Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 1090-4 Filed 07/30/20 Page 1 of 29

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

--------------------------------------------------X

Plaintiff,
v.
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
Defendant.

.............................................
..

VIRGINIA L. GIUFFRE,

15-cv-07433-RWS

--------------------------------------------------X

MOTION TO COMPEL ALL ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS AND
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
PLACED AT ISSUE BY PLAINTIFF AND HER ATTORNEYS

Laura A. Menninger
Jeffrey S. Pagliuca
HADDON, MORGAN, AND FOREMAN, P.C.
East 10th Avenue
Denver, CO 80203
303.831.7364

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................... ii
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERRAL ............................................................................................ 1
INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................... 1
BACKGROUND FACTS RELEVANT TO DISPUTE ................................................................. 2
1. Correspondence re: Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 v. United States.................................... 2
2. Correspondence re: Giuffre v. Maxwell, 15-cv-07433-RWS .............................................. 2
3. Correspondence re: Bradley Edwards and Paul Cassell v. Alan Dershowitz ...................... 3
4. Correspondence re: Jane Doe No. 102 v. Jeffrey Epstein.................................................... 3
5. Categorical Entry re: correspondence potential legal action against entities and individuals
3
I.

The Attorney-Client and Work Product Privilege Standards and Limitations ............. 7
a. The Attorney-Client Privilege .............................................................................................. 7
b. Work Product Privilege ....................................................................................................... 7

II.

Plaintiff and her Attorneys Waived Attorney-Client and Work Product Privileges by
Putting Plaintiff’s Representation At Issue in the Dershowitz Case ............................... 8

a. Plaintiff’s Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege ........................................................... 10
b. Edwards and Cassell’s Waivers of Attorney-Client and Work Product Privilege in the
Dershowitz Case ............................................................................................................ 15
c.

The elements for finding an at issue waiver are satisfied .................................................. 18

III. There is No Privilege as to Communications with Scarola ............................................ 22
a. There is no Attorney-Client Relationship .......................................................................... 22
b. Work Product Privilege has been Waived ......................................................................... 23
c.

There is no basis to claim common interest or joint defense privilege .............................. 23

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 24
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................................... 25

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 210 F.R.D. 506, 509-10 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) ........................................................................................................................................... 9
Bowne of New York City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ....... 15, 21
Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) .......................... 8
Chevron Corp. v. Salazar, 275 F.R.D. 437, 445-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) .......................................... 10
Chin v. Rogoff & Co., P.C., No. 05 CIV. 8360(NRB), 2008 WL 2073934, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May
8, 2008) ..................................................................................................................................... 21
Drimmer v. Appleton, 628 F.Supp. 1249, 1252 (S.D.N.Y.1986) .................................................. 20

In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir.) ..................................................................................... 20
In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d . ..................................................................................................... 15, 20
In re. Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993) …………………………………….9
Koumoulis v. Indep. Fin. Mktg. Grp., Inc., 295 F.R.D. 28, 39-40 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). ..................... 9
McGrath v. Nassau Cty. Health Care Corp., 204 F.R.D. 240, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) .............. 9, 22
Schaeffler v. United States, 806 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir.2015)………………………………..........16
S.E.C. v. Yorkville Advisors, LLC, 300 F.R.D. 152, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ................................... 25
United States ex rel Edney v. Smith, 425 F.Supp. 1038, 1052 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) .......................... 20
United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir.1991 ................................................. 9, 15
United States v. Mejia, 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011) .............................................................. 8

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United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975). ....................................................................... 9
United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1997) ............................................................ 15
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) ................................................................. 8
Urban Box Office Network, Inc. v. Interfase Managers, L.P., No. 01 Civ. 8854, 2004 WL
2375819, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2004) ............................................................................. 10
Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 304 F.R.D. 384, 391 (S.D.N.Y.2015) ......................................... 8, 24

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Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell (“Ms. Maxwell”) files this Motion to Compel All
Attorney-Client Communications and Attorney Work Product Placed At Issue By Plaintiff and
Her Attorneys (“Motion”), and as grounds therefore states as follows:
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERRAL
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(1), undersigned counsel certifies that
she conferred with opposing counsel regarding the issues contained herein and was unable to
resolve the matter.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and her attorneys have tied a Gordian knot of overlapping litigations, client
representations and joint defense agreements. Through these multiple litigations and
representations, they attempt to strategically leverage attorney-client communications and
attorney work product to their tactical advantage by selectively disclosing information.
Simultaneously, they desperately seek to avoid disclosure of related materials they know are
unfavorable, would destroy Plaintiff’s claim that she has been truthful, and reveal her attorneys’
knowledge of Plaintiff’s false statements in multiple sworn filings and her concerted media
campaign. The law, however, does not permit such a manipulation of the attorney-client and
work product privileges. Rather, the selective disclosure of privileged materials results in a
waiver of privilege as to all such material. This waiver is broad-sweeping when, as here, the
persons asserting the privileges have affirmatively put the subject matter of the materials at issue.
In the most recent of their serial litigations (apart from this case), Plaintiff’s own
attorneys Bradley Edwards (“Edwards) and Paul Cassell (“Cassell”) sued Harvard Law Professor
Alan Dershowitz (“Dershowitz”) for defamation in Florida state court. The subject matter of that
litigation concerned whether Mr. Dershowitz defamed Plaintiff’s attorneys by claiming
a) Plaintiff is lying; b) Edwards and Cassell knew Plaintiff is lying; c) Edwards and Cassell helped

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Plaintiff lie and helped her concoct her stories; d) Edwards and Cassell failed to properly
investigate Plaintiff’s allegations before filing pleadings and sworn statements on Plaintiff’s
behalf; and e) Edwards and Cassell were motivated to take these actions by a desire to achieve
personal economic gain. This litigation put at issue all communications between Plaintiff and
her attorneys as well as her attorneys’ complete work product in the investigations of Plaintiff’s
stories and accusations. The truth of the matters put at issue in the Dershowitz litigation can only
be tested by examination of privileged materials, resulting in a sweeping waiver.

