The Domestic Legal Framework
for US Military Cyber Operations
ROBERT CHESNEY 

Aegis Series Paper No. 2003

Conventional wisdom holds that Congress has abandoned its duty regarding the
government’s war powers. It is not hard to understand why. Between the agelessness
and flexibility of the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for Use of Military Force1 (AUMFs)
and periodic unilateral uses of military force in Libya, Syria, and Iraq, the executive
branch appears to act largely at its own discretion when it comes to conventional military
operations. But matters are different in the cyber domain. With little fanfare and less public
notice, Congress and the executive branch have cooperated effectively over the past decade
to build a legal architecture for military cyber operations. This framework reflects recurring
and constructive congressional engagement. The resulting structure is far less familiar to
most observers than its cousins—those architectures associated with conventional military
operations and intelligence activities—but is no less important. This is particularly true in
light of the Pentagon’s commitment to the “defend forward” operational model.

Context: Defending Forward
Amid the fallout from the coronavirus pandemic, a group of senators from both major
political parties dispatched a remarkable letter in April 2020 to General Paul Nakasone,
commander of US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). The senators expressed “profound
concerns” about “sophisticated hacking operations” targeting pandemic-related health
services and research programs. In particular, they cited activity attributed to Russia,
China, Iran, and North Korea. The letter concluded by asking Nakasone to “evaluate further
necessary action to defend forward in order to detect and deter” such activity.2
What did they mean by “defend forward”? For anyone who had been following the
evolution of the policy and legal frameworks associated with USCYBERCOM in recent years,
the phrase was a familiar and significant one.
In the spring of 2018, Nakasone released a “command vision” document calling for
USCYBERCOM to sustain an operational tempo of continuous—or persistent—engagement
with adversaries in the cyber domain. Of course, those adversaries were already persistently
engaging the United States through intrusions into US networks. The real novelty in
Nakasone’s vision was his insistence that USCYBERCOM need not remain in a defensive
crouch, defending largely or even solely from within its own networks. Instead, it could and
should focus on “defending forward as close as possible to the origin of adversary activity

National Security, Technology, and Law

A HOOVER INSTITUTION ESSAY

 2

[in order to extend] our reach to expose adversaries’ weaknesses, learn their intentions
and capabilities, and counter attacks close to their origins.” By defending forward,
persistent engagement could be made to impose “tactical friction and strategic costs on our
adversaries,” rather than vice versa.3 The 2018 Defense Department Cyber Strategy, released
later that year, affirmed the concept, “direct[ing] the Department to defend forward.”4
Introduction of the defend forward strategy sparked a great deal of debate.5 For some,
the phrase appeared euphemistic, masking what might better be described as offensive
operations. A Chinese scholar (and former People’s Liberation Army colonel) insisted that
the new posture would be destabilizing.6 But for others, defending forward was a welcome
development that was, if anything, long overdue given the growing array of hostile cyber
activities directed against US interests.7
In the two years since the release of General Nakasone’s command vision, we have had
several glimpses of defend forward in action. Some examples—such as USCYBERCOM’s
forward deployment to help countries like Macedonia, Ukraine, and Montenegro defend
their networks—have been innocuous (though still important) in that they did not
necessarily involve operational activity in “red space”—that is, in an adversary’s systems.8
But the broader potential of the concept also has been on display. At the time of the 2018
midterm elections, for example, USCYBERCOM disrupted the networks of the “Internet
Research Agency,” the infamous Russian troll farm known for its efforts to spread
propaganda in the United States during the 2016 election, and directly messaged individual
Russian hackers in order to make clear that the United States was aware of their roles and
identities.9
Against this backdrop, it is not hard to understand the real meaning of the senators’ request
that Nakasone explore opportunities to “defend forward” in the face of Russian, Chinese,
Iranian, and North Korean hacking directed at pandemic-related medical and research
entities in the United States. Simply put, the senators wanted USCYBERCOM operating
inside the networks of those adversaries, at the very least to identify such activities but if
necessary to go further and shut them down at their source.10
Whether or not USCYBERCOM conducts such high-stakes operations, the prospect draws
attention to a critical question that lurks in the background of out-of-network operations
in general but especially those targeting the systems of foreign governments: What is the
domestic legal framework that governs them?
The question matters in circumstances beyond the prospect of responding to pandemicrelated espionage, of course. There is a presidential election on the horizon, and given the
events of 2016 and 2018, we can expect ample need for disruption in adversary networks
in order to prevent interference of various kinds—and, therefore, a corresponding need

Robert Chesney  •  The Domestic Legal Framework for US Military Cyber Operations 

 3

to establish and maintain access in advance. We also should not lose sight of the fact that
USCYBERCOM’s capacity for out-of-network operations is not limited to the defend-forward
scenario. As illustrated by the summer 2019 crisis in which USCYBERCOM carried out
disruption operations against Iranian assets after Iran shot down a US Navy surveillance
drone (providing what proved to be a de-escalatory response at a time when the White
House reportedly was considering missile strikes), there are times when such operations are
intended to achieve effects unrelated to detecting, deterring, or disrupting an adversary’s
out-of-network operations.11
In short, the desire to conduct such operations will arise in a wide array of settings, and
in many of them the stakes will be quite high. This places considerable pressure on the
domestic legal framework that governs such operations.
In the pages that follow, I describe that framework in detail, emphasizing how Congress and
the executive branch have collaborated in recent years to create a system that facilitates—
but also monitors—precisely the sort of operations described above. I do so by breaking the
framework down into four constituent elements:
•  Authorization rules (which allocate decision-making authority between Congress
and the executive branch);
•  Process rules (which impact the decision-making process within the executive branch);
•  Transparency rules (which compel the executive branch to share information with
Congress); and
•  Substantive rules (which prohibit certain actions).

Authorization Rules
Military cyber operations, like military operations in general, raise complex separation of
powers questions. In what circumstances has Congress authorized such actions by statute,
thus rendering constitutional issues moot? To what extent can the executive branch act in
the absence of statutory authorization, relying instead on authority from Article II of the
Constitution? And what about Congress’s major effort to curb executive branch military
unilateralism, the War Powers Resolution?

