TGP EXEBET A ii. . 3 PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATEGNAL SECURITY AGENCY NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS BELIEVEB TO oursinn ran UNITED states to ACQUIRE FOREIGN re" as 'w rnromviarron PURSUANT To section 792 or ran FOREEG-N SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED (S) These procedures address: (I) the manner in which the National Security A gency/Central Security Service (NSA) will determine that a person targeted under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of l978, as amended ("the Act"), is a non-United States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States ("foreignness determination"); (ll) the post~targeting analysis done by NSA to ensure that the targeting of such person does not intentionally target a person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States and does not result in the intentional. acquisition of any as to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States; the docnn'1ent.ation of NSA's foreignness determination; (IV) cornpliance and oversight; and (V) departures from these procedures. - I. (U) DETERMENATEON OF WHETHER TEE ACQUESETEGN TARGETS NON- UNITED STATES PERSONS REASONABLY BELEEVED TO BE LOCATED OUTSEBE THE UNITED STATES (S) NSA determines Whether a person. is a non--United States person reasonably believed to be outside the United States in light of the totality of the circumstances based on the information available with respect to that person, including infomiation concerning the facility or facilities used by that person. (8) NSA examine the following three categories of information, as appropriate under the circumstances, to make the above determination: (1) they examine the lead infonnation they have received regarding the potential target or the facility that has generated interest in conducting surveillance to detennine what that lead information discloses about the person's location; (2) they conduct research in NSA databases, available reports and collateral information information to which NSA has access but did not originate, such as reports from other agencies and publicly available information) to determine whether NSA knows the location of the person, or knows inforrnation that would provide evidence concerning that location; and (3) they conduct technical analyses of the facility or facilities to determine or verify information about the person's location. NSA may use information from any one or a conibination of these categories of information in evaluating the totality of the circumstances to determine that the potential target is located outside the United States. in addition, in those cases Where NSA seeks to acquire comn'n.1nications about the target that are not to or from the target, NSA will either employ an Internet Protocol filter to ensure that the person from whom it seeks to obtain foreign intelligence information is located Derived From: l--52 Dated: 20070108 Declassify On: 20320108 TOP TOP overseas, or it will target Internet links that terminate in a foreign country. In either event, NSA will direct surveillance at a party to the reasonably believed to be outside the United States. (S) Lead Information (S) When NSA proposes to direct surveillance at a target, it does so because NSA has already learned something about the target or the facility or facilities the target uses to conununicate. Accordingly, NSA will the lead information to deterinine What it reveals about the physical location of the target, including the location of the facility or facilities being used by the potential target. (S) The following are examples of the types of lead information that NSA may examine: a) Has the target stated that he is located outside the United States? For example, has NSA or another intelligence agency collected a statement or statements made by the target indicating that he is located outside the United States? b) Has a human intelligence source or other source of lead information indicated that the target is located outside the United States? c) Does the lead infonnation provided by an intelligence or law enforcement agency of the United States government or an intelligence or law enforcement service of a foreign government indicate that the target is located outside the United States? d) W3.S the lead information about the target found on a hard drive or other rnediuni that was seized in a foreign country? c) Vllith whom has the target. had direct contact, and what do we know about the location of such persons? For example, if lead information indicates the target is in direct contact with several members of a foreign--based terrorist organization or foreign- based political organization who themselves are located overseas, that may suggest, depending on the totality of the circumstances, that the target is also located overseas. (S) Information NBA Fins About the Target's Location and/or Facility or Facilities Used by the Target (S) NSA may also review information in its databases, including repositories of information collected by NSA and by other intelligence agencies, as well as publicly available to determine if the person's location, or information providing evidence about the person's location, is already known. The NSA databases that would be used for this purpose contain infoimation culled from signals intelligence, huinan intelligence, law enforcement inforniatiori, and other sources. For example, NSA databases may include a. report produced by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with the fact that a known terrorist is using a telephone with a particular number, or detailed information on Worldwide telephony numbering plans for wire and wireless telephone systems. TOP 2 TOP (S) NSA Technical Analysis of the Facility (8) NSA may also apply technical analysis concerning the facility from which it intends to acquire foreign intelligence information to assist it in making deterrninations concerning the location of the person at whom NSA intends to direct snweillance. For exarnple, NSA may examine the following types of information: S) For telephone numbers: a) Identify the country code of the telephone number, and determine what it indicates about the person's location. 