BACKGROUND FACTS RELEVANT TO DISPUTE
In her privilege log, Plaintiff has “categorically” logged five separate groups of
documents she has withheld on the basis of “AC Privilege and Work Product/joint
defense/common interest.” The documents are identified as:

1.
Correspondence re: Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 v. United States, Case No. 0880736-CIV-Marra, pending in the Southern District of Florida. ("CVRA Case")
Plaintiff withheld documents purportedly to and from her attorneys (and others) related to
legal advice regarding the CVRA Case (to which Plaintiff is not a party), and documents
purportedly giving attorney mental impressions related to the CVRA Case and
“evidence” related thereto. Declaration of Laura A. Menninger (“Menninger Decl..”),
Exhibit A.
(i) The date range of the documents is 2011 – Present. Id.
(ii) Persons identified as involved in the communications are: Plaintiff Virginia
Giuffre (“Giuffre”), Brad Edwards (“Edwards”), Paul Cassell (“Cassell”),
Brittany Henderson (“Henderson”), Sigrid McCawley (“McCawley”),
Meredith Schultz (“Shultz”), David Boies (“Boies”), Jack Scarola (“Scarola”),
Stan Pottinger (“Pottinger”), Ellen Brockman (“Brockman”), Legal Assistants
(“Legal Assistants”), Professionals retained by attorneys to aid in the rendition
of legal advice and representation (“Other Professionals”). Id.
2.
Correspondence re: Giuffre v. Maxwell, 15-cv-07433-RWS, pending in the
Southern District of New York (“Maxwell Case”). Id.
(i) The date range of the documents is September 21, 2015– Present. Id.
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(ii) Persons identified as involved in the communications are: Giuffre, Edwards
Cassell, Henderson, McCawley, Schultz, Boies, Pottinger, Stephen Zach
(“Zach”), Brockman, Legal Assistants and Other Professionals. Id.
3.
Correspondence re: Bradley Edwards and Paul Cassell v. Alan Dershowitz
(“Dershowitz Case”), Case No. 15000072, pending in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County, Florida. (“Dershowitz Case”). Id.
(i) The date range of the documents is January 2015 -Present. Id.
(ii) Persons identified as involved in the communications are: Giuffre, Edwards
Cassell, Henderson, McCawley, Schultz, Boies, Pottinger, Zach, Brockman,
Legal Assistants and Other Professionals. Id.
4.
Correspondence re: Jane Doe No. 102 v. Jeffrey Epstein (“Epstein Case”), Case
No. 09-80656-CIV-Marra/Johnson (Southern District of Florida) (“Epstein case”)
(i) The date range of the documents is 2009 – Present
(ii) Persons identified as involved in the communications are: Giuffre, Bob
Josefsberg, Katherine W. Ezell, Amy Ederi, other Podhurst attorneys, Legal
Assistants, and Professionals retained by attorneys to aid in the rendition of
legal advice. Id.
5.
“This categorical entry is regarding correspondence potential legal action against
entities and individuals.” (same description re potential litigation)
(i) The date range of the documents is from January 2015 –Present.
(ii) Persons identified as involved in the communications are: Giuffre, Edwards
Cassell, Henderson, McCawley, Schultz, Boies, Pottinger, Zach, Brockman,
Legal Assistants and Other Professionals.
Plaintiff is withholding “Approx. 1.3 kilobytes [of documents] overlapping with other
cases” based on the categorically logged entries in Paragraph 1.
According to her most recent interrogatory response, Plaintiff has been represented in
various litigation matters identified above as follows:
(a)
Pottinger, Boies, and McCawley (along with other Boies Schiller & Flexner LLP
(“Boies Schiller”) attorneys represent Ms. Giuffre as a non-party in the Dershowitz Case,
starting in February 2015.
(b)
Edwards (along with other Farmer, Jaffe, Weissing, Edwards, Fistos & Lehrman,
P.L. attorneys), Cassell, Pottinger, Boies and McCawley and Boies Schiller attorneys
represent Ms. Giuffre in the Maxwell case, “the complaint of which was filed in
September, 2015.” Id.
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(c)
Cassell represents Ms. Giuffre as a non-party in the CVRA Case, starting in May
of 2014. Id.
(d)
Edwards and other Farmer, Jaffe attorneys represent Ms. Giuffre as a non-party in
the CVRA Case, starting in 2011. Id.
(e)
Cassell provided Ms. Giuffre with legal advice concerning potential legal action
starting in early 2011. Id.
(f)
Cassell, Edwards and other Farmer, Jaffe attorneys, Pottinger, Boies (along with
other Boies Schiller attorneys) represent Ms. Giuffre regarding investigations into
potential legal action starting in the second half of 2014. Id.
(g)

According to Plaintiff, she has never been represented by Scarola.

Menninger Decl., Ex. B at 4.
The CVRA Case
In the CVRA Case, Edwards (starting in 2011) and Cassell (starting in May 2014) have
represented Plaintiff in attempting to obtain joinder in the pending action. On December 30,
2014, Cassell and Edwards filed a pleading titled "Jane Doe #3 and Jane Doe #4's Motion
Pursuant to Rule 21 for Joinder in Action" in the CVRA Case. Menninger Decl., Ex C (the
"Joinder Motion"). The Joinder Motion contained a number of allegations on behalf of “Jane
Doe # 3,” who is actually Ms. Giuffre, the Plaintiff in this case. The allegations include that
“Epstein also sexually trafficked the then-minor Jane Doe [#3], making her available for sex to
politically-connected and financially-powerful people." The "politically-connected and
financially powerful people" identified by Edwards and Cassell by name in the Joinder Motion
as having had sexual relations with Jane Doe #3 were Prince Andrew, Duke of York ("Prince
Andrew"), Ms. Maxwell, Jean Luc Brunel ("Brunel") and Alan Dershowitz (“Dershowitz”). Id.
at 3-6.1

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The judge in the CVRA case subsequently struck these allegations, stating “[a]t this juncture in the proceedings,
these lurid details are unnecessary to the determination of whether Jane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 4 should be permitted
to join Petitioners’ claim that the Government violated their rights under the CVRA. The factual details regarding
with whom and where the Jane Does engaged in sexual activities are immaterial and impertinent to this central claim

