i MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE SECURITY light i ii CONNECTION WETB ACQUESITEONS OF FUREEGN 5: INFORRMTION PURSUANT T0 SECTIGN 762 THE FGREEGN it 3' SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED Section 1 - Applicability and Scope (U) These Nationai Security Agency (NSA) minimization procedures apply to the acquisition, retention, use, and dissemination of non--pu.blicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons that is acquired by targeting non.--United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States in accordance with section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 197 8, as amended ("the Act"). (U) If SA determines that it must take action in apparent departure from these ininiinization procedures to protect against an immediate threat to human life force protection or hostage situations) and that it is not feasible to obtani a timely modification of these procedures, NSA may take such action NSA will report the action taken to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and to the National Security Division of the Department of Justice, which will notify the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of such activity. (U) Section 2 Definitions (U) In addition to the definitions in sections 101 and 701 of the Act, the following definitions will apply to these procedures: Acquisition means the collection. by NSA or the FBI through electronic means of a non- public coniniunication to which it i.s not an intended party. (U) concerning a United States person include all communications in which a United States person is discussed or mentioned, except where such coini.nunica.tio1is reveal only publicly-available information about the person. (U) Conirnunications of a United States person include all cornrnunications to which a United States person is a party. (U) Consent is the agreement by a person or organization to permit the NSA to take particular actions that affect the person or organization. To be effective, consent must be given by the affected person or organization with sufficient knowledge to understand the action that may be taken and the possible consequences of that action. Consent by an organization will be deemed valid if given on behalf of the organization by an official. or governing body determined by the General Counsel, NSA, to have actual or apparent authority to make such an agreement. (U) Derived From: l-52 Dated: 20070108 - "Declassify On: 20320108 Foreign. communication means a comniunication that has at least one outside of the United States. Ail other including comniunications in which the sender and all intended recipients are reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition, are domestic Identification of a United States person means the name, unique titie, address, or other personal identifier of a United States person in the context of activities conducted by that person or activities conducted by others that are related to that person. A reference to a product by brand name, or manufacturer's name or the use of a name in a descriptive sense, e. "Monroe Doctrine," is not an identification of a United States person. Processed or processing means any step necessary to convert a communication into an intelligible form intended for human inspection. (U) (11) Pabliclyevailable information means information that a member of the public could obtain on request, by research in public sources, or by casual observation. (U) Technical data base means information retained for traffic analytic, or signal exploitation purposes. United States person means a United States person as defined in the Act. The following guidelines apply in determining whether a person whose status is unknown is a United States person: (U) (1) A person known to be currently in the United States will be treated as a United States person unless positively identified as an alien who has not been admitted for permanent residence, or unless the nature or circumstances of the person's communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is not a United States person. (U) (2) A person known to be currently outside the United States, or whose location is unknown, wiil not be treated as a. United States person unless such person can be positively identified as such, or the nature or circumstances of the person's give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is a United States person. (U) (3) A person known to be an alien admitted for permanent. residence ioses status as a United States person if the person leaves the United States and is not in compliance with 8 U.S.C. 1203 enabling re-entry into the United States. Failure to follow the statutory procedures provides a reasonable basis to conclude that the alien has abandoned any intention of maintaining his status as a permanent resident alien. (U) (4) An unincorporated association whose headquarters or primary office is located outside the United States is presumed not to be a United States person unless there is information indicating that a substantial number of its members are citizzens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence. (U) 2 30108 Section 3 -- Acquisition and Processing - General (U) Acquisition (U) The acquisition of inforniation by targeting non~--United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States pursuant to section 702 of the Act will be effected in accordance with an authorization made by the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence pursuant to subsection 702(a) of the Act and will be conducted in a manner designed, to the greatest extent reasonably feasible, to ininiinize