Existing Statutory Authority
At the time of this writing in the summer of 2020, three statutes provide some degree
of authorization for military cyber operations. Two are generally applicable military
authorizations, while the third is specifically focused on USCYBERCOM.

Hoover Institution  •  Stanford University

 4

Let’s start with the two generally applicable military authorizations. First and most
famously, the 2001 AUMF12 remains on the books. It authorizes the president to use “all
necessary and appropriate force” against groups and individuals whom the chief executive
determines to have come within the AUMF’s scope. Second, the 2002 AUMF,13 relating to
Iraq, also remains active. Together, they eventually became the basis for the full spectrum
of military operations directed against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. These operations
came to include an array of cyber activities conducted by Joint Task Force-Ares.14 In contexts
properly associated with either or both of these AUMFs, therefore, the simplest answer to
the war powers question is that Congress has authorized the use of military force generally,
and this encompasses operations that happen to be carried out in the cyber domain.
However broad the two AUMFs may be, though, they are not limitless. And so it matters
whether there is any separate statute authorizing military cyber operations in other settings.
The answer is yes: Section 1642 of the John McCain National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for fiscal year 201915 eliminates any doubt about the authority of the executive
branch to conduct cyber activities in response to certain provocations. Specifically,
Section 1642 authorizes USCYBERCOM to “take appropriate and proportional action in
foreign cyberspace” in order “to disrupt, defeat, and deter” ongoing adversarial activity in
the cyber domain, though only where the National Command Authority—the president
and secretary of defense or their deputized alternates—determines that two conditions
have been met:
(1) there is “an active, systematic, and ongoing campaign of attacks against the
Government or people of the United States in cyberspace, including attempt[s] to
influence American elections and democratic political processes” and
(2) the entity deemed responsible for the campaign is Russia, China, North Korea, or Iran.

The importance of Section 1642 for the defend-forward concept should be apparent.
Section 1642’s triggering conditions read like a road map to the most strategically significant
areas in which the defend-forward concept might be employed: those involving systematic
adversarial activity conducted by any of the four countries usually considered primary
threats to the United States in the cyber domain. This is not an accident. The act’s legislative
history makes clear that Congress intended for it to prune away any lingering concerns
about whether USCYBERCOM has the authority to conduct cyber operations in these
circumstances.
Note, however, that the relative specificity of Section 1642 raises a further question: Do its
narrowing conditions imply that all other USCYBERCOM operations of the defend-forward
or offensive varieties are illegal, absent fresh legislation or a colorable AUMF argument?
No. The best understanding of Section 1642 is that it functions as a belt-and-suspenders

Robert Chesney  •  The Domestic Legal Framework for US Military Cyber Operations 

 5

provision, mooting separation-of-powers objections that might otherwise arise. It does not,
however, concede that those objections would have been well-taken without Section 1642.
(Certainly nothing in the text or legislative history suggests such an understanding
by Congress or the president.) From that point of view, the question that arises for
any operation that falls outside the scope of the AUMFs and Section 1642 is the same
question that existed prior to Section 1642’s passage: Does a given operation even require
congressional authorization in the first place, or does Article II of the Constitution confer
adequate authority for the executive branch to conduct the operation?

Authority to Conduct Cyber Operations Without Statutory Authorization
The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has in recent decades, under administrations of both
major political parties, employed a consistent framework to determine when a military
operation requires separation-of-powers analysis. That framework is described in both an
Obama-era analysis of the legality of using force against the Qaddafi regime in Libya in
2011 and again in a Trump-era analysis involving force against the Assad regime in Syria
in 2018. In each one, the OLC takes the position that the separation-of-powers issue arises
only when the military activity in question reaches the level of “war.” In this instance, war
is a constitutional term of art turning on a variety of factors, including whether service
members’ lives are at risk on a sustained basis.16 As the Syria opinion puts it: “Consistent
with that early recognition, we have repeatedly distinguished between limited hostilities
and prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S.
military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period.”17 Under that analysis, the
OLC concluded that a substantial (though localized) kinetic strike on a Syrian military
airfield did not rise to the level of war, nor did the much more substantial and sustained
campaign of airstrikes that ultimately played a key role in toppling the Qaddafi regime.
So long as that is the framework for determining when congressional authorization might
be required, military operations conducted in the cyber domain, standing alone, will not
likely qualify as war, barring the most extreme fact patterns. (For example, it is conceivable
that an operation that would deprive a large population of electricity for a long period
would entail enough anticipated harm to compel a different conclusion despite the absence
of boots on the ground, though even that is unclear under the OLC’s exceedingly narrow
approach.) Put simply, most if not all cyber operations, when analyzed standing alone, will
fall short of this standard and thus not require a constitutional war powers analysis.

What about the War Powers Resolution?
What of the War Powers Resolution of 1973?18 The WPR is best understood as an attempt
by Congress both to reinforce a particular vision of the Constitution’s distribution of war
powers and to generate a set of new transparency rules increasing congressional awareness
of the executive branch’s more significant decisions relating to the use of the military. I will
review those rules in the appropriately labeled section below. For now, I will focus on how

