United States Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520 August 27,2020 The Honorable Eliot Engel, Chairman Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515 Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your August 17 letter to Secretary Pompeo regarding Chairmen Grassley (R-IA) and Johnson's (R- WI) investigations and documents produced to the Senate Committee on Finance (SFC) and the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs (HSGAC). The Department categorically rejects your baseless assertion that the Department may have acted inappropriately or violated any law by producing documents to two Senate Committees, in your words, in "what appears to be partisan misuse of resources." We welcome the opportunity to share the facts on this matter. First, your accusation that the Department is politicizing its responses to Congressional oversight requests and producing documents only to Republicans while refusing to respond to oversight requests from Democrats is inaccurate and misleading. All of the documents produced by the Department in response to the two Senate Committees' investigatory requests are provided to the Republican Chairmen and the Democratic Ranking Members of those Committees, consistent with long-standing practice. In addition, after reaching a mutual accommodation last year, the Department produced to your Committee, along with the Chairs and Ranking Members of the House Oversight and Reform Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), more than 18,000 pages of documents pursuant to your investigation concerning alleged prohibited personnel practices. With respect to the "outstanding" requests you have cited as evidence of the Department's partisan misuse of resources, many of those principally relate to the now-concluded impeachment inquiry. As the Office of Legal Counsel, Departmt:nt of Justice made clear in an O.L.C. Slip Opinion of January 19,2020 and Counsel to the President Pat Cipollone did as well in his letter of October 8, 2019, the Executive Branch, including the Department of State, would not and will not comply with those Constitutionally-invalid requests. Furthermore, the Department has, in fact, responded to all of the Committee's inquiries identified in your May 21, 2020 letter, consistent with the accommodations process. Enclosed for your reference is a summary of each of the Department's responses to those requests. Second, with respect to Chairmen Grassley and Johnson's investigation, the Department has engaged in an accommodation process, consistent with longstanding principles of mutual accommodation, absent of political or partisan influences, based upon the clear statement of purpose in the Committees' initial November 2019 letter to the Department. That purpose was to "better understand what actions, if any, the Obama administration took to ensure that policy decisions relating to Ukraine and Burisma were not improperly influenced by the employment and financial interests of family members." If the letter the Department received had indicated that the Committees' expressed investigatory purpose was to "smear" Vice President Biden or any other political figure, or to score political points in any other way as you allege, the Department would have considered any potential response in that light. That, however, is not the request the Department received. As such, it certainly does not follow that the Department's participation in the Constitutionally mandated accommodation process with another Congressional Committee, conducting an authorized investigation, is inappropriate or unlawful because you disagree with the merits of your colleagues' oversight priorities. Third, your letter suggests the Department should treat differently Committees that have "primary" jurisdiction of the Department of State and those that do not. This is a distinction without a difference in this instance. The Senate Committees' request was made, in part, by a Committee that is authorized by Rule XXV of the Standing Rule:s of the Senate to investigate "the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of all agencies and departments of the Government." Because the Department of State is a part of the Government, th(~Committee has jurisdiction and the Department is responding to a duly authorized investigation by two committees of the United States Senate. We can assure you that if the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) made a request identical or substantially similar to the HSGAC inquiry, the Department would engage HFAC in the same process of accommodation. Fourth, you claim that the Department has "rushed out" documents to the Senate Committees and characterized the Department's production process as a "rapid, all-hands on deck" response. In fact, the Committees' investigation was initiated nearly a year ago in November 2019, and the Department is still processing documents that are potentially responsive to the Senate Committees'requests. Fifth, your August 20, 2020 letter claimed that Secretary Pompeo "committed to mobilize additional resources to search for yet more documents" during his July 30, 2020 testimony in front of the SFRC. This characterization is, again, inaccurate and lacks precision. In response to a question from Senator Johnson, Secretary Pompeo stated that the Department would do its best to be responsive, but he did not indicate one way or the other whether that effort would involve additional resources or working within existing resources. Here is the direct quote from Secretary Pompeo in response to Senator Johnson's question during the hearing: "Senator, we'll do our best to be responsive. We understand the requests. We're working through it. Yes, I'm familiar with the information that you set forth there with respect to the behavior that took place in October of 20 16 in the State Department." In light of your August 20,2020 letter, the Department would also like to clearly explain the role of the Executive Secretariat, which continues to be mischaracterized based upon a complete misunderstanding of a leaked document from the Department. The Executive Secretariat is institutionally responsible for ensuring that the records of the n~partment are not accessed or released without Federal law and Department regulations being followed. As required by the Foreign Affairs Manual, the Secretariat coordinates searches for any documents via a written "tasker" - like the one that was inappropriately leaked and cited in your letter. This is a required step in the process of authorizing searches and collections in response to Congressional requests for documents as well as documents in response to Freedom of ]lnformation Act (FOIA) requests. The position of the Executive Secretariat in no way intervenes on policy issues or the final decisions on what documents are sent externally from the Department, whether to Congress or in FOIA, and it certainly is not partisan in nature. Finally, contrary to the characterization in your letter, the original request from the Senate Committees included specific date ranges and SUbjects. As is frequently the case, the Department's search period reflects the incoming request letter from a Committee, and that was the case with this particular search as well. For practical reasons, taskers include a return date, which is an internal matter. Return dates are not arbitrary but are determined through consultations with the individuals who would be conducting the work. The Department would also like to clarifY the Department's pra(;tice regarding so-called courtesy copies. The Department believes it is imperative that the Department and Committee operate from a shared, accurate understanding as it relates to the historical approach of the provision of so-called "courtesy copies". The Department is aware of two examples cited by your staff or others that purport to demonstrate that the Department has a long-standing policy of producing courtesy copies of documents produced to one congressional committee to another congressional committee: (1) a June 1 email from your staff claimed that Department of State produced courtesy copies regarding a number of topics to then-Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee Chuck Grassley during the 114th Congress, and (2) the production of documents to the Select Committee on Benghazi in 2014 and 2015 that were also produced to other congressional committees. There were instances during the 114th Congress when, at the request of Chairman Grassley, documents that the Department produced via the FOIA process were also provided to his Committee. These productions were made as a courtesy to Chairman Grassley because he had open investigations that related to the same subject matter as the responsive FOIA documents. This is consistent with the Department's practice, as explained in our letters to you from June 3 and August 7,2020, that there are instances when, by request from a Committee, documents produced via FOIA are provided to Committees as a "courtesy." As another example, your Committee has received copies from FOIA productions related to your Committee's investigation into prohibited personnel practices and continues to do so. Additionally, the Department recently provided you with courtesy copies of documents produced via FOIA that related to the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which correlated with one of your outstanding investigatory requests. All other Department records previously produced to Chairman Grassley were provided in response to Senate judiciary Committee investigations of specifie matters within that Committee's jurisdiction, as set out in numerous investigative letters sent by Chairman Grassley to the Department. The Department would be happy to provide, upon request, an exemplary, non-exclusive, list of investigative letters sent by Chairman Grassley to which the Department was responding through 2018. In summary, while the Department provided courtesy copies of FOIA productions to Chairman Grassley, the Department is not aware of any "courtesy copy" documents originally produced