UNCLASSIFIED

Homeland
Securlty

UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

Introduction

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
    
     
   
   
   
     
   

 

 

 

 

 

Scape Note
Key Takeaways
The Cyber Threat to the Homeland 7
Nation?State Threats 7 .
Cybercrime 9
Cyber Threats to US Democratic Processes 9
Foreign In?uence in the Homeland 12
Amplifying US Social-Political Division 13
In?uence Narratives 14
2020 US Presidential Election 16
2020 US Census I8
In?uencing State and Local Governments 13
l? Counterintelligence and Threats to US Economic Security 20
COVID-I9 E?iects on Economic Security 20
Exploiting US Academic Institutions and Research 21
Foreign Investment in the United States 22
Threats to US Supply Chain Integrity 23
Violations of US Trade Laws and Policies 24
The Terrorist Threat to the Homeland 25
Violent Extremism in the United States 2 5
Foreign Terrorist Threats 23

Transnational Organized Criminal Threats to US Security 30

 

 

Mexico-based Cartels 30
Illicit Drugs 31
Irregular Migration to the United States 32
Irregular Land Migration 32

 

Irregular Maritime Mgration 33

  
 

    

Introduction

 

The evolving Homeland threat landscape includes complex
challenges from hostile nation-states, cyber threat actors,
terrorists, transnational criminal organizations, and emerging
infectious diseases. In this ?rst annual Homeland Threat
Assessment, we provide a strategic overview of these and other
key threats, and how we anticipate their evolution through 2021.

While terrorism and criminal threats endure, this
Assessment makes clear that great-power competition? often
considered in terms of overseas actions and foreign policy?-
increasingly is playing out in the Homeland through cyber,
in?uence, and economic means. We see the effects throughout all
levels of government, industry, academia, and society.

Most recently, the novel coronavirus pandemic
has presented a new set of challenges to America?s security,
safety, health, and prosperity. impact on every
traditional Homeland threat vector underscores the need to
continually reassess existing assumptions across all domains. The
effects of this pandemic undoubtedly will shape the Homeland
threat environment in unpredictable ways, probably for years to
come.

The Department of Homeland Security? 5 Intelligence
Enterprise (DI-IS IE) works every day to collect, analyze, and share
information from all sources on the threats we describe in this
Assessment. We ensure that policymakers and operators at the
Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial levels as well as in the
private sector?can act to keep America safe, secure, and resilient.
The officers of the DHS IE will remain vigilant and agile as we
adapt to the changing threat landscape and arm our partners to do
the same.

 

  
    

 
  

i 3? .5 
Scope Note

 

This Homeland Threat Assessment was produced in
response to direction from the Secretary of Homeland Security to
prepare an annual strategic forecast of the Homeland threat
environment. It is intended to support policymaking, planning,
resource allocations, and inter-governmental partnerships.

The judgments within the HTA are those of the Department of
Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise (DI-IS IE), including
two US Intelligence Community elements -?the Of?ce of
Intelligence and Analysis and the US Coast Guard and the
intelligence elements within US Citizenship and Immigration
Services, US Customs and Border Protection, the Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
the US Secret Service, the Transportation Security Administration,
and the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Of?ce.

0 The HTA addresses what the DHS IE judges are top threat
issues through 2021 it is not a comprehensive review of all
Homeland threats. The HTA focuses on issues for which
DHS has direct policy or operational roles or equities.

I As this is an unclassified document, we do not provide all
the underlying reporting, details, or sourcing. However,
the assessments herein are consistent with the full body of
classified intelligence available to DHS.

0 We have included preliminary analysis of how 
will affect the Homeland; however, forecasting the full
scope of its effects is challenging, given myriad variables
and the stage of the pandemic as of this writing.

I The I-ITA forecast period is through 2021. The cutoff date
for information and analysis is 27 August 2020.

 

 

 

   
     
      
    

We ?an; 

Venue?J5?, 


Cyber- Foreign In?uence

 

Economic 

Nation-state actors will sustain expansive cyber-enabled
espionage and malign in?uence aclivity aimed at all levels of
government and industry, while also advancing offensive
cyber capabilities that hold at risk US critical infrastructure.
Cybercriminals will continue to ?nd innovative ways to pro?t
?nancially, including through increased cyber disruption of
infrastructure.

