



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

September 1, 2020

MR. JASON LEOPOLD  
BUZZFEED NEWS  
7<sup>TH</sup> FLOOR  
1630 CONNECTICUT AVENUE NW  
WASHINGTON, DC 20009

FOIPA Request No.: 1432673-000  
Civil Action No.: 19-cv-01278  
Subject: All 302's of individuals who were  
questioned/interviewed by FBI Agents working for the  
Office of Special Counsel Robert Mueller

Dear Mr. Leopold:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Below you will find checked boxes under applicable statutes for the exemptions asserted to protect information exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the processed pages next to redacted information. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted to indicate where pages were withheld entirely pursuant to applicable exemptions. An Explanation of Exemptions is enclosed to further explain justification for withheld information.

Section 552

☒ (b)(1)

☐ (b)(2)

☒ (b)(3)

Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure 6(e)

50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1)

☒ (b)(4)

☒ (b)(5)

☒ (b)(6)

☒ (b)(7)(A)

☐ (b)(7)(B)

☒ (b)(7)(C)

☒ (b)(7)(D)

☒ (b)(7)(E)

☒ (b)(7)(F)

☐ (b)(8)

☐ (b)(9)

Section 552a

☐ (d)(5)

☐ (j)(2)

☐ (k)(1)

☐ (k)(2)

☐ (k)(3)

☐ (k)(4)

☐ (k)(5)

☐ (k)(6)

☐ (k)(7)

809 pages were reviewed and 529 pages are being released.

- ☒ Deletions were made by the Department of Justice/Office of Information Policy (DOJ/OIP), Department of Justice/National Security Division (NSD), Department of Justice/Criminal Division (CRM), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Office of the Inspector General (FDIC OIG), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the United States Marshal Service (USMS).

Please see the paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request and the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

- ☒ Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning, other Government Agency (ies) [OGA].
- ☐ This information has been referred to the OGA(s) for review and direct response to you.
- ☒ We are consulting with another agency. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is completed.

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. "Part 1" of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. "Part 2" includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records on individuals. "Part 3" includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

Although your request is in litigation, we are required by law to provide you the following information:

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP's website: <https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at [ogis@nara.gov](mailto:ogis@nara.gov); telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing [foipaquestions@fbi.gov](mailto:foipaquestions@fbi.gov). If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

Please direct any further inquiries about this case to the Attorney representing the Government in this matter. Please use the FOIPA Request Number and/or Civil Action Number in all correspondence or inquiries concerning your request.



See additional information which follows.

Sincerely,



Michael G. Seidel  
Section Chief  
Record/Information  
Dissemination Section  
Information Management Division

Enclosures

**Additional Information:**

In response to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, enclosed is a processed copy of Bates Stamped documents, FBI (19-cv-1278)-4564 through FBI (19-cv-1278)-5372. The enclosed documents represent the tenth interim release of information responsive to your request.

You were previously advised we were consulting with another agency concerning information related to your litigation. A portion of that information has been returned to the FBI and is enclosed in the following Bates Stamped documents FBI (19-cv-1278)- 1548-1559, 1829-1839, 2495-2502, 2705-2711, 3076, 3092-3096, 3109, 3162-3163, 3330-3350, 3587-3599, 3615-3627.

## FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum includes information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records on individuals. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records. For questions regarding Parts 1, 2, or 3, visit the [www.fbi.gov/foia](http://www.fbi.gov/foia) website under "Contact Us." Previously mentioned appeal and dispute resolution services are also available at the web address.

### Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010))]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the [www.fbi.gov/foia](http://www.fbi.gov/foia) website.
- (ii) **National Security/Intelligence Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of national security and foreign intelligence records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and PA exemption (j)(2) as applicable to requests for records about individuals [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2); 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that national security or foreign intelligence records do or do not exist.

### Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records for Incarcerated Individuals.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any incarcerated individual pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

### Part 3: General Information:

- (i) **Record Searches.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching those systems or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. A reasonable search normally consists of a search for main files in the Central Records System (CRS), an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled and maintained by the FBI in the course of fulfilling law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization and encompasses the records of FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ), FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide and includes Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records. For additional information about our record searches visit [www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/requesting-fbi-records](http://www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/requesting-fbi-records).
- (ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheets. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative "FBI file." An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at [www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks](http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks). Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at [www.edo.cjis.gov](http://www.edo.cjis.gov). For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.
- (iv) **The National Name Check Program (NNCP).** The mission of NNCP is to analyze and report information in response to name check requests received from federal agencies, for the purpose of protecting the United States from foreign and domestic threats to national security. Please be advised that this is a service provided to other federal agencies. Private citizens cannot request a name check.

## EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ( A ) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ( B ) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ( C ) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, ( D ) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, ( E ) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or ( F ) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FOI/PA

## DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

Civil Action No.: 19-cv-1278 / 19-cv-1626

FOIA: 1432673-000 / 1433273-000

PDF Title:19-cv-1278 Release 10 Bates 4564-5372

Total Withheld Pages = 280

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19cv1278) 1548	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1549	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1550	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1551	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1552	b1; b3; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1553	b1; b3; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1554	b1; b3; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1555	b1; b3; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1556	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1557	b1; b3; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b7A; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1558	b1; b3; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b7A; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1559	b1; b3; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1829	b1; b3; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1830	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b7A; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1831	b4; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1832	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1833	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1834	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1835	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1836	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1837	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1838	b7A; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4564	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 4565	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 4594	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 4595	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 4596	Referral/Consult
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FBI(19cv1278) 4598	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 4599	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 4600	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 4601	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4602	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4603	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4604	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E

<b>Bates Page Reference</b>	<b>Reason for Withholding</b> (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19cv1278) 4605	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4606	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4607	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4608	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4609	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4610	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4611	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4612	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4624	Referral/Consult
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FBI(19cv1278) 4637	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 4638	Referral/Consult
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FBI(19cv1278) 4644	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 4652	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
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FBI(19cv1278) 4654	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
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FBI(19cv1278) 4656	Referral/Consult
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FBI(19cv1278) 4673	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 4675	Referral/Consult
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FBI(19cv1278) 4685	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 4686	Referral/Consult

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FBI(19cv1278) 4687	Referral/Consult
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FBI(19cv1278) 4691	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 4692	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 4693	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 4694	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 4743	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 4763	Referral/Consult
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FBI(19cv1278) 4857	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
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FBI(19cv1278) 5025	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5026	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5027	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E


<b>Bates Page Reference</b>	<b>Reason for Withholding</b> (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19cv1278) 5028	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5029	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5030	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5031	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5032	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5033	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5034	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5081	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 5082	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 5083	Referral/Consult
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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/18/2014

Richard Gates, date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was interviewed at the law offices of Miller & Chevalier, 655 15th St, NW, #900, Washington, DC. Also present were Assistant Deputy Chief, Asset Forfeiture Money Laundering Section, DOJ, Dan Claman, and attorneys for Richard Gates, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, Gates provided the following information:

Gates stated that he was employed by DMP International. Gates stated that he originally worked for Davis Manafort Partners starting in September 2006. Gates stated that [REDACTED] left the business in [REDACTED] and the company was renamed DMP International. Gates stated that he provided political and campaign consulting services to international political candidates. Originally the company provided these services to US and foreign candidates, but by 2006 the majority of their work was with international clients, including candidates in the Ukraine. Gates stated that they also worked on parliamentary elections.

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Gates stated that in 2006 he was hired by Paul Manafort to develop a party format in Ukraine that was based on western platforms.

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Gates added that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] His background was in international business.

Gates stated that Paul Manafort (Manafort) was a strategist and he (Gates) worked on structure. Gates worked on the day to day strategic documents. Gates stated that the principals of DMP were Manafort, himself, and Konstantin Kilimnik (Konstantin). Gates stated that Konstantin was a Russian citizen who lived in Ukraine and worked on the day to day operations of DMP in Ukraine. Konstantin had worked for Davis Manafort before 2006 and is still employed by DMP. Gates stated that technically he is employed by DMP but he is not an employee. Gates stated that Konstantin's job was to interact with party members. He was their person on the ground in Kyiv.

Gates stated that when they needed work done on a campaign such as

Investigation on 07/02/2014 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 07/09/2014

by [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of Richard Gates. On 07/02/2014 , Page 2 of 8

[redacted]

advertising, polling or speech writing, they contracted US companies to work on the campaign.

Gates opined that after working on elections they transitioned into providing policy advice to the Party of Regions. They did not have a contract but worked from a proposal. Gates added that although the proposal was accepted, they were never paid on time, but they did eventually get paid. They were hired to help move the platform toward more western governance.

Gates stated that the Party of Regions changed over the years. Boris Kolesnikov was the campaign manager for Victor Yanukovych in 2010. The Party of Regions still exists but Manafort and Gates helped develop the Ukraine Development Party, which was a younger and more progressive party.

Gates stated that the Party of Regions was only designed to serve the South and East regions of Ukraine. It was a regional party which is why it was not successful. The new party was formed on a platform that included anti-corruption and covered all the regions of Ukraine. [redacted] worked with this new party.

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Gates stated that [redacted]

[redacted]

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Gates stated that in his position he worked with mid-level people. [redacted] was on the Party of Regions. Manafort worked with the higher ranking officials.

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Gates stated that he met Rinat Ahkmetov a few times, not in meetings, but at a hotel lobby. Gates stated that he never did business with him.

Gates stated that he did meet [redacted] two or three times. He met him while he was working on the campaign for Andrei Kluyev. Gates added that he met Sergei Kluyev as well.

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Gates stated that they worked to get the Ukraine to sign a deal with the European Union in 2013, but that it never happened. Sergei Kluyev was in the US at least twice in 2013 -- once at a US-Ukraine dinner, where Sergei was a speaker.

Gates stated that he did know the US-Ukraine Business Council and had worked with them at least twice in 2010 after Yanukovych was elected.

Gates stated that [redacted] was loyal to [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of Richard Gates. On 07/02/2014 , Page 3 of 8

Gates stated that Paul Manafort was the boss of DMP. [REDACTED] did not know about operations in Ukraine.

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IRI, the International Republic Institute, is a US bi-partisan group.

National Party not a regions party. From IRI, Konstanin Klimnik was the person on the ground for DMP in Kyiv.

[REDACTED] worked on the first campaign as a [REDACTED] not as an employee. [REDACTED] worked for Manafort prior to Gates working there.

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Gates stated that he and Manafort didn't really work for officials, but were working for the Party of Regions. After 2010 they also offered policy advice. Gates stated that they were hired as consultants to assist with campaigns and they they transitioned off of campaigns and into providing direction on policy matters. Gates stated that they provided suggestions on western reform policies.

Gates stated that they worked with Sergey Lyovochkin ,Yanukovych's Chief of Staff on devising a political agenda between 2010 and 2014. After 2014 they worked with the Party of Regions on policy matters.

Gates was a [REDACTED]

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Gates stated that they were directed to open accounts in Cyprus because it was easier for the candidates to pay them from a Cypriot account to a Cypriot account.

Gates stated that invoices for campaign assistance were paid into the account in the name of Lucicle in Cyprus.

Invoices for policy advice was paid into Global Endeavor account in Cyprus. Telmar paid into this account.

Gates stated that the oligarchs would pass the hat to collect funds to pay for the work DMP performed on consulting proposals. Different campaign projects were paid into different accounts. Gates stated that people in Ukraine did not want other candidates to know who was working on their campaigns.

Gates stated that they were told to open accounts in Cyprus for ease of payment. He was told it would be easier for DMP to be paid from a Cypriot account to another Cypriot account. Gates stated that they used standard

Continuation of FD-302 of Richard Gates. On 07/02/2014 . Page 4 of 8

English common law contracts and the fee was included on the contract.  
Then they would invoice the customer for payment.

Gates stated that Bletilla Ventures Ltd. and Leviathan Advisors Ltd. were used to invoice for services. Gates stated that Lilred LLC was used for Paul Manafort's investments. Lilred LLC was not related to DMP, only to Paul Manafort.

Gates stated that Yiakora Ventures Ltd was set up in Cyprus and was associated with DMP. Gates added that Loav Advisors Ltd was also associated with DMP. Gates stated that one of the companies was set up in Virginia. Global Endeavor was set up in St. Vincent. Another company, Jeynet was also set up in St Vincent.

Gates stated that Manafort did not have other business interests in the Ukraine, only political consulting and policy consulting.

Gates stated that there were no real estate investments in the Ukraine. They looked into investing in the Underground Mall, but they did not invest in it. Ukrainians wanted US investors to invest in Ukraine real estate and industries.

Gates stated that [redacted] did a lot of business in Ukraine.

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Gates stated that Rinat Ahkmetov [redacted] but he added that not many Ukrainian oligarchs [redacted]

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Gates stated that he met former President Victor Yanukovych on two occasions. Gates heard rumors about Yanukovych, but did not have any first hand knowledge about his criminal activities.

Gates stated that he never met [redacted] and did not have any information about him.

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Gates stated that, from 2005-2012, there was the same "group of player" in Ukrainian politics. By 2012, "the Family" members were being brought into place in government positions. Gates stated that things changed in 2012. Gates stated that people close to the Yanukovych family were being placed in key government positions. They were the "Donetsk Clan". Older established politicians were being replaced with Yanukovych family members.

Gates stated that he never met [redacted] Gates heard that [redacted] organized all the deals in Ukraine but he never had contact with him.

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Continuation of FD-302 of Richard Gates. On 07/02/2014 , Page 5 of 8

Gates stated that Andrei Kluyev was one faction of the Party of Regions. Kluyev was the Chairman of the National Security and Defense Counsel. Gates said that [REDACTED]

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Gates stated that he never met Sergei Arbuzov, [REDACTED]

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Gates stated that he met Yuri Boyko twice. Once at a business dinner. Gates stated that Boyko was viewed as an educated businessman and that he had a good working knowledge of the Ukrainian energy sector.

Gates stated that he never met [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]. Gates added that he met [REDACTED] twice while he was working on the presidential campaign.

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Gates stated that he never met [REDACTED]

Gates stated that he knew that [REDACTED] was a member of the Yanukovych family and was involved in the [REDACTED] sector.

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Gates stated that in order to score the next election, Yanukovych was moving "family members" into key positions.

Gates stated that Manafort and Konstantin had contact with the US Embassy in Kyiv. Manafort had contact with the US Ambassador, but did not have contact with the US Economic Section personnel. Gates stated that he did not have contact with the embassy and he was not the person on the ground in Kyiv.

Gates stated that he never met Victor Pshonka, and did not think Manafort had met him either.

Gates stated that he did not have any contact with Alexander Yakymenko.

Gates stated that he knew that [REDACTED] was a member of the Party of Regions. Gates did not have any knowledge of [REDACTED] business deals but Konstantin might have.

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Gates stated that he did not know [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]

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Gates stated that Global Highway Ltd was a DMP company. Actinet Trading was a Ukrainian company, and Smythson LLC was a US company.

Gates added that Evo Holdings was a company used for working on

Continuation of FD-302 of Richard Gates. On 07/02/2014 , Page 6 of 8

[redacted]

elections.

Gates stated that they never had any contracts with [redacted]

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Gates stated that Sergei Lyoavochkin contacted Manafort and they met with [redacted] Lyovochkin was a behind the scenes guy. [redacted] wanted to be more western. Gates stated that [redacted] worked with [redacted] wanted to improve his image in [redacted]

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Manafort and Gates met with [redacted] with a few of his men and a translator.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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EurAsia 21 is a US based think tank in Eastern Europeans trying to establish themselves on the international stage.

Gates stated that he had no knowledge of [redacted] [redacted] Gates stated that they pitched ideas to [redacted] but that he passed on their ideas. Gates stated that [redacted] introduced them to [redacted] was the point of contact [redacted] related to [redacted] worked for [redacted] Gates stated that Manafort did not have any other deals with [redacted]

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Gates stated they only worked on political consulting after that point.

Gates stated that he had no knowledge of Ukrainians investing money in the US or moving money out of the Ukraine. Gates was not involved in lobbying in Ukraine and did not get involved in business deals. Gates stated that he was never approached to move money to the US. Gates stated that the accounts they had were used to receive payments for services.



Continuation of FD-302 of Richard Gates. On 07/02/2014 , Page 7 of 8

Gates stated that the amounts they received would match the amounts they invoiced for services. Gates added that they were always paid late and in tranches.

Gates stated that all the people used by DMP to work on campaigns were selected by DMP and were US companies.

Gates stated that in 2010-2014, President Yanukovych's Chief of Staff, Boris Kolesnikov, ran things. Manafort told the Chief of Staff that they were not going to work on the campaign if they did not get paid.

Gates stated that he worked with Konstantin. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Gates stated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Gates reiterated that he only worked with mid-tier officials. Gates stated that DMP kept campaign work and policy work separate.

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Gates stated that [REDACTED]

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Gates stated that they were directed to set up accounts in Cyprus and St Vincent. The Ukrainians told them it was easier to pay them into accounts in Cyprus or to pay in US dollars or Euros. Boris Kolesnikov said it was easier to pay from a Cypriot account to a Cypriot account. The law firm also suggested setting up accounts in St. Vincent. Gates stated they also opened an account in the UK. This account was not used for payment for policy work.

Gates stated that the Smythson account was set up for this reason.

Setting up these accounts was at the request of the Ukrainians who wanted to keep it quiet that they were paying DMP.

Gates stated that a Ukrainian introduced them to a Cypriot law firm and ran the Presidential election from Cyprus.


Continuation of FD-302 of Richard Gates

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07/02/2014

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/02/2014

PAUL J. MANAFORT (MANAFORT), date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED] was interviewed at MILLER & CHEVALIER CHARTERED, 655 15th St., NW, Washington, D.C. 20005. Present for this interview were Department of Justice Attorneys Daniel Claman and [REDACTED] FBI Supervisory Special Agents [REDACTED], FBI Special Agent [REDACTED] FBI Forensic Accountant [REDACTED] and Defense Attorneys [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, MANAFORT provided the following information:

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MANAFORT recalled meeting RINAT AKHMETOV in June 2005. MANAFORT was asked to step in and help AKHMETOV on political matters. AKHMETOV hired [REDACTED] with Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP, a law firm in Washington D.C., to assist with an asset the Ukrainian government claimed AKHMETOV illegally privatized. AKHMETOV introduced MANAFORT to VIKTOR YANUKOVYCH in August 2005.

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The company DAVIS, MANAFORT, and FREEDMAN was incorporated in 1995. The company was composed of RICK DAVIS, PAUL MANAFORT, and [REDACTED]. In 2005, [REDACTED] left and the company became DAVIS-MANAFORT. There was a transition in 2008, and by 2009 the company was named DMP INTERNATIONAL. Neither [REDACTED] nor DAVIS worked in the Ukraine.

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When MANAFORT began working with AKHMETOV, he would only take advance payment for his services. AKHMETOV recognized the need to lobby the United States Government. MANAFORT advised AKHMETOV to get all of his assets in order.

In 2006, MANAFORT put a strategy together for the Parliamentary Elections. MANAFORT advised his client was the PARTY of REGIONS (POR).

For example, there could be 150 candidates but MANAFORT's only client was the POR. MANAFORT did not recall who specifically wired him money for his services to the POR.

MANAFORT did significant work for both OLEG DERIPASKA and RINAT AKHMETOV. MANAFORT acknowledged that he received [REDACTED] from an account in the name of VEGA HOLDINGS for services he did for either

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Investigation on 07/30/2014 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 07/30/2014

by [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of Paul Manafort, On 07/30/2014, Page 2 of 7

DERIPASKA or AKHMETOV. He then received an additional [REDACTED] dollars from VEGA HOLDINGS within a year of receiving the original [REDACTED]

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MANAFORT recalled that the work he did was for AKHMETOV and he would need to verify whether VEGA HOLDINGS is associated with AKHMETOV or DERIPASKA. MANAFORT worked with DERIPASKA on an initiative to democratize countries. Montenegro was the first success.

All of the money from Ukraine or Ukrainians that has been transferred into MANAFORT's accounts, personal and/or business were for his services.

AKHMETOV never directed MANAFORT to put money anywhere and MANAFORT did not do business deals with anyone.

ANTES MANAGEMENT CORP OST WEST sent money to MANAFORT's account in July, August, September and December 2006, totaling over [REDACTED] dollars. MANAFORT did not recall this company but stated this money could have come from POR as he was very active in the elections and polling. POR paid MANAFORT directly, but he was not in charge of the billing contracts or the invoices. There was one contract in the beginning with AKHMETOV, but after that MANAFORT did work for AKHMETOV without a specific written contract.

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MANAFORT stated KONSTANTIN KLIMINIK worked for MANAFORT's firm, occupied an office in Kiev and generated paperwork for services. KLIMINIK and RICHARD GATES were in charge of collecting and tracking all monies coming in for MANAFORT's services.

MANAFORT was then questioned about certain individuals:

BORYS KOLESNIKOV, a.k.a. BVK, was MANAFORT's principal contact in the POR.

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Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of Paul Manafort, On 07/30/2014, Page 3 of 7

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When asked, MANAFORT stated PERICLES INVESTMENTS LLC was set up to do business in the United States and may have been used as a vehicle to do the deal.

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MANAFORT provided a detailed history of his work with the elections in the Ukraine. MANAFORT conducted a poll and saw a way for YANUKOVYCH to succeed. MANAFORT set up a series of meetings with YANUKOVYCH. The first meeting MANAFORT listened to YANUKOVYCH and the next few meetings MANAFORT briefed him on the campaign strategy for the next 5 years where the goal was for YANUKOVYCH to take the lead on judicial and economic reforms. MANAFORT worked on behalf of AKHMETOV and campaigned for YANUKOVYCH.

In February, 2007 MANAFORT ran the election as YANUKOVYCH's campaign manager and to public surprise, won in Parliament. YANUKOVYCH became Prime Minister of Ukraine. MANAFORT had lawyers involved to insure there was no voter fraud and briefed U.S. Ambassadors in succession; John Herbst, William Taylor, John Teft, and Geoffrey Pyatt, on a regular basis.

The Ukrainian government then tried to create a SNAP election because they didn't like the fact the POR had won. The west pressured YANUKOVYCH to accept. As a result, there was another election within a year.

There were many factions in the POR. Towards the end of his presidency, YANUKOVYCH replaced cabinet members with members of "The Family", which included SERGEI ARBUZOV and MANAFORT is not friendly with anyone in the Family. MANAFORT met SERGEI ARBUZOV once and they became fast enemies. ARBUZOV became the Central Bank President and then the Prime Minister of Ukraine.

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MANAFORT explained the POR as being divided into two groups: the AZAROV group which included the international economic experts and the older generation of the POR, and the LEVOCHKIN group which were the reformists who handled negotiations. MANAFORT worked with the LEVOCHKIN group on the successful IMF deal during the first year of YANUKOVYCH's presidency.

ANDRIY KLYUYEV managed the crises within the cabinet and often YANUKOVYCH would look to him for advice and to help negotiate. MANAFORT interacted with KLYUYEV on a regular basis.

MIKHAILOVYCH AZAROV met with MANAFORT in 2005. AZAROV was part of the party leadership.

MANAFORT denied any direct knowledge of business dealings with the

Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of Paul Manafort, On 07/30/2014, Page 4 of 7

following individuals:

[REDACTED] - MANAFORT never did business with him.

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YURIY BOIKO - the Minister of Energy. MANAFORT dealt with him on energy policy issues only, never did business with him.

[REDACTED] - MANAFORT met him twice but no business dealings.

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KLYUYEV brothers - MANAFORT did not know anything about their involvement with Activ Solar and never did business with them.

MANAFORT never met with YULIA TYMOSHENKO and does not know [REDACTED]

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Towards the end of his Presidential term, YANUKOVYCH began replacing cabinet members with members of the "Family", and [REDACTED] began consolidating power. ARBUZOV became the Central Bank President and then the Prime Minister of Ukraine.

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In the summer of 2013, PUTIN realized YANUKOVYCH planned to sign the Ukraine/European Union Association Agreement deal and started to squeeze PETRO POROSHENKO on the chocolate industry. POROSHENKO's chocolate plants are in Russia and PUTIN told YANUKOVYCH if he didn't sign the deal, PUTIN would cause economic ruin on Ukraine.

MANAFORT currently feels the local level corruption is crushing the Ukraine economy.

MANAFORT once asked BOYKO about the oil rig. The registered Agent was the same who signed off on something for TYMOSHENKO. MANAFORT and BOYKO had a good relationship.

When asked, MANAFORT stated he talked to YANUKOVYCH about corruption as a liability but never spoke about specific names. MANAFORT demonstrated it using factual data like the polling numbers. MANAFORT feels local level corruption is responsible for damaging the economy in Ukraine.

According to MANAFORT, the only person outside of PUTIN who benefited from the European Association Agreement not being signed was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Oligarchs, such as AKHMETOV, [REDACTED] BOYKO and [REDACTED] supported the signing. YANUKOVYCH would have signed the agreement if the Europeans had come up with the \$3 billion dollars of economic support for Ukraine, prior to the signing. In September 2013, MANAFORT organized a meeting between STEFAN FULE, the European Commissioner of Enlargement, JOSE BARROSA, the European Commission President, and

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Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of Paul Manafort, On 07/30/2014, Page 5 of 7

YANUKOVYCH to work towards an economic safety bridge for Ukraine. In November 2013, the Germans and Dutch realized YANUKOVYCH would not sign the agreement, but by then it was too late. YANUKOVYCH is currently in Russia.

MANAFORT advised he only met with YANUKOVYCH once in Mezhyghyria, when it was just a small house. YANUKOVYCH said he had purchased it but he and MANAFORT never met there again.

In 2008, around the time of the elections, MANAFORT acknowledged he knew of several companies established in Cyprus. He advised that GATES and KLIMINIK worked with BOYKO to do what the Ukrainians wanted. Their direction came from KOLESNIKOV. MANAFORT maintained he didn't know who specifically set up the Cypriot accounts but verified he was never a signator on the accounts. MANAFORT said the reasoning behind the company nomenclatures was because he was high profile. The accounts were vehicles used to pay him. MANAFORT stated there was no concealment necessary when these companies were established because he was providing political services in the public eye.

When asked about CMZ VENTURES in New York, MANAFORT advised he was [REDACTED] This was the one instance MANAFORT stepped out of the political world and attempted a business deal. [REDACTED] idea was to raise money overseas and buy real estate in the United States. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] MANAFORT backed out of the project and never got involved in business dealing. [REDACTED]

MANAFORT has never heard of NEOCOM or GLOBAL ENDEAVOR. GLOBAL HIGHWAY LTD and LEVIATHAN sounded familiar and any money flowing from those companies would have been money he earned from his services. MANAFORT has never been to the Seychelles and stated he had an accounting firm that would have records of all the companies. MANAFORT advised that LILRED LLC has nothing to do with Ukraine.

In response to switching banks, MANAFORT stated he switched from [REDACTED] because the average American bank does not like money coming from the Ukraine or other foreign jurisdictions, such as Cyprus.

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In closing, MANAFORT hasn't spoken with YANUKOVYCH since December 2013. He feels YANUKOVYCH lied to him and remains committed to helping the

FBI(19cv1278)-2709



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of Paul Manafort . On 07/30/2014 . Page 6 of 7

current leaders in power in the Ukraine. Currently MANAFORT is working with POROSHENKO, Ukraine's President, and [REDACTED]

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In reference to the Oligarchs, MANAFORT advised DERIPASKA left Ukraine at the beginning of YANKUKOVYCH's presidency, AKHMETOV remained a part of the EU faction and [REDACTED] did not choose a side and lives off his Russian business.

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
Notes taken during the interview, an outline, and a bank account chronology is maintained in a 1A envelope.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of Paul Manafort, On 07/30/2014, Page 7 of 7

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/01/2017

Timothy BARRETT, Chief of Media Relations, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), [REDACTED] was interviewed by FBI [REDACTED] Washington Field Office Special Agents [REDACTED] at The Office of the General Counsel, ODNI, in the presence of ODNI attorney [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, BARRETT provided the following information:

On Wednesday, 11/22/2017, BARRETT received a call from Saoud MEKHENNET, a journalist who he had a previous professional relationship with as a function of his position in media relations. MEKHENNET is a German female of Muslim faith, affiliated with the Washington Post. She has recently written a book about her experiences reporting on the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) called They Told Me To Come Alone. BARRETT believed MEKHENNET generally had excellent sources and was well respected. During this call, MEKHENNET told BARRETT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] b3 per ODNI  
[REDACTED] b6 per FBI  
[REDACTED] MEKHENNET was looking for some type of b7A per FBI  
confirmation or denial of this information from BARRETT, as well as b7C per FBI  
guidance on if there were reasons she should not publish the story. BARRETT told her he would ask around about the inquiry. BARRETT then informed the ODNI National Intelligence Officer for Russia-Eurasia, [REDACTED]


On the evening of 11/28/2017, BARRETT received a follow-up call from MEKHENNET asking if there was anything he could share about the story. BARRETT said there was not, [REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 11/29/2017 at McLean, Virginia, United States (In Person)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 11/30/2017by [REDACTED]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



Date of entry 03/22/2018

[redacted] for UBS was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [redacted] FDIC OIG Agent [redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Kyle Freeney. Present during the interview were [redacted] b6 per FBI & FDIC OIG  
counsel for [redacted] b7C per FBI & FDIC OIG After being b6  
advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

Background

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

b6  
b7CLoans

[redacted] typically does not have any correspondence with borrowers during the loan process. [redacted] reviews summaries prepared by underwriters and interacts with underwriters and loan officers if he has questions about the information.

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Financial advisors are the point of contact for customers seeking mortgages with UBS. Financial advisors gather information and documentation from the borrowers and then contact the mortgage credit specialists to initiate the loan process. The mortgage credit specialist and the financial advisor then contact the borrower to go through the information on the borrower's loan application and the terms of the loan. After this, the loan is sent to underwriting. Underwriters work with mortgage credit specialists and financial advisors to request additional information and documentation from the borrowers as needed.

Investigation on 11/29/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/29/2017

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted] . On 11/29/2017 . Page 2 of 5

Loan to value (LTV) is the ratio between the value of the property and the amount of the loan. The lower the LTV, the better the risk for the bank. The maximum LTV for loans is [redacted] whether primary residence or investment property. [redacted] clarified that exceptions to this maximum LTV threshold can be obtained.

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Debt to income (DTI) is the ratio between the borrower's income versus the borrower's debt. The purpose of calculating DTI is to determine the borrower's ability to service the loan payments. UBS looks at the borrower's other mortgage debt, any consumer debt, credit card debt and other types of monthly debt obligations. Generally, the maximum DTI threshold is [redacted] but [redacted] can be acceptable in certain circumstances.

b4

Income is calculated by reviewing the borrower's W2s, tax returns, financial statements and schedule of real estate (REO).

Some debt obligations will be apparent on the borrower's credit report, but some debt may not show up on the credit report. For example, personal loans or debt in the name of LLCs may not show up on the borrower's credit report, but would still be included in DTI.

The borrower's REO is reviewed to determine what debts, expenses and income are generated from the borrower's real estate holdings. UBS is relying on the borrower's accurate disclosures of this information.

Credit reports are run so UBS can see the borrower's credit history and character as it relates to other debt payments. If a borrower has a history of making late payments, it is an indicator that they may have a future of making late payments as well.

Use of proceeds letters are used with cash out refinance loans so USB can know how the funds are being used. UBS is particularly concerned with refinance proceeds being used to purchase securities, which is a violation of certain regulations.

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It is expected that the borrower provide complete and accurate information to UBS during the loan process. The reason the borrower signs the loan documents is to certify that the information is accurate and complete.

Manafort

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 11/29/2017 . Page 3 of 5

[redacted] approved Manafort's cash out refinance loan for the property at [redacted] did not specifically recall reviewing Manafort's loan as he reviews between 300-500 loans per month.

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[redacted] reviewed the Mortgage Credit Report, which is a summary of the loan, the borrower, the property and any other relevant information for his decision.

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Manafort [redacted]

[redacted] Manafort also [redacted]

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The Residential Loan Application Supplemental Questionnaire (RLAS) is a document all borrowers are required to complete for any type of loan at UBS. The RLAS asks the borrower to indicate if more than 50% of their income/wealth is derived from a foreign country and if the borrower is, or is a close associate of a politically exposed person (PEP). If either of these questions are answered in the affirmative, the loan is elevated to the Compliance Department and Legal Department. Additional information is obtained on where the borrower's income is derived and who the PEPs may be. During the Compliance and Legal review, the loan is stopped.

It is expected that the borrower answers questions on the RLAS accurately and completely. If [redacted] knew Manafort was providing false answers on his RLAS, or at any point during the loan process, he would have stopped the loan.

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The Residential Loan Application (1003) is a document all borrowers are required to complete for mortgage loans. There are usually many iterations of this document as the amount of the loan, or other items may change throughout the process. Information provided by the borrower on the 1003, such as financial information, real estate owned and disclosures, is relevant to the underwriting process. Such information factors into DTI, LTV and other decisions made by UBS on whether to approve the loan.

The borrower is required to sign the 1003 to certify the information is accurate and complete.

Profit and Loss Statements (P&Ls) are provided by self employed borrowers in lieu of tax returns if tax returns have not yet been filed. The P&Ls give UBS a look at the borrower's financial picture.

The Income Analysis Worksheet is a documents prepared by the underwriter and reviewed by the credit officer. [redacted]

[redacted] could not recall

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview . On 11/29/2017 . Page 4 of 5

if Manafort's 2012, 2013 and 2014 income years were relied upon for his DTI calculation. [redacted] did not recall knowing about [redacted]

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[redacted] stated even with [redacted] [redacted] Manafort may still have been able to pay the loan.

Manafort's Mortgage Credit Report (MCR) was reviewed by [redacted] Underwriting on Manafort's loan was conducted by PHH Mortgage and not in house by UBS. PHH Mortgage has a contract with UBS for underwriting. In 2015, PHH Mortgage did not have the ability to approve loans, but rather they had to be sent to UBS for approval.

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[redacted] noted UBS learned of an additional property purchased by Manafort which was not disclosed. [redacted] did not independently recall this matter. UBS would want to know about any properties owned by Manafort and if there was any debt associated with those properties. Even if Manafort did not have a mortgage loan, he may have monthly debt associated with the properties' association dues, taxes and insurance.

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[redacted] was not sure if Manafort's undisclosed property affected the loan terms. If there were other properties owned by Manafort which were not disclosed, this may have affected Manafort's DTI.

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Had [redacted] known Manafort had a [redacted] which was undisclosed, he would have taken a closer look and asked additional questions about the debt.

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[redacted] In addition, [redacted] would have been concerned with the lack of disclosure and material omissions.

[redacted] would stop a loan if he was concerned with material omissions.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U)

[Redacted]

Interview


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11/29/2017

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5 of 5

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/12/2018

US Marshals [redacted] cellular telephone number [redacted] b6  
was interviewed telephonically by FBI Special Agent [redacted] b7C  
[redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and b7F per USMS  
the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] explained that the US Marshals in the Eastern District of  
Virginia did not have a detention facility capable of housing inmates long b6  
term. As such, the US Marshals practice is to utilize local jails to b7C  
house inmates locally. Paul Manafort was housed at the Alexandria b7F per USMS  
Sheriff's Jail in accordance with this practice.

When inmates are housed at local jails, they are required to abide by  
the policies and procedures of that local jail.

Manafort's defense counsel, [redacted] made a request to the US b6  
Marshals for a laptop be made available to Manafort for discovery b7C  
review. [redacted] acted as a liaison between [redacted] and the Alexandria b7F per USMS  
Sheriff's Jail with respect to this request.

[redacted] told [redacted] the laptop could be provided to Manafort; however, b6  
the laptop would have to be inspected by the jail's IT staff to make sure b7C  
it did not have the capability to access the internet. b7F per USMS

A laptop was provided to the Alexandria Sheriff's Jail for Manafort  
sometime on or before July 16, 2018. On July 16, 2018, [redacted] texted b6  
[redacted] that the jail refused the laptop because they discovered it was b7C  
capable of accessing the internet, which was forbidden. The laptop was b7F per USMS  
returned to [redacted] and resubmitted on July 19, 2018.


On August 21, 2018, [redacted] was notified by Alexandra Sheriff's Captain b6  
[redacted] that a password on the laptop had been changed and files had b7C  
been hidden. [redacted] had no further information about these issues. b7F per USMS

Investigation on 08/21/2018 at Alexandria, Virginia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/10/2018

by [redacted]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/23/2018

On or around 8/3/2018, SA [ ] interviewed [ ] in Washingb6 per FBI & NSD  
DC. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents, b7C per FBI & NSD  
[ ] provided the following information:

At the start of the interview, [ ] reviewed EX1, a memorandum regarding b6  
PAUL MANAFORT by [ ] dated December 22, 1987. b7C

[ ] joined DOJ's unit b6  
that oversaw registration under the Foreign Agents Registration Act b7C  
(FARA). Throughout his time in the FARA unit, the number of attorneys in  
the unit varied from four to eight. At the time of [ ] work on the  
MANAFORT matter, the FARA unit had 5 or 6 attorneys.

Inspections at the FARA Unit at DOJ were very thorough. Inspectors would  
compare a firm's filings to the firm's records to evaluate whether or not  
the disclosures met FARA's requirements.

The FARA unit would usually send accountants and paralegals to carry out  
inspections. The senior FARA attorneys would determine what they needed  
and the junior staff were responsible for copying and collecting  
documents. [ ] did not recall taking part in an inspection related to b6  
MANAFORT. b7C

[ ] did not have a present recollection of drafting the December 22, b6  
1987 memo (EX1). The memo related to possible criminal charges against a b7C  
presidential appointee. The FARA unit primarily focused on disclosures.  
[ ] did not recall the memo but opined that it was so different from his  
normal work that he should have remembered it. Reading his memo, [ ]  
believed that MANAFORT was working as an agent of a foreign power.

[ ] believed there may have been additional documentation, either from b6  
the Assistant Attorney General's office or from the White House that he b7C  
would have used to compose his memorandum. [ ] did not recall having any

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 08/03/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [ ] Date drafted 08/06/2018by [ ]b6  
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b7E

[REDACTED]  
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[REDACTED]  
(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]  
Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] on 8/3/2018 . On 08/03/2018 . Page 2 of 2


interaction with anyone from the White House or Attorney General's office. Likewise, [REDACTED] did not recall having any interaction with MANAFORT, MANAFORT's attorney(s), or anyone from MANAFORT's firm.

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Communication that came from the White House would have first gone to [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] knew investigations well. [REDACTED] and  
is currently living in [REDACTED]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/05/2018

[redacted] social security number, [redacted] was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [redacted] FDIC OIG Special Agent [redacted] Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres and Assistant United States Attorney [redacted]. Present during the interview were counsel for [redacted] and [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview [redacted] provided the following information: b6 per FBI & FDIC/OIG  
b7C per FBI & FDIC/OIG

[redacted] was provided with a Proffer Agreement which he signed and acknowledged understanding. [redacted] was told that the interview was voluntary and if he chose to answer questions he needed to do so truthfully as lying to a federal agent could constitute a federal crime.

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

b6  
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[redacted]

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 12/04/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/06/2017

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 12/04/2017 . Page 2 of 21

b6  
b7C  
b7EThe Federal Savings Bankb6  
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[redacted]

Prior to this interview, [redacted] spoke with [redacted] interview with the Special Counsel's Office. [redacted] and [redacted] did not talk substantively about the interview. [redacted] told [redacted] to tell the truth. [redacted] was worried about the interview.

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[redacted] boss at TFSB is [redacted]

[redacted]

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b7CDTI/DSC

[redacted] explained debt-to-income (DTI) ratio as a ratio of the borrower's income versus their debt which is relied upon in residential loans. Debt service coverage (DSC) ratio is used in commercial loans and factors in income generated from the subject property to offset debt associated with the loan.

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DTI is the borrower's global income versus their global debt. The reason the bank looks at DTI is to determine whether the borrower will be able to make their loan payments. DTI is "one of the pegs" relied upon when underwriting a loan.

[redacted] stated there were "5 C's" an underwriter looked for when underwriting a loan: Credit, Character, Capacity, Collateral and another C which [redacted] could not recall. All are important. If a borrower had great DTI, but bad character, the bank might not do the loan.

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A borrower discloses debt obligations to the bank on their Form 1003 Loan Application (1003) and in their Personal Financial Statement (PFS). An underwriter also looked at the borrower's credit report; court filings for liens, judgments and bankruptcies; and tax returns to see other debt the borrower may not have included in their 1003 or PFS. [redacted] stated that the borrower was expected to disclose all debt obligations on the 1003 and PFS.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview . On 12/04/2017 . Page 3 of 21

Debt such as mortgages, car payments and personal loans are all included in the borrower's debt obligations. Personal loans may not appear on the credit report, but should be disclosed on the 1003 and PFS.

The borrower was also expected to disclose all properties they owned and all businesses in which they had an ownership interest. Debts related to businesses owned by the borrower may factor into the underwriter's debt calculations.

A self-employed borrower's income was typically shown by providing tax returns, bank statements and K-1 distribution forms.

#### LTV

Loan-to-value (LTV) for a construction loan is calculated using the "as complete" value of the property versus the loan amount. The goal of a construction loan is for the loan proceeds to be used to enhance the value of the property and in the end, for the property to be worth more than the loan amount. If the property is not going to be worth more in the end, the borrower needs to put up additional collateral to secure the loan.

In a construction loan, the underwriter reviewed the construction budget, plans and specifications. These documents are provided to the appraiser to determine the "as complete" value.

The cost to complete a project is central to the bank in a construction loan. If there is not enough money in the loan for the borrower to complete the project, then the borrower needs to bring money into the bank to make up the difference. The bank needs to have enough money to complete the project.

The borrower was expected to provide true and complete information regarding the construction budget and cost to complete. These documents often came from the contractor or the borrower. Regardless, the borrower has to sign the contractor agreement certifying the information is true and correct and they agree with the amount.

#### REO

TFSB requires borrowers to submit a schedule of real estate owned (REO). The borrower's REO is important to the bank because it shows if the borrower has any additional collateral to pledge in security of the loan. In addition, it shows if the borrower has any other mortgages and property carrying costs which would be included in the borrower's debt calculation.

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 12/04/2017 . Page 4 of 21

The borrower was expected to provide true and complete information on their REO. TFSB relied on the borrower for this information. In [redacted] experience, borrowers tend to inflate the value of their properties owned. [redacted] did not think it was typical for borrowers to omit the fact that they own other properties.

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#### Credit Report

TFSB runs a credit report for all borrowers to determine the borrower's debt, payment history and other loans. When other mortgage loans appear on the borrower's credit report, TFSB asks the borrower to identify which properties are collateral for these mortgages. TFSB would not know which mortgages go with which properties unless the borrower were to provide this information. The borrower was expected to provide true and complete information regarding other debts and other properties.

#### Use of Proceeds

In commercial loans, the use of refinance proceeds is limited to commercial purposes only. The reason for this is the interest rates and bank fees on a commercial loan are higher than on a residential loan. Therefore, the bank is not qualified for the same protections on commercial loans as they would be on residential loans.

When TFSB extends a commercial refinance, they require the borrower to acknowledge that they are obtaining a commercial loan and verify the proceeds will be used for commercial purposes only. [redacted] defined "commercial purposes only" as business use, or commercial real estate projects. [redacted] could not think of any prohibited uses.

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Paul Manafort told TFSB he was using the proceeds of his \$9.5 million refinance on 174 Jobs Lane, Bridgehampton (Jobs Lane) for speculative and commercial purposes. [redacted] said this included a very broad range of potential uses. Manafort was not required by TFSB to specify how he was going to use the proceeds. Manafort's use of proceeds was not very relevant to the bank's decision. The only reason TFSB asked for an explanation on Manafort's use of proceeds was because technically, Manafort's loan was a commercial loan. Ultimately, TFSB did not know, or care how Manafort used the proceeds.

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#### Loan Process

At TFSB, loans are generated by loan officers. The loan officer obtains the initial information from the borrower and is the conduit for obtaining any follow up information during the course of the loan.



Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 12/04/2017 . Page 5 of 21

The loan officer submits an email to the Portfolio Scenario Desk, which includes [redacted] In this email, the loan officer writes up a portfolio loan scenario and attaches the borrower's 1003 and credit report. Sometimes, [redacted] are copied on the email.

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The portfolio loan summary is reviewed and sometimes further summarized by whomever receives it. This scenario is then provided to the Credit Committee which consists of [redacted] The Credit Committee votes and, if a unanimous vote to approve is achieved, a deal memo is generated which includes terms of the proposed deal.

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The borrower is sent a term sheet which they are required to sign and return with a non-refundable deposit equal to a portion of the bank's fees. [redacted] gave an example of a deposit being equal to 1 point or 1% of the loan amount.

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Once the borrower signs the term sheet and the deposit is obtained, an appraisal is ordered and underwriting begins. The underwriter's questions and requests for additional information and documentation are sent to the loan officer who communicates with the borrower.

The underwriter provides the Credit Committee with a verbal and written description of what they found and generally provides an assessment of the loan. The underwriter's job is to collect information to sufficiently answer all of their questions and then provide the facts to the Credit Committee so they can make a decision to approve, deny or restructure the loan.

