Ia.) ENDORSED FILED ALAMEDA COUNTY AUG 3 1 2020 gLEHK?i?itlEEMs'l?Rfe?B?ium SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA KAWIKA SMITH. through his guardian ad litem LEILANI GLORIA D, through her guardian ad litem DIANA STEVEN ., through his guardian ad litem, MARGARET ALEXANDRA VILLEGAS, an individual; CHINESE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, nonpro?t organization; COLLEGE ACCESS PLAN, a nonpro?t organization; COLLEGE SEEKERS, a nonpro?t organization; COMMUNITY COALITION, a nonpro?t organization; DOLORES HUERTA FOUNDATION, a nonpro?t organization; and LITTLE MANILA RISING, a nonpro?t organization, Plaintiffs, V. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF JANET NAPOLITANO, in her of?cial capacity as President of the University of California; and DOES 1?100, Defendants. Case No. RG19046222 ORDER AFTER HEARING GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Defendant The Regents ofthe University ofCalifornia from considering the results of SAT or ACT tests in admissions and scholarship decisions. While Ix) b4 they decry the asserted racially discriminatory and classist impact of the tests, their primary argument is that the current ?test?optional" policy at most of the UC campuses denies admissions applicants with disabilities meaningful access to the additional admission opportunity that test- submitters will enjoy, in large part because they have not taken these tests and will not be able to take them with appropriate accommodation during this Covid?l9 pandemic. In short, students with disabilities are denied the same option and second chance for admissions that non-disabled applicants enjoy in the test-optional regime. Although the parties dispute many things, many basic facts in this case are not disputed. like many universities, for years required undergraduate admissions applicants to submit SAT or ACT test results as part of their applications, and it considered such test results as part of its admission criteria. On May 21, 2020. however, UC decided to eventually eliminate the use of the tests. In the ?rst phase, its campuses could decide to continue the use of the test as an ?optional" part ofthe admissions process until 2022. Thereafter, the admissions process would be ?test-blind.? A number ot?campuses, including UC Berkeley, UC Santa Cruz and UC Irvine, have decided to immediately abandon the use ofthese tests even in an optional manner. Other campuses, such as UC Riverside, UC San Diego, and UCLA have elected to continue the optional use ofthe test. The one month application period opens on November 1, 2020, and tests may be submitted as late as the end ofthe year for the test optional campuses. The current Covid?19 pandemic has resulted in restrictions in the availability oftest-sites. While test-taking Opportunities for all students have been limited, for persons with disabilities, the ability to obtain accommodations or even to locate suitable test locations for the test is "almost nil." (Hiss Decl. par. 54). The court concludes that plaintiffs have satisfied their burden ofjustifying the issuance of a preliminary injunction. L.) L.) L..- l. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The SAT and ACT tests have long been a part ofthe UC Admissions process. and have also long been the subject of much controversy regarding their validity; alleged bias, and other issues. The experts from both sides in this case agree that these are serious matters which limit the utility ofthe tests under normal circumstances. (See generally Blanck Decl. Supp. Plfs.? Mot. T. 19; Hiss Decl. Supp. Def's Opp. 28. 30, 36.) The experts debate whether students who do not submit tests at colleges and universities which allow, but do not require, test results as part of their admissions criteria ?test-optional" institutions) are disadvantaged in the admissions process. Both sides cite a work by defense experts Steven T. Syverson and William C. Hiss (along with their co-author Valerie W. Franks, who is not an expert in this case): ?De?ning Access: How Test-Optional Works" (2018). This research project, apparently not yet published, looked at colleges and universities. not including UC. and compared admission rates. The data all preceded the Covid-19 pandemic. The experts draw different conclusions from the data. (Con-mare Blanck Decl. 40?43; Syverson Decl. 14, 17?21; Hiss Decl. 21-22.) The court agrees with the defense experts that their data do not demonstrate that, in general, non?submitters in the pre-Covid-l 9, non-UC world were disadvantaged by a test-optional admissions process. The data cited by the defense experts. however, could not provide sufficient