Hoover Institution  •  Stanford University

 6

the attempt to reinforce Congress’s conception of the distribution of war powers relates to
USCYBERCOM’s out-of-network operations.
The WPR addresses the distribution of war powers in two ways. First, it provides a
statement of Congress’s views on the doctrinal boundaries between the respective roles of
Congress and the president in this area. Second, it attempts to put teeth into this vision by
establishing a deadline for the withdrawal of US armed forces from certain situations absent
sufficient congressional authorization.
Let’s turn first to the WPR’s claims about the Constitution. As a mere statute, of course,
the WPR cannot actually alter the Constitution’s allocation of military authority between
Congress and the president. But since the details of the Constitution’s allocation are
themselves contested (as noted earlier), this part of the WPR might bear weight in
interpretive calculations with some audiences, and thus it warrants brief consideration here.
The WPR opens with an assertion of Congress’s view of when the president has the authority
“to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.” Specifically, it claims
that there are three such circumstances: “(1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its
territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”19 First, note that this list seems incomplete
insofar as it omits, for example, the use of the armed forces to protect citizens abroad.
That said, the provision hinges entirely on the meaning of hostilities. This is a statutory
term of art, and if it is interpreted to be coextensive with the OLC’s understanding of the
constitutional term of art war, then much if not all of the potential tension between this
language and the OLC’s constitutional analysis described above simply drops out.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the executive branch has interpreted hostilities that way. The best
illustration, including a summation of past executive interpretations, may be the testimony
in 2011 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of Harold Koh, at the time the
State Department legal adviser. He explained the Obama administration’s interpretation
of hostilities for the purpose of analyzing the WPR’s implications in the United States’
continuing role in the Libya conflict.20 Citing the course of practice since 1973 along with a
consistent interpretive practice by the executive branch, Koh identified a set of factors that
compelled the conclusion that America’s actions did not constitute the introduction of our
armed forces into hostilities—notwithstanding the existence of armed conflict and direct
participation by the United States in the form of airstrikes. Specifically: the mission had a
very limited purpose; the risk of US casualties was almost nonexistent since our role did not
include boots on the ground; the risk of unintended escalation also was almost nonexistent
for the same reason; and the military means employed were quite limited (and certainly far
short of a “full military engagement”). Koh cautioned, however, that the answer might be
different were any of these factors not present.

Robert Chesney  •  The Domestic Legal Framework for US Military Cyber Operations 

 7

As with the interpretation of war for purposes of constitutional analysis, the executive
branch’s restrictive interpretation of hostilities is contested. But insofar as the executive
interpretation continues to prevail in practice, as it did in Libya, it is clear that military
activities in the cyber domain, analyzed as a stand-alone proposition, would not constitute
the introduction of US forces into hostilities. The executive branch’s decision to prioritize in
the analysis the physical exposure of US service members foreordains this outcome.
In light of this analysis, the second feature of the WPR’s attempt to regulate the distribution
of war powers—that is, its attempt to establish an automatic deadline for the withdrawal
of US forces in the form of a sixty-day “clock”—has little practical relevance for military
operations in the cyber domain, at least when one analyzes such operations on a standalone basis. If cyber operations do not constitute the introduction of armed forces into
“hostilities” (or into situations where hostilities are imminent) in the first place, the sixtyday clock never starts running.
A note of caution before moving on from these authorization rules: It should be obvious
that the executive branch’s restrictive approach to both “war” and “hostilities” depends
upon an increasingly dated understanding of the manner and means through which the
United States projects military power. Disruptive technological changes with respect to
the array of capabilities for delivering kinetic attacks without placing service members in
range of hostile fire, not to mention the emergence of the cyber domain in its entirety,
are producing an ever-larger set of circumstances in which the United States can exercise
coercion without putting troops in harm’s way. To be sure, this dynamic should not
change the “war” and “hostilities” analyses if in both cases the ultimate determining
factor is indeed whether service members’ lives are in immediate danger. But if instead
considerations of escalation risk drive these analyses, their logical foundations are eroding.
All of which is another reason to continue to pay attention to the potential applicability of
the AUMFs and Section 1642 of the NDAA when analyzing particular operational proposals,
since those authorities obviate the “war” and “hostilities” questions where they apply.

Process Rules
Proceeding on the assumption that the executive branch as a whole has the authority to
conduct a particular military operation in the cyber domain (whether based on Section 1642,
one of the AUMFs, or Article II), the next question is whether the domestic legal architecture
requires compliance with certain decision-making procedures. More specifically, does the law
require the approval of a particular person before the operation can take place?
The idea that certain operations cannot occur without the approval of particular persons is
hardly foreign to military operations. From the commander in chief on down, it is common
to use this approach in order to ensure that matters of particular sensitivity are decided only
at higher levels in the chain. It is a matter of policy preference, expressed in the form of
rules of engagement, execute orders, orders from the combatant commander, and so forth.

Hoover Institution  •  Stanford University

 8

What we are not accustomed to seeing in the military context is legislation that effectively
does the same thing, mandating that certain military decisions be made only with the
approval of, say, the commander in chief.
Contrast that with the legal framework governing covert action—which, as we shall see,
has special relevance for the cyber domain. Famously, Congress in 1974 broke new ground
(in the so-called Hughes-Ryan Amendment21) by leveraging the power of the purse to insist
upon a documentable presidential role in authorizing covert action. Specifically, Congress
forbade the expenditure of funds by or on behalf of the CIA for overseas operations
intended for purposes other than intelligence collection, absent what would come to
be known as a presidential “finding.” This was a quaintly coy way of describing covert
action (i.e., operations intended to cause overseas effects where the sponsoring role of the
US government is not meant to be apparent or acknowledged) and mandating that the
president take personal, written responsibility for approving such operations.22
Why did Congress do this? The effect was to eliminate presidential “deniability”—that is,
the situation in which a president might plausibly claim to have not known of a program.
But the reason for doing it? The normative justification for mandating a presidential
finding—the public policy gain from doing so—is that the certainty of presidential
accountability naturally tends to harness the self-interest of an administration, increasing
incentives for it to screen out bad or unduly risky ideas ex ante. Indeed, over time this has
resulted in the executive branch’s adoption of vetting procedures through which proposed
covert action programs are filtered within the larger National Security Council system.23
Those procedures, notably, have a substantial interagency element to them, giving rise to
the possibility that agencies with different equities, such as the State Department, will have
a chance to weigh in on the wisdom and desirability of a proposed operation. The end result
is a system that is less quick and efficient than what existed before and one that might
even defeat some good-but-risky ideas. Yet on the whole it strikes a reasonable balance in
a situation that can entail unusually serious risks in the event of a miscalculation, risks
ranging from diplomatic friction to war.
If Congress had defined the scope of the covert action framework in institutional terms,
applying it solely to deniable operations conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency, then
we would now move on to ask whether Congress has adopted (or should adopt) something
comparable for military operations in the cyber domain. But Congress did not so limit the
covert-action framework. Rather, it created a two-step definition of covert action that left
ample room for debate over its scope. At step one, the definition is inclusive of all parts of the
US government: “covert action” as a default matter applies to any part of the US government
that implements an operation intended to have an overseas effect with the sponsoring
role of the United States neither apparent nor acknowledged. But at step two, the statute
excludes various situations, including “activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire
intelligence” as well as “traditional . . . ​military activities” (often referred to as “TMA”).24