for another Congressional Committee that were also produced to Chairman Grassley in the 114th Congress without there being an investigative request covering the subject-matter of such documents from his Committee. The other example that has been cited of the Department's production of so-called "courtesy copies" from the Department is in relation to the multiple congn~ssional inquiries in the aftermath of the 2012 terrorist attack on the Department's facility in Benghazi, Libya, that resulted in the death of four Americans, including u.s. Ambassador Christopher Stevens, foreign service officer Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty. The Department evaluated each of the Committees' requests in determining the appropriate response as part of the mutual accommodation process. The Department ultimately did provide tens of thousands of pages of documents to the Select Committee on Benghazi that it had previously produced to other Congressional Committees, as the Select Committee initiated a new investigation of previously investigated matters. It is important to note that these multiple productions of documents to different Committees was not based on a request for the same documents - it was based upon the fact that the stated scope of each investigation was very similar. As such, the Department reviewed all documents in light of all substantive committee requests and concluded that the documents reviewed were responsive to multiple investigations. In that instance, nearly all the Congressional Committees were seeking to learn what happened in 2012 in Benghazi and how to minimize the chance that something like that ever happened agaiin. In short, as previously indicated, it is not "longstanding" policy to provide courtesy copies of documents produced to one Committee of Congress to another Committee, simply based on only a request to receive courtesy copies of such documents. What is the case, is that if two Congressional Committees open an investigation into identical or very similar matters, the Department will respond to each, and if the mutual accommodatiion process results in production of documents, such productions are likely to significantly overlap and perhaps be identical. As such, with respect to your July 31, 2020 subpoena related to the Department's production of documents for Senate committees, the Department notes that your request is not focused on an identical or similar investigatory subject as the Senate Committees' investigation. As such, if the core objective of the Committee's interest is to receive documents produced to the Senate Committees, the Department respectfully recommends sending the Department a letter that substantively articulates a revised request. If you can confirm by letter that the Committee is, in fact, substantively investigating identical or very similar corruption issues involving Ukraine and corrupt influence related to U.S. foreign policy, the Department is ready to commence production of documents responsive to such a request. Such responsive documents are very likely to significantly overlap and perhaps be identical to what has been provided on that subject to the two Senate Committees, consistent with the precedents and accommodation process described above. If the Committee is not willing to request an investigation into this matter, an alternative approach the Department would respectfully suggest would be for you to discuss within the Legislative Branch your request for courtesy copies of documents already produced to the Chairman and Ranking Member of the two Senate Committees. With respect to the other documents sought in the subpoena, namely "Since January 3, 2019, any and all documents referring, relating to or regarding the actual , requested, or potential production of documents to Congress," the Department reiterates its position in two respects: (1) this attempt at compulsion is defectively premature because it bypasses the constitutionally required accommodation process, in that there was no previous request from the Committee in any way for these documents until the subpoena, and (2) it appears on its face to violate the Separation of Powers doctrine because it seeks to review the Executive Branch's constitutional function of responding to Congressional oversight requests and demands production of internal deliberative communications about responding to Congress that are subject to a heightened Executive Branch confidentiality interest. Sincerely, Ryan M. Kaldahl Acting Assistant Se:cretary of State Bureau of Legislative Affairs Enclosure: As stated. Cc: The Honorable Michael McCaul, Ranking Member House Committee on Foreign Affairs Department of State Respons.~s to Committee on Foreign Affairs OversiJi~htRequests • President Trump's communications with Russian president Vladimir Putin (March 4, 2019) Department Response: • Counsel to the President Pat Cipollone responded on behalf of the Department via letter (March 21, 2019) • Jared Kushner's diplomatic activities (March 28, 2019) Department Response: • The Department of State responded via letter and provided State Department logistical information responsive to the request and referring the Committee to the White House for general questions regarding Mr. Kushner's (June 12,2019) • Allegations that the Administration politicized and distorted intelligence regarding nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (May 16,2019) Department Response: • As requested in your letter, the Department provided the House Foreign Affairs Committee and House Intelligence Committee staffa classified briefing with 12 experts from various bureaus; HASC staffers were invited to the briefing but did not attend (June 11, 2019) • State Department spending of taxpayer funds at Trump properties (July 22, 2019) Department Response: • The Department made its first production of documents responsive to the request via hard copy delivery to the Committee (August 26, 2019) • The Department is processing another production in response to the Committee's follow up letter of March 2, 2020, which production should be transmitted in the corning week. • Subpoena to the Honorable Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State (September 27,2019) Department response: • Secretary Pompeo responded via letter (October 1, 2019) • Counsel to the President Pat Cipillone responded on behalf of the Department via letter (October 8, 2019) • Allegations that the physical security of then-Ambassador was threatened (January 15,2020) Department Response: Marie "Mash a" Yovanovitch • • The Department provided Chairman Engel's senior committee staff a classified briefing on the security of Department personnel and the U.S. Mission in Kiev to accommodate the request for information in the January 15 letter (January 17,2019) The Department subsequently responded via letter confirming that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security had been following this matter and coordinating with the Federal Bureau oflnvestigations (FBI) and offered to providl~ additional information involving investigations sought by the Committee in the appropriate setting (January 22,2019) • Allegations of mismanagement and nepotism by an Ambassador (February 5, 2020) Department Response: • The Department responded via letter detailing steps taken to ensure Ambassador Marks was briefed on the laws, rules, and regulations that would govern her service (February 27,2020) • Ambassador Marks met with bipartisan HF AC staff (February 28, 2020) • Cables regarding the COVID-19 virus that you have claim«;~dprovide "substantial evidence" on the origins of the virus (April 15, 2020). Department Response: • The Department produced the two requested Department of State cables redacted pursuant to the Freedom ofInformation Act via a letter (July 16, 2020) • The Administration's decision to suspend U.S. funding oftbe World Health Organization in the middle of a global health pandemic (April 27, 2020) Department Response: • • The Department responded to your April 22 and April 27 letters regarding the World Health Organization (WHO) (May 12,2019 and May 20, 2019) The President responded on behalf of the Department, which letter was included in the Department's May 20 response, provided a detailed timeline of WHO's failures and outlines the way forward (May 18 letter) THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON March 21, 2019 The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings Chairman Committee on Oversight and RefOlTI1 House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 The Honorable Eliot Engel Chairman Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 The Honorable Adam B. Schiff Chairman Pelmanent Select Committee on Intelligence House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Messrs. Chairmen: Thank you for your letters of February 21, 2019 and March 4,2019 to Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney. Those letters seek information relating to the Presidential Records Act (the "PRA") as well as the President's actions in conducting foreign diplomacy. As I have previously stated, we will continue to work to accommodate the Committees' legitimate oversight interests while at the same time respecting the separation of powers and the constitutional prerogatives of the President. This good faith approach is guided by and consistent with long-standing precedent reflected in the holdings of the Supreme Court and other courts, in similar positions taken by past administrations of all political parties dating back to the Founding, and in numerous opinions of the Department of Justice"s Office of Legal Counsel. It also has repeatedly been recognized by Congress itself. It is in th~:spirit of seeking accommodation and cooperation where possible, and always guided by a respect for the constitutional roles of each branch of government, that I provide this response. First, to the extent that your letters seek information related to the White House's compliance with the PRA, we have already provided several responses to similar requests for this infOlmation. Specifically, I refer