information from which any definitive conclusions could be drawn for applicants with disabilities because "there is limited research. and very limited data. regarding students with Learning Differences/Disabilities (LD) in the college admission process.? (Syverson Decl. 1) 15.) Dr. Syverson explains that he is ?not aware ofany study with a sufficiently large amount of appropriate data to allow meaningful conclusions to be drawn about the impacts oftest-optional admissions policies on LB students.? ii 27.) LB applicants nevertheless are a significant portion of the applicant pool for colleges, ranging from 4-7% of all applicants in the test optional study. (Id. ii 25.) Other data suggests the proportion ofLD college applicants who have disabilities may be greater. (See. Blanck Decl. 33 n.33 [46% of test?takers are given La.) IQ 6 accommodations. but 14% ofCalil'ornia students qualify for special education and 12.5% receive services through lEPs under the The challenges for applicants with disabilities in the pre?Covid-l9 world were substantial. Significant barriers faced these students seeking accommodations in the SAT or ACT process. (Blanck Decl. 25?32: Offiesh Decl. Tl 32-37.) There is little data regarding the validity or reliability of these tests for test-takers with disabilities. (Blanck Decl. 11"] 21?22.) Such students nevertheless score lower on average on these tests than their non?disabled peers. ever when they receive test accommodations. (Blanck Decl. 33.) Indeed. defense expert Syverson states fully acknowledge and endorse the numerous concerns over the lack of value. appropriateness. and accessibility of the for LD students.? (Syverson Decl. TI 26,) The barriers faced by students with disabilities have been greatly exacerbated by the Covid-19 epidemic. which has disrupted test taking locations, closed schools, and limited access to school counselors. While plaintiffs? witnesses recount these problems in great detail (we general/y Blanck. Kazan. Offlesh and Grajewski Decls.), defense expert Hiss bluntly summarizes: ?As the expert witnesses have expressed, the odds in this Covid time of students either getting their accommodations approved or finding a suitable testing site are almost m'l. especially in California with its extraordinarily poor ratio ofstudents to guidance counselors who are supposed to guide requests for accommodations, and given that most schools have been closed since mid?spring. and are likely to remain in limbo well into the fall.? (Hiss Decl. ll 54 [emphasis added].) To be sure, Covid-19 has disrupted the testing process for many students to an extent that, at the hearing on this matter. defense counsel could not offer an estimate ofthe number of likely test-takers this year. But the barriers faced by students with disabilities are indisputably significantly greater than those faced by non-disabled students. As noted above. UC has adopted a temporary ?test-optional" policy but left it to individual campuses to decide whether to permit a test option at all. As ofthe date ofthe hearing 20 26 on this matter, three UC campuses (UC Berkeley. UC Irvine and UC Santa Cruz) have decided against allowing the test option. (To use the term. they are "Test-Blind Campuses") The other six campuses are "test optional." which means applicants have the option to submit the test results or not. (Ofcourse, as noted above. students with disabilities do not have a test option as a practical matter because the chances olibeing able to take either standardized test with or without accommodations are almost nil.) The ?test-optional? campuses, with the exception ot?UC Riverside, all do an initial ?holistic review? of an applicant without taking test results into account. Thereafter, for test- submitters, there is a second review including test scores. UC Riverside, on the other hand, uses a ?Dual?algorithmic? process under which each student is evaluated for admission without consideration oftest results, based on their entire application. and separately evaluated with the test results included. Whichever process results in a higher score is used for UC Riverside?s admissions decisions. While the Regent?s declarants state that the absence ofa test will not be held against applicants, and assert that admissions officials will be trained to not do so, they do not dispute that the inclusion of test results can help an applicant?s chances of admission. and will not hurt their chances of admission. As counsel for UC conceded at the hearing on this matter, test results can only help, and never hurt an applicant. Put another way. the tests are treated as plus factor and thus test-submitters are given a second opportunity for admissions consideration. II. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF The standards for preliminary in junctive relief are well settled. ?In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction. a court must weigh two "interrelated" factors: (I) the likelihood that the moving party will ultimately prevail on the merits and (2) the relative interim harm to the parties from issuance or nonissuance of the injunction. . . . The trial court?s determination must be guided by a "mix? ofthe potential-merit and interim-harm factors; the greater the plaintiff?s IQ Lu 6 Showing on one, the less must be shown on the other to support an injunction." (Butt State of CalifOrnia (1992) Cal.4th 668. 677?678 [citation omitted].) Although the court must assess the relative harm to the parties, there is no freestanding requirement that plaintiffestablish irreparable injury. In Burt, the court was faced with a similar allegation. but held ?the court was not obliged to deny a preliminary injunction simply because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that ?irreparable? harm to students was unavoidable by other means. The preliminary record properly convinced the court bot/7 that plaintiffs had a reasonable probability ofsuccess on the merits, and that they would suffer more harm in the meantime if an injunction were denied than the State would suffer if it were granted. This ?mix" of the "interrelated" relevant factors fullyjustified the court's decision to grant the injunction." (Burr, supra. Cal.4th at pp. 693?694; see also White v. Den-ts (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528. 554 [?To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiffordinarily is required to present evidence of the irreparable injury or interim harm that it will suffer if an injunction is not issued." [emphasis added].) The court accordingly evaluates the parties? likelihood of success and relative harm. A. Standing to Seek Injunction Earlier in this case. this court addressed standing issues when faced with Defendant?s Demurrer. The Court noted that UC conceded that plaintiff Stephan had standing under the Disabled Person Act but as then pleaded, there were insufficient facts alleged to establish associational standing for the organizational plaintiffs. including College Seekers because the complaint failed to allege that the organization?s members were affected by the test requirement. (Order After Hearing on Defendants? Demurrer to Plaintiffs? Complaints [May 15, 2020].) Plaintiffs have since amended their complaint to add additional allegations and plaintiffs and have provided declarations in support oftheir claims in this motion. Although UC does not explicitly couch their argument against plaintiffs in this motion as a standing claim, the thrust ofits argument is that no plaintiffhas standing to seek preliminary injunctive relief. UC argues first that no student plaintiff actually seeks admission in the Ia.) Lu 6 upcoming semester and thus they cannot show any irreparable injury to themselves. UC is correct that some ofthe plaintiffs are not eligible to seek admission for the 2021 semester. For example, plaintiffStephen is currently a sophomore in High School and not eligible to apply in the upcoming year. On the other hand, newly added plaintiff Gary W. just graduated from high school and has completed all UC prerequisites for application. He has diagnosed learning disabilities and received accommodations in high school. He has faced formidable barriers to taking the SAT, and has been unable to do so. Because he is unable take the SAT or ACT with accommodations, he plans to take a ?gap year." (See Gary W. Decl.) UC argues that Gary W. cannot establish irreparable injury to support preliminary relief because he doesn?t plan to apply this year. This argument misreads his declaration. The reason Gary W. is not applying this year is because he cannot take the SAT. He confirms this in his supplemental reply declaration where he states that ifUC had a "test blind" policy. he would be happy to apply. (Gary W. Suppl. Decl. Gary W. has alleged and declared sufficient facts to establish standing to seek injunctive relief. Under the DPA, which provides that ?potentially aggrieved? individuals may seek injunctive relief. ?virtually any disabled person" may seek such relief. (Flowers Pmsad (2015) 238 Ca1.App. 4th 930, 943. quoting Jankey Lee (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1038, 1051.) UC also argues that organizational plaintiffCollege Seekers cannot establish standing because it does not have members who are injured by the test optional policy. But its Executive Director, Laura Kazan, makes clear in her declaration that the organization has student members who have struggled to get accommodated in the test process and that, in the Covid?l 9 period. such accommodations are virtually impossible to obtain. (Kazan Decl. 1W 4, 16. 