Robert Chesney  •  The Domestic Legal Framework for US Military Cyber Operations 

 9

Note the relevance of the intelligence-collection exemption for military activities in the
cyber domain. There are many circumstances in which penetration of (and persistence
within) someone else’s network can fairly be described as activities whose “primary
purpose” is intelligence collection, even though it is foreseeable that the very same access
at some point might be used to generate an effect. If and when a decision is made to seek
such an effect, of course, some other exception—most likely TMA—must apply or else
the covert-action default rules will snap into place. But prior to that point, and for so long
as it can be said fairly that the operation is primarily about acquiring information, the
intelligence exception resolves the issue and obviates the need to wrestle with the question
of just what counts as TMA in the cyber domain. Then again, as I will explain in more
detail, characterizing an operation in this way rather than TMA potentially implicates the
transparency rules that require keeping the two congressional Intelligence Committees fully
apprised of significant intelligence activities. This fact alone might provide a significant
incentive (from the military’s perspective) for applying the TMA label instead.
All that being the case, what actually counts as TMA in the cyber domain? Had Congress
simply used the shorter phrase “military activities” in crafting this exception, it would not be
a difficult question. But that is not what Congress did. The T in TMA stands for traditional,
and this term has invited debate over the scope of the exception. That debate in turn has cast a
shadow over the decision-making process for some military activities in the cyber domain.25
The TMA-scope issue is not just a cyber-domain matter. It first became a significant issue
in the post-9/11 period thanks to noncyber, special-operations activities taking place away
from combat zones. It has since become an issue with respect to military operations in the
cyber domain as well.
In the two settings, the stakes are the same: If an operation is “in scope” for the TMA
exception, it can be approved without a written presidential “finding” (and without the
need for reporting to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, in accordance with
the transparency rules discussed in the next section). But if it does not qualify for the TMA
exception, the opposite is true.
Complicating matters further, if the TMA exception does not apply to a proposed operation,
an issue also might arise under Executive Order 12333’s default rule providing that the
CIA shall have responsibility for conducting “covert action” outside of contexts covered
by a declaration of war or at least a notification under the War Powers Resolution.26 The
president, of course, can choose to direct the military to conduct the covert activity instead
but in that case would need to make a specific determination on that point—thus ensuring
elevation of the issue to the White House level in any event.
In recent years, such issues have proved to be a significant source of friction in the approval
of military operations in the cyber domain. Such operations by their nature require

Hoover Institution  •  Stanford University

 10

concealment, at least at the stage of establishing and maintaining access to a system (though
concealment may or may not remain necessary at the point of seeking an operational effect
via that access), and at times they involve maintaining a presence on systems or networks in
contexts in which it would be preferable not to acknowledge American responsibility in the
event the presence is detected.
The fact that confusion would arise about TMA’s applicability in this circumstance is not
surprising. First, there has long been disagreement between those who focus on the word
traditional in TMA (and thus attempt to resolve the scope question by pondering whether
cyber operations are sufficiently analogous to military operations, with their longer
historical pedigree) and those who, instead, focus on the specific definitional compromise
that Congress and the administration of President George H. W. Bush worked out on this
point at the time of the relevant statutory enactment (in which case TMA applies to any
operation that is [a] both commanded and implemented entirely by service members
and [b] conducted in a context in which hostilities are ongoing or in which operational
planning for hostilities has been approved by the National Command Authority). Second,
even if everyone accepted and tried to apply the latter approach, hard questions might
(and presumably did) arise with respect to whether a particular proposed operation relates
sufficiently to a situation for which operational planning has been approved. Particularly
in the context of gray zone engagements in the cyber domain, it is not hard to imagine
circumstances for which that connection might be tricky to establish.
The first public sign of congressional concern about this issue emerged in 2011. The
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2012, enacted in December 2011, was
supported by a conference committee report that offered the following observation:
The conferees recognize that because of the evolving nature of cyber warfare, there
is a lack of historical precedent for what constitutes traditional military activities in
relation to cyber operations and that it is necessary to affirm that such operations may be
conducted pursuant to the same policy, principles, and legal regimes that pertain to kinetic
capabilities. The conferees also recognize that in certain instances, the most effective way
to deal with threats and protect U.S. and coalition forces is to undertake offensive military
cyber activities, including where the role of the United States Government is not apparent
or to be acknowledged.27

Those words seemed cryptic to those who were unaware of the ongoing disputes over the
scope and relevance of the TMA exception. But understood in that context, the passage was
reasonably clear: the conferees wanted to establish that the TMA exception does indeed
apply to deniable military cyber operations. Unfortunately, the corresponding language
in the statute itself fell short of the mark. Rather than state the TMA point with clarity,
Section 954 of the NDAA fiscal year 2012 states that military “offensive operations in