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Paul Manafort

[redacted] underlying documents for Manafort's loans to include, but not limited to the following: 1003, PFS, tax returns and draft tax returns, profit and loss statements for 2015 and 2016 (P&L), credit report, Affidavit and Acknowledgement, REO and information or

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] (U) [REDACTED] Interview . On 12/04/2017 . Page 6 of 21

documentation in email communication carbon copied (CC'd) or forwarded to

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b7C

[REDACTED] did not have direct communication with Manafort until August 2017.

[REDACTED] did communicate with Manafort's attorney, [REDACTED] regarding legal documentation and to obtain some information related to Manafort's loan. [REDACTED] did not directly communicate with Manafort's CPA or accountants, but he may have been CC'd on emails including them. [REDACTED] did not communicate directly with [REDACTED] or Rick Gates either.

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[REDACTED] had heard of Rick Gates because Manafort had a severely delinquent \$300,000 American Express (AMEX) payment on his credit report. This was very concerning to [REDACTED] because of the amount and duration of the delinquency. This was a red flag to [REDACTED] because it reflected negatively on Manafort's character and capacity.

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Manafort told TFSB the payment was made on his AMEX card by his friend, Rick Gates for New York Yankees season tickets. Gates was supposed to repay Manafort, but had not done so yet. Eventually, the payment was made. [REDACTED] never spoke with Gates about this matter.

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b7C

Manafort was brought to TFSB through [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] did not know who referred Manafort to [REDACTED] first recollection of Manafort was in April 2016 when Manafort and [REDACTED] were looking for financing to finish a building in Manhattan.

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] The deal ended up going nowhere because [REDACTED] physically went to look at the building and realized TFSB had been led to believe the project was further along than it really was. [REDACTED] blamed the misrepresentation on [REDACTED]

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b7Cb6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 12/04/2017 , Page 7 of 21

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b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[REDACTED] could not think of any other time in which a loan was approved for a borrower who did not disclose a foreclosure. [REDACTED] knew other borrower's who disclosed their foreclosures and subsequently had loans approved.

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[REDACTED] stated that if TFSB was aware that a borrower's property was in foreclosure they may restructure the deal to protect the bank by charging more fees up front or something of that nature. [REDACTED] was not sure if Manafort and [REDACTED] deal was restructured in this way.

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b7CManafort Issuesb6  
b7C

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] but by that time, Manafort was no longer involved with the Trump Campaign. [REDACTED]

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b7Cb6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 12/04/2017 , Page 8 of 21

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b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[REDACTED]. Additionally, Manafort provided false information to TFSB about a variety of issues.

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b7Cb6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 12/04/2017 , Page 9 of 21

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7CFBI Interviewb6  
b7C

After the interview, [REDACTED] about the  
interview. [REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED] he had been interviewed. [REDACTED]  
was aware that they had all been interviewed as well. [REDACTED]

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b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview , On 12/04/2017 , Page 10 of 21

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The loans to Manafort were unusual because there were a number of questions that were never answered. In addition, the financials received from Manafort were incorrect, which was unusual.

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b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[Redacted]

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b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 12/04/2017 , Page 11 of 21

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
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[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

OCC Investigation

[Redacted] investigation found that Manafort's income was incorrectly calculated.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview . On 12/04/2017 . Page 12 of 21

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C



Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview . On 12/04/2017 . Page 13 of 21

[REDACTED] has reviewed the draft memo of findings from the OCC. [REDACTED] recalled a recommendation that TFSB reconstruct Manafort's cash flow analysis. [REDACTED] may have reviewed the final report from the OCC as well.

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The issues raised by the OCC had to do with TFSB's underwriting process. [REDACTED] recalled an issue about relying on stale financial information, which he did not agree with because the financials relied upon were less than 6 months old. [REDACTED] also recalled an issue with using a credit report from April 2016. [REDACTED] stated that credit report was used because it showed the delinquency to American Express which was removed on the subsequent credit report. [REDACTED] was aware that a subsequent credit report showed a lower credit score for Manafort.

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[REDACTED] believed the OCC mentioned there was a lack of financial reporting for Manafort's businesses which should have been present in a commercial loan. [REDACTED] stated that because the Manafort loans started as residential loans, that was likely the reason for this lack.

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[REDACTED] to Jobs Lane

When Manafort decided to restructure the [REDACTED]  
a cash-out refinance on [REDACTED]

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b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

#### Documents

1. [REDACTED] was shown the DMP 2015 P&L provided by Manafort to TFSB. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] When TFSB received DMP's draft tax returns for 2015, the information on the tax

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview . On 12/04/2017 . Page 14 of 21

returns would have taken precedence over the P&L because in [REDACTED] experience, a borrower may inflate their income to a bank, but deflate their income to the IRS.

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12. [REDACTED] was shown an email dated [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] regarding the DMP draft tax returns for 2015.

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[REDACTED] stated that he recalled there was a discrepancy between the 2015 P&L provided by Manafort and the draft tax returns received. The draft tax returns only showed \$344,000 of income while the P&L showed \$4.4 million in income.

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b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 12/04/2017 , Page 15 of 21

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b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

4. [REDACTED] was shown an email exchange between [REDACTED] dated [REDACTED] was directed to [REDACTED] email which read, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] recalled these questions and that neither he nor [REDACTED] received answers to them. TFSB had received the 2015 P&L referenced previously and a 2016 year-to-date P&L for DMP. The 2015 P&L showed approximately \$4.4 million in income while the 2016 P&L showed a loss. Manafort told TFSB that he was expecting a \$2.4 million payment in 2016 that he had not yet received.

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[REDACTED] did not know what the \$2.4 million was for. At some point, Manafort provided an updated DMP balance sheet showing the \$2.4 million had been received.

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b7C

Given that Manafort's loan was a \$9.5 million cash-out refinance, he would have had to show sufficient liquidity to make up for the lack of income. [REDACTED]

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b7Cb6  
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted] . On 12/04/2017 . Page 16 of 21

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[redacted]

Manafort's liquidity was a very relevant factor given he did not have income for 2016.

7. [redacted] was shown an email from [redacted] dated [redacted] and an attached memo from [redacted] stated he asked [redacted] to write this memo.

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b7Cb6  
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[redacted]

Manafort's mortgage on Union St. was not included in Manafort's DSC because TFSB did not know about the loan at the time they were underwriting the loan on [redacted] learned about the Union St. mortgage and the fact that the property was [redacted] after the [redacted] loan had already closed. Manafort should have disclosed this information to TFSB, but he didn't.

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b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] When [redacted] tried to bring this up, he was told that Manafort was a busy person and he was still involved in the Trump Campaign behind the scenes. [redacted] could not recall who told him this.

Manafort also had a severely delinquent payment to AMEX in the amount of \$300,000 that was listed on his credit report. Manafort told TFSB he allowed Gates to purchase season tickets to the New York Yankees on his AMEX and Gates had not yet repaid him. [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview . On 12/04/2017 . Page 17 of 21

14. [redacted] was shown the Credit Approval Form (CAF) dated November 12, 2016 which was completed by [redacted] and reviewed by [redacted]

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[redacted] believed such information could have negatively affected TFSB's decision on whether to approve the loan. Manafort was under intense scrutiny for work he had done and money he had received for that work.

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With regards to the DSC rating of 2.08X, this was based upon Manafort's 2014 and 2015 income.

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With respect to the portion of the CAF discussing the two mortgages from Citizens Bank. Manafort told TFSB that those two mortgages were secured by two separate residences.

20. [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted] . On 12/04/2017 . Page 18 of 21

[redacted] did not know why. [redacted] knew that no money from the Union St. loan went to pay off Citizens Bank. [redacted] could not answer why the [redacted] was not listed on the CAF. [redacted] could not answer why the [redacted] were not included in Manafort's DSC.

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[redacted] As such, TFSB only included debt obligations Manafort had during that year in their DSC coverage. Since the [redacted] loan's first year of payments was held back, this amount was not included in the DSC calculation for the Union St. loan.

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[redacted] stated that this was not standard practice and could not think of any other instance when this occurred. Typically, all of the debt is included from day one.

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b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[redacted] stated that the risk rating for the Manafort loans was not really "Average". The loans never should have been made at all. [redacted] and [redacted] discussed how the Manafort loans never should have closed. [redacted] did not think he told [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted] . On 12/04/2017 . Page 19 of 21

21. [redacted] was shown an email thread forwarded from [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] stated that he was questioning Manafort's attorney,  
[redacted] charging \$140,000.

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b7Cb6  
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[redacted] believed Manafort had two encumbered accounts at TFSB: one for \$630,000 which was set up to cover the first year of payments on the Jobs Lane loan; one for \$2.5 million which was set up as cash collateral for the Union St. loan; and one with the remaining proceeds of the [redacted] loan. The first two accounts were encumbered and Manafort was not able to use the funds in them. However, Manafort was free to use the remaining proceeds of the [redacted] loan.

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#### Holding Company Participation Agreement

In order for TFSB to stay within their legal lending limit, a portion of the Manafort loans had to be funded by TFSB's holding company. [redacted] learned about this from [redacted] sometime in December 2016 or January 2017. [redacted] did not know whose idea this was. [redacted] had heard of similar participation agreements several times before, but had never worked on any of those transactions. [redacted] personally thought the concept of the holding company funding a portion of the loan seemed strange, but it was allowed by regulators.

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The holding company was funding their participation in the Manafort loans from a line of credit at another bank. The line of credit had to be increased and then drawn down upon to fund this participation. [redacted]

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#### Foreclosure Issues

[redacted] was shown an email from [redacted] dated [redacted]  
[redacted] with the subject line, [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 12/04/2017 . Page 20 of 21

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b7C

[redacted]  
[redacted] could not recall discussing the matter with anyone else. [redacted] did not know if [redacted] was aware of the foreclosure.

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[redacted] was shown the memo written by [redacted] dated [redacted] [redacted] to write this memo. [redacted] was directed to paragraph 13 which read, "Little information on the hard money lenders that are funding the various California SFR projects. (loans cross collateralized, will they provide extensions on the maturity dates, current on loans)."

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[redacted]  
[redacted] wanted to know the status of Manafort and [redacted] loans to that lender, if those loans were "falling apart", and how those loans were going to affect Manafort and [redacted]

Otherb6  
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[redacted] told [redacted] to document the issues with the Manafort loans. [redacted] was difficult to get responses from. [redacted]  
[redacted]

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[redacted]  
[redacted] did not know if this related to the Manafort loans.

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As previously stated, [redacted] was going to approve the Manafort loans "no matter what". [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] was aware that Manafort obtained a third lien against 377 Union St., which was a default of the TFSB loan which prohibited subordinate financing. [redacted] did not know about this third lien until February 2017. TFSB has not taken any action on the default issue. Normally, TFSB would take action, but thus far, nothing has been done.

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


[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview . On 12/04/2017 . Page 21 of 21



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/05/2018

[redacted] previously identified, was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [redacted] FDIC Special Agent [redacted] Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres and Assistant United States Attorney [redacted]

[redacted] Present during the interview were attorneys for [redacted] [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6 per FBI & FDIC/OIG  
b7C per FBI & FDIC/OIG

[redacted] was provided with a proffer agreement which he signed and acknowledged understanding. [redacted] was advised that the interview was voluntary and if he chose to answer questions he needed to do so truthfully.

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Background

[redacted]

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[redacted] In or around [redacted] was hired by The Federal Savings Bank (TFSB) as [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] are the owners of TFSB. [redacted] purchased Baytree Bank in or around [redacted] and changed the name to TFSB. [redacted] purchased a bank because it was the easiest way to have a mortgage lending business licensed in all 50 states. [redacted] is the [redacted] of TFSB.

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[redacted]

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DTI

[redacted] defined DTI as the amount of debt a borrower has versus the amount of earnings, or income. DTI's relevance in the underwriting process is dependent on the type of loan. [redacted] calculated DTI to ensure a borrower

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Investigation on 11/30/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/19/2017

by [redacted]

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b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 11/30/2017 . Page 2 of 13

could service their debt, meaning repay their loan. At TFSB, DTI over [redacted] is a red flag.

b4

Initially [redacted] stated that DTI was not relevant for the loans extended to Paul Manafort because the primary source of repayment for those loans was the sale of property. [redacted] was reminded that the initial loan extended to Manafort was a \$9.5 million cash-out refinance which was wholly dependent on Manafort's cash flow for repayment. [redacted] agreed and stated that Manafort's DTI was material to the underwriting process of the \$9.5 million loan.

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The borrower's income was generally obtained by reviewing W2s, tax returns, and/or profit and loss statements (P&Ls). P&Ls provide an interim financial statement for years in which tax returns have not yet been filed. Year-to-date (YTD) P&Ls show income earned to date in the current year. Projected P&Ls showed a projection of income intended to be earned.

[redacted] could review a projected P&L, but he did not believe a projected P&L could be used for calculating income. [redacted] believed the OCC would not allow this. [redacted] would review a projected P&L as a mitigating factor. If a projected P&L were supplied to [redacted] he would expect the borrower to indicate that the income was not yet earned.

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The borrower's debt was generally obtained by reviewing the personal financial statement (PFS) and credit report. Credit reports show debt such as mortgage liens, car payments and credit card payments. Unsecured or private loans are not usually apparent on credit reports. The borrower is required to disclose all debt on their PFS.

#### LTV

Loan-to-value is the amount of the loan versus the value of the collateral. LTV is important and TFSB's guidelines are to keep the LTV on cash out refinances to less than [redacted] was not sure if there was a maximum LTV allowed.

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#### Loan Process

Loans are typically generated by bankers. The bankers send a summary of the loan to the Loan Portfolio Desk, which includes [redacted] [redacted] When [redacted] receives an email with a loan summary, he reviews it for DTI, LTV and "the story" to determine if it is a viable loan. TFSB does not have strict guidelines that each portfolio loan must follow and every loan is slightly different. That's why [redacted] looks at the story. Loans can have imperfections if the story makes sense.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 11/30/2017 . Page 3 of 13

If [redacted] determines the loan to be viable, he sends it back to the banker and the banker submits it to the Credit Committee, which is comprised of [redacted]. If the Credit Committee approves the loan, it comes back to [redacted] for underwriting. At this point, [redacted] requests information and documentation from the borrower through the banker and orders an appraisal.

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b7C

[redacted] is looking for the "5 C's" when underwriting: Capacity, or the borrower's ability to repay the debt; Collateral, or the value of the property; Cash Flow, or the borrower's income; Character, or the borrower's history of repaying debt; and Credit, or the borrower's credit report.

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Once [redacted] has completed his review, he provides the information in the form of a Credit Approval Memorandum (CAM) to [redacted] for further review. A Credit Approval Form (CAF) is a brief version of a CAM. [redacted] signs off on the CAM/CAF and it is uploaded to the borrower's file for regulatory purposes.

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Not all approved loans result in funded loans. [redacted] gave the example of a recent cash-out refinance loan for a bagel shop. The loan was initially approved by the Credit Committee and came to [redacted] for underwriting. During the course of underwriting the loan, [redacted] requested the financials for the bagel shop. The owner of the bagel shop was reluctant to provide the business' financials. Ultimately, they provided the documents, but if they hadn't the loan would likely have not been funded. [redacted] would have relayed to the Credit Committee that he did not have sufficient information to underwrite the loan and the loan would likely have died.

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[redacted] does not have the authority to approve or deny loans, only the Credit Committee can do that. [redacted] does notify the Credit Committee of relevant information for their decision to approve or deny. [redacted] makes recommendations and reports the facts.

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[redacted] was given an example of a borrower who initially indicated their income was \$4.5 million per year, but during the underwriting process, [redacted] noticed their income was actually \$400,000 per year. [redacted] stated he would notify the Credit Committee of the information so they could make their decision.

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[redacted] was asked what he would do if he knew the borrower was falsifying and/or doctoring financial statements to support his income. [redacted]

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[redacted] would

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 11/30/2017 . Page 4 of 13

also "probably" tell the Credit Committee about the discrepancy in the documentation and information. [redacted] would "probably" tell [redacted] first. [redacted] job is to filter loans out.

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b7C

[redacted] does not typically communicate directly with borrowers and did not communicate directly with Paul Manafort. [redacted] did not communicate with anyone on Manafort's behalf. [redacted] did not communicate with [redacted] or Rick Gates. [redacted] did communicate with one of Manafort's accountants located in California after Manafort's loans closed for the purpose of a billing issue. [redacted] was also copied on a number of emails which may have included Manafort and others listed above.

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#### Paul Manafort

[redacted] first learned of the Manafort loans with TFSB in or around April 2016 after a meeting between [redacted] and Manafort in New York. Manafort was seeking financing for a property in New York.

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[redacted] told [redacted] about the meeting. [redacted] was tasked with gathering documentation and information on the potential deal so [redacted] could provide the scenario to Goldman Sachs. The deal never materialized. [redacted] did not have any further information on this initial deal.

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At the time when [redacted] first learned of Manafort's potential loans with [redacted] told [redacted] to "Google" Manafort. This was how [redacted] learned about Manafort's involvement in the Trump Campaign.

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b7C

The second Manafort deal [redacted] recalled was a construction loan for a property in [redacted] believed this deal was initiated sometime in or around [redacted] was the underwriter for this loan. The borrower was [redacted] and the personal guarantors were Manafort and [redacted]

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[redacted] recalled Manafort and [redacted] needed financing to finish construction and also to refinance the existing loans on the property. There was a [redacted] which prompted [redacted] to request additional financial on the deal.

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The lender for the existing lien was [redacted] a hard money lender located in California. [redacted] could not recall if he knew at the time he was underwriting the loan that [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview . On 11/30/2017 . Page 5 of 13

[ ] reviewed Manafort and [ ] PFSSs, tax returns, draft tax returns and P&Ls during the underwriting process.

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The [ ] deal did not not fund. [ ] could not recall why the deal did not go through. When [ ] was close to funding, [ ] was told that it was not going to fund, but he could not recall why. [ ] did not believe he was involved after the [ ] loan did not fund.

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b7CDocument 1

[ ] was shown the DMP 2015 P&L provided to TFSB for the Manafort loans. [ ] had seen and reviewed this document during the underwriting process. The document showed DMP's net income for 2015 was around \$4.5 million.

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b7CDocument 4

[ ] was shown an email dated August 11, 2016 between [ ] with the subject line, "quick questions". [ ] was directed to the portion of his email which read, "Is DMP losing money in 2016 because he has given up his consulting business to concentrate on the Trump campaign. Why did revenues go up so much in 2015?"

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[ ] was also shown a copy of his Loan Memorandum dated September 13, 2016 in which he noted a number of questions he had related to Manafort's income in 2015 and 2016.

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b7C

[ ] was trying to gather information on Manafort's income. [ ] was relying on Manafort's 2015 P&L (Document 1) and trying to find out more information.

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b7CDocument 5

[ ] was shown an email dated September 12, 2016 between [ ] with the subject line, "Outstanding items for Manafort". [ ] was directed to the portion of his email which read, "Additionally, I don't know where the cash is coming from to fund the debt service (Paul doesn't appear to have it). Plus, I asked several question [sic] of Paul which I only think that Trump Tower question was answered."

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[ ] was asked if Manafort's income was a relevant factor in his [ ] stated that it was. [ ] needed to determine that Manafort had the funds to cover the debt service. [ ] was relying on Manafort's 2015 P&L (Document 1) to calculate his debt service coverage and still having problems showing Manafort could afford the loan payments.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 11/30/2017 . Page 6 of 13

Had [redacted] known the 2015 P&L was falsified and Manafort's 2015 income was substantially less, it would have been relevant to the bank. [redacted]

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[redacted] would have attempted to get additional information to determine if there was a justifiable reason for the misleading information.

[redacted] did learn that Manafort's 2015 P&L was substantially discrepant from his 2015 draft tax returns. [redacted] did write an email to [redacted] and others to notify them of this discrepancy. [redacted] tried to obtain additional information about the discrepancy, but he was unsuccessful.

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[redacted] could not recall if the topic of filing a SAR came up with the Manafort loan. [redacted] has filed SARs before. [redacted] did not know why he did not file on in this case.

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b7CDocument 9

[redacted] was shown an email dated October 11, 2016 between [redacted] with the subject line, "My 2015 Tax Return - FINAL Draft". [redacted] was directed to a portion of his email which read, "As a fyi, Manafort's YE 2015 financials for DMP International, LLC are considerably different then [sic] his tax returns. 12/31/15 DMP International, LLC shows over \$4.4MM in net income, yet tax returns (K-1) only show [redacted]"

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[redacted] recalled thinking the P&L was "kind of hinkey" because of the difference in Manafort's income on the P&L and the tax returns. [redacted] tried to get back up documentation for the P&L, but he was unsuccessful. The reason [redacted] was looking at Manafort's financials was to determine if Manafort could repay the loan.

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[redacted] had concerns that Manafort was not providing accurate information. [redacted] made these concerns known to [redacted] and [redacted] told them he was receiving inaccurate information and not getting answers to his questions.

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b7C

[redacted] told [redacted] the Manafort deal was going to go through because the Credit Committee had approved it. [redacted] was aware of other deals initially approved by the Credit Committee that did not ultimately fund.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview , On 11/30/2017 , Page 7 of 13

[redacted] job is to make sure the information provided to the bank for its lending decision is accurate. In the case of the Manafort loan, the information was not accurate. The Manafort loan should not have gone through.

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[redacted] stated Manafort was a "prominent man" and that's why his loan was funded. [redacted] believed [redacted] enjoyed the "semi-celebrity" of Manafort. When [redacted] was appointed to [redacted] [redacted] was "please to be appointed" and posted about his appointment on his [redacted]

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[redacted] knew Manafort had a role in [redacted] the appointment to the council. [redacted] Manafort and [redacted] had a conversation about putting [redacted] on the [redacted] [redacted] told [redacted] that [redacted] said he wanted to help with the Trump Campaign.

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[redacted] was interested in Manafort's "fame". [redacted] recalled in January 2017, [redacted] was looking to be appointed as the [redacted] reached out to TFSB employee [redacted] and asked for an introduction. [redacted] was not sure if Manafort was involved in [redacted] attempts to gain a position within the Trump Administration.

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Manafort and [redacted] were friends and had a good relationship. [redacted] heard this from [redacted] Per [redacted] "loved" the Manafort loan and wanted it to fund. Had this loan not been for Manafort, it would not have funded. If [redacted] had not caused this loan to fund, it would not have funded. Manafort had many issues other than the inaccurate income information, such as issues related to his work in the Ukraine.

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Everyone who worked on the loan knew it was a priority to [redacted] and it needed to get done. [redacted] did not tell [redacted] this directly, but [redacted] knew this because of [redacted] actions. Despite all of the issues with the loan, [redacted] still funded it.

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[redacted] heard from [redacted] that [redacted] was "hot for the deal" and wanted the deal done. This was expressed to [redacted] by [redacted] early on in the underwriting process.

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[redacted] has only talked to [redacted] directly about Manafort two times. Once was in or around February 2017 when a blog mentioned [redacted] as it related to Manafort's property at [redacted] told [redacted] the loan was "all good" and he would make the same loan again ten times over. [redacted] did not respond when [redacted] said this.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 11/30/2017 . Page 8 of 13

The second conversation with [redacted] about Manafort was after the FBI and a "federal prosecutor" came to [redacted] residence to interview him in or around June 2017. After the interview, [redacted] called [redacted] to tell him a bank attorney would contact him.

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[redacted] did not know how [redacted] knew the FBI had interviewed him. [redacted] had told [redacted] about the interview and [redacted] said [redacted] told him. [redacted] told [redacted] he had received a call from the FBI as well.

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[redacted] called [redacted] that evening. [redacted] and [redacted] discussed how the FBI came to [redacted] [redacted] asked [redacted] what the FBI asked in the interview. [redacted] told [redacted] the FBI was interested in the Manafort loan. [redacted] told [redacted] the primary focus was [redacted] [redacted] told [redacted] he never liked [redacted] also told [redacted] the Manafort loans were "all good" and he'd do them again. [redacted] thought it was nice of [redacted] to call him and check on him.

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[redacted] did not tell [redacted] what to say or what to do. [redacted] did not know if [redacted] was just calling him to get information about what the FBI asked or what [redacted] told them.

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[redacted] called [redacted] when the FBI arrived. [redacted] told [redacted] the FBI was at his house as well. [redacted] and [redacted] spoke about the interviews afterwards, but nothing specific. [redacted] initially stated he and [redacted] only talked about the "style of the interview" and not the substance. [redacted] then stated that he told [redacted] the FBI asked about a memo [redacted] sent to [redacted]

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[redacted] expressed their concern that the FBI was interviewing them. [redacted] knew Manafort was going to come back to "bite" them. [redacted] said the bank never should have given this loan to Manafort. During the loan process, [redacted] sent an email telling [redacted] to document everything because the FBI would be looking into the loan one day.

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After the interview, [redacted] kept his "head down" and didn't talk about the matter.

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[redacted] was asked if he believed [redacted] was pushing Manafort's loan through because he wanted something from Manafort in return. [redacted] stated that [redacted] got what he wanted from Manafort, meaning [redacted] [redacted] did not think [redacted] approved Manafort's loan as a form of repayment.

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[redacted] "loved the collateral" for Manafort's loan. [redacted] was referring to the cash-out refinance loan on 174 Jobs Lane in Bridgehampton.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview , On 11/30/2017 , Page 9 of 13

[redacted] reiterated that [redacted] told him [redacted] wanted the Manafort deal to go through and no matter what issues [redacted] found in Manafort's paperwork, the deal was going to go through regardless. [redacted] told [redacted] to outline his concerns in writing.

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[redacted] did not know why [redacted] was enamored with the deal.

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[redacted] was asked about the status of the collateral on the 377 Union St. loan. [redacted] stated the 377 Union St. loan was "cash secured" by [redacted] [redacted] Manafort was required to deposit as collateral on the loan. [redacted] knew about this deposit because of his involvement in the loan. [redacted] then stated he had a "small role" in the loan.

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[redacted] was asked where cash collateral should come from in a normal loan. [redacted] stated cash collateral should come from the borrower's cash assets. [redacted] was asked if cash collateral should come from another loan. [redacted] stated it shouldn't. [redacted] did not know that Manafort's [redacted] cash collateral came from another loan.

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[redacted] had never seen an instance before where "cash collateral" did not come from the borrower's assets. It did not make sense to [redacted] that the collateral could come from another loan. Borrowed money is not the borrower's money.

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[redacted] learned Manafort's cash collateral deposit came from the proceeds of his cash-out refinance on 174 Jobs Lane from [redacted] sometime in January 2017. [redacted] were talking about Manafort's deals and [redacted] brought it up. [redacted] stated [redacted] did not seem overly concerned about the issue.

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b7CDocument 6

[redacted] was shown an email dated September 13, 2016 from him to [redacted] [redacted] with an attached letter also written by [redacted] bearing the same date.

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[redacted] stated [redacted] told him to write the letter to document the issues he had with the Manafort loan. [redacted] had written letters regarding loan issues before, but none this detailed. [redacted] estimated he had only written letters about loan issues 2-3 times before, but he could not recall what the issues were or what happened with those loans.

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b7CDocument 7

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 11/30/2017 . Page 10 of 13

[redacted] was shown an email dated September 20, 2016 between [redacted] and [redacted] with the subject line, "Manafort Issues". [redacted] stated his email boiled down the concerns he had previously sent in the letter. [redacted] never received a response from his previous letter, which is why he sent another email. [redacted] would normally have expected a response to a letter like the one he wrote on September 13, 2016 (Document 6).

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[redacted] kept expressing his concerns because he was not getting any answers.

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[redacted] wanted Manafort's loan done, but [redacted] did not know why. [redacted] was "headstrong" and had approved loans before that should not have been approved. [redacted] specifically recalled a loan for [redacted]

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[redacted] should not have been approved. [redacted] did not believe [redacted] provided any false information to [redacted]

[redacted] was not aware of any pre-existing relationship between Manafort and [redacted]

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#### Restructure

[redacted] did not know why the [redacted] was restructured to a cash-out refinance loan on a property at 174 Jobs Lane. Underwriting for a cash-out refinance is different because the primary focus is the borrower's income. Manafort's income was already a concern for [redacted] Manafort did not have the cash flow to afford such a large loan. When [redacted] expressed this to [redacted] told [redacted] the loan was going to go through anyway.

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When [redacted] heard Manafort was getting a second loan from TFSB on 377 Union St., he was surprised. [redacted] heard [redacted] mention the 377 Union St. loan had funded. [redacted] wasn't sure, but may have done some underwriting on the 377 Union St. loan.

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#### Document 11

[redacted] was shown the Credit Approval Form and Memorandum (CAF and CAM) for Manafort's loan on 174 Jobs Lane which was prepared by [redacted] and dated November 12, 2016.

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[redacted] included background information on Manafort in the CAM such as the fact that Manafort worked in Angola, allegations of undisclosed cash payments for his work in Ukraine, and his resignation from the Trump

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 11/30/2017 . Page 11 of 13

campaign because [redacted] told [redacted] to include these items. [redacted] obtained this information from open source outlets.

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b7CDocument 3

[redacted] was asked if he'd seen the 2016 DMP P&L provided by [redacted] in August 2016. [redacted] had seen the document and reviewed it during the underwriting process. [redacted] was shown the 2016 DMP P&L prepared by [redacted] with an effective date of July 31, 2016 which showed a net loss of \$638,048 for DMP.

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[redacted] stated the fact that DMP was operating on a loss in 2016 was of concern to him. The Manafort loans were still extended, despite the fact that his business did not have any income in 2016, because [redacted] "loved this loan". [redacted] did not know why [redacted] "loved" the Manafort loans. The loans did not make sense. [redacted] was experienced in banking and [redacted] considered him intelligent. [redacted] did not know why [redacted] made these loans.

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b7CDocument 11

[redacted] was referred back to the CAF/CAM and directed to the portion of the document which listed the risk rating of [redacted] stated he consulted with [redacted] before assigning the risk rating.

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[redacted] made "a mistake" in rating the loan a [redacted] believed the risk was actually higher. A [redacted] is what was recommended by the Credit Department. [redacted] did not want to start the loan as "Watch" or "Special" risk rating, which were "borderline" deals.

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When asked if [redacted] was instructed to rate the loan a [redacted] he responded, "I don't want to say..." [redacted] then said he consulted with [redacted] about the risk rating. [redacted] was not sure how strong his opinion was as to this loan's actual risk rating.

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When asked again if someone told [redacted] to rate the loan a [redacted] said he believed [redacted] did, but he was not sure. [redacted] stated [redacted] didn't have anything to do with the risk rating. [redacted] did not know if [redacted] and [redacted] talked about risk rating.

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[redacted] explained that this loan never should have been funded in the first place. Were [redacted] truly rating the risk of this loan, it would have been worse that a [redacted] When [redacted] discussed how to write up the CAM, they both agreed that the loan should never go through to begin with. [redacted] told [redacted] to put a [redacted] put a [redacted] even though he knew it shouldn't be a [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 11/30/2017 . Page 12 of 13

[redacted] did not say if he was instructed to rate the loan a [redacted] by someone else. [redacted] did not have the impression that the instruction came from someone else.

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Even if he had rated the loan a "Watch" or "Special", it would not have gone back to the Credit Committee because the document was an internal document.

[redacted] was directed to the Financial Statement Analysis section of the CAM. [redacted] was asked why he noted the discrepancy between the 2015 P&L and the draft tax returns if he wasn't going to use the income listed on the tax returns in his calculations. [redacted] stated this was a mistake on his part. There was a period of time when Manafort's income was being calculated by someone other than [redacted] used their calculations in the CAM even though he had done his own calculations based upon the tax returns. The calculations done by the other person were incorrect.

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[redacted] corrected this error in the CAM for the 377 Union St. loan.

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[redacted] did not list any information about Manafort's [redacted] on 377 Union St. because he did not know about [redacted]. This would have been relevant information and should have been included in the CAM.

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#### Legal Lending Limit

[redacted] was aware that TFSB's holding company participated in the 377 Union St. loan because of [redacted] legal lending limit. [redacted] learned about this during a Credit Committee meeting. The holding company's participation was brought up as a way to do the loan. [redacted] did not know the details of how this worked.

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[redacted] believed TFSB's holding company used funds from a line of credit from PNC Bank in order to participate in the Manafort loan.

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[redacted] was aware of one other instance in which a participation loan was obtained due to TFSB's legal lending limit. TFSB did a [redacted]

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[redacted] personally participated in the loan to keep TFSB within the legal lending limit.

[redacted] was not aware of any other participation agreements. [redacted] and [redacted] discussed how strange the holding company participation agreement was and what a "pain in the ass" the documentation was.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview , On 11/30/2017 , Page 13 of 13

did not want to do the participation agreement. told the bank should not do the deal. said trouble was going to "rain down" on TFSB and there would be "investigations".

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did not know why TFSB went to such trouble to lend to Manafort.

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was aware that the loan on 377 Union St. was currently "hush hush" at the bank. The loan matures in January and the construction is not complete. TFSB was negotiating with the federal government about what they can and can't do. heard this from

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was aware of Manafort's problem This was a big problem for the bank. Manafort was required to but he was unable to do so because he

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Manafort sent an email saying he had but then found out

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was not sure what TFSB was going to do with the property come January.


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b7COther

discussed how they had to go to Washington DC for interviews with the Special Counsel's Office. told to tell the truth. knew were also interviewed because they told

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about his interview with the Special Counsel's Office. also told last name unrecalled that he was being interviewed. did not tell them anything specific other than he was being interviewed. All of these people knew had given Manafort loans which were under scrutiny.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/20/2018

[redacted] previously identified, was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [redacted] Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres, Assistant United States Attorney [redacted] and FDIC Special Agent [redacted]

[redacted] Present during the interview were counsel for [redacted] [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] b6 per FBI & FDIC/OIG  
the following information: b7C per FBI & FDIC/OIG

[redacted] was provided with a proffer agreement which he signed and acknowledged understanding. [redacted] was advised that the interview was voluntary and if he chose to answer questions, he needed to be honest in his answers.

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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b7CTFSB Loans

Investigation on 11/20/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/27/2017

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 11/20/2017 . Page 2 of 13

TFSB is a small bank with approximately \$300 million in assets. When they began, they had \$44 million in assets. TFSB focuses on originating residential mortgages to sell on the secondary market. The loans are not packaged together and securitized, but rather are sold individually. At least half of the loans originated by TFSB are VA or FHA loans.

TFSB also originates portfolio loans, which are serviced by TFSB and not sold to other lenders. Portfolio loans generally don't meet the guidelines for VA or FHA loans. TFSB's goal is to have the borrower refinance their portfolio loans with TFSB at a time when the loan adheres to conventional guidelines and can be sold on the secondary market.

Portfolio loans at TFSB are approved by the Credit Committee, which consists of [redacted] A unanimous decision is required for a loan to be approved. Conventional loans do not need to go through the Credit Committee, but rather are underwritten and approved through a different process.

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TFSB underwriters do not have approval authority for portfolio loans as they must be approved by the Credit Committee. Underwriters can approve conventional loans.

TFSB has approximately 1000 employees, half of whom are salespeople. Loans are originated by salespeople. When a salesperson has a loan which does not fit into the conventional model, they submit a brief description of the loan to the Credit Committee for review. This brief description often contains information about the borrower, the collateral, the loan desired and the borrower's basic financial information. If the Credit Committee approves the loan subject to underwriting, the salesperson, or loan officer, collects additional documents and submits the loan package to the Credit Group, which consists of [redacted] and [redacted] for underwriting. If the facts change, the loan may come back to the Credit Committee for review and restructuring before funding.

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Portfolio loans are underwritten by TFSB's Credit Group. The guidelines for portfolio loans are not as defined as they are for conventional loans. TFSB can adjust guidelines on a case to case basis and take mitigating factors into account when underwriting portfolio loans. [redacted] stated "the story" behind a borrower and the loan are factored into TFSB's decision.

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TFSB has extended loans to borrowers with bankruptcies, short sales and other issues. If TFSB thinks the loan will be able to be refinanced in the future, they are more likely to extend a loan with risk. The average



Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 11/20/2017 . Page 3 of 13

life of a portfolio loan is 8 months before it is refinanced or sold to another lender. Portfolio loans are typically "good yielding assets" for TFSB.

The interest rate on portfolio loans is 7.25% and the loans are adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs). This is a good yield to the bank and motivates the borrower to refinance the loan and get a better rate. TFSB tries to get the borrower to refinance with TFSB and then tries to sell that refinanced loan to another lender.

In 2016, TFSB originated approximately \$4.2 billion in loans which were sold on the secondary market. They also serviced approximately \$60-\$70 million in portfolio loans.

#### DTI

Debt to income ratio is the ratio of a borrower's income versus the borrower's expenses. DTI is calculated to determine the borrower's available cash flow. TFSB often refers to debt service coverage (DSC) in lieu of DTI. DTI is generally used in relation to residential loans and DSC is generally used in relation to commercial loans.

Income for self employed borrowers is determined by reviewing tax returns and profit loss statements (P&Ls) if the tax returns have not yet been filed. TFSB looks for consistency of income and the borrower's credit history.

[redacted] recalled Manafort said his 2016 income was low because he was focusing on the Trump Campaign. TFSB looked at Manafort's history of income over previous years and his ability to make that income in the future as a mitigating factor to the low income in 2016.

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Debt is determined by factoring in all PITI, or principal, interest, taxes and insurance payments for properties owned, as well as any other debt obligations the borrower may have.

TFSB is generally looking for a DSC of 1.2X, meaning the borrower has 1.2 times the amount of their debt obligations in available cash flow. For example, if the borrower's debt obligations are \$100 per month, TFSB wants to see that the borrower has at least \$120 per month in available cash after paying their debt obligations. The 1.2X DSC guideline can be reduced if there are mitigating factors such as great credit history, or significant collateral. TFSB does not strictly adhere to the 1.2X DSC policy for portfolio loans.

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 11/20/2017 . Page 4 of 13

DSC is very important to the bank and the borrower is expected to provide a complete and accurate picture of their income and debt obligations. If TFSB learned that a borrower had omitted or falsified information concerning their debt obligations, they may restructure the loan to fit the actual information. [redacted] gave the example of a borrower not disclosing a mortgage loan. [redacted] stated TFSB would restructure the loan factoring the newly learned loan amount into the DSC.

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[redacted] was asked what TFSB would do if they learned the borrower had provided falsified documentation in support of their omissions or false information. [redacted] stated it would depend on the situation. [redacted] stated that "embellishments" were not uncommon.

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[redacted] gave the example of a borrower not disclosing subordinate financing on a property. When TFSB found out, they recalculated DTI to include the additional loan debt. As a result, the DTI was too high and TFSB did not approve the loan.

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#### LTV

Loan to value is the ratio between the amount of the loan and the value of the collateral. Ideally, TFSB tries to keep LTV under 80%, but there are exceptions. TFSB considers rental properties more risky than residences. TFSB would want to know if a property was a rental property so they could review the rent rolls, leases and other documentation related to the income generated from the property.

TFSB tries to cross-collateralize loans with other properties to help keep LTV low.

In general, TFSB will try to restructure a loan to fit in the risk profile. For example, if a borrower's DTI was [redacted] TFSB may require the borrower to bring in cash to close the loan and lower the amount of the loan and therefore their DTI. TFSB may ask for a co-borrower or for additional collateral to mitigate the risk of the high DTI.

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#### REO

TFSB requires borrowers to provide a schedule of real estate owned (REO) so they can see what equity the borrower has in other properties which may be able to be used as cross-collateral. The REO also shows additional debt the borrower has on other properties, which factors into DTI.

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 11/20/2017 . Page 5 of 13

Credit reports typically show other mortgage debt the borrower may have. TFSB also relies on the borrower to accurately and completely disclose this information in their REO.

#### Use of Proceeds

The borrower is required to provide an explanation of how they intend to use the proceeds of a cash out refinance. The use of proceeds may be relevant to TFSB, but it is not generally that important. If the borrower is using the funds to purchase another property or to renovate another property, TFSB would want to know, but it would not necessarily affect the loan. The borrower is expected to provide accurate representation of how they intend to use the proceeds of the loan.

#### Credit Reports

[redacted] does not deal with credit reports and is not sure if TFSB reviews them for recent inquiries or other items.

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#### Paul Manafort

[redacted] does not usually have direct communication with borrowers. [redacted] never spoke with, or met Manafort. [redacted] was copied on emails involving Manafort.

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[redacted] never communicated with [redacted] Rick Gates, or [redacted]

[redacted] spoke with one of Manafort's accountants located in California on one occasion. The purpose of the conversation was to get information for [redacted]

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[redacted] knew very little about Manafort when Manafort first became a client of [redacted] learned that Manafort was involved in politics. [redacted] learned that Manafort worked as a political consultant, or advisor to presidents in foreign countries.

[redacted] did not analyze Manafort documentation during the underwriting process, that was [redacted] job. As a member of the Credit Committee, [redacted] was privy to Manafort's income, asset and debt information as that was material to his decision.

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Document 27

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 11/20/2017 . Page 6 of 13

[redacted] was shown an email dated July 28, 2016 from [redacted] to [redacted] with the subject line, "Revised Portfolio Summary - Paul Manafort [redacted]"

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[redacted] could not recall what happened with Manafort's original loan with TFSB. It was not uncommon for a borrower's loan to not be approved, but [redacted] could not recall the reason(s) why Manafort's original loan scenario did not go through. [redacted] could not recall if he worked on the original loan.

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In July 2016, Manafort came to TFSB for a construction loan on a property in California [redacted]. There were discussions about a number of construction loans for Manafort, but [redacted] could not recall the specifics.

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There was an existing lien against the property [redacted] but [redacted] did not recall who the lender was. [redacted] believed the existing loan was maturing around the time of the application, but that could have been a different loan. [redacted] did not know who owned [redacted]

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The Credit Group, specifically, [redacted] notified [redacted] [redacted] did not know how [redacted] did not know if Manafort disclosed the [redacted] [redacted] did not speak with the existing lender and was not sure if anyone at TFSB spoke with them. Typically, TFSB will coordinate with an existing lender when they prepare to close a loan, but that would be [redacted] job.

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When asked if the default was material to TFSB, [redacted] stated "you always want to know", but the [redacted]

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When adverse information about a borrower is learned, [redacted] tries to obtain additional information to see if there are mitigating factors. In the event of [redacted] may ask the borrower what happened and the borrower's representations may be enough to satisfy [redacted] would be memorialized somehow in the loan file.

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If a borrower was in payment default to an existing lender, this would be "good information to know". If the borrower had made payments to the

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 11/20/2017 . Page 7 of 13

existing letter with bounced checks or fabricated checks, [redacted] would take the information into account.

[redacted] was asked why this type of information would not be a disqualifier for [redacted] agreed that the information was "very important" and he would want to understand why, but it would not be an automatic disqualifier. "Most likely", TFSB would not extend a loan to a borrower that paid a previous lender with bounced checks or fake checks and was in payment default on an existing lien. [redacted] thought it "highly unlikely" that such a loan would be closed.

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[redacted] was asked if he had ever known a borrower was committing fraud and yet he still approved a loan for funding. [redacted] stated that he has never approved such a loan.

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#### P&Ls

[redacted] was asked about the 2015 and 2016 P&Ls for DMP received by TFSB for Manafort's loans. [redacted] did not believe he had reviewed these documents previously, but he was aware they had been provided by Manafort and he had received email communication from [redacted] related to these documents.

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Manafort's financial situation was relevant to the Credit Committee's decision to lend. If there had been substantial changes in Manafort's financial situation during the loan process, the Credit Committee would want to know. [redacted] recalled that prior to the final approval and closing of the loan, he learned that Manafort's financial situation had substantially changed. [redacted] could not recall how it had changed.

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[redacted] was asked if he recalled Manafort's 2015 tax returns showing income of approximately \$400,000 whereas the P&L provided by Manafort for 2015 showed income of approximately \$4 million. [redacted] did not recall the details of this matter. [redacted] believed Manafort's income was lower because of his focus on the Trump Campaign. [redacted] did not recall the difference in income being that large. A difference as large as this would be material to the Credit Committee.

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Had [redacted] known that Manafort submitted a falsified 2015 P&L to make DMP's income appear much greater than it actually was, this would have been material to the Credit Committee's decision. The difference in income would have been material as it related to Manafort's ability to cover the debt service and the fact that Manafort had misrepresented information.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 11/20/2017 . Page 8 of 13

[redacted] stated that when Manafort's loan was a construction loan, the source of repayment was the sale of the property and therefore the Credit Committee was more focused on the value of the property, not Manafort's income. In addition, Manafort had a number of other properties that could serve as cross-collateral for the loan. Manafort had owned some of these properties for a long period of time and he had a good history of repayment. [redacted] had confidence that Manafort could make his payments on the TFSB loan.

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[redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] was asked if his comments regarding the Credit Committee's focus on the value of property rather than Manafort's income were true for the \$9.5 million cash out refinance TFSB extended to Manafort. [redacted] stated that the primary source of repayment on the cash out refinance was Manafort's income and therefore the Credit Committee's focus would have been on Manafort's cash flow.

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Had [redacted] known that Manafort provided falsified documentation or false information to TFSB regarding his income, namely an altered P&L which showed approximately \$4 million in income when DMP actually earned approximately \$400,000 in income, he would have declined the loan. [redacted] did not think it likely that Manafort's loan could have been restructured in light of the false information and the large difference in income. The mere fact that Manafort provided falsified documentation or false information was "probably enough" to deny the loan.