13) Review commercially available and NSA telephone numbering databases for indications of the type of telephone being used g. landline, Wireless mobile, satellite, etc.), information that may provide an understanding of the location of the target. (8) For electronic coinniunications Review NSA. content repositories and Internet communications data repositories (which contain, among other things, Internet metadata) for previous Internet activity. This information may contain network layer Internet Protocol addresses) or inachine identifier Media Access Control addresses) inforniation, which NSA compares to information contained in NSA's communication network databases and conntnercialiy available Internet Protocol address registration information in order to determine the location of the target. (8) Assessment of the Non--U1iited States Person Status of the Target (8) In many cases, the infonnation that NSA examines in order to determine whether a target is reasonably believed to be located outside the United States may also bear upon the non~United States person status of that target. For example, lead infonriation provided by an intelligence or law enforcement service of a foreign government may indicate not only that the target is located in a foreign country, but that the target is a citizen of that or another foreign country. Similarly, infortnation contained in NSA databases, including repositories of infonnation collected by NSA and by other intelligence agencies, may indicate that the target is a non--United States person. (S) Furthermore, in order to prevent the inadvertent targeting of a United States person, NSA maintains records of telephone numbers and electronic accounts/addresses/ identifiers that NSA has reason to believe are being used by United States persons. Prior to targeting, a particular telephone number or electronic conununications account/address/identifier will be compared against those records in order to ascertain whether NSA has reason to believe that telephone nurnber or electronic accountfaddress/identifier i.s being used by a United States person. TOP 3 TOP (S) in the absence of specific information regarding whether a target is a United States person, a person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States or whose location is not known will. be presumed to be a non-United States person unless such person can be positively identified as a United States person, or the nature or circumstances of the person's coinmunications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is a United States person. (S) Assessment of the Foreign intelligence Purpose of the 'l'argeting (8) ln assessing whether the target possesses and] or is likely to communicate foreign intelligence inforrnation concerning a foreign power or foreign territory, NSA considers, among other things, the following factors: a. With respect to telephone communications: hiforniation indicates that the telephone number has been used to communicate directly with another telephone number reasonably believed by the US. Intelligence Community to be used by an individual associated. with a foreign power or foreign territory; at Information indicates that a user of the telephone number has directly with an individual reasonably believed by the U.S. intelligence Community to be associated with a foreign power or foreign territory; Information indicates that the telephone number is listed in the telephone directory of a telephone used by an individual associated with a foreign power or foreign territory; a lnfonnation indicates that the telephone number has been transmitted during a telephone call or other corrnnunication with an individual reasonably believed by the U.S. intelligence Community to be associated with a foreign power or foreign territory; a Publicly available sources of in.forn1ation(e.g., telephone listings) match the telephone number to an individual reasonably believed by the US. intelligence Cornrnunity to be associated with a foreign power or foreign tenitory; Information contained in various NSA--1na.intained knowledge databases containing foreign intelligence information acquired by any lawful means, such as electronic surveillance, physical search, or the use of a pen register and trap or trace device, or other information, reveals that the telephone number has been previously used by an individual associated with a foreign power or foreign territory; or The NSA knowledge databases that would be used to satisfy this factor contain fused intelligence information concerning international terrorism culled from signals intelligence, human intelligence, law enforcement information, and other sources. The information compiled in these databases is information that assists the signals intelligence system in effecting collection on intelligence targets. For example, a report produced by the CIA may include the fact that a known terrorist is using a telephone with a particular number. NSA would include that information in its knowledge databases. TOP 4 TOP lnfonnation made available to NSA as a result of processing telephony metadata records acquired by any lawful means, such as electronic surveillance, physical search, or the use of a pen register or trap and trace device, or other information, reveals that the telephone number is used by an individual associated with a foreign power or foreign territory. With respect to Internet coinniunications: 9 lnforrnati on indicates that the electronic eonununications account/address/identifier has been used to cornmunicate directly with an electronic account/address/identitier reasonably believed by the U.S. intelligence Community to be used by an individual associated with a foreign power or foreign territory; information indicates that a user of the electronic account/address/ identifier has directly with an individual reasonably believed to be associated with a foreign power or foreign territory; Information indicates that the electronic account/address/identitier