Robert Chesney  •  The Domestic Legal Framework for US Military Cyber Operations 

 11

cyberspace” are “subject to . . . ​the policy principles and legal regimes that the Department
follows for kinetic capabilities, including the law of armed conflict.”28 Read in context with
the legislative history, the reference to “legal regimes” could be understood as a veiled
attempt to settle the TMA question in favor of its applicability. But without that context,
this is anything but obvious. The issue accordingly persisted.
The language of Section 954 also gave rise to two other issues. First, even if Section 954
had been clear enough to settle the TMA issue related to military “offensive operations
in cyberspace,” a question of scope would nevertheless arise with respect to which cyber
operations count as offensive. The current-day language associated with “defending forward”
underscores the point: not all out-of-network activities are necessarily offensive in nature.
Second, Section 954 had the potential to give rise to further uncertainty because it also
contains language confirming the general authority of the Defense Department to conduct
such operations “upon direction by the President.” That formulation might have been
read to require presidential authorization on an operation-by-operation basis, in which case
Section 954 would have been somewhat akin to the covert-action process rules associated
with presidential “findings” (but without the statutory requirement that the authorization
be in writing and without the transparency-rule requirement of sharing the finding with
Congress). The language was ambiguous on this point, however, and could just as well be
read to mean that presidential authorization was required as a more general matter.
At any rate, Congress remained concerned about the TMA/covert-action issue, and in 2018
it returned to the subject with a far more specific and effective statutory intervention.
The conference report for the NDAA for fiscal year 2019 makes clear that Congress once
again felt that TMA-scope issues were generating unjustified friction for military cyber
operations. The conferees lamented that:
The Department of Defense faces difficulties within the interagency in obtaining mission
approval. One of the challenges routinely confronted by the Department is the perceived
ambiguity as to whether clandestine military activities and operations, even those short
of cyber attacks, qualify as traditional military activities as distinct from covert actions
requiring a Presidential Finding. As a result, with respect to actions that produce effects on
information systems outside of areas of active hostilities, the Department of Defense has been
limited to proposing actions that could be conducted overtly on attributable infrastructure
without deniability—an operational space that is far too narrow to defend national interests.
The conferees see no logical, legal, or practical reason for allowing extensive clandestine
traditional military activities in all other operational domains (air, sea, ground, and space)
but not in cyberspace. It is unfortunate that the executive branch has squandered years
in interagency deliberations that failed to recognize this basic fact and that this legislative
action has proven necessary.29

Hoover Institution  •  Stanford University

 12

Inspired by hope that the problem could be solved conclusively, Section 1632 of the NDAA
for fiscal year 2019 first specifies that any activity constituting a “clandestine military
activity or operation in cyberspace” necessarily qualifies as TMA.30 This clarification alone
was not enough to settle the question, however. Choosing to use the word clandestine as
a way to describe the type of operations at issue added an unnecessary layer of difficulty.
The word clandestine, after all, does not normally connote deniability, but simply secrecy.
The two concepts are distinct. Secrecy means that an operation is meant to be undetected.
Deniability implies that the US government’s sponsoring role is not meant to be apparent
or acknowledged. Without further clarification, therefore, the label “clandestine military
activity” would not necessarily encompass the very set of actions (i.e., deniable cyber
operations) that gave rise to the TMA/covert-action dispute in the first place.
Some further definitional language, accordingly, was needed in order for the “clandestine”
test to have the intended effect despite the term’s usual meaning. And Section 1632 duly
provided it. The phrase “clandestine military activity or operation in cyberspace” was
specially defined there as referring to military operations in cyberspace that not only are
clandestine in the traditional sense—that is, intended to go undetected—but also in the
distinct sense of deniability. More specifically, the statute provided that the phrase must be
understood to cover activities “marked by, held in, or conducted with secrecy, where the
intent is that the activity or operation will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”31
Having thus swept all instances of deniable military cyber operations into the TMA exception
(without respect to whether the operation would better be understood as offensive or defensive
in nature), Congress might have stopped. But having just ensured that no presidential findings
would be required (and, by extension, that no reporting to the Intelligence Committees would
be necessary), Congress then imposed a substitute rule of process.
Specifically, the same section (1632) also imposed a requirement that either the president
or the secretary of defense authorize the operation in question.32 To be sure, this is not as
demanding as a stipulation that the president alone make the necessary determination,
nor does it require that the authorization be reduced to writing. And given that the
authorization can be made at the secretary of defense level, it follows that this provision
does not necessarily harness the self-interest of the White House in a way that might
ineluctably lead to increased vetting, including voices from outside the military.
Nonetheless, it is not meaningless to insist upon such high-level authorizations.
A final note: Section 1632 contains one final condition, and it is one that proves to be a bit
of a mystery. In the relevant part, Section 1632 provides that the operation in question be
carried out:
(i) as part of a military operation plan approved by the President or the Secretary
in anticipation of hostilities or as directed by the President or the Secretary;

Robert Chesney  •  The Domestic Legal Framework for US Military Cyber Operations 

 13

(ii) to deter, safeguard, or defend against attacks or malicious cyber activities against the
United States or Department of Defense information, networks, systems, installations,
facilities, or other assets; or
(iii) in support of information related capabilities.33

At first blush, the existence of that final three-pronged condition—the trio of scenarios in
which a secret and deniable military cyber operation might qualify for automatic inclusion
in the TMA category—implied that the same old debate could continue to rage as to
other scenarios. And perhaps the range of “other” scenarios might be broad. But on closer
inspection, it seems quite the contrary. Focus on the first of the three eligible scenarios,
with an emphasis on the language italicized above. The phrasing “or” sets it off from the
first part of the sentence, making it an additional, fourth, eligible scenario. And it is a
broad one indeed, covering any situation in which the president or secretary of defense has
directed that an operation take place. Given that Section 1632 already requires the approval
of either of those two individuals, it appears that this three- or four-pronged element might
be doing no actual work.

Transparency Rules
This brings us to a topic already mentioned a few times above: transparency rules.
Transparency rules oblige executive branch actors to provide certain information to
Congress (or to subparts of Congress), if not also to the public. In theory, they serve the
important purpose of making it more reasonable for Congress to conduct oversight of
secret, highly sensitive activities and thus to be in a reasonable position to legislate or take
other actions as needed. They also have the salutary effect of ensuring that the executive
branch actors understand that someone from outside their immediate sphere will to some
extent be aware of what they do (thus incentivizing greater care). Indeed, in extreme cases,
transparency rules might allow these actors to intervene and stop undesirable activity. And
while it may be that transparency rules at times also constitute a vector through which
others are able to stop truly desirable activities without good enough reasons, that tradeoff provides an essential element of legitimacy in a situation in which we want to have
both rule of law in a democratic society and also the secrecy needed for national-security
activities to be carried out effectively.
As noted above, we long ago struck such a balance in regard to covert action. In particular,
for decades we have required that presidential findings for covert action be shared with the
Intelligence Committees and so too with important updates to existing findings. We have
parallel transparency rules for important intelligence-collection activities, moreover, and in
the course of actual practice a great deal more oversight takes place through interactions at
the staff level.