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Following the Joinder Motion, Dershowitz made numerous public appearances in which
he vigorously denied the allegations, stated that Edwards and Cassell “are lying deliberately,”
and that if Cassell and Edwards “had just done an hours’ worth of work, they would have seen
she [Plaintiff] is lying through her teeth.” See Menninger Decl., Ex. E at 9-10.
The Dershowitz Case
On January 6, 2015, Edwards and Cassell initiated litigation against Dershowitz - the
Dershowitz Case. See Menninger Decl., Ex. F.
In the Dershowitz Case, Edwards and Cassell sued Dershowitz for defamation claiming
that Dershowitz’s public statements – that they and their client were lying and that they failed to
investigate their client’s claims – were false. The Complaint by Edwards and Cassell alleged that
“[i]mmediately following the filing of what Dershowitz knew to be an entirely proper and wellfounded pleading, Dershowitz initiated a massive public media assault on the reputation and
character of Bradley J. Edwards and Paul G. Cassell accusing them of intentionally lying in their
filing, of having leveled knowingly false accusations against the Dershowitz without ever
conducting any investigation of the credibility of the accusations, and of having acted unethically
to the extent that their willful misconduct warranted and required disbarment.” Menninger Decl.,
Ex. F, ¶ 17.
Edwards and Cassell claimed as false Dershowitz’s statements that “Edwards and Cassell
failed to minimally investigate the allegations advanced on behalf of their client [Virginia
Giuffre] and even that they sat down with her to contrive the allegations.” Menninger Decl., Ex.
E at 9. During the Dershowitz litigation, Edwards and Cassel responded to interrogatories and
requests for production issued by Dershowitz. Menninger Decl., Ex. G. Interrogatory No.1 asked:
(i.e., that they were known victims of Mr. Epstein and the Government owed them CVRA duties), especially
considering that these details involve non-parties who are not related to the respondent Government. These
unnecessary details shall be stricken.” See Menninger Decl., Ex. D.

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“State verbatim or as close as possible Each statement by Dershowitz that You assert defamed You,”
to which Edwards and Cassel responded with nine pages of statements made by Dershowitz in the
press where Dershowitz states: 1) Plaintiff is lying; 2) Edwards and Cassel know Plaintiff is lying; 3)
Edwards and Cassel helped Plaintiff lie and “put words in her mouth”; and 4) Edwards and Cassel
failed to properly investigate Plaintiff’s allegations before publicizing Plaintiff’s statements.
Menninger Decl., Ex. G at 3-11.
Edwards and Cassell further stated that the listed Dershowitz press statements were
defamatory because “[t]he factual assertions contained or implied in the statements quoted in

answer to Interrogatory Number 1 were not true, notably with regard to claims that Edwards and
Cassell were deliberately lying, had failed to conduct an investigation of the allegations before
filing them, had manipulated or conspired with Jane Doe No. 3 to make intentionally false
allegations about Mr. Dershowitz, and that Plaintiffs were motivated to participate in the filing of
knowingly false accusations against the Defendant by a desire to achieve personal economic
gain.” Menninger Decl., Ex. G at 11, Response to Interrog. 2.
At the time the Dershowitz Case was filed, Edwards, Cassell and Boies represented
Plaintiff regarding “potential litigations.” See supra at ¶ 3f.
Plaintiff, Edwards and Cassell claim to be in a joint defense or common interest
agreement relating to the Dershowitz Case (Menninger Decl., Ex. H at 205:19-206:7), although
no such agreement has ever been produced.
Plaintiff and her counsel actively participated in the Dershowitz Case. Plaintiff provided
a declaration in the Dershowitz Case in support of the claims against Dershowitz. Menninger
Decl., Ex. I. Plaintiff also sat for a deposition in the Dershowitz Case and testified in a manner
expected to support Edwards’ and Cassell’s claims. Menninger Decl., Ex. H. Her counsel filed
12 pleadings in that matter.
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I.

The Attorney-Client and Work Product Privilege Standards and Limitations
a. The Attorney-Client Privilege
“The attorney-client privilege protects communications (1) between a client and his or

her attorney (2) that are intended to be, and in fact were, kept confidential (3) for the purpose of
obtaining or providing legal advice.” United States v. Mejia, 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011).
The purpose of the privilege “is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). “In order to
balance this protection of confidentiality with the competing value of public disclosure, however,
courts apply the privilege only where necessary to achieve its purpose and construe the privilege
narrowly because it renders relevant information undiscoverable.” Mejia, 655 F.3d at 132.
Because the privilege “stands in derogation of the search for truth so essential to the effective
operation of any system for justice ... the privilege must be narrowly construed.” Calvin Klein
Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)). “The party invoking the privilege also has the burden to show that the
privilege has not been waived.” Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 304 F.R.D. 384, 391
(S.D.N.Y.2015).

b. Work Product Privilege
The work-product privilege protects documents either created by counsel or at counsel's
directive, in anticipation of litigation. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 19, 2002 &
August 2, 2002, 318 F.3d 379, 383 (2d Cir. 2003). The attorney work-product privilege “shelters
the mental processes of the attorney, providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and
prepare his client's case.” United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975). Again, the party
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asserting the work-product privilege “bears the heavy burden of establishing its applicability.” In
re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 6, 2005, 510 F.3d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 2007). Work product
“includes both opinion work product, such as an attorney's mental impressions or legal theories,
and fact work product, such as factual investigation results.” Koumoulis v. Indep. Fin. Mktg.
Grp., Inc., 295 F.R.D. 28, 39-40 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff'd, 29 F. Supp. 3d 142 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
“Both the attorney-client and work-product privileges may be waived if a party puts the
privileged communication at issue by relying on it to support a claim or defense.” Id.

II.