you to the prior responsive letters fi-omthe Office of White House Counsel dated April 11, 2017, October 10, 2017, and December 10, 2018, which were provided to the Committee on Oversight and Refonn, and which we believe fully address your questions. As stated in those letters, the Administration is committed to compliance with the PRA and takes appropriate steps to ensure that Presidential records are appropriately managed, preserved, and available for transfer to the National Archives and Records Administration. If Chainnen Cummings, Engel & Schiff Page 2 you have any remaining questions regarding this issue, we are available at your convenience to discuss this matter further. Second, your letters also seek detailed infonnation conceming the President's conduct of foreign relations and his communications with his most senior advisors regarding these matters. For example, the letter of March 4 expressly seeks detailed infonnation related to the Presidenfs meetings and telephone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin, as well as confidential communications between the President and his advisors before and after those meetings and telephone calls. The March 4 letter also asks that "all White House or Executive Office of the President employees, contractors, or detailees, whether current or fOlmer, with knowledge of these communications," submit for transcribed interviews concerning the same subject. While we respectfully seek to accommodate appropriate oversight requests, we are unaware of any precedent supporting such sweeping requests. Rather, the Supreme Comi and administrations of both parties have consistently recognized that the conduct of foreign affairs is a matter that the Constitution assigns exclusively to the President. It is settled law that the Constitution entIusts the conduct of foreign relations exclusively to the Executive Branch, as it makes the President "the sole organ of the federal govemment in the field of international relations." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); see also Chicago & S Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman SS. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948) ("The President also possesses in his own right certain powers conferred by the Constitution on him as ... the Nation's organ in foreign affairs."). In keeping with Supreme Court precedent, the Executive Branch has consistently taken the position, across administrations of both political patties, that the President has exclusive authority to conduct diplomacy with foreign nations. See, e.g., Foreign Affairs with Respect to Haiti, 20 Op. O.L. C. 5, 7 (1996) ("[T]he conduct of foreign affairs is an exclusive prerogative of the executive branch"); Bill to Relocate United States Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, 19 Op. O.L.C. 123, 124 (1995) ("It is well settled that the Constitution vests the President with the exclusive authority to conduct the Nation's diplomatic relations with other States."); Common Legislative Encroachments on Executive Branch Authority, 13 Op. O.L.C. 248, 256 (1989) ("The President has the responsibility, under the Constitution, to detelmine the fOlm and manner in which the United States will maintain relations with foreign nations."). This unbroken recognition that the Constitution assigns the conduct of foreign affairs exclusively to the Executive Branch is critical to a fair assessment of the Committee's legitimate oversight needs, because the Supreme Court has also made clear that, "[s]ince Congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot in,uire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the Government." Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1959) (emphasis added); see also Scope o/Congressional Oversight and Investigative Power With Respect to the Executive Branch, 9 Op. O.L.C. 60, 62 (1985) ("Congress' power of inquiry must not be pelmitted to negate the President's constitutional responsibility for managing and contI'oIling affairs committed to the Executive Branch."). Accordingly, since the Founding, the Executive Branch has cOlTectlyand successfully asserted that information concerning the conduct of foreign affairs is, constitutionally, within the Chahmen Cummings, Engel & Schiff Page 3 exclusive control of the Executive Branch and Congress cannot demand its disclosure. "History is replete with examples of the Executive's refusal to produce to Congress diplomatic communications and related documents because of the prejudicial impact such disclosure could have on the President's ability to conduct foreign relations." Foreign Affairs with Respect to Haiti, 20 Op. O.L.C. 5, 6 (1996) (citing History of Refusals by Executive Branch Officials to Provide Information Demanded by Congress, 6 Op. O.L.C. 7S1 (1982». Indeed, the very first administration emphatically made this exact point when President George Washington declined a House committee's request for copies of documents relating to the negotiation of the Jay Treaty with Great Britain. See id at 753 (1982) (noting that President Washington sent a letter to Congress stating, "[t]o admit, then, a right in the House of Representatives to demand, and to have, as a matter of course, all the papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign Power would be to establish a dangerous precedent.") Even if the exclusive constitutional assignment of foreign relations authority to the Executive did not in itself limit congressional oversight power in this arena, it is equally wellestablished that privilege principles categorically protect the President's diplomatic communications. The President must be free to engage in discussions with foreign leaders without fear that those communications will be disclosed and used as fodder for partisan political purposes. And foreign leaders must be assured of this as well. No foreign leader would engage in private conversations with the President, or the President's senior advisors, if such conversations were su~iect to public disclosure (or disclosure to c,ommittees of Congress). For the same reasons, the President must be free to consult with his senior advisors-to ask frank questions, solicit and receive recommendations, weigh options, and debate policy alternatives. Otherwise, those advisors would be less likely to provide the President with candid advice. This is why, from the Nation's beginning, Presidents from all political parties have determined that the law does not require the Executive Branch to provide Congress with documents relating to confidential diplomatic communications between the President and foreign leaders. For example, the Clinton Administration determined that documents requested by a congressional committee were not subject to disclosure because the documents related to the President's conduct of foreign affairs with Haiti. See Foreign Affi1irs with Respect to Haiti, 20 Op. O.L.C. 5,5 (1996). In that case, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (then known as the Committee on International Relations) requested, among other things, documents relating to communications between President Clinton and the leaders of Haiti. In response, Attorney General Janet Reno concluded that the President had the authority under the Constitution to protect the confidentiality of diplomatic communications. Id As Attorney General Reno explained, the Constitution clearly gives the President "the authority to assert executive privilege to protect the confidentiality of diplomatic communications." Foreign Affairs with Respect to Haiti, 20 Op. O.L.C. 5, 5 (1996); see also In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (infonnation protected under executive privilege "includes information that would result in disruption of diplomatic relations with foreign governments.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Hallan v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 990 n.S3 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("The privilege extends to matters affecting diplomatic relations between nations."). That being said, the Constitution requires both the Executive and the Legislative Branch to engage in an accommodation process. United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. Chainnen Cummings, Engel & Schiff Page 4 1977) ("[E]ach branch should take cognizance of an implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation tluough a realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches. "). That process is not simply "an exchange of concessions or a test of political strength," but rather "an obligation of each branch to make a principled effOlt to acknowledge, and if possible to meet, the legitimate needs of the other branch." Assertion of Executive Privilege in Response to a Congressional Subpoena, 5 Op. O.L.C. 27, 31 (1981). The White House takes the accommodation process seriously. Since the beginning of the 116th Congress, we have made a principled effort at accommodation based on we:ll-settled legal precedent. While we work to provide your Committees with information necessary for legitimate oversight, including by pelmitting the inspection of documents and offering briefings, as appropriate, the Committees appear up to now to be unwilling to make reasonable efforts in retUlTIto accommodate the legitimate interests of the Executive Branch. Rather, it appears that the practice of the Committees has been to request information that the Committees have no legal entitlement to receive and then to unfairly criticize the White House for simply adhering to consistent bipartisan past practice in its response. This White House is conducting the accommodation process based on well-settled law and in the very same manner as past Republican and Democratic administrations. Importantly, the Committees' letters cite no legal authority for the proposition that another branch of the government can force the President to disclose diplomatic communications with foreign leaders or that supports forcing disclosure of the confidential internal deliberations of the President's national security advisors. To the contrary, the