We judge that state and non-state cyber actors will seek to use
cyber means to compromise or disrupt infrastructure used to
support the 2020 US Presidential election? such as voter
information, state or municipal networks, and election officials
themselves and other foundational democratic processes,
such as the US Census.

Russia probably will be the primary covert foreign in?uence
actor and purveyor of disinformation and misinformation in
the Homeland. We assess that Moscow's primary aim is to
undermine the US electoral process and weaken the United
States through discord, division, and distraction in hopes of
making America less able to challenge Russia?s strategic
objectives. Some Kremlin-linked disinformation also might
motivate domestic actors to engage in acts of violence and
increase the risk to US public safety.

ecurity 8r. Counterintelligence

The pandemic will reshape the global economy and
pose prolonged challenges to US economic security. We assess
that companies and countries will reduce their supply cham
vuln?rabili?es by changing supplier networks and develong
national industrial bases.

China allenger to US

w?lremam the primarych . .
mpe??veness- globally and the leading source or US. trade
:2)qu violations. Chinaalmost certair?y will conmaie._ 

      

Hill 9., 

'0 Russia and China will pose the top threats to the integrity of
US chains especially 111 the information and
communications technology sector. - 

  
     
    

Terrorism

0 Lone offenders and small cells of individuals motivated by a
diverse array of social, ideological, and personal factors will
pose the primary terrorist threat to the United States. Among
these groups, we assess that Domestic Violent Extremists will
pose the most persistent and lethal threat.

0 Although two decades of counterterrorism pressure has
degraded terrorist groups overseas, many maintain the intent
to strike the Homeland, and terrorists have proven they can
adapt quickly and resurge. Transportation infrastructure? .
especially the aviation sector?will remain a primary target for 

 

terrorists plotting overseas. ?r

  
 
 
  
  
   
 
   
     
     
   
   
     

I [ran will develop its terrorist capabilities, including through
Lebanese Hizballah, as an option to deter the United States
from taking what its leadership perceives as regime-

threatening actions or to retaliate for such actions.

Transnational Organized Crime

I Among transnational criminal organizations, Mexico-based
cartels will pose the greatest threat to the Homeland because
of their ability to control territory - including near the US
Southwest Border?an coopt parts of government,
particularly at a state and local level. The cartels dominate US.-
bound drug traf?cking and use their considerable resources
and sophisticated techniques to adapt to law enforcement.

'ke fentanyl and heroin will continue

0 Potent opioid narcotics 11 - . .
to cause excessive levels of overdose. We expect a use an the

 

       

?t '5 3? all);



    
   
     
     
        
  
 

Irregular Wyation to the United ma 

0 The duration and severity of the COVID-19 pandemlcm?le
United States and within Central and South America .Will
shape migration to the US Southwest Border; however, we
judge that underlying economic and political conditions in the
region will remain the primary driver. As COVID-I9-re1ated
citizen mobility restrictions ease, we expect to see increased
migration flow to pre?pandemic levels.

0 Worsening socio-economic conditions in Cuba, political
. instability and food insecurity in Haiti, and the uncertainty of
effects in the region increase the chances of a
maritime mass migration event, although we judge the overall
risk will remain low.

 

 

 

      
  

. will remain acute 
critical infrastructure owns ma
threats of disruptive or destructive cyber attacks. Fedenii, statelocai 
tribal and territorial government, as well as the private sector, will . I
experience an array of evolving cyber?enabted threats designed to access

sensitive information, steal money, and force ransom payments.

 
  
  

 
    
 
 

    
   
     
     
   

alien-State Threats

  
 

We judge that Russia- which possesses some of the most
sophisticated cyber capabilities in the world?can disrupt or
damage some US critical infrastructure networks via cyber
attacks. Moreover, Russian state-affiliated actors will continue
targeting US industry and all levels of government with intrusive
cyber espionage to access economic, policy, and national security
information to further the Kremlin?s strategic interests.

  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 

0 We assess that Russia can conduct cyber attacks that
would result in at least localized effects over hours to
days ?such as a power outage or supply chain
disruption? and probably is developing capabilities that
would cause more debilitating effects.

0 We expect Russian cyber actors to use a range of
capabilities including social engineering, publicly known
software and hardware vulnerabilities, poorly configured
netWorks, and sophisticated ?zero-day? attacks that
exploit security weaknesses in software, of which vendors
may be unaware.

0 Under Russian law, the Federal Security Service (FSB) can
compel Russian firms doing business in the United

i States or Russians working with US ?rms?to comply

I with FSB information sharing and operational mandates,

presenting additional routes for cyber espionage.

