition and discipline of the  
department, and of the police force of the department” (emphasis added).  New York City
Administrative Code § 14-115(a) provides that, in cases of police misconduct:  “The
commissioner shall have power, in his or her discretion, ․ to punish the offending party.”  
Though these two provisions are now New York City legislation, both were originally enacted as
state statutes;  the Charter provision was adopted by the State Legislature in 1897 (L. 1897, ch.
378, enacting N.Y. City Charter § 271), and the Code provision in 1873 (L. 1873, ch. 335, §§ 
4

 41, 55).   Thus, they reflect the policy of the State that police discipline in New York City is
subject to the Commissioner's authority.
The Legislature has provided similarly for the discipline of town and village police forces,
including those in Rockland County, where Orangetown is located.   Section 7 of the Rockland
County Police Act (L. 1936, ch. 526), similar in its wording to more general statutes, Town Law
§ 155 and Village Law § 8-804, provides in part:
“The town board shall have the power and authority to adopt and make rules and regulations for
the examination, hearing, investigation and determination of charges, made or preferred against
any member or members of such police department.   Except as otherwise provided by law, no
member or members of such police department shall be fined, reprimanded, removed or
dismissed until written charges shall have been examined, heard and investigated in such manner
or by such procedure, practice, examination and investigation as the board, by rules and
regulations from time to time, may prescribe.”
Thus, the Legislature has committed police discipline in Orangetown to the “power and
authority” of the Orangetown Town Board.
Appellate Division cases-one of which we have referred to favorably-have consistently held that
legislation of this kind overcomes the presumption in favor of collective bargaining where police
discipline is concerned.   Thus, in 1983 the Appellate Division, Second Department held that
police discipline in the Town of Greenburgh was not subject to collective bargaining;  it
distinguished Auburn on the ground that discipline in Greenburgh was committed to the
authority of the Town Board or Board of Police Commissioners by the Westchester County  
Police Act (Town of Greenburgh, 94 A.D.2d at 771-772, 462 N.Y.S.2d 718).   In 1989, the same
Court reached a similar conclusion under the Rockland County Police Act, one of the laws at
issue here (Rockland County Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn., 149 A.D.2d at 517, 539 N.Y.S.2d
993).   In 1994, the Appellate Division, First Department held that the other laws at issue heresection 434 of the New York City Charter and section 14-115 of the New York City
Administrative Code-excluded police discipline in New York City from collective bargaining.  
The Court held that the legislation “discloses a legislative intent and public policy to leave the
disciplining of police officers ․ to the discretion of the Police Commissioner” (MacDonald, 201
A.D.2d at 259, 607 N.Y.S.2d 24).   We quoted these words with approval in Matter of Montella
v. Bratton, 93 N.Y.2d 424, 430, 691 N.Y.S.2d 372, 713 N.E.2d 406 [1999] where we held, in a
case not involving collective bargaining, that police discipline in New York City is not subject to
the procedures prescribed in Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76.   Finally, in 2001, the Appellate
Division, Third Department, endorsed the decisions of the First and Second Departments in
Town of Greenburgh, Rockland County Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. and MacDonald, holding
that the Charter of the City of Mount Vernon, like the legislation involved in the other Appellate
Division cases, removed police disciplinary procedures from the scope of collective bargaining
(Mount Vernon, 289 A.D.2d at 675-676, 733 N.Y.S.2d 793).
The NYCPBA and the Orangetown PBA argue that this line of Appellate Division cases is
wrong.   In this they are supported by PERB, which, although it is bound by and has followed
the Appellate Division decisions, now urges us to reject them.   This is not a case, however, in
5