only justifications the March 4 letter cites to SUppOltthe Committees' information requests do not pass muster under the principles announced in the Supreme Court decisions cited above. The letter asselts that the Committees need to determine the "impact of [the President's] communications on U.S. foreign policy" and to detelmine whether President Trump's conduct of foreign relations is "in the national interest." March 4 letter at 2. With all respect, the Constitution assigns the President the role of charting the course of U.S. foreign policy and detelmining which diplomatic communications advance the national interest. Policy disagreements with the President's decisions on those matters do not create a legislative right to review the President's diplomatic communications with foreign leaders. The only other justification cited in the Mar'ch 4 letter is an asselted need for the Committees to assess whether "applicable laws, regulations, and agency procedures with respect to diplomatic communications" with foreign leaders "have been complied with and remain sufficient." Ii But, other than references to the PRA (which is addressed above), the letter cites no such law or regulation. And under longstanding precedent detailed above, Congress cannot require the President to disclose his confidential communications with foreign leaders. This office is adhering to well-established precedent in order to protect the ability of this President, and future Presidents, to manage effectively the foreign affairs of the United States and to receive the advice and assistance of their close advisors in ,conducting diplomacy. We welcome the opportunity to discuss the clear' legal principles applilcable to this matter at your ear'liest convenience. Chainnen Cummings, Engel & Schiff Page 5 Finally, your March 4 letter states that "staff on all three of our Committees will jointly schedule a meeting with the White House Counsel shortly to discuss this request and ensure the scope is properly understood by the White House," but we have received no communication regarding this matter. In any event, as always, we would welcome the opportunity to meet with you to discuss this matter as part of the accommodation process. If you would like to discuss any ofthe issues addressed in this letter, please let me know. cc: The Honorable Jim Jordan, Ranking Member, Committee on Oversight and Reform The Honorable Michael McCaul, Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign Affairs The Honorable Devin Nunes, Ranking Member, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence United States Department of State '. Washington, D. C. 20520 JUN 1 2 2019 The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, Chairman Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515 Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter of March 28 regarding your review of 1Nhite House Senior Advisor Jared Kushner's February 2019 travel to the Middle East. Please find enclosed Department of State logistical information msponsive to your request. The Department refers you to the White House with regard to Mr. Kushner's travel generally. Please protect the enclosed documents, as they include internal operational details. In sharing such information for the limited purpose of responding to the Committee's request, the Department is not in any way waiving any legal privileges that apply to this information. The public release of any portion of the enclosed documents is not authorized by this communication' and, should you wish to disclose any document or portions thereof, the Department asks that you provide it with a reasonable opportunity to inform the Committee of any sensitive information that should be safeguarded. We hope this information is helpful to you. Please let us know if we may be of further assistance. Sincerely, ClfJ($;}Mary Elizabeth Taylor Assistant Secretary Bureau of Legislative Affairs Enclosures: As stated. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON October 1. 2019 The Honorable Eliot L. Engel. Chairman Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515 Dear Mr. Chairman: We are in receipt of your September 27, 2019 letter requesting the Department make available five current and fom1er DepaI1ment officials for depositions. to voluntarily I am concerned with aspects of your request. described more fully belo\\.. that can be understood only as an attempt to intimidate. bully, and treat improperly the di.stinguished professional ohhe Depa!1ment of State. including several career Foreign Service Oflicers. whom the Committee i now targeting. I have also been made aware that Committee staff has been ending intimidating communications to career Department profes ionals. who have specifically a ked for Committee ommunication' to be channeled through the Bureau of Legi lative Affairs. a is customar:. Let me be clear: I will not tolerate such tactics, and [ will use all means at my di po al to prc\'ent and expo any attempts to intimidate the dedicated professionals whom r am proud to lead and -~r\'c alongside at the Department of tate. Your letter al 0 raises significant legal and procedural concerns. First, your letter raise fundamental legal questions related to the authority oftlle Committee to compel an appearance for a deposition solely by virtue of these letters. Your letter implies that you have sought to compel Department officials to appear for depositions on the identified dates. yet the Committ e has not i', LIedany subpoenas for depositions, and we are not aware of any other authority by v;hich the committee could compel appearance ar a deposition. The HOLlse Rules also require the Committee to provide a Notice of Deposition. but your letter contains no such notice and othe[\\ise fails to l11"'etthe requirements of those rules. It therefore appears that your letter rna) only he read as a request for a \'oluntary appearance of the tiw Dt~partment officials. Second, your letter provides a woefully inadequate 0PPol1unity for the Department and the requested v.itnesses to prepare. These individuals have retained, or mao be retaining. private counsel, as is their constitutional right. and in the course of the Department' discussions with these individual . several have indicated that they need more time both 10 retain and to consult v•.ith private counsel. In addition. State Department counsel must consult with these oflicials and their counseL once retained. regarding the Department's legitimate interests in safeguarding potentially privileged and classified information. The proposed dates for the depositions do not provide adequate time for the Department and its employees 10 appropriately prepare. -2- Third. your letter. and subsequent communications by Committee staft~ indicate that the Committee intends to prevent State Department counsel from participating in the depositions of CUlTentand fom1er Department officials. This amounts to an attempt to circumvent the Executive Branch's unquestionably legitimate constitutional interest in protecting potentially privileged information related to the conduct of diplomatic relations. This information may also remain subject to federal rules relating to the unauthorized disclosure of classified intormation. As the Departm~nt of Justice ha made clear, a congressional committee may not validly prohibit agency counsel trom being present during an employee d~position. because such an exclusion "'vvould impair the President's constitutional authority to control the disclosure of privileged information and to supervise the Executive Branch's communications with Congress ..·j Therefore. the five officials subject to your letter may not attend any interview or deposition without counsel from the Executive Branch present to ensure that the Executive Branch's constitutional authority to control the disclosure of confidential intc)lmation. including deliberative matters and diplomatic communications, is not impaired. Fourth, the invitations the Committee sent to the tive Department officials include requests that each oftbem personally produce a vast amount of documents. These requests appear to duplicate the subpoena that was previously served on the Secretary of State. The requested records constitute the property of the DepaJ1ment of State and are subject to restrictions on the unauthorized disclosure of classified infc)rmation and various Executive Branch privileges. By purporting to induce individual Depar1ment professionals and career Foreign Service Officers to produce materials that are not theirs to produce - which could potentially constitute a violation of numerous civil and criminal statutes and regulations if proper procedures are not followedthe Committee has engaged in an act of intimidation and an invitation to violate federal records la\vs. Finally. you have asserted that failure by Department officials to meet your demonstrably inadequate timeline for vollU1tary appearances "shall constitute evidence of obstruction." There is no legal basis for such a threat. Given the serious substantive and procedural deficiencies in the Committee' requests. including the Committee's apparent effort to circumvent Executiv Branch constitutional interests in having Department counsel present at any depositions. the Committee's assertion lacks any recognized legal hasis. I urge you to exercise restraint in making uch unfounded statements in the future. The Department also acknowledges receipt of the subpoena communicated by separate letter dated September 27.2019 and intends to respond to that subpoena by the noticed return date of October 4,2019. , Department of Ju (ice, Office of Legal Counsel. Slip Opinion (May 23, 2019) ("Congress may not con tirutionaliy prohibit agency cOllnsel from accompanying agency employees called to testify aboLlt matters thaI potentially involve informarion protected by executive privilege.") -3- Based on the profound procedural and legal deficiencies noted above, the Committee's requested dates for depositions are not feasible. The Department will be in further contact with the Committee in the near future as we obtain