Hoover Institution  •  Stanford University

 14

With the TMA issue seemingly settled in favor of not treating military cyber operations as
covert action, the covert-action and intelligence-collection transparency rules fall by the
wayside. Congress has not left matters there, however. Instead, it has gradually constructed
a series of alternative transparency rules, geared toward the military and running to the
Senate and House Armed Services Committees.
As was the case with the TMA debate, attention to this issue originated not with
cyber-domain activities but, rather, with special operations activities conducted in physical
space. In particular, it originated with a desire to craft replacement transparency rules
concerning the killing or capturing of individuals that might take place outside of certain
recognized areas of hostilities. In a series of NDAA provisions enacted over a period of years,
Congress designated such scenarios “sensitive military operations” and mandated periodic
reporting about them to both Armed Services Committees.34
We now have something analogous for the cyber-domain activities described above in the
preceding section. In 2017, Congress borrowed from the “sensitive military operation”
transparency rule to create a nearly identical rule for “sensitive military cyber operations.”35
Specifically: the secretary of defense must submit a written notification to the Armed
Services Committees within forty-eight hours of any military cyber operation intended
to have effect in a foreign location other than ones in which US forces “are involved in
hostilities.”36
This requirement is the most tailored of the military cyber transparency rules, perhaps, but
it is not the only one.
First, back in 2013, Congress instituted an obligation for the secretary of defense to
provide “quarterly briefings on all offensive and significant military operations in
cyberspace carried out by the Department of Defense during the immediately preceding
quarter.”37 The briefings must be broken down with reference to each geographic and
functional command’s separate experience during the reporting period and must include
an “overview of authorities and legal issues applicable to the operations, including any
relevant legal limitations.”38 They also must address “any hostile cyber activity directed at
the command”39 in question and “any interagency activities and initiatives relating to” the
command’s cyber operations.40
Second, in 2017, Congress imposed a separate transparency rule requiring the secretary
of defense to notify the Armed Services Committees on a quarterly basis regarding the
application of the Pentagon’s “weapons review” process to cyber capabilities—that is, the
process of ex ante review of the legality of novel weapons as required by Department of
Defense Directive 5000.01. Congress also required forty-eight hours’ notification upon use
of any capability that has been the subject of such review.41

Robert Chesney  •  The Domestic Legal Framework for US Military Cyber Operations 

 15

Third, in late 2019 Congress enacted a different sort of transparency rule. As noted above,
one of the most important authorization rules in that legal architecture is Section 1642 of
the NDAA enacted in late 2018. The provision eliminates any doubt that USCYBERCOM
can conduct out-of-network operations in response to systematic hostile cyber activity
conducted by Russia, China, Iran, or North Korea. Critically, that provision contains an
embedded process rule in that it expressly lodges the authority to act under that provision
at the level of the National Command Authority. Then, in the NDAA for fiscal year 2020,
Congress enacted a related transparency rule. Henceforth, the secretary of defense must give
notice within fifteen days if the president delegates to the secretary any authority related to
military operations in cyberspace that would otherwise be lodged at the National Command
Authority level. That includes a description of the authority so delegated. Further, the
same provision requires the secretary to notify the Armed Services Committees of any
“concepts of operation” that the secretary may then approve under that delegated authority,
again within fifteen days. Notably, this operational notification must include an array of
particulars, including any actual activities that are conducted or planned to be conducted,
the objectives to be achieved, the countries where the activities may occur, and details
regarding any associated orders the secretary may have issued.42
Further research (in particular, extensive interviews with persons involved in
operationalizing these transparency rules over time) is needed to assess how well the rules
are functioning, both in absolute terms and in comparison to the analogous rules for
oversight of covert action and collection. For now, it is enough to observe that Congress
rapidly built a parallel transparency-rule architecture at much the same time it was
endeavoring to shield military cyber operations from the covert action and intelligence
legal frameworks, thus addressing in advance what otherwise might have been a significant
objection to the latter project.
A final note regarding the WPR: In addition to the distribution-of-powers rules discussed
above, the resolution is known for its transparency rules. Specifically, it requires
consultation and notification to Congress regarding the introduction of US armed
forces into hostilities or situations in which hostilities are imminent. And though some
administrations have questioned the constitutionality of that statutory obligation, all
have chosen to comply, or at least act “consistent with,” that obligation. But much like the
narrow reading of “hostilities” emphasized above, the use of cyber capabilities standing
alone—especially without boots on the ground—would not trigger this obligation.

Substantive Rules
The legal frameworks that regulate national-security-related activities include not just rules
of authorization, process, and transparency but also “substantive” rules, which simply
prohibit certain actions or outcomes. Sometimes those rules are sourced in our domestic
law, and sometimes they flow from international law. Sometimes it is both. With detainee

Hoover Institution  •  Stanford University

 16

treatment, for example, there are important domestic-law substantive rules (such as the
Torture Act and the War Crimes Act) and also important international-law rules (the Geneva
Conventions, for example).
Critically, the United States simply has not adopted cyber-specific domestic laws of this kind.
There is no statute or executive order, for example, that flat out forbids the implanting
of malware in industrial control systems associated with the electrical grid in a foreign
country. Nor have there been any significant proposals for statutes of that kind. Any
applicable substantive rules, as a result, are those that apply more generally rather than
being cyber specific. And there are no obvious examples of general domestic laws likely
to significantly constrain USCYBERCOM operations of the sort described earlier, such as
operations meant to disrupt Russian election interference or respond to Iranian military
actions in and around the Persian Gulf.
What of international law as a source of substantive constraints? This is the topic that
several others in this series will address. Here, I will simply observe that we do not as yet
have any cyber-specific international laws constituting substantive constraints. There is,
to be sure, much talk of cyber norms—that is, a hoped-for convergence of international
opinion regarding the moral or policy propriety of this or that action. But that should not
be confused with the formation of customary international law, let alone a treaty. What
we do have, instead, are general-purpose international law concepts that can be applied to
cyber-domain operations as much as any other.

Conclusion
The domestic legal framework for military cyber operations is surprisingly robust, considering
its recent vintage. Far more quickly than it did for earlier institutional innovations such as the
emergence of the CIA’s covert action capability, Congress has responded to the maturation
of USCYBERCOM by adopting relatively detailed rules of authorization, process, and
transparency. The resulting framework has gone far toward eliminating otherwise-debilitating
obstacles to the ability of USCYBERCOM to carry out its mission through out-of-network
operations. At the same time, though, it imposes increasingly detailed oversight mechanisms
that one hopes will induce desirable care and caution in making use of this greater freedom
of action. Time will tell if the interaction of these rules results in a stable and effective
equilibrium—perhaps sooner than we might wish, given the looming election, ongoing
military tensions with Iran and North Korea, and pandemic-related espionage.