is included in the "buddy list" or address book of an electronic conununications account/address/identifier reasonably believed by the US. Intelligence Corninutiity to be used by an individual associated with a foreign power or foreign territory; Infonnation indicates that the electronic account/address/identifier has been transmitted during a telephone call or other coinniunicatioii with an individual reasonably believed. by the US. Intelligence Coinrnunity to be associated with a foreign power or foreign territory; Public Internet postings match the electronic cornniunications account/address/ identifier to an individual reasonably believed by the U.S. intelligence Community to be associated with a foreign power or foreign territory; Information contained in various NSA-niaintained knowledge databases of foreign intelligence inforination acquired by any lavvfiil means, such as electronic surveillance, physical search, the use of a pen register or trap and trace device, or other information, reveals that electronic cornnsunications account/address/identifier has been previously used by an individual associated with a foreign power or foreign territory; lnforrnation made available to NSA as a result of processing inetadata records acquired by any lawful means, such as electronic suiveillance, physical search, or the use of a pen register or trap and trace device, or other information, reveals that the electronic coinniunications account/address/identifier is used by an individual associated with a foreign power or foreign territory; or lnforniation indicates that Internet Protocol ranges and/or specific electronic identifiers or signatures specific types of or steganography) are used almost exclusively by individuals associated with a foreign power or foreign territory, TOP 5 or are used by individuals associated. with a foreign power or foreign territory. H. (S) POST-TARGETIING ANALYSIS BY NSA. After a person has been targeted for acquisition by NSA, NSA will condu.ct post>> targeting analysis. Such analysis is designed to detect those occasions when a person who when targeted was reasonably believed to be located outside the United States has since entered the United States, and will enable NSA to take steps to prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States, or the intentional targeting of a person who is inside the United States. Such analysis may include: For telephone nuinbers: Routinely comparing telephone numbers tasked. purseant to these procedures against information that has been incidentally collected from the Global System for Mobiles (GSM) Home Location Registers (HLR). These registers receive updates whenever a GSM phone moves into a new service area. Analysis of this HLR information provides a primary indicator of a foreign user of a mobile telephone entering the United States. NSA may analyze content for indications that a foreign target has entered or intends to enter the United States. Such content analysis will be conducted. according to analytic and intelligence requirements and priorities. For electronic communications 9 Routinely all electronic communications accounts/addresses/identitiers tasked pursuant to these procedures against available databases that contain Internet communications data (including metadata) to determine if an electronic communi cations account/address/identifier was accessed from overseas. Such databases contain contact information and summaries of activity tron} NSA signals intelligence collection. The foreign access determination is made based on comparing the lnternet Protocol address associated with the account activity to other inforination NSA possesses about geographical area(s) serviced by particular Internet Protocol addresses. If the address associated with the target activity is identified as a U.S.--based network gateway a l-Iotmail server) or a private Internet Protocol address, then NSA will be required to perfoini additional research to determine if the access was in a foreign country using additional criteria such as machine identifier or case notation (NSA circuit identifier) of a. cornrnunications link known to be foreign. Such databases normally maintain i11forn1ation about such activity for a 12-month period. This data will be used in an attempt to rule out false positives from U.S.-based network gateways. If the account access is determined to be from a U.S.-based machine, further analytic checks will be performed using content collection to determine if the target has moved into the United States. 6 TOP 08 Routinely comparing electronic cornniunications accounts/addresses/identifiers tasked pursuant to these procedures against a list of electronic communications accounts/ addresses/identifiers already identified by NSA as being accessed from inside the United States. This will help ensure that no target has been recognized to be located in the United States. a NSA inay analyze content for indications that a target has entered or intends to enter the United States. Such content analysis will be conducted according to analytic and intelligence requirenients and priorities. (S) detennines that a target has entered the United States, it will follow the procedures set forth in section IV of this document, including the termination of the acquisition from the target without delay. ln cases where NSA cannot resolve an apparent conflict between information indicating that the target has entered the United States and information indicating that the target remains located outside the United States, NSA will presume that the target has entered the United States and will terminate the acquisition from that target. If at a later time NSA determines that the target is in fact located outside the United. States, NSA may re--initiate the acquisition in accordance with these procedures. (S) If NSA deterrnines that a target who at the time of targeting was believed to be a non--United States person was in fact a United States person, it will follow the procedures set forth in section IV of this document, including the terrnination of the acquisition horn the target