further clarity on these matters. Sincerely yours. I i . ,,11/0'" I Michael R. Pompeo Cc: The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, Ranking Member House Committee on Foreign Affairs THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON October 8, 2019 The Honorable Nancy Pelosi Speaker House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 The Honorable Eliot L. Engel Chairman House Foreign Affairs Committee Washington, D.C. 20515 The Honorable Adam B. Schiff Chairman House Permanent Select COlmnittee Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20515 011 The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings Chairman House Committee on Oversight and Reform Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Madam Speaker and Messrs. Chairmen: I write on behalf of President Donald J. Trump in response to your numerous, legally unsupported demands made as part of what you have labeled-contrary to the Constitution of the United States and all past bipartisan precedent-as an "impeachment inquiry." As you know, you have designed and implemented yom inquiry in a maImer that violates fundamental fairness and constitutionally mandated due process. For example, you have denied the President the right to cross-examine witnesses, to call • witnesses, to receive transcripts of testimony, to have access to evidence, to have counsel present, and many other basic rights guaranteed to all Americans. You have conducted your proceedings in secret. You have violated civil liberties and the separation of powers by threatening Executive Branch officials, claiming that you will seek to punish those who exercise fundamental constitutional rights and prerogatives. All of this violates the Constitution, the rule of law, and evelY past pl·ecedellt. Never before in our history has the House of Representatives-under the control of either political party-taken the American people down the dangerous path you seem determined to pursue. Put simply, you seek to overturn the results of the 2016 election and deprive the American people of the President they have fi.'eelychosen. Many Democrats now apparently view impeachment not only as a means to undo the democratic results of the last election, but as a strategy to influence the Ilext election, which is barely more than a year away. As one member of Congress explained, he is "concerned that if we don't impeach the President, he will get reelected."! Your highly partisan and unconstitutional effort threatens grave and lasting damage to our democratic instiultions, to our system offree elections, and to the American people. I Interview with Rep. AI Green, MSNBC (May 5, 2019). Speaker Pelosi, and Chairmen Engel, Schiff, and Cummings Page 2 For his pali, President Trump took the unprecedented step of providing the public transparency by declassifying and releasing the record of his call with President Zelenskyy of Ukraine. The record clearly established that the call was completely appropriate and that there is no basis for your inquiry. The fact that there was nothing wrong with the call was also powerfully confirmed by Chairman Schiff s decision to create a false version of the call and read it to the American people at a congressional hearing, without disdosing that he was simply making it all up. In addition, information has recently come to light that the whistleblower had contact with Chairman Schiffs office before filing the complaint. His inJitiaidenial of such contact caused The Washington Post to conclude that Chairman Schiff "clearly made a statement that was false.,,2 In any event, the American people understand that Chairman Schiff cannot covertly assist with the submission of a complaint, mislead the public about his involvement, read a counterfeit version of the call to the American people, and then pretend to sit in judgment as a neutral "investigator." For these reasons, President Trump and his Administration reject your baseless, unconstitutional efforts to overturn the democratic process. Your unprecedented actions have left the President with no choice. In order to fulfill his duties to the American people, the Constitution, the Executive Branch, and all futme occupants of the Office of the Presidency, President Trump and his Administration cannot participate in your partisan and unconstitutional inquiry under these circumstances. I. Your "Inquil1''' Is Constitutionally Invalid and Violates Basic Due P.·ocess Rights and the Separation of Powers. Your inquiry is constitutionally invalid and a violation of due process. In the history of our Nation, the House of Representatives has never attempted to launch an impeachment inquiry against the President without a majority of the House taking political accountability for that decision by voting to authorize such a dramatic constitutional step. Here, House leadership claims to have initiated the gravest inter-branch conflict contemplated under our Constitution by means of nothing more than a press conference at which the Speaker of the House simply announced an "official impeachment inquiry.,,3 Your contrived process is unprecedented in the 2 Glenn Kessler, Schiff's False Claim His Committee Had Nol Spoken 10 the Whistleblower, Wash. Post (Oct. 4, 2019). 3 Press Release, Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Remarks Announcin~ Impeachment Inquiry (Sept. 24, 2019). Speaker Pelosi, and Chail111enEngel, Schiff, and Cummings Page 3 history of the Nation,4 and lacks the necessary authorization for a valid impeachment proceeding.5 The Committees' inquiry also suffers fro111a separate, fatal defect. Despite Speaker Pelosi's commitment to "treat the President with fairness,,,6 the Committees have not established any procedures affording the President even the 1110stbasic prote,~tions demanded by due process under the Constitution and by fun.amental fairness. Chairman Nadler of the House Judiciary Committee has expressly acknowledged, at least when the President was a member of his own party, that "[t]he power of impeachment ... demands a rigorous Ilevelof due process," and that in this context "due process mean[s] ... the right to be infonned of the law, of the charges against you, the right to confront the witnesses against you, to call your own witnesses, and to have the assistance of counsel.,,7 All of these procedures have been abandoned here. These due process rights are not a matter of discretion for the Committees to dispense with at will. To the contrary, they are constitutional requirements. The Supreme Court has recognized that due process protections apply to all congressional! investigations.8 Indeed, it has been recognized that the Due Process Clause applies to impeachment proceedings.9 And precedent for the rights to cross-examine witnesses, call witnesses, and present evidence dates back nearly 150 years. 10 Yet the Committees have decided to deny the President these elementary rights and protections that form the basis of the Amerilcanjustice system and are protected by the Constitution. No citizen-including the President-should be treated this unfairly. 4 5 6 7 Since the Founding of the Republic, under unbroken practice, the House has never undertaken the solemn responsibility of an impeachment inquiry directed at the President without Hrst adopting a resolution authorizing a committee to begin the inquiry. The inquiries into the impeachments of Presidents Andrew Johnson and Bill Clinton proceeded in mUltiple phases, each authorized by a separate House resolution. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 581, I05th Congo (1998); H.R. Res. 525, 105th Congo (1998); III Hinds' Precedents § § 2400-02, 2408, 2412. And before the Judiciary Committee initiated an impeachment inquiry into President Richard Nixon, the Committee's chairman rightfully recognized that "a[n] [inquiry] resolution has always been passed by the House" and "is a necessary step." III Deschler's Precedents ch. 14, § 15.2. The HOllse then satisfied that requirement by adopting H.R. Res. 803, 93rd Congo (1974). Chairman Nadler has recognized the importance of taking a vote in the HOllse before beginning a presidential impeachment inquiry. At the outset of the Clinton impeachment inquity-where a floor vote was held-he argued that even limiting the time for debate before that vote was improper and thal "an hour debate on this momentolls decision is an insult to the American people and another sign that this is not going to be fair." 144 Congo Rec. HI 00 18 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler). Here, the House has dispensed with any vote and any debate (11 all. Press Release, Nancy Pelosi, Transcript of Pelosi Weekly Press Conference Today (Oct. 2, 2019). Examining fhe Allegations of Misconduct Agaillst IRS COl1/missioner John Koskinell (Part II): Hearillg Before the H. Comm. 011 the Jlldicim)', 1I4th Congo 3 (2016) (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler); Background alld Histo/y of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 011 the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Congo 17 (1998) (statement of Rep. Jen'old Nadler). g See, e.g., Watkins v. Ullited States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957); Quilln v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955). 9 See Hastillgs V. United States, 802 F. Supp. 490, 504 (D.D.C. 1992), vacated on other grounds by Hastillgs v. Ullited Stales, 988 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1993). See, e.g., III Hinds' Precedents § 2445. 