the acquisition of information not relevant to the authorized purpose of the acquisition. Monitoring, Recording, and Processing (U) (1) Personnel will exercise reasonable judgment in determining whether infonnation acquired must be minimized and will destroy inadvertently acquired conirnunications of or concerning a United States person at the earliest practicable point in the processing cycle at whi ch such corninunication can be identifi ed either: as clearly not relevant to the authorized purpose of the acquisition the communication does not contain foreign intelligence infonnation); or, as not containing evidence of a crime which may be disseminated under these procedures. Such inadvertently acquired conrniunications of or concerning a United States person may be retained no longer than five years in any event. The that may be retained include electronic communications acquired because of limitations on NSASS ability to filter communications. (2) Comnziunications of or concerning United States persons that may be related to the authorized purpose of the acquisition may be forwarded to analytic personnel responsible for producing intelligence infortnation from the collected data. Such or inforrnation may be retained and disseminated only in accordance with Sections 4, 5, 6, and 8 of these procedures. (C) (3) Magnetic tapes or other storage media that contain acquired coinrnunications may be processed. (S) (4) As a is reviewed, NSA analyst(s) will determine whether it is a domestic or foreign communication to, from, orabout a target and is reasonably believed to contain foreign intelligence information or evidence of a crime. Only such cornniunications may be processed. All other cornniunications may be retained or disseminated only in accordance with Sections 5, 6, and 8 of these procedures. (5) Magnetic tapes or other storage media containing acquired pursuant to section 7 02 may be scanned by computer to identify and select coinrnunications for analysis. Computer selection terms used for scanning, such as telephone numbers, key words or phrases, or other disciiniinators, will not include United States person 3 16108 names or identifiers and will be limited to those selection terms reasonably likely to return informati on about foreign intelligence targets. (6) Further processing, retention and dissemination of foreign coinniunications will be made in accordance with Sections 4, 6, 7, and_ 8 as applicable, below. Further processing, storage and dissemination of inadvertently acquired domestic will be made in accordance with Sections 4, 5, and 8 below. Destruction of Raw Data (C) Coinmunications and other information, including that reduced to graphic or "hard copy" form such as facsimile, telex, computer data, or equipment einanations, will be reviewed for retention in accordance with the standards set forth in these procedures. Communications and other information, in any forrn, that do not meet such retention standards and that are to contain communications of or concerning United States persons will be destroyed upon. recognition, and may be retained no longer than five years in any event. The communications that may be retained include eiectronic communications acquired because of limitations on NSA's ability to filter communications. Change in Target's Location or Status (1) In the event that NSA determines that a person is reasonably believed to be located outside the United States and after targeting this person leams that the person is inside the United. States, or if NSA concludes that a person who at the time of targeting was believed to be a States person is in fact a United States person, the acquisition irom that person will be tenninated without delay. (2) Any comrnunications acquired through the targeting of a person who at the time of targeting was reasonably believed to be located outside the United States but is in fact located inside the United States at the time such communications were acquired, and any acquired by targeting a person who at the time of targeting was believed to be a non~United States person but was in fact a United States person, will be treated as domestic communications under these procedures. SI) Section 4 - Acquisition and Processing -- Attorney~Client (C) As soon as it becomes apparent that a is between a person who is known to be under criminal indictment in the United States and an attorney who represents that individual in the matter under indictment (or someone acting on behalf of the attorney), monitoring of that will cease and the will be identified as an attorney-client in a log maintained for that purpose. The relevant portion of the comrnunication containing that conversation will be Segre gated and the National Security Division of the Department of Justice will be notified so that appropriate procedures may be established to protect such cornrnunications from review or use in any criminal prosecution, while preserving foreign intelligence information contained therein. Additionally, all proposed disseminations of information constituting United States person attorney-client 4 privileged communications must be reviewed by the NSA Office of General Counsel prior to dissernination. Section 5 -- Domestic Conimunications (U) A communication identified as a domestic coinmunication will be destroyed upon. recognition unless the Director (or Acting Director) of NSA specifically determines, in writing, that: (S) (1) the communication is reasonably believed to contain significant foreign intelligence information. Such communication may be provided to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (including United States person