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#### Loan Memorandum

A Loan Memorandum is a write up from the Credit Group summarizing the analysis of the loan, the borrower and the source of repayment. The Credit Group sends Loan Memoranda to the Credit Committee if the original facts change or new information is learned. [redacted] recalled seeing the Loan Memorandum for Manafort's loan on 377 Union St., but he did not believe he saw the Loan Memorandum for [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 11/20/2017 . Page 9 of 13

[redacted] recalled Manafort claimed to have [redacted] in accounts receivable, or funds he had earned but not yet received. [redacted] could not recall if Manafort ever received these funds during TFSB's loan process. Accounts receivable and accounts payable, or funds due to another party but not yet paid, are factored into the borrower's income analysis. TFSB relies on borrower disclosure to know about accounts receivable or payable. The borrower should list these items on their PFS.

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b7CDocument 31

[redacted] was shown an email dated September 14, 2016 from [redacted] with the subject line "Payoff letters". [redacted] did not have an independent recollection of this email.

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[redacted] forwarded that information to [redacted] because it was new information. This is information Manafort should have disclosed to [redacted] could not recall what answer was given for why this information was not disclosed.

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[redacted] did not recall a conversation with [redacted] about this topic. [redacted] thought it was explained to him that Manafort was in

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[redacted] was asked, what if anything TFSB did to alleviate any concerns [redacted] was more worried about Manafort [redacted] was out of the deal, TFSB felt more comfortable. [redacted] was the person in charge of the [redacted]

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b7CDocument 32

[redacted] was shown an email dated September 20, 2016 from [redacted] with the subject line "Manfort [sic] Issues". [redacted] stated that [redacted] email to him because the terms of the loan were changing.

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[redacted] was directed to the portion of [redacted] forwarded email which read, "Consulting business for Manafort shows \$638,048 in expenses and no income. Mr. Manafort says that there is \$2.4MM in fees earned. Would

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 11/20/2017 . Page 10 of 13

like to at least receive a a/r aging." [redacted] was asking for a list of all accounts receivable and how long those amounts had been outstanding. This was relevant because if the funds due had been due for a long period of time, it was more unlikely that they may not ever be received.

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[redacted] was asked if the fact that DMP was operating on a loss of \$638,048 for 2016 was of relevance to the Credit Committee. [redacted] stated that this was concerning. [redacted] was asked what was done by TFSB to mitigate this concern. [redacted] stated that TFSB focused on the income history of Manafort. Manafort was focused on the Trump Campaign in 2016 and not on DMP. However, Manafort had a history of income and had assets and cash reserves that mitigated the income issues in 2016. The fact that DMP was operating on a loss in 2016, made the 2015 income more relevant because TFSB was looking to Manafort's income history.

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[redacted] was directed to the portion of [redacted] email which read, "Would like to know the properties that are associated with the two mortgage loans." [redacted] recalled learning that Manafort had undisclosed mortgage debt, but he did not believe he learned this until TFSB had already closed the loan on 377 Union St. After 377 Union St. closed, TFSB did a title search and noticed an additional lien against the property to Genesis Capital.

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b7CDocument 32A

[redacted] was shown an email dated September 21, 2016 from [redacted] with the subject line "Comments to agreements [redacted] Attached to this email was a letter written by [redacted] and [redacted] dated September 13, 2016. [redacted] was directed to the portion of [redacted] letter which read, "Mr. Manafort has two mortgage loans with [redacted] and [redacted] Credit Officer still does not know which properties these loans are associated."

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[redacted] stated he did not have a recollection of Manafort's undisclosed mortgages to [redacted] This would have been material to the Credit Committee's decision because it impacted Manafort's DTI. [redacted] would want to know why they were not disclosed by Manafort. Depending on the amount of the mortgages and the reason they were not previously disclosed, the Credit Committee may have chosen to restructure the loan terms.

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b7CDocument 33

[redacted] was shown an email dated October 5, 2016 from [redacted] with the subject line "Manafort [redacted] files - update post [redacted] meeting". [redacted] was directed to the portion of [redacted] email

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted] . On 11/20/2017 . Page 11 of 13

which read, "I will be receiving the 2015 draft tax returns for both [redacted] and Paul by end of business tomorrow. I'm told that the gross income for [redacted] and for Paul is in excess of [redacted]"

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[redacted] recalled Manafort's tax returns were on extension and therefore TFSB had been relying on the 2015 P&L. TFSB had requested a draft copy of Manafort's tax returns and that's what Raico was referring to.

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[redacted] did not know why [redacted] believed Manafort's gross income for 2015 was in excess of [redacted] obtained this information from Manafort or Manafort's accountant. [redacted] only knew this number because [redacted] told him. [redacted] was creating this number on his own.

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[redacted] was directed to the portion of [redacted] email which read, "One of the questions from [redacted] was did Paul collect the [redacted] in receivables, and he did." [redacted] did not recall this information being relayed to him. [redacted] obtained this information from Manafort or Manafort's accountant.

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[redacted] was asked if he recalled being told about a large discrepancy in Manafort's income which was realized when Manafort's draft tax returns were received. [redacted] did not recall. [redacted] did not know if he was told about this and has since forgot, or if he was never told.

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[redacted] would have considered it a significant factor to know that Manafort's P&L did not match his draft tax returns and that the difference in income was nearly \$4 million. Had [redacted] known this, he "probably" would not have approved the loan. [redacted] would want to know the reason for the discrepancy.

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The 2015 DMP P&L provided by Manafort should have been true and complete. [redacted] was asked how Manafort's \$9.5 million cash out refinance closed given that TFSB learned he had provided false information in the form of the 2015 P&L. [redacted] stated, "I don't have a good answer for you."

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[redacted] stated that "the Credit Committee owns this". [redacted] [redacted] did not close. [redacted] was asked why the \$9.5 million cash out refinance loan on [redacted] to Manafort closed in light of the issues with Manafort's income. [redacted] stated that TFSB was looking at historical income and counting on Manafort's ability to make money in the future. In addition, Manafort had significant collateral for the loan.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 11/20/2017 . Page 12 of 13

[redacted] stated that in a cash out refinance, TFSB was relying on Manafort's cash flow as the source of repayment and that the collateral was a secondary source of repayment.

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[redacted] recalled the Credit Committee trying to get as much collateral as possible for the [redacted] loan. In addition, TFSB wanted [redacted] involved in the loan as a co-borrower. Ultimately, the Credit Committee made the decision to approve this loan and the vote was unanimous.

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[redacted] learned during the course of the OCC investigation earlier in 2017 that TFSB had incorrectly calculated Manafort's DTI. Had they calculated it correctly, the loan would not likely have been approved because Manafort's DTI was too high.

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b7CDocuments 34

[redacted] was shown an email dated October 19, 2016 from [redacted] with the subject line "Restructure framework of Loan Agreement". [redacted] stated he recalled Manafort changed the loan from a construction loan on [redacted] because he did not want the risk associated [redacted] did not know why.

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b7CDocument 35

[redacted]

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[redacted] stated that he was opposed to the restructure proposed by Manafort because it weakened the credit. [redacted] explained that the [redacted] was a construction loan on a property which would be resold resulting in TFSB's repayment. [redacted] wanted the deal to remain this way because the source of repayment was the sale of the property and not Manafort's income.

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[redacted] discussed this matter with the Credit Committee, but he cannot recall the specifics of those discussions. The Credit Committee decided to allow the restructure and approve the \$9.5 million cash out refinance [redacted]

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[redacted] could not recall how he became comfortable with the restructure.

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 11/20/2017 . Page 13 of 13

[redacted] was directed to [redacted] response to his email. [redacted] believed that the idea of selling the Manafort loan to Bank of the Internet (BOI) was always a possibility and was a factor in the Credit Committee's decision. BOI purchases a number of TFSB's non-conforming loans. [redacted] could not recall what happened with BOI in the instance of Manafort's loan. [redacted] did not recall if the idea of selling the loan to BOI helped him get comfortable with the loan restructure.

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b7CDocument 36

[redacted] was shown an email dated November 10, 2016 from [redacted] and [redacted] with the subject line "Request for supporting documentation - Mr. Paul Manafort/Loan [redacted]"

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[redacted] recalled that the "income breakdown done by the MD Ops staff" was incorrectly calculated. They counted K1 distribution income twice and counted a loan as distribution income. [redacted] with these calculations. [redacted] job duties included income analysis.

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[redacted] did not know why [redacted] calculated the income the way she did. [redacted] should have included the debt from Manafort's mortgages on Trump Tower and [redacted] [redacted] did not know why these were not included.


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[redacted] stated that TFSB relied on the calculations in the attachment to this email, but he did not believe he reviewed those calculations.

Other

[redacted] spoke with [redacted] about being interviewed by the Special Counsel's Office. [redacted] spoke last week when they found out about the interviews. [redacted] to coordinate schedules so someone could be in [redacted] for work related matters. [redacted] only discussed that they were coming for an interview and did not have a substantive conversation about this matter.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/04/2018

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] social security number [redacted] cellular telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] residence, [redacted] [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

**Background:**

[redacted] currently works in [redacted] which he described as [redacted]

[redacted] works for [redacted] who works for [redacted]

**Association with Roger Stone:**

[redacted] had not spoken to Roger Stone for about three or four weeks at the time of the interview. [redacted] said Stone was mobile and he was not sure if Stone was working in New York or Florida.

[redacted] met Stone when he was [redacted] around [redacted] in Florida. [redacted]

[redacted] added that

Investigation on 05/09/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/11/2018

by [redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 05/09/2018, Page 2 of 7

Stone was not a "tech guy" [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Stone lived full time in Florida, but traveled to New York every week or so for a couple of days at a time [REDACTED]

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Stone ran his own Twitter, [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 05/09/2018, Page 3 of 7

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[REDACTED] At one point, [REDACTED] made good money with Stone, but he made "nothing really" over the last two years. [REDACTED] noted that people leave Stone when they have families, because you cannot have a family and work for Stone. Stone requires too much of your time to do anything else. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] has never been to the home Stone currently rents in Florida.

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#### Association with Donald Trump:

Stone and Donald Trump met in 1986 through Paul Manafort. Stone was their "bulldog," not a dealmaker. Manafort and Stone worked together for a long time and know how the game is played, unlike people like Donald Trump, Jr. and Jared Kushner. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] , On 05/09/2018 , Page 4 of 7

reviewed all of their work and they stayed clear of Board of Elections violations, but he was not sure if others did the same. [REDACTED] did not think Stone was a lawbreaker, nor would he break the law for Trump.

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Stone [REDACTED] and ran his social media.

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] said the amount of time Stone spent talking about Hillary Clinton and her emails was related to the fact that Stone was selling a book at the time. The "Hillary angle" was good for book sales.

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[REDACTED] remembered the DNC hack, but did "not really" remember talking to Stone about it. He added that anybody can go online and buy anything and may not know where it came from. For example, people buying Tweets may not know that North Korea actually owned the sites where the Tweets came from.

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Since the election, [REDACTED] has talked to Stone about media coverage related to Stone. [REDACTED]

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Stone was "all about Twitter" and the number of re-Tweets his posts received. Stone did not pay for his re-tweets. [REDACTED] added that when you do buy re-tweets, you just go online and pay for them, there is nothing complicated about it.

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[REDACTED] thought Stone had received only two or three calls from Trump since the 2016 election. [REDACTED] thought it was because [REDACTED]

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Regarding the Russia investigation, [REDACTED] said he could understand why investigators would be interested in Stone, but that he did not think there was anything there.

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[REDACTED] has not been in contact with any Russians himself.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 05/09/2018 . Page 5 of 7

**Stone's Associates:**Alex Jones

[REDACTED] knew very little about Alex Jones, but he did not like him. [REDACTED] thought Stone started working at InfoWars because [REDACTED] and they needed Stone to cover a couple of hours in the afternoon.

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[REDACTED] thought Stone got about [REDACTED] a year from InfoWars. He explained InfoWars realized early on the power of radio, since it is cheap and effective. InfoWars is on about 7,000 radio channels and is very popular in rural areas that "the left has forgotten." Stone was on InfoWars five days a week, for an hour or two a day. [REDACTED] thought Stone was on in the afternoon, but he was not sure of the exact time slot.

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[REDACTED] did not know who did the IT work at InfoWars, but he thought it might have been [REDACTED]. He noted there were [REDACTED]. InfoWars had a more savvy digital media strategy than Stone's team, mostly because InfoWars had more money. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED] thought Stone lied to [REDACTED] and others to get credibility with them.

Stone often took credit for things he did not do. [REDACTED] said 80% of what Stone said was putting feelers out, but not having any real facts. Then when something he mentioned came to be, Stone took credit for it. It was how Stone operated.

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[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 05/09/2018 . Page 6 of 7

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[REDACTED]

Stone and [REDACTED] had a "love-hate" relationship. [REDACTED] recalled a time [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was furious with Stone.

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b7CMichael Caputo

Michael Caputo was another person with whom Stone had a complicated relationship. They were friends, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Caputo also once worked as Stone's driver. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7CJerome Corsi

[REDACTED] was familiar with Jerome Corsi from his books on the JFK assassination. Corsi thinks of himself as a writer and calls himself a "historian" on InfoWars. [REDACTED] Corsi helped Stone write one of his books, possibly the book about Bush. [REDACTED] was not aware of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not immediately recognize the name [REDACTED] but after discussion, determined he knew the individual in question as [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] had never met [REDACTED] but had seen a photo of him. [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 05/09/2018, Page 7 of 7

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[REDACTED] was not sure if Stone used encrypted apps to communicate. They communicated via email and Stone did not generally respond to text messages.

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[REDACTED] suggested investigators speak to [REDACTED] who could provide additional information on Stone. He also recommended investigators speak directly to Stone to clear everything up and said he did not think Stone would lie to the FBI.

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b7C**Administrative note:**

At the conclusion of the interview, SA [REDACTED] reminded [REDACTED] that it is a crime to lie to law enforcement in the course of an investigation and was offered an opportunity to discuss any of the answers he previously provided. [REDACTED] said he understood it was a crime to lie and declined to modify any of his responses.


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SA [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED] served [REDACTED] with a federal grand jury subpoena

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] agent interview notes and a copy of the subpoena will be maintained in the 1A section of the case file.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/20/2018

## FEDERAL GRAND JURY INFORMATION

This document contains information pertaining to a federal grand jury proceeding. The information may not be disseminated within or outside the FBI, except as provided for under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3), wherein disclosure may be made to: (1) an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney's official duties; or (2) any government personnel that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney's official duties.

[redacted] DOB: [redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street, SW, Washington, D.C. Present during the interview were Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, FBI Special Agent [redacted] and FBI Intelligence Analyst [redacted]. Also present for the interview was [redacted] attorney [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] was advised that lying to the FBI was a crime. [redacted] was further advised that the captioned interview was voluntary in nature and could be terminated at any moment of her choosing.

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Investigation on 08/09/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)  
File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/20/2018  
by [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] 08/09  
Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] /2018 , On 08/09/2018 , Page 2 of 6

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 08/09  
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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 08/09/2018, Page 3 of 6

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 08/09  
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 08/09/2018, Page 4 of 6

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 08/09  
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 08/09/2018, Page 5 of 6

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 08/09  
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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_ . On 08/09/2018 . Page 6 of 6

[Redacted]

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
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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


Date of entry 03/28/2018

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was contacted at 6:52 PM on phone number [redacted]. After the writer introduced himself and explained that he would like to speak with [redacted] about his associations with the 2016 TRUMP Campaign, [redacted] replied, "sure, why not." [redacted] agreed to be interviewed at 9:00 AM at the restaurant of the Beverly Wilshire Hotel on March 24, 2018.

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At 7:59 PM, [redacted] called the writer back and declined to be interviewed the following day. [redacted] said he would be getting an attorney. [redacted] said he had, "nothing to do with the TRUMP Campaign." The writer provided [redacted] with his contact information.

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 03/23/2018 at Los Angeles, California, United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 03/27/2018by [redacted]b3  
b6  
b7C  
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b7EUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/05/2018

[redacted] also known as [redacted]  
date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]  
[redacted] Present for the interview were his attorneys [redacted]  
[redacted] and [redacted] Special Agent (SA) [redacted]  
Forensic Accountant [redacted] and Senior Assistant Special Counsel  
(SASC) Zainab AHMAD. After being advised of the identity of the  
interviewing personnel and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the  
following information:

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b7C

(Agent Note: AHMAD thanked [redacted] for agreeing to meet and described  
the Proffer agreement. AHMAD told [redacted] he should feel free to privately  
meet with his attorneys or take breaks at anytime during this  
interview. AHMAD described the need for honesty and indicated this  
interview was voluntary. [redacted] did not have any questions with the  
proffer agreement and signed it along with his attorney, [redacted].

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 04/05/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)  
File # [redacted] Date drafted 04/05/2018  
by [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

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b3  
b6  
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b7E

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview with [REDACTED] . On 04/05/2018 . Page 2 of 14

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

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[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview with [Redacted] . On 04/05/2018 . Page 3 of 14

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

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FBI(19cv1278)-4582

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b3  
b6  
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b7E

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview with [REDACTED] . On 04/05/2018 . Page 4 of 14

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

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FBI(19cv1278)-4583

[Redacted]

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b6  
b7C  
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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview with [Redacted] . On 04/05/2018 . Page 5 of 14

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
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FBI(19cv1278)-4584

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b3  
b6  
b7C  
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[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview with [REDACTED] . On 04/05/2018 . Page 6 of 14

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED] did not plan anything similar with the CLINTON Campaign.

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b7C

[REDACTED]

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b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

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FBI(19cv1278)-4585

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview with [REDACTED] . On 04/05/2018 . Page 7 of 14b6  
b7A  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[REDACTED] does not recall if there were discussions related to setting up a meeting with MANAFORT, but knows that no one reached out to him in an effort to set up a meeting with MANAFORT.

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FBI(19cv1278)-4586



[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview with [REDACTED] . On 04/05/2018 . Page 8 of 14

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

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b7A  
b7C

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FBI(19cv1278)-4587

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b3  
b6  
b7C  
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[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview with [REDACTED] . On 04/05/2018 . Page 9 of 14

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

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b7A  
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FBI(19cv1278)-4588

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview with [REDACTED] . On 04/05/2018 . Page 10 of 14

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4589

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview with [REDACTED] . On 04/05/2018 . Page 11 of 14b6  
b7A  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7C

After MANAFORT resigned from Candidate TRUMP's campaign, [REDACTED] spoke with [REDACTED] and expressed that the resignation was not something abnormal. [REDACTED] indicated [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] were not concerned with MANAFORT resigning, but [REDACTED] was. [REDACTED] was concerned because there was a lot of negative things he heard about Steve BANNON.

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b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7Cb6  
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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4590

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview with [Redacted] . On 04/05/2018 . Page 12 of 14

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4591

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview with [REDACTED] . On 04/05/2018 . Page 13 of 14b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[REDACTED] invited [REDACTED] to the opening of the TRUMP Hotel in Washington, DC. There, [REDACTED] got to take a photo with TRUMP, but the interaction was very quick. He also met Eric TRUMP and Donald TRUMP Jr.

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b7C

[REDACTED] attended the Presidential Inauguration in 2017. While there he met with Donald TRUMP Jr. [REDACTED] This was not a significant interaction, just for pictures. He also saw President TRUMP. [REDACTED]

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b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
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FBI(19cv1278)-4592

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview with [Redacted] . On 04/05/2018 . Page 14 of 14

[Redacted]

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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]


b6  
b7A  
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[Redacted]

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b7A  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/05/2017

## DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security  
account number [redacted] address [redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed by FBI Supervisory Special Agent [redacted]  
Special Agent [redacted] Special Counsel Prosecutors Andrew  
Weissmann, Greg Andres and Brian Richardson. Present during the interview  
was counsel for [redacted] and [redacted] After [redacted] was  
advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of  
the interview, she provided the following information:

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b7C

[redacted] was advised that her participation in the interview was  
voluntary and she was not obligated to answer any questions. [redacted] was  
told that if she chose to answer questions, she needed to answer them  
honestly as lying to a federal agent could constitute a crime. [redacted]  
acknowledged that she understood.

b6  
b7CBackground

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7CPodesta Group

Investigation on 09/15/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/16/2017

by [redacted]

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b7C  
b7E



Continuation of FD-302 of (U) , On 09/15/2017 , Page 2 of 11

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b7C

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b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

This was around the time when Ukraine came to PDG as a potential client.

Ukraine

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] , On 09/15/2017 , Page 3 of 11

[REDACTED] first recollection of Ukraine as a client was on [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] a meeting with Rick  
Gates who represented the Ukrainian government. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] There may have been earlier meetings on Ukraine at PDG's  
offices, [REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] knew nothing about Ukrainian  
issues or politics and therefore had no opinion on the client.

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b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED], On 09/15/2017, Page 4 of 11

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b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[REDACTED] did not have any personal reservations about Ukraine and did not have any conflicts among other clients, or credibility issues as it pertained to other government work.

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b7C

[REDACTED] knew that one of the reservations [REDACTED] people had was that they did not want to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) for Ukraine. As [REDACTED] understood it, they would have to register under FARA if they made any contacts with US government officials on behalf of Ukraine. [REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED] could not recall the names of any Mercury/Clark & Weinstock (MCW) people who worked on Ukraine.

#### Gates and Manafort

The first meeting [REDACTED] for this client was a strategy session at the offices of MCW. In preparation for the first meeting, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was Gates, as he was the point of contact for the client.

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b7Cb6  
b7C

[REDACTED] knew Gates worked for and reported to Paul Manafort. [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] , On 09/15/2017 , Page 5 of 11

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] and likely, Rick Gates. It was clear to [REDACTED] that Manafort was Gates' boss.

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b7Cb6  
b7C

[REDACTED] Gates made multiple references to Manafort meeting with members at the "highest level" of the Ukrainian government. [REDACTED] recalled emails from Gates in which Gates would tell PDG he needed information for Manafort's meetings with Ukrainian government officials. Gates bragged about the fact that he and Manafort worked for the Ukrainian government.

b6  
b7CECFMU

At the time of the first meeting with Gates, the European Centre for a Modern Ukraine (ECFMU) had not yet been mentioned. [REDACTED]

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b7C

The ECFMU was created to solve a problem the Ukrainian government had. As [REDACTED] understood it, the Ukrainian government's image was not favorable in the US at the time and lobbying on behalf of the Ukrainian government was not going to be a very credible option for PDG or MCW. [REDACTED] explained that in such situations where an entity is trying to improve its credibility and image, it is common to create a seemingly neutral third party to act on the entity's behalf. When the seemingly neutral third party talks about how great the entity is, it is more effective and credible. This is a common strategy for improving an entity's image.

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b7Cb6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] , On 09/15/2017 , Page 6 of 11

[REDACTED] recalled talk about needing a director for the ECFMU. Initially, the person designated was a Party of Regions (PoR) member. This person was replaced with a woman named [REDACTED] also recalled talk about needing a board of directors for the ECFMU. PDG was involved in these discussions. [REDACTED] did not know who built the ECFMU website.

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b7C

The client did not change when the ECFMU was built. Although the name of the client technically changed to the ECFMU, functionally, the client was still the Ukrainian government. There was a more concerted effort at PDG to refer to ECFMU as the client on documents and in communication with US government officials and a blurb was created to describe the ECFMU as a non-governmental organization (NGO), based in Brussels. That blurb was used by PDG's external communications and publications. [REDACTED] wasn't sure who came up with the language in the blurb, but she assumed it was someone on the public relations (PR) team.

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b7C

Internally, people at PDG referred to the client as Ukraine, not the ECFMU. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Gates was the conduit for information and instruction to PDG and the point of contact for information from PDG.

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#### Emails

[REDACTED] recalled conversations about filing FARA versus filing under the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA). One of these conversations had to do with PDG and MCW filings needing to be the same. [REDACTED]

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b7Cb6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED], On 09/15/2017, Page 7 of 11

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[REDACTED] recalls a conversation among PDG employees [REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED] During this conversation, all of the PDG employees were in agreement that FARA was required in this matter.

[REDACTED] believed the above described conversation was prompted by the fact that [REDACTED] prior to filing anything, PDG was setting up meeting between Ukrainian government officials and US government officials. It seemed clear to [REDACTED] that this required a FARA filing.

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b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[REDACTED] recalled one of the issues with filing FARA had to do with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and somehow filing FARA would have an adverse effect on this. [REDACTED] could not recall specific details about this issue. [REDACTED] believed this was why the filing

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b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED], On 09/15/2017, Page 8 of 11

[REDACTED] decision took so long. [REDACTED] thought maybe PDG was trying to convince MCW to file FARA as well. [REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED] was asked if the same issue arose as it pertained to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] did not know.

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[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Ultimately, [REDACTED] learned MCW filed under LDA. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was shown a copy of the Skadden letter upon which PDG relied in order to file LDA. [REDACTED]

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Until [REDACTED] saw the Skadden letter on [REDACTED] she assumed PDG would file FARA. The letter [REDACTED] saw was a draft. At the time, [REDACTED] had not read the FARA statute. [REDACTED] did not think she had ever read the FARA statute at all. [REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED] did not read the letter carefully and she did not recall what facts were relied upon to justify the opinion that LDA could be used instead of FARA.

Had [REDACTED] read the letter carefully and realized the facts upon which the opinion was based were wrong, she would have had a couple options. [REDACTED]

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Looking at the Skadden letter now, [REDACTED] was asked what she thought about the representation that the ECFMU was independent from PoR and/or the Ukrainian government. [REDACTED] stated that she knew nothing about who financed the ECFMU, but to her, it came down to who directed and

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] , On 09/15/2017 , Page 9 of 11

controlled the ECFMU. [REDACTED] stated it was clear that Gates was the person directing PDG as it related to the client. [REDACTED] believed Gates was controlling strategy as it related to PDG's work for the client as well.

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b7C

[REDACTED] stated that it was clear that Gates worked for PoR and the Ukrainian government. Everyone at PDG knew this, to include

b6  
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To [REDACTED] it seemed that the Skadden letter was [REDACTED] the answer PDG needed in order to file LDA. [REDACTED] explained that PDG needed a way to avoid FARA. In order to avoid filing FARA, the client could not be the Ukrainian government or PoR. The ECFMU was built to solve this problem.

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b7C

[REDACTED] about the representation of Ukraine/ECFMU as it related to FARA. [REDACTED] did not provide any substance of conversations with [REDACTED]

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b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C



Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED], On 09/15/2017, Page 10 of 11

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[REDACTED] opined that some entities and/or individuals may not want to file FARA because the reporting requirements are rigorous. FARA gives complete transparency on every contact that is made. This allows a preview into everything being done for a client. This can give an advantage to opponents because they get to see who is being contacted. This can also make contacts feel uncomfortable because it becomes public knowledge that they have been lobbied on the topic.

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b7C

When PDG filed FARA retroactively, there were a number of media stories about PDG, Manafort, Gates and Ukraine. As a result, there were discussions in the office about this issue. Mostly, people were nervous about how it would affect them. Some questioned what PDG had done and why they hadn't filed FARA in the first place. Everyone knew that the client was a FARA client. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] There was also talk about reliance on [REDACTED]


Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] . On 09/15/2017 . Page 11 of 11

outside counsel and how that covered PDG. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] could not recall having a more recent conversation with [REDACTED] about the issue. [REDACTED] did speak with [REDACTED] but he did not work on Ukraine.

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/05/2018

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Jeannie S. Rhee and Andrew Weissmann. Present representing [redacted] were [redacted] and [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted]

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[redacted] does not know who funded the European Centre for a Modern Ukraine (ECFMU).

b6  
b7C


The ECFMU newsletter had positive stories about the Ukraine and was distributed to U.S. government officials, the press and think tanks. Many people could have contributed to the newsletter. [redacted] a larger apparatus that included European consultants.

b6  
b7C

"Engage Ukraine" was the name of a government relations (GR) and press relations (PR) campaign in the U.S.

[redacted]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 09/04/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/04/2018by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/19/2017

## DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

On October 18, 2017, Special Agent [ ] and Supervisory Intelligence Analyst [ ] went to 1050 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC 20036, the registered address for the HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY GLOBAL INITIATIVE FOUNDATION (HRAGIF) in an attempt to interview [ ] REGUS PLC, 1050 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC, telephone [ ] [ ] advised [ ] only comes into the office when he has a meeting.


b6  
b7C

SA [ ] and SIA [ ] then went to [ ] listed residence at [ ] [ ] An illuminated light was observed in the foyer but no one answered the door. A [ ] [ ] was parked in the driveway and is registered to [ ] white female, date of birth [ ]

b6  
b7C

SA [ ] and Staff Operations Specialist [ ] returned to the HRAGIF office later on October 18, 2017. [ ] explained that REGUS PLC provides office space/services for approximately 300 companies including 200 in house and 100 virtual office customers. [ ] advised that company policy prevented her from providing [ ] contact information but she agreed to contact [ ] and give him SA [ ] information. She also indicated that [ ] comes in to the office approximately [ ]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 10/18/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [ ] Date drafted 10/18/2017by [ ]b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/04/2017

## FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

This document contains information pertaining to a federal grand jury proceeding. The information may not be disseminated within or outside the FBI, except as provided for under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3), wherein disclosure may be made to: (1) an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney's official duties; or (2) any government personnel that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney's official duties.

On December 2, 2017, at approximately 3:55 p.m., Special Agent (SA) [redacted] provided the attached subpoenas to [redacted] at [redacted]. [redacted] initially denied being [redacted] at which time SA [redacted] identified himself as an FBI Special Agent. [redacted] asked SA [redacted] for identification and SA [redacted] displayed his FBI credentials. SA [redacted] asked if [redacted] had received voicemails from SA [redacted] and [redacted] stated that he had not because his phone does not retain voicemail. SA [redacted] provided [redacted] with hard copies of the subpoenas for [redacted]. [redacted] and explained to [redacted] that he was required to appear before the federal grand jury in [redacted] on [redacted]. [redacted] indicated he [redacted] scheduled for [redacted] and could possibly be unable to make the [redacted] grand jury. SA [redacted] advised [redacted] that either he or his attorney should contact Assistant Special Counsel L. Rush Atkinson if he had questions and to coordinate his appearance before the grand jury. [redacted] indicated he did not currently have an attorney.

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
Investigation on 12/02/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/03/2017

by [redacted]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



Date of entry 05/15/2018

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] spoke with Agents via telephone. At approximately 11:15 a.m., FBI Special Agent [redacted] spoke with [redacted]. At approximately 12:45 p.m., FBI Special Agent [redacted] spoke with [redacted] provided the following information in conversations with both Agents:


When Agents [redacted] ran into Sam Clovis. Clovis recognized [redacted] told Clovis that [redacted] Clovis offered to [redacted] did not tell Clovis that [redacted]

[redacted] recently called [redacted] have not communicated in a long time. [redacted] wondered if [redacted] called [redacted] because [redacted] had been contacted by the Special Counsel's Office. [redacted] worked on Trump's Campaign in [redacted] had more access to Trump Campaign officials than [redacted] did. [redacted] was close with members of the [redacted] had some bad dealings with [redacted]

Investigation on 05/03/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] SM-2284941 [redacted] Date drafted 05/14/2018

by [redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/29/2018

On 2/6/2018, SA [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel Prosecutor Kyle Freeny interviewed [redacted] at the Special Counsel's Office. Also present for the interview were [redacted] attorneys, [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted] of [redacted] was advised that the interview was voluntary and that at any time he would be permitted to confer with his counsel. [redacted] signed a proffer agreement. [redacted] provided the following information:

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b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
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Investigation on 02/06/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)  
File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/15/2018  
by [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 02/06/2018 . Page 2 of 6

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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FBI(19cv1278)-4646



[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 02/06/2018 . Page 3 of 6

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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FBI(19cv1278)-4647

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 02/06/2018 . Page 4 of 6

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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FBI(19cv1278)-4648

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 02/06/2018 . Page 5 of 6

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7A  
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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 02/06/2018 . Page 6 of 6

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]


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[Redacted]

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FBI(19cv1278)-4650



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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/23/2018

On May 4, 2018, [redacted] telephone number [redacted] was telephonically contacted in preparation for possible testimony at the trial of Paul Manafort in July 2018. Also present were Assistant United States Attorney [redacted] and FBI Forensic Accountant [redacted]. [redacted] furnished the following information;

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[redacted]

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[redacted]  
[redacted] pursuant to a federal grand jury subpoena.  
[redacted]

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[redacted]


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Investigation on 05/14/2018 at [redacted] United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/17/2018

by [redacted]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/01/2018b6  
b7C

(U) On 05/17/2018 Special Agents (SA) [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky interviewed [redacted] at 26 Federal Plaza, New York, NY. Also present at the interview were [redacted] legal counsel [redacted]. [redacted] ASC Zelinsky admonished [redacted] that the interview was voluntary; it is a crime to lie to the FBI; and ASC Zelinsky requested discretion in not revealing the interview to the media. After having been advised the identity of the interviewing Special Agents, [redacted] provided the following information:

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(U) [redacted] met ROGER STONE (STONE) through [redacted] who came to know STONE after [redacted]

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(U) [redacted]

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(U) [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

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(U) [redacted]

(U) DONALD J. TRUMP and STONE would fall in and out of friendship. STONE claimed to have spoken to TRUMP throughout [redacted] however, STONE called TRUMP once [redacted] and TRUMP did not answer. STONE tried to make noise in public and was trying to get back in TRUMP's good graces. STONE

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Investigation on 05/17/2018 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/21/2018

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 05/17/2018, Page 2 of 3

went on the radio and would do anti-CLINTON rallies. STONE enacts on people's behalf.

(U) [REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED]

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b7C

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

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b7C

(U) [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

(U) [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 05/17/2018 . Page 3 of 3

(U) [REDACTED] did not remember any talk regarding TRUMP's statement about, "Russia, if you're listening..." [REDACTED] did not remember if STONE talked about Russia, Ukraine, or lobbying.

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(U) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED]

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
(U) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

(U) [REDACTED]





## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/17/2018

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(U) On 07/31/2018 Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] Intelligence Analyst [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky interviewed [redacted] at the Special Counsel's Office in Washington, DC. [redacted] attorney, [redacted] was also present. ASC Zelinsky admonished [redacted] that the interview was voluntary; [redacted] could consult with his attorney at any time; questions are not meant to gather information regarding conversations between [redacted] and his attorney; and lying to the FBI is a crime which includes a material false statement and claiming to not remember something when in fact [redacted] did. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] asked for a proffer letter, at which point, Zelinsky and [redacted] agreed to verbally describe the proffer agreement to [redacted] and to print and execute the letter at a break. The proffer agreement was later executed during the interview.]

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(U) [redacted]

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(U) [redacted]

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(U) [redacted]

Investigation on 07/31/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/06/2018

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [redacted] , On 07/31/2018 , Page 2 of 12

[redacted]

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(U) [redacted]  
[redacted]

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b7C

(U) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U) [redacted]  
[redacted]

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b7C

(U) [redacted]  
[redacted]

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b7C

(U) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 07/31/2018, Page 3 of 12

[REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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b7C

(U) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b6  
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(U) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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b7C

(U) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b6  
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(U) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 07/31/2018, Page 4 of 12

(U)

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(U)

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b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 07/31/2018, Page 5 of 12

(U)

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(U)

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(U)

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(U)

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 07/31/2018, Page 6 of 12

[REDACTED]

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(U)

[REDACTED]

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(U)

[REDACTED]

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(U)

[REDACTED]

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(U)

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 07/31/2018, Page 7 of 12

[REDACTED]

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(U)

[REDACTED]

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(U)

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U)

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U)

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U)

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 07/31/2018, Page 8 of 12

[REDACTED]

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(U)

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U)

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U)

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U)

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]



Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 07/31/2018, Page 9 of 12

(U)

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(U)

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 07/31/2018, Page 10 of 12

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 07/31/2018, Page 11 of 12

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
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 07/31/2018, Page 12 of 12

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



Date of entry 08/13/2018

On July 10, 2018, FBI Special Agents [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] attempted to locate and interview [REDACTED]

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On July 16, 2018, SA [REDACTED]

On July 17, 2018, SA [REDACTED]

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On July 23, 2018, SA [REDACTED]

b6  
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
[REDACTED] SA [REDACTED] further provided [REDACTED] with  
contact information for Associate Special Counsel, Aaron Zelinsky.

Investigation on 07/10/2018 at [REDACTED] United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 08/06/2018

by [REDACTED]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/07/2018

(U) On 02/06/2018 SA [redacted] left a voicemail for [redacted] at [redacted] [redacted] At 9:46 AM SA [redacted] sent an email to [redacted] as listed on the [redacted] website.

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(U) Shortly thereafter at about 9:54 AM, SA [redacted] received a phone call from [redacted] at [redacted] identified himself as [redacted] [redacted] stated that [redacted]

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
[redacted] SA [redacted] identified Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky and stated that we would reach out to [redacted] stated that he was meeting with [redacted] on [redacted] and they would likely not be able to meet with the Special Counsel's Office until the week after. [redacted] also stated that if there are any conflict issues related to his employment at [redacted] [redacted] can have another associate at the interview.

Investigation on 02/06/2018 at District of Columbia, Washington, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/06/2018

by [redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/15/2017

On August 14, 2017, [redacted] work address [redacted]  
[redacted] work telephone number [redacted] was interviewed  
telephonically. [redacted] was familiar with the identity of the interviewing agent and  
the nature of the interview from a previous interview. [redacted] provided the  
following information:

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[redacted] searched the [redacted] for the term [redacted] and found a  
renter identified as [redacted] who listed [redacted] on his rental  
application. The [redacted] was opened in [redacted] and is still being  
rented by [redacted] has never seen [redacted] but has known [redacted] to access  
[redacted] periodically. [redacted] did not know [redacted] name. [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] searched the [redacted] for the name [redacted]  
and found he had rented [redacted] in the past [redacted] listed  
[redacted] on his rental agreement. [redacted] were rented at [redacted]  
[redacted] no  
longer rents [redacted] and his rental agreement expired in [redacted]


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Investigation on 08/14/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/14/2017

by [redacted]

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b7C  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/31/2018

On 5/23/2018, Senior Assistant Special Counsel Jeanne Rhee, Assistant Special Counsel L. Rush Atkinson and FBI Special Agent [REDACTED] spoke via telephone with [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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b7D

After speaking with [REDACTED] provided the following information:

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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b7C  
b7D

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7DUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 05/23/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 05/23/2018

by [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Telephone interview with [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/23/2018, Page 2 of 2

[REDACTED]

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b7D

[REDACTED]

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b7C  
b7D

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7D


[REDACTED] also told the Special Counsel's Office that on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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FBI(19cv1278)-4696

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/07/2018

On Thursday, April 19, 2018, [redacted] Land Rover Alexandria, 2712 Duke Street, Alexandria, VA, telephone number [redacted] appeared at the Office of the Special Counsel in preparation for possible testimony at the trial of Paul Manafort in July 2018. Also present were Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Weissmann and FBI Forensic Accountant [redacted] [redacted] furnished the following information:

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[redacted] has worked in the automobile business since approximately [redacted] and is currently [redacted] at Land Rover of Alexandria. [redacted] reviewed the records for vehicles purchased by [redacted] and family in [redacted] and [redacted] stated the files/deals looked correct.

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Land Rover of Alexandria does accept wire transfer payments for vehicles purchased/leased; however, [redacted] stated that in his [redacted] in the business he could not recall ever receiving an overseas wire transfer payment.

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[redacted] identified [redacted] as the salesperson that dealt with the [redacted] in [redacted] While [redacted] no longer works for Land Rover of Alexandria, [redacted] agreed to follow-up and furnish contact information for her. Note: [redacted] later furnished the following telephone number for [redacted] [redacted]

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[redacted] only interaction with the Manaforts was [redacted] when [redacted]

b6  
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The interview notes for the meeting with [redacted] have been attached for the file.


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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 04/19/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 04/30/2018

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/07/2018

On Thursday, April 19, 2018, [REDACTED]

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b7C


[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Alexandria, VA, telephone number [REDACTED] appeared at the Office of the Special Counsel in preparation for possible testimony at the trial of Paul Manafort in July 2018. Also present were Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Weissmann and FBI Forensic Accountant [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] furnished the following information:

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b7Cb6  
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The interview notes for the meeting with [REDACTED] have been attached for the file.

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~Investigation on 04/19/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 04/30/2018by [REDACTED]b6  
b7C  
b7E



b7E

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/02/2018

On 10/05/2018, [redacted] born [redacted] social security account number [redacted] [redacted] cellular telephone [redacted] email [redacted] was interviewed at her residence by FBI Special Agents (SAs) [redacted] and [redacted]. The interview started at approximately 1:10pm and ended at approximately 2:40pm. [redacted] was familiar with the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview and provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7CInvestigation on 10/05/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/23/2018by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U) Interview of [redacted] dated 10/05

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] /2018 . On 10/05/2018 . Page 2 of 4

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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\_\_\_\_\_

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018 , On 10/05/2018 , Page 3 of 4

This image shows a single sheet of white paper designed for use in a binder. It features three horizontal black lines spaced evenly down the page, creating four distinct writing areas. Along the left edge, there are five circular punch holes, positioned at approximately one-quarter, one-third, two-thirds, and three-quarters of the way down the page. The paper is otherwise completely blank, with no text or markings.

b6  
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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted] dated 10/05  
Continuation of FD-302 of /2018 . On 10/05/2018 . Page 4 of 4

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]


b6  
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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/28/2018

On 8/09/2018, at approximately 7:04pm, [Redacted] born [Redacted]  
[Redacted] social security account number [Redacted]  
[Redacted] cellular telephone [Redacted]  
email [Redacted] left a voicemail on the office phone of FBI  
Special Agent SA [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Investigation on 08/14/2018 at [Redacted] United States (Phone)  
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/25/2018  
by [Redacted]


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[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) Telephonic interview of [redacted] (8  
Continuation of FD-302 of /14/2018) . On 08/14/2018 . Page 2 of 2



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/28/2018

On 08/17/2018 at approximately 1:17pm, [redacted] born [redacted]  
[redacted] social security account number [redacted]  
[redacted] cellular telephone [redacted]  
email [redacted] contacted Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)  
Special Agent (SA) [redacted] during which she provided the  
following information:

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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b7C

[redacted]


b6  
b7CInvestigation on 08/17/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/25/2018by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] (8-17-2018) . On 08/17/2018 . Page 2 of 2

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


Date of entry 08/28/2018

[redacted] born [redacted] social security account number [redacted] [redacted] cellular telephone [redacted] email [redacted] was interviewed telephonically by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent (SA) [redacted] in response to two voicemail messages left by [redacted] for SA [redacted] on 08/17/2018. [redacted] was familiar with the identity of the interviewing agent and provided the following information:

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b7C

[Large redacted area]

b6  
b7CInvestigation on 08/20/2018 at [redacted] United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/25/2018by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7E



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/02/2018

On 9/12/2018, [redacted] born [redacted] social security  
account number [redacted]

[redacted] cellular telephone [redacted] email [redacted]

b6  
b7C

was interviewed at her residence by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted]

[redacted] The interview started at approximately 5:15pm and concluded at  
approximately 6:58pm. [redacted] was familiar with identities of the  
interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the  
following information:

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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b7C

Investigation on 09/12/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

b6  
b7C  
b7E

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/01/2018

by [redacted]

(U) Interview of [redacted] dated 9/12

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] /2018 . On 09/12/2018 . Page 2 of 5

[redacted]

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b7C

[redacted]

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b7C

[redacted]

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b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

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b7C

(U) Interview of [redacted] dated 9/12

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] /2018 . On 09/12/2018 . Page 3 of 5

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b7C

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b7C

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b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted] dated 9/12  
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_ . On 09/12/2018 . Page 4 of 5

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- 
- 
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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C



[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted] dated 9/12

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018 . On 09/12/2018 . Page 5 of 5


[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/02/2018

On 9/14/2018 at 12:35pm, [redacted] born [redacted]  
social security account number [redacted]  
[redacted] cellular telephone [redacted] email [redacted]  
[redacted] contacted SA [redacted] via telephone during  
which she provided the following information:

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b7Cb6  
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On 9/14/2018, at 4:55pm, [redacted] was interviewed at her residence by SA  
[redacted] and SA [redacted] was familiar with  
identities of the interviewing agents, was advised of the nature of the  
interview and, provided the following information:

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7CInvestigation on 09/14/2018 at [redacted] United States (Phone, In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/22/2018

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U) Interview of [redacted] dated 9/14

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] /2018 . On 09/14/2018 . Page 2 of 3

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]


b6  
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(U) Interview of [redacted] dated 9/14

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] /2018 . On 09/14/2018 . Page 3 of 3

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b7C

b6  
b7C



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/02/2018

On 9/19/2018, [redacted] born [redacted] social security  
account number [redacted]  
[redacted] cellular telephone [redacted] email [redacted]  
was interviewed at her residence by FBI Special Agents (SAs) [redacted]  
[redacted] and [redacted] was familiar with the identity of the  
interviewing agents and the nature of the interview and provided the  
following information:

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[Redacted content]

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b7C

[Redacted content]

b6  
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Investigation on 09/19/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)  
File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/23/2018  
by [redacted]

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b7C  
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
(U) Interview of [redacted] dated 9/19

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] /2018 . On 09/19/2018 . Page 2 of 2

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



Date of entry 11/01/2018

On 9/4/2018 at approximately 3:34pm [redacted] born [redacted]  
[redacted] social security account number [redacted]  
[redacted] cellular telephone [redacted]  
email [redacted] was interviewed after she telephonically  
contacted SA [redacted] The call lasted from 3:34pm to 3:59pm.  
[redacted] was familiar with the identity of the interviewing agent and provided  
the following information:

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

Investigation on 09/04/2018 at [redacted] United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/01/2018

by [redacted]


b6  
b7C  
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[redacted]

[redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [redacted] dated 9/4/2018 . On 09/04/2018 . Page 2 of 2



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/12/2019

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] was interviewed by phone. Present for the interview were FBI Special Agent [redacted] Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, and FBI Supervisory Special Agent [redacted]

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[Agent Note: [redacted] had been served with a grand jury subpoena by FBI Special Agents [redacted]

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[redacted] wanted to know what was required of him as a result of receiving a grand jury subpoena. [redacted] said he had already met with four Special Agents from the FBI in Washington D.C. earlier in 2018.

b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted] said he was currently living in [redacted] [redacted] indicated his plan was to [redacted] [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted] said he wanted to help the investigation and asked if his appearance before the grand jury [redacted] [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted] said the only thing he had responsive to the subpoena was [redacted] [redacted]

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b7A  
b7C

[redacted] was advised he was not a target of the Special Counsel's investigation.