10 Speaker Pelosi, and Chairmen Engel, Schiff, and Cummings Page 4 To comply with the Constitution's demands, appropriate procedures would include-at a minimum-the right to see all evidence, to present evidence, to call witnesses, to have counsel present at all hearings, to cross-examine all witnesses, to make objections relating to the examination of witnesses or the admissibility of testimony and evidence, and to respond to evidence and testimony. Likewise, the Committees must provide for the disclosure of all evidence favorable to the President and all evidence bearing on the credibility of witnesses called to testify in the inquiry. The Committees' current procedures provide nOlle of these basic constitutional rights. In addition, the House has not provided the Committees' Ranking Members with the authority to issue subpoenas. The right of the minority to issue subpoenas-subject to the same 111lesas the majority-has been the standard, bipartisan practice in all recent resolutions authorizing presidential impeachment inquiries. I I The House's failure to provide co-equal subpoena power in this case ensures that any inquiry will be nothilng more than a one-sided effort by House Democrats to gather information favorable to their views and to selectively release it as only they determine. The House's utter disregard for the established procedural safeguards followed in past impeachment inquiries shows that the current proceedings are nothing more than an unconstitutional exercise in political theater. As if denying the President basic procedural protections were not enough, the Committees have also resOlted to threats and intimidation against potential Executive Branch witnesses. Threats by the Committees against Executive Branch witnesses who assert common and longstanding rights destroy the integrity of the process and brazenly violate fundamental due process. In letters to State Depaltment employees, the Committees have ominously threatenedwithout any legal basis and before the Committees even issued a subpoena-that "[a]ny failure to appear" in response to a mere letter reqllest for a deposition "shall constitute evidence of obstruction.,,12 Worse, the Committees have broadly tlueatened that if State Department officials attempt to insist upon the right for the Department to have an agency lawyer present at depositions to protect legitimate Executive Branch confidentiality interests-or apparently if they make any effort to protect those confidentiality interests (It (Ill-these officials will have their salaries withheld. 13 The suggestion that it would somehow be problematic for anyone to raise longestablished Executive Branch confidentiality interests and privileges in response to a request for a deposition is legally unfounded. Not surprisingly, the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice has made clear on mUltiple occasions that employees of the Executive Branch who have been instructed not to appear or not to provide particular testimony before Congress based on privileges or immunities of the Executive Branch cannot be punished for II H.R. Res. 581, 105th Congo (1998); H.R. Res. 803, 93rd Congo (1974). 12 Letter from Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, HOllse Committee on Foreign Affairs" et aI., to George P. Kent, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of State 1 (Sept. 27,2019). 13 See Letter fi'om Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, House Committee on Foreign AftaiI's, et aI., to John 1. Sullivan, Deputy Secretary of State 2-3 (Oct. I, 2019). Speaker Pelosi, and Chairmen Engel, Schiff, and Cummings Page 5 following such instructions.14 Current and fOlTIlerState Department officials are duty bound to protect the confidentiality interests of the Executive Branch, and the Office of Legal Counsel has also recognized that it is unconstitutional to exclude agency counsel from participating in congressional depositions.ls In addition, any attempt to withhold an official's salary for the assertion of such interests would be unprecedented and unconstitutional.I6 The Committees' assertions on these points amOlUltto nothing more than strong-arm tactics designed to rush proceedings without any regard for due process and the rights of i.ndividuals and of the Executive Branch. Threats aimed at intimidating individuals who assert these basic rights are attacks on civil liberties that should profoundly concern all Americans. II. Tbe Invalid "Impeachment Inquiry" Plainly Seel January 22. 2020 The Honorable Eliot L. Engel. Chairman Committee on foreign Affairs U.S. Hou,'e of Representatives Washington. DC 20515 Dear Chairman Engel: Thank you for your January 15 letter expressing concem over the possible surveillance of a U.S. ambassador. Th safety of the men and women who conduct diplomacy on behalf of the United Stales is a matter of critical importance to the Department. We are glad you share our passionate commitment to this principle. The Department provided your senior committee staff a classified briefing on January 17 on the security Department personnel and the U.S. Mission in Kiev. As indicated in the briefing, the Bureau Diplomatic Security ha been following this matter and coordinating with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) since the conceming infonnation first became known to the Dc:panment late on January 14, the same time these messages wer'e released to the public. We are aware that some Congressional personnel may have possessed copies of text messages pertaining to this possible surveillance as early as January 12, and that Congressional per onnel may have additional relevant information in their possession as additional messages were released to the public late last week. or or As you can understand, any etlort by the Department to either investigate a potential securit)concern, or to take steps to ensure the safety of specific officials. relies on the timely transmission of all relevant information to the Diplomatic Security Service. For this reason. I ask that you please transmit as soon as possible any additional information that you or your colleagues may have which could assist us in further understanding, investigating, and responding to any potential threat to DepaJ1ment personnel or facilities. Any such inlolmation can be passed by Congressional personnel to the DepaJ·tment through the Offices of the Sergeants at Anns, which maintain close and continuing relationships with law enforcement agencies, including the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. While the Departrnem is not in a position to provide information involving investigation ., we hope that the <.:Iassified brieting provided to your stafr on January 17 has accommodated the request j()r information contained in your January 15 Jetter. Should the commi.ttee have additional questions within the scope of the information discussed in the January 17 briefing with your staff, we would we happy to fevie\ .•• ' and respond in the appropriate setting. Thank you for supporting the Department's continued efforts to ensure the safety of its personnel. Sincerely, Brian J. Bulatao Under Secretary of State for Management U.S. Department of State cc: The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, Ranking Member Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives Washington. DC 20515 United States Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520 February 27, 2020 The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, Chairman Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your February 5 letter regarding U.S. Embassy Pretoria and Ambassador Lana Marks. The Department shares your commitment to addressing any allegations or evidence of misconduct by Department personnel, to include prohibited management practices or violations of applicable ethics rules. The Department's interest and objective has always been to set the Ambassador up for success which includes ensuring that her conduct conforms to the traditionally high ethical standards of the Department of State. Immediately upon her confirmation and prior to her departure to post in November 2019, Department leadership ensured Ambassador Marks was briefed on the laws, rules, and regulations that would govern her service. As soon as the Department became aware of potential issues regarding her compliance with these policies and procedures, senior leaders engaged her directly to provide her additional guidance and direction, both before and after she arrived at post. Department leaders continue to provide guidance and support to the Ambassador and the personnel at Embassy Pretoria as necessary to ensure the mission's success. The Department has made a significant effort to substantively addn:ss the questions and concerns raised by your staff related to management practices and personnel matters at the Embassy. In November 2019, the Department responded to questions your staff :)ent by email confirming the Ambassador's son's status as a Member of Household (MOH) and detailing the relevant rules and regulations pertaining to MOHs at post. In January, the Department furnished additional, detailed responses to staff questions regarding the Ambassador's son, the Ambassador's social media use, and the voluntary curtailment and departure of the Depuly Chief of Mission in January. The Department requested that the information not be shared publicJIyas it pertained to internal, sensitive personnel matters that are subject to privacy considerations. Considering these sensitivities as well as respecting the committee's important oversight role, the Department is prepared to consider providing the committee with additional information in response to specific and relevant inquiries so long as it can do so consistent with preserving the ability of the Department to duly execute its internal management obligations and protect the rights of all involved. Further, the Department would ask the committee to please share any information it receives alleging prohibited conduct involving Department employees so that such al1egations can be appropriately addressed as soon as possible. We understand your staff and Ambassador Marks arranged to meet to discuss these issues this week. We look forward to working with the committee on these important matters. Sincerely, ~~Ior Assistant Secretary of State Bureau of Legislative Affairs United States Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520 The Honorable Eliot Engel, Chairman Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515 JUL 16 2020 Dear Mr. Chairman: In response to your May 4 letter, enclosed for your information are the two Department of State cables redacted pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, und,er