20?23.) Her supplemental declaration con?rms that her members include students with disabilities who meet UC requirements. wish to apply in the fall of this year, but cannot take the SAT with the accommodations they require. (Kazan Suppl. Decl. 11 4.) DJ 9 11) L.) UI 26 argues that purported injuries to non-parties cannot establish irreparable injury since no class Claims have been pled. Here, however, plaintiffs have shown injury to several parties. Regents cite no authority for the proposition that class claims are required under California law in order to seek an injunction where individual plaintiffs have established their own standing to seek such relief. nor do they explain how individual reliefcould be provided to plaintiffs where, as here. a general policy has been challenged. In any event. even in federal cases where the strictures of Article 111 impose constitutional standing requirements not applicable to California state courts (see People errel. Becerm Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 486, 497), an individual plaintiff is not barred from seeking broad injunctive reliefin the absence ofa certified or even alleged class where the challenge is to a general policy. (See, Bresga/ v. Brock (9th Cir. 1987) 843 F.2d1163, 1171.) B. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on their Disability Claims Plaintiffs assert claims under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Disabled Persons Act (DPA). and Government Code 1 1135. Both the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the DPA incorporate the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and make violation ofthe ADA a basis for liability under these California statutes. (See Civ. Code 51(t), 54(c), 1n adopting the ADA, the California Legislature intended "to strengthen California law in areas where it is weaker than the and to retain California law when it provides more protection for individuals with disabilities than the (Manson v. Del Taco, Inc, (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 669, quoting Stats. 1992, ch. 913,9; 1, p. 4282). The ADA protections are not limited to victims of intentional discrimination. Rather, a broad range ofconduct is proscribed. as the applicable regulations attest. The regulations provide that a public entity ?may not, directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements. on the basis of disability . . . (ii) Afford a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others . . . Provide a qualified individual with a disability with an aid, benefit, or service that is not Lu UI IL) 20 26 as effective in affording equal opportunity to obtain the same result. to gain the same bene?t. or reach the same level of achievement as that provided to others . . . [or] (vii) Otherwise limit a quali?ed individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any right. privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others receiving the aid, bene?t or service.? (28 CPR. Further. public entity shall not impose or apply eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class ofindividuals from fully and equally enjoying any service. program, or activity being offered.? (28 C.F.R. The ADA thus extends to reach a range ofconduct. including conduct that creates an adverse impact on an individual with a disability. The Supreme Court, however, requires a showing that the proscribed conduct has denied persons with disabilities "meaningful access to the benefit" that is offered. provided that "the bene?t itself, of course, cannot be de?ned in a way that effectively denies otherwise quali?ed handicapped individuals the meaningful access to which they are entitled . . . (Alexander v. Chou/e (1985) 469 US. 287, 301.) Under that test, the ADA eschews reliance solely on traditional intentional or adverse impact labels: instead, the courts must look to the ?meaningful access standard.? (Crowder v. Kirc'rgmva (9th Cir. 1996) 81 F.3d 1480, 1484.) In row-iider, for example, Hawaii?s canine quarantine requirement for travelers was equally applied to all persons but denied meaningful access to vision impaired individuals ?in a manner different and greater than it burdens others." In Smith v. City Qde/damHND. Cal. 2020) __F.Supp.3d 2020 WL 2517857, persons with disabilities claimed an Oakland Ordinance limited the number of accessible dwelling units available to