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b7C

[redacted] advised his email address was [redacted]


b3  
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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 08/20/2018 at [redacted] United States (Phone)

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b6  
b7C  
b7E

File # [redacted] Date drafted 01/12/2019

by [redacted]

b3  
b7EUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/12/2019b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] was interviewed by phone. Present for the interview were FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky.

b3  
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b7C

[Agent Note: [redacted] had been served with a grand jury subpoena by FBI Special Agents [redacted]


[redacted]  
[redacted]  
also could not promise he would be present for a pre-testimony meeting with the investigators.

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b7Cb3  
b6  
b7A  
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[redacted]  
[redacted] to FBI Special Agents at their first meeting in Washington D.C.


b3  
b6  
b7Cb3  
b6  
b7A  
b7Cb3  
b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 08/21/2018 at [redacted] United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 01/12/2019by [redacted]b3  
b6  
b7C  
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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/30/2018

[redacted] previously identified, contacted FBI Special Agent [redacted]  
[redacted] telephonically and provided the following information:

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b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7CInvestigation on 12/02/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/03/2017by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7E



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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/23/2018

On Friday, May 11, 2018, [redacted] telephone number: [redacted] email address: [redacted] appeared at the Eastern District of New York Federal Courthouse in Central Islip, NY in preparation for possible testimony at the trial of Paul Manafort in July 2018. Also present were Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Weissmann and FBI Forensic Accountant [redacted] furnished the following information:

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~Investigation on 05/11/2018 at Central Islip, New York, United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/21/2018by [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED] - May 11, 2018 . On 05/11/2018 . Page 2 of 2


[REDACTED]

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A copy of the interview notes have been attached for the file.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4724



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/01/2017

Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [redacted] interviewed SSA [redacted] [redacted] regarding events surrounding the dismissal of FBI Director James Comey. [redacted] provided the following information:

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On 05/09/2017, [redacted] At 4:51 p.m., the White House Situation Room contacted SIOC [redacted] to request Director Comey's email address. SIOC personnel contacted the Director's Office to obtain authorization to provide the requested information. Authorization was granted after approximately five minutes. Upon being asked whether the Director's unclassified or classified email was needed, the White House representative advised [redacted] "it doesn't matter, just give us his email address." Thereafter, [redacted] provided the Director's unclassified, secret and top secret email addresses.

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At approximately 4:55 p.m., the FBI police telephonically contacted SIOC to advise White House Representative Keith Schiller was at an FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) checkpoint requesting to deliver a letter. Schiller just showed up without an appointment [redacted]

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[redacted] After briefly speaking to Schiller, [redacted] placed him on hold and unsuccessfully tried to contact the Director's Chief of Staff, James E. Rybicki.

At 5:31 p.m., SIOC contacted the White House, verified Schiller's identity and confirmed he was delivering an official letter for the Director. [redacted] then discussed the matter with Assistant Section Chief [redacted] who, at 5:36 p.m., contacted the Director's [redacted] [redacted] to deliver the letter to the Director's office.

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At approximately 5:38 p.m., [redacted] departed SIOC and met Schiller at the FBI Visitor's Center. [redacted] spoke with Schiller for a few minutes and apologized for the delay. Schiller provided [redacted] the letter and advised he could open it if necessary; [redacted] did not do so. At approximately 5:41 p.m., [redacted] access to the Director's Executive Suite

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Investigation on 05/16/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/17/2017


by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) SSA [REDACTED], On 05/16/2017, Page 2 of 2

where he delivered the letter to [REDACTED]. As [REDACTED] exited the suite, [REDACTED] commented that [REDACTED] may have just handled history, advising [REDACTED] of news reports of Comey's firing.

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b3  
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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/16/2018

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] Telephone Number [redacted]  
[redacted] Email: [redacted] was interviewed by Special Agents [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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## BACKGROUND

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[redacted] INVOP's parent organization is IOCO, which is based in Cyprus. IOCO stopped providing money to INVOP, which made INVOP become insolvent. Psy-Group is the business name of INVOP. INVOP is currently going through liquidation and went out of business approximately one and a half months ago. [redacted]

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[redacted] INVOP (hereafter referred to as Psy-Group). The former employees of Psy-Group do not like [redacted] because he allowed the company to fall behind on numerous debts totaling [redacted] is owed two paychecks from Psy-Group.

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 03/23/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 03/25/2018by [redacted]b3  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] Interview . On 03/23/2018 . Page 2 of 8b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

Psy-Group mainly produces OSINT. However, sometimes they buy reports from people. The company consists of many part-time employees who are students. There were only a few full-time employees.

The first major project for Psy-Group was a United Arab Emirates (UAE) online influence project. This project was against the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in France. [REDACTED] connections, helped Psy-Group obtain this contract. [REDACTED] is very wealthy and [REDACTED] knows a lot of wealthy people.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] described Psy-Group's activities as doing bad stuff to good people. [REDACTED] left Psy-Group [REDACTED] indicated the company closed approximately one and half months ago.

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b7C

#### 2016 U.S. Presidential Election Proposals and Analysis

[REDACTED] was aware Psy-Group drafted a proposal for the Donald TRUMP Campaign, but [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was aware [REDACTED] had knowledge of the proposals related to the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election and that he had connections he could leverage to try and fund the proposals. [REDACTED] is not directly aware of any role [REDACTED] had with the proposals or efforts to seek funding for the proposals.

Proposals in the company were made by [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Some of the larger scale or sensitive proposals were presented to [REDACTED] would have been presented the 2016 U.S. Presidential Campaign proposals. [REDACTED] needs to approve proposals of a

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FBI(19cv1278)-4728

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] Interview . On 03/23/2018 . Page 3 of 8

[REDACTED] sensitive or large nature. [REDACTED] would have meetings monthly where these proposals would be discussed. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] a company named Intuview. Intuview does sentiment analysis similar to a more popular company called Crimson Hexagon. Sentiment analysis was important for the 2016 Presidential Election proposal because it would allow Psy-Group to understand the perspectives of the targets of influence for the campaign.

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[REDACTED] Psy-Group never ended up working with Intuview because of [REDACTED] and because Psy-Group never did any work related to the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.

[REDACTED] viewed a profile sheet identified as PSY000034. [REDACTED] acknowledged the report was conducted in the format of Psy-Group reports, [REDACTED] indicated this profile sheet was likely done by [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] indicated there was no way the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election proposals were executed by Psy-Group. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was shown a briefing identified as "Trump 2016 Presidential Election - White." DAAR indicated he has never seen this briefing, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] conducted analysis related to the election for marketing purposes. This type of information was within the line of business that Psy-Group operates in, so it was not unusual for [REDACTED] to pursue this analytical endeavor. [REDACTED] thinks it was

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4729

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] Interview . On 03/23/2018 . Page 4 of 8

probably assigned by [REDACTED] to assist them in business development efforts. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] never mentioned Psy-Group having any involvement in influence activities related to the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. [REDACTED] has been involved in a wide range of Psy-Group efforts, including [REDACTED]

#### Russia Related Activities of Psy-Group

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FBI(19cv1278)-4730

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] Interview . On 03/23/2018 . Page 5 of 8

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
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Psy-Group Activities in the U.S.

[REDACTED]

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Psy-Group Infrastructure and Modus Operandi

[REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] Interview . On 03/23/2018 . Page 6 of 8

b4

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b6  
b7Cb4  
b6  
b7C

b4

## Legal Compliance

In every case where Psy-Group has done work, Psy-Group had legal consultation. [redacted] firmly believes Psy-Group has never broken the law, even if some of the actions of Psy-Group were unethical. Maintaining legal compliance was very important for all employees of Psy-Group. [redacted]

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## People who work for Psy-Group

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[Redacted]

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b7C  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] Interview . On 03/23/2018 . Page 7 of 8

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6  
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[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Miscellaneous Discussions

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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[REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]


Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] Interview . On 03/23/2018 . Page 8 of 8

(Agent Note: All documents shown to [REDACTED] will be shown in an electronic and hard copy 1A).

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b7EUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/03/2018

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] Telephone Number [redacted]  
[redacted] Email: [redacted] was telephonically interviewed  
by Special Agent [redacted] After being advised of the  
identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted]  
provided the following information:

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[redacted] has very little information about Psy-Group's two Russia related  
contracts they worked through [redacted]

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[redacted]

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b7A  
b7C


[redacted]

b4  
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[redacted] does not recall any other information related to the Russians or  
the work done by Psy-Group related to them. [redacted] could not provide any  
additional information related to the scope of work, how Psy-Group was  
paid, direct communication between Psy-Group and the Russians, or any  
connections the Russians had with any United States persons.

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 03/26/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 03/26/2018by [redacted]b3  
b6  
b7C  
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b7E

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/23/2018

[redacted] previously identified, was interviewed at [redacted]  
[redacted] law firm in [redacted] by FBI Special Agent [redacted]  
[redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres. Present during the  
interview were [redacted]  
[redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties  
and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] was advised that the trial for Paul Manafort was scheduled to  
begin on July 10, 2018 in Alexandria, Virginia.

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

Investigation on 05/16/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/18/2018by [redacted]b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview . On 05/16/2018 . Page 2 of 4

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview , On 05/16/2018 , Page 3 of 4

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b7Db6  
b7C  
b7Db6  
b7C  
b7Db6  
b7C  
b7Db6  
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Construction holdback funds cannot be used to make mortgage or interest payments on the loans. They can only be used for construction on the property.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview . On 05/16/2018 . Page 4 of 4

b6  
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[Redacted]

b6  
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
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/20/2018

On or about 3/29/2018 [REDACTED] an employee at [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] received information with potential  
relevance to the Special Counsel's Office from an individual who at the  
time wished to remain anonymous.

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On 3/30/2018, [REDACTED] provided SA [REDACTED] the name of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] [PROTECT IDENTITY] and telephone number [REDACTED] On 3/30  
/2018, SA [REDACTED] conducted a telephone interview with [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7DUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 03/30/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 04/06/2018by [REDACTED]b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]  
[PROTECT IDENTITY]

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 03/30/2018, Page 2 of 3

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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[REDACTED]


(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]  
Continuation of FD-302 of [PROTECT IDENTITY] . On 03/30/2018 . Page 3 of 3

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/22/2017b6  
b7C


[redacted]  
[redacted] New York, New York, was  
contacted telephonically by ASAC [redacted] and provided the  
following information:

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b7C

[redacted]  
(NOTE: Following the telephone conversation, [redacted] forwarded three  
emails to the writer containing [redacted] These are attached to  
this communication).

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 09/21/2017 at New York, New York, United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/22/2017by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7E




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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/28/2017b6  
b7C

[redacted]  
[redacted] New York, New  
York, was contacted telephonically by ASAC [redacted] and  
provided the following information:

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 09/26/2017 at New York, New York, United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/28/2017by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7E



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/31/2018

(U) On 05/17/2018 Special Agents (SA) [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky interviewed [redacted] at 26 Federal Plaza, New York, NY. Also present at the interview were [redacted] legal counsel [redacted]. [redacted] ASC Zelinsky admonished [redacted] that the interview was voluntary; it is a crime to lie to the FBI; and ASC Zelinsky requested discretion in not revealing the interview to the media. After having been advised the identity of the interviewing Special Agents, [redacted] provided the following information:

(U) [redacted] was introduced to STONE at a political function. [redacted] read the [redacted] profile of STONE and found STONE fascinating. [redacted] sent the profile to [redacted]

(U) Prior to DONALD J. TRUMP's June 2015 declaration of candidacy for President of the United States [redacted] and his associates were aware STONE was involved in TRUMP's flirtations with the Presidency. [redacted] did not expect TRUMP would be President, [redacted] STONE was a paid campaign strategist.

(U) Neither TRUMP nor STONE disclosed the frequency of contact with each other to [redacted]

(U) [redacted] did not recall any discussions with STONE regarding finding HILLARY CLINTON's (CLINTON) missing emails prior to the public reporting of the hack at the DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE (DNC) and JULIAN ASSANGE claiming to have data in June of 2016.

[redacted]

Investigation on 05/17/2018 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/22/2018

by [redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 05/17/2018, Page 2 of 2

recalled discussing this prior to the Republic National Convention, but nothing ever came of it.

(U) [REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED] was not sure if they discussed STONE's PODESTA tweet with STONE.

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(U) [REDACTED] STONE discussed how CLINTON was the real criminal. STONE did not talk about the hacked DNC and PODESTA emails.

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(U) STONE had no discussions with [REDACTED] regarding Russian interference in the election. Publicly, STONE said it was a hoax.

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(U) [REDACTED] did not recollect STONE saying he was in communication with GUCCIFER 2.0.

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(U) [REDACTED] spoke to STONE a few months ago. They have not talked frequently. People have contacted [REDACTED] asking to get in touch with STONE. [REDACTED] friend, [REDACTED] asked for STONE's contact information. [REDACTED] did not discuss the Russia investigation with STONE in their recent interactions.

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(U) STONE has made statements saying he never met CARTER PAGE (PAGE). [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] On the CHRIS HAYES show, PAGE said he met STONE at a book signing. STONE said he could not remember meeting PAGE.

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~~Secret. Source~~  
 no automatic down grade or declassification  
 unless for all source action

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
 ON 07-22-2020

Date of entry 02/28/2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) On February 11, 2017, JOSEPH MIFSUD, date of birth (DOB) [redacted] Director, London Academy of Diplomacy, mobile telephone number [redacted] email address [redacted] was interviewed in the lobby of the Omni Shoreham Hotel, 2500 Calvert Street, NW, Washington, DC 20008. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, MIFSUD provided the following information:

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(U//~~FOUO~~) MIFSUD lives in London and is the Director of the London Academy of Diplomacy, however, he is also an adviser at the London Centre of International Law Practice (LCILP). After reviewing a photograph provided by the interviewing agents, MIFSUD immediately identified the individual as GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS. PAPADOPOULOS is also a member of LCILP, however, MIFSUD first met him in Rome when PAPADOPOULOS traveled with his boss, NAGI IDRIS, to the Link Campus University in Rome approximately 8 months ago. The meeting had approximately 8 participants and was an informational exchange focused on organizing policy seminars and building a relationship between the University and LCILP.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Approximately two months later, MIFSUD met PAPADOPOULOS for the second time when the two had coffee in the UK during the period when PAPADOPOULOS was transitioning from LCILP to a position with the DONALD TRUMP campaign. In addition to MIFSUD and PAPADOPOULOS, OLGA POLENSKAYA, an MBA student from Link Campus University, was at the meeting. POLENSKAYA was in town to meet with IDRIS and MISFUD. There were no other persons, including foreign officials, present. MIFSUD did not believe POLENSKAYA was related to VLADIMIR PUTIN or any other Russian government officials. MIFSUD stated PAPADOPOULOS was interested in foreign policy ideas, TRUMP's recent speech, Israel, migration, Russia, and other geo political subjects. PAPADOPOULOS did not ask MIFSUD to join the TRUMP campaign during this conversation. MIFSUD described the meeting as happenstance. He was at LCILP and saw PAPADOPOULOS there, so they had lunch in the cafeteria,

~~Reason: 1.4(b)  
 Derived From: FBI  
 NSISC-20090615  
 Declassify On: 20421231~~

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Investigation on 02/10/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)  
 File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/16/2017  
 by [redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Interview of JOSEPH MIFSUD . On 02/10/2017 . Page 2 of 2

followed by coffee at the hotel across from LCILP. During lunch POLENSKAYA and  were also present.

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~~(U//FOUO)~~ MIFSUD stated he had no advance knowledge Russia was in possession of emails from the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and, therefore, did not make any offers or proffer any information to PAPADOPOULOS. They spoke about cyber security and hacking as a larger issue. PAPADOPOULOS must have misunderstood their conversation.


~~(U//FOUO)~~ MIFSUD believed PAPADOPOULOS and POLENSKAYA may have had a social engagement after the meeting. He also introduced PAPADOPOULOS to IVAN TIMOFEEV, who works at the Russian International Affairs Council, via email.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ MIFSUD has not seen PAPADOPOULOS since the UK meeting. He emailed PAPADOPOULOS in December about meeting while MIFSUD was in the US, but he did not meet with him. On or about the same time, MIFSUD received an email from PAPADOPOULOS stating he had left the TRUMP campaign.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ After the meeting, MIFSUD emailed one of the interviewing agents with additional information. The email, as well as the photo displayed to MIFSUD, are attached to this communication as a 1A.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/27/2018

On December 21, 2017, [REDACTED] was interviewed under a proffer agreement at 395 E. Street SW, Washington DC. Present for the interview were FBI Special Agent [REDACTED] FBI Forensic Accountants [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and Senior Assistant Special Counsels (SASC) Zainab Ahmad, Brandon Van Grack, and Andrew Weissman. Also present was [REDACTED] attorney [REDACTED]

After [REDACTED] was advised of the identities of the interviewers, SASC Ahmad explained to [REDACTED] that the interview was voluntary and if at any time he wanted to consult with his counsel he could do so. [REDACTED] was advised that he needed to be honest in answering the questions and that making false statements could constitute a federal crime. [REDACTED] then provided the following information:

Background:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In the 2016 election cycle, [REDACTED] and then moved to support the DONALD J. TRUMP campaign.

Joining the TRUMP campaign:

[REDACTED] met COREY LEWANDOWSKI while working for [REDACTED]. They became friends and remained in touch. Approximately [REDACTED] joined the TRUMP campaign in part from LEWANDOWSKI's efforts. LEWANDOWSKI had offered [REDACTED] a position [REDACTED]. Eventually, LEWANDOWSKI asked [REDACTED]

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Investigation on 12/21/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 12/22/2017

by [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 12/21/2017 . Page 2 of 10

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When he joined, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The campaign's first event occurred the week after Memorial Day at TOM BARRACK's house. After that time, the campaign signed a fundraising agreement with the REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE (RNC), creating the joint fundraising committee (JFC) called TRUMP VICTORY. [REDACTED] provided his description of two types of campaign money: hard money, which he defined as the \$2,700 individual campaign contribution limit and soft money being contributions more than \$2,700 which could be given through other organizations outside the core campaign, e.g. political action committees (PACs). [REDACTED] did not have a role with any Super PAC. Based on his own knowledge, [REDACTED] knew one could not raise money for the campaign and a Super PAC and so he understood it would have been illegal for him to have been involved with a Super PAC. [REDACTED] defined JFC's such as TRUMP VICTORY as part of the campaign. [REDACTED] later stated he viewed TRUMP VICTORY and the official campaign as one. He was not sure of the relationship between the campaign and the TRUMP MAKE AMERICAN GREAT AGAIN COMMITTEE (TMAGAC).

MNUCHIN's official title within the campaign was Finance Chairman. [REDACTED] was unsure of his formal reporting chain, but understood him to be discussing matters directly with TRUMP and a hybrid of the campaign manager, Jared KUSHNER, and others similarly positioned. [REDACTED] did not participate in or attend all of these discussions.

b6  
b7CFundraising:

The efforts for the campaign to build its donor list began with the BARRACK fundraiser, the donors brought by the RNC, and others who reached out to the campaign. [REDACTED] had no insight in to the ROMNEY finance operations - as he was part of [REDACTED] - but knew ROMNEY had a pre-existing network. This contrasted to the TRUMP campaign, which did not come with its own list. When the campaign created JFCs with the RNC, they began to rely on the RNC machinery that was already in place. In that relationship, MNUCHIN's [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was not aware of anyone on the campaign asking BARRACK to participate or assist in running a Super PAC; Paul MANAFORT attempting to

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 12/21/2017 . Page 3 of 10

staff a Super PAC; or anyone raising concerns about the campaign's relationship with Super PACs. [REDACTED] did not observe anything which concerned him.

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In May of 2016, the fundraising operation was dormant or non-existent. The only activity was the campaign merchandise store. [REDACTED] TRUMP VICTORY which would allow individuals to give more money, as amounts more than the individual limits could be allocated to the other entities involved in the JFC. [REDACTED] the BARRACK fundraiser which was held at BARRACK's house in California. Both REINCE PRIEBUS and EISENBERG attended.

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The BARRACK event was a success [REDACTED] but TRUMP did not want to fundraise in what [REDACTED] understood to be the traditional sense. This led to the campaign hosting smaller events at campaign rallies which involved having a separate room where the campaign could organize a photo line and other things for donors.

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[REDACTED] spent much of his time working with the RNC. [REDACTED] . Much of the fundraising mechanics went through the RNC and the campaign would rely on donors and the RNC for events. [REDACTED] knew of [REDACTED] and that he had a role on the RNC finance committee, but knew of him as a donor and viewed that his title was in recognition of his donor role.

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[REDACTED] had little to do with understanding how much to spend on rallies. [REDACTED] thought [REDACTED] would know more of the expenditure side of things as [REDACTED] did not get involved or deal with expenses. [REDACTED] viewed his role as [REDACTED] would work with MNUCHIN and [REDACTED] in order to understand how much money would be coming in. [REDACTED] might have participated in understanding how many events were being held or planned. [REDACTED] does not remember receiving specific fundraising targets; his goal was to raise as much as possible. [REDACTED] would occasionally receive checks at events, he would provide those either to RNC staff or RED CURVE. Beyond taking checks, [REDACTED] was not sure what RED CURVE did with the campaign.

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#### Campaign Operations:

[REDACTED] both traveled with the campaign and worked in Trump Tower. He worked on [REDACTED]

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He would

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 12/21/2017 . Page 4 of 10

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] interact with others on the campaign staff for various issues, but [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] understood MANAFORT to have come in to the campaign for delegate matters. LEWANDOWSKI was campaign manager at the start. [REDACTED] does not recall talking with LEWANDOSKI as to why MANAFORT was brought on to the campaign.

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[REDACTED] did not recall any concerns with the campaign's use of vendors.

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(At this point there was a short break in the interview.)

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[REDACTED] did have interactions with MANAFORT; he described them as rare and casual and further stated he may have sat in a meeting or two involving MANAFORT. [REDACTED] interacted more with Rick GATES who was around the campaign and [REDACTED] more than MANAFORT. [REDACTED] recalled them both as being very focused on the Republican National Convention in Cleveland ("the convention").

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[REDACTED] did not remember why MANAFORT left and did not understand why GATES stayed after that point. [REDACTED] perspective was that if two people were operating as a package and one goes, it would seem odd that the other one stayed on.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 12/21/2017 . Page 5 of 10

b6  
b7CBundlers:

[REDACTED] worked with the RNC to coordinate bundler operations although they were never able to get the bundler program running as much as they wanted. From the RNC, regional managers [REDACTED] were primarily involved although he later stated he would call [REDACTED] for details from the list. [REDACTED] believed the RNC kept a list of the top bundlers. [REDACTED] recalled [REDACTED] he interacted with, but could not recall how they met.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] described bundlers as typically being a person who could not write their own huge check, but would call 100 others and coordinate their gifts. A bundler would be assigned some sort of ID, which could be included in whatever link or form was used to collect donations so the efforts of the bundler could be tracked. Typically bundlers would be tiered by campaigns based on how much they brought in. The JFCs were created and could collect more money because more entities beyond the campaign were involved. The first tranche of funds from an individual - up to the individual campaign limit - would be applied to the campaign, the rest to the other entities. When asked why the TRUMP campaign did not disclose their bundlers, [REDACTED] did not recall the reason or being part of any discussion to disclose or not, but that that campaign did not have many bundlers.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] knew contributions were limited to U.S. Citizens although he stated he was not aware of what was done to ensure that requirement was met. He did not remembering hearing of any excessive contributions or other campaign finance issues associated with the TRUMP campaign.

b6  
b7C

When it came to the mechanics of the events, the RNC was heavily involved. Although [REDACTED] and others wanted to do traditional campaign fundraising events, TRUMP wanted to do rallies. In order to plan the events, [REDACTED] would work with the RNC which would provide insight into what could be done. The RNC would send invites to potential donors and track the responses. [REDACTED] does not recall instances of events being planned the other way, where the campaign took the lead regarding donors. Separate from events, [REDACTED] would reach out to people he knew, individuals he knew had contributed from [REDACTED]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4754

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 12/21/2017 . Page 6 of 10

[REDACTED] did not recall how the BARRACK event was set up - as in driven by the campaign or the RNC - and had the same response regarding events he knew were coordinated with [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] believes he met [REDACTED] through [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was a bundler who [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not recall how [REDACTED] came to be involved with the TRUMP campaign efforts.

b6  
b7CEmails and Documents:

[REDACTED] was shown an email sent to [REDACTED] from BRAD PARSCALE regarding [REDACTED] (marked Ex 1 in attached files). [REDACTED] did not recall receiving the email, talking with PARSCALE about it, there being a controversy or issue in general, or responding to the email. [REDACTED] did not interact closely with PARSCALE and later stated his interactions with PARSCALE were similar to his with MANAFORT. He was unsure but believed PARSCALE was involved with digital fundraising. [REDACTED] knew PARSCALE to be based in both the Trump Tower and in Texas.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] knew Erik PRINCE, stating that he met him during the campaign although he was unsure as to when or the context of their meeting. [REDACTED] recalled PRINCE wanted to plan an event.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] was shown an email relating to PRINCE and a fundraising event (marked Ex 2 in attached files). This was the effort [REDACTED] recalled but did not believe it actually occurred. [REDACTED] recalls PRINCE claiming the capability to fill a stadium for the event and that this was a claim [REDACTED] did not believe. He further stated he would be skeptical of anyone making that claim. He did not recall what followed the email but just knew the event did not occur. [REDACTED] recalled PRINCE calling one or two times a week for fundraising purposes. [REDACTED] believed PRINCE wanted to bundle, but does not remember that occurring either. [REDACTED] saw PRINCE in Trump Tower, on the 15<sup>th</sup> floor where many people sat, at the end of the campaign. [REDACTED] did not know why he was dropped from the email chain and why GATES was added.

b6  
b7C

(Note: At this point, SASC Weissman left the interview.)

[REDACTED] was shown a copy of data from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) website detailing TRUMP contributions to his campaign (marked Ex 3 in attached files). [REDACTED] was not part of internal discussions leading to contributions to the campaign from candidate TRUMP and was not sure who

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 12/21/2017 . Page 7 of 10

would have been involved. Regarding the four \$2 million contributions, he was unsure if the period was designed. Regarding the single \$10 million contribution [REDACTED]

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[REDACTED] was asked but was not sure of what controls the campaign had in place for foreign, excessive, or other ineligible contributions.

b6  
b7C

(Note: At this point, there was a short break in the interview).

[REDACTED] was shown an email related to an individual named [REDACTED] (marked Ex 4 in attached files). [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] (writer's note: original notes from the interview reference another bates stamp reference to 71949. Writer believes a final "4" was excluded from his notes, DJTFP\_SCO\_00719494 appears to be the same email as shown to [REDACTED] by interviewers.)

[REDACTED] was shown a copy of an email chain that discusses FELIX SATER (marked Ex 5 in attached files). [REDACTED] did not recall SATER nor remember

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4756

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 12/21/2017 . Page 8 of 10

[REDACTED] TMAGAC until viewing the email during this interview. [REDACTED] did not recall knowing anything about SATER.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] was shown a copy of an email chain that discusses [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] attendance at the Republican convention (marked Ex 6 in attached files). [REDACTED] met [REDACTED] knew [REDACTED] and had a lot of money, but was not sure where he was from. Donors would get seats, participate in parties, or special events in recognition of their contributions. [REDACTED] does not recall if the lunch described in the email occurred, but stated he saw and spoke with [REDACTED] at the convention and believed [REDACTED] was with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was unsure if [REDACTED] attended any event or meeting with TRUMP or his family and did not recall if he had spoken with [REDACTED] since the convention. [REDACTED] was unsure of [REDACTED] goals for the requested meeting and stated he only made small talk with [REDACTED].

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] was shown a letter dated January 10, 2017, from the FEC to [REDACTED] (marked Ex 7 in attached files). [REDACTED] did not recall seeing the letter prior to the interview. When [REDACTED] received campaign contributions at events, he would simply send them to either the RNC or RED CURVE without screening for any compliance matters himself. The RNC would handle contributions in order to track bundlers and build their donor lists but that the contributions would eventually end up with RED CURVE. Most of the time, people from the RNC were at events and could take the contributions there. Otherwise [REDACTED] would send the contributions via FedEx or UPS. [REDACTED] does not recall cash donations being common.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] interacted with STEVE BANNON. He described these as being similar in nature to his interactions with MANAFORT or GATES; only surface level conversations about how much money was raised or how an event went. [REDACTED] was not aware of a BANNON company being paid during the campaign while [REDACTED] knows the [REDACTED] but was not sure if Make America Number 1 was theirs. [REDACTED] recalled meeting [REDACTED] on the campaign but could not recall the details. [REDACTED] did not recall having heard of a company called GLITTERING STEEL.

b6  
b7C

Regarding TRUMP's forgiveness of loans to his campaigns, [REDACTED] was not part of the conversation and could not place the details of how he learned about it.

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4757

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 12/21/2017 . Page 9 of 10

[REDACTED] did not recall details about any of the following vendors: [REDACTED] MCLAUGHLIN & ASSOCIATES, and LUKENS. He did not recall anyone asking questions about vendors.

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED] recalled the name [REDACTED] as being familiar, thinks he may have gone to the RNC but was unsure.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] had never heard of vendors receiving payment from sources other than the campaign for campaign expenses.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] was not part of digital advertising decisions. Although he knows PARSCALE he does not recall discussing digital fundraising with him.

b6  
b7C

Regarding fundraising, [REDACTED] reiterated that TRUMP's was an unorthodox campaign and unlike [REDACTED] clarified he was not involved in the [REDACTED] financial operation, but understood it had been building since the time [REDACTED] spent his time on the TRUMP campaign working with the RNC and focused on the hard dollars.

b6  
b7C

Regarding bundlers, [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] was shown two emails sent by [REDACTED] referencing [REDACTED] marked Ex 8 in attached files). [REDACTED] could not recall who the individual was but recalled the emails because of the individual [REDACTED] [REDACTED] could not recall if the campaign did anything and did not recall discussions about the specific email shown.

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED] was unsure of why [REDACTED] would be involved in the specific email but does not recall himself being a part of the discussion.

Later on in the campaign, the fundraising efforts died down and [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] was unsure if there were other discussions on [REDACTED] materials. [REDACTED] was also unsure how [REDACTED] obtained his name and contact information. [REDACTED] gave out business cards with that information all over during the campaign. [REDACTED] was unsure if he clicked on the links, and could not recall if he accessed [REDACTED] separately from these emails.

b6  
b7A  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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[REDACTED]  
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~[REDACTED]  
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 12/21/2017 . Page 10 of 10

[REDACTED] knew TRUMP was going to win after observing the reaction at rallies - they were like a concert event every time. TRUMP was high-energy and [REDACTED] never saw him sleep. [REDACTED]


b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] He had a job during the transition but did not recall the specific title. His real job during that time was [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] further stated that [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4759

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/09/2018

[redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed by writer and Forensic Accountant  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted]  
[redacted] was introduced to PSY Group. [redacted] was introduced to PSY Group through [redacted]

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

PSY Group was headquartered in Cyprus. [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] The company in Cyprus was IOCO Limited (IOCO). [redacted] was the owner of PSY Group. [redacted]

[redacted] was not aware of anyone above [redacted] at PSY Group.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Investigation on 02/08/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/08/2018

by [redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview . On 02/08/2018 . Page 2 of 3

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] or someone from PSY Group visited the U.S. approximately once a month. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] initially had a contract with PSY Group which probably expired. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] PSY Group paid [REDACTED]

Public relations firms did not really have a code of conduct. Thus

b6  
b7C

PSY Group ran influence campaigns. [REDACTED] wanted to run influence

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4761

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview . On 02/08/2018 . Page 3 of 3

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C


[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/23/2018

[redacted] previously interviewed, was interviewed at 395 E Street SW, Washington D.C., by writer and Forensic Accountant [redacted]. [redacted] was represented by [redacted]. Also present during the interview was Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Zainab Ahmad and SASC Brandon Van Grack. The interview was conducted after a proffer agreement was signed by [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 03/08/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 03/08/2018

by [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]  
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview 03/08/2018 . On 03/08/2018 . Page 2 of 11

[REDACTED] understood PSY Group's work included gathering information and using it in on-line influence campaigns. Those two components were "sold separately" to clients. [REDACTED] working with PSY Group, they offered both aspects together. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

Regarding political campaigns post 2016, PSY Group conducted a review of the 2016 Presidential election. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4766

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview 03/08/2018 . On 03/08/2018 . Page 3 of 11

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4767

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview 03/08/2018 . On 03/08/2018 . Page 4 of 11

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4768

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview 03/08/2018 . On 03/08/2018 . Page 5 of 11

[REDACTED] did not know where the PSY Group servers were located. They had a standard office in Israel. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[REDACTED] asked PSY Group about TRUMP's campaign, [REDACTED]

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[REDACTED] met through PSY Group. There was nothing they were trying to sell [REDACTED] may have requested white papers for PSY Group.

b6  
b7C

Before the election, [REDACTED]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4769

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview 03/08/2018 . On 03/08/2018 . Page 6 of 11

When asked if he was familiar with [REDACTED]

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

When [REDACTED] signed the contract with PSY Group, he asked what IOCO was. They said it was a holding company in Cypress. They further explained that GCC states were not thrilled paying in Shekels so IOCO was established.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] After Fusion GPS' involvement in 2016, [REDACTED] a meeting for PSY Group through [REDACTED]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4770



[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview 03/08/2018 . On 03/08/2018 . Page 7 of 11

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] PSY Group never mentioned having any connections to the TRUMP Administration in [REDACTED] It never came up.

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4771

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview 03/08/2018 . On 03/08/2018 . Page 8 of 11

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4772

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview 03/08/2018 . On 03/08/2018 . Page 9 of 11

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

To the best of his knowledge, [redacted] owned PSY Group. It has a board made up of founders. [redacted]

Finances

[redacted] was only aware of PSY Group and IOCO. [redacted]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4773

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview 03/08/2018 . On 03/08/2018 . Page 10 of 11

[redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]  
[redacted] invited people PSY  
Group met with or people they wanted to meet. Many were connected to  
political influence.

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4774

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]


Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview 03/08/2018 . On 03/08/2018 . Page 11 of 11

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

AGENT NOTE: All documents shown to [REDACTED] will be maintained in a 1A.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4775

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/10/2018

[redacted] date of birth  
(DOB) [redacted] Social Security Number [redacted] email address  
[redacted] phone number [redacted] was interviewed at his home  
[redacted] on September 28 2018. Present at the interview were  
[redacted] Special Agent [redacted] and Special Agent  
[redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing  
agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following  
information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 09/28/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)  
File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/30/2018  
by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 09/28/2018 . Page 2 of 3

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4780

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]


Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 09/28/2018 . Page 3 of 3

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4781





## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/17/2018

On May 14th 2018 3:00 PM, at the office of Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee's legal counsel, Perkins Coie, 700 Thirteenth Street Northwest, Suite 600, Washington, District of Columbia 20005, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Date of Birth (DOB) [REDACTED] from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was interviewed by employees of the Special Counsel's Office. In attendance were Perkins Coie Attorney [REDACTED] Perkins Coie Associate [REDACTED] Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent [REDACTED] Federal Bureau of Investigation Management and Program Analyst [REDACTED] and Special Counsel Attorney Jessica Romero. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents, and purpose of the interview, [REDACTED] stated the following:

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 05/14/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 05/15/2018

by [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 05/14/2018, Page 2 of 2

b6  
b7C


b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/19/2017

[redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed at the  
Special Counsel's Office (SCO). Also present during the interview were  
Forensic Accountant [redacted] SCO attorneys L. Rush Atkinson,  
Andrew Weissman and Jeannie Rhee, as well as attorneys [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] representing [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the  
interviewing Agent, accountant and attorneys, as well as the nature of the  
interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted] was first introduced to FRB client Michael Cohen [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] recalled  
Cohen having a bobblehead pitbull with Cohen's head on it and telling him  
that he was special counsel to Donald Trump. Cohen also owned taxi  
medallions and had a real estate consulting practice. Cohen said he  
advised corporations about potential New York City locations. At the  
time, Cohen had mortgages and various checking accounts at FRB. [redacted]

b6  
b7C

The FRB preferred banker for Paul Manafort [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 09/08/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In  
Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/11/2017

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) 302

On 09/08/2017 , Page 2 of 4

b6  
b7C

FRB Loan Approval Worksheet (LAW) starting

b6  
b7C

[redacted] was provided with the Uniform Residential Loan Application [redacted] does not believe Cohen included his taxi medallion debt as a liability on his financial statement because Cohen was not a personal guarantor on that debt. That is also why the debt did not show up on Cohen's credit report. If Cohen was a personal guarantor on that taxi medallion debt and did not include it on this financial statement, that would have been a material misstatement. [redacted]

[redacted] ever found out that Cohen provided materially false information or failed to disclose material information to FRB, Cohen's loans would have been immediately called and the Cohen relationship would have been "removed from the institution." [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] was provided with the LAW [redacted]

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U)

302

. On 09/08/2017 . Page 3 of 4

b6  
b7C

[redacted] was provided with the LAW [redacted]  
[redacted] FRB will extend a home equity line of credit (HELOC) of  
up to [redacted] Cohen told  
[redacted] that his other bank "wanted to be taken out" and he expected to use  
the proceeds from the HELOC to make additional real estate investments.

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] 302, On 09/08/2017, Page 4 of 4

[redacted]


b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/01/2017

## DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

[redacted] telephone number [redacted] email address [redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed at her place of employment, [redacted]  
[redacted] Washington, D.C. by FBI Special Agents [redacted]  
[redacted] After being advised of the identities of the  
interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the  
following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted] was advised by the interviewing agents that any materially false  
statements made to federal agents could constitute a crime. [redacted]  
acknowledged her understanding and agreed to answer questions.

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 08/09/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/10/2017

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 08/09/2017 . Page 2 of 4

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[redacted] Mercury did not have a lot of foreign accounts.

ECFMU

[redacted] could not recall when Mercury took on the European Center for a Modern Ukraine (ECFMU) as a client. [redacted]

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[redacted] could not recall what ECFMU hired Mercury to do, but she believed it had something to do with someone imprisoned in Ukraine.

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C



Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview . On 08/09/2017 . Page 3 of 4

[REDACTED] was not involved in any meetings or phone calls regarding ECFMU. [REDACTED] did not believe notes and/or minutes of meetings or phone calls would have been maintained as this was not customary for Mercury.

b6  
b7C

Rick Gates was involved with ECFMU. [REDACTED] did not know who Gates was prior to this client. [REDACTED] did not know what Gates' role was with this client. Gates may have come to Mercury's offices. [REDACTED] recalled [REDACTED] telling her Gates was coming. [REDACTED] described Gates as a "big shot", but [REDACTED] did not recall why.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] believed Paul Manafort may have come to Mercury's offices as well, but she could not recall for sure.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview , On 08/09/2017 , Page 4 of 4

b6  
b7C


b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/04/2018

[redacted] was contacted at [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] had been contacted by an associate of his, [redacted]  
[redacted] for Bill Browder. [redacted]

b6  
b7C

According to [redacted]


b6  
b7Cb6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 05/30/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/30/2018

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/06/2018


[redacted]  
[redacted] telephonically  
contacted Special Agent [redacted] and after being advised of the  
identity of the interviewing Agent, [redacted] provided the following  
information:

[redacted] was served by the FBI with a grand jury subpoena  
to appear in Washington DC, [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7Cb3  
b6  
b7Cb3  
b6  
b7Cb3  
b6  
b7Cb3  
b6  
b7C

Investigation on 04/16/2018 at [redacted] United States (Phone)  
File # [redacted] Date drafted 04/24/2018  
by [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


Date of entry 06/27/2018

Cassandra Ford was interviewed by the FBI on 4/20/2018. The hard copies of the notes taken by SA [REDACTED] during the interview will be attached and maintained in the 1A Section of the file.

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 06/27/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)  
File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 06/27/2018  
by [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/10/2018

On Friday, September 21 2018, Cassandra Ford, [REDACTED] left a message on the voicemail of Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Kyle Freeny stating that Ford had information she wished to pass along to the Special Counsel's Office (SCO).

b6  
b7C

On Friday, September 21 2018, ASC Freeny contacted Ford's attorney [REDACTED] and gained consent for the SCO to speak with Ford without an attorney present.

b6  
b7C

On Monday, September 24 2018, ASC Freeny and Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] called Ford at [REDACTED] after notifying Ford of the nature of the interview and consent of Ford's attorney, confirming that she did not wish her attorney to be present, Ford stated the following:

b6  
b7C

Ford was concerned about [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Ford [REDACTED]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 09/24/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone, Email)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 09/25/2018

by [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of CASSANDRA FORD . On 09/24/2018 . Page 2 of 4

Ford believed [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

Ford followed up [REDACTED] to ASC Freeny and SA [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4796

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of CASSANDRA FORD . On 09/24/2018 . Page 3 of 4

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4797



[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of CASSANDRA FORD . On 09/24/2018 . Page 4 of 4

[REDACTED]


b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4798



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/03/2017

[redacted] was contacted at his residence on 10/31/2017 by ASAC  
[redacted] and provided the following information:

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7DUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 10/31/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/02/2017by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] on 10  
Continuation of FD-302 of /31/2017 . On 10/31/2017 . Page 2 of 2


b6  
b7C  
b7D

(NOTE: [REDACTED] provided the writer with [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED])

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4800



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/31/2017

Contact [redacted] was contacted at their residence on 7/13/2017 by the undersigned and SIA [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

b7D

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 07/13/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 07/14/2017by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 07/13/2017 . Page 2 of 3

[Redacted]

b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 07/13/2017 . Page 3 of 3

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D


[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/06/2017

Contact [redacted] was contacted at their residence on 7/21/2017  
by ASAC [redacted] and SIA [redacted] provided  
the following information:

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]


b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b7D  
b7E

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7DUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 07/21/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/05/2017by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/05/2017

Contact [redacted] was telephoned by ASAC [redacted] and provided the following information:

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7DUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 07/31/2017 at [redacted] United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 07/31/2017by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E



[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~


[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] on 7-  
Continuation of FD-302 of 31-17 . On 07/31/2017 . Page 2 of 2

b6  
b7C  
b7D

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4806



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/06/2017

On 8/2/2017, the undersigned spoke to [redacted] telephonically.  
[redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]


b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7DUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 08/02/2017 at [redacted] United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/22/2017by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/06/2017

[redacted] was contacted by telephone on 8/21/2017 by ASAC [redacted]  
[redacted] and provided the following information:

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]


b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7DUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 08/21/2017 at [redacted] United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/06/2017by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E


UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/12/2017

[redacted] was contacted at his residence by ASAC [redacted] and SIA [redacted] on 8/7/2017. [redacted] provided the following information at that time:

b6  
b7C  
b7Db6  
b7C  
b7Db6  
b7C  
b7DUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 08/07/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/06/2017by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/12/2017

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted] telephonically contacted ASAC [redacted] on 9/5  
/2017 and provided the following information:

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7DUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 09/05/2017 at [redacted] United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/12/2017

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] on 9  
Continuation of FD-302 of /5/2017 . On 09/05/2017 . Page 2 of 3

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4811


[redacted]  
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [redacted] on 9  
Continuation of FD-302 of /5/2017 . On 09/05/2017 . Page 3 of 3

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/03/2017

(U) On or about 06/30/2017 Special Agent [redacted] interviewed [redacted] at Regus New York (Regus), 590 Madison Avenue, 21st Floor, New York, NY. After being advised of the identity of the Special Agent, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

(U) [redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U) Regus has about 200 mailbox only customers. Regus maintains logs of client's office usage, however, [redacted] was not at liberty to provide logs to SA [redacted]. [redacted] queried the local office records and only found [redacted]


b6  
b7C

[redacted] stated that the older records were expunged and unavailable to her. [redacted] directed SA [redacted] to Regus Corporate office in Texas for logs and billing records.