NOTES
1 ​Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
2 ​Letter from Sen. Richard Blumenthal et al., to Christopher Krebs, Director, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency, Department of Homeland Security, and Gen. Paul M. Nakasone, Commander, US Cyber

Robert Chesney  •  The Domestic Legal Framework for US Military Cyber Operations 

 17

Command (April 20, 2020) (emphasis added), https://­w ww​.­blumenthal​.­senate​.­gov​/­imo​/­media​/­doc​/­2020​.­0 4​
.­20%20​-­%20CISA%20and%20CC%20​-­%20Coronavirus%20Cybersecurity%20​-­%20FINAL​.­pdf.
3 ​US Cyber Command, Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority 6 (2018).
4 ​US Dept. of Defense, Summary: Department of Defense Cyber Strategy 2018, at 7 (2018) (emphasis removed).
5 ​See, e.g., Monica Kaminska, Strauss Center, “Workshop Report: A Transatlantic Dialogue on Military Cyber
Operations,” August 13, 2019, https://­strausscenter​.­org ​/­wp​-­content​/­uploads​/­pdf​/­Amsterdam​-­Workshop​
-­Report​-­Final​- ­Oct​-­1​.­pdf (summarizing discussions from a two-day workshop in Amsterdam involving experts
from military, civilian, and academic institutions from seven countries); Jacquelyn G. Schneider, “Persistent
Engagement: Foundation, Evolution and Evaluation of a Strategy,” Lawfare (blog), May 10, 2019, https://­w ww​
.­lawfareblog​.­com​/­persistent​- ­engagement​-­foundation​- ­evolution​-­and​- ­evaluation​-­strategy.
6  Lyu Jinghua, “A Chinese Perspective on the Pentagon’s Cyber Strategy: From ‘Active Cyber Defense’ to
‘Defending Forward,’ ” Lawfare (blog), October 19, 2018, https://­w ww​.­lawfareblog​.­com​/­chinese​-­perspective​
-­pentagons​- ­cyber​-­strategy​-­active​- ­cyber​- ­defense​- ­defending​-­forward. For my response to that scholar, see
Robert M. Chesney, “An American Perspective on a Chinese Perspective on the Defense Department’s Cyber
Strategy and ‘Defending Forward,’ ” Lawfare (blog), October 23, 2018, https://­w ww​.­lawfareblog​.­com​/­american​
-­perspective​-­chinese​-­perspective​-­defense​-­departments​-­cyber​-­strategy​-­and​-­defending​-­forward.
7 ​See H.R. Rep. 115-874, at 1049 (2018) (Conf. Rep.).
8 ​See, e.g., Mark Pomerleau, “Here’s How Cyber Command Is Using ‘Defend Forward,’ ” Fifth Domain,
November 12, 2019, https://­w ww​.­f ifthdomain​.­com​/­smr​/­cybercon​/­2019​/­11​/­12​/­heres​-­how​- ­cyber​- ­command​-­is​
-­using​-­defend​-­forward.
9 ​See Ellen Nakashima, “U.S. Cyber Command Operation Disrupted Internet Access of Russian Troll Factory on
Day of 2018 Midterms,” Washington Post, February 26, 2019, https://­w ww​.­washingtonpost​.­com​/­world​/­national​
-­security​/­us​-­cyber​-­command​-­operation​-­disrupted​-­internet​-­access​-­of​-­russian​-­troll​-­factory​-­on​-­day​-­of​-­2018​
-­midterms​/­2019​/­02​/­26​/­1827fc9e​-­36d6​-­11e9​-­af5b​-­b51b7ff322e9​_ ­story​.­html; Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Begins First
Cyberoperation Against Russia Aimed at Protecting Elections,” New York Times, October 23, 2018, https://­w ww​
.­nytimes​.­com​/­2018​/­10​/­23​/­us​/­politics​/­russian​-­hacking​-­usa​-­cyber​-­command​.­html.
10 ​This echoes the recent announcement that the Australian Signals Directorate (roughly equivalent to the
American NSA) has been conducting disruption operations targeting criminal hacking crews that are exploiting
the pandemic with ransomware attacks targeting Australians. See Senator the Hon. Linda Reynolds CSC, “On
the Offensive Against COVID-19 Cyber Criminals,” press release, April 7, 2020, https://­w ww​.­minister​.­defence​.­gov​
.­au​/­minister​/­lreynolds​/­media​-­releases​/­offensive​-­against​- ­covid​-­19​- ­cyber​- ­criminals. Doing the same to statesponsored attackers, of course, involves greater risks.
11 ​Robert M. Chesney, “The Legal Context for CYBERCOM’s Reported Operations Against Iran,” Lawfare (blog),
June 24, 2019, https://­w ww​.­lawfareblog​.­com​/­legal​-­context​-­cybercoms​-­reported​-­operations​-­against​-­iran.
12 ​Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
13 ​Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
14 ​For a collection of declassified documents concerning JTF-Ares, see “Joint Task Force ARES and Operation
GLOWING SYMPHONY: Cyber Command’s Internet War Against ISIL,” National Security Archive, August 13, 2018,
https://­nsarchive​.­g wu​.­edu​/­briefing​-­book​/­cyber​-­vault​/­2018​- ­08​-­13​/­joint​-­task​-­force​-­ares​-­operation​-­glowing​
-­symphony​-­cyber​-­commands​-­internet​-­war​-­against​-­isil.
15 ​Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 1636, 2132 (2018).
16 ​See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legal Counsel, to the Attorney General, “Authority to Use Military Force in Libya,” April 1, 2011; Memorandum