 which we defer to PERB's judgment.   The primary issue here is not the application of the Taylor
Law to particular facts, an area in which PERB is entitled to deference (Matter of Poughkeepsie
Professional Firefighters' Assn., Local 596, IAFF, AFL-CIO-CLC v. New York State Pub. Empl.
Relations Bd., 6 N.Y.3d 514, 814 N.Y.S.2d 572, 847 N.E.2d 1146 [2006] [decided today];  Matter
of West Irondequoit Teachers Assn. v. Helsby, 35 N.Y.2d 46, 50-51, 358 N.Y.S.2d 720, 315
N.E.2d 775 [1974] ), but the relative weight to be given to competing policies, including those
reflected in the New York City Charter, the New York City Administrative Code, and the
Rockland County Police Act-legislation not within PERB's area of expertise (see Schenectady
Police Benevolent Assn., 85 N.Y.2d at 485, 626 N.Y.S.2d 715, 650 N.E.2d 373).   We think the
Appellate Division decisions evaluated these policies correctly.
While the Taylor Law policy favoring collective bargaining is a strong one, so is the policy
favoring the authority of public officials over the police.   As long ago as 1888, we emphasized
the quasi-military nature of a police force, and said that “a question pertaining solely to the
general government and discipline of the force ․ must, from the nature of things, rest wholly in
the discretion of the commissioners” (People ex rel. Masterson v. French, 110 N.Y. 494, 499, 18
N.E. 133 [1888] ).   This sweeping statement must be qualified today;  as Auburn demonstrates,
the need for authority over police officers will sometimes yield to the claims of collective
bargaining.   But the public interest in preserving official authority over the police remains
powerful.   It was the basis for our holding, only last June, that the statutory right of a police
commissioner to select “an officer to fill a position important to the safety of the community”
may not be surrendered in a collective bargaining agreement (Buffalo Police Benevolent Assn., 4
N.Y.3d at 664, 797 N.Y.S.2d 410, 830 N.E.2d 308).   The same policy has determined the result
of other cases, including Matter of Silverman v. McGuire, 51 N.Y.2d 228, 231-232, 433 N.Y.S.2d
1002, 414 N.E.2d 383 [1980], where we rejected a resolution of a police disciplinary proceeding
negotiated by a subordinate official, in light of “the sensitive nature of the work of the police
department and the importance of maintaining both discipline and morale.”
 The New York City Charter and Administrative Code, and the Rockland County Police Act,
state the policy favoring management authority over police disciplinary matters in clear terms.  
In New York City, the police commissioner “shall have cognizance and control of the ․ discipline
of the department” (N.Y. City Charter § 434[a] ) and “shall have power, in his or her
discretion[,] ․ to punish [an] offending party” (Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 14115[a] ).   In Rockland County, the town board “shall have the power and authority to adopt and
make rules and regulations for the examination, hearing, investigation and determination of
charges, made or preferred against any member or members of such police department”
(Rockland County Police Act § 7).   These legislative commands are to be obeyed even where
the result is to limit the scope of collective bargaining. The issue is not, as the unions argue,
whether these enactments were intended by their authors to create an exception to the Taylor
Law;  obviously they were not, since they were passed decades before the Taylor Law existed.  
The issue is whether these enactments express a policy so important that the policy favoring
collective bargaining should give way, and we conclude that they do.
Accordingly, in Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York State
Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.   In
Matter of Town of Orangetown v Orangetown Policemen's Benevolent Assn., the proceeding
6

 should be converted to a declaratory judgment action, and the order of the Appellate Division
modified to declare that article 15 of the collective bargaining agreement is invalid, and the order
should otherwise be affirmed, with costs to the Town of Orangetown and the Town Board of the
Town of Orangetown.
In Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Pub. Empl.
Relations Bd.:  Order affirmed, with costs.
In Matter of Town of Orangetown v Orangetown Policemen's Benevolent Assn.:  Order
modified, etc.
R.S. SMITH, J.
Judges G.B. SMITH, CIPARICK, ROSENBLATT, GRAFFEO and READ concur. Chief Judge
KAYE taking no part.

Copyright © 2020, Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.

City of Schenectady v. New York State
Public Employment Relations Board
Annotate this Case
Justia Opinion Summary

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division, granted the petition
of the City of Schenecatdy, and annulled the determination of the New York State Public
Employment Relations Board, which determined that the City committed an improper
employer practice by enacting General Order 0-43. The general order adopted new
police disciplinary procedures that differed from those contained in the parties’ expired
collective bargaining agreement. Supreme Court dismissed the City’s petition,
concluding that N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law 14 (the Taylor Law) superseded the provisions of the
Second Class Cities Law regarding police discipline. The Appellate Division affirmed.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the lower courts, holding that the relevant
provisions of the Second Class Cities Law were not superseded by the enactment of the
7

 Taylor Law, and therefore, police discipline is a prohibited subject of bargaining in the
City of Schenectady.
Read more
Matter of City of Schenectady v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd. 2017 NY Slip Op
07210 Decided on October 17, 2017 Court of Appeals Wilson, J. Published by New York State
Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject
to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
Decided on October 17, 2017
No. 93
[*1]In the Matter of City of Schenectady, Appellant,
v
New York State Public Employment Relations Board et al., Respondents.