Plaintiff and her Attorneys Waived Attorney-Client and Work Product Privileges
by Putting Plaintiff’s Representation At Issue in the Dershowitz Case
“The [attorney-client] privilege may implicitly be waived when [a party] asserts a claim

that in fairness requires examination of protected communications.” United States v. Bilzerian,
926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir.1991); see also McGrath v. Nassau Cty. Health Care Corp., 204
F.R.D. 240, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Parties may waive any work product protection by putting
the privileged information at issue”). Courts determine whether a subject matter has been placed
at issue based on whether “(1) assertion of the privilege was a result of some affirmative act,
such as filing suit, by the asserting party; (2) through this affirmative act, the asserting party put
the protected information at issue by making it relevant to the case; and (3) application of the
privilege would have denied the opposing party to information vital to his defense.” Bank
Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 210 F.R.D. 506, 509-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(quoting Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D.Wash.1975)). “[C]ourts have generally
applied the Hearn [at issue] doctrine liberally, finding a broad waiver of attorney-client privilege
where a party asserts a position “the truth of which can only be assessed by examination of the
privileged communication.” Bank Brussels Lambert, 210 F.R.D. at 508.

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After a party voluntarily discloses attorney-client communications or work-product
information “to an adversary in one proceeding, it cannot withhold the same documents on the
basis of privilege in a subsequent proceeding, even if that subsequent proceeding involves a
different adversary.” Chevron Corp. v. Salazar, 275 F.R.D. 437, 445-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see
also In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d. Cir. 1993) (“The waiver doctrine provides
that voluntary disclosure of work product to an adversary waives the privilege as to other parties
[in a subsequent proceeding].”); Urban Box Office Network, Inc. v. Interfase Managers, L.P.,
No. 01 Civ. 8854, 2004 WL 2375819, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2004) (applying same principle
to waive attorney-client privilege). This, of course, makes sense because “where a party
voluntarily undertakes actions that will predictably lead to the disclosure of [a] document, then
waiver will follow.” Chevron Corp., 275 F.R.D. at 445-46 (internal citations omitted).
“The scope of the attorney-client privilege waiver is determined on a case by case basis
by considering the context of the waiver and the prejudice caused to the other party by permitting
partial disclosure of privileged communications.” McGrath, 204 F.R.D. at 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
(citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 190 (2d Cir.2000)). “As in the attorneyclient context, fairness and prejudice concerns define the scope of any work product waiver.” Id.
at 192. Factors considered by the Second Circuit to find a broad waiver appropriate include
“(1) whether substantive information has been revealed; (2) prejudice to the opposing party
caused by partial disclosure; (3) whether partial disclosure would be misleading to a court; (4)
fairness; and (5) consistency.” Id.

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a. Plaintiff’s Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege
Edwards and Cassell sued Dershowitz for defamation claiming that Dershowitz’s public
statements about their representation of client were false. At the time those claims were filed,
Edwards and Cassell represented Plaintiff in the CVRA Case. She was also represented by
Edwards, Cassell and Boies regarding “potential litigation.” The statements Edwards and
Cassell claimed as false included that “Edwards and Cassell failed to minimally investigate the
allegations advanced on behalf of their client [Virginia Giuffre] and even that they sat down with
her to contrive the allegations.” The allegations Edwards and Cassell failed to minimally
investigate and/or contrived where the allegations made by Plaintiff in the CVRA Joinder
Motion. Dershowitz counterclaimed against Edwards and Cassell suing them for 1) the
publication of the false allegations of Giuffre in the Joinder Motion and 2) defamation for their
extra-judicial false statements concerning Dershowitz and his alleged involvement with Giuffre.
Plaintiff and her counsel McCawley actively participated in the Dershowitz Case and
affirmatively waived any attorney-client privilege over Plaintiff’s communications. Plaintiff
produced documents, sat for a deposition (Menninger Decl., Ex. H) and provided a sworn
declaration (Menninger Decl., Ex. I). Through her participation in the case, Plaintiff specifically
discussed her communications with Edwards and Cassell. In her sworn declaration, she
discussed the following attorney communications:


Her conversation with Brad Edwards in 2011 when she first told him her story. This was
followed by a telephone conversation with Edwards and his attorney, Scarola, which was
recorded with her knowledge and consent and which has been filed in multiple court
papers and given to the press2 (Menninger Decl., Ex I at ¶ 55-56);

2

Edwards participated in this call as Plaintiff’s attorney. Plaintiff believed that the conversation was covered by
attorney-client privilege. See Menninger Decl., Ex. J, (email between Plaintiff and Sharon Churcher crafting
communication to Edwards regarding publication of privileged communication). Yet, when the conversation was
sent to the press, and used in later court filings, Plaintiff did nothing to stop the publication of this privileged

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

Her discussions with Edwards and Cassell of her representation in the CVRA Case (id. at
¶ 61);



Her directions to counsel to pursue criminal charges (id. at ¶ 65);



In her conversations with her attorneys “no one” has “pressured” her to identify
Dershowitz as a person who allegedly abused her (id. at ¶ 67);



Her authorization to her attorney to file various affidavits including her stories (id. at
¶ 67);



Her attorneys’ belief in the truth of her statements (id. at ¶ 68).

Plaintiff’s waiver of her attorney-client privilege was solidified during her deposition in
the Dershowitz Case. At the conclusion of questioning by Dershowitz’s counsel, and after off
the records discussions between and among McCawley, Edwards, Cassell and Jack Scarola
(counsel for Edwards and Cassell), Mr. Scarola then asked Plaintiff a series of questions directly
discussing her communications with her counsel. McCawley made no objection and Plaintiff
responded to each question. Scarola asked if Edwards pressured or encouraged her to lie:

Q. Has Brad [Edwards] ever pressured you or encouraged you in any way or under any
circumstances at any time to provide false information about Jeffrey Epstein?
A. Never.
Q. Has he ever pressured you or encouraged you at any time or in any way, under any
circumstances to provide false information about anyone or anything?
A. Never.
Menninger Decl., Ex. H at 202:5-202:12. Scarola asked similar questions concerning Cassell.
Id. at 202-03. The questioning, however, was not limited to Plaintiff’s conversations with
Edwards and Cassell. Scarola’s final question, again answered without objection by McCawley,
was:
communication. This alone is sufficient to waive the attorney-client privilege communication as between Edwards
and Plaintiff. See infra, p. 19-20.