identities) for possible dissemination by the FBI in accordance with its minimization procedures; (S) (2) the coinniunication does not contain foreign intelligence information but is reasonably believed to contain evidence of a crime that has been, is being, or is about to be Such comniunicati on may be disseminated (including United States person identities) to approp1ja.te Federal law enforcement authorities, in accordance with 50 U.S.C. l806(b) and l825(c), Executive Order No. 12333, and, where applicable, the oriines reporting procedures set out in the August l995 "Mernorandurn of Understanding: Reporting of Information Concerning Federal Crimes," or any successor document. Such communications may be retained by NSA for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed. six months unless extended in writing by the Attorney General, to permit law enforcement agencies to determine whether access to original recordings of such is required for law enforcement purposes; (8) (3) the cornrnunication is reasonably believed. to contain technical data base information, as defined in Section or information necessary to understand or assess a communications security vulnerability. Such communication may be provided to the FBI and/or disseminated. to other elements of the United States Government. Such comnnmications may be retained for a period sufficient to allow a thorough. exploitation and to permit access to data that are, or are reasonably believed likely to become, relevant to a current or future foreign intelligence requirement. Sufficient duration may vary with the nature of the exploitation. a. In the context of a effort, maintenance of technical data bases requires retention. of all. that are enciphe-red or reasonably believed to contain secret meaning, and sufficient duration may consist of any period of time during which material is subject tothe case of coinmunications that are not enciphered or otherwise thought to contain secret meaning, sufficient duration is five years unless the Signal Intelligence Director, NSA, determines in writing that retention for a longer period is required to respond to authorized foreign intelligence or counteiintelligence requirenientsg or 5 (4) the contains information pertaining to a threat of serious harm to life or property. (8) Notwithstanding the above, if a domestic indicates that a target has entered the United States, NSA may advise the FBI of that fact. Moreover, technical data regarding domestic comniunications may be retained and provided to the FBI and CIA for collection avoidance purposes. Section 6 - Foreign Communications of or Concerning United States Persons (U) Retention (U) Foreign of or concerning United States persons collected in the course of an acquisition authorized under section 702 of the Act may be retained only: (1) if necessary for the maintenance of technical data bases. Retention for this purpose is permitted for a period sufficient to allow a thorough exploitation and to permit access to data that are, or are reasonably believed likely to become, relevant to a current or future foreign intelligence requirement. Sufficient duration may vary with the nature of the exploitation. a. In the context of a effort, maintenance of technical data bases requires retention of all communications that are enciphered or reasonably believed to contain secret meaning, and sufficient duration may consist of any period of time during which niateri al is subject tothe case of cornrnunications that are not enciphercd or otherwise thought to contain secret meaning, sufficient duration is five years unless the Signals Intelligence Director, NSA, detennines in writing that retention for a longer period is required to respond to authorized foreign intelligence or counterintelligence requirements; (2) if dissemination of such corninunications with reference to such United States persons would be permitted under subsection below; or (3) if the information is evidence of a crime that has been, is being, or is about to be committed and is provided to appropriate federal law enforcement authorities. Dissemination (U) A report based on communications of or concerning a United States person may be disseminated in accordance with Section 7 or 8 if the identity of the United States person is deleted and a generic term or symbol is substituted so that the infonnation cannot reasonably be connected with an identifiable United States person. Otherwise, dissemination of intelligence reports based on cornrnunications of or concerning a United States person may 6 only he made to a recipient requiring the identity of su.ch person for the performance of official duties but only if at least one of the following criteria is at so met: (1) the United States person has consented to disseinination or the information of or concerning the United States person is available publicly; (2) the identity of the United States person is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance, e. the identity of a senior official in the Executive Branch; (3) the or inforniation indicates that the United States person may be: 21. b. an agent of a foreign power; a foreign power as defined in Section 101 of the Act; residing outside the United States and holding an official position in the government or inilitary forces of a foreign power; a corporation or other entity that is owned or controlled directly or indirectly by a foreign power; or acting in collaboration with an intelligence or security service of a foreign power and the United States person has, or has had, access to classified national security information or material; (4) the or information indicates that the