(U) SA [redacted] asked for a point of contact for legal process. [redacted] attempted to call one of Regus' directors, but was unable to make contact. SA [redacted] left a hand-written note with contact information and stated that the inquiry was in reference to [redacted]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 06/30/2017 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 06/30/2017by [redacted]b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E



UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/21/2017

## DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

On August 22, 2017, [redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), Washington DC. She was accompanied by her attorney [redacted] and co-counsel, [redacted]. Also present were Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] Special Agent [redacted] Senior Assistant to the Special Counsel Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres, and Assistant Special Counsel Brian Richardson.

b6  
b7C**Proffer Agreement:**

Prior to being asked any questions, SCO Weissmann read and explained the Proffer Agreement to [redacted] and advised [redacted] could meet with her attorney and /or end the Proffer Agreement at any time. After acknowledging her understanding of the Proffer Agreement, two identical copies were executed. SCO Weissman also advised [redacted] lying to the FBI was a violation of federal law. [redacted] acknowledged and stated she understood.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 08/22/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/23/2017

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~(U//~~LES~~) [redacted] Proffer -

Continuation of FD-302 of August 22, 2017

. On 08/22/2017 . Page 2 of 9

There are approximately [redacted] senior professionals at PG. [redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

PG does not bill hourly, but generally works by retainer. Most overseas clients are billed three months in advance. The pricing depends on the workload and the objective of the client. [redacted]

[redacted] The PG client manager is responsible for the day to day support and interactions. [redacted]

[redacted]

Some clients are referred to PG by third parties, sometimes called finders, or via a request for proposal process (RFP). Some "finders" are paid a fee for the referral.

With regards to the Ukraine, [redacted] believed [redacted] received a call from Rick Gates (Gates) or [redacted] regarding a potential client. [redacted] at Mercury, a public strategy firm. Prior to this call, [redacted] believed Mercury had already been engaged with Gates for work on this matter. [redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] believed Gates was hiring Mercury and Podesta to work for a client. It was not unusual for a client to hire lobbyists to persuade Democratic (Podesta) and Republican (Mercury) government representatives. [redacted]

b6  
b7C

Gates was looking for people with international communication expertise within government relations (GR) and public relations (PR).

[redacted]

[redacted] Based upon information she received initially [redacted] she understood that the work PG would be doing was for the Centre for a Modern Ukraine (Centre). [redacted] believed the Centre was in the process of being created. [redacted] understanding was [redacted]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4823

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~(U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED] Proffer -

Continuation of FD-302 of August 22, 2017 . On 08/22/2017 . Page 3 of 9

that Gates was the person helping create the Centre.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

When Gates approached PG in 2012, PG did not have outside compliance counsel.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Gates and Manafort were political consultants who worked for a political party in the Ukraine. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] was asked what she thought Gates, Manafort and DMPI's relationship was to the Centre. [REDACTED] believed they were responsible for creating the Centre. [REDACTED] knew Gates and Manafort worked together, but she believed there was [REDACTED] meetings with Manafort and [REDACTED] PG's primary contact for this client was Gates.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] was asked what she thought the relationship between the Government of Ukraine, who Gates, Manafort and DMPI represented, and the Centre was. [REDACTED] said it was not unusual for a client to create an entity for work they wanted done. [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

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Proffer -

Continuation of FD-302 of August 22, 2017

. On 08/22/2017 . Page 4 of 9

[redacted] said initially, she did not understand what the relationship between Gates, Manafort, DMPI, the Government of Ukraine and the Centre was. At some point, [redacted] understood that the Centre was being directed by and for the benefit of the Ukrainian government and that PG's actual client was the Ukrainian government.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] was told by Gates that the Centre was run by a woman named [redacted] and [redacted] other board members. [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] Initially, both Gates and [redacted] seemed to agree to file under FARA.

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FBI(19cv1278)-4825

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~(U//~~LES~~) [redacted] Proffer -

Continuation of FD-302 of August 22, 2017 . On 08/22/2017 . Page 5 of 9

[redacted] noted that [redacted] Mercury filed an LDA prior to consulting with PG. [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] After Mercury filed under LDA, Gates said he wanted the filings by both PG and Mercury to be consistent. [redacted]

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[redacted] noted if it had been any other client originator besides [redacted] FARA would have been filed. [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] believed it should have been filed under FARA since day one. The client was a foreign entity and therefore FARA was required. [redacted] noted that [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] was asked what the difference between filing under LDA and FARA was. [redacted] stated FARA filings require more transparency into the specific lobbying activities done on behalf of the client. Sometimes, clients don't want FARA filed because it reveals their activities publically. [redacted] said PG was not afraid of filing FARA.

[redacted] noted PG did incomplete LDA filings each quarter because they could not complete the second page which required affiliated organizations and information about the client's funding. [redacted] also noted that each quarter, the LDA was sent to Gates for the client's signature. [redacted]

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4826

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~(U//~~LES~~) [redacted] Proffer -

Continuation of FD-302 of August 22, 2017 . On 08/22/2017 . Page 6 of 9

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b7C

[redacted] was shown an attestation letter signed by [redacted] and a draft opinion letter prepared by Skadden letter which contained language that the Centre was not "supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party."

b6  
b7C

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
knew the two factual issues were who was the Centre financed by and who was the principal beneficiary. The attestation letter was provided to Skadden and Skadden prepared an opinion letter saying Mercury could file under LDA as opposed to FARA based upon the information in the attestation letter. [redacted] has seen the draft copy of the Skadden letter, but did not think she had ever seen the final copy. Skadden did not represent

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b7C

[redacted]  
[redacted] never spoke with [redacted] or anyone at the Centre regarding the information in the attestation letter. [redacted]  
[redacted]

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For example, [redacted] recalled a time when Gates was unhappy with PG

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4827

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~(U//~~LES~~) [redacted] Proffer -

Continuation of FD-302 of August 22, 2017 . On 08/22/2017 . Page 7 of 9

regarding [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[redacted]  
[redacted] thought something was going on with Gates. She learned that DMPI was getting paid, but not paying PG. [redacted] reached out to [redacted] told [redacted] that Gates and Manafort had been paid, but [redacted] had not seen them in weeks. [redacted]

[redacted]

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b7Cb6  
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FBI(19cv1278)-4828

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Proffer -

Continuation of FD-302 of August 22, 2017 . On 08/22/2017 . Page 8 of 9

b6  
b7C

[redacted] knew Gates worked with Manafort. [redacted] noted that Manafort advised the President (of Ukraine). [redacted] did not think Manafort dealt with the client managers, [redacted]

b6  
b7C

Not only was Gates the point of contact for contract negotiations and payment, Gates also provided direction to [redacted] activities for the client. Gates wrote the "statement of work" for PG. Gates was difficult to work with and he did not seem appreciative of PG's work.

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

She was not sure why the Centre was in Brussels except that [redacted] [redacted] said the Centre was not the real client, but the client was in fact the Government of Ukraine.

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b7Cb6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4829



[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED] Proffer -

Continuation of FD-302 of August 22, 2017 . On 08/22/2017 . Page 9 of 9

[REDACTED] assumed [REDACTED] did not think people understood clearly enough who the real client was.

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED]


b6  
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[REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED//LES

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/06/2018

On Friday, May 11, 2018, [REDACTED] were interviewed telephonically in preparation for possible testimony at the trial of Paul Manafort in July 2018. Also present during the interview were Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Weissmann and FBI Forensic Accountant [REDACTED] furnished the following information:

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As previously stated to the Office of the Special Counsel during a July 17, 2017 interview, [REDACTED]

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As also previously stated,

b6  
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b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7c

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 05/11/2018 at [REDACTED] United States (Phone)

File #	Date drafted	05/24/2018
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by

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Continuation of FD-302 of


. On 05/11/2018 . Page 2 of 2

b6  
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b7Cb6  
b7C

A copy of the interview notes have been attached for the file.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4832

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/10/2018

## DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [redacted] Forensic Accountant [redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres. Present during the interview was counsel for [redacted] [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] was advised that his interview was voluntary and if he chose to answer questions he needed to be honest in his responses as lying to an FBI agent could constitute a crime.

Background

[redacted]

[redacted] first met Richard Gates around [redacted] had heard of Gates prior to that time, but did not meet him until later. [redacted] never met Paul Manafort, but thought that Manafort [redacted] with Cohen at some time. He could not recall exactly when, and does not know when Manafort and Cohen first met. Gates worked with Manafort. He thought the Gates/Manafort relationship was similar [redacted] Gates was Manafort's right-hand man and Gates handled the operations. If [redacted] mainly communicated with [redacted] via telephone and email. [redacted]

Gates and Cohen/Cohen family were business partners in Jupiter Venture Partners LLC, Jupiter Holdings Management LLC (collectively, Jupiter), and [redacted] could not recall who owned Global Sites LLC

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 12/06/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/08/2017by [redacted]

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview . On 12/06/2017 . Page 2 of 4

(Global Sites) [REDACTED] He also  
did not know when these entities were established. [REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

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FBI(19cv1278)-4834

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview [REDACTED] . On 12/06/2017 . Page 3 of 4

Cohen was interested in a company called ID Watchdog, which is an identity protection firm. Cohen and Gates formed a partnership called Jupiter Holdings Management LLC, which invested in Jupiter Venture Partners LLC. Jupiter Venture Partners LLC also had some outside investors who invested through the brokerage firm Laidlaw and Company. Cohen could not recall the names of the outside investors. [REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED] could not recall how or when Gates and Cohen decided to invest in ID Watchdog together, and whether it was Gates or Cohen who decided to invest in ID Watchdog via Jupiter. Prior to forming Jupiter with Gates, Cohen had invested in ID Watchdog on his own. [REDACTED] could not remember how Gates [REDACTED] After Cohen passed away in 2014, [REDACTED]

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4835

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview . On 12/06/2017 . Page 4 of 4

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C


[REDACTED] did not recognize the name [REDACTED] and could not think of anything else that the interviewing agents should know. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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FBI(19cv1278)-4836

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/10/2017

On Tuesday, August 8, 2017, [REDACTED]

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
[REDACTED] contacted Senior Financial  
Investigator [REDACTED] Office of the Special Counsel, and  
furnished the following information:

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[REDACTED] (NOTE: A copy of that notification was furnished by  
[REDACTED] on 07/31/2017; however, another copy is attached for the  
file. While the notification is signed by [REDACTED]  
it is not dated.)

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~Investigation on 08/08/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 08/09/2017by [REDACTED]b6  
b7C  
b7E





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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/12/2017

[redacted] was  
contacted at her offices at [redacted] by ASAC [redacted]  
[redacted] and SIA [redacted] provided the following information:

b6

b7C

[redacted] was asked about her time working for [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6

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b6


b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 08/08/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/06/2017by [redacted]

b6

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/24/2017

On August 16, 2017, [redacted], date of birth [redacted]  
[redacted] work address [redacted]  
[redacted] cellular  
telephone number [redacted] was interviewed telephonically. [redacted] was  
already aware of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature  
of the interview. [redacted] provided the following information:

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[Large redacted area]


b3  
b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 08/16/2017 at [redacted] United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/22/2017

by [redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/18/2018

On or around October 16, 2018, Forensic Accountant [redacted]  
telephonically interviewed [redacted] provided the  
following information:

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b7C

Regarding loans to Manafort, the only loan [redacted] was aware of was from  
[redacted]  
[redacted] was not aware of any gifts or loans to Manafort  
in 2017.

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[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]


b6  
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[redacted]

b6  
b7C

Handwritten interview notes are maintained in a 1A envelope.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 10/16/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/17/2018by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/15/2019

On 12/21/2018, [redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was  
contacted telephonically by FBI Special Agent [redacted]  
[redacted] provided the following information:

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
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 12/21/2018 at [redacted] United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 01/15/2019

by [redacted]

b6

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/19/2018

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was contacted telephonically by FBI Special Agent [redacted]. Also present for the conversation was Special Agent [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted]

b6  
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[redacted]


b6  
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[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7CInvestigation on 07/18/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 07/19/2018by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7E



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/16/2018

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was contacted telephonically by FBI Special Agent [redacted]. Also present for the conversation was Special Agent [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]


b6  
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[redacted]

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b7C

[redacted]

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b7CInvestigation on 07/09/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 07/11/2018by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
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b7E

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/18/2019

On January 16, 2019 at approximately 1:30 PM, Special Agent [ ] received a phone call from Jeffery D. Gordon, from telephone number ( [ ] SA [ ] had previously left a message for Gordon on his cell phone, and advised that the Special Counsel's Office wished to speak with him again.

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Gordon said he would be willing to participate in another interview but wanted to speak with his attorney prior to doing so. Gordon asked whether or not his status has changed as a subject in an investigation and SA [ ] relayed that it remained the same as before. SA [ ] told Gordon the Special Counsel's Office wished to speak with him more about the Ukrainian platform change. Gordon said he had seen recent news reports about Konstantin Kilimnik having taken credit for the platform change, which are not true.

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Gordon advised he would speak with his attorney and notify SA [ ] after doing so.


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Investigation on 01/16/2019 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [ ] Date drafted 01/18/2019

by [ ]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


Date of entry 02/05/2019

On February 5, 2019, FBI Special Agent [redacted] received a telephone call from J.D. Gordon. Gordon advised [redacted] [redacted] which would require him to travel and be out of the area for the remainder of this week. An interview with Gordon was scheduled for February 7, 2019 and he requested that it be postponed until February 14, 2019 at 1:00 PM, at the Washington Field Office.

b6  
b7CInvestigation on 02/05/2019 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/05/2019by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7E



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/20/2019

Jeffrey D. Gordon, aka J.D. Gordon, date of birth [REDACTED] was interviewed over the telephone on March 18, 2019. Present with Gordon on the call was his attorney, [REDACTED] telephone number [REDACTED] [REDACTED] telephoned the Special Counsel's Office at approximately 2:00 PM and placed his phone on speakerphone so that he and Gordon could both participate in the interview. Present from the Special Counsel's Office were Senior Assistant Special Counsel Jeannie Rhee, and Supervisory Intelligence Analyst [REDACTED] Special Agent [REDACTED] [REDACTED] SASC Rhee also placed her phone on speakerphone.

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SASC Rhee advised Gordon that the same ground rules applied for this interview as they did in previous ones, and that intentional false statements to FBI Agents would be a violation of criminal law. Gordon said he understood and then inquired as to what his current status was in terms of being a target of the investigation. SASC Rhee relayed that Gordon's status had not changed since his last interview and that he was not considered a target in the investigation. Gordon then stated that his memory was good but not perfect and that he would do his best to answer the questions in the best way his memory would allow.

Gordon was asked whether or not anyone had asked him to leave early from the Republican National Convention in July 2016. Gordon responded no, and added that he had actually attended the full two weeks of the convention. On the Saturday prior, which he believed to be July 9th, 2016, Gordon rented a car in Washington, DC and drove straight to Cleveland for the convention. Gordon stayed at the Westin hotel for the first week and on the following Saturday [July 16, 2016], he transferred to a Super 8 motel located outside of Cleveland. Trump and his entourage came to the convention during the second week and therefore Gordon was unable to stay at the Westin for both weeks.

Gordon was asked whether he had any recollection of someone asking him to leave the convention early. Gordon said no, and then inquired as to whether or not someone had said that in a separate interview. Gordon was not provided with an answer to his question. Gordon then recalled an

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Investigation on 03/18/2019 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 03/18/2019by [REDACTED]b6  
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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


(U) Telephone call with JD Gordon on 3/18  
Continuation of FD-302 of /2019. . On 03/18/2019 . Page 2 of 2

incident where John Mashburn had asked him to track down and locate various individuals who were working with them during the convention. Gordon remembered Mashburn saying something the effect of, "if we can't find them then we'll just send them home." Gordon said he remembered that but did not recall any incident in which someone had told him to go home early.

Gordon was asked whether or not anyone at the RNC had expressed disapproval with him as a result of his efforts on the Ukraine platform change. Gordon said the only thing he could recall was that Mashburn had voiced his opinion about removing certain words related to the two state solution for Israel. Gordon was then asked if he had any recollection of anyone asking him to leave early as a result of that particular topic. Gordon said he recalled an incident where Rick Dearborn had seen the Israeli two state solution surface on CNN and he was upset that Gordon had not flagged the issue for them. Dearborn raised his finger at Gordon and motioned for him to come over and speak with him. Dearborn asked Gordon why he didn't flag the issue for them and Gordon responded that he didn't feel it was an issue that Donald Trump wanted to intervene in, so he didn't write it down. Gordon further explained that if he felt an issue wasn't worth interfering in, then his opinion was to just leave it to the delegates and let them fight it out. [REDACTED] observed the heated conversation between Dearborn and Gordon so he walked over to them and Dearborn began yelling at [REDACTED] ended up putting his arm on Dearborn's shoulder and eventually Dearborn calmed down. Gordon subsequently provided Dearborn with talking points related to the two state solution for Israel.

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Gordon said there were approximately five or six people who were standing in close proximity of his conversation with Dearborn and he wouldn't be surprised if one of them remembered some tension during their interactions. Gordon added that the conversation was only pertained to the two state solution however and had nothing to do with the Ukraine platform amendment.



b7E

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/22/2017

On August 21, 2017, SSA [REDACTED] contacted J.D. GORDON on his cellular phone number [REDACTED]. GORDON advised that he was [REDACTED] and would be back in town next week. GORDON agreed to be interviewed by the FBI on Tuesday, August 29, 2017 and stated he would be happy to assist with the FBI's investigation. GORDON requested that the meeting time and place be relayed to him via text message to his cellular phone number.

b6


b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 08/21/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 08/22/2017by [REDACTED]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/06/2017

(U) On 08/28/2017, JEFFREY D. GORDON contacted SSA [redacted] via telephone in response to a confirmation of his interview on 08/29/2017. GORDON explained that he had spent lots of money on an attorney and did not want to bring his attorney to the interview if he did not need to. SSA [redacted] explained that was up to GORDON but the questions would probably be similar to those asked by the Senate and House committees.

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(U) GORDON explained that he didn't do anything wrong and was happy to cooperate with the FBI. GORDON also explained the TRUMP team treats people terribly and they should not have lied about their Russian contacts. GORDON stated that of course they had talked to the Russians. All their Russian contacts were benign and the team should just have said that. GORDON was surprised to find out about TRUMP JR.'s meeting with Russians. By lying about their contacts they were making things worse, even victimizing FLYNN and MANAFORT. GORDON indicated both TRUMP and HOPE HICKS had lied about Russian contacts by the TRUMP team.

(U) GORDON said he has been asked thousands of questions by the media, including questions about CARTER PAGE.

(U) GORDON again explained how the TRUMP team treated him terribly by promising to pay him and then never paying him. RICK DEARBORN was paid [redacted] per month by the campaign in addition to his Senate salary.

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b7C

(U) GORDON went on to explain that former FBI Director COMEY was part of the problem by selectively saying things about the investigation. COMEY painted a picture indicating that more people were under investigation when PAGE was the only one monitored under FISA. COMEY also leaked information to the New York Times. GORDON said COMEY painted him as a monster even though COMEY did not name GORDON. GORDON had been named by others which caused defamation of his name.

(U) GORDON indicated that attorneys were expensive but at least they gave him piece of mind to come out in March. [Note: There was no further indication of what this meant.]

Investigation on 08/28/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/29/2017

by [redacted]


b6  
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FD-302a (Rev. 05-08-10)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Telephone conversation with Gordon on  
Continuation of FD-302 of 08/28/2017 . On 08/28/2017 . Page 2 of 2

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/19/2018

On 11/15/2018, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had

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b7C

a telephone call with Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Jeannie Rhee, Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, and Special Agent

[REDACTED] provided the following information:

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b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

\*\* At approximately 4:40 PM EST [REDACTED] called the SCO to provide additional information \*\*

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 11/15/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 11/16/2018

by [REDACTED]

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b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]


(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] 11/15  
Continuation of FD-302 of /2018 . On 11/15/2018 . Page 2 of 2

[REDACTED]		
[REDACTED]	SASC Rhee advised	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]		

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b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4859

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/17/2018

On 11/26/2018, [redacted] telephone number [redacted] email address [redacted] had a telephone call with personnel from the Special Counsel's Office (SCO). Present for the phone call were Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Jeannie Rhee, SASC Andrew Goldstein, Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, FBI Special Agent [redacted] FBI Special Agent [redacted] FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst (SIA) [redacted] and FBI Intelligence Analyst [redacted] provided the following information:

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b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~


Investigation on 11/26/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/12/2018

by [redacted]

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b7C  
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b3  
b7EUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/09/2018

(U//~~FOUO~~) On Tuesday, February 20, 2018, [redacted] was interviewed [redacted] at Greenberg Traurig LLP, 2101 L Street NW, Washington, DC 20037. Present during the interview were [redacted] Attorneys [redacted], FBI Special Agent (SA) [redacted] SA [redacted] [redacted] Forensic Accountant [redacted] Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Zainab AHMAD, and SASC Brandon VAN GRACK.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) (Agent Note: AHMAD thanked [redacted] for meeting with the Special Counsel's Office (SCO) and informed [redacted] this was a voluntary interview. AHMAD indicated the Proffer Agreement gave [redacted] protections relating to the conversation that would occur, but it gave no protection if [redacted] was not honest. [redacted] indicated he went over the Proffer Agreement with his attorneys and had no questions relating to it. [redacted] indicated his willingness to answer questions and assist the FBI.)

b6  
b7C(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]b6  
b7C

[redacted] had an idea for a company, later named WikiStrat, [redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) At some point, WikiStrat customers wanted more research services and therefore, they split into more than one company. The new company became Psy-Group. [redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] WikiStrat has a small, full time staff of about five to six people. [redacted]

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 02/20/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (, Other

File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/21/2018

by [redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]  
Continuation of FD-302 of February 20, 2018 . On 02/20/2018 . Page 2 of 8

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] is not sure how many employees Psy-Group has. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) WikiStrat primarily does research and analysis related to hypothetical future analysis. For instance, "what does X in the news mean for us in the future." Their first major project was with NATO.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Psy-Group primarily does one of two things. First, it conducts open source intelligence; Secondly, it does "guerilla marketing." Strategic influence is another name that gives the concept of guerilla marketing a nice twist.

(U//~~FOUO~~) From time to time, Psy-Group has done strategic influence campaigns. [REDACTED] is not familiar with Psy-Group ever doing any political influence in connection with an election. [REDACTED] has no recollection Psy-Group has ever worked for a political candidate. [REDACTED] has no recollection of marketing any service to any candidate.

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b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) In preparation for meeting with the SCO, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4862

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]  
Continuation of FD-302 of February 20, 2018 . On 02/20/2018 . Page 3 of 8

(U//~~FOUO~~) WikiStrat has had full time staff doing sales, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] is unsure if WikiStrat currently  
has someone conducting sales [REDACTED] In 2016, [REDACTED] suspects  
there was someone who did sales, but he could not be sure. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] the term "policy papers" is broad and might  
fall into a category of what WikiStrat has done. [REDACTED] clarified,  
indicating their work falls into three different categories.

b6  
b7C

1. Recruiting projects,
2. Blog posts, and
3. Research into hypothetical events

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] repeated he had no recollection of any influence  
campaign related to a political campaign, including the U.S. Presidential  
Election of 2016, with any organization or company he is affiliated with.

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b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b4  
b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4863

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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b6  
b7C  
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[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of February 20, 2018 . On 02/20/2018 . Page 4 of 8

[REDACTED]

b4  
b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

b4  
b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

b4  
b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

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b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4864

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of February 20, 2018 . On 02/20/2018 . Page 5 of 8

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4865

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of February 20, 2018 . On 02/20/2018 . Page 6 of 8

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

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b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

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b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

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b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

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b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

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b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

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b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4866

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]  
Continuation of FD-302 of February 20, 2018 . On 02/20/2018 . Page 7 of 8

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] does not recall the following entities: Cordish, Americans for Jerusalem, [REDACTED] Clarion Fund, Global Futures, Zendaphie, Chester Creek Consulting, or NTC Stroisvjkomplect.

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] has limited knowledge of an individual named [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] is unaware of [REDACTED] having any travel to Russia or the Ukraine.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] has heard of Meginum, which he believes is a non-profit that has done work with Psy-Group.

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b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4867

[Redacted]

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b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]  
February 20, 2018

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_ . On 02/20/2018 . Page 8 of 8

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b6  
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(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]


[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4868



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/23/2018

## FEDERAL GRAND JURY INFORMATION

This document contains information pertaining to a federal grand jury proceeding. The information may not be disseminated within or outside the FBI, except as provided for under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3), wherein disclosure may be made to: (1) an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney's official duties; or (2) any government personnel that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney's official duties.

[redacted] was interviewed at 395 E Street SW, Washington, D. C. [redacted] was represented by [redacted] of Steptoe and Johnson, and two associates. Also present for the interview were writer, SA [redacted] and Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Zainab Ahmad. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted]

b3

[redacted]

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b7A  
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[redacted]

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b6  
b7A  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on	<u>04/03/2018</u>	at	<u>[redacted]</u>	United States (In Person)
File #	<u>[redacted]</u>	Date drafted	<u>04/04/2018</u>	
by	<u>[redacted]</u>			

b3  
b6  
b7C  
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[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Grand Jury Prep . On 04/03/2018 . Page 2 of 8

[Redacted]

b3  
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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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b7A  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4871

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Grand Jury Prep . On 04/03/2018 . Page 3 of 8

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

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b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

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b7A  
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[Redacted]

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b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

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b7C  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Grand Jury Prep . On 04/03/2018 . Page 4 of 8

[Redacted]

b3  
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b7A  
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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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b7C  
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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Grand Jury Prep . On 04/03/2018 . Page 5 of 8

[Redacted]

b3  
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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

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b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

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b7A  
b7C

Agent Note: A brief break was taken.

[Redacted]

b3  
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b7A  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4874

[Redacted]

b3  
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b7C  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Grand Jury Prep . On 04/03/2018 . Page 6 of 8

[Redacted]

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b7A  
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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b3  
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b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4875

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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b6  
b7C  
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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Grand Jury Prep . On 04/03/2018 . Page 7 of 8

[Redacted]

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b7A  
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[Redacted]

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b7A  
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[Redacted]

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b7A  
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[Redacted]

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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4876


UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U)  Grand Jury Prep . On 04/03/2018 . Page 8 of 8b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7Cb3  
b6  
b7A  
b7Cb3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

Agent Note: Copies of all GJEs shown will be maintained in a 1A.

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FBI(19cv1278)-4877





b7E

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/16/2017

On September 6, 2017, Special Agents (SAs) [redacted]  
[redacted] met with [redacted]  
[redacted] at the FBI Washington Field Office (WFO), 601 4th Street NW,  
Washington, DC 20535, to discuss [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] with the aforementioned agents, [redacted] provided the  
following information:

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b7C  
b7D  
b7E

[redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

Investigation on 09/06/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)


File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/12/2017

by SA [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) De-Brief of [REDACTED], On 09/06/2017, Page 2 of 2

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/22/2018

[redacted] was interviewed at the Office of Special Counsel by SA [redacted] IA [redacted] Forensic Accountant [redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutors Greg Andres and Zainab Ahmad. [redacted] was represented by counsel.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] was advised that the interview was voluntary and if at any time he wanted to consult with his counsel he could do so. [redacted] was advised that he needed to be truthful in answering the questions and that making false statements could constitute a federal crime. [redacted] acknowledged that he understood and provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 01/09/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 01/10/2018

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 01/09/2018 . Page 2 of 7b6  
b7A  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED] had met PAUL MANAFORT [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] He understood MANAFORT to be a  
longtime friend of BARRACK's from his days in Washington, DC. [REDACTED]  
and MANAFORT had no additional meetings prior to his involvement in the  
Trump campaign. [REDACTED] had seen MANAFORT in May or June for a Trump  
fundraiser. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4881

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 01/09/2018 . Page 3 of 7

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4882

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 01/09/2018 . Page 4 of 7

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
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[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4883

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 01/09/2018 . Page 5 of 7b6  
b7A  
b7COther Individualsb6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED] as a partner in some of COLONY's business ventures but did not have a meeting or dinner with [REDACTED]

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b7A  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED] described State-Sponsored Enterprises as organizations run by a monarch or other singular source of power such as China. There was no dedicated program inside of Colony for State-Sponsored Enterprises.

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4884

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 01/09/2018 . Page 6 of 7

[REDACTED] had never met HRH SHEIK HAMAD BIN KHALIFA AL THANI.

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED] had never met [REDACTED] had one time mentioned that [REDACTED] had recommended he buy stock in Coca Cola.

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[REDACTED] had no knowledge of [REDACTED]

RICK GATES

[REDACTED] met RICK GATES sometime around Summer or Fall 2016 in the lead up to the election. A handful of people from the campaign worked out of Colony's New York offices at 54th and 5th, and was introduced to him there. BARRACK grew fond of GATES and proposed that GATES join Colony.

b6  
b7C

GATES' role at Colony was "soft" business development, specifically related to infrastructure projects. GATES was suited for this role because he was a lobbyist with existing relationships in and around the government. Aside from his rolodex and his capacity as a facilitator, [REDACTED] did not see much value in GATES.

[REDACTED] occasionally interacted with GATES. GATES' role included directional thoughts for Colony and brainstorming new ideas for the company that leveraged BARRACK's access to the administration. [REDACTED] never saw GATES' consulting agreement.

b6  
b7C

Some time in May of 2017, BARRACK had hosted a dinner during Milken Global and GATES filled the tables.

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4885



[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]


Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 01/09/2018 . Page 7 of 7

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4886



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/05/2018

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed at his residence, [redacted] [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents [redacted] invited them into his residence. [redacted] was advised the FBI [redacted] [redacted] After being advised of the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7CInvestigation on 02/06/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/12/2018by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 02/06/2018, Page 2 of 5

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 02/06/2018, Page 3 of 5

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]


b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 02/06/2018, Page 4 of 5

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

The original documents provided by [REDACTED] are being maintained for the file in a physical 1A envelope. Copies of those documents are enclosed as digital attachments to this FD-302.

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [redacted] , On 02/06/2018 , Page 5 of 5




b7E

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/04/2018

On March 27, 2018, [redacted] born [redacted] residing at [redacted]  
[redacted] cellular telephone [redacted] was  
contacted at his residence. After being advised of the identity of the  
interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview [redacted] provided the  
following information:

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7CInvestigation on 03/27/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 04/03/2018by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7E



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/16/2018

On 1/25/2018, [redacted] contacted SA [redacted] by email and requested that SA [redacted] contact him. On 1/26/2018, SA [redacted] spoke to [redacted] on the telephone. [redacted] provided the following information:

b6

b7C

[Redacted]

b6

b7C

[Redacted]

b6

b7C


UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 01/26/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 01/30/2018by [redacted]

b6

b7C

b7E





b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/14/2017

On 12/5/2017, SA [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel Kyle Freeny spoke to [redacted] on the telephone. [redacted] provided the following information:

b6

b7C

b3 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b6

b7C

[redacted]

b6

b7C

[redacted]

b6

b7C

[redacted]

b6

b7C

[redacted]

b6

b7C

[redacted]

b6

b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6

b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 12/05/2017 at [redacted] United States (Phone) b3 per DOJ/OIP  
File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/14/2017  
by [redacted]

b6

b7C

b7E

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Telephonic Interview of [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 12/05/2017 , Page 2 of 2

[REDACTED]


b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4895



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/14/2017

On 12/6/2017, SA [ ] spoke to [ ] on the telephone.  
[ ] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

Following [ ] phone call with SA [ ] and Assistant Special Counsel  
Kyle Freeny the previous day, [ ]

b6  
b7C

[ ]

[ ]


b6  
b7C

[ ]

b6  
b7C

[ ] explained to SA [ ] that he had called because he did not want  
to do anything wrong.

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 12/06/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)File # [ ] Date drafted 12/14/2017by [ ]b6  
b7C  
b7E



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/21/2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 6/16/2017 at or around 8:41 PM EST, [ ] telephoned SA [ ] from telephone number [ ] to express his concerns about their previous meeting regarding PAUL MANAFORT. [ ] informed SA [ ] that he had not informed MANAFORT of his previous meetings with FBI SA's, but that MANAFORT had recently [ ]

b6

b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [ ] told SA [ ] that he was concerned that MANAFORT would ask if he had been contacted by the FBI, and [ ] did not want to be deceptive. [ ] was concerned that telling MANAFORT that he had spoken to the FBI would get him in trouble with the FBI. Furthermore, [ ] explained that he understood MANAFORT to be a powerful and well-connected person [ ]

b6

b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA [ ] informed [ ] that while the FBI would prefer [ ] not inform MANAFORT of their interest in him, the FBI was not legally compelling him not to inform MANAFORT. SA [ ] requested that [ ]

b6

b7C


UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 06/16/2017 at Los Angeles, California, United States (Phone)File # [ ] Date drafted 06/19/2017by [ ]

b3

b6

b7C

b7E



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/24/2017

On 8/17/2017, [redacted] and SA [redacted] spoke on the telephone regarding the subpoena for [redacted] [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

b3 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

b3 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 08/17/2017 at [redacted] United States (P) **b3 per DOJ/OIP**File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/21/2017b6  
b7C  
b7Eby [redacted]

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FBI(19cv1278)-4898

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Telephone Call with [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 08/17/2017, Page 2 of 2

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b3 Per DOJ/OIP


b6  
b7C

b3 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4899



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/10/2017

On 08/08/2017, Special Agent (SA) [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Charlotte Division/Raleigh Resident Agency, contacted [redacted] telephone number: [redacted] via telephone to arrange a meeting. [redacted] agreed to meet SA [redacted] at his residence at 1:00PM on the same day. SA [redacted] arrived at [redacted] residence at approximately 1:05PM on 08/08/2017 and [redacted]

b6  
b7C

b3 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] being aware of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the purpose for the interview, voluntarily provided the following information:

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

b3 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 08/08/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/10/2017

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U) Subpoena Service and Interview of

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] . On 08/08/2017 . Page 2 of 4

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C



(U) Subpoena Service and Interview of

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 08/08/2017, Page 3 of 4

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

(U) Subpoena Service and Interview of

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 08/08/2017, Page 4 of 4

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]


b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] stated that he has not been threatened by anyone in regards to this matter and has not feared for his life or safety. [REDACTED] stated he would immediately notify SA [REDACTED] if he receives threats related to this matter.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] was present throughout the duration of the interview. The interview took place [REDACTED] and lasted approximately [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

b3  
b7EUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/02/2018

On January 17, 2018 [redacted] was interviewed at his place of employment, [redacted] by [redacted] Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [redacted] and Forensic Accountant [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 01/17/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 01/17/2018by [redacted]b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 01/17/2018 . Page 2 of 5

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4905

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 01/17/2018 . Page 3 of 5

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4906

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 01/17/2018 . Page 4 of 5

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4907

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 01/17/2018 . Page 5 of 5

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C


[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b3  
b7EUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/29/2018

[redacted] was interviewed at the Washington Field Office located at 301 4th Street NW, Washington, D.C, by writer and Forensic Accountant [redacted]. Also present in the interview were Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Zainab Ahmad and SASC Brandon Van Grack. Representing [redacted] during the interview was his attorney [redacted] of [redacted]. The interview was conducted under a signed proffer agreement. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

Agent Note: [redacted]

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 02/15/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/15/2018

by [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C



[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 02/15/2018 . On 02/15/2018 . Page 2 of 15

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 02/15/2018 . On 02/15/2018 . Page 3 of 15

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 02/15/2018 . On 02/15/2018 . Page 4 of 15

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] 02/15/2018 . On 02/15/2018 . Page 5 of 10

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4913

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 02/15/2018 . On 02/15/2018 . Page 6 of 15

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4914

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 02/15/2018 . On 02/15/2018 . Page 7 of 15

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

Agent Note: A break was taken in the interview for approximately ten (10) minutes.

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4915

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 02/15/2018 . On 02/15/2018 . Page 8 of 15

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4916

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 02/15/2018 . On 02/15/2018 . Page 9 of 15

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 02/15/2018 . On 02/15/2018 . Page 10 of 15

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4918

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 02/15/2018 . On 02/15/2018 . Page 11 of 15

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4919

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 02/15/2018 . On 02/15/2018 . Page 12 of 15

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4920

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 02/15/2018 . On 02/15/2018 . Page 13 of 15

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

Agent Note: A break was taken in the interview.

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4921

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 02/15/2018 . On 02/15/2018 . Page 14 of 15

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4922

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] 02/15/2018 . On 02/15/2018 . Page 15 of 15

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C


[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

Agent Note: All documents shown will be maintained in a 1A.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4923



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/02/2018

On 3/12/2018, [REDACTED] [PROTECT IDENTITY] contacted the Special Counsel's Office with information she believed was relevant to the investigation. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7Db6  
b7C  
b7Db6  
b7C  
b7Db6  
b7C  
b7Db6  
b7C  
b7DUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 05/02/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 05/02/2018by [REDACTED]b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]  
[PROTECT IDENTITY]


Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 05/02/2018, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~





b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/11/2018

On Wednesday, April 25, 2018, [redacted]  
[redacted] telephone number [redacted] appeared at the [redacted]  
[redacted] located at [redacted]  
[redacted] in preparation for possible testimony at the trial of  
Paul Manafort in July 2018. Also present were Senior Assistant Special  
Counsel Greg D. Andres and FBI Forensic Accountant [redacted]  
[redacted] furnished the following information:

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b7C

b6

b7C

b6

b7C

b6

b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 04/24/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/07/2018

by [redacted]

b6

b7C

b7E

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED] - April 25,  
Continuation of FD-302 of 2018 . On 04/24/2018 . Page 2 of 2

b6  
b7C


b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

A copy of documents shown to [REDACTED] have been attached for the file. The interview notes have also been attached.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4950

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/10/2018

On July 6, 2018, [REDACTED] was interviewed by Assistant United States Attorney [REDACTED] and FBI Forensic Accountant [REDACTED] in preparation for possible testimony at the trial of Paul Manafort in July 2018. Present during the interview were counsel for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] corresponded with Manafort at the beginning of the loan application process, and then with Gates later in the process. Overall, [REDACTED] believes she corresponded with Richard Gates more than Paul Manafort.

b6  
b7C


b3 per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

b3  
b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 07/06/2018 at [REDACTED] United States (In Person) b3 per DOJ/OIP  
File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 07/06/2018  
by [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E



b7E


UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/24/2017

On August 16, 2017, the writer and SA [REDACTED] attempted to interview [REDACTED] at her last know address, [REDACTED]. There was no answer at her door, so the writer left his business card.

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~Investigation on 08/16/2017 at [REDACTED] United States (In Person)b6  
b7C  
b7EFile # [REDACTED] Date drafted 08/18/2017by [REDACTED]



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/01/2017

[redacted] (PROTECT IDENTITY) was contacted at [redacted]  
[redacted] on 7/21/2017. [redacted] (PROTECT  
IDENTITY) and provided the following information:

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b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]


b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7DUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 07/21/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 07/24/2017

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/19/2018

On October 9, 2018, [REDACTED] was interviewed under a proffer agreement. Participating in the interview were FBI Special Agent [REDACTED] FBI Forensic Accountant [REDACTED] and Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Zainab Ahmad. Also present was [REDACTED] attorney, [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

After [REDACTED] was advised of the identities of the interviewers, SASC Ahmad presented and explained the terms of the proffer letter. [REDACTED] had no questions or concerns and signed the letter. [REDACTED] then provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 1, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

The campaign had two phases for fundraising purposes, the primary and general. The primary phase formally ends when the candidate accepts his or her party's nomination. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] Typically candidates loan money, especially at the beginning of the

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 10/09/2018 at [REDACTED] United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 10/12/2018

by [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 10/09/2018 . Page 2 of 8

campaign. The reason for this is the campaign can pay back loans with contributions.

Candidate contributions, by contrast, cannot be paid back by other contributions to the campaign. Candidate loans can be converted into contributions, but contributions can never be converted into loans. The advantage of the candidate making contributions instead of loans is optics. Potential contributors could be dissuaded from making contributions to the candidate's campaign because the candidate might use the money to pay back loans instead of using the money for the campaign.

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

Exhibit 2, [REDACTED]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4955

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 10/09/2018 . Page 3 of 8

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 3, [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4956



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 10/09/2018 . Page 4 of 8

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 6, [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] was allowed to read Exhibit 6.

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

There is no way to "advance" a contribution to a campaign. Candidate support of their campaign is either a contribution, loan, or "in-kind" contribution.

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4957

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] . On 10/09/2018 . Page 5 of 8

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Additional information regarding the

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4958

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 10/09/2018 . Page 6 of 8

b6  
b7CEnd of 2016 campaign:b6  
b7C

Part of the conversion from a successful campaign to a reelection effort are new filings with the FEC to declare candidacy. The 2016 campaign can continue to raise funds to pay debts from the 2016 campaign. Invoices that come in from 2016 campaign work are counted as debts.

Money raised for the 2020 campaign cannot be used to pay 2016 debts. However, leftover 2016 funds can be moved forward to the 2020 campaign.

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7CEmail addresses:b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4959

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] . On 10/09/2018 . Page 7 of 8

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

will review his text messages with his attorney and agreed to provide them to the Special Counsel's Office.

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4960

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 10/09/2018 . Page 8 of 8

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]


b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4961

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/03/2018

On December 22, 2017 [redacted] was interviewed under a proffer agreement at 395 E. Street SW, Washington, DC. Participating in the interview were FBI Special Agent [redacted] FBI Forensic Accountants [redacted] and Senior Assistant Special Counsels (SASC) Zainab Ahmad and Andrew Weissman. Also present was [redacted] attorney, [redacted]

b6  
b7C

After [redacted] was advised of the identities of the interviewers, SASC Ahmad explained to [redacted] that the interview was voluntary and if at any time he wanted to consult with his counsel he could do so. [redacted] was advised that he needed to be honest in answering the questions and that making false statements could constitute a federal crime. [redacted] then provided the following information:

b6  
b7CBackground:

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 12/22/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/22/2017

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 12/22/2017 . Page 2 of 12

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

TRUMP Campaign:

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] COREY LEWANDOWSKI was in  
place as campaign manager. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4963

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 12/22/2017 . Page 3 of 12

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4964



[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 12/22/2017 . Page 4 of 12

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4965

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 12/22/2017 . Page 5 of 12

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED] asked for and took a short  
break with his attorney.

When the interview resumed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4966

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 12/22/2017 . Page 6 of 12

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4967

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 12/22/2017 . Page 7 of 12

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4968

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] . On 12/22/2017 . Page 8 of 12

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Documents Shown:

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4969

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] . On 12/22/2017 . Page 9 of 12

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4970

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] . On 12/22/2017 . Page 10 of 12

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4971

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 12/22/2017 . Page 11 of 12

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4972



[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 12/22/2017 . Page 12 of 12

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]


b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4973

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/30/2018

[redacted] telephone number: [redacted] email address: [redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed at his office located at [redacted]  
[redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted] works as [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] is not aware of any attempts to influence the 2016 US Presidential election. [redacted] previously communicated to the Washington Field Office (WFO) that he received a communication that had a summary of the "Trump Dossier." [redacted] received this dossier from a friend in [redacted] [redacted] worked for [redacted] and now works at [redacted] [redacted] forwarded [redacted] an email [redacted] received that came from the "Hillary Clinton apparatus." [redacted] indicated that Salon Magazine bureau chief, Sidney Blumenthal and William Clinton's former attorney, lined up a former CIA officer named Tyler DRUMHELLER to gather intelligence related to then Presidential Candidate Donald TRUMP. DRUMHELLER has since passed away.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] showed the forwarded email he received to someone named [redacted] [redacted] from [redacted] The email had the "salacious pissing thing." The email contained content, but did not have the entire document. [redacted] did not see the entire document until it appeared in Buzzfeed.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] indicated he knows Russia very well and knew they were involved in the 2016 Presidential election. [redacted] was "dead certain they were messing with us", but had no direct knowledge. [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 03/20/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person, Mail)  
File # [redacted] Date drafted 04/13/2018  
by [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 03/20/2018 . Page 2 of 3b6  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7Cb6  
b7C  
b7Eb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[REDACTED] indicated his surprise to hear that [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Psy-Group talked about influencing elections using Avatars, or online personas. They would build an online profile that would engage targets, utilize BOTNETs and deliver messaging. Psy-Group is active in Africa and South America. Their campaigns would be to win the confidence of people.

The first time [REDACTED] met with Psy-Group it was between [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] thought Psy-Group might be useful to [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(Agent Note: [REDACTED] opened his computer and conducted a search for Psy-Group. He had [REDACTED] related to Psy-Group.)

[REDACTED] indicated Israel and Russia have close connections. Prime Minister Netanyahu is always traveling to Russia and winning his elections because of the Israeli-Russian connections. [REDACTED] articulated that "something is going on" between these two countries.