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Q. Apart from any efforts made by Jeffrey Epstein or agents on behalf of Jeffrey Epstein to
silence you or to have you refrain from providing true and accurate information about the
interactions that you had with Jeffrey Epstein and others to whom you were trafficked by Jeffrey
Epstein, has anyone apart from that circumstance pressured you or encouraged you to provide
false information about any of the topics that were covered during the course of your
examination? . . .
A. No.
Menninger Decl., Ex. H at 203:18-204:7.
There is no mechanism by which Plaintiff could respond to any of these questions with
the answer “never” unless she is recollecting and relying on the content of each and every
communication she had with Edwards, Cassell and any other person (including each and every
one of her attorneys) about the “topics covered” in the deposition. The topics covered in the
deposition were wide ranging including the full breadth of statements she and her counsel had
made in the CVRA Case, identification of the “high powered” individuals with whom she claims
to have had sexual relations, when and how she allegedly met Epstein, the timing and specifics
of her alleged encounters with Dershowitz, Prince Andrew, Maxwell and others, and her
interviews with and statements to media outlets. In other words, the topics included every story
Plaintiff has ever told concerning the time she claims she was a “sex slave.”
Notably, the Special Master overseeing Plaintiff’s deposition in the Dershowitz Case
immediately recognized the waiver. On re-direct, the following colloquy occurred:
Q BY MS. BORJA (Dershowitz’ counsel): Now, I understand from your testimony that Mr.
Edwards did not pressure you to give false information about this matter, is that fair?
A. That's fair.
Q. Tell me everything that Mr. Edwards told you about this matter?
MS. MCCAWLEY: Objection, that's privileged and she has not waived any privilege. She's not
here testifying as to what she discussed with her lawyers.

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SPECIAL MASTER: You know, it's an interesting point. I'm going to grant your motion for
privilege, but I'm going to suggest to you that there might be a strong argument to be made that
those questions opened some of the door. I'm going to let the judge decide that. But you can go
ahead, ask the questions, we'll put it on the record for later determination, and it's going to force,
to be blunt, this among other things may force the witness to come back and complete the
deposition. Just let's be aware of that.
Menninger Decl., Ex. H at 205:15-206:10.
This testimony directly placed Plaintiff’s attorney-client communications and work
product at issue in the Dershowitz Case. Edwards and Cassell took the affirmative position that
Dershowitz’s statements that Edwards and Cassell helped Plaintiff fabricate her stories were
false and defamatory. See Menninger Decl., Ex E, p. 2 (“Dershowitz went so far as to repeatedly
accuse Edwards and Cassell of criminal misconduct in actively suborning perjury and fabricating
the allegations of misconduct against him - acts that would warrant their disbarment from the
legal profession. . . . Put simply, Dershowitz has made highly defamatory allegations that have
no basis in fact”). Communications between Plaintiff and her attorney were a central issue in the
claims brought by Edwards and Cassell, and Plaintiff voluntarily testified regarding those
communications.
Plaintiff was acutely aware of how the information was being utilized in the Dershowitz
Case. According to Plaintiff, she is a party to a joint defense or common interest agreement with
Messrs. Edwards and Cassell. When the Dershowitz Case was filed, a mere week after the filing
of the Joinder Motion on Plaintiff’s behalf, Edwards and Cassell represented Plaintiff, who
Dershowitz had also threatened to sue. Thus, Edwards and Cassell allegedly act both as
Plaintiff’s attorneys and her joint-defense or common interest partners. Plaintiff was aware that
what was, or in this case was allegedly not, said between her and her attorney would be
affirmatively used by her counsel/joint defense partners in support of their claims. She
authorized the disclosure and testified, both with the assistance of McCawley.
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Plaintiff, on behalf of her joint defense partners, provided evidence to support the factual
claim neither Edwards or Cassell (nor anyone else) asked Plaintiff to lie about her stories of
alleged sexual abuse and trafficking. The only way the truth of that issue can be tested is
through the examination of all her communications about her stories, with attorneys or
otherwise. See Bowne v. AmBase Corporation, 150 F.R.D. 465, 488 (S.D.N.Y.1993), aff'd by
161 F.R.D. 258 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (otherwise privileged communications put in issue where party
“asserts a factual claim the truth of which can only be assessed by examination of a privileged
communication”); United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir.1991) (“[a] defendant
may not use the privilege to prejudice his opponent's case or to disclose some selected
communications for self-serving purposes. Thus, the privilege may implicitly be waived when
defendant asserts a claim that in fairness requires examination of protected communications.”);
In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 101–02 (“[I]t has been established law for a hundred years that
when the client waives the privilege by testifying about what transpired between her and her
attorney, she cannot thereafter insist that the mouth of the attorney be shut. From that has grown
the rule that testimony as to part of a privileged communication, in fairness, requires production
of the remainder.”); United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1997) (criminal defendant
who testified that she was never advised by her attorney of the fifth amendment implications of
proceeding pro se put at issue all communications with her former attorney and her knowledge
of the law as informed by her attorney-client communications).
“[T]he attorney-client privilege cannot at once be used as a shield and a sword. . . . A
defendant may not use the privilege to prejudice his opponent's case or to disclose some selected
communications for self-serving purposes.” Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991)
(internal citations omitted); Locascio, 357 F.Supp.2d 536, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The privilege