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

    
  

China already poses a high cyber espionage threat to the
Homeland and Beijing?s cyber-attack capabilities will continue to
grow. Chinese cyber actors almost certainly will continue to
engage in wide?ranging cyber espionage to steal intellectual
property and personally identifiable information (Pll) from US
businesses and government agencies to bolster their civil-military 
?industrial development, gain an economic advantage, and
support intelligence operations.

0 We expect China?s cyber operations against US companies
will focus on the critical manufacturing, defense industrial
base, energy, healthcare, and transportation sectors. 

I Beijing also has targeted information technology and
communications firms whose products and services
support government and private-sector networks
worldwide, all while advocating globally for Chinese
information technology companies that could serve as
espionage platforms.

0 We remain concerned about potential Chinese intent to
compromise US critical infrastructure to cause disruption I,
or destruction during periods of con?ict, or possibly when
Beijing views information posted and shared online as
being at odds with its interests.

Although Russia and China are the most capable nation-state
cyber adversaries, Iranian and North Korean cyber actors also
pose a threat to US systems networks, and information. Iran
continues to present a cyber espionage threat 81161.15 developing
accesses in the Homeland that, during periods of mcreasedN th
tension, could be repurposed for destructive cyber or
Korean cyber capabilities, while soptusttcated, pif-oba 3:11: If
remain largely confined to criminal generahon :1 reveilid .Uiddy
Pyongyang?s intent changes, however, it probe can (1

build capabilities to conduct broader espionage activity or
threaten infrastructure with disruptive cyber attacks.

    

   

   

., ., .

Cybercrimiuals increasingly will target HS critical infrastru, 
to generate profit, whether through rausomware, e-mail
impersonation fraud, social engineering, or malware.
Underground marketplaces that trade in stolen information and
increasingly capable cyber tools including for-hire cyber tools
and personnel ?will continue to thrive and serve as a resource,
even for sophisticated foreign adversaries.

0 Ransomware attacks?which have at least doubled since
2017? often are directed against critical infrastructure
entities at the state and local level by exploiting gaps in
cybersecurity. For example, ransomware attacks against
metropolitan governments in Baltimore and New Orleans
in 2019 disrupted government services and cost millions of
dollars in lost revenue and network remediation.

I Victims of cybercriminal activity in 2018 reported over $2.7
billiOn in losses more than twice the amount lost in 2017.
This ?gure almost certainly does not represent the full
scope of loss because some victims do not report incidents.

Cyber Threats to US Democratic Processes

We judge that some state and non-state actors will seek to use
cyber means to compromise or disrupt infrastructure used to
support the 2020 US Presidential election and the 2020 US Census.
Given the national importance of these events, any related cyber
activities? or mere claims or false allegations of compromise 
might fuel influence operations aimed at depressing voter turnout
or census participation, misinforming about democratic processes,
or shaping perceptions about the integrity or outcome of the
election or census (see Foreign In?uence in the Homeland).

Election In?asnucture

Advanced persistent threat and other malicious cyber actors .
likely will increase targeting of 'electiou-?related-zufras .

.a

 

     

 

?at-<7 

#162020 Presidential-election appmaqh?l?y fa?? .

municipal or state networks, or state election o??i?aia . - .
Operations could occur throughout the 2020 election Cycle? "3 - l;
through pre-election activities, Election Day, and the post-61ml 
period. -

  

Adversaries? cyber capabilities vary greatly? as does the
cyber defensive posture of electoral boards to stymie such
actors. Adversaries could attempt a range of election
interference activities, including using exploits to target
voter registration systems; endeavoring to compromise
election system supply chains; trying to exploit poor
cybersecurity practices on protected election systems or
networks; or hacking official election websites or social
media accounts to disseminate false information.

 

Census re

Malicious cyber actors probably will attempt operations against
tafomation technology systems and the data a??iliated with the
2020 US Census in an attempt to undermine the results, steal
sensitive personal data, or disrupt the process. While we have not
observed evidence of Census 2020 being targeted specifically, we
note that cyber actors over at least the last year have engaged in
suspicious communications with the US Census public-facing
network, including conducting vulnerability scans and attempting
unauthorized access. We have not attributed this activity to a

nation-state.