Christopher Langlois, for appellant.
David P. Quinn, for respondent New York State Public Employment Relations Board.
Michael P. Ravalli, for respondent Schenectady Police Benevolent Association.

WILSON, J.:

The City of Schenectady brought this CPLR article 78 proceeding to review a
determination of the New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB).
PERB determined that the City committed an improper employer practice by enacting
General Order 0-43, which adopted new police disciplinary procedures different from
those contained in the [*2]parties' expired collective bargaining agreement. Supreme
Court confirmed the determination and dismissed the City's petition, concluding that
article 14 of the Civil Service Law (hereinafter the Taylor Law) superseded the
provisions of the Second Class Cities Law regarding police discipline. The Appellate
Division affirmed (136 AD3d 1086 [3d Dept 2016]). This case is controlled by our prior
decisions in Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York
State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd. (6 NY3d 563 [2006]) and Matter of Town of Wallkill v
Civil Servs. Empls. Assn., Inc. (19 NY3d 1066 [2012]), which held that the statutory
grants of local control over police discipline in New York City and Wallkill —
substantively similar to the statutory provisions relevant here
8

 rendered discipline a prohibited subject for collective bargaining.
I.

Before 1894, the Constitution required specific state legislation to charter a city or to
amend a city's charter. As a result of the Constitutional Convention of 1894, the
Constitution was amended to designate cities by population as cities of the first, second
and third classes. The legislature enacted general laws applicable to each of the three
classes, and the Constitution prevented the legislature from changing those laws unless
the change affected all cities within a class.
In 1906, the Legislature enacted the Second Class Cities Law, which provided a
standard charter for all cities of the second class. The parties agree that Schenectady
was, and still is, a city of the second class. The Second Class Cities Law contains
detailed provisions governing the procedures for police discipline. For example, "[t]he
commissioner of public safety shall have cognizance, jurisdiction, supervision and
control of the government, administration, disposition and discipline of the police
department" (Second Class Cities Law § 131). In addition, the commissioner:
"is authorized and empowered to make, adopt, promulgate and enforce reasonable
rules, orders and regulations for the . . . discipline . . . of [police] officers. . . , and for the
hearing, examination, investigation, trial and determination of charges made or
prepared against any officer . . . and may, in his discretion, punish any such officer or
member found guilty thereof; but no officer . . . shall be removed or otherwise punished
for any other cause, nor until specific charges in writing have been preferred against
and served upon him, and he shall have been found guilty thereof, after reasonable
notice and upon due trial before said commissioner"
(id. § 133; see also id. §§ 135, 137).
The Taylor Law, which went into effect in 1967, states, "[w]here an employee
organization has been certified or recognized . . . the appropriate public employer shall
be, and hereby is, required to negotiate collectively with such employee organization in
the determination of, and administration of grievances arising under, the terms and
conditions of employment of [*3]the public employees" (Civil Service Law § 204 [2]). As
we have recognized, the Taylor Law represents a "strong and sweeping policy of the
State to support collective bargaining" (see Cohoes City Sch. Dist. v Cohoes Teachers
Ass'n, 40 NY2d 774, 778 [1976]).
II.