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may not simultaneously be used as a shield and a sword; where a defendant opens the door by
waiving the attorney-client privilege, . . . the [party] cannot open the door only to the information
he would like to admit.”) Plaintiff has used her attorney communications as a sword on behalf of
her joint defense partners, and therefore her communications with her attorneys are no longer
shielded.
Plaintiff also testified that she shared her conversations and communications with
Edwards to unrelated third parties. In particular, she shared her communications with a reporter
for the Daily Mail Online, Sharon Churcher. See Menninger Decl., Ex. K, at 297:5-300:6. There
is no doubt that sharing attorney-client communications with a third-party, particularly when that
third party is a member of the press, acts to waive any claim of privilege. Schaeffler v. United
States, 806 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir.2015). (“A party that shares otherwise privileged communications
with an outsider is deemed to waive the privilege by disabling itself from claiming that the
communications were intended to be confidential.”).
b. Edwards and Cassell’s Waivers of Attorney-Client and Work Product Privilege in
the Dershowitz Case
In addition to Plaintiff’s direct waiver, Plaintiff’s counsel/joint defense partners Edwards
and Cassell waived both attorney-client privilege and protection of their work product by putting
those matters at issue in the Dershowitz Case. The scope of the subject matter put at issue in the
Dershowitz Case could not be broader. Edwards and Cassell pleaded and argued at every
conceivable turn that: 1) they had a good faith belief that Ms. Giuffre’s allegations –
communicated to them by Giuffre -- were true; 2) they conducted a thorough investigation of
Ms. Giuffre’s claims (their work product regarding Plaintiff and her allegations); 3) that Ms.
Giuffre and her story were credible; 4) they did not have any communications or encourage

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Plaintiff to fabricate facts or portions of her stories; and 5) they were not motivated in taking
their actions by potential financial gain . Edwards and Cassell point to both communications
with Plaintiff and their own work product in an attempt to prove their claims.
By way of example, in the Motion for Summary Judgement in the Dershowitz Case,
Edwards and Cassell make the following assertions, citing attorney-client-privileged
communications and work product documents in support of their claims and defenses:


“Ms. Giuffre has submitted a sworn affidavit, not only attesting to the truthfulness of her
allegations against Dershowitz but also about the fact that she told her lawyers about
these claims.” (emphasis supplied) (attorney-client communications);



“The assertions of sexual abuse are more than adequately corroborated by compelling
circumstantial evidence which is detailed at length by Cassell in his deposition.” (work
product/investigations);



“Regardless of whether Dershowitz sexually abused Ms. Giuffre, Edwards and Cassell
clearly had a good faith basis for relying on the sworn representations of their client.”
(attorney-client communications, attorney thought process);



“Edwards and Cassell had clearly conducted extensive investigation into the basis for Ms.
Giuffre's allegations” (work product);



“the undisputed record evidence establishes that Edwards and Cassell had every right
following their detailed investigation to rely on Ms. Giuffre's credibility” (attorney-client
communication, work-product and investigations, thought process and credibility
assessments);



“The good faith basis for Edwards and Cassell's reliance on Giuffre's allegations is laid
out in detail by Professor Cassell in more than 50 pages of sworn testimony during his
deposition. See Depo. Transcript of Paul Cassell (Oct. 16 & 17, 2015), at 61-117 (Exhibit
#3)” (attorney investigative activities, work-product and attorney thought process based
on what they “knew” through attorney-client communications).



“Edwards and Cassell clearly had a powerful basis for believing their client's allegation
that she had been sexually abused by Dershowitz, particularly where she had made this
allegation to them as far back as 2011” (attorney-client communications)



“Dershowitz made false and defamatory statements by alleging that two experienced and
capable attorneys who thoroughly investigated and believed Ms. Giuffre's allegations in
good faith should be disbarred” (work-product, investigation of alleged acts and
investigation of credibility).

Menninger Decl., Ex E, at 1-13.

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In addition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Cassell in his deposition spent
more than 50 pages detailing the investigations and assessment of all of the evidence used as a
factual basis for the Joinder Motion in the CVRA Case on behalf of Plaintiff. Menninger Decl.,
Ex. L at 61-117. During this soliloquy, Cassell details his and Edwards thought processes in
assessing the claims, their evaluation of the evidence they reviewed, and all other information
that he had to believe Plaintiff’s stories. He specifically refers to Plaintiff, their evaluation of the
evidence in light of the information they “knew” about Plaintiff, and their evaluation and thought
process of how the evidence supported her stories. Of course, the information they “knew”
about Plaintiff was a direct result of her attorney-client communications with them, and their
evaluation of that evidence in the case is clearly work product. In reciting the work product he
believes supports “Virginia’s” story, Cassell states that this is “important to Virginia” and “I
want to do a good job for Virginia Roberts on -- on representing all the -- the evidence that is
available to support her.” Menninger Decl.., Ex. L at 102:1-3 & 118:7-8. Having put these
matters directly at issue, and utilizing both their work-product and attorney-client
communications in support of the claims, there is a complete waiver of protection over 1) the
content of communications between Plaintiff and her attorneys, and 2) her attorneys’ work
product and thought process in investigating and “reasonable belief” in the claims.3

3

In a joint press release relating to the settlement of the Dershowitz Case, Plaintiff and her attorneys again
affirmatively cite to Plaintiff’s communications with them, their investigation of her statements, and their
assessment of her credibility. The references include the time frame prior to their initial filing as well as information
discovered throughout the course of the Dershowitz Cases. In that press release, Edwards and Cassel stated
“Edwards and Cassell maintain that they filed their client's allegations in good faith and performed the necessary
due diligence to do so, and have produced documents detailing those efforts.” Menninger Decl., Ex. M, p.1. The
press release continues in stating that it was a “mistake” to have filed sexual misconduct allegations against
Dershowitz citing, among other things, “the records and other documents produced by the parties.” Id. at 2. These
public statements provide a further waiver over the work product that led to the public acknowledgement that filing
the lawsuit and reliance on Plaintiff’s allegations was a “mistake.”