In conversations or indications with Psy-Group personnel, [REDACTED] never had any indication that Psy-Group took part in any efforts related to the

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~


FBI(19cv1278)-4975

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 03/20/2018 . Page 3 of 3

2016 US Presidential election. In the course of [REDACTED] conversations, analysis of the 2016 US Presidential election came up in the context of "You should see our analysis of the US election." [REDACTED] was interested in [REDACTED] so he was very interested in this. [REDACTED] indicated Psy-Group [REDACTED] but that [REDACTED] indicated they had "very interesting analysis on the Trump election." [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C(Agent Note: [REDACTED] provided copies of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED])b6  
b7C  
b7EUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4976



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/02/2018

[REDACTED] Date of Birth: [REDACTED] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street, SW, Washington, D.C. Agents reported the interview in serial 141. At the request of the Assistant Special Counsel, Agents report the following additional information provided during that interview:

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[REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 05/18/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)


File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 07/31/2018

by [REDACTED]

b6

b7C

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/28/2018

On or about 11/06/2016, [redacted] were telephonically interviewed by the author with Special Counsel Prosecutors Jeannie S. Rhee and Lawrence R. Atkinson. [redacted] represented [redacted] [redacted] provided the following information about [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7CInvestigation on 11/06/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/13/2018by [redacted]b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


(U) Telephone Call with [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] . On 11/06/2017 . Page 2 of 2

b6  
b7A  
b7C

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b7C

A copy of the interview notes were saved to the 1A.



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/30/2018

(U) On 10/17/2018 Special Agents (SA) [redacted]  
[redacted] interviewed [redacted] during the  
interview of [redacted]


b6  
b7C

[redacted] After having been advised  
of the identity of the interviewing SAs, [redacted] provided the following  
information:

(U) [redacted]

b6  
b7CInvestigation on 10/17/2018 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/30/2018by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7E



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/30/2018

On April 27, 2018, [REDACTED] appeared at the New York Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation located at [REDACTED] New York, New York. Also present were Forensic Accountant [REDACTED] Senior Assistant Special Counsel Greg Andres, and [REDACTED] attorney, [REDACTED]. In preparation for possible testimony at the trial of Paul Manafort in July 2018, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

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b7C

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Most clients pay their invoices by check or credit card. Only one or two clients send wire transfers to pay their invoices.

b6  
b7C

Paul Manafort only made payments with wire transfers, usually from a foreign country. [REDACTED] did not recognize the names of the foreign entities Manafort used to pay his invoices [REDACTED] of the wires matched the amount of Manafort's outstanding invoices. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED]


b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 04/27/2018 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 04/30/2018

by [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/04/2018

(U) On 08/30/2018 Special Agents (SA) [redacted] and [redacted] interviewed an unidentified female (UF), later identified as [redacted] at [redacted]. The SAs did not identify themselves as FBI SAs.

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(U) The UF asked if the SAs were looking for [redacted]. SA [redacted] replied he was looking for [redacted]. The UF confirmed [redacted] was [redacted] and asked if the SAs wanted her to call [redacted]. The UF stated [redacted] was at work [redacted] but was not sure where his office was. SA [redacted] asked for [redacted] phone number and stated he would call [redacted]. The UF provided the number [redacted].


b6  
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Investigation on 08/30/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/31/2018

by [redacted]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/01/2017

## DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

## FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] residence [redacted]  
[redacted] telephone number [redacted] was contacted  
at his residence by FBI Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted]  
[redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents  
and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted]

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b7C

[redacted]

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b7C

The ECFMU account was brought to Mercury by Paul Manafort. Manafort and [redacted] had a previous relationship, but [redacted] was not sure the exact origin of their relationship. Manafort and Rick Gates were working for the Ukrainian government at the time they brought ECFMU to Mercury. Specifically, [redacted] believed Manafort and Gates were working for Ukrainian President Yanukovich and the Party of Regions ("POR").

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Investigation on 08/07/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/07/2017

by [redacted]

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b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 08/07/2017 . Page 2 of 6

[redacted]  
[redacted] The ECFMU was hiring Mercury and another lobbying firm, Podesta Group, to lobby United States government officials to support Ukraine's pull toward western Europe and membership in the European Union. [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C

It was clear from the beginning of Mercury's relationship with ECFMU that Manafort and Gates, who represented the Yanukovych government, were connected to ECFMU. [redacted] was never clear as to the exact relationship between Manafort and Gates and the ECFMU. [redacted] did not think this relationship was particularly strange as many non-governmental organizations ("NGO") have connections and affiliations to political parties and governments.

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b7C

[redacted] would have been the people at Mercury to negotiate the contract with ECFMU and handle payment issues. [redacted]  
[redacted]

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Throughout the time ECFMU was Mercury's client, Manafort, Gates, [redacted] and [redacted] Podesta Group, met on a regular basis. [redacted] did not attend these meetings and could not say for sure the purpose of these meetings. In addition, there were weekly calls with Rick Gates, [redacted] [redacted] and people working on the ECFMU account at Mercury and Podesta. [redacted]  
[redacted]

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[redacted]  
met [redacted] when he came to the United States. [redacted] seemed very knowledgeable on policy issues and highly intelligent. [redacted] but [redacted] did not know where he was from. [redacted] did not recognize the name [redacted] and did not know who the board members of ECFMU were.

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b7Cb6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview . On 08/07/2017 . Page 3 of 6

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] never understood why Mercury did not originally register this client under FARA. For some reason, Mercury filed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act ("LDA") instead. [REDACTED] did not understand the decision to file under LDA at all. [REDACTED] thought it was clear cut that work for ECFMU necessitated a FARA filing. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] recalled that Podesta Group also filed LDA rather than FARA. [REDACTED] believed Podesta Group and Mercury coordinated these filings, but he did not have specific knowledge of this. [REDACTED] recalled [REDACTED] wanted to file under FARA as well.

[REDACTED] recalled there was a meeting early on in the relationship with ECFMU between [REDACTED] Manafort, Gates and [REDACTED] to discuss the issue of whether to file under FARA or LDA. After this meeting, it was decided Mercury could file under LDA. [REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED] learned Mercury retroactively filed under FARA [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was not notified of Mercury's intention to retroactively file and did not participate in the filing. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] recalled the meetings listed in Mercury's retroactive FARA filing were accurate to the best of his knowledge.

[REDACTED] also reviewed Podesta Group's retroactive FARA filing and recalled thinking Mercury's filing was much more detailed. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview . On 08/07/2017 . Page 4 of 6

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and he was excited about ECFMU as a client because he thought it meant future business for Mercury with Russian Oligarchs.

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Mercury acquired Clark & Weinstock some time shortly before the ECFMU deal started. Prior to this acquisition, Clark & Weinstock were struggling to break even because of a prior acquisition from Omnicom.

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There were many times during on the ECFMU account that if Mercury was working for ECFMU, or the Ukrainian government, because Gates regularly communicated information to Mercury which seemed to be for the benefit of the Ukrainian government versus ECFMU. responses were generally to downplay the requests from Gates as small and unimportant.

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b7C

was asked about emails from Gates to various employees at Mercury and Podesta asking for updates on their activities so he could relay them to Manafort who was meeting with Yanukovych that day.

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

recalled the imprisonment of former Ukrainian President Tymoshenko was of concern to Gates. Mercury was asked to provide information on the proposed resolution by the United States to condemn the imprisonment of Tymoshenko. never approved of this work by Mercury as he believed it was work for the Ukrainian government. never lobbied United States government officials as it related to the Tymoshenko issue.

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 08/07/2017 . Page 5 of 6

[redacted] was asked about emails from Gates to Mercury and Podesta employees regarding a meeting about the Tymoshenko issue and the "resolution". [redacted] did not recall the meeting specifically, but generally recalled Gates wanted Mercury and Podesta to discourage members of United States Congress from signing or supporting a resolution. [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] was not sure if other employees of Mercury or Podesta did lobby in this manner.

[redacted] recalled Wiley Rein, a law firm, was working with former Congressman Slattery in opposition of the Tymoshenko arrest and imprisonment. [redacted] did not recall communicating with Gates regarding this issue.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] was asked about an email from Gates asking Mercury to implement a strategic plan which was approved by Kyiv. [redacted] did not recall this email, or a meeting about a strategic plan from Kyiv.

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b7C

[redacted] was asked about an email from Gates referring to new ECFMU board members. [redacted] did not recall this email, or any change among ECFMU board members. [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] was asked if he ever lobbied Congressman Rohrbacher on behalf of ECFMU. [redacted] was adamant that he never lobbied Rohrbacher. Rohrbacher was a notorious pro-Russian [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] was asked if he ever met with anyone from Carnegie regarding the ECFMU. [redacted] did not believe he ever met with anyone from Carnegie, but [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] told [redacted] all politicians in Russia and Ukraine were corrupt.

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b7C

b3 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 08/07/2017 . Page 6 of 6

[redacted] was advised that deliberately making false statements to federal agents was a crime.

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b7C

Subsequent to this interview, [redacted] sent the interviewing agents a series of emails. Those emails have been attached to this FD 302. In summary, [redacted] provided the following information in the emails:

b6  
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Mercury employee [redacted] may not have worked on the ECFMU account.


b6  
b7C

[redacted] contacted [redacted] to let her know the FBI may be contacting her.

[redacted] did not contact [redacted] for the specific purpose of talking about ECFMU; however their conversation did turn to the topic of ECFMU. Per [redacted] profile which was attached to [redacted] email, [redacted]

b6  
b7C



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/06/2017

[redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed at  
Signature Bank (SB) [redacted] Also  
present during the interview were [redacted]  
[redacted] representing both SB and [redacted] and FBI Forensic  
Accountant [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the  
interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the  
following information:

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b7C

[redacted]

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b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 10/12/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/16/2017

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]  
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]  
Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] 302 (Signature Bank) . On 10/12/2017 . Page 2 of 3

[Redacted]  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5005

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]


Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] 302 (Signature Bank) . On 10/12/2017 . Page 3 of 3

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5006



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/24/2017

On February 20, 2017, Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] and  
Intelligence Analyst (IA) [REDACTED] both of the Federal Bureau  
of Investigation (FBI), met with [REDACTED] (PROTECT IDENTITY) [REDACTED]

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b7D

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] After being advised of the identity of the interviewers  
[REDACTED] provided the following information:

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b7Db6  
b7C  
b7Db6  
b7C  
b7Db6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7DUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 02/20/2017 at [REDACTED] (In Person)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 02/21/2017

by [REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

b3  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] interview . On 02/20/2017 . Page 2 of 3

[Redacted]

b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b7D

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] interview . On 02/20/2017 . Page 3 of 3

[Redacted]

b7D


[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/03/2017

On February 27, 2017, Special Agents (SAs) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] and Intelligence Analyst (IA) [REDACTED] all of the  
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), met with [REDACTED] (PROTECT  
IDENTITY), [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] After being advised of the identity of the interviewers  
[REDACTED] provided the following information:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 02/27/2017 at [REDACTED] (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 03/01/2017

by [REDACTED]

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b7Db3  
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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

. On

02/27/2017

. Page

2 of 2

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b7D


[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5011





## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/07/2017

[REDACTED] previously identified, was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [REDACTED] and Special Counsel Prosecutors Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres. Present during the interview for [REDACTED] were [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

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[redacted] was advised that her participation in the interview was voluntary and if she chose to answer questions, she needed to be honest in her responses as lying to the FBI and/or DOJ could constitute a federal crime.

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Investigation on	10/23/2017	at	United States (In Person)
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b3  
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File #  Date drafted 10/27/2017

by \_\_\_\_\_

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up . On 10/23/2017 . Page 2 of 13

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up , On 10/23/2017 , Page 3 of 13

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Follow Up , On 10/23/2017 , Page 4 of 13

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up , On 10/23/2017 , Page 5 of 13

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up , On 10/23/2017 , Page 6 of 13

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up , On 10/23/2017 , Page 7 of 13

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up , On 10/23/2017 , Page 8 of 13

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up , On 10/23/2017 , Page 9 of 13

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up , On 10/23/2017 , Page 10 of 13

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up , On 10/23/2017 , Page 11 of 13

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up , On 10/23/2017 , Page 12 of 13

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]


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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up . On 10/23/2017 . Page 13 of 13

[Redacted]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/30/2018

[redacted] previously identified, was interviewed by FBI Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres. Present during the interview was attorney for [redacted] [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted]

b6  
b7CFARA

[redacted] understanding of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) was gained from on the job experience. [redacted] has never received any formal training on FARA or LDA.

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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PDG consulted with outside counsel, Perkins & Cooley, regarding FARA issues when necessary. Additionally, PDG hired [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

Investigation on 11/08/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/03/2017

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Follow Up , On 11/08/2017 , Page 2 of 9

b6  
b7CUkraine

meeting with Rick Gates in which Gates suggested a work around to filing FARA,

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b7Cb6  
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Ukraine was a hot issue in Washington D.C. and was aware the representation would receive media coverage.

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did not believe she had subsequent conversations with about the fact that PDG did not file FARA for Ukraine.

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was aware that various PDG employees who worked on Ukraine discussed the matter of FARA among themselves. Some of the employees who worked on Ukraine expressed their discomfort with the representation. Specifically,

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had multiple conversations with about the Ukraine client. did not recall specific details of these conversations. Generally, knew the representation was for the

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Follow Up , On 11/08/2017 , Page 3 of 9

government of Ukraine and that it required FARA.

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may have talked to about Ukraine, but she could not recall.

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did not recall any conversations with about Ukraine.

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had conversations with about Ukraine.

understood the client was the government of Ukraine and had an issue with PDG not registering under FARA for the client.

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may have had some conversations with about Ukraine.

meeting with Gates and he

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did not know if worked on Ukraine.

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did not have any verbal conversations with about this matter.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Follow Up , On 11/08/2017 , Page 4 of 9

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b7Cb6  
b7C

No client wanted PDG to register under FARA for their representation because this meant more visibility into what they were doing.

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b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Follow Up , On 11/08/2017 , Page 5 of 9

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b7C

did not think had a previous relationship with either Paul Manafort or Rick Gates.

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did not think had an aversion to FARA. was aware that generally, firms liked filing LDA because the more LDA filings they did, the higher their rankings.

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Some people who worked at PDG had an aversion to working on FARA clients because of their work on political campaigns.

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b7Cb6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Follow Up . On 11/08/2017 . Page 6 of 9

Meeting with Gates[redacted] meeting was run by Gates and [redacted]  
[redacted]b6  
b7C

During the meeting, it was clear that Gates was there on behalf of Paul Manafort. At the beginning of the meeting, Gates introduced himself as working for Manafort. Gates also said that Manafort represented the government of Ukraine. Gates spent most of the meeting talking about the Skadden Report and the issues with Yulia Tymoshenko.

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[redacted]  
[redacted] Manafort also had a long time relationship with President Viktor Yanukovich.

Gates did not specifically discuss why the government of Ukraine was looking to hire PDG, but he did say that Yanukovich was concerned with how Washington D.C. was viewing Ukraine. This was the reason the Skadden Report was commissioned to deal with the Tymoshenko issue. Gates talked a lot about the Tymoshenko issue, American views on Ukraine and the dissemination of the Skadden Report in this meeting.

Gates never specifically said that the government of Ukraine was hiring PDG, but he implied that he and Manafort were hiring PDG on behalf of the government of Ukraine.

At the end of the meeting, Gates made reference to the fact that PDG would not be registering under FARA for this client. Gates brought up the European Centre for a Modern Ukraine (ECFMU), which he described as an NGO established in Brussels. Gates said PDG would register for the ECFMU and thereby not need to file FARA. [redacted]  
[redacted]

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Gates said that the Ukrainian government could not be directly tied to hiring a lobbying group that was going to lobby on the Tymoshenko issue. The Ukrainian government wanted the lobbying efforts to appear independent from the government.

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Follow Up , On 11/08/2017 , Page 7 of 9

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b7Cb6  
b7C

[redacted] Gates and Manafort would be giving direction to PDG on behalf of the client. [redacted] did not get the impression that PDG would be taking direction from the ECFMU. [redacted]

Gates gave direction and not the ECFMU.

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[redacted] recalled hearing many complaints about the Ukraine client. [redacted] remembered hearing that a Party of Regions (PoR) parliamentary member was put in charge of the ECFMU originally and then this was changed because someone on the hill questioned why PoR was running the ECFMU. [redacted] believed the PoR member was changed for a woman. [redacted] also recalled hearing people complain about the ECFMU's website and how to describe the ECFMU to US government officials they were lobbying.

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[redacted] did not recall any reference to how PDG would be paid, or whether that payment would come directly from the ECFMU or elsewhere. [redacted] reiterated that the purpose of the ECFMU was to provide separation from the Ukrainian government and make it appear that the lobbying efforts were independent. That said, she did not believe Gates talked about how PDG would be paid.

Gates said the government of Ukraine wanted to change the view in Washington D.C. that Ukraine was Russia-leaning. The government of Ukraine wanted Washington D.C. to view them as European-leaning. Gates said the government of Ukraine was concerned that the Tymoshenko issue was causing people in Washington D.C. to view Tymoshenko as the pro-European choice and Yanukovych as the pro-Russian choice. [redacted] said this view had traction among US government officials and think tanks.

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The impropriety of using the NGO to avoid FARA did not come up during the meeting. [redacted]

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Other

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Follow Up . On 11/08/2017 . Page 8 of 9

ended up publishing an article on Manafort's work for Yanukovych and how it related to PDG and MCW.

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has not talked to anyone else about this matter, except when the FBI came to her house for an interview.

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knows of Konstantin Kilimnik, but she does not know him personally. Kilimnik is a frequently discussed person in Ukraine. It is commonly known that Kilimnik is connected to Russian Intelligence and was trained by Russian Military Intelligence (GRU). believed Kilimnik had admitted as much in previous interviews. stated that the Russian model for intelligence officers is to integrate them as businessmen.

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thought it was odd that the International Republican Institute (IRI) hired Kilimnik. Kilimnik began working for the IRI sometime in 2004 or 2005. also thought it was odd that the US Embassy in Ukraine relied so heavily on Kilimnik for information on Russia and Ukraine. It was

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recalled Kilimnik wrote an article on what was wrong with American Democratic dissemination. believed Kilimnik did this while working for Manafort and the IRI.

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heard from media sources that Kilimnik wrote a memo for Manafort on how to pitch the Russians. did not have any other information on this.

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Uranium One was a client of PDG Spear Bank was a client of PDG did not think PDG should have taken on either client.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] (U) [redacted] Follow Up . On 11/08/2017 . Page 9 of 9

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
[redacted] did not believe Uranium One involved any lobbying in the US. [redacted] did not know how Uranium One came to PDG. [redacted]

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Spear Bank was a Russian controlled entity. [redacted] did not know why Spear Bank hired PDG. [redacted] thought the hiring of PDG had something to do with sanctions the US had put on Russian interests. [redacted]

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[redacted] did not have communication with anyone who worked for MCW about Ukraine.



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/17/2017

## DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutors Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres. Present during the interview for [redacted] were [redacted]. [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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b7CInvestigation on 10/05/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/05/2017by [redacted]b3  
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] , On 10/05/2017 , Page 2 of 6

[redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted], On 10/05/2017, Page 3 of 6

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] , On 10/05/2017 , Page 4 of 6

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted], On 10/05/2017, Page 5 of 6

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted], On 10/05/2017, Page 6 of 6

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]


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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/29/2018

[redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Jeannie S. Rhee and Andrew Weissmann. Present representing [redacted] was [redacted]

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[redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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Podesta grew quickly during the Obama Administration [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] knew foreign clients would pay big fees and raise the profile of the firm.

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[redacted]  
[redacted] Some foreign governments did not want their lobbyists to file under FARA because of the transparency. The financial reporting may be a problem domestically because the government would need to explain where the money for the often high fees came from. The foreign governments also wanted the lobbying efforts to look independent which disclosing the government as the client did not

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 08/17/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/24/2018

by [redacted]

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[REDACTED]  
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]  
(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]  
Continuation of FD-302 of 08.17.2018 . On 08/17/2018 . Page 2 of 2

allow. Each Podesta employee had to keep track of their own FARA activities.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Almost all Podesta's clients had more than one lobbying firm. The work was divided by area of expertise or political party. Podesta was associated with [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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
There were a large number of people from Podesta and Mercury at the first client meeting in Podesta's conference room. Rick Gates represented the client. The meeting lasted about two hours. The meeting focused on two or three issues including a white paper from Skadden Arps on the trial of Tymoshenko. Greg Craig, the former White House counsel, authored the paper. The discussion centered on how it would be rolled out. Another issue was Podesta arranging meetings in the U.S. for Ukrainian government officials. Gates did most of the talking during the meeting. Gates said he was there on behalf of Manafort. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] reported to Gates who reported to Manafort who reported to Yanukovych. Gates explained that a non-government organization (NGO), the European Centre for a Modern Ukraine (ECFMU), was being setup. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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FBI(19cv1278)-5064

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/01/2017b6  
b7C

[redacted] born [redacted] was contacted at Washington, D.C. [redacted] was accompanied by his attorney, [redacted] Present for the interview was the undersigned Special Agents, as well as SIA [redacted] and Attorney Andrew Weisman. After being apprised of the official identities of all present, and having reviewed and signed the letter dated [redacted] stated the following:

Bayrock:

[redacted]  
[redacted] Felix Sater introduced [redacted]  
[redacted] Sater himself, [redacted]  
[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 07/20/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 07/25/2017

by [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 07/20/2017 . Page 2 of 3

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 07/20/2017 . Page 3 of 3b6  
b7C

Felix Sater:

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Sater traveled  
to [REDACTED] and worked as a  
'senior advisor' for the Trump Organization.

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Eventually, Trump threw Sater out after press releases indicating his  
(Sater's) criminal past. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]


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[REDACTED] stated that he has never done business with Paul Manafort,  
Carter Page, Michael Flynn, or Richard Gates. The name Agalarov sounded  
familiar but he couldn't specify.

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5067

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/21/2017

## DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account  
number [redacted] address [redacted]  
cellular telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at her residence  
by FBI Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] and Special Agent [redacted]  
[redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents  
and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

b6  
b7CThe Podesta Group

[redacted]

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b7C

Investigation on 09/14/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/15/2017

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted] , On 09/14/2017 , Page 2 of 10

[redacted]  
[redacted] understanding  
was that any foreign government or political party influencing United  
States (US) policy required a FARA registration. [redacted] was not  
uncomfortable registering under FARA. [redacted]

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[redacted]  
[redacted] did not believe she had registered under the Lobbying  
Disclosure Act (LDA) for any foreign client. [redacted] did not think the LDA  
exception should even exist.

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b7Cb6  
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview , On 09/14/2017 , Page 3 of 10

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Ukraine

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview . On 09/14/2017 . Page 4 of 10

[REDACTED]

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Beginning in or around [REDACTED] began hearing talk about the Ukraine becoming a client. [REDACTED] believed there were some early emails exchanged on the topic. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] and

[REDACTED] all had reservations about the Yanukovych government, the issues related to the jailing of Yulia Tymoshenko, human rights issues and the departure from democracy that was occurring in Ukraine under Yanukovych's rule. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] and some others were in the meeting on the PDG side. In addition, there were a few people from Mercury in the meeting, but [REDACTED] was not sure who from Mercury attended. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The meeting was held by Rick Gates and [REDACTED] who worked for Paul Manafort. Gates and [REDACTED] made it clear in the meeting that they were there on behalf of Manafort and that they, along with Manafort, represented the Ukrainian government and Yanukovych. Gates and [REDACTED] said they had a long standing political consulting contract with the Ukrainian government.

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[REDACTED] recalled Gates and [REDACTED] referred to a Skadden Arps report written by former White House Counsel, Greg Craig. Gates and [REDACTED] said the Ukrainian government had hired Skadden Arps to write this report to

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 09/14/2017 . Page 5 of 10

explain how Tymoshenko was a drug addict who had directed murders. Further, Tymoshenko was the reason for the Orange Revolution's collapse and she deserved to be in prison. Gates and [redacted] said a draft of the report would be out in the near future and they would provide a copy to PDG for review.

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Gates and [redacted] on behalf of Manafort and the Ukrainian government, wanted to hire PDG to lobby members of the US government and talk to various think tanks primarily on the issue of Tymoshenko. Gates and [redacted] explained that the Obama Administration's relationship with the Ukrainian government was strained and helping US government officials to see the Tymoshenko arrest as legitimate was central to improving that relationship. Gates and [redacted] also mentioned that delegations of Ukrainian officials would be coming to the US to meet with various members of the US government and PDG would be arranging for those meetings. At least half of the meeting was spent talking about the Tymoshenko issue and specifically, ways to discredit Tymoshenko.

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During the meeting, [redacted]

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[redacted] Gates and [redacted] made it clear that Manafort had direct access and contact with various members of the Ukrainian government, to include Yanukovych.

Gates and [redacted] wanted PDG to write up a plan on what they planned to do. Toward the end of the meeting, Gates and [redacted] mentioned they would be setting up a non-governmental organization (NGO) through which they would work with PDG. [redacted] recalled the NGO was called the European Centre for a Modern Ukraine (ECFMU). Gates and [redacted] said the ECFMU was going to be established in Belgium and they would create a website for it. Gates and [redacted] said the purpose of the ECFMU was so that PDG did not need to file FARA. [redacted] recalled Gates and [redacted] saying that the ECFMU would be the client, PDG would file under LDA and that this could not be connected to Yanukovych.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] recalled some discussion about the ECFMU being made to look like they were oriented toward the west. Gates and [redacted] said something about the ECFMU putting out the Skadden Report, facilitating briefings, setting up meetings on the Hill and visits to the US by Ukrainian officials. [redacted] remembered that a Party of Regions (PoR) official was named as the head of the ECFMU and then Gates realized that needed to be

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview . On 09/14/2017 . Page 6 of 10

[REDACTED] changed that so a woman was put in charge. [REDACTED] also believed Gates and [REDACTED] said that the ECFMU would be the entity paying PDG.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] further explained that Gates and [REDACTED] were absolutely clear about the fact that they were hiring PDG to represent the government of Ukraine. They were also clear that the NGO was being established for this purpose and it was merely a "pass through", or financial vehicle used to pay PDG so they could file LDA.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] sensed that the decision had already been made. [REDACTED] recalled [REDACTED] just nodded in response.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] was not sure when PDG actually began work for Ukraine or who ended up leading the Ukraine team. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] read in newspapers that PDG obtained a letter from the ECFMU which stated the ECFMU was not connected to the government. [REDACTED] did not know for sure, but said it was likely that [REDACTED] asked for this letter even though [REDACTED] knew this was not true. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview . On 09/14/2017 . Page 7 of 10

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7CEmails

[REDACTED] searched her iPhone for emails related to this matter. [REDACTED] recalled forwarding some emails to her personal email around this time because she was frequently out of the office and country. [REDACTED] found an email from her dated [REDACTED]. In the email, [REDACTED] had forwarded an

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]  
forwarded the email to [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] thought this email was prior to the meeting with Gates and [REDACTED] but after she had been invited to the meeting.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] found another email dated [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. In this email, [REDACTED] forwarded an article regarding [REDACTED] commented in the body of the email, [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C



Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview . On 09/14/2017 . Page 8 of 10

[REDACTED] found a third email dated [REDACTED] In this email, [REDACTED] forwarded an article titled [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] In the body of the email, [REDACTED]

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[REDACTED] was shown an email dated [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] regarding [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] recalled that Gates was the point of contact for this client. [REDACTED] understanding was that Gates told [REDACTED] what he wanted PDG to do and [REDACTED] relayed that to the PDG team working on Ukraine.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] was asked if PDG had used similar "pass throughs" to avoid registering under FARA for any other clients. [REDACTED] said that she did not think PDG had misused the LDA exception in this manner before. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview . On 09/14/2017 . Page 9 of 10

recalled a "Soviet laser guy" who worked for an entity called Uranium1. The client was Russian, but the work was not in the US. believed this occurred a few months prior to Ukraine and that PDG filed under LDA for this client.

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7C

recalled British Petrol (BP) was a long standing client of PDG's. BP wanted PDG to lobby on the Hill about a deal that was unraveling that related to Alpha Bank. did not have other details about this.

b6  
b7C

PDG took on Spear Bank as a client. Spear Bank was well known to be Russian government.

b6  
b7C

knew of Paul Manafort from but she did not personally know Manafort.

b6  
b7C

Manafort was the person who used the contacts of the firm and international clients to do business deals.

recalled Manafort was connected to Konstantin Kilimnik, a Russian intelligence officer with great English language skills. Kilimnik and Manafort worked for Yanukovych. Kilimnik had great Ukrainian contacts and was even known to have regular access to US government officials at the Embassy in Kiev. heard this from various reporters investigating the connection between Manafort, Yanukovych, Kilimnik and US lobbying.

b6  
b7C

stated she would search for any other documents related to this matter and voluntarily provide those to the FBI.

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 09/14/2017 . Page 10 of 10

The morning following this interview, [redacted] forwarded another email found on her iPhone. This email was a continuation of the [redacted] email in which she had forwarded [redacted]


b6  
b7C

[redacted] In the continuation, [redacted] and [redacted] exchanged emails as follows:

[Large redacted area]

b6  
b7C

The emails shown to and forwarded by [redacted] have been attached to this FD302.



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/08/2016

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]  
social security account number [redacted] was interviewed by telephone at  
phone number [redacted] resides at [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] After being advised of the identity of the  
interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the  
following information:

[redacted] was formerly employed at [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]  
KONSTANTIN KILIMNIK (KILIMNIK), who is involved in the DONALD J. TRUMP  
(TRUMP) campaign. KILIMNIK is associated to the campaign through one of  
TRUMP's advisers, PAUL JOHN MANAFORT (MANAFORT). [redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 08/05/2016 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/08/2016

by [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

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to be distributed outside your agency.

FBI(19cv1278)-5078

[REDACTED]  
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 08/05/2016 , Page 2 of 2

b6  
b7A  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] BLACK MANAFORT AND  
STONE, a political consulting company, is located at 211 North Union  
Street, Suite 300. One of their subsidiaries, DAVIS MANAFORT AND FREEDMAN,  
is located at 211 North Union Street, Suite 250.


b6  
b7A  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] is willing to provide  
this, along with the supporting documentation, to the FBI at any time.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5079

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/29/2018

(U) On 01/18/2018 Assistant Special Counsel L. Rush Atkinson and Special Agent [redacted] called [redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U) SA [redacted] explained that the Special Counsel's Office was interested in [redacted] knowledge of the Trump Tower Moscow deal. ASC Atkinson provided some specifics related to the SCO's line of questioning during the interview.

b6  
b7C


(U) [redacted] asked if it was possible to conduct the interview virtually, however, ASC Atkinson declined.

Investigation on 01/18/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 01/18/2018

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/30/2018

On May 10th 2018 4:00 PM, at the office of Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee's legal counsel, Perkins Coie, 700 Thirteenth Street Northwest, Suite 600, Washington, District of Columbia 20005, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was interviewed by employees of the Special Counsel's Office. In attendance were Perkins Coie Attorney [REDACTED] Perkins Coie Associate [REDACTED] Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent [REDACTED] Federal Bureau of Investigation Management and Program Analyst [REDACTED] Special Counsel Attorney Jessica Romero, and Special Counsel Attorney Heather Alpino. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents, and purpose of the interview, [REDACTED] stated the following:

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b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7CInvestigation on 05/10/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 05/10/2018by [REDACTED]b6  
b7C  
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 05/10/2018, Page 2 of 2

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C


[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C





b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/28/2017

On September 26, 2017, [REDACTED] with a home address of [REDACTED] and telephone numbers of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was interviewed at her residence. Prior to the interviewing agent's arrival at [REDACTED] home, the agent spoke to [REDACTED] briefly on the phone to coordinate logistics for the interview. Upon arrival, after being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] previously [REDACTED] but at the time of the interview no longer worked for [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] provided the interviewing agent with an envelope containing documents related to [REDACTED] had been provided the documents by [REDACTED] explained wished to remain anonymous in order to protect [REDACTED] These documents included [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

LNU lived local to the [REDACTED] area.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] the office for PAUL MANAFORT in [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Part of this process involved handling large quantities of [REDACTED]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 09/26/2017 at [REDACTED] United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 09/27/2017

by [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 09/26/2017 . Page 2 of 2


cash. LNU thought this was indicative of tax evasion. LNU understood

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5087

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/11/2018

ON 5/7/2018, SA [REDACTED] SA [REDACTED] and Special Counsel Prosecutor (SCP) Andrew Weissmann interviewed [REDACTED] was represented by [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Prior to the start of the interview, SCP Weissmann advised [REDACTED] that the interview was voluntary. Additionally, [REDACTED] was advised that lying to federal investigators was a criminal offense. After being advised of the above and the identities of the interviewing team, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

b6  
b7CBackground

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] at the time of the interview. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] At the time of the interview,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7CMANAFORT Loans

In making a mortgage decision, the bank would take the average of tax filings for the previous 2 years and the borrower's Profit & Loss statements (P&L), and use the lower of the two values. The P&L, therefore, could only hurt a borrower when acquiring a loan. An exception, therefore would only be to ignore P&L, rather than use P&L to increase lending

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 05/07/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 05/11/2018

by [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] 5/7  
Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] /2018 . On 05/07/2018 . Page 2 of 4

limits. If a customer wanted to use P&L to qualify for a higher loan, he or she would need an audited P&L.

The bank looked at total cumulative loan to determine a borrower's ability to borrow money from them.

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

In 2016, for a cash-out refinance, a borrower would need to show up in-person to sign closing paperwork. A power-of-attorney could sign only with an exception. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

EX PM 2 Email [REDACTED]

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

If mortgage debt was on the tax returns it was required on the REO.

At the time of closing, borrowers sign a final application. The bank relied on the information signed-off by the borrower to be accurate. Underwriters did not revalidate information after a loan closed.

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5104

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] 5/7  
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 05/07/2018, Page 3 of 4

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

EX TR 8 [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

EX PM 5 Email [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

EX PM 4 Email [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

EX PM 8 [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5105

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] 5/7  
Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] /2018 . On 05/07/2018 . Page 4 of 4

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C


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b7C

b6  
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b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5106

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/13/2018

On July 3, 2018, [REDACTED] was interviewed by Special Counsel's Office Prosecutor Uzo Asonye and Forensic Accountant [REDACTED] in advance of trial.

b6  
b7C

Handwritten interview notes are maintained in a 1A envelope.


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Investigation on 07/03/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 12/12/2018

by [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/17/2017b6  
b7C

On August 16, 2017, SSA [redacted] received a telephone call from [redacted] of the Law office of [redacted] [redacted] office phone number [redacted] cellular phone number [redacted] email address [redacted] [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted] represents [redacted] who indicated that he wants to be cooperative with the FBI's investigation, but because [redacted] [redacted] and unavailable [redacted] had not re-contacted the FBI. [redacted] indicated that he would contact Special Counsel attorney Aaron Zelinksy for further information about the investigation before scheduling a meeting with his client who was willing to cooperate.


Investigation on 08/16/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/16/2017

by [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/08/2017b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted] (PROTECT IDENTITY), [redacted]  
[redacted] was contacted at [redacted]  
[redacted] (PROTECT IDENTITY) provided the  
following information:

b6  
b7C  
b7Db6  
b7C  
b7Db6  
b7C  
b7Db6  
b7C  
b7Db6  
b7C  
b7DUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 11/01/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/02/2017by [redacted]b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~


[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]  
(PROTECT IDENTITY)

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_ . On 11/01/2017 . Page 2 of 2

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5113

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/14/2017~~LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE~~

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## DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was contacted on his home telephone in [redacted] He provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]


b3

(U//~~FOUO~~) McFarland's confirmation as U.S. Ambassador to Singapore is still pending and they did not know the reason for the delay. Once she is confirmed, McFarland is supposed to receive multiple State Department briefings before reporting. [redacted] thought much of that would be unnecessary given McFarland's previous position as Deputy National Security Adviser, so they would be able to move fairly quickly.

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]

b6  
b7C~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~Investigation on 11/13/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/13/2017by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7E



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/20/2017

[redacted] was contacted telephonically at [redacted] and provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

In [redacted] opinion, Russian President Vladimir Putin has "bit off more than he can chew" in his government's efforts to interfere in the U.S. election. The Russian administration sought to throw a wrench into the U. S. political process for what it perceived was a slight by the Obama administration in which Russia was not taken seriously.


b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 10/10/2017 at [redacted] (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/19/2017

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/04/2019

On or around August 8, 2018, SA [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED] interviewed NICHOLAS PANUZIO, DOB 10/28/1935 at [REDACTED] St. Michaels, Maryland. Also present was [REDACTED] attorney, [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents, PANUZIO provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

PANUZIO had a background in lobbying and consulting. He had been the mayor of Bridgeport, CT, and knew PAUL MANAFORT's father. PANUZIO was recruited by [REDACTED] and MANAFORT and hired as the managing partner of Black, Manafort & Stone (BMS) on April 1, 1981. PANUZIO was responsible for running the business.

At the time he was hired, PANUZIO did not know anything about FARA. His first exposure to the law was when he was contacted by the FARA unit regarding work performed for the Dominican Republic by BMS lobbyist, [REDACTED]. From then on, PANUZIO filed FARA for BMS's foreign lobbying work.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] filling out FARA forms. When preparing FARA filings, [REDACTED] would go to the relevant partner to gather information she needed for the filing. When [REDACTED] finished her paperwork, she would bring it to PANUZIO for a signature. BMS did not use outside lawyers for FARA. PANUZIO did not feel it necessary to consult an attorney when signing off on the FARA filings. PANUZIO provided a telephone number of [REDACTED].

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] PANUZIO provided telephone numbers [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] was an attorney and a friend of MANAFORT's. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

MANAFORT had a lot of foreign clients.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 08/08/2018 at St. Michaels, Maryland, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 08/08/2018

by [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of NICHOLAS PANUZIO

Continuation of FD-302 of on 8/8/2018

. On 08/08/2018 . Page 2 of 3

MANAFORT left the firm in 1992. PANUZIO did not discuss business with MANAFORT after he left.

PANUZIO left BMS in approximately 1992 and started a business with another individual (NFI). Following that business venture, PANUZIO started a lobbying business in Connecticut [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

PANUZIO's last saw MANAFORT at dinner with MANAFORT and [REDACTED] in May 2016 after [REDACTED]

PANUZIO's last phone contact with MANAFORT was approximately 2 months ago. PANUZIO and MANAFORT did not discuss anything related to MANAFORT's criminal charges.

EX1

PANUZIO did not recall the letter.

PANUZIO recognized the name [REDACTED] did some work with MANAFORT but did not do a lot of foreign work. Since the time of the letter, [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

PANUZIO assumed that BMS amended their registration statement forms.

PANUZIO would not have needed an external legal opinion because he had two lawyers already working for the firm, MANAFORT and [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

PANUZIO may have alerted MANAFORT and [REDACTED] after receiving the letter but was unsure. He also may have given the letter to [REDACTED]

EX2

This document came after the firm had added new partners.

PANUZIO may have brought the letter to the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] because it was financial in nature.

b6  
b7C

PANUZIO did not recall meeting [REDACTED]

Agents pointed out to Panuzio that page 15 of Attachment I to the letter states that the FARA unit met with PANUZIO and [REDACTED] PANUZIO did not recall meeting with the FARA unit. He did not recall STONE and [REDACTED] performing the work described on page 14 of Attachment I of the letter.

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5118

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
Continuation of FD-302 of on 8/8/2018, On 08/08/2018, Page 3 of 3

EX3

--

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/02/2018

Richard (AKA Ricky) Ruben Pinedo Jr. and Jeremy Lessem (Lawyer from Lessem & Newstat LLP) were interviewed at [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent [REDACTED], Prosecutor Lawrence R. Atkinson, and Prosecutor Ryan K. Dickey and the nature of the interview, PINEDO provided the following information:

## BIOGRAPHICAL:

[REDACTED]

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## AUCTION ESSISTANCE:

PINEDO developed an entrepreneurial self employment with PINEDO's company named Auction Essistance (AE). AE was described as a service orientated company to provide virtual bank solutions for e-commerce companies [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] PINEDO described two main types of services: Virtual Bank Account (VBA) [REDACTED]

Investigation on 12/21/2017 at [REDACTED] United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 12/21/2017

by [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Richard (AKA Ricky) Ruben Pinedo Jr. , On 12/21/2017 , Page 2 of 6

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**VIRTUAL BANK ACCOUNT (VBA):**

[REDACTED] PINEDO provided the service of offering VBA (s). The VBA service allowed clients to verify a bank account with an e-commerce entity [REDACTED]. After PINEDO's client received the VBA information, the client would utilize the VBA [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] PINEDO opened several bank accounts in PINEDO's name. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PINEDO provided PINEDO's personal banking information (account number and routing number) to PINEDO's clients to facilitate the VBA service. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Since 2015, PINEDO sought a supplier for bank accounts to continue PINEDO's VBA service and identified two top suppliers. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] PINEDO purchased bank account information from these two suppliers [REDACTED]. PINEDO continued operations with these suppliers: PINEDO's clients completed an online form on auctionessistance.com; PINEDO ordered bank accounts from the suppliers; the suppliers provided banking information; finally PINEDO forwarded this banking information to PINEDO's clients. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PINEDO's service was necessary for PINEDO's clients in order to achieve a "Verified Status" [REDACTED]. PINEDO acknowledged the distribution of fake bank accounts and verification of accounts was wrong. PINEDO instructed PINEDO's clients that the bank information was "Fake Info" through PINEDO's website.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Richard (AKA Ricky) Ruben Pinedo Jr. , On 12/21/2017 , Page 3 of 6

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**REQUESTED DOCUMENTATION:**

PINEDO identified further documentation that would be made available to the author. [REDACTED]

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**RUSSIA:**

PINEDO did not have knowledge any of his clients were from Russia. However, after the FBI visit, PINEDO searched open source information for the email address [REDACTED] and noted that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were customers of AE. These email addresses were identified with [REDACTED] per PINEDO's open source research.

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NEW CUSTOMER ORDER [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Richard (AKA Ricky) Ruben Pinedo Jr. , On 12/21/2017 , Page 4 of 6

[REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED]

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RE: VBA DETAILS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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RE: VBA DETAILS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Richard (AKA Ricky) Ruben Pinedo Jr. , On 12/21/2017 , Page 5 of 6

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b7C

RE: VBA DETAILS

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RE: Order Update

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b7C

RE: Vba

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Richard (AKA Ricky) Ruben Pinedo Jr. , On 12/21/2017 , Page 6 of 6

[REDACTED]

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**AUCTIONESSISTANCE.COM:**

PINEDO created the website auctionessistance.com.

**@AUCTION\_E:**

PINEDO utilized the twitter handle @Auction\_E to advertise AE services.


**FACEBOOK:**

PINEDO utilized a Facebook account with name auctionessistant to advertise AE services.

[REDACTED]

PINEDO maintained a second company identified as [REDACTED] with a domain, Twitter account, and Facebook account.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/11/2017

Richard "Ricky" Pinedo (Pinedo), born [REDACTED]  
Driver's License number: [REDACTED] was interviewed at his residence [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] After being advised of the identities of the  
interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, Pinedo provided the  
following information:

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Pinedo was reminded to be honest and truthful and that lying to the FBI  
was illegal to which he responded in the affirmative. He was also told  
that his interview was entirely voluntary. Pinedo was shown a copy of a  
Wikipedia pertaining to Chris Kyle, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] These documents have been  
placed electronically into a 1A.

Pinedo utilizes the email account [REDACTED] for personal and  
business purposes. He is the only person who has access to this email  
account. He uses a two factor authentication for security purposes.

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Pinedo stated that he is self-employed. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] He owns and operates [REDACTED]  
Auction Assistance.

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Investigation on 12/05/2017 at [REDACTED] United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 12/05/2017

by [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Richard "Ricky" Pinedo, On 12/05/2017, Page 2 of 5

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b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

Pinedo stated that he receives

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Richard "Ricky" Pinedo , On 12/05/2017 , Page 3 of 5

permission from customers to use their personnel information and said it would be a legal issue if he used false information with banking institutions.

SA [REDACTED] stated something to effect of, "You are aware that providing false information to a banking institution is fraud and it is a crime, correct?" to which Pinedo responded, "Yes" and added that you cannot use fake names, and it was against their policy too.

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[REDACTED]

Pinedo responded in the negative whether he had ever used anyone's personal information to set-up online accounts, including bank accounts. Pinedo responded in the negative as to whether he had ever directed anyone to use false documents to set-up any accounts [REDACTED] Pinedo responded in the negative as to whether he or anyone connected with his company had set-up any false bank accounts for the purpose of setting up accounts [REDACTED]

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Pinedo said that he does not know [REDACTED] Pinedo stated that he would have no reason to have her banking information.

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Pinedo said he does not recall an email exchange with Chris Kyle (Kyle) in 2016. Pinedo was shown a picture of Kyle from Wikipedia and was told that Kyle was deceased which prompted Pinedo to state that he recognized the picture and recalled researching Kyle on the internet. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Pinedo knew that [REDACTED] was from a foreign country because he used Internet Protocol (IP) tracing software to see from where [REDACTED] was



Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Richard "Ricky" Pinedo , On 12/05/2017 , Page 4 of 5

emailing and sending IM messages.

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Pinedo stated that he does not deal with customers from Russia.

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b7C


Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Richard "Ricky" Pinedo , On 12/05/2017 , Page 5 of 5

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b7C

Pinedo agreed to cooperate with the FBI and admitted that he lied about the bank account that he provided to [REDACTED] Pinedo read and signed an FD-1086, Consent to Assume Online Identity Authorization Form. Pinedo also read and signed an FD-941, Consent to Search Computer(s). Pinedo was asked to take his time in reading the forms and asked if he had any questions regarding them. Pinedo stated that he did not have any questions.