United States person may be the target of intelligence activities of a foreign power; (5) the or information indicates that. the United States person is engaged in the unauthorized disclosure of classified national security inforrnation or the United States person's identity is necessary to understand or assess a communications security vulnerability, but only after the agency that originated the information certifies that it is properly classified; (6) the or inforrnati on indicates that the United States person may be engaging in international terrorist activities; (7) the acquisition of the United States person's communication was authorized by a court order issued pursuant to the Act and the communication may relate to the foreign intelligence purpose of the surveillance; or (8) the coinrnunication or information is reasonably believed to contain. evidence that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be cornniitted, provided that dissemination is for law enforcement purposes and is made in accordance with 50 U.S.C. l806(b) and l825(c), Executive Order No. l2333, and, applicable, the crimes reporting '7 10108 procedures set out in the August 1995 "Memorandum of Understanding: Reporting of Information Concerning Federal Crimes," or any successor document. (U) Provision of Unminirnized Communications to CIA and FBI (1) NSA may provide to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) uuminimized communications acquired pursuant to section 702 of the Act. CIA will identify to NSA targets for which NSA may provide unminimized communications to CIA. CIA will process any such unminimized communications received from NSA in accordance with CIA nairiiniization procedures adopted by the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National lntelligence, pursuant to subsection 7 02(e) of the Act. (2) NSA may provide to the FBI unminimized communications acquired pursuant to section 702 of the Act. The FBI will identify to NSA targets for which NSA may provide uuminimized communications to the FBI. The FBI will process any such unrniniuiized communications received from NSA in accordance with FBI rninimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, pursuant to subsection 702(e) of the Act. SI) Section 7 - Other Foreign Cornmunications (U) Foreign comrnunications of or concerning a non--United States person may be retained, used, and disseminated in any form in accordance with other applicable law, regulation, and policy. (U) Section 8 -- Collaboration with Foreign Govermnents (3.) Procedures for the dissemination of evaluated and immunized information. Pursuant to Section of Executive Order No. 12333, as amended, NSA conducts foreign liaison relationships with certain foreign governments. information acquired pursuant to section 702 of the Act may be disseminated to a foreign government. Except as provided in subsection 8(b) of these procedures, any dissemination to a foreign governrnent of information of or concerning a United States person that is acquired. pursuant to section 702 may only be done in a manner consistent with subsections 6(b) and 7 of these NSA minimization procedures. (S) Procedures for technical or linguistic assistance. It is anticipated that NSA may obtain informa.tion or cornniunications that, because of their technical or linguistic content, may require further analysis by foreign governments to assist NBA in determining their meaning or significance. Notwithstanding other provisions of these minimization procedures, NSA may disseminate computer disks, tape recordings, transcripts, or other inforrnatioii or items containing uniriinirnized information or communications acquired pursuant to section 7 O2 to foreign governments for fiirther processing and analysis, under the following restrictions with respect to any materials so disseminated: (S) 8 10168 l) Dissemination to foreign governments will be solely for translation or analysis of such information or communications, and assisting foreign governments will make no use of any information or any communication of or concerning any person except to provide technical and linguistic assistance to NSA. (S) (2) Dissemination will be only to those personnel within foreign governments involved in the translation or analysis of such infonnation or cormnunications. The number of such personnel will be restricted to the extent feasible. There will be no dissemination within foreign governments of this unrninimized data. (3) (3) Foreign governments will make no perrnanent agency record of information or cornrnunications of or concerning any person referred to or recorded on computer disks, tape recordings, transcripts, or other items disseminated by NSA to foreign governments, provided that foreign governments may maintain such temporary records as are necessary to enable them to assist NSA with the translation or analysis of such information. Records maintained by foreign governments for this purpose may not be disseminated within the foreign governments, except to personnel involved in providing technical or linguistic assistance to NSA. (S) (4) Upon the conclusion or" such technical or linguistic assistance to NSA, computer disks, tape recordings, transcripts, or other items or infornration disseminated to foreign governments will either be returned to NBA or be destroyed with an accounting of such destruction made to NSA. (S) (5) Any information that foreign governments provide to NSA as a result of such teclrnicalr or linguistic assistance may be disseminated by NBA in accordance with these rrzinirn.izatiorr procedures. (S) lo Date Eric H. Holder, Jr. Attorney General of the United tates 9