Schenectady asks us to reverse the holding of the Appellate Division that the relevant
provisions of the Second Class Cities Law were superseded by the enactment of the
Taylor Law, and thus collective bargaining applies to police discipline in Schenectady.
This is not the first time we have addressed the effect of the Taylor Law on police
disciplinary procedures. In Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn., we determined that
9

 although Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76 generally govern police disciplinary
procedures, preexisting laws that expressly provide for control of police discipline were
"grandfathered" under Civil Service Law 76 (4), which provides that nothing in sections
75 and 76 "shall be construed to repeal or modify any general, special or local" laws or
charters (6 NY3d at 573). We then confronted "[the] tension between the strong and
sweeping policy of the State to support collective bargaining under the Taylor Law . . .
and a competing policy — here, the policy favoring strong disciplinary authority for those
in charge of police forces" (id. at 571). There, we held that the policy favoring collective
bargaining must give way, and police discipline was a prohibited subject of bargaining
(id. at 576). We harmonized that result with Matter of Auburn Police Local 195, Council
82, Am. Fedn. of State, County & Mun. Empls., AFL-CIO v Helsby (62 AD2d 12 [3d Dept
1978], affd for reasons stated below 46 NY2d 1034 [1979]), by noting that the Taylor
Law prevails where "no legislation specifically commits police discipline to the discretion
of local officials" (6 NY3d at 571). However, "where such legislation is in force, the policy
favoring control over the police prevails, and collective bargaining over disciplinary
matters is prohibited" (id. at 572). In Matter of Town of Wallkill, we extended Matter of
Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. to a local law regarding police discipline, where the local
law was adopted pursuant to authority granted by Town Law § 155, itself a general law
enacted prior to Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76 (19 NY3d at 1069).
The specific commitments of police discipline in Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn.
and Matter of Town of Wallkill resolve the question at issue here: "Is there a public policy
strong enough to justify excluding police discipline from collective bargaining?" (6 NY3d
at 573). In Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn., we answered in the affirmative
where the New York City Charter and Administrative Code gave the police
commissioner "cognizance and control over the . . . discipline of the department" and
the authority "to punish [an] offending party" (id. at 573-574). In Matter of Town of
Wallkill, we found Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. dispositive where the Town
Law committed to the Town "the power and authority to adopt and make rules and
regulations for the examination, hearing, investigation and determination of charges,
made or preferred against any member of members of such police [*4]department," and
where Wallkill had enacted a local law vesting disciplinary power with the Town Board
(19 NY3d at 1066). In the present case, the Second Class Cities Law, enacted prior to
Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76, specifically commits police discipline to the
commissioner and details the relevant procedures, as described above [FN1]. The
Taylor Law's general command regarding collective bargaining is not sufficient to
displace the more specific authority granted by the Second Class Cities Law. Thus, our
decisions in Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. and Matter of Town of Wallkill
control, and police discipline is a prohibited subject of bargaining in Schenectady.
PERB attempts to distinguish the present case by noting that section 4 of the Second
Class Cities Law contains a supersession clause, which states that a provision applies
"until such provision is superseded pursuant to the municipal home rule law, was
superseded pursuant to the former city home rule law or is or was otherwise changed,
repealed or superseded pursuant to law." PERB reads the supersession clause as
evidencing the legislature's "statutorily planned obsolescence" for the Second Class
10

 Cities Law. The Appellate Division distinguished Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn.
and Matter of Town of Wallkill on that same basis (City of Schenectady v New York
State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 136 AD3d 1086, 1089 [3rd Dept 2016]). However, we
reject the notion that the supersession clause demonstrates the legislature's intent that
the Second Class Cities Law was expected to be ephemeral. The Second Class Cities
Law's supersession clause does nothing more than affirm that the Second Class Cities
Law was intended to remain in force unless it is changed or repealed pursuant to law,
and does not distinguish the present case from Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn.
and Matter of Town of Wallkill [FN2]. Indeed, article IX, § 3 (b) of the New York State
Constitution contains the identical [*5]language: "The provisions of this article shall not
affect any existing valid provisions of acts of the legislature or of local legislation and
such provisions shall continue in force until repealed, amended, modified or superseded
in accordance with the provisions of this constitution."
The Second Class Cities Law has not been expressly repealed or superseded by the
legislature nor was it implicitly repealed by the enactment of the Taylor Law in 1967.
"The repeal of a statute by implication is not favored by law, for when the legislature
intends to repeal an act it usually says so expressly" (Matter of Tiffany, 179 NY 455, 457
[1904]; see Alweis v Evans, 69 NY2d 199, 204 [1987]). "Generally, a statute is deemed
impliedly repealed by another statute only if the two are in such conflict that it is
impossible to give some effect to both. If a reasonable field of operation can be found
for each statute, that construction should be adopted" (Alweis, 69 NY2d at 204). The
Second Class Cities Law and the Taylor Law are not irreconcilable. Article 9 of the
Second Class Cities Law governs disciplinary procedures for police officers in cities of
the second class, whereas the Taylor Law generally requires public employers to
negotiate but does not specifically require police disciplinary procedures to be a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining. There is no express statutory conflict
between the two laws; the only conflict is in the policies that they represent, and this
Court has already resolved that policy conflict in favor of local control over police
discipline (see Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn., 6 NY3d at 573; Matter of Town
of Wallkill, 19 NY3d at 1069).
III.