0 Cyber activity directed at the US Census could include
attempts to gain illicit access to censusgathered bulk data
related to US citizens; using exploits to try to alter census
registration data of residents or register residents
fraudulently; endeavoring to compromise the census
infrastructure supply chain to miscount responses; or
conducting denial-of-service attacks against the US Census

survey website. 

  

 

    

. . .- 
the US healthcare and public health sector; gave
response entities, such as the US Department of Healtlr?hd

Human Services and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency; and the broader emergency services sector.

Cybercriminals most likely will deploy ransomWare for
?nancial gain, whereas nation-state cyber actors might
seek to capture insights into US response plans and
scientific information related to testing, therapeutics,
and vaccine develoPment.

We expect that cyber criminals and nation-state cyber
actors will target victims in the United States with
COVID?lQ?themed spear-phishing e-rnails, which we
already have observed overseas. These e-mails appear
to be from of?cial government sources, including the
US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the
US Department of State.

Cyber actors also might use ?typo?squatting" ?the use
of domain names similar to legitimate websites? to
target unsuspecting persons, for financial gain, or other
malicious purposes. For example, June 2020,

unidentified cyber actors registered cyber domains that
closely resemble those associated with a US business
conducting COVID-19 vaccine research and
development.

 

 

 

 

Foreign Influence in the Homeland

 

 

Foreign in?uence activity will target USforeign and domestic policy,
international events such as COVlD-19,and democratic processes and
institutions, including the 2020 US Presidential election. Russia
probably will lie the primary covert in?uence actor and purveyor of
disinformation and misinformation within the Homeland. We assess that
Moscow?s primary objective is to increase its global standing and
in?uence by weakening America domestically and abroad through
e?orts to sow discord, distract, shape public sentiment, and undermine
trust in Western democratic institutions and processes.

 

Foreign In?uence Definitions

Foreign In?uence. Any covert, fraudulent, deceptive, or
unlawful activity of foreign governments or persons acting ?1
on their behalf ?undertaken with the purpose or effect of
in?uencing, undermining con?dence in, or adversely affecting
US democratic processes or institutions or otherwise affecting
socio-political sentiment or public discourse to achieve malign
objectives.

0 Covert in?uence. Activities in which a foreign government
hides its involvement, including the use of agents of
in?uence, covert media relationships, cyber in?uence
activities, front organizations, organized crime groups, or
clandestine funds for political action.

Overt In?uence. Activities that a foreign govermnent
conducts openly or has clear ties to, including the use of
strategic communications, public diplomacy, ?nancial
support, and some forms of propaganda.

Disinformation. A foreign government?s deliberate use of false
or misleading information intentionally directed at another
government? 5 decisionmakers and decision-making processes
to mislead the target, force it to waste resources, or in?uence a
decision' in favor of a foreign government?s interests.

 

iSInfonnation. Foreign use of false or mmleading-
lion. Msmformatlon is broader 

 

 

 

     

 
   



a

it . lg?; of.? 7 I
. sewage-that?assian in?uence actors. will continue using?o??ft

andcooert methods to aggravate social and. racial tensions,
undermine trust in US authorities, stoke political resentinent, and
criticize politicians who Moscow views as anti-Russia. Although
some of this activity might be framed in the context of the US
election? seemingly in support of or opposition to political
candidates -we assess that Moscow? 3 primary aim is to weaken
the United States through discord, divisiori, and distraction in
hopes it results in an America less able to challenge Russia?s
strategic objectives.

0 We assess that Russian in?uence actors will engage in
media manipulation across social media platforms, proxy
websitesa, and traditional media, to include state-
controlled outlets ?to exacerbate US social, political, racial,
and cultural fault lines.b

We assess that Russian actors will attempt to undermine
national unity and sow seeds of discord that exploit
perceived grievances within minority communities,
especially among African-Americans. Russian in?uence
actors often mimic target audiences and amplify both sides
of divisive issues to maximize discord, tailoring messaging
to specific communities to ?push and pull? them in
different ways.

I Moscow relies on promulgating misinformation, threats,
and other narratives intended to incite panic or animosity
among social and political groups. For example, Russian

 

?Proxy Website: Foreign news outlets, think tanks, and investigative journalist
websites on behalf of foreign governments or foreign government-linked
businessmen and oligarchs in a non-overt or way and that echo
foreign government narratives, talking points, and disinfonnation. State media often
cite these proxy websites and portray them as credible and independent sources of
in ormation. . . .
'3 {Vs note that [15 Persons linking, Citing, manager coming the same themes,
narratives or opinions raised by these in?uence activities likely are eggagihng great

they are acting in cance wt a

endment- rotected activity, unless .
cg" the topics covered; thisfoAssessrn?nt, mft?gtnhat
. I to act reign in uen

divisive terms, should not be assume . . .
i333; absent infonnation speci?cally attributing the content to. malign?mgn

actors.