without delay. H1. (U) DOCUMENTATEON (S) who request tasking will document in the tasking database a citation or citations to the information that led them to reasonably believe that a targeted person is located outside the United States. Before tasking is approved, the database entry for that tasking will be reviewed in order to verify that the database entry contains the necessary citations. (3) A citation is a reference that identifies the source of the information, such as a report number or intercept identifi er, which NSA will maintain. The citation will enable those responsible for conducting oversight to locate and review the inforrnation that led NSA to conclude that a target is reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. (S) also will identify the foreign power or foreign territory about which they expect to obtain foreign intelligence information pursuant to the proposed targeting. W. (U) AND comprrancs (S) NSA's Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID) Oveisight and Coinpliance, with NSA's Office of General Counsel (OGC), will develop and deliver training regarding the applicable procedures to ensure intelligence personnel responsible for approving the targeting of persons under these procedures, as well as with access to the acquired foreign intelligence infonnation understand their responsibilities and the procedures that apply to this acquisition. SID Oversight and Compliance has established processes for ensuring that raw traffic is labeled and stored only in authorized repositories, and is accessible only to those who have had the proper training. SID TOP 7 TOP Oversight and Compliance will conduct ongoing oversight activities and will make any necessary reports, including those relating to incidents of noncompliance, to the NSA Inspector General and OGC, in accordance with its NSA charter. SID Oversight and Compliance will also ensure that necessary corrective actions are taken to address any identified deficiencies. To that end, Oversight and Compliance will conduct periodic spot checks of targeting decisions and intelligence disseniinations to ensure compliance with established procedures, and conduct periodic spot checks of queries in data repositories. (S) The Department of Justice (DOD and the Office of the Director of National l'ntel.li.gence (ODNI) will conduct oversight of NSA's exercise of the authority under section 702 of the Act, Wliich will include periodic reviews by and ODNI personnel to evaluate the iinpleinentation of the procedures. Such reviews will occur at least once every sixty days. (8) NSA will report to DOJ, to the ODNI Office of General Counsel, and to the ODNI Civil Liberties Protection Officer any incidents of noncompliance with these procedures by NSA personnel that result in the intentional targeting of a person reasonably believed to be located in the United States, the intentional targeting of a United States person, or the intentional acquisition of any coininunication in which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of acquisition to be located within the United States. NSA will provide such reports within five business days of learning of the incident. Any information acquired by intentionally targeting a United States person or a person not reasonably believed to be outside the United States at the time of such targeting will be purged from NSA databases. (S) NSA will report to through the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the National Security Division with responsibility for intelligence operations and oversight, to the ODNI Oitiice of General Counsel, and to the ODNI Civil Liberties Protection Offi cer, any incidents of noncompliance (including overcollection) by any electronic service provider to whom the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence issued a directive under section 702. Such report will be made within five business days after determining that the electronic service provider has not complied or does not intend to comply vvith a directive. (S) In the event that NSA concludes that a person is reasonably believed to be located outside the United States and after targeting this person learns that the person is inside the United States, or if NSA concludes that a person who at the time of targeting was believed to be a non-United States person was in fact a United States person, it will take the following steps: 1) Terminate the acquisition without delay and determine whether to seek a Court order under another section of the Act. If NSA inadvertently acquires a cornrnunication sent to or from the target While the target is or was located inside the United States, including any coinniunication where the sender and all intended recipients are reasonably believed. to be located inside the United States at the time of acqtlisition, such will be treated in accordance with the applicable ininirnization procedures. 8 TOP 2) Report the incident to through the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the National Security Division with responsibility for intelligence operations and oversight, to the ODNI Office of General Counsel, and to the ODNI Civil Liberties Protection Officer Witliin five business days. V. (U) DEPARTURE FROM PRGCEDURES (S) If, in order to protect against an immediate threat to the national security, NSA determines that it must take action, on a temporary basis, in apparent departure from these procedures and that it is not feasible to obtain a timely modification of these procedures fi'O3'11 the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence, NSA may take such action and will report that activity to through the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the National Secuiity Division with responsibility for intelligence operations and oversight, to the ODNI Office of General Counsel, and to the ODNI Civil Liberti es Protection Officer. Under such circurnstances, the Government will continue to adhere to all of the statutory limitations set forth in subsection 702(b) of the Act. 3-art re": Date Eric H. Holder, Jr. Attorney General of the United gates 9