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Pinedo was not promised any specific benefit in return for his information or any cooperation that he provided in the interview. The FBI has not provided him any benefit in return for his statements and cooperation.



b7E

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/12/2017

On June 8, 2017, [redacted] social security number [redacted] date of birth [redacted] home address [redacted] [redacted] Virginia, was interviewed at her residence. Also present during the interview was [redacted] Department of Justice Senior Financial Investigator. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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Upon being advised of the nature of the interview, [redacted] asked if [redacted] [redacted] could sit in on the interview, which he did.

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[redacted] first met Paul Manafort (Manafort) during [redacted] [redacted] Black, Manafort, Stone, and Atwater (BMSA). [redacted] worked as [redacted]

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[redacted] [redacted] an acquaintance of Manafort. [redacted]

b6

b7C

In approximately [redacted] [redacted] Davis, Manafort, Stone, and Freedman (DMSF). One of the primary projects DMSF worked on at the time was Senator Dole's presidential campaign. Not long after, Stone left the firm [redacted] [redacted] at DMSF,

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Investigation on 06/08/2017 at [redacted] Virginia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 06/09/2017

by [redacted]

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b7C  
b7EContinuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 06/08/2017 . Page 2 of 3

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] which ultimately became Davis Manafort (DM). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] to name a  
few. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED] did not have any knowledge of any bank accounts held in  
Cypress. [REDACTED] assumed Manafort or Gates would have overseas accounts  
since they traveled for work internationally quite a bit. Manafort  
traveled quite a bit when he worked on the campaign in Ukraine. During  
the campaign in Ukraine, Manafort hired a few people to work with him in  
Ukraine. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
In approximately 2012, Manafort and [REDACTED] went their separate ways, and  
the office was closed. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[REDACTED] had never heard of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5132

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7EContinuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 06/08/2017 . Page 3 of 3b6  
b7C


[REDACTED] has not had contact with Manafort [REDACTED]

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b7Cb6  
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At the conclusion of the interview, [REDACTED] asked if the investigation into Manafort was a "witchhunt". The writer advised [REDACTED] FBI Agents gather evidence, and are only interested in seeking the truth and are impartial.

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5133



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/07/2018

(U) On 02/05/2018 Special Agent [redacted] interviewed PETE LANDRUM via telephone for the purposes of establishing an in-person interview. SA [redacted] called [redacted] and left a voicemail identifying himself and requesting that LANDRUM return his call referencing setting up a time for an interview.


(U) On 02/05/2018 at about 3:30 PM LANDRUM returned SA [redacted] voicemail. LANDRUM asked if the interview was related to his time working at the Senate for Senator Sessions. SA [redacted] told him it was, and specifically relating to the September 8th meeting. LANDRUM said that was the meeting with the Russian Ambassador, and agreed to the interview. LANDRUM would contact the Senate to see if he had any requirements with them related to the interview. LANDRUM said he would call SA [redacted] back after hearing from the Senate.

Investigation on 02/05/2018 at District of Columbia, Washington, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/05/2018

by [redacted]

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



Date of entry 01/29/2018

(U) On 01/13/2018 Special Agent [redacted] called [redacted]

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(U) [redacted]

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(U) [redacted]

b6  
b7C


(U) [redacted] agreed to continue the conversation in the following week.

Investigation on 01/13/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 01/18/2018

by [redacted]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/05/2018

[redacted] was interviewed by  
FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg  
Andres at [redacted]

[redacted] Present during the interview were  
counsel for [redacted] After being advised  
of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the  
interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

Background

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Loan-To-Value (LTV)

Loan-to-value (LTV) represents the amount of the loan requested versus the value of the collateral, or property. The maximum LTV allowed for a loan is dependent on a few factors, to include the type of loan. For example, an investment property transaction has a maximum LTV of 65% while an initial purchase of a primary residence can have an LTV up to 90%. Fixed rate loans allow for higher LTVs than adjustable rate (ARM) or

Investigation on 11/17/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/18/2017

by [redacted]

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b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C  
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 11/17/2017 , Page 2 of 9

interest only loans. The loan amount also affects the LTV allowed. The higher the loan amount requested, the lower the LTV allowed. For example, the initial purchase of a primary residence requiring a loan amount over \$3 million has a maximum LTV of 70%.

The higher the risk, the lower the LTV. Investment properties are more risky than primary residences, as such, investment properties have lower maximum LTVs. [REDACTED] believed this was because the borrower is dependent on renters to pay their mortgage. In addition, borrowers are more likely to default on an investment property loan than on a mortgage against their primary residence.

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LTV thresholds are subject to exceptions if there are mitigating factors. Exceptions within 5% of the LTV thresholds are not uncommon.

#### Debt-To-Income (DTI)

Debt-to-income consists of two different ratios. The first is the amount of the borrower's mortgage/housing cost on the subject loan versus the borrower's income. The second is all of the borrower's debt versus the borrower's income.

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b7Cb6  
b7C

DTI is material to the underwriting decision as it determines whether the borrower can afford the mortgage payments.

For a \$3 million loan, the maximum DTI allowed is 30%. If the loan is less than \$3 million, DTI can increase to a maximum of 45%.

#### Real Estate Owned (REO)

Borrowers are required to provide a schedule of real estate owned. The purpose of this is to see any additional debt the borrower is responsible for, such as mortgages, property taxes and insurance on other properties. This debt factors into the borrower's DTI and is therefore material to the loan.

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview . On 11/17/2017 . Page 3 of 9

Usually, a borrower's other mortgages appear on the borrower's credit report, but sometimes they do not. If a property is owned free and clear, it is still relevant to the underwriting decision as there are costs associated with the property, such as insurance, taxes and homeowners association dues.

The bank requests homeowners insurance certificates for all properties owned by the borrower. These certificates show mortgagee information as well as what the borrower pays in insurance on the property.

#### Credit Report

runs credit reports on their borrowers. the credit report to see the borrower's payment history, how extended the borrower is, if there are any derogatory items such as late payments, and to look at any other debt obligations the borrower may have.

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Additionally, recent inquiries on a borrower's credit report may be an indication they are acquiring new debt. As a condition of the loan, requires borrowers to verify they have not acquired any new debt as a result of recent inquiries on their credit report. Again, this affects DTI and is therefore material to the loan.

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In addition, it takes approximately 30 days for new debt to show up on credit reports or MERS.

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#### Use of Proceeds

Any cash-out refinance transaction which involves more than \$500,000 cash out to the borrower requires a letter of explanation as to the use of proceeds. In general, cash out in excess of \$500,000 is not permitted by the bank without an exception.

The reason the bank asks for a use of proceeds explanation is ensure the borrower is not using the funds to obtain new debt. For example, if the borrower was using the cash out to put a down payment on another property, that would need to be included in the debt obligations.

#### Occupancy

The use of the property is material to the bank because it determines risk. As described above, primary residences are less risky than

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

(U)

Interview

. On 11/17/2017 . Page 4 of 9

investment properties. As such, loans on investment properties have higher interest rates, have lower LTVs and require higher DTIs.

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7CBorrower Information

The bank relies on the accuracy and completeness of information provided by the borrower. When the borrower signs various documents related to the loan, to include the 1003 Loan Application and various disclosure, they are attesting to the truthfulness and completeness of the information provided.

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The underwriter reviews the documentation and then sets conditions needed for the loan to close. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Conditions must be cleared for the loan to close. The information and/or documentation requested in those conditions are material to the loans closing.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview , On 11/17/2017 , Page 5 of 9

Paul Manafort

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

b6  
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Document 1

[REDACTED] was shown an email thread dated [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

b6  
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[REDACTED]

b6  
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[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview , On 11/17/2017 , Page 6 of 9

[redacted]

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[redacted]

b6  
b7CDocument 2

[redacted] was shown [redacted] for Manafort.

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b7C

[redacted]

b6  
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[redacted]

b6  
b7CDocument 15

[redacted] was shown [redacted]  
[redacted]

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[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7CDocument 3

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview [REDACTED] . On 11/17/2017 . Page 7 of 9

[REDACTED] was shown and email [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]b6  
b7CDocument 4[REDACTED] was shown an email [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

Only properties owned by the borrower and for which the borrower is responsible are included in the borrower's debt. If the property is owned by a business and the borrower is not personally responsible for the costs associated with that property, then it is not included in the borrower's debt.

Document 5[REDACTED] was shown an email [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]b6  
b7Cb6  
b7CDocument 6[REDACTED] was asked about an email [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 11/17/2017 . Page 8 of 9

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

Document 8

[redacted] was shown an email [redacted]  
[redacted]

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b6  
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Other

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 11/17/2017 , Page 9 of 9

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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
[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/30/2018

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres. Present during the interview were [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7CBackground

[redacted]

b6  
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[redacted] worked at [redacted] prior to being hired by Banc of California (BOC) in [redacted] [redacted] left BOC in [redacted] and currently works for [redacted] [redacted] Throughout this time, [redacted] role has been [redacted] [redacted] title at BOC was [redacted]

b6  
b7CBOC Loan Process

At BOC, loans are originated by Relationship Managers. Relationship Managers forward potential loans to the Portfolio Group Manager, who assigns it to a Portfolio Manager for pre-screening.

Usually, the Relationship Manager forwards some basic financial information such as a Personal Financial Statement (PFS) and tax returns along with a summary of the loan scenario. The Portfolio Manager then requests additional documentation and information needed to underwrite the loan. This process typically involves multiple follow up requests which are relayed to the borrower through the Relationship Manager. At times, the Portfolio Manager communicates directly with the borrower.

Once all of the documentation and information is received, the Portfolio Manager summarizes everything for the Portfolio Group Manager, Credit Administrator and President of Private Banking for review and

Investigation on 12/07/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/11/2017

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 12/07/2017 . Page 2 of 11

approval. If the loan amount exceeds \$5 million, it has to go to the Chief Credit Officer for final review and approval.

The Portfolio Manager meets with the Portfolio Group Manager and the Credit Administrator to review information acquired during underwriting. If the Portfolio Group Manager and the Credit Administrator approve the loan to move forward, the Portfolio Manager writes up all of the facts and terms into a Credit Approval Memorandum (CAM). The Portfolio Manager does not approve or deny loans.

During the time that [redacted] worked at BOC, [redacted]

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At BOC, [redacted]

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[redacted] Unsecured loans are loans which are not secured by any specific collateral and thereby require personal guarantors.

#### DSC

Debt Service Coverage (DSC) is the ratio between a borrower's global cash flow, or income, and the borrower's global debt. DSC is a relevant factor in the underwriting process because it is the way the bank determines if a borrower can afford to make payments on the loan. BOC looked at the borrower's cash flow extended over a 5 year period.

At BOC, a DSC of 1.25X - 1.5X the loan amount, or better was standard. This threshold can vary depending on aggravating or mitigating circumstances. [redacted] gave the example of an exception being granted for a borrower who had a large amount of liquid assets or a very high net worth. In such a circumstance, the DSC required could be less than 1.25 X. [redacted] are the only people who can authorize a variance from the 1.25X DSC threshold. [redacted] believed he had seen loans approved where the borrower only had a DSC of 1.0X, but that borrower had a lot of liquidity.

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In an unsecured loan, the borrower's income was generally a primary source of repayment and therefore very important to the bank's decision of whether to lend.

Income is determined by looking at the borrower's tax returns, distributions from business entities and profit loss statements (P&Ls) for

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview . On 12/07/2017 . Page 3 of 11

years in which tax returns had not yet been filed. If the borrower is self employed and their income is derived primarily from their business, their business' financials may also be reviewed.

Debt is determined by looking at mortgages, unsecured loans, credit card debt, car payments and other debt obligations the borrower has. [REDACTED] would know about the borrower's debt by looking at the Personal Financial Statement (PFS) and the borrower's credit report. The borrower was required to disclose any and all debt on their PFS. BOC relied on the borrower to accurately and completely disclose debts and income to the bank.

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In the case of the loan for Paul Manafort and [REDACTED] the proceeds were going to be used to pay for soft costs and improvements on properties they were developing. Manafort and [REDACTED]

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#### REO

BOC required borrowers to submit a schedule of real estate owned (REO) when applying for a loan. The purpose of the REO was so the bank could see what equity the borrower had in real estate assets and whether or not those assets could be used a secondary source of repayment on the loan. In addition, the bank looked at the REO to determine what other debt obligations the borrower had as it related to other properties.

The borrower's debt obligations on REO was a relevant factor in determining the borrower's DSC and therefore their ability to repay the loan. BOC relied on the borrower to provide an accurate and complete account of their REO.

#### Credit Report

[REDACTED] looked at the borrower's credit report to see what debt obligations the borrower had, how leveraged they were, what their credit and payment history looked like and what types of debt they had. [REDACTED] considered it a red flag when a borrower had a lot of unsecured debt because this was an indication of the borrower being too leveraged.

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#### Use of Proceeds

Borrowers are required to provide BOC an explanation as to how the proceeds of the loan will be used. BOC required this to understand the risk associated with the borrower. For example, if a borrower was going

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 12/07/2017 . Page 4 of 11

to use the proceeds to pay off other debt, that would be risky because they were just trading one debt for another and not generating income or adding to their net worth. This was an indication of a leveraged borrower in perpetual debt. BOC wanted to see the proceeds going toward something that was going to be profitable.

[redacted] was not aware of any prohibited uses for loan proceeds. That said, BOC may deny a loan because of the way the borrower intended to use the proceeds. [redacted] gave the example of BOC potentially denying a loan if they knew the borrower was using the proceeds to pay off other debt.

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BOC relied on the borrower to accurately disclose their intended use of proceeds.

Manafort and [redacted] told BOC they were going to use the loan proceeds to pay for soft costs related to the development of real estate. This explanation was relevant to the bank because the real estate development business was a source of future cash flow and net worth for Manafort and [redacted]. Had BOC known Manafort and [redacted] were using the loan proceeds for living expenses or to pay off other debts, that may have had a bearing on whether the loan was approved. [redacted] was unable to say for sure if, or how it would have changed the loan.

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Had [redacted] known that Manafort and/or [redacted] misrepresented their use of proceeds explanation, that would go to the truthfulness and honesty of the borrower. [redacted] would have brought such a misrepresentation up to his boss, [redacted] immediately. [redacted] had never known a borrower misrepresented such a thing before and couldn't say for sure how it would have affected the loan.

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[redacted] stated that errors were different than intentionally false misrepresentations. [redacted] gave the example of when borrowers overestimated the value of properties they owned. This was not that important to BOC, because BOC performed their own analysis of the properties values and did not rely on the borrower's estimated values.

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#### Manafort [redacted] Loan

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[redacted] believed the Manafort [redacted] loan came to BOC through a [redacted] named [redacted] who referred the loan to [redacted]. The use of [redacted] to generate business was not abnormal for [redacted] but it was atypical for BOC in general. [redacted] had come to BOC from [redacted] and had [redacted] from his previous employment.

Manafort and [redacted] initial loan scenario was for a [redacted] unsecured line of credit for the purpose of investing in soft costs related to real

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 12/07/2017 . Page 5 of 11

estate development projects [redacted] was assigned as the Portfolio Manager for this loan.

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[redacted] could not recall how the loan dropped from the initial [redacted] to [redacted] but he believed [redacted] was not comfortable with a [redacted] unsecured line of credit to new customers. [redacted] vaguely recalled a conversation with [redacted] in which [redacted] said he wanted to take the new relationship slow. [redacted] also noted that Manafort and [redacted] cash flow would not have supported a [redacted] loan.

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[redacted] met with [redacted] and Manafort to discuss the purpose and terms of the loan. [redacted] was at the meeting in person and Manafort attended over the phone. [redacted] did most of the talking during the meeting. [redacted] described what he and Manafort were doing with the properties [redacted] and why they wanted the line of credit. [redacted] provided information on [redacted]

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[redacted] did not recall Manafort saying much, if anything during this meeting. Manafort was there to be financial backer for [redacted] and to personally guarantee the loan. Manafort had an ownership interest in the properties being developed.

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[redacted] knew Manafort was a political consultant from looking at his tax returns, PFS and from open source searches, like Google, he had done on Manafort. [redacted] did not know much about DMP International, other than it was Manafort's consulting business per P&L Manafort supplied.

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After the first meeting described above, [redacted] had a subsequent meeting with Manafort and [redacted] in person. This meeting occurred sometime in late 2016 or early 2017 and the purpose was to discuss why the properties had not been developed, the upcoming maturity of the loan and the avenue for repayment. The meeting took place at BOC's offices in Century City, California. [redacted] were there on behalf of BOC.

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The meeting was requested by the bank because the line of credit had been fully drawn upon, no principal payments had been made and [redacted] and Manafort had been non-responsive to requests for updated information on the development of the properties and their financials. Manafort and [redacted] were required to provide quarterly updated financials to ensure they were abiding by the financial covenants of the loan, to include maintaining a [redacted] liquidity. If a borrower does not abide by the financial covenants, it is technically a default of the loan. Generally, this results in the bank getting a waiver of the default and trying to restructure the loan with some kind of collateral as security.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 12/07/2017 . Page 6 of 11

At the meeting, [redacted] asked for an update on Manafort and [redacted] business plan. Again, [redacted] did most of the talking during this meeting. [redacted] said they were still developing the properties, they were just moving more slowly than originally planned. Manafort backed up what [redacted] was saying during the meeting. Neither [redacted] nor Manafort disclosed [redacted]

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[redacted] found out about [redacted] when he spoke with [redacted] was trying to get information from Manafort when Manafort directed him to [redacted] Manafort said [redacted] was [redacted] for [redacted] and could answer [redacted] questions.

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[redacted] was not sure when he spoke with [redacted] but he believed it was sometime in early 2017 after his meeting with [redacted] and Manafort. [redacted] was not 100% sure his conversation with [redacted] was after his meeting with [redacted] and Manafort.

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Had BOC learned [redacted] they likely would have "downgraded" the loan and not agreed to extend it past the maturity date. The bank would have exercised the personal guarantees and required Manafort and [redacted] to personally repay the loan. [redacted] stated it would have been a problem "for sure".

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#### PFS

[redacted] was shown the PFS submitted to BOC for Manafort. [redacted] stated he relied on this document while underwriting the loan. The purpose of the document was for the borrower to provide BOC with information on their income, assets, liabilities and net worth. The reason the borrower was required to sign the document was to attest to the accuracy of the information contained therein and to authorize BOC to pull their credit report.

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In the section "Liabilities", Manafort was required to disclose all of his debt obligations.

In the section "Schedule of Expenses", Manafort was required to break down his expenses such as carrying costs for properties. [redacted] stated this some of this information can also be obtained from looking at a borrower's credit report or tax returns. However, if the property is held in the name of an LLC, it might not be on the borrower's tax returns and

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 12/07/2017 . Page 7 of 11

BOC would not likely have looked at tax returns for every entity owned by Manafort. If Manafort was personally responsible for the debt, he was expected to list it on the PFS.

In the section "Contingent Liabilities", Manafort was required to list any other loans for which he was a guarantor.

In the section "Partnerships, LLCs & Businesses Owned", Manafort was required to list any entities of which he was at least a 20% owner.

In the section "Other Debts", Manafort was required to disclose any other debts that weren't already listed elsewhere on the PFS. Often listed here are car payments, credit card debt or margin debt.

The reason BOC required the information listed above was so they could accurately know the borrower's DSC, net worth and liquidity.

#### DMP 2015 P&L

[redacted] explained that Manafort's business' 2015 P&L was requested because the tax returns for that year had not yet been filed. [redacted] needed to look at the P&L to determine the profitability of DMP and to understand Manafort's distribution income for 2015.

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Had [redacted] known the P&L, showing over \$4.4 million in income for 2015 was incorrect and the real income was closer to \$400,000, he would have immediately told [redacted] that Manafort did not have sufficient cash flow to sustain the loan. [redacted] stated, "the loan wouldn't have worked" because the "debt service coverage wouldn't have made sense". [redacted] stated Manafort would not have been able to afford the loan given that his income was from DMP.

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Had [redacted] known that Manafort, or others on Manafort's behalf, falsified the P&L, he would have notified [redacted] that Manafort submitted a materially false income statement and he would have recommended the loan for denial. This would have been a "big problem" for [redacted] as he was relying on Manafort's honesty.

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[redacted] had never found out a borrower submitted a materially false document for a loan. [redacted] considered this fraud. [redacted] had never filed a suspicious activity report (SAR) before, but he believed a SAR would likely have been filed in this matter. [redacted] was not sure what BOC's process was for elevating fraud matters.

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#### Request for Other Loans

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 12/07/2017 . Page 8 of 11

[redacted] was shown an email from him to [redacted] dated March 23, 2016 in which he requested a "list of current loans against liquidity..." for Manafort.

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[redacted] recalled asking for liquidity statements for Manafort and [redacted] and possibly [redacted] also asked for a list of any loans against their liquidity. [redacted] knew about a margin loan that Manafort had against his brokerage account already. [redacted] expected Manafort to respond with any other loans against his liquidity as these factored into Manafort's DSC.

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Had [redacted] known that Manafort did not disclose all loans against his liquidity, he would have recommended BOC not pursue the loan because Manafort was being dishonest.

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#### Bridgehampton

[redacted] was shown an email from [redacted] dated May 3, 2016. [redacted] stated that [redacted] was his [redacted]

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[redacted] recalled this issue occurred while he was [redacted] recalled the issue related to Manafort not wanting [redacted] to be a guarantor on the loan. However, [redacted]

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[redacted] In order for Manafort to use all of the DMP International income and the full amount in his liquid accounts, BOC needed [redacted] did not know why Manafort did not agree to this.

As a result of this issue, the amount of the loan was reduced from [redacted] to [redacted]

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With regards to [redacted] statement about Manafort misrepresenting his ownership of the property in Bridgehampton, [redacted] recalled that [redacted] Manafort had listed the property on his REO in his PFS, but he should not have listed it because he did not own it. [redacted] was not sure what [redacted] meant in the email when he wrote, "Explanation as to the misrepresentation was unsatisfactory to me."

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#### Manafort's Liquidity

[redacted] was shown an email from [redacted] dated May 4, 2016. [redacted] was directed to the portions of [redacted] email which read, "The liquidity is

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview , On 12/07/2017 , Page 9 of 11

somewhat volatile as it is net, margined liquidity at over 50% margin and subject to the equities market performance" and "Excluding the SFR would materially weaken Paul Manafort's guaranty to the point that I would not feel comfortable recommending the [redacted] unsecured RLOC for approval at this time."

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[redacted] stated that [redacted] did not think Manafort's financials supported a [redacted] loan. [redacted] assumed that [redacted] reference to volatile liquidity related to the fact that Manafort's liquid assets were mostly in a brokerage account which was subject to the stock market's volatility and which was margined by a line a of credit.

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b7CCAM

[redacted] was shown the Credit Approval Memorandum (CAM) for the Manafort [redacted] loan. [redacted] stated he created the original CAM for the loan when it was at [redacted]. When the loan amount was reduced to [redacted] [redacted] so the [redacted] had to revise the CAM. [redacted] stated this was the revised version prepared by [redacted] had seen and reviewed this document before and the bulk of its content was pulled from [redacted] previous CAM.

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The CAM would be sent to [redacted] and then [redacted] for approval.

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The "Financial Covenants" section contained various metrics Manafort and [redacted] were required to maintain for the life of the loan.

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The "Source of Repayment" section listed the primary, secondary and tertiary sources of repayment given what was represented from Manafort and [redacted]. Specifically, Manafort and [redacted] indicated the funds would be used to further their real estate development projects [redacted]. That was deemed the primary source of repayment. The secondary source of repayment was Manafort's personal income from his business, DMP International. The 2015 P&L was relied upon to determine Manafort's ability to repay this loan. The tertiary source of repayment was Manafort's liquid assets.

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The "Guarantor Analysis" section for Manafort referred to "verified income from Manafort's consulting company". The information relied upon for this was the DMP International tax returns and P&L. [redacted] noted that [redacted] listed DMP International's 2015 income as [redacted] which was a miscalculation. [redacted] believed [redacted] divided the income in half after [redacted] had already divided it in half on the previous CAM.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 12/07/2017 . Page 10 of 11

[redacted] stated that DMP International's 2014 income was down from the previous year, but the average cash flow from 2013-2015 was taken. [redacted] stated that income can be volatile from year to year so the fact that DMP International's income was low in 2014 was not that important.

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b7CHandwritten PFS

[redacted] was shown a copy of Manafort's signed PFS which also had handwriting on it. [redacted] stated the handwriting was his.

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[redacted] was directed to the "Assets" section where he wrote, "Incl. In RE schedule - "as completed" values of several SFRs not currently owned."

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[redacted] stated Manafort's REO contained [redacted] Manafort and [redacted]. During [redacted] due diligence process, he realized [redacted] by Manafort or [redacted] and should not be included in the PFS. [redacted] did not speak with Manafort about this. [redacted] did bring the issue up to [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] were removed from Manafort's PFS.

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[redacted] explained that he learned [redacted] [redacted] during searches on the internet.

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[redacted] was directed to the question, "Are you a co-borrower or guarantor on a loan?" next to which he wrote, "Guarantees MC Brooklyn Loans - \$5.3 MM".

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[redacted] stated he learned about Manafort's personal guaranty on loans given to MC Brooklyn Holdings. Manafort should have disclosed this on his PFS. [redacted] did not know if this was an oversight by Manafort or intentionally omitted. [redacted] did not recall how he learned about the loans or Manafort's guaranty. [redacted] speculated it was while he was conducting property searches on the internet, but he was not sure.

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[redacted] did not know why Manafort did not disclose these loans on his REO. [redacted] did not recall being concerned about this lack of disclosure at the time he was underwriting the loan. [redacted] thought it could have been an oversight by Manafort.

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[redacted] was asked why Manafort listed other mortgage loans on his REO, but not these. [redacted] did not know. [redacted] agreed that these loans should have been listed.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 12/07/2017 . Page 11 of 11

[redacted] was asked why a borrower would not disclose additional mortgage debt. [redacted] stated borrowers would overstate their assets and understate liabilities so as to look more attractive to the bank. [redacted] also thought the borrower may be trying to hide a problem with the loan.


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Looking at the CAM, the [redacted] loan was not factored into Manafort's DSC. [redacted] did not know why. [redacted] stated it should have been included and it would have negatively affected Manafort's DSC. [redacted] speculated he was told the loan was being paid by someone else, but he could not recall for sure.

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b7CCurrent Status

When [redacted] left BOC, he was trying to work with Manafort and [redacted] to pay down a portion of the loan's principal. [redacted] was trying to reduce the bank's exposure to loss. The loan matured in May 2017 [redacted] [redacted] did not know where the loan stood now.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/07/2018

[redacted] previously identified, was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres. Present during the interview were counsel for [redacted] [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] has never testified before. [redacted] has never been arrested.

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[redacted] met Paul Manafort approximately two times in person and believed he would recognize Manafort if he saw him.

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b7CBanc of California Document Maintenance

Banc of California (BOC) maintained loan files on a shared drive folder. Generally, email communication was not saved in the loan file, but attachments transmitted to the bank via email would be saved in the loan file. The loan documents usually came from the Relationship Manager. [redacted] was the Relationship Manager for the [redacted] [redacted] If [redacted] did not forward documents or information he received, [redacted] would likely not have any way of knowing it.

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b7CPersonal Financial Statement/Loan Application

Personal Financial Statement and Loan Applications (PFS) are sometimes revised by borrowers to complete and/or correct information, but not always. Sometimes, the complete and/or correct information is handwritten on the original PFS by [redacted] when learned.

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When [redacted] worked at BOC, he was able to run property profiles through Stewart Title. [redacted] recalled running many of the properties listed on Manafort and [redacted] PFS's through Stewart Title so he

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Investigation on 06/06/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 06/06/2018

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 06/06/2018 . Page 2 of 4

could understand who/what entity owned the properties and whether the properties were encumbered. Through this process, [redacted] learned some of the properties listed on Manafort's PFS were not actually owned by him. [redacted] could not recall if this was how he learned about the mortgage against 377 Union St., Brooklyn, New York. [redacted] thought it was likely that he learned about that mortgage through his title searches, but he had no independent recollection of that.

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If Manafort owned a property that was not listed on the PFS, [redacted] would not know to run it and therefore would not know if it had a mortgage.

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Manafort's Schedule of Real Estate (REO) was not completed correctly. In addition to listing properties he did not yet own, Manafort also listed "market value" as the future completed value of potential renovation projects. [redacted] assumed Manafort did not understand the purpose of the REO, which was for currently owned properties and their current values.

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#### DMP 2015 P&L

[redacted] asked for the DMP 2015 P&L. When reviewing this document, [redacted] looked at member distributions, but the main item he looked for was net income of the company. [redacted] used the net income of DMP to understand Manafort's income since Manafort and [redacted] were the only owners of the company.

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If the distribution amount to Manafort had been higher than the net income of DMP, [redacted] would have questioned how the company was able to distribute more than they made. It was possible distributions were taken from cash reserves, but that was not a sustainable source of income and it would have made [redacted] question Manafort's income.

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DMP's 2015 tax returns had not yet been filed so [redacted] could not compare the P&L to the tax returns. [redacted] accepted the representations of income on the P&L at face value.

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The P&L indicated it was prepared on an "income tax basis". This meant the numbers on the P&L would correlate with the tax returns. It also meant the income listed on the P&L was already earned and received by December 31, 2015.

#### Credit Approval Memo (CAM)

The section for "Mission Rating" was for marketing purposes. A mission rating of 6 was on the low side.

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview . On 06/06/2018 . Page 3 of 4

The [REDACTED] loan was attributed a risk rating of [REDACTED]. A risk rating of 5 was standard for unsecured loans which have a strong guarantor. A risk rating higher than 5 would have required additional approvals.

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Manafort's guaranty was "essential" to BOC's decision to extend the loan to [REDACTED] was a speculative business and required a strong financial guarantor. [REDACTED] underwrote this loan exclusively using Manafort's financial wherewithal as [REDACTED]

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In the Manafort cash flow analysis section of the CAM, in the 2015 column, a figure of [REDACTED] was used for Manafort's income. [REDACTED] stated that number should have been [REDACTED] based upon the 2015 P&L provided by Manafort. [REDACTED] was not sure why [REDACTED] was used as he was [REDACTED] when this CAM was revised by [REDACTED]

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The cash flow analysis previously prepared by [REDACTED] likely used [REDACTED] [REDACTED] assumed [REDACTED] thought [REDACTED] was the total income to DMP and since Manafort only owned half of the company, she divided it in half.

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Had the [REDACTED] figure actually been [REDACTED] or half of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] it would have resulted in a major discrepancy and the debt service coverage (DSC) would have been less than zero.

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[REDACTED] but he would not have recommended this loan for approval if the 2015 DSC was less than zero. Despite the fact that tax returns showed 2012 and 2013 as strong years for DMP's income, [REDACTED] would have given the most weight to more recent years. In addition, Manafort's liquidity was around [REDACTED] [REDACTED] This amount would not have been enough to mitigate the lack of cash flow from income as Manafort's expenses were high.

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#### PFS with Handwriting (BOC0007394-7400)

[REDACTED] was not aware of Manafort resubmitting a revised PFS. The handwriting on this copy of the original PFS was [REDACTED]

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#### Loan Documents

The Building Loan Agreement and Guaranty documents are mostly boiler plate language except the Financial Covenants sections which are drawn from the CAM.

#### Other

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview . On 06/06/2018 . Page 4 of 4

After the [redacted] loan closed, [redacted] requested updated financial information from Manafort and [redacted] multiple times in accordance with the financial covenants requirement. It was very difficult to get any information, but [redacted] may have received minimal response to his requests.

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[redacted] is an internal credit reviewer at BOC. [redacted] questioned why income and expenses were divided in half for Manafort since [redacted] [redacted] was not a signor on the loan. [redacted] wasn't sure why expenses were also cut in half.

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[redacted]  
[redacted] was aware of a [redacted] had at [redacted]  
[redacted] learned of this after the [redacted] loan had been extended. [redacted] knew [redacted] amount was substantial, but he did not know how much. [redacted] never spoke with [redacted] about this. The fact that [redacted] had a substantial [redacted] was relevant to the loan. [redacted] believed [redacted] provided some explanation as to the reason for [redacted] [redacted] but he could not recall what that explanation was.

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[redacted] was not aware of a personal relationship between [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] was not aware of [redacted] participation in any scheme with [redacted]


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[redacted]  
BOC

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[redacted] was aware of issues BOC's CEO had with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). [redacted] believed BOC's CEO had made a misstatement in a press release, but he did not recall any other details. [redacted] also thought BOC was sued by a former employee for wrongful termination.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/09/2018

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Andrew Weissmann. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted]  
[redacted] In [redacted] BMSK merged with Gold & Liebengood to form BKSH & Associates. [redacted] heard that Manafort and [redacted] were asked to leave after the merger.

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[redacted]  
the Kashmiri American Council (KAC). The KAC were members of the Kashmiri diaspora in the U.S. that sought self-determination for the people in Kashmir. BMSK intensely lobbied Congress, the media and the Administration on behalf of the KAC. When BMSK split, the KAC went with Manafort to his new firm. In 2012, the KAC's director, Syed Fai was convicted of violating FARA. [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] did not know that the Pakistani government funded the KAC. [redacted] does not know if Manafort knew about the funding but Manafort had a lot of interaction with officials in the Pakistani government. Manafort met them at the embassy in the U.S. and over in Pakistan. [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]  
[redacted] A person may not want to file under FARA because (1) it is a cumbersome process; (2) you must

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 07/20/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 07/26/2018

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E



[REDACTED]  
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~[REDACTED]  
(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]


Continuation of FD-302 of 07.20.2018 . On 07/20/2018 . Page 2 of 2

disclose your finances and contacts; and (3) identifying that you are paid by a client undercuts your credibility and authenticity.

[REDACTED] Manafort did not report his activities to [REDACTED] did not know about BMSK's financials.

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5174



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/05/2017

On December 5, 2017, pursuant to an attorney proffer, [Redacted]  
[Redacted] serving as outside counsel to  
AT&T INC. (AT&T), provided information via telephone to Assistant Special  
Counsel (ASC) Andrew Goldstein of the Special Counsel's Office. [Redacted]  
[Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

On November 29, 2017, MICHAEL COHEN [Redacted]  
[Redacted] had a meeting at AT&T's offices in Washington, DC. [Redacted]  
[Redacted] summarized the contents of the meeting and ASC Goldstein took notes,  
which are being included in the attached 1A envelope.


b6  
b7C

Investigation on 12/05/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/05/2017

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/18/2018

(U) On 10/05/2018 Special Agent (SA) [redacted] called [redacted] at [redacted] SA [redacted] identified himself and asked if [redacted] was available for an interview in the afternoon of 10/05/2018. [redacted] stated he was not available and requested SA [redacted] write an email to him identifying the purpose of the interview. SA [redacted] asked if it was acceptable to send an email from the fbi.gov address as proof of SA [redacted] identity and then to discuss the purpose of the interview over the phone. [redacted] stated he did not want to discuss it over the phone and wanted it in writing.

b6  
b7C

(U) On 10/05/2018 SA [redacted] emailed [redacted] per [redacted] request. SA [redacted] emailed [redacted] and [redacted] The email to [redacted] returned undeliverable.

b6  
b7C

(U) On 10/05/2018 [redacted] responded from the [redacted] to SA [redacted] with the attached email.

b6  
b7C

(U) On 10/05/2018 SA [redacted] called [redacted] who provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

(U) [redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

(U) [redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

(U) On 10/05/2018 SA [redacted] called [redacted] who provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 10/05/2018 at [redacted] United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/05/2018

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Telephone Interview of [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 10/05/2018, Page 2 of 2

(U) [REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

(U) [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C


(U) [REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

(U) On 10/05/2018 [REDACTED] emailed SA [REDACTED] with the attached response to questions.

b6  
b7C

(U) On 10/06/2018 and 10/09/2018 [REDACTED] emailed SA [REDACTED] the attached emails [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/08/2017

## FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On Monday, July 31, 2017, [redacted] business partners/owners of [redacted] were interviewed at their place of business located at [redacted] telephone number [redacted]. Present for the interview were Senior Financial Investigator (SFI) [redacted] Office of the Special Counsel, and Special Agent [redacted] Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation - Office of the Inspector General. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing SFI and Agent and the nature of the interview, the following information was furnished:

b3  
b6  
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According to [redacted]

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b6  
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A Federal Grand Jury subpoena for [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted] A copy of the subpoena and Proof of Service have been attached for the file.

Note: Approximately one hour after leaving [redacted] office, [redacted] telephoned SA [redacted] to advise he was in the office and available to talk. [redacted] interview will memorialized in a separate FD-302.

b3  
b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 07/31/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/03/2017

by [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~


[REDACTED]

(U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] - July 31, 2017 . On 07/31/2017 . Page 2 of 2

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5184

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/21/2017

## FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On September 19, 2017, [REDACTED], work address [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] work telephone number [REDACTED] was  
interviewed at his place of employment [REDACTED]. Also present  
during the interview was Senior Financial Investigator [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing  
agent and the nature of the interview and the nature of the interview,  
[REDACTED] provided the following information:

b3  
b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] When the writer identified himself, [REDACTED] knew the  
questions would relate to [REDACTED]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] was served a Federal Grand Jury subpoena [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b3  
b6  
b7Cb3  
b6  
b7Cb3  
b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 09/19/2017 at [REDACTED] United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 09/19/2017

by [REDACTED]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 09/19/2017 . Page 2 of 2

[REDACTED]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]


b3  
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[REDACTED] served subpoena are  
attached to this document as 1A evidence.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5193





## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/22/2017

## FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

[redacted] was interviewed via telephone on July 21, 2017. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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After [redacted] provided a response to a Grand Jury Subpoena regarding

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
[redacted]

[redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

Investigation on 07/21/2017 at [redacted] United States (Phone) [redacted]  
File # [redacted] Date drafted 07/21/2017  
by [redacted]

b3  
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b7C  
b7E



b7E

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/04/2019

On October 11, 2018, FBI Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] attempted to locate and interview [redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] at his residence, [redacted]

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b7C

At approximately 10:00 AM, the Agents knocked on the door and were met by [redacted] [redacted] relayed that [redacted] was [redacted] and invited the Agents into the home. [redacted] telephoned [redacted] and allowed SA [redacted] to speak with him. SA [redacted] relayed the Agents intent to speak with him and [redacted] stated, [redacted] SA [redacted] confirmed the interview pertained to them and [redacted] agreed to return to the residence for the interview. The Agents departed the residence for a short time and returned at approximately 10:30 AM, at which time [redacted] was interviewed in his home office. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]  
Credico knew Roger Stone [redacted]  
[redacted] thought Stone and Credico had known each other for a long time and that [redacted] had linked them up initially [redacted] thought Credico also did the promotions introductions for Stone on Stone's shows.

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 10/11/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/17/2018

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
(U) Interview of [redacted] on 10/11  
Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] /2018. On 10/11/2018, Page 2 of 5

[redacted]  
[redacted] recalled that James  
Comey had been recently fired from his position as the FBI Director and  
there was speculation in the news about the possibility of standing up a  
Special Counsel for the Russia investigation.

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

Communications between [redacted]

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b7C

In early 2018 Credico publicly shifted his comments on television and  
began denying that he was Stone's back channel to WikiLeaks. Credico would  
sometimes answer questions from news reporters truthfully, and sometimes  
he did not. [redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U) Interview of [redacted] on 10/11

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] /2018. On 10/11/2018, Page 3 of 5

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] Stone had contacts at ArtVoice [redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U) Interview of [redacted] on 10/11

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] /2018. On 10/11/2018, Page 4 of 5

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
(U) Interview of [redacted] on 10/11  
Continuation of FD-302 of /2018. . On 10/11/2018 . Page 5 of 5

Voluntary production of documents:

[redacted] agreed to provide the interviewing agents with copies of [redacted]  
[redacted]

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b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

**Administrative:** The original agent notes, along with a copy of the  
[redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] will be maintained in the 1A section of the case file.

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/31/2019

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, 395 E Street Southwest, Washington, DC 20024. [redacted] was accompanied by his attorney, [redacted]. Present from the Special Counsel's Office were Special Agent [redacted] Special Agent [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel attorneys Aaron Zelinski and Jeannie Rhee. [redacted] was provided with a proffer agreement for this interview. [redacted] and his attorney both signed the agreement. [redacted] was advised that the interview was entirely voluntary and that he could take a break or speak with his attorney at any time. After being advised of the nature of the interview and the identity of the interviewing Agents, [redacted] provided the following information:

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--

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b7C

[REDACTED] said he knew Credico had attempted to arrange an interview with Julian Assange [REDACTED]

--

b6  
b7C

--

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 10/18/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File #	Date drafted 01/30/2019
--------	-------------------------

by \_\_\_\_\_

b6  
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b7E

(U) Interview of [REDACTED] on 10/18

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] /2018. On 10/18/2018, Page 2 of 3

[REDACTED] is still friends with [REDACTED] but thinks he's been misled.

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

[REDACTED] stated that he had not read a copy of Stone's testimony to the House Intelligence Committee nor was he aware of what Stone said in it.

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C




(U) Interview of [REDACTED] on 10/18

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] /2018. . On 10/18/2018 . Page 3 of 3

[REDACTED] surmised that [REDACTED] likely told [REDACTED] that the FBI had contacted him after his interview. [REDACTED] contacted both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] after the Agents first tried to contact him. [REDACTED] showed the Agents a copy of his text message exchanges with both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and allowed SA [REDACTED] to take photographs of them. The photographs are enclosed for the file as digital 1A attachments to this FD-302, along with the original notes and a copy of the signed proffer agreement. The original notes and proffer agreement will be maintained as a physical 1A item.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/01/2019

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed at the United States District Courthouse, District of Columbia, 333 Constitution Avenue Northwest, Washington, DC 20001. Present from the Special Counsel's Office were FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel attorney Aaron Zelinsky. [redacted] attorney, [redacted] was also present. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:


b6  
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[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7CInvestigation on 10/19/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 01/31/2019by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7E



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/11/2018

On Tuesday, April 24, 2018, [redacted] telephone number [redacted] [redacted] appeared at the FBI West Palm Beach Resident Agency located at 505 S. Flagler Drive, Suite 500, West Palm Beach, FL 33401, in preparation for possible testimony at the trial of Paul Manafort in July 2018. Also present were Senior Assistant Special Counsel Greg D. Andres and FBI Forensic Accountant [redacted] furnished the following information;

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b7C

b6

b7C

b6

b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 04/24/2018 at West Palm Beach, Florida, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/01/2018

by [redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) April 24, 2018 . On 04/24/2018 . Page 2 of 2b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C


When questioned if he knew an individual named Rick Gates, [REDACTED] stated he heard of the name and might have spoken to him once when Gates asked for [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] did not know of, and never met an individual by the name of Konstantin Kilimnik.

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b7Cb6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5210

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/08/2017

[redacted] was contacted by ASAC [redacted] at [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] is scheduled to come to his home in [redacted] 11/20/2017 and will remain for two weeks. He stated that business is "generally good," and has been active in [redacted] and throughout [redacted].

b6  
b7C

[redacted] was the company of [redacted]. It had previously engaged in [redacted]. [redacted] stated that he personally had no ties to the business and had not contributed to it financially. [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 11/08/2017 at [redacted] (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/08/2017

by [redacted]

b6  
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[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] on 11/8/2017 . On 11/08/2017 . Page 2 of 2


Despite [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] claimed to know very little about the business Silk Road. He heard that Silk Road was partners of [REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5212



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/04/2018

## FEDERAL GRAND JURY INFORMATION

This document contains information pertaining to a federal grand jury proceeding. The information may not be disseminated within or outside the FBI, except as provided for under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3), wherein disclosure may be made to: (1) an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney's official duties; or (2) any government personnel that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney's official duties.

During an interview with [redacted] at [redacted]  
[redacted] on March 27, 2018, Special Agent (SA) [redacted]  
[redacted] and SA [redacted] served [redacted] with a Federal Grand Jury  
subpoena [redacted]

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
A copy of the subpoena is enclosed for the file as a digital 1A attachment to this FD-302.

Investigation on 03/27/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 04/03/2018

by [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/04/2018

[redacted] DOB [redacted] was interviewed telephonically by Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky and Special Agent [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] had contacted the Special Counsel's Office prior to the captioned phone conversation and spoke with SA [redacted] and advised he could be reached [redacted]. The captioned interview took place at approximately 1:15 PM EST.

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[redacted]  
[redacted] ASC Zelinsky advised [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] ASC Zelinsky further advised [redacted]  
[redacted]

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[redacted]  
[redacted] the subpoena given to him by Agents on the evening of March 27, 2018. ASC Zelinsky advised [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] ASC Zelinsky, SA [redacted]  
[redacted]

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
ASC Zelinsky advised [redacted] he would be sending a revised subpoena for [redacted]  
[redacted] confirmed the aforementioned as a [redacted] at which he could be reached.