  
 
    
 

 
  
 
     
   
   
   
   
        
       
      
   

 

UNCLASSIFIED

actors amplified narratives such as US law enforcement
Ignoring ICE detention requests and releasing an illegal
unnugrant accused of rape; assaults on supporters and

opponents of the US President; and portrayals of US law
enforcement as racially biased.

0 Russian in?uence actors also have exploited speci?c
national tragedies, such as the 2017 mass shooting in Las
Vegas, and protest movements?sometimes magnifying
both a protest and counter-protest?such as the 2018
protest activity in Charlottesville.

COV 113-19 influence Narratives

Russian online in?uence actors are advancing misleading or what
they perceive as inflammatory narratives about the COVID-IQ
pandemic probably to stoke fear, undermine the credibility of the
US Government, and weaken global perceptions of America.
Moscow probably will study the American public?s reaction to its
disinformation to improve future influence campaigns
aimed at shaking public confidence in Washington, which it can
unleash opportunistically during a crisis, hostilities, or a period of

degraded relations.

a Russian onlinc influence actors have claimed that the US
President is incapable of managing the crisis
and sought to exacerbate public concerns by amplifying
content critical of the US response to the public health

crisis and the economic downturn. In contrast, the actors

highlighted China?s and Russia?s alleged success against
the outbreak and praised President Putin's

plan and Russia?s ample supply of tests.

ine influence actors have spread

piracy theories about the origin of
a US-engineered biological
spread in China.

0 Russian on]
misinformation and cons
claiming it is

weapon that US military officials

aging a disinfonnation -
tics? including soczal media
0 to other countries,

tives probably are re
vert and covert tar: .
onsibility for the pandem:

Chinese opera
campaign using 0
trolls to shift 1?35?

14

. UNCLASSIFIED

 

  

- . {3 3; 1th . 
inducing the, United States. m-mng. 
activities in response to what it views as anti?Clhina 
from the US Government over Cl?na?s role in the pandeIruc

 
   
  

  
 
 

 

  
  
   
       
 
 

0 Since August 2019, more than 10,000 suspected fake
Twitter accounts have been involved in a coordinated
in?uence campaign with suspected ties to the Chinese
Government, according to a US nonpro?t investigative
journalism organization. Among these are hacked accounts
from users around the world that now post messaging and
disinformation about the pandemic and other
topics of interest to China, according to the same 
organization. .

    
   
   
   
    

. 0 China's Foreign Ministry, state media, and of?cial Twitter "If
accounts have promoted overt narratives claiming the
coronavirus may have originated in the United States,
criticized the US pandemic response, and promoted
China?s COVID-IQ-related medical assistance to US cities
and states. China has doubled the number of of?cial
government posts disseminating false narratives about
and has carried out persistent and large-scale
disinformation and in?uence operations that correlate
with diplomatic messaging.

I


  
  
  
 
  
  
 
 

0 China most likely will continue amplifying narratives
supportive of its pandemic response while denigrating US
official criticism that Beijing views as tarnishing its global

image.

Iranian online in?uence actors are employing inauthen?c social
media networks, proxy news websites, and state outlets to
amplify fa Ise narratives that seek to shift responmbihty for the
COVID-19 pandemic to the United States and'other Western
nations. Tehran probably will continue to malign the United .
States for enforcing economic sanctionsicasung them as hinderig
Iran?s ability to put forward an appropriate public hea th respo 

 
   
   
        
  

to the pandemic.

  

     



  

. 12W 
According to a report from a social mediaai?ialy?g. 
company, Iranian actors have been active'on Facebook,
Instagram, and Twitter spreading comp?19 
disinformation and false narratives by posting videos,
cartoons, and news stories from state media outlets to
appeal to US and Western audiences.

 

  
   
  
 
   
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
  
   
  
 
 

Iranian operatives have covertly used proxy networks and
sites to advance narratives suggesting that the United
States created the virus as a bioweapon, that Western
media is spreading lies about in Iran, and that

Iran responded better to the pandemic than the United
States.

2020 US Presