STATE OF MICHIGAN
WAYNE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
MICHAEL OLIVER,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO.
HON.

NO

v.
DONALD BUSSA, In his
individual and official capacity,
STEPHEN CASSINI, an individual
and CITY OF DETROIT,
Jointly and Severally,
Defendants,
__________________________________________________________/
DAVID A. ROBINSON (P 38754)
BRANDON MCNEAL (P 81300)
ROBINSON AND ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
28145 Greenfield Rd., Suite 100
Southfield, MI 48076
(248) 423-7234
davidrobinsonlaw@gmail.com
THOMAS E. KUHN (P37924)
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff
615 Griswold Street, Ste. 515
Detroit, MI 48226
313.963.522; fax 313.963.9061
tekuhn@aol.com
___________________________________________________/
COMPLAINT and JURY DEMAND
There is no other pending or resolved cases between these parties or other parties
arising from the transaction or occurrence alleged in the complaint.
_____/s/ David A. Robinson_______

 DAVID A. ROBINSON (P39754)
NOW COMES the Plaintiff, by and through his attorneys, and for his
complaint against the Defendants states as follows:
PARTIES
1. At all pertinent times, Plaintiff was a resident of Wayne County, and a citizen
of the State of Michigan.
2. Defendant Bussa, (hereafter Bussa) was a citizen of the State of Michigan,
and at all pertinent times worked and was employed by Defendant City of
Detroit, a Michigan municipality, as a police officer in Wayne County.
3. Defendant CITY OF DETROIT (hereinafter DETROIT ) is a municipal
corporation and/or political sub-division operating under, and subject to, the
constitution and laws of the State of Michigan, and of the United States.
4. Defendant Cassini (hereafter Cassini) is a resident of Wayne County and was
a citizen of the State of Michigan,
JURISDICTION and VENUE
5. Individual Defendant Bussa was at all pertinent times employed as a police
officer and was, at all times pertinent, acting under color of state law and
pursuant to customs, policies and practices of Defendant City of Detroit.
6. The Plaintiff brings this action under the Constitution of the United States and
under 42 USC 1983, and state law.

2

 7. The actions giving rise to this complaint arose entirely within Wayne County,
Michigan around July 31, 2019, but also earlier and later.
8. The amount in controversy exceeds TWELVE MILLION DOLLARS 00/100
$12,000,000.00.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
9. Defendant Bussa, working as DPD investigator, was assigned to investigate a
larceny committed by a person, easily identifiable, against Cassini which
occurred May 15, 2019.
10. On the date of the larceny Cassini’s phone was snatched by an African
American male at the same time that Cassini was recording him, his friend
and a large crowd on Warren Ave. in the City of Detroit.
11. The disturbance arose near the school where Cassini worked as a teacher, and
involved a number of students from the school. Other students from the school
hollered at the African American suspect telling him that Cassini was a
teacher. This made the suspect throw the phone away, after which Cassini
retrieved it.
12.

Cassini called the police to report the crime. The recording on Cassini’s
phone was undisturbed. He gave his phone to the police who obtained the
images of the African American suspect.

3

 13.

The images recorded the crime, the actual suspect and a friend of the
suspect.

14.

At some later time Cassini met with Bussa and told Bussa that Andre
Jackson was the other African American in the video who was in the
company of the suspect.

15.

On being assigned the case Bussa contacted the DPD Crime Intel Unit. He
gave the image from the phone to Lieutenant Joseph Dabliz, who was in
charge of DPD facial recognition and requested he run the suspect’s image
through the Data Works Plus data bank.

16.

The facial recognition data bank in use by the DPD returned Plaintiff’s
photo. Without any further investigation, Bussa denoted the Plaintiff was
the person in the recording who assaulted Cassini.

Without further

investigation and without the benefit of a DPD written policy on the use and
implementation of facial recognition utility, Bussa assumed Plaintiff was
the person who snatched Cassini’s phone.
17.

Based on the failed technology and failed DPD policy Bussa conducted a
photo show up where Cassini allegedly identified the Plaintiff.

18.

During the investigation Cassini claimed he spoke to his former student,
Andre Jackson, and learned from him that the Plaintiff was the person who
snatched his phone. This was a lie.
4

 19.

Without contacting Andre Jackson or the school or any of the student
witnesses to the actual crime Bussa submitted a warrant request to the
Wayne County Prosecutor which resulted in a warrant for the Plaintiff’s
arrest.

20.

On July 31, 2019, while the Plaintiff was driving to work he was stopped by
a Ferndale police officer and told there was a felony warrant out of Detroit
for his arrest. The officer took Plaintiff from his car and ordered him under
arrest. The officer also impounded his car.

21.

Plaintiff was handcuffed and carted off to jail. Detroit police picked up the
Plaintiff from Ferndale and drove him to the Detroit Detention Center
(DDC) where he was jailed for nearly three days.

22.

While at the DDC, Bussa never made any attempt to take a statement from
the Plaintiff or do anything to offer the Plaintiff the chance to prove his
innocence.

23.

Bussa never attempted to take any other investigative strategies to correctly
identify the actual criminal who assaulted Cassini.

24.

On August 26, 2019, at a preliminary examination Plaintiff was bound over.
Cassini pointed at the Plaintiff during the hearing identifying him. However
this in court identification was clearly tainted.

5

 25.

On or about September 13, 2019 at the prosecutor’s request all charges
against the Plaintiff were dismissed as it was clear to the prosecutor, the
court and Plaintiff’s attorney that the image of Plaintiff and that of the
suspect were distinctly not the same and he had been misidentified.

26.

As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ misconduct, the Plaintiff
suffered injuries and damages including, but not limited to:
a.

Physical and emotional injuries, aggravations and pain and suffering;

b.

Fear, anxiety, humiliation, and shame;

c.

Loss of liberty;

d.

Serious emotional distress;

e.

Economic damages, past and future, including, but not limited to
medical expenses and attorney fees.
COUNT I
42 USC 1983 AGAINST BUSSA

27.

Plaintiff hereby re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference all of the
prior paragraphs, as though the same were fully set forth herein word for
word.

28.

Bussa’s actions were done in his individual capacity, and under color of
state law.

29.

Bussa’s actions violated clearly established rights of the Plaintiff including
but not limited to:
6

 (a)
(b)

30.

The right to be free from wrongful seizure (4th Amendment);
The right to procedural and substantive due process and fair
treatment during stop, search, and seizure (1st, 4th, and 14th
Amendments);

As a direct and proximate result of Bussa’s actions, Plaintiff suffered injury
and damages including those set forth in paragraph 26.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff claims judgment against Bussa in the amount

of TWELVE MILLION DOLLARS ($12,000,000.00) which is fair and just and
consistent with the law and evidence as shall be determined, together with
interest, costs and attorney’s fees, and all other damages, including exemplary
and/or punitive damages allowable by law.
COUNT II
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY AGAINST DEFENDANT CITY OF DETROIT
UNDER 42 USC 1983
31.

The Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in the
paragraphs above, as if fully set forth herein.

32.

At all times herein, Defendant CITY OF DETROIT, with deliberate
indifference to the constitutional rights of the Plaintiff and other similarly
situated individuals, established, condoned, promulgated, implemented, and
maintained the following customs, policies, and/or practices that were a
proximate cause and a moving force in violations of the Plaintiff’s rights
under the United States Constitution:
7

 (a) Routinely

continuing

wrongful

seizures

without

reason

or

justification based on a facial recognition system put in use by DPD to
catch criminals knowing at the time the technology was problematic when
attempting identify persons of color;
(b) Even though knowing the facial recognition system in use
misidentified persons of color DPD put this flawed identification process
in use without any written policy or training or notice to users of its
systemic inadequacy in identifying persons of color.
(c) That the record of misidentifications is greater than just this Plaintiff
and others known to the Plaintiff including but not limited to Robert
Williams, who is similarly of African American heritage, and others as yet
unknown to the Plaintiff but who will be identified in the discovery
process;
(d) Routinely concealing, covering up, and hiding evidence of
wrongdoing by law enforcement officers employed by the Defendant City
of Detroit;
(e) Failing to adequately train, supervise, and/or discipline law
enforcement officers and supervisors with regard to the appropriate and
necessary bases for lawful seizure;

8

 (f) Hiring and/or retaining as law enforcement officers and supervisors
certain persons whom the Defendant City of Detroit knew or had actual
notice of unlawful seizure without reason or justification;
(g) Failing to intervene when it knew of improper continuation of use of
unlawful seizure;
(h) Ratifying, condoning and/or permitting the conduct of Bucca and
other officers to continue the use of facial recognition procedure knowing
the technological failure of the process to accurately identify persons of
color;
(i) Relying on failed facial recognition technology knowing the science
of facial recognition has a substantial error rate among black and brown
persons of ethnicity which would lead to the wrongful arrest and
incarceration of persons in that ethnic demographic.
(j) Failing to even have a written policy at the time of Plaintiff’s
wrongful arrest knowing the science of facial recognition has a substantial
error rate among black and brown persons of ethnicity which would lead
to the wrongful arrest and incarceration of people in that ethnic
demographic.
33. Each of the aforementioned customs, policies, or practices was known to
Defendant City of Detroit as highly likely and probable to cause violations
9

 of the United States Constitutional rights of Plaintiff and other individuals
subject to wrongful identification and arrest, each was a moving force in the
violations of the Plaintiff’s United States Constitutional rights, as set forth
herein.
34.

As a direct and proximate result of the actions taken by the Defendants, as
discussed more fully above, the Plaintiff has suffered severe damages as
listed in paragraph 26, and including but not limited to:
(a)
(b)

Psychological harm, past and future;

Degradation, humiliation, embarrassment, indignation, outrage,
shame, fear, anxiety, loss of reputation, emotional distress, loss of
enjoyment, loss of enjoyment of life, and past and future mental
anguish;
(c)

Pain and suffering due to physical injury;

(d)

Economic loss;

(e)

Attorney fees and costs allowable under 42 USC 1988.

COUNT III
EQUALPROTECTION UNDER THE 14TH AMENDENT
35.

The Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in the
paragraphs above, as if fully set forth herein.

10

 36.

DPD and Bussa had a duty pursuant to the the 14 th Amendment of the
United States Constitution to provide Plaintiff with equal protection under
the law.

37.

DPD and Bussa breached their duty by continuing to use a flawed facial
recognition system knowing it’s error rate in misidentifying black and
brown persons who were not involved in any crime yet seeking arrest
warrants against them and doing so with no written DPD policy on the use,
implementation and direction.

38.

As a direct and proximate result of the actions taken by the Defendants, as
discussed more fully above, the Plaintiff has suffered severe damages as
listed in paragraph 26, and including but not limited to:
(a)

Psychological harm, past and future;

(b)

Degradation, humiliation, embarrassment, indignation, outrage,

shame, fear, anxiety, loss of reputation, emotional distress, loss of
enjoyment, loss of enjoyment of life, and past and future mental anguish;
(c)

Pain and suffering due to physical injury;
(d) Economic loss;

(e) Attorney fees and costs allowable under 42 USC 1988.
COUNT IV
ELLIOT LARSON
VIOLATION OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE
AT MCLA37.2301 AGAINST THE CITY OF DETROIT
11

 39.

Plaintiff incorporates herein Paragraphs 1- 39 and further states:

40.

The Plaintiff was denied “full and equal enjoyment of . . . public service
because of . . . race. . .” MCL 37.2302.

41.

Defendants' conduct constituted racial discrimination as defined under the
Elliott-Larsen Act.

42.

Defendant COD allowed Bussa and others to engage in a pattern of racial
discrimination of plaintiff and other African-American citizens in violation
of the equal protection guaranteed by Elliott-Larsen Act.

43.

As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of defendants, plaintiff has
suffered injuries and damages, including but not limited to:
i. Past and future pain and suffering, embarrassment,
humiliation, mortification;
ii. Economic Damages;
iii. Past and future emotional distress; and
iv. Deprivation of equal protection and due process of law.

44.

Defendant CITY OF DETROIT Police Department is a place of public
accommodation, a public service, and law enforcement agency as defined in
Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act (the Act), MCLA 37.2301.

45.

COD’s officer Bussa is a person, as that term is defined in the Act, and is an
agent of the CITY OF DETROIT.
12

 46.

Defendant COD violated the Act and deprived the Plaintiff of his civil
rights by, among other things, subjecting the Plaintiff, because of his race,
arresting Plaintiff and other untoward acts which had the purpose and effect
of denying her the full benefit of public safety of the police department and
denying Plaintiff full and equal access to the use and privileges of public
accommodations, public service, and police protection.

47.

Wherefore, Plaintiff requests damages as allowable by law.
COUNT V
NEGLIGENCE AGAINST CASSINI

48.

Cassini had a duty to tell the truth about who had stolen his phone in order
to avoid infliction of harm and wrongful arrest of the Plaintiff.

49.

Cassini breached that duty when he claimed it was the Plaintiff that
comitted the larceny thereby instigating the Plaintiff’s arrest.

50.

As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ misconduct, the Plaintiff
suffered injuries and damages including, but not limited to:
a. Physical and emotional injuries, aggravations and pain and suffering;
b. Fear, anxiety, humiliation, and shame;
c. Loss of liberty;
d. Serious emotional distress;
e. Economic damages, past and future, including, but not limited to
medical expenses and attorney fees.
13

 COUNT VI
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
51.

Plaintiff hereby re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference all of the
prior paragraphs, as though the same were fully set forth herein word for
word.

52.

At all times relevant hereto Bussa notwithstanding his standard duty of
care, owed Plaintiff the following duties, among other:
(a) To refrain from inflicting intentional emotional distress on Plaintiff,
in bad faith;
(b) To refrain from subjecting Plaintiff to wrongful arrest and other abuse
in violation of Michigan law and in bad faith;
(c) To refrain from subjecting Plaintiff to emotional distress through
wrongful seizure, physical assault and battery, and further threats which
were also assaults;
(d)

53.

To refrain from treating Plaintiff in an extremely abusive manner;

Bussa willfully, wantonly, recklessly, knowingly and/or intentionally
breached one or more of said duties by, among other things:
(a) Recklessly, wantonly and/or intentionally, in bad faith, inflicting
emotional distress upon Plaintiff by wrongfully assaulting and battering
Plaintiff;
(b) Recklessly, wantonly and/or intentionally, in bad faith, subjecting
Plaintiff to injury and pain resulting from assault and battery;
(c) Recklessly, wantonly and/or intentionally, in bad faith, treating
Plaintiff in an extremely and outrageously abusive manner.

14

 54.

As a direct and proximate result of said reckless, willful, wanton, knowing
and/or intentional misconduct, all done in bad faith, by Bussa, Plaintiff
suffered and continues to suffer serious and permanent personal injuries,
including but not limited to, physical and mental pain, serious mental
anguish, serious emotional distress, shock, fright, humiliation, degradation,
embarrassment, loss of enjoyment of life, and a lesser leaning, liking and
ability towards previous home, family, social, recreational and personal
activities, all past, present and future, as well as any other damage listed in
paragraph 26.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant Bussa for

whatever amount a jury shall determine together with interests, costs, exemplary
damages, attorney fees and any other relief allowable by law.
COUNT VII
GROSS NEGLIGENCE
55.

Plaintiff re-alleges all prior paragraphs.

56.

Defendant Bussa owed Plaintiff a duty of care, including but not limited to
a:
(a)

Duty to provide protection for Plaintiff when he was in a helpless
condition;

(b)

Duty not to make Plaintiff’s condition worse after taking him into his
custody and control;

(c)

Duty to properly supervise other officers;
15

 57.

(d)

Duty to properly assure the safety of Plaintiff when he was in his
care;

(e)

Duty not to discontinue their aid or protection, and by doing so leave
Plaintiff in a worse position than when the Defendant took charge of
him. Rest. 2nd Torts §324A;

(f)

Duty not to injure Plaintiff through gross negligent conduct.

The actions of Bussa, wantonly and recklessly, with gross negligence,
violated the duties to Plaintiff and disregarded Plaintiff’s rights.

58.

Bussa wantonly and recklessly, with gross negligence, violated the duties to
Plaintiff and disregarded Plaintiff’s rights.

59.

Bussa’s acting with gross negligence and denying Plaintiff’s rights caused
loss of rights and injury to the Plaintiff.

60.

The Bussa’s actions were in wanton, reckless and callous disregard to
Plaintiff’s rights and to the injury to Plaintiff and were grossly negligent.

61.

Under MCL 691.1407, citizens may maintain an action in tort against police
officers whose actions constitute gross negligence and state granted
immunity does not bar such a claim even when the officer is acting within
the scope of his authority.

62.

As a direct and proximate result of Bussa’s actions, Plaintiff suffered injury
and damages including, but not limited to, those set forth in paragraph 26.

16

 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendant for
whatever amount a jury shall determine together with interests, costs, and attorney
fees.
JURY DEMAND
NOW COMES the Plaintiff and demands trial of his cause by jury.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ David A. Robinson
David A. Robinson(P38754)
Brandon McNeal (P81300)
Thomas E. Kuhn (P37924)
ROBINSON AND ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Dated: September 4, 2020

17