which they have been produced to plaintiffs and requestors. In reviewing these records, please bear in mind that U.S. embassies around the world observe and report on many things: political conditions, economic conditions, developments in technology and human rights, amqng many other matters. Ibis re:porting includes developments in science and health care. Some embassies host personnel of U.S. technical agencies on the regular embassy staff. Even where such technical experts serve on embassy staff, there are also career Foreign Service officers who are trained to follow specific topics. One of the enclosed cables (18 WUHAN 38) was written based upon a field visit by two such Foreign Service officers. The other enclosed cable (18 BEIJING 138) was not based upon a specific field visit, but was written by non-technical embassy staff, and represents a survey of historical and current information gathered from open sources and Embassy Beijing contacts along with limited impressions of embassy staff. These cables we:re reviewed by USG experts attached to the Embassy, who work on these matters on a regular and continuing basis. These cables are now two years old, and as with all topical reporting from U.S. embassies, represent a snapshot of observations at the time of their writing. Should you need further assistance, please do not hesitate to contlct us. Sincerely, Ryan M. Kaldahl Acting Assistant Secretary Bureau of Legislative Affairs Enclosures: As stated. Cc: The Honorable Michael McCaul, Ranking Member Committee on Foreign Affairs UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED SBU MRN: 18 BEIJING 138 Jan 19. 20181 190739Z JAN 18 AMEMBASSY BEIJING WASHDC. SECSTATE ROUTINE 13526 SHLH,ETRD. ECON,PGOV, CN SENSITIVE 17 WUHAN 48 Date/DTG: From: Action: E.O.: TAGS: Captions: Refe'rence: Subject: China Opens First Bio Safety Level 4 Labl:>ratory I. (SBU) Summary and Comment: The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) has recently established what is reportedly China'5 first Brosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) laboratory in Wuhan. This state-of-the-art facility is designed for prevention and control research on diseases that require the highest level ofbiosafety and biosecurity containment. Ultimately, scientists hope the lab will contribute to the development of new antiviral drugs and vaccines, but its current productivity is limited by a shortage of the highly trained technicians and investigators required to safely operate a BSL-4 laboratOIv and a lack of claritv in related Chinese. government nolicies and guidelines.I(b)(5) I (b)(5) 1(b)(5) I End Summary and Comment. China Investing in Infectious Disea~ Control 2. (U) Between November 2002 and July 2003, China faced an outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). which, according to the World Healith Organization, resulting in 8,098 cases and leading to 774 deaths reported in 37 countries. A majority of cases occurred in China, where the fatality rate was 9.6%. This incident convinced Cillina to prioritize internatienal cooperation for infectious disease control. An aspect of this prioritization was China'S work with the Jean Merieux BSL-4 Laboratory in Lyon, France, to build China's first high containment laboratory at Wuhan's Institute ofViro!ogy (WlV), an institute under the auspices of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). Construction took 11 years and $44 million USD, and construction on the facility was completed on January 31, 2015. Following UNCLASSIFIED Page 1 of 3 UNCLASSIFIED two years of effort, which is not unusual for such facilities, the wry lab was accredited in February 2017 by the China National Accreditation Service for Conformity Assessment. It occupies four floors and consists of over 32,000 square feet. wrv leadership now considers the lab operational and ready for research on class-four pathogens (P4), among which are the most virulent viruses that pose a high risk of aerosolized person-ta-person transmission. Unclear Guidelines on Virus Access and a Lack of Trained Talent lmpede Research 3. (SBU) In addition to accreditation, the lab must also receive permission from the National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) to initiate research on specific highly contagious pathogens. According to some WIV scientists. it is unclear how NHFPC determines what viruses can or cannot be studied in the new laboratory. To date, WIV has obtained permission for research on three viruses: Ebola virus, Nipah virus, and Xinjiang hemorrhagic fever virus (a strain of Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever found in China's Xinjiang Province). Despite this permission, however, the Chinese government has not allowed the WIV to import Ebola viruses for study in the BSL-4 lab. Therefore, WIV scientists are frustrated ami have pointed out that they won't be able to conduct research project with Ebola viruses at the new BSL-4 lab despite of the permission. (b)(6) 0 1 )(6) jrhus, while the BSL-4 lab is ostensibly fully accredited, its utilization is limited by lack of access to specific organisms and by opaque government review and approval processes. As long as this situation continues, Beijing's commitment to prioritizing infectious disease control - on tl)e regional and international level, especially in relation to highly pathogenic viruses, remains in doubt X6) ~ noted that the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and invei~tigatorsneeded to safely operate this high-contaiiunent laboratory. University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston (UTMB), which has one of severa] well-established BSL-4 labs in the United States (supported by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAll) ofNIH)), has scientific collaborations with WIV, which may help alleviate this talent gap over time. Reportedly, researchers from GTMB are hel in train technicians who work in the wrv BSL-4 lab. Despite this b)(6) ey would welcome more help from U.S. and intemafiona orgaruzattons as ey esta "gold standard" operating procedures and training courses for the first time in China. As China is building more BSL·4 labs, including one in HaroiD VeterinaIy Researeb Institute subordinated to the Chinese ~: Agricultutal Sciences (eAAS) for veterinary research ustX6) he training for technicians and investigators working on dangerous pathogens will ce I y be in demand. r Despite Limitations, WIV Researchers Produce SARS Discoveries UNCLASSIFIED Page 2 of 3 UNClASSIFIED 6. (SBU) The ability ofWIV scientists to undertake productive research despite limitations on the use of the new BSL-4 faGilig is demonstrated bJ a recent publicatton on the origins of SARS. Over a five-year study, )(6) (and their research team) widely sampled bats in Yunnan province with funding support from NIAIDINUI, USAID, and several Chinese funding agencies. The study results were published in PLoS Pathogens online on Nov. 30,2017 (I), and it demonstrated that a SARS-like coronaviruses isolated from horseshoe bats in a single cave contain all the building blocks of the pandemic SARS-coronavirus genome that caused the human outbreak. These results strongly suggest that the highly pathogenic SARS-coronavirus originated in this bat population. Most importantly, the researchers: also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARScoronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-Iike disease. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats and study of the animalhuman interface.critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and preventionE] r){5) WIV scientists are allowed to study the SARS-like coronaviruses isolated tram bats while t ey are precluded frt>m studying human-disease causing SARS corona virus in their new BSL-4 lab until permission for such work is granted by the NHFCP. l 1. Hu B, Zeng L-P, Yang X:..L, Ge X-Y, Zhang W. Li B, et al. (20 J17) Discovery of a rich gene pool of bat SARS-related coronavirus. Signature: provides new insights tato the origin of St\RS BRANSTAD Drafted By: Cleared By: Approved By: Released By: Info: Dissemination coronaviruses PLoS Pathog 13(11): e1006698. https:lldoi.orgll0.1371/journa1.ppat.l006698 b)(6) .._________ CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE Rule: ] ROOTTNE Archive C9PY UNCLASSIFIED SBU UNCLASSIFIED Page 30f 3 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED SBU MRN: Date/DTG: From: Action: E.O.: TAGS; Captions: Reference: Subject: 18 WUHAN 38 Apr 19. 20181 190551Z APR 18 AMCONSUL WUHAN WASHDC. SECSTATE ROUTINE 13526 SHlH, PGOV, CN, PREl, TBIO. KGHI. CDC, EAID, KHIV, IN, JP, TW, TSPl, PINS, SENV SENSITIVE A) 18 BBJING 138 B) 17 BEIJING 2458 C) 11 MUMBAI 630 D) 17 TOKYO 716 E) 13 SEOUL 790 China Virus Institute Welcomes More U.S. Cooperation on Global Health Security 1. (SBU) Summary with Comment: China's Wuhan Institute of Virology, a globalleadcr in virus research, is a key partner for the United States in protecting global health security. Its role as operator of the just-launched Biosafety Level 4 (or "P4',) lab -- the first such lab in China-opens up even more 0 i . s fi r x ert exch n e . I . . 'age of trained staff (Ref A). )(5) ~o-m--m-e-n~~-----------------------------------------~ End Summary with 2. (U) Wuhan Institute of Virology researcbers and staff gave an oVlerviewof the lab and current cooperation with tbe United States to visiting Environment, Science. Technology and Health Counsellor Rick Switzer and Consulate Wuhan Consul General Jamie Fouss in late March. In the last year. the institute has also hosted visits from the National Institutes of Health (NIH). National Science Foundation, and experts from the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston. The institute reports to the Chinese Academy of Scienc(:s in Beijing. P4 Lab is Open and Transparent. Officials Emphasize 3. (SBU) The Wuhan P4 lab, referring to labs with the highest level of safety precautions, became fully operational and began working with live viruses early this year. Institute officials said they believed it is the only operational P4lab in Asia aside from a U.S. Centers for Disease UNCLASSIFIED Page 1 of 4 UNCLASSIFIED Control (CDC)-supported facility in Pune, India (Ref C). Clrlna plans to stand up a second P4 lab in Harbin. Institute officials said Japan's biosafety labs are "old" and lack cutting-edge equipment, so they cruWder Japan's labs to be "P3 Plus" (Note: the Japanese government says it has one P4-level lab in the Tokyo suburbs, though its activities are limited, and Japan is building a new P4 lab in Nagasaki, see RefD. Taiwan operates at least ~ P4lab. South Korea was close to opening a P4 lab as of last year, see RefE. End.Note.) Wuhan's lab is located about 20 miles from the eity center in Zhengdian district, and the institute plans to gradually consolidate its other training, classroom and lab facilities at that location. 