Hoover Institution  •  Stanford University

 18

Opinion from Steven A. Engel, Office of Legal Counsel, to the Counsel to the President, “April 2018 Airstrikes
Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities,” May 31, 2018.
17 ​Engel, “April 2018 Airstrikes” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
18 ​50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48 (2018).
19 ​50 U.S.C. §§ 1541(c).
20 ​For the full text of his statement, and the colloquy at the hearing, see Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 89 (2011) (statement of Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, US Department
of State). For a summary of his testimony, see Robert M. Chesney, “An Overview of Harold Koh’s Testimony on the
WPR at Today’s SFRC Hearing,” Lawfare (blog), June 28, 2011, https://­w ww​.­lawfareblog​.­com​/­overview​-­harold​
-­kohs​-­testimony​-­wpr​-­todays​-­sfrc​-­hearing.
21 ​Section 32 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, 88 Stat. 1804, amended the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.),
adding a new section 662 as described in the text above.
22 ​The provision is now found in 50 U.S.C. § 3093.
23 ​See, e.g., National Security Decision Directive 159, Covert Action Policy Approval and Coordination Procedures,
January 18, 1985, https://­w ww​.­cia​.­gov​/­library​/­readingroom​/­docs​/­CIA​-­RDP97M00248R000500190016​-­9​.­pdf.
24 ​50 U.S.C. § 3093(e)(1)–(2).
25 ​For an in-depth exploration of this debate and its practical relevance, see Robert M. Chesney, “MilitaryIntelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate,” Journal of National Security Law and Policy
5, no. 2 (January 24, 2012).
26 ​Executive Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, at § 1.7(a)(4) (Dec. 4, 1981) (“No agency except the Central
Intelligence Agency [or the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war declared by the Congress or during
any period covered by a report from the President to the Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution,
Public Law Number 93-148] may conduct any covert action activity unless the President determines that another
agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective.”).
27 ​H.R. Rep. 112-329, at 686 (2011) (Conf. Rep.) (commenting on Section 954).
28 ​National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 954(1), 125 Stat. 1298, 1551 (2011)
(emphasis added).
29 ​H.R. Rep. 115-874, at 1049 (2018) (Conf. Rep.) (commenting on Section 1632).
30 ​10 U.S.C. § 394(c) (2018).
31 ​10 U.S.C. § 394(f)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
32 ​10 U.S.C. § 394(f)(1).
33 ​10 U.S.C. § 394(f)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
34 ​For an overview, see Robert M. Chesney, “Expanding Congressional Oversight of Kill/Capture Ops Conducted
by the Military: Section 1036 of the NDAA,” Lawfare (blog), December 8, 2016, https://­w ww​.­lawfareblog​.­com​
/­expanding​- ­congressional​- ­oversight​-­killcapture​- ­ops​- ­conducted​-­military​-­section​-­1036​-­ndaa.
35 ​10 U.S.C. § 395 (emphasis added).
36 ​10 U.S.C. § 395(c)(1)(C)(i). Originally, Congress specified that such operations only triggered reporting
requirements if they constituted either “offensive” operations or else operations to respond to “ongoing or
imminent” threats. In late 2019, Congress abandoned that effort, albeit in an awkward way. The statute now
specifies that the operation in question must be either offensive or defensive in nature. That pairing covers the

Robert Chesney  •  The Domestic Legal Framework for US Military Cyber Operations 

 19

waterfront, meaning that the language no longer is doing any work. See Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 1632, 133 Stat. 1198,
1746 (2019) (codified as amended in 10 U.S.C. § 395) (replacing the “ongoing or imminent” threat language).
37 ​10 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2018).
38 ​10 U.S.C. § 484(b)(2).
39 ​10 U.S.C. § 484(b)(1).
40 ​10 U.S.C. § 484(b)(3).
41 ​10 U.S.C. § 396 (2018).
42 ​Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 1642, 133 Stat. 1198, 1751–52 (2019) (This provision now appears in the notes
accompanying 10 U.S.C. § 394).

The publisher has made this work available under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
license. To view a copy of this license, visit https://­creativecommons​.­org ​/­licenses​/­by​-­nd​/­4​.­0.
Copyright © 2020 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
26 ​25 ​24 ​23 ​22 ​21 ​20  

7 ​6 ​5 ​4 ​3 ​2 ​1

The preferred citation for this publication is Robert Chesney, The Domestic Legal Framework for US Military Cyber
Operations, Hoover Working Group on National Security, Technology, and Law, Aegis Series Paper No. 2003 (July 29,
2020), available at https://www.lawfareblog.com/domestic-legal-framework-us-military-cyber-operations.

Hoover Institution  •  Stanford University

 Working Group on National Security,
Technology, and Law

About the Author

ROBERT CHESNEY
Professor Robert Chesney holds
the James A. Baker III Chair in the
Rule of Law and World Affairs at
the University of Texas School of
Law, where he also serves as the
associate dean for academic affairs.
Separately, he serves the broader
university as director of the Robert
Strauss Center for International
Security and Law. He is a cofounder
of Lawfare, the leading online
source for national security law
news and analysis, and also cohosts
the popular weekly show the
National Security Law Podcast.

Hoover Institution, Stanford University
434 Galvez Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6003
650-723-1754

The Working Group on National Security, Technology, and
Law brings together national and international specialists
with broad interdisciplinary expertise to analyze how
technology affects national security and national security
law and how governments can use that technology to defend
themselves, consistent with constitutional values and the rule
of law.
The group focuses on a broad range of interests, from
surveillance to counterterrorism to the dramatic
impact that rapid technological change—digitalization,
computerization, miniaturization, and automaticity—are
having on national security and national security law. Topics
include cybersecurity, the rise of drones and autonomous
weapons systems, and the need for—and dangers of—state
surveillance. The group’s output will also be published on
the Lawfare blog, which covers the merits of the underlying
legal and policy debates of actions taken or contemplated
to protect the nation and the nation’s laws and legal
institutions.
Jack Goldsmith is the chair of the National Security,
Technology, and Law Working Group.
For more information about this Hoover Institution Working
Group, visit us online at http://­w ww​.­hoover​.­org​/­research​-­teams​
/­national​-­security​-­technology​-­law​-­working​-­g roup.

Hoover Institution in Washington
The Johnson Center
1399 New York Avenue NW, Suite 500
Washington, DC 20005
202-760-3200