them. Defendant argued that the plaintiffs in fact were able to rent in Oakland. The court found that this assertion ?mischaracterizes the alleged injury" because plaintiffs "allege[d] that they were denied equal opportunity to participate in and bene?t from? the ordinance and were thus denied meaningful access to services that ?remain open and easily accessible by others." at While the plaintiffs could rent in Oakland, this no more excused the denial of services than the disabled court attendees who were able to attend court ?by [a L: U: crawling up the courthouse steps." (1d. at citing Tennessee Lane (2004) 541 US. 509.) The cases do not define ?meaningful access" with precision. Conduct that creates some additional burden on a person with a disability may not alone be sufficient. ('Hzmsaker Contra Costa Cir. 1988) 149 UC argues that Plaintiffs cannot show a denial of meaningful access because they cannot Show that the optional use ofthe tests will have an adverse impact on admission rates ofpersons with disabilities. Because the test optional regime has not been in place for an admissions cycle, UC is correct that there is no data available to demonstrate such adverse impact. Further, there is a paucity ofdata for persons with disabilities in the admissions process at schools with test optional policies. (Syverson Decl. par. 27.) Relief under the ADA, however, is not dependent on proofof such ultimate impact. Rather. the question here is whether the inability ofpersons with disabilities to avail themselves of the test option, and thus the inability to take advantage ofthe ?plus factor" or "second look" available to test takers is a denial of meaningful access to an opportunity or benefit that persons without disabilities enjoy. In short, applicants with disabilities are denied meaningful access to the ?aid, benefit or service? that test?taker have. They are denied a potential second chance at admission. UC suggests its ?holistic" process might make up for the denial of the ability to offer a test. But as its counsel admitted in the hearing on this matter, a test can only help the applicant. First. whether to submit a test score is solely up to the applicant: if they believe the test will not assist them, they need not submit it. More to the point, the specific procedures at the campuses that have chosen a test-optional regime, give the applicant the benefit ofa higher score (UC Riverside). or gives the test taker a ?second look? (UC Santa Barbara, UC Davis). UC analogizes this case to 'Comvel! v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452. In that case, the Court of Appeal rejected an equal protection challenge to the high school exit exam when students had alternatives to the exam and the only arguable injury they would face would be a delay in receipt ofa diploma. There was, however, no question that the high school diploma 10 Id 6 requirement was a valid method of measuring academic achievement and that there was a clear public interest in requiring such a measure of achievement. (Id. at p.1471.) Here, the evidence shows that the efficacy ofthe tests is at best minimal, and the ADA provides a broader basis for liability than the equal protection clause. Nor is the fact that students with disabilities have other campus options at UC or elsewhere a defense to liability. As UC must acknowledge, the campuses are not fungible. They differ in their geographic location, and also in the relative ofscholastic and extra?curricular programs. Students with disabilities do not have the same meaningful access as non?disabled students ifthey are relegated to only a few of the UC campuses. The court concludes that plaintiffs have made a substantial case that they will likely succeed on the merits under the current pandemic conditions. C. Relative Harm Plaintiffs have shown that they are denied meaningful access to the additional "benefit, aid or service? that the test option affords. Unlike their non?disabled peers, they do not have the option to submit test scores; even if they did, their chances ofobtaining necessary test accommodations are Virtually non-existent. They get no second look or "plus factor? that non? disabled students are afforded in the admissions process. UC argues that this harm must be balanced against harm to it and third parties. argues that the test optional process afford students ?choice" and "flexibility.? (citing Syverson Dec 1 34 and Hiss Decl. i] 31). The extent of this choice during the current Coyid-19 period, when test centers are limited. is open to question. UC and some ofits experts suggest a test-optional regime might assist some applicants from disadvantaged