4. (U) Officials described the lab as a "regional node" in the global biosafety system and said it would play an emergency response role in an epidemic or pandemk. The lab's English brochure highlighted a national security role, saying that it "is an effective measure to improve China's availability in safeguarding national bio-safety if[a] possible biologi~l warfare or terrorist attack happens." 5. (SBU) Institut~ officials said ther\! would be 'TlOlitedavailability" for international and domestic scientists who had gone through the necessary approval p:rocess to do research at the lab. They stressed that the lab aimed to be a "worldwide, open platfonn" for virology. They said they welcomed U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) experts, noting that the Chinese Academy of Sciences was not strong on human disease expertise, having only focused on it in the last] 5 years, after the SARS outbreak. A Wuhan-based French consulate official who works on science and teclmology cooperation with China also emphasized that the lab, which was initiated in 2004 as a France-China joint project, was meant to be "open and transparent" to the global scientific community. "The intent was to set up a lab to international standards. and open to international research," he said. French experts have provided guidance and biosafety training to the lab, which ,vin continue, the French official said. Institute-officials said that France provided the lab's design and much of its teclmology, but that it is entirely China-funded and has been completely China-run since a ''handover" ceremony in 2016. 6. (U) In addition to French assistance, experts from the NIH-supported P4 lab at the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston have traIned Wuhan lab technicians in lab management and maintenance, institute officials said. The Wuhan institute plans to invite scientists from the Galveston lab to do research in Wuhan's lab. One Wuhan Institute of Virology researcher trained for two years at the Galveston lab, and the institute also sent one scientist to U.S. CDC headquarters in Atlanta for six months' work on influenza. Nm-Supported Research Revises SARS Origin Story 7. (U) NIH was a major funder, along with the Natural Science FOWldationof China ~A~~.res~~~g py tl!e Wuhan lnstitut~ of Virology's b)(6) (b)(6) UNCLASSIFIED Page 20f 4 UNCLASSIFIED ~)(6) learn has provided support in statistical modeling to assess the risk of more coronaviruses like SARS crossing over to human populations. 0)(5) Ready to Help with the Global Virome Project 8. (U) Institute officials expressed strong interest in the Global Vif(nne Projeet (GVP), and said Chinese funding for the project would likely come from Chinese Academy of Sciences funding already eannarked for One Belt, One Road-related initiatives. The GVP aims to launch this year as an international collaborative effort to identity within ten years virtually all of the planet's viruses that have pandemic or epidemic potential and the ability to jump to humans. "We hope China will be one of the leading countJies to initiate the Global Viroine Project," one Wuhan Institute ofViro1ogy official said. China attended a GVP unveiling meeting in January in Thailand and is waiting for more details on the initiative. The officials said that the Chinese government funds projects similar to GVP to investigate the background of viruses and bacteria. This essentially constituted China's own Virome Project, officials said, but they noted the program currently bas no official name. I is th~' ----J hich IS desIgn eo to show "proof of concept" and be a foreru~er to the Goa trome rOJect.f}(6} ~ith the EcoHealth Alliance (a New "+'¥.I-I'~I.>.,L;~"""'''''''''''''''O that is working with the University of California avis to manage the ecently planned to visit Wuhan to meet with ~)(6 )(6) oted that China has ""e=x=pf=:e~ss:::::' """""m::':t""er=e""s:C-: building 1=n the GVP database, which would put Chma m a leadership position. Other countries have confidence in China's ability to build such a database, but are Skep.~. on whether China could remain transparent as a "gatekeeper" for this informationpii(6fl said }{6} xpressed frustration with the slow progress so far in launching GVP, noting that tHe---J effort cked funding sources, needed to bire a CEO, and would have to boost its profile at G7, G20 and other high-level international meetings. ~~~~~~~b1.Ul~.lLL...U·LUL1¥gyts~b){6) U.S.-China Workshop Explores Research Partnerships 10. (U) The Institute also bas ongoing collaboration with tbe U.S. National Science Foundation, including a just-concluded workshop Shenzhen, involving about 40 scientists from the United States and China, on the topic of the "Ecology and Evolution of Infectious Diseases." Cosponsored by the Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), ~I/~\ I m l(b)(6) I The workshop explored opportunities for U.S.China research cooperation in areas like using "big data" to predict c:mlerging infectious diseases, climate change's effect on vector-borne diseases, and pathogen transmission between wildlife, domestic animals and humans. 11. (SBU) Some worksbop participants also expressed skepticism about the Global Virome Project's (GVP) approach, saying that gaining a predictive understanding of viruses with pandemic potential would require going beyond the GVP's strategy of sample collection, to take an "ecological" approach that considers the virome beyond vertebrate systems to identity UNCLASSIFIED Page 3 of 4 UNCLASSIFIED mechanisms driving pathogen evolution. A follow-on workshop will be held in June at the University of Berkeley. NSF and NSFC hO"peto jointly announce a funding call for collaborative projects later this year. Signatu're: FOUSS Drafted By: Cleared By: b){5) Approved By: Released By: Info: Dissemination CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE RounNE Rule: Archive Copy UNCLASSIFIED SBU UNCLASSIFIED Page 4 of 4 MAY 12 2020 fhl:! r )ol1orabk l]iot L Fn~d. Chairman House rL}r~ignAITairs Committee ll.S. I-lous.: of Represenlati\(; \Vashingron. DC 1:- ~os L) aT' Mr. Chaim1an: Ihank ,vOlJ for your. pril ~2 am.i April 27 letters rt'garding the \Vorlc4ucnccd b-.:y Hld \.\ 'vidLClce [t date to sugg~::;t China"s record in dealing wilh COVIO-J<) or iLS tran.;parency are so impressivt:;;1' IU VI.: "bl..·.'onJ words:' h was not until :'vlar(;h 11 :.inc!' lhl: viru. had kilkd more Iha 4.000 people nnd infected more dHlIl 100,000 p(;Orle WI) Idwidc that the Wt 10 dcclarcu COVID-19 a global countril. • the gl!110n1e and shared it with \VI [0 and the world arc \-' '1') impre. sive and )rds. So is China's commitment to 11'311Sparenc..:y and tn suppol1ing other p311dcmic, _" I h 're is n(l • Lastly the International Health Regulations require 'oumries to noti!): the WIIO of an event that may constitute a public health emergency concern like COVTD-19 and to provide the WI 10 timel •. aCl:urate, and sul1iciently detailed public health information [lvailable. We have grave concerns that this mandalory reporting 10 Ih Wl-fO did nOI happen in ~l timely manner with re 'peel to China and its reporting to the WHO about lhe deadly cOl'Onavirus. It remains to be seen whether all of the data provided by China to the \VHO was unreliable and vY'ent unchallenged by the \\THO or if onJy orne of the data ''vaq. Therefore. on '\pril 14. President Tnunp announced a pause in the- provision of additional funding to WHO for 60 to 90 days while a fu.ll re iew of the WHO's rformance during its illitial response to COVJD- 19 is undertaken, including its relationship with China. 'Ibis revie\v process is under development and will include all relevant USC Departments. It will examine WHO's early response to the outbreak. such as the timing of WHO actions in relation to its declaration of a public health emergency of international concern (P EIe), and the unfounded criticism of C.S. eftorts to address the outbreak and protect the American people. through l ., . rcstri tions on travel from China to the United States. TIle objective of the l:nited States is to ref cus the \\11-10 on nllfilling its core public health mission of prevention, preparednes . and response. stopping outbreaks at their source. and ef1Cctively coordinating \<\ 'tll ·take-holders. The Unikd Stales \ViH advocate for ref()Tms to improve and strengthen the way the WIlO can restore lhe public" tru't in it to handl!:! thi . pandemic and future publie health crises. These refon1lS would aim to improve transparency data sharing, hold member states accountable tor abiding by the International Health Regulations increase access [0 medicines, ensure against undue iJIJlucncc, and restore independence and to the organization. The United States is fully invested in workint! \/I,1lh the global cm~l1munily 10 re.-pond [0 lhi. pandemic and is leading the worid's humanitarian and health n.:sponSl: to the COY ill-' 9 panJemic. About $900 million in emergency health, humanitarian, and economic as istancc has bcnn committed by the U .. Government in addition to lhe funding already provided to multilateral and non-government •. '!1 organization (NOOs) are helping communities around the world respond to the pandemic. During the review period for ')..1 10, th~ Department of lale, USAID. amI the De)}artment of Health and Hwnan Service \\lill \\