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c. The elements for finding an at issue waiver are satisfied
As discussed above, “courts have generally applied the [at issue] doctrine liberally,
finding a broad waiver of attorney-client privilege where a party asserts a position “the truth of
which can only be assessed by examination of the privileged communication.” Bank Brussels
Lambert, 210 F.R.D. at 508. All of the factors for waiver have been met: “(1) assertion of the
privilege was a result of some affirmative act, such as filing suit, by the asserting party; (2)
through this affirmative act, the asserting party put the protected information at issue by making
it relevant to the case; and (3) application of the privilege would have denied the opposing party
to information vital to his defense.” Id. 210 F.R.D. at 509-10. Here, Edwards and Cassell, with
the full knowledge and consent of Plaintiff, took the affirmative act of filing and participating in
the Dershowitz Case. Through this affirmative act, they put at issues what Plaintiff told her
attorneys, whether it was true, whether her attorneys helped her concoct additional allegations
that would help her position, whether they adequately investigated her claims, their basis for
believing Plaintiff was credible, and if they and their client were motivated to file false claims by
a desire for financial gain.
As discussed above, Plaintiff voluntarily and affirmatively waived the attorney-client
privilege through her testimony. That alone is sufficient to find an at issue waiver. Plaintiff also
permitted the waiver of the attorney-client privilege by permitting Edwards and Cassell to put
her communications with them and her attorneys’ work product at issue with her full knowledge
and consent. Plaintiff is a party to a joint defense agreement with Edwards and Cassell. She and
her attorneys were involved in communication about the Dershowitz Case beginning in January
2015. The case was preemptively filed to beat Dershowitz to the courthouse, before he could act
on his public statements that he intended to sue both Plaintiff and her attorneys for, among other

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things, defamation. Plaintiff did nothing to stop her counsel from filing the Complaint, despite
the fact that it would necessarily put her communications with her counsel at issue. And, she
actively participated in the litigation. Indeed, the testimony of Cassell makes clear that the
purpose of the litigation was for Plaintiff’s benefit, and that he wanted to do a “good job” for her.
Normally, an attorney cannot waive the attorney-client privilege without his client’s
knowledge and consent. In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 101. But, “[a] client may nonetheless by
his actions impliedly waive the privilege or consent to disclosure.” Id., 828 F.2d 94, 101 (2d Cir.
1987) (citing See United States ex rel Edney v. Smith, 425 F.Supp. 1038, 1052 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)
(implied waiver), aff'd, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977); Drimmer v.
Appleton, 628 F.Supp. 1249, 1252 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (implied consent); Wigmore, supra, § 2327)).
In certain circumstances, an attorney may have “an implied authority to waive the privilege on
behalf of his client.” Drimmer, 628 F.Supp. at 1251; see also In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 101.
“It is the client's responsibility to ensure continued confidentiality of his communications.” Id.
If a client is aware of her attorney’s waiver of privilege and takes no action to preserve
confidentiality, the privilege is lost. Id.; In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 867 (1973) (“[i]t is not asking too much to insist that if a client wishes to preserve the
privilege under such circumstances, he must take some affirmative action to preserve
confidentiality”).
This situation is analogous to a client asserting advice of counsel as a defense, a situation
in which an at issue waiver of the full scope of attorney-client communications is automatic. See
Bilzerian, 926 F.2d at 1292 (defendant’s testimony that he thought his actions were legal would
have put his knowledge of the law and the basis for his understanding of what the law required
into issue, directly implicating his conversations with counsel); Chin v. Rogoff & Co., P.C., No.

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05 CIV. 8360(NRB), 2008 WL 2073934, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2008) (in suit for damages
against tax advisor for negligence in providing tax advice, reliance and causation could only be
assessed through invading the attorney-client privilege and examining the nature of counsel’s
advice to determine different advice was given by attorneys). The at issue waiver is complete
“even if a party does not attempt to make use of a privileged communication” Bowne of New
York City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (discussing Bilzerian,
926 F.2d 1285); Chin, 2008 WL 2073934, at *6 (waiver occur even where client does not
reference attorney communications if review of communications is necessary to establish an
element of a claim). Here, Edwards and Cassell put the issue of their “good faith” reliance on
Plaintiff’s communications to them affirmatively at issue, as well as their investigation of what
she told them in those communications. Having done so with Plaintiff’s knowledge and consent,
and without her protest, the waiver is complete.
The application of the privilege here, after it has been selectively waived, denies Ms.
Maxwell information vital to her defense. By way of very limited example, in the case at bar,
Plaintiff claims that she was defamed when Ms. Maxwell stated that the allegations Plaintiff
made in the Joinder Motion, included allegations regarding Dershowitz, Ms. Maxwell and Prince
Andrew, were false. In the Joinder Motion Edwards and Cassell boldly state “Epstein required
Jane Doe #3 to have sexual relations with Dershowitz on numerous occasions while she was a
minor, not only in Florida but also on private planes, in New York, New Mexico, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands.” Menninger Decl., Ex. C at 4. Edwards and Cassell, however, had doubts about
Plaintiff’s allegations based on their own investigation, including whether Dershowitz and
Plaintiff were ever on Epstein’s plane together. Cassell identified flight logs Edwards and he
reviewed as supporting the allegations made by Plaintiff. Menninger Decl., Ex. L at 69-70. He

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admits, however, that there is not a single log entry that put Dershowitz and Plaintiff on the same
plane.4 Having put at issue their investigation and “good faith belief” in Plaintiff’s stories, they
must provide all information about anything that both supports and undermines Plaintiff’s story
and their own belief in the credibility of that story.
Plaintiff will undoubtedly attempt to prop-up her claims that she was telling the truth
through use of the investigative material, work product, mental impressions and opinions on her
credibility offered by her attorneys/joint defense partners, Edwards and Cassell. Ms. Maxwell
cannot be denied access to information showing her attorney’s work and investigation shows
Plaintiff’s stories were fabricated, including the details uncovered demonstrating Plaintiff’s lack
of credibility.
Each of the factors considered by the Second Circuit to find a broad waiver weighs in
favor of finding such a waiver here. The factors are “(1) whether substantive information has
been revealed; (2) prejudice to the opposing party caused by partial disclosure; (3) whether
partial disclosure would be misleading to a court; (4) fairness; and (5) consistency.” McGrath v.
Nassau Cty. Health Care Corp., 204 F.R.D. 240, 244.
Cassell and Edwards have revealed in extensive detail their work-product demonstrating
why they believed Plaintiff’s allegations and incorporated them in the Joinder Motion. It would
be prejudicial for Plaintiff to be able to support her claim in this case that she is not a liar using
her attorney’s testimony and work product, while preventing discovery of work-product and
communications that would prove otherwise or cast doubts on Plaintiff’s credibility. It would be
4

My question, Mr. Cassell, is: You reviewed the flight logs, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. You reviewed them in some detail, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Is there any entry on those flight lines -- logs that you read as putting Professor Dershowitz and Miss Roberts on
the same plane?
A. No.
Menninger Decl., Ex. L 206:3-11.