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 03/28/2018 at [redacted] United States (Phone) [redacted]  
File # [redacted] Date drafted 03/29/2018  
by [redacted]

b3  
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b7C  
b7E



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/18/2013

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] home address [redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed at the law  
offices of [redacted]  
[redacted] In attendance was [redacted] attorney, [redacted]  
Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) [redacted] and [redacted]  
[redacted] of the AUSA's office. After being advised of the identities of the  
interviewing Agent, the AUSA and the nature of the interview, [redacted]  
provided the following information:

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[redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] as requested by subpoena  
served by the AUSA's office [redacted]

b3

[redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 03/13/2013 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 03/18/2013

by [redacted]

b3  
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b7E

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of [REDACTED], On 03/13/2013, Page 2 of 2

[REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED]

b3  
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b7C

[REDACTED]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]


b3  
b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] was not aware of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] was not aware of [REDACTED]

b3  
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FBI(19cv1278)-5223



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/31/2018

Paul J. Manafort, date of birth [REDACTED] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street SE, Washington, D.

C. Participating in the interview were Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] SA [REDACTED] Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Jeannie S. Rhee, SASC Andrew Weissman, and Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky. Manafort was accompanied by his attorneys, Richard Westling, Thomas Zehnle, and [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information:

Roger Stone was informally involved in the Donald J. Trump presidential campaign in April or May of 2016. Stone had been involved in the campaign in the beginning, while Manafort was not, so Manafort used Stone for institutional memory and knowledge of the campaign. Stone used Manafort for informal access back into the campaign.

Stone recommended that Manafort bring on Michael Caputo, which Manafort did. Caputo initially came on to help with the April primary in New York, and then Manafort brought him on full time after that. Caputo had worked with Stone in the past and Manafort had met him years prior. Stone also recommended [REDACTED]

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Manafort said Stone gave him information about Corey Lewandowski and Hope Hicks, two members of the campaign that Manafort did not know well. Stone hated Lewandowski, who undercut Manafort in the campaign. Stone thought he was helping Manafort by undercutting Lewandowski in the press, but it did not actually help Manafort much.

Manafort explained that "the Count of Monte Cristo" was a nickname given to him during the Dole campaign period. [REDACTED] made that nickname up for Manafort because of the way Manafort wore his overcoat over his shoulders like a cape.

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Stone was an effective advocate from outside of the campaign. He was effective with both the mainstream and the alt-right media. Stone could also do things from outside the campaign that the campaign may not want to

Investigation on 09/27/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 09/30/2018

by [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Interview of Paul J. Manafort  
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be directly associated with. For example, when Stone attacked Lewandowski, he thought he was being helpful from the outside. Manafort did not ask or need Stone to do it, as he did not think it was helpful.

Stone tried to get [REDACTED] involved in the campaign at one point because he thought it would help with [REDACTED]. Manafort wanted nothing to do with it and killed it, but Trump later brought it up himself. Manafort thought Trump raised it because Stone brought it up to him.

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Stone had a PAC that was not well funded and he wanted Manafort to designate it as the favored PAC for the campaign, but Manafort did not want to. Lewandowski also had a PAC and wanted the same thing, and Manafort did not want to deal with internal politics related to their PACs. He thought it was a good idea to have a designated PAC, he just did not want it to be either Stone's or Lewandowski's.

Stone asked Manafort for the RNC's internal lists and access to the list of users who had "liked" Trump on Facebook and Twitter, and Manafort told him he could not do it. Manafort explained that while Stone had some ability to build his own lists and raise money, Stone would have had to build off of old lists. Stone would need the lists of people that were currently supportive of the candidate.

Manafort was not sure how Stone made his money. Manafort knew Stone wrote books and gave speeches and did some consulting. Manafort knew Stone was working on a book about the Trump campaign and consulted with different candidates and on various referenda. Manafort did not know Stone's client base. Manafort was not familiar with the company Citroen.

Manafort and Stone communicated by telephone, email, and text message. Usually the emails and text messages were just to set up phone calls. They did not use encrypted apps to talk on the phone. Manafort did not know Stone's phone number off the top of his head, and said he just used whatever number was in his phone. Stone called Manafort from the same number every time, because it came up with his name on Manafort's phone when Stone called. Stone and Manafort did not talk on a regular schedule. Sometimes Manafort had Rick Gates call Stone if Manafort was busy. Stone and Gates did not get along; Stone thought Gates was a liar. If Gates and Stone talked, Gates would report back to Manafort about the call. Gates and Stone would only talk if Stone needed something or needed something passed on to Manafort.

Manafort reviewed an article from The Guardian dated June 12, 2016, entitled "WikiLeaks to publish more Hillary Clinton emails - Julian Assange." Manafort recalled he had a conversation with Stone before that article came out where Stone said WikiLeaks had Clinton's emails. At that

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(09.27.18)

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time, Clinton's emails were a big thing in the news and Trump liked to say that she had been hacked and that she had put the country at risk with her private server. It was part of Trump's speeches.

In late May or early June, Stone said he had spoken to someone and had good information that WikiLeaks had access to the emails on Clinton's server. It was a very self-serving comment from Stone. Manafort did not listen with enough specificity to be able to recall distinctly whether Stone said WikiLeaks had the emails in their possession or if he said WikiLeaks had access to the emails. Manafort thought Stone brought it up in context to something Trump was saying at the time.

Manafort did not convey Stone's information about the emails to Trump. He did not want to deal with a "fire drill" and be sent to go after the emails. Stone always had theories and ideas, some were true and some were not, and Manafort had no basis to know if this one was true. Manafort knew Trump would want him to do something and he did not want to. Manafort asked Stone not to convey it to Trump, and Stone agreed. Manafort thought Stone would keep his word, but he was not convinced he would. Manafort did not have any indication of whether or not Stone told Trump regardless of Manafort's request. Manafort did not have a contemporaneous memory that Stone had told Trump about the emails, because he did not recall a conversation with Trump about it back then, which he would have expected if Trump knew.

On June 12, 2016, when Julian Assange had a big press event about Clinton, Trump was excited. It allowed Trump to move his discussion about Clinton up in his campaign speeches. Whereas before that day, Trump could only speculate about whether the emails were hacked, the fact that WikiLeaks had the emails allowed Trump to say that if WikiLeaks had them, it was possible a foreign adversary had them too. Manafort said there was no real fire drill after June 12, 2016 because the information was already out there. The fire drill would have been if Stone had been the only one saying it and Trump wanted more. Manafort recalled Trump said he looked forward to seeing what Assange had.

Stone was probably talking to others about the emails at the time, but Manafort was not aware at that time who. It was Manafort's understanding that Stone was the guy that had some connection or ability to contact WikiLeaks because Stone had been proven right.

Manafort and Stone talked after the June 12, 2016 article, and Manafort said he was looking forward to seeing what came out and asked Stone if he knew what Assange had.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Interview of Paul J. Manafort  
Continuation of FD-302 of (09.27.18) . On 09/27/2018 . Page 4 of 11

Gates knew about the fact that Stone had mentioned the emails prior to the June 12, 2016 story. Gates and Manafort talked about it before and after the story. Stone may have told [REDACTED] about it. Manafort thought he spoke to Trump and said Stone had it right, and that Trump was happy and looked forward to what WikiLeaks had. Trump asked Manafort if Stone knew what was in the emails and Manafort told him no. Manafort and Trump talked first about how to use the information that WikiLeaks had the emails in the first instance and then talked about what the content of those emails might be second. Manafort told Trump he would let Trump know what he learned from Stone about the emails.

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Manafort believed Stone told him he was working to find out what the emails included. Manafort thought Stone was using the Clinton emails to stay relevant to the campaign. At that point, Manafort could not rely on Assange. Manafort told Stone to keep him posted.

Manafort did not ask Gates to ask Stone to get in touch with Assange. Manafort did not get really interested until something was released, which happened between the two conventions.

Manafort was not sure if he talked to [REDACTED] about WikiLeaks. He thought if Miller was on the campaign at that time, he would have had him track it.

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Manafort used Caputo to keep track of Stone, but by around June 15, 2016, Caputo left the campaign.

Manafort discussed a breakfast he had with Stone during the RNC, which was visible briefly in the "Get Me Roger Stone" documentary. They discussed convention speeches at that breakfast. Stone also complained about Ted Cruz. They discussed the DNC, because Manafort planned to go and give some speeches during it. WikiLeaks would have come up in that breakfast in reference to what they would be doing and how the campaign could use it. Manafort did not recall whether Stone said he knew when the WikiLeaks information was going to come out. They discussed Clinton's server, WikiLeaks, and the DNC hack. They focused more on the DNC hack because it had current political value at that time. Manafort summarized the breakfast as a discussion about the the DNC hack, when WikiLeaks planned to release the material, Manafort trying to understand the attack lines that would be used during the DNC and in the month of August, and the thematic strategy for the campaign.

Stone "went dark" on WikiLeaks in late June. Manafort initially thought Stone's advance knowledge was more of a guess. It was not until the information about Debbie Wasserman-Schultz came out that Manafort realized

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_ . On 09/27/2018 . Page 5 of 11

the real value of the information. Stone did not tell Manafort the Wasserman-Schultz information was coming out in advance, but he was pleased when it did. That was the first time Manafort thought Stone's connection to WikiLeaks was real.

Stone led Manafort to believe that the DNC information leaked would be helpful to the campaign. Stone said the information was coming and it would be helpful to the Republicans. Stone was the only one Manafort heard from regarding WikiLeaks.

After the Wasserman-Schultz information came out, Manafort told Stone he was impressed and that it was useful. Manafort recalled he told Stone he would be using the information the upcoming weekend in Philadelphia. Stone said there was more coming, and it would be good, but he did not specify when Manafort asked him for more information. At that point, Manafort thought Stone had a connection, but he did not think Stone had a direct connection to WikiLeaks.

After the July 22, 2016 dump of information by WikiLeaks, Manafort thought he talked to Trump first. It was a busy day and they had to deal with a press conference that day. At the end of the day, Manafort talked to Trump and Reince Priebus about the information and how Trump would use it. Manafort did not think they talked about Stone. Manafort recalled that at some point that weekend, he raised with Trump that Stone had predicted the WikiLeaks dump and Trump responded that Stone should stay on top of it.

Manafort thought the conversation with Trump about Stone was probably on Saturday, July 23, 2016, because he recalled saying he planned to use the information in a press conference on Sunday, July 24, 2016. Manafort thought that by Sunday, he and Priebus had scripted out what to say about the WikiLeaks dump.

Manafort did not tell Stone specifically that Trump had asked that he stay on top of it. He would have just told him to stay on top of it. Manafort did not want to get into a cycle with Stone where Stone used him as an errand boy to get to Trump.

Manafort did not have any indication Trump heard from Stone directly, but he thought he would have. Trump would not have told Manafort if he was talking to Stone. Trump compartmentalized; it was just the way he was.

Manafort told Stone it was good stuff and to keep him posted, and Stone offered no indication he knew any more specifics.

Manafort and Stone did not discuss Stone's August 8, 2016 speech in which he said more was coming from WikiLeaks. Manafort recalled from the press

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coverage that Stone was confident more was coming in the fall. Stone never told Manafort he was dealing with Assange directly. Manafort assumed Stone had a contact of some sort. Stone's August 8, 2016 comment was not out of character for Stone.

Manafort did not recall any specific conversations in August 2016 with Stone about WikiLeaks. At that time, people on the campaign expressed interest in what Assange had, but they were more curious than they were setting up an operation to proactively find out. That was the same week Manafort was dealing with [redacted] and trying to convert a primary operation into a general election operation.

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Manafort was not certain when the next Monday morning meeting was, but it was either July 31 or August 7, but thought it was probably August 7, 2016. Manafort was sure WikiLeaks was raised and the discussion was about how useful the information was and when they could expect the next dump. Manafort thought it was probably a topic of many conversations. Trump was fixated on it.

At that time, opposition research was not being done by the campaign, but by the RNC. [redacted] was linked up with the RNC to work on that, so [redacted] and Manafort may have also discussed WikiLeaks.

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Manafort and Trump talked about how to use the information already out there. More in depth conversations about WikiLeaks would have probably come in September, closer to the election. In August, Manafort had a set of specifics points on specific topics, but WikiLeaks wasn't the most important thing then, because they didn't know anything else specific.

No one, such as Priebus or Kushner, had a specific interest in the WikiLeaks issue. Miller was interested because it was in his wheelhouse to pay attention to those issues.

The Monday family meetings had a two-fold agenda. One, they discussed relevant "gossip" for the campaign. As an example, they discussed the fact that Lewandowski accused Manafort of leaking, but Michael Cohen eventually obtained the administrative rights to the emails on the server and determined that Lewandowski had been leaking. Donald Trump, Jr., who had made sure Lewandowski left the campaign, liked hearing it. The meeting also covered scheduling. Manafort would lay out Trump's travel schedule and they discussed how to integrate the family into events. Manafort said that when WikiLeaks was in the news, it would have been covered in the gossip section of the meeting. He remembered a discussion in which people said the Wasserman-Schultz stuff was helpful because it allowed Trump to say Clinton rigged the election against Bernie Sanders.



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Manafort was sure he mentioned in a Monday meeting that Stone predicted the WikiLeaks dump. The reaction was something along the lines of "that sounds like Roger" and wondering about what else was coming. Stone had been putting it out there, but Manafort did not know if the family knew Stone had predicted it in advance.

Family meetings were attended by Manafort, Gates, Trump, Jr., Eric Trump, Hope Hicks, and sometimes Jared Kushner and Ivanka Trump.

Somewhere in that same week, things started to fall apart for Manafort personally and he had to put together a campaign plan.

Manafort thought the campaign would have started to more aggressively look for more information from WikiLeaks in late August, and by that time, he was gone. They had what they needed for a couple of weeks in the first instance and wouldn't have needed to get more until September.

Manafort told Gates to stay in touch with Stone on the WikiLeaks stuff; that was Manafort's way of following up on it. Based on what Stone learned, they would decide what to do next. The difference between Manafort's reaction in June and his reaction after the July 22, 2016 release was that it became real when it happened. Manafort had a more proactive interest and told Stone to report back to him what he heard. Manafort tasked Gates to stay in touch with Stone even though they did not get along because it was the best way for Manafort to stay in touch with Stone.

Manafort's memory was clear that Stone said he had a contact before July 22, 2016. In August or September, Stone said he was talking to Assange directly, but Manafort did not believe him. Stone did not tell Manafort any characteristics of his intermediary, but Manafort thought the contact was male. Stone did not say where the person was, whether the person was a supporter of Trump, or whether the person was witting or unwitting. Stone did not say how he communicated with his contact.

Manafort did not specifically recall when he heard about or saw Stone's tweet on August 21, 2016 that said "Trust me, it will soon be the Podesta's time in the barrel. #crookedHillary." Manafort's memory of that day is that he was focused on his own issues, not Stone's Twitter feed.

Manafort was sure he had at least two conversations with Stone prior to the October 7, 2016 leak of John Podesta's emails.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Interview of Paul J. Manafort  
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In the one conversation between Stone and Manafort, Stone told Manafort "you got fucked." Stone's comment related to the fact that Manafort had been fired. The conversation was either the day Manafort left the campaign or the day after.

In the other conversation, Stone told Manafort that there would be a WikiLeaks drop of emails with Podesta, and that Podesta would be "in the barrel" and Manafort would be vindicated. Manafort had a clear memory of the moment because of the language Stone used. Stone also said Manafort would be pleased with what came out. It was Manafort's understanding that WikiLeaks had Podesta's emails and they were going to show that [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Manafort would be vindicated because he had to leave the campaign for being too pro-Russian, and this would show that Podesta also had links to Russia and would have to leave.

Manafort's best recollection was the "barrel" conversation was before he got on the boat the week of August 28, 2016.

Manafort and Stone had other conversations about WikiLeaks in September and October 2016, but they were not that substantive. They reaffirmed the previous conversations about Podesta and WikiLeaks and Stone would tell Manafort that "it was going to come out soon." Manafort said they touched on the issue two or three times in September and he knew they talked about it at least one time in October before Podesta's emails were released. The early October conversation was similar to others and Manafort got the impression the emails would come out soon.

On October 7, 2016, Manafort was in Florida. Manafort did not know in advance that the tape of Trump and Billy Bush was going to come out. Manafort thought he learned of the tape on the news. Manafort and Gates spoke that day, but he thought it was after the tape came out. Gates asked Manafort's opinion on how damaging the tapes were, and Manafort asked him what people on the campaign thought. Gates told Manafort that some people thought Trump had to quit, but Manafort thought that was ridiculous. He considered calling Kushner or Priebus but ultimately decided not to. Kushner was the person Manafort would contact on issues related to Trump himself, and Priebus was the person Manafort would deal with on issues in general. Manafort was very nervous about Priebus; Priebus could be "very Washington" about this sort of thing.

Manafort did not recall speaking to Gates about the Podesta emails. The conversation was focused on the Billy Bush tape. He thought if the Podesta emails were out, they would have talked about them. He did not recall talking to Gates about how to spin the Podesta emails. He recalled

(U) Interview of Paul J. Manafort  
(09.27.18)

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_ . On 09/27/2018 . Page 9 of 11

a conversation with Gates about the Podesta emails, but he did not think it was the same day.

Manafort did not recall a conversation about how to use the Podesta emails. That discussion would have gone through Steve Bannon, and Manafort did not talk to him about it. Manafort did not have tactical discussions with Stone about the Podesta emails.

Manafort made a conscious decision to sit back and not inject himself into the campaign. He did not engage with the campaign again until the last couple of weeks of the campaign. Manafort was not happy with the campaign at that point.

Stone followed up with Manafort after the Podesta emails came out. The conversation tied the Podesta emails to the Billy Bush tape; Manafort said the Podesta emails were very helpful. Stone was glorying in the moment, and thought he was screwing Clinton and that Podesta would have to quit her campaign. Stone said the Podesta emails buried the Billy Bush tape and would end up being more damaging for Clinton than the Billy Bush tape was to Trump.

Stone did not indicate he or anyone he knew had a role in the timing of the release of the Podesta emails. Stone said he had been predicting the emails would come out and took credit for them. Stone thought the emails inoculated the Trump campaign and changed the narrative. Stone did not indicate a consciousness on the part of WikiLeaks regarding the significance of the timing, but continued to say he told Manafort it was coming and that he (Stone) was right. They talked about the value of the emails as it related to changing the narrative.

Stone led Manafort to believe more was coming from WikiLeaks after the Podesta leaks. Manafort talked to Gates after the emails came out and recommended that Gates talk to Priebus and Kushner.

Manafort wondered at the time who was trying to block whom. He thought the Clinton campaign may have leaked the Billy Bush tape because they knew the Podesta emails were coming. On the other hand, Manafort did not credit the Trump campaign with being that clever and leaking the Podesta emails because they knew the Billy Bush tape was coming. That said, Stone was not part of the campaign and he was capable of it. Stone had told Manafort about WikiLeaks previously and had the ability and motivation and contact to pull it off.

Manafort agreed that he appreciated the significance of the timing of the two events, but he did not remember thinking about it at the time. Manafort did not recall whether Stone indicated he knew the Billy Bush

(U) Interview of Paul J. Manafort  
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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_ . On 09/27/2018 . Page 10 of 11

tape was coming out in advance. Manafort did not ask Stone about his connection to WikiLeaks or ask where the information came from; Manafort did not need to know who Stone spoke to.

Stone's statement of denial on October 11, 2016 that he had advance knowledge of the leak of the Podesta emails was "inconsistent with what he told" Manafort. Manafort believed Stone knew in advance Podesta's emails were coming out.

Manafort and Stone did not have a conversation in which Stone said Manafort should not tell anyone what he knew about the timing of the Podesta emails. They did not talk about Stone running away from what Stone had told Manafort.

In approximately the last six months, Manafort and Stone have had conversations in which Stone told Manafort he was being targeted by the Special Counsel's Office and that the investigation was costing him a lot of money. Stone said the Special Counsel's Office was accusing him of effectively controlling the timing of the leaked Podesta emails. Manafort thought it was some time in May or June 2018 that Stone told him the Special Counsel's Office thought he had a role in the Podesta emails. Stone did not expressly remind or tell Manafort what he (Stone) knew about the emails. They did not discuss the fact that Stone did actually have advance knowledge of the Podesta emails.

Stone said to Manafort that he was not the decision maker or the controller of the information. Stone said he may have had advance knowledge, but he was not the decision maker. Stone was making clear to Manafort that he did not control the emails or make decisions about them. Stone said he received information about the Podesta emails but was a conduit, not someone in a position to get them released. Manafort was confused as to the various people and hacks. Manafort asked Stone to go through the narrative of Assange, Guccifer, the DNC hack, and Seth Rich so that Manafort could understand it.

Stone knew Manafort knew that Stone's public statements were false, but Stone "confused" Manafort.

Stone did not advise Manafort to punch back or discredit the Special Counsel's Office. Stone did not raise any desire to respond to the Special Counsel's Office investigation by planting media stories.

Manafort was not aware of any attempts on Stone's part to contact Manafort after Manafort was incarcerated.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Interview of Paul J. Manafort  
Continuation of FD-302 of (09.27.18) . On 09/27/2018 . Page 11 of 11

Stone did not tell Manafort whether he passed the Podesta email information to anyone else on the campaign or associated with the campaign. Manafort speculated Stone may have passed the information to Bannon, since Stone and Bannon had a relationship.

Stone and Bannon knew each other before the campaign. Manafort believed they were in touch throughout the campaign. Manafort had the impression Stone passed information and ideas to Bannon, some of it Bannon used. Stone would get frustrated with Bannon if he did not think all of his information was being passed on to Trump or used in the campaign.

One of Stone's "harebrained" ideas involved using [REDACTED] in the campaign. Stone alleged [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Stone did not indicate to Manafort that he tried to get Bannon to do anything with [REDACTED]


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Manafort credited Stone for the "war on women" part of the campaign, in which women who alleged Bill Clinton sexually assaulted them showed up to a debate. Stone had previously raised the issue with Manafort on the campaign trail, and Manafort said no.

Manafort thought Stone gave messaging ideas to Bannon, but did not think Stone was a source of information for Bannon. Manafort thought Stone used Bannon as a way to get into the campaign, similar to the way Stone used Manafort to get into the campaign.

**Administrative:**

The documents shown to Manafort and the original interview notes are being maintained in a 1-A envelope in the case file.



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/16/2017

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted], was interviewed at [redacted]  
[redacted] After being advised of the identity of the  
interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided  
the following information:

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SA [redacted] gave [redacted] a cellular number she can reach the FBI at until  
[redacted]


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Investigation on 10/20/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/23/2017

by [redacted]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/11/2017

## FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On October 6, 2017 [REDACTED] contacted Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) AARON S.J. ZELINSKY via telephone to discuss a subpoena, which she received from Special Agent [REDACTED] to testify before the grand jury. Also present on the call was Forensic Accountant [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] ASC ZELINSKY advised [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] ASC ZELINSKY explained [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]


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[REDACTED] provided her phone number [REDACTED] and email address, [REDACTED] for future contact [REDACTED] could also be reached by calling [REDACTED]

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Investigation on 10/06/2017 at [REDACTED] United States (Phone)  
File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 10/06/2017  
by [REDACTED]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/29/2017

[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]

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[redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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Investigation on 08/03/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/05/2017

by [redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] . On 08/03/2017 . Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] provided a business card with the following identifiers:


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[Redacted]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/08/2017

On June 7, 2017, Unit Chief (UC) [redacted] & Information Liaison Specialist [redacted] both of the FBI Records Management Division (RMD), [redacted] were interviewed in the FBI Headquarters Special File Room, JEH Room [redacted]. Also present was MAPA [redacted].

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The FBI Special File Room is holding all non-electronic documents recovered from former FBI Director James Comey's office. RMD received multiple boxes from SSA [redacted] for Assistant Director (AD) Richard Haley starting May 10, 2017 (10 boxes); May 12, 2017 [redacted].

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[redacted]  
[redacted] RMD AD Michelle Jupina provided [redacted]

[redacted] RMD began cataloging the material and transferring it [redacted]

FBI personnel went to Comey's house to retrieve electronic information and equipment and other things, such as an FBI seal, but nothing from the Comey household was provided to the Special File Room. Based upon information RMD received from [redacted] it appears [redacted] gave Comey 23 boxes containing personal items retrieved from his office.

b6  
b7C

RMD Section Chief (SC) David Hardy and Assistant Section Chief (ASC) [redacted] are involved in Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests related to the Comey documents and they are working with Office of General Counsel (OGC) attorney [redacted].

b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 06/07/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 06/07/2017

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
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b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RMD UC [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] & ILS [Redacted] . On 06/07/2017 . Page 2 of 2

Administrative

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E


[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5256

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



Date of entry 06/01/2017

On May 2, 2017, [redacted] work address [redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed at his place of employment,  
[redacted] Also taking part in the interview was Financial Investigator [redacted]  
[redacted] The writer went to this location as [redacted] lists this  
address as one of its administrative offices. After being advised of the  
identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview,  
[redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted] used by several clients, one of which was [redacted]  
[redacted] is headquartered at [redacted]  
[redacted] job at [redacted] was to take phone calls for  
businesses, and collect mail. [redacted] also provides web services to  
clients. [redacted] was not familiar with Paul Manafort or any of his  
businesses.


b6  
b7C

Investigation on 05/02/2017 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/31/2017

by [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/01/2019

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed in the International Terminal of the San Francisco International Airport (SFO), San Bruno, CA. Special Agent [redacted] was also present and assisted with the interview. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

The Agents explained to [redacted] that the interview was voluntary and she was free to leave at anytime during the interview and did not have to answer any questions. The Agents also explained to [redacted] that although the interview was happening inside the Customs and Border Patrol area of the SFO, she was not being detained by the CBP and was free to leave at any point and refuse the interview with the FBI. [redacted] indicated that she understood and expressed her willingness to speak to the Agents.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] just landed at SFO [redacted] and was on her way to [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7CInvestigation on 02/25/2019 at San Bruno, California, United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/27/2019by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 02/25/2019, Page 2 of 4

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

The interview was conducted in English and lasted approximately two hours.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 02/25/2019, Page 3 of 4

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C


[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 02/25/2019, Page 4 of 4



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/30/2018

On April 24, 2018, [REDACTED] appeared at [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C[REDACTED] Also present were FBI Forensic Accountant  
[REDACTED] Senior Assistant Special Counsel Greg Andres, and  
[REDACTED] attorney [REDACTED][REDACTED] provided the following  
information:b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 04/24/2018 at [REDACTED] United States (In Person)

b6  
b7C  
b7E

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 04/30/2018

by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~


[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] - April 24, 2018 . On 04/24/2018 . Page 2 of 2

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5263

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/24/2017

## FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On August 15, 2017, [redacted] work address [redacted]  
[redacted] work telephone number [redacted]  
work email address [redacted] was interviewed at his place of  
employment, [redacted] After being advised of the  
identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview,  
[redacted] provided the following information:

b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~Investigation on 08/15/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/18/2017

by [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 08/15/2017 . Page 2 of 2


b3  
b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

At the conclusion of the interview, [REDACTED] was served with a Federal Grand Jury subpoena for records. A copy of this subpoena is maintained as 1A evidence attached to this file.

b3  
b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5265

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/25/2014

[redacted]  
[redacted] tel. [redacted] fax [redacted] date of  
birth [redacted] was interviewed at the offices of the FBI [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C

After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the  
nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 04/11/2014 at [redacted] United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 04/14/2014by [redacted]b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of [Redacted], On 04/11/2014, Page 2 of 3

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of

[Redacted]

, On 04/11/2014 , Page 3 of 3

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C


[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



b7E

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/04/2017

[redacted] NATIONAL PRESS CLUB (NPC),  
telephone number [redacted] email address [redacted] work  
address 529 14th Street NW, Washington, DC 20045, was interviewed  
telephonically by Special Agent (SA) [redacted] After being advised of  
the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview,  
[redacted] provided the following information:

b6

b7C

[redacted] recalled the foreign policy speech event, scheduled for April  
27, 2016 at the NPC, being cancelled shortly before the event took place.  
Center for the National Interest (CNI) organized the event and signed a  
contract with NPC. [redacted] possessed the signed contract between NPC and  
CNI, invoices for the event, and copies of payments made related to the  
event. [redacted] stated that he would provide writer with copies of the  
documents in his possession after receiving a subpoena.

b6

b7C

Investigation on 11/29/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/30/2017


by SA [redacted]

b6

b7C

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b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/06/2017

## FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On May 11, 2017, [redacted] was interviewed at her place of employment, [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted] telephone number [redacted] Also present during the interview was [redacted] Department of Justice Senior Financial Investigator (Contractor). After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted] was served with a Federal Grand Jury Subpoena related to [redacted] and she agreed to locate and furnish all related documents [redacted] A copy of this subpoena is attached to this case file as 1A evidence.


b3  
b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 05/11/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/15/2017

by [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/23/2018

b6  
b7C

[redacted] previously identified, was interviewed at [redacted]  
[redacted] located at [redacted] by FBI  
Special Agent [redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres.  
Present during the interview was [redacted] After being  
advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of  
the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted] was told that the trial against Paul Manafort was scheduled to  
begin July 10, 2018 in Alexandria, Virginia.

Paul Manafortb6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

Investigation on 05/16/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

b6  
b7C  
b7E

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/18/2018

by [redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview , On 05/16/2018 , Page 2 of 5

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

would recognize Manafort if she were to see him.

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

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b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

DOC 2A

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview , On 05/16/2018 , Page 3 of 5

b6  
b7C

DOC 2B and 2C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

DOC 2D

b6  
b7C

DOC 3A

b6  
b7C

DOC 4A

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview , On 05/16/2018 , Page 4 of 5

DOC 5Ab6  
b7CDOC 6Ab6  
b7CDOCS 7A - 24Ab6  
b7C

[redacted] was shown a series of [redacted] made the following statements about each item:

7 - [redacted]

b6  
b7C

8 - [redacted]

9 - [redacted]

[redacted]

10 - [redacted]

11 - [redacted]

12 - [redacted]

13 - [redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

14 - [redacted]

15 - [redacted]

16 - [redacted]

17 - [redacted]

18 - [redacted]

19 - [redacted]

20 - [redacted]

21 - [redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview . On 05/16/2018 . Page 5 of 5

b6  
b7C  
b7E

22

[Redacted]


23

[Redacted]

24

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/03/2019

## FEDERAL GRAND JURY INFORMATION

This document contains information pertaining to a federal grand jury proceeding. The information may not be disseminated within or outside the FBI, except as provided for under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3), wherein disclosure may be made to: (1) an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney's official duties; or (2) any government personnel that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney's official duties.

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC 20546. [redacted] resides at [redacted] and his cell phone number is [redacted] [redacted] email address is [redacted] was accompanied by his attorney, [redacted] [redacted] email address is [redacted] and his phone number is [redacted] Present from the Special Counsel's Office were Special Agent [redacted] Special Agent [redacted] [redacted] Senior Assistant Senior Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein and Assistant Senior Special Counsel Jeannie Rhee. [redacted] was advised that intentionally providing false statements to the interviewing Agents would be a violation of federal law. After being advised of the nature of the interview and the identity of the interviewing Agent, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 11/02/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)  
File # [redacted] Date drafted 01/02/2019  
by [redacted]

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted] on 11/02

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018. . On 11/02/2018 . Page 2 of 3

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]


b3  
b6  
b7C



(U) Interview of [REDACTED] on 11/02

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] /2018. . On 11/02/2018 . Page 3 of 3

b3  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/10/2019

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security [redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office located at 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC 20024.  
Accompanying [redacted] during this interview was his attorney, [redacted]  
[redacted] Present from the Special Counsel's Office were Senior Assistant Special Counsel Jeannie Rhee, Assistant Special Counsel Lawrence Atkinson, FBI Special Agent [redacted] FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst [redacted] and FBI Intelligence Analyst [redacted] After being advised of the nature of the interview and the identities of the interviewers, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 01/24/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 04/09/2019by [redacted]b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 01/24/2018 . Page 2 of 5

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

In May 2016, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

During either the first or second week of June 2016, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5301

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] . On 01/24/2018 . Page 3 of 5

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5302

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] . On 01/24/2018 . Page 4 of 5

[Redacted]

b7A

[Redacted]

b7A

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b7A

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5303

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] . On 01/24/2018 . Page 5 of 5

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C


[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5304



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/24/2017

## FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On August 16, 2017, [redacted] work address [redacted]  
[redacted] work telephone number [redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed at her place of employment, [redacted]  
[redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing  
agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following  
information:

b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~Investigation on 08/16/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/18/2017by [redacted]b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 08/16/2017 . Page 2 of 2

b3  
b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]


The information provided by [REDACTED] as well as the subpoena served are included in this case file as 1A evidence.

b3  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5306





~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/17/2017

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] cellular telephone number [redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed at his residence located at [redacted]  
[redacted]. After being advised of  
the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview,  
[redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

PAPADOPOULOS [redacted] but he previously worked for the  
Donald Trump and Ben Carson presidential campaigns. [redacted] was not sure  
what PAPADOPOULOS's job title or employment duties were in either  
campaigns. He did not know if PAPADOPOULOS was paid at either campaign.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] did not know PAPADOPOULOS's role in either campaign or who he  
reported to, but PAPADOPOULOS did travel to New York and Washington, DC a  
lot. [redacted] did not know if he spoke with Trump, but he did see a  
picture of PAPADOPOULOS seated at the same table as Trump.

b6  
b7C

[redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] was shown 3 pictures and he positively identified the pictures as  
PAPADOPOULOS.

b6  
b7C

(Writers note, the pictures used in teh interview are hand labeled 1,2 and

~~Reason: 1.4(b)  
Derived From: National Security  
Information SCG  
Declassify On: 20421231~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

Investigation on 02/17/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/17/2017

by [redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~ // ~~ORCON~~ / ~~NOFORN~~

[Redacted]


b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] . On 02/17/2017 . Page 2 of 2

3 and are maintained in the 1A section of this report.)

~~SECRET~~ // ~~ORCON~~ / ~~NOFORN~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5312

b6  
b7C  
b7E~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
ON 07-30-2020

Date of entry 03/09/2018

b6  
b7C

[redacted] was interviewed [redacted]  
[redacted] Participating in the interview were Federal  
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and SA  
[redacted] After being advised of the identity of the  
interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the  
following information:

b6  
b7C

(U) [redacted] was advised that agents had some follow-up questions  
regarding [redacted] his October 30,  
2017 interview with the FBI. Specifically, [redacted] was directed to  
information he provided during the [redacted] interview where he  
indicated there was a meeting at the METROPOLITAN CLUB in Washington, DC  
that was attended by [Jeff] SESSIONS, [Sergey] KISLYAK, [General Charles]  
BOYD, [Dmitri] SIMES, and possibly [Jared] KUSHNER. [redacted] was reminded  
that he had previously indicated his belief that this meeting had occurred  
sometime after the April 27, 2016 MAYFLOWER HOTEL meeting where Donald  
TRUMP gave a foreign policy speech and the 2017 Presidential election.  
[redacted] could not recall the exact date when this meeting at the  
METROPOLITAN CLUB could have occurred [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] said he had no reason to believe that the METROPOLITAN CLUB  
meeting had not occurred but also no reason to believe that it had.  
[redacted] believed he heard about the METROPOLITAN CLUB meeting from [redacted]  
[redacted] General Charles BOYD, Chairman of the CNI  
Board of Directors. [redacted]

[redacted] said something about working on an event or a dinner at the  
METROPOLITAN CLUB for General BOYD. [redacted] could not recall at the time

Reason: 1.4(b)

Derived From: FBI NSISC-  
20090615

Declassify On: 20431231

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 02/26/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person, Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/26/2018

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Re-interview of [REDACTED] . On 02/26/2018 . Page 2 of 4

of this interview however, why he previously had indicated that SESSIONS, KISLYAK, BOYD, SIMES, and possibly KUSHNER had been in attendance at that meeting. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

(U) While at CNI, [REDACTED]

required. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

During the

interview, [REDACTED]

(U) During his employment with CNI, [REDACTED]

As a result, [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

financial aspects associated with the METROPOLITAN CLUB meeting, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not

recall any email correspondence regarding a meeting at the METROPOLITAN CLUB [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5316

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Re-interview of [REDACTED] . On 02/26/2018 . Page 3 of 4

[REDACTED] advised that if SIMES were present for the meeting at the METROPOLITAN CLUB than [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

During this interview, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) NOTE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Specifically, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

(U) The assistants for each member of the CNI Board of Directors also

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5317

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Re-interview of  . On 02/26/2018 . Page 4 of 4(U) 

•

•

•

b6  
b7C

(U)  had not heard of the Pennsylvania Room or a room on the second floor of the MAYFLOWER HOTEL.  was not aware of any other meetings that were attended by SESSIONS, KISLYAK, BOYD, SIMES and possibly KUSHNER.

b6  
b7C(U) 

(U)  was receptive to future contact should any additional information be required. The interview started at approximately 6:30pm and ended at approximately 8:15pm.

b6  
b7C~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5318

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/29/2016

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at her residential address, [redacted] telephone numbers [redacted] (newest) and [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] MANAFORT was DONALD TRUMP's presidential campaign manager who has suspected ties to Russia [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~  
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC, dated~~  
~~20120629~~  
~~Declassify On: 20411231~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 09/14/2016 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/16/2016

by [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~Continuation of FD-302 of  (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of  . On 09/14/2016 . Page 2 of 6b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

She also stated that she had read an article about 20,000 e-Mails taken, at which time she told  that she had concerns, and suspected that the hackers would release the e-Mails around the time of the Democratic National Convention.

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

SETH RICH was murdered on the morning of 07/10/2016 in Washington, DC.

b6  
b7C~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5320



[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Interview of [Redacted] . On 09/14/2016 . Page 3 of 6

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~b6  
b7C  
b7EContinuation of FD-302 of  (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of  . On 09/14/2016 . Page 4 of 6b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

said that when the New York Times article was published on March 28, 2016, which revealed that MANAFORT had officially joined the presidential campaign of Donald Trump,

 is  
attached to the 1A section of this document, and partially listed below:b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5322

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/14/2016, Page 5 of 6

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

DNC Staffer Seth

b6  
b7C

Conrad Rich was murdered [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

FBI(19cv1278)-5323

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 09/14/2016 . Page 6 of 6

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C


[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG  
ON 08-05-2020

Date of entry 04/03/2017

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed on [redacted]  
[redacted] at the [redacted] Washington, DC., by SSA [redacted]  
[redacted] and SA [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the  
interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily  
provided the following information:

b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U)

~~(S//OC/NF)~~b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U)

~~(S//OC/NF)~~b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U)

~~(S//OC/NF)~~b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U)

~~(S//OC/NF)~~b6  
b7C  
b7D~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-  
20090615~~~~Declassify On: 20421231~~~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

Investigation on [redacted] at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 03/29/2017

by [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U)

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Interview of [Redacted] On [Redacted] Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U)

~~(S//OC/NF)~~

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U)


~~(S//OC/NF)~~

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E~~SECRET//NOFORN~~DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG  
ON 08-06-2020

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/05/2017

~~DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL~~

Do not disseminate outside the FBI without the permission of the originator or program manager.

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed by  
SSA [redacted] and SA [redacted] at [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and  
the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following  
information:

(U)

~~(S//NF)~~b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U)

~~(S//NF)~~b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U)

~~(S//NF)~~b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U)

~~(S//NF)~~b6  
b7C  
b7D~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-  
20090615~~~~Declassify On: 20421231~~~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on [redacted] at DC, Washington, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 04/26/2017

by [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FBI(19cv1278)-5327

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U)

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~(S//NF)~~ Interview of [Redacted], On [Redacted], Page 2 of 2


(U)

b6  
b7C  
b7D

~~(S//NF)~~ [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



b6  
b7C  
b7E~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICC  
ON 08-05-2020

Date of entry 06/05/2017

~~DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL~~

Do not disseminate outside the FBI without the permission of the originator or program manager.

(U)

b6  
b7C  
b7D

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] [PROTECT IDENTITY], date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] was interviewed by SSA [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] After being advised of the identity of the  
interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [REDACTED] voluntarily  
provided the following information:

(U)

b6  
b7C  
b7D

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(U)

b6  
b7C  
b7D

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(U)

b6  
b7C  
b7D

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-  
20090615~~~~Declassify On: 20421231~~~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on [REDACTED] at DC, Washington, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 05/22/2017

by [REDACTED]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U)

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~(S//NF)~~ Interview of [REDACTED] . On [REDACTED] . Page 2 of 2b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U)

~~(S//NF)~~b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U)

~~(S//NF)~~b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U)

~~(S//NF)~~b6  
b7C  
b7D


(U)

~~(S//NF)~~b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U)

~~(S//NF)~~b6  
b7C  
b7D~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5330

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG  
ON 07-30-2020

Date of entry 05/06/2018

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] born [redacted] cellular  
telephone number [redacted] home address [redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed at her home. After being advised of the  
identity of the interviewing Agents [SSA [redacted] and SA [redacted]  
and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]b6  
b7C(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]b6  
b7C~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-  
20090615~~~~Declassify On: 20431231~~~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 04/27/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 04/30/2018

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] . On 04/27/2018 . Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]


(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
ON 07-22-2020~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/05/2016

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed at the FBI Chicago Field Office, 2111 West Roosevelt Road, Chicago, Illinois 60608. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the interviewing Agents with information related to her work in [redacted] matters. That information will be documented in a separate FD-302. [redacted] then provided the following information pertinent to this investigation:

b6  
b7C

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] comes from a predominately Republican background. [redacted] was Republican, and most of her family and friends lean toward the Republican side of politics. [redacted] advised that although her friends are mostly Republican, they don't necessarily agree with DONALD J. TRUMP (TRUMP).

b6  
b7C

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] has stressed to [redacted] that they should remain politically neutral in their work, specifically during this time of year in the months leading up to the election.

b6  
b7C

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] was asked if she had any contacts in political circles of the upcoming election. To that, [redacted] advised that she has friends in both the Republican and Democratic sides of the election. When asked who those friends were, [redacted] advised that she had met a few of them while attending [redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] was then asked if she knew of anyone who could provide additional information about two recent news topics, such as the hack of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the alleged associations between TRUMP and Russia. [redacted] stated that she knew of one individual, WALID PHARES (PHARES), who could potentially provide the FBI with further

b6  
b7C~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~~~Derived From: FBI~~~~NSISC-20090615~~~~Declassify On: 20411231~~~~SECRET//NOFORN~~Investigation on 10/04/2016 at Chicago, Illinois, United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/04/2016by [redacted]b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Continuation of FD-302 of ~~(S//NF)~~ Interview of  . On 10/04/2016 . Page 2 of 2


insight about those two areas. When asked if she knew PHARES,  advised that she had never met him, but that she knew him to regularly speak on FOX NEWS as a talking head for the DNC attacks.

b6  
b7C

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ could not recall any additional contacts in Washington DC,  who could report on either of those two topics.  then asked for  business card and stated that she would contact him if she recalled any additional contacts in the future.

b6  
b7C~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5343

b6  
b7C  
b7E~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
ON 07-30-2020

Date of entry 12/13/2017

## DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

Sandra Luff was contacted by telephone at [redacted] SSA [redacted] told her he worked for the Special Counsel and wanted to interview her regarding her knowledge of events surrounding Presidential Candidate Donald Trump's April 27, 2016 Mayflower Hotel speech in her capacity as an aide to then-Senator Jeff Sessions. She provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

Luff was willing to cooperate with the Special Counsel's investigation. She thought it would be useful for the Special Counsel to know that in August or September 2017 she provided a full statement about the topic, and additional information, to the Senate Intelligence Committee. She did not have anything new or different to add to the information she provided to them.

She dealt with committee staff member [redacted] and security officer [redacted] Last Name Unknown. She did not have a copy of her testimony.

b6  
b7C

Luff is represented, but she did not identify her attorney.

## Administrative

SSA [redacted] told Luff he would try to obtain her testimony from the Senate and asked that Luff have her attorney contact him.

b6  
b7C

~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~  
~~Derived From: National~~  
~~Security Information SCG~~  
~~Declassify On: 50X1-HUM~~


~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 12/12/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/12/2017

by [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

b6  
b7C  
b7E~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG  
ON 07-30-2020

Date of entry 08/19/2016

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security  
account number [redacted] was interviewed at the [redacted]  
office. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and  
the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7Cb6  
b7C~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~~~Derived From: FBI~~~~NSISC-20090615~~~~Declassify On: 20411231~~~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 08/17/2016 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/17/2016

by [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~~~(U//FOUO)~~ Interview of Continuation of FD-302 of 

On 08/17/2016 Page 2 of 4

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7A  
b7C KILIMNIK had ties  
in open source public records databases to PAUL MANAFORT and businesses  
MANAFORT owned and/or operated. b6  
b7A  
b7C MANAFORT is the  
campaign manager for Republican Presidential nominee DONALD TRUMP.b6  
b7A  
b7C~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5361

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of

[Redacted]

On 08/17/2016 Page 3 of 4

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted]

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
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

Administrative: Due to case restrictions in this matter, this FD-302 was written by SA [Redacted] and forwarded to SA [Redacted] for serialization in the case file.

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
ON 07-22-2020

Date of entry 08/16/2017

(U) On 08/15/2017 SA [redacted] utilized [redacted] to call [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U) [redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U) [redacted] is willing to meet with SA [redacted]. When told that SA [redacted] wanted to discuss [redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U) [redacted]

b6  
b7C~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~~~Derived From: FBI NSIC dated  
20120629~~~~Declassify On: 20421231~~~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 08/15/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone, Other [redacted])

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/15/2017

by [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E