backgrounds. This assertion is speculative and, more to the point, does not dispute that applicants with disabilities yyill be unable to take advantage of this benefit or that disadvantaged applicants in general would be much less likely to be able to benefit from the test option than non?disadvantaged applicants. Indeed they do not dispute that the test option is likely to be more available to students from 11 I-J L4J L): a higher-income families who have the means to pay for test preparation courses and travel to distant available test locations. UC also argues that granting the injunction would cause confusion and upend the admissions process. Although an injunction would no doubt dismay some. the application process has not yet opened. The fact that a number ofcampuses have decided in short order to eliminate the test as part of the admission process, and others have a two?step process?the first step of which allows all students to be evaluated without a test?undermines a claim that eliminating the test will result in chaos or confusion by the admissions departments. All UC campuses must evaluate all applicants without the tests in the first instance. Eliminating the test option would only eliminate that second step. Moreover. the ?chaos and confusion? argument ignores the realities ofthis pandemic period. The pandemic has already disrupted the admissions process?by limiting test availability, disputing the final semester of high school seniors? classes. precluding counseling and the like. (l?liss Decl. ?i 29 [?"l"hrough circumstances with Coyid none of us could have predicted. a lot of the next year in Admissions will be quite Nobody expects the pre?Covid-19 status quo under these conditions. however fervently they wish it would return. The precise manner in which the test?optional schools will implement the new process has not been ?rmly established at each ofthe schools. and information about the process has not been uniformly published. (See Def.?s Opp. at pp.21?22.) UC properly argues that the court should consider the public interest as well as the interest ofthird parties. The public interest in continuing the use of tests that the University has indicated that it will abandon is not clear, particularly where three UC campuses. including Berkeley, will immediately cease using test results in admissions. UC does not seriously argue that the test is a valid and effective means of determining admissions nor does it deny that that non-disabled. economically advantaged. and white test takers have an inherent advantage in the IJ 6 IQ 2t} test process. It also does not deny that, in the current pandemic conditions. the availability of tests is further restricted and thus would likely exacerbate these advantages. The court concludes that the balance of harm tips decidedly in favor of the Plaintiffs. EVIDENTIARY RULINGS objections to the Declaration ofLisa Grajewski are OVERRULED. Grajewski is qualified as an expert and has foundation for the opinions expressed in the declaration. The arguments raised in objection go to the weight ofthat opinion, not its admissibility. UC's Objections to the Declaration ofNicole Ofiesh are OVERRULED. Ofiesh is qualified as an expert and has foundation for the opinions expressed in the declaration. The arguments raised in objection go to the weight ofthat opinion, not its admissibility. Objections to paragraphs 14 and 15 ofthe Declaration ofGary are OVERRULED. These statements are not offered for the truth of the matters asserted but rather for Gary W.?s state ofmind. Objections to paragraphs 9 and 20 ofthe Declaration of Stephen C. are OVERRULED. Stephen C?s personal fears are testimonial facts and his conclusions based on limited information are admissible lay opinion. Objection to paragraph 10 of the Declaration of Stephen C. is SUSTAINED. Stephen C?s guidance counselors statements may not be offered for the truth ofthe matters asserted. objection to the Declaration ofDillon Delvo is OVERRULED. The declaration tends to show that families and students are aware that a ?test?optional" application system is an aid or benefit to applicants who are able to provide test scores. objections to the Declaration of Lauren Kazan are OVERRULED. Kazan is a guidance counselor and may speak from her own experience. even without showing that it is representative. Her opinion that test-optional admissions processes will advantage test-takers is adequately supported by her experience as a guidance counselor and other evidence in the record DJ LJ on this motion. l-ler conclusion that she must encourage her students to take standardized tests notwithstanding ?test-optional" processes is