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misleading to the court or any jury to hear testimony from Plaintiff’s counsel about all the factual
basis, work product and thought process on which they relied in making the allegations in the
Joinder Motion, but refusing to permit Ms. Maxwell discovering or presenting contradicting
information that Plaintiff’s attorneys had, including information that led them to conclude that it
was a “mistake” to have filed sexual misconduct allegations against Dershowitz. Fairness and
consistency require that Plaintiff and her attorneys be required to disclose all work product and
attorney-client communications relating their investigations of Plaintiff’s statements and story as
alleged in the CVRA Case, their investigations of the allegations, their assessment of the
credibility of the allegations, and contradictory evidence uncovered.
III.

There is No Privilege as to Communications with Scarola
Plaintiff listed on her privilege log Jack Scarola, Edwards and Cassell’s attorney, as an

individual who received or sent communications or documents relating to the CVRA Case. The
log does not state what these documents are, instead including them as part of the “categorical”
logging. The “Types of Privileges” identified are Attorney Client, Work Product, and Joint
Defense/Common Interest. It is entirely unclear how any of these protections can be invoked
regarding communications including Scarola or over documents provided by or to him.

a. There is no Attorney-Client Relationship

Plaintiff specifically states in her interrogatory responses that Scarola is not and has never
been her attorney. Thus, there can be no attorney-client-communications between Plaintiff and
Scarola. If there were, Plaintiff has clearly and voluntarily waived any privilege.

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b. Work Product Privilege has been Waived
In 2011, Scarola acted as Edward’s attorney in a case captioned Epstein v. Edwards, Case
No. 502009CA040800XXXMB, in the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County, Florida (the “Epstein v. Edwards Case.”). That action is still pending. According
to the most recent discovery responses, Edwards represented Plaintiff in the CVRA Case at the
same time. SOF, ¶(d).
On April 7, 2011, Edwards, Scarola and Plaintiff had a telephone conversation, recorded
with the knowledge and consent of Plaintiff. Menninger Decl., Ex N at 1. The content of the
conversation is a detailed interview of Plaintiff recounting her story of her time with Epstein.
The transcript of that conversation, clearly marked “Work Product,” has been produced widely
and attached to multiple court filings. It was used affirmatively in the Epstein v. Edwards Case
and filed on May 17, 2011 in that case. See Menninger Decl., Ex. O (Notice of Filing). It was
also used affirmatively in the CVRA Case. See Menninger Decl., Ex. P, DE #290, Exhibit 3. It
was produced in this case and in the Dershowitz Case by Plaintiff and her counsel. See
Menninger Decl., Ex. Q. It apparently was also transmitted to the press. See Menninger Decl.,
Ex. J.
As discussed above, putting information contained in this “work product” document at
issue waives of any protection and extends to any and all work product of Scarola related to
Plaintiff or her claims and stories.

c. There is no basis to claim common interest or joint defense privilege
It bears repeating that “[t]he party asserting the privilege ... bears the burden of
establishing its essential elements.” Mejia, 655 F.3d at 132; see also Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd.,

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304 F.R.D. 384, 391 (S.D.N.Y.2015) (“The party invoking the privilege also has the burden to
show that the privilege has not been waived.”).
Plaintiff provides no basis for claiming a common interest or joint defense with anyone
related to the CVRA case. The only two people Scarola represents, to Ms. Maxwell’s
knowledge, are Edwards and Cassell. They are the attorneys in the CVRA case, and by
definition should not have a personal or common interest with the parties in that litigation.
Regardless, it is Plaintiff’s burden to establish that such and interest exists, who is involved, and
Scarola’s role. Having failed to provide any of the information necessary to establish the
applicability of these privileges, they are waived. See S.E.C. v. Yorkville Advisors, LLC, 300
F.R.D. 152, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (failure to provide adequate descriptions of the subject matter,
authors and recipients of the withheld documents resulted in waiver of privilege). There is
simply no basis for withholding any communication with or work product of Scarola.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff and her lawyers waived any privilege as to their communications related to the
subject matters of (a) the CVRA litigation and (b) the Edwards and Cassell v. Dershowitz Case.
Similarly, Plaintiff’s lawyers waived any claim of work product to material gathered in relation
to those litigations.
Accordingly, Ms. Maxwell requests that the Court enter an order finding (a) a waiver of
the attorney-client privilege as to the subject matter of the CVRA and Dershowitz litigations and
(b) a work product exemption for materials gathered in relation to those matters. She further
requests an Order directing Plaintiff to provide Ms. Maxwell with all documents as to which
such the attorney-client privilege and work product have been waived.

Dated: May 26, 2016.
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Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Laura A. Menninger
Laura A. Menninger (LM-1374)
Jeffrey S. Pagliuca (pro hac vice)
HADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C.
150 East 10th Avenue
Denver, CO 80203
Phone: 303.831.7364
Fax:
303.832.2628
lmenninger@hmflaw.com
Attorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on May 26, 2016, I electronically served this Motion to Compel all
Communications and Work Product Put At Issue by Plaintiff and Her Attorneys via ECF on the
following:
Sigrid S. McCawley
Meridith Schultz
BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER, LLP
401 East Las Olas Boulevard, Ste. 1200
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
smccawley@bsfllp.com
mschultz@bsfllp.com

Paul G. Cassell
383 S. University Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
cassellp@law.utah.edu

Bradley J. Edwards
FARMER, JAFFE, WEISSING, EDWARDS,
FISTOS & LEHRMAN, P.L.
425 North Andrews Ave., Ste. 2
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
brad@pathtojustice.com
/s/ Nicole Simmons
Nicole Simmons

25