Respondents' additional arguments are also unpersuasive. The Schenectady
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association argues that Schenectady's own course of dealing
proves that the Civil Service Law -- rather than the Second Class Cities Law -- applies
to police discipline, and that because of Schenectady's position in previous
proceedings, Schenectady should be judicially estopped from arguing that the Civil
Service Law does not apply. However, the proceedings and "course of dealing"
referenced all took place prior to 2006, when we decided Matter of Patrolmen's
Benevolent Assn. As Schenectady notes, "[d]uring that period of time, the City and the
PBA . . . were operating under the belief -- albeit, a mistaken belief -- that the City could
lawfully negotiate" and enter into agreements that modified the Second Class Cities Law
by incorporating provisions of the Civil Service Law. In fact, it was shortly after our
decision in Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. that Schenectady changed course
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 and issued a press [*6]release on June 4, 2007, announcing that the "disciplinary action
process within the police department [would] undergo a significant change effective
immediately."
PERB argues that an amendment to the Civil Service Law regarding state troopers
supports its interpretation. In 2001, the legislature amended Civil Service Law § 209 (4)
(e) to delete the exclusion for collective bargaining of disciplinary procedures regarding
state troopers. The supporting memorandum states: "Local police officers and
Firefighters currently are afforded full binding arbitration (i.e. compensatory and noncompensatory issues are subject to binding arbitration). The legislation would simply
grant State Police Officers equal treatment with respect to their local counterparts" (L.
2001, c 587, Memorandum in Support of Bill No. A. 8589). The 2001 amendment does
not alter our conclusion, because it has no bearing on what the legislative intent was in
1906 (when the legislature passed the Second Class Cities Law) or 1967 (when the
legislature adopted the Taylor Law). Moreover, the statement that state troopers would
be given "equal treatment to their local counterparts" provides no guidance here,
because it is quite clear, from the different results in Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent
Assn., Matter of Town of Wallkill, and Matter of Auburn Police, that some local
counterparts have the right to bargain about police discipline, and some do not.
Respondents' remaining arguments are not properly before us (see Matter of Scherbyn
v Wayne-Finger Lakes Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 77 NY2d 753, 758 [1991]).
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, the
petition granted and the determination of respondent New York State Public
Employment Relations Board annulled.
*****************
Order reversed, with costs, petition granted and determination of respondent New York
State Public Employment Relations Board annulled. Opinion by Judge Wilson. Chief
Judge DiFiore and Judges Rivera, Stein, Fahey, Garcia and Feinman concur.
Decided October 17, 2017
Footnotes
Footnote 1: Subsequent changes to Schenectady's form of government have eliminated the
office of the commissioner and transferred that office's powers and responsibilities to others,
which is irrelevant for the purpose of our decision in this case.
Footnote 2: Certain of the laws at issue in those cases included similar language. Section 7 of
the Rockland County Police Act, considered in Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn.,
authorized town boards in Rockland County to hear and determine disciplinary charges against
members of the police department in accordance with its own rules and regulations "[e]xcept as
otherwise provided by law." Similarly, Town Law § 155, considered by this Court in Matter of
Town of Wallkill, provided for the discipline of town police officers in accordance with rules and
regulations prescribed by the town board, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law." Although we
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 did not address that language in either case, the existence of such language did not alter the
outcome. There is no significant distinction between the phrase "except as otherwise provided
by law" and the phrase "changed, repealed[,] or superseded pursuant to law" contained in
Second Class Cities Law § 4 that would justify a different result here.

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