not speculation. The Court declines to rule on the remaining objections as they are not relevant to the grounds ofits opinion. IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER The Court concludes that that Plaintiffs have met their burden to justify the issuance or a preliminary injunction. The motion is therefore GRANTED. The defendants, their officers. agents and employees (including their individual campuses). are hereby enjoined from using SAT and the ACT test results for admissions or scholarship decisions' during the pendency of this action. In a footnote in its opposition papers, UC cites Code of Civil Procedure section 529, arguing that. if an injunction is granted. the Court must require the moving party to provide an undertaking sufficient to cover any damages sustained by UC by reason of the injunction. Although mandatory in form. there are recognized exceptions to this requirement. such as the poverty ofthe plaintiffs. (Canover Ha]! (1974) 1 Cal. 3d 842.) There is a split of authority as to whether in fixing the amount ofthe undertaking the likelihood ofpreyailing in the case may be taken into account. (Compare ABBA Rubber Co. v. Seaqm'st (1991) 235 C'al.App.3d l. 16 n.8, with One For (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1036. 1062.) In any event. UC offers no argument or eyidence in support of its request regarding the amount of the undertaking that may be assessed. The Court. in its discretion. sets the amount ofplaintifts undertaking at $1.000. The court SETS a Case Management Conference in this case on September 29. 2020. at 3:00 pm. A Joint CMC Statement should be filed (and emailed to the department clerk) no later than 5 days before the hearing. IT IS SO ORDERED. Although plaintiffs? motion also seeks to enjoin the use ofthe tests for post-enrollment course placement decisions. their motion lacks evidentiaiy support and no plaintiff at this point has shown that such use would cause them injury. Accordingly. the court denies this request for relief. 14 Ix.) D) U: 6 Dated: August 31, 2020 Brad seligw?n Judge of the Superior Court SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA Case Number: RG19046222 (Consolidated with RG19046343) Case Name: Smith v. Regents of the University of California RE: ORDER AFTER HEARING GRANTING PRELIMINARY INIUNCTION CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that I am not a paity to this cause and that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed ?rst class, postage prepaid, in a sealed envelope, and that the mailing of the foregoing and execution of this certi?cate occurred at 1225 Fallon Street, Oakland, California. Executed: 09/01/2020 ?ee/mm ?wfa/wa?/ Courtroom Clerk, Dept. 23 PUBLIC COUNSEL Mark Rosenbaum Amanda Savage 610 S. Ardmore Avenue Attorneys for Los Angeles, CA 90005 mrosenbauma?nubliceounselorg asavage@nublicounsel.0rg SCHEPER KIM HARRIS LLP Katherine Karkas 800 West Sixth Street, 18'? Floor Attorneys?w Plaintifjfs Los Angeles, CA 90017 EQUAL JUSTICE SOCIETY Eva Paterson. Mona Tawatao Attorneysfor Lisa Holder 634 S. Spring Street, Suite 7'16 Los Angeles, CA 90017 lisaholder@vahoo.com BROWN GOLDSTEIN LEVY, LLP Eve. L. Hill Abigail A. Graber 120 East Baltimore Street, Suite 1700 Baltimore, MD 21202 agl?aber?ibrowngold.com Attorneysfor Piainti/?? MILLER ADVOCACY GROUP Marci Lerner Miller 1303 Avocado Ave, Suite 230 Newport Beach, CA 92660 marci@milleradvocacvcom Attorneys for Piainti??s OLIVAREZ MADRUGA LEMIEUX LLP Thomas M. Madruga 500 South Grand Avenue, 12m Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071 tmadrueaQDomlolaw.com Attorneysfar Piainti?s Bryan H. Esq. Allison M. Day, Esq. MUNGER, TOLLES OLSON LLP 560 Mission Street, 27th Floor San Francisco, CA 94105 Allison.Dav@mto.com Attorneysfar De endants Janet Napaiitano, in Her Official apaeitJ-J as President afTiie University of Catifarnia and The Regents oftiie Ui-iiversity of Catifornia Hailyn J. Chen, Esq. Omar H. Noureldin, Esq. Gina F. Elliott, Esq. MUNGER, TOLLES OLSON LLP 350 South Grand Avenue, 50?? Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071 omarnoureldin@mto.com ginaelliottgagmtoeom Attorneys for Defendants Janet Napot'itano, In Her Capacity as President Oane University of aiifarnia and The Regents aft/76 University af ai yarn ia Charles F. Robinson, Esq. Margaret L. Wu, Esq. Rhonda S. Goldstein, Esq. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL 1111 Franklin Street, Floor Oakland, CA 94607 Charles.robinson@ucon.edu Rhondagoldsteihalluconedu Attorneysfor De endants Janet Napoiitana, in Her O?icia/ Capacity as President of The University of aiifornia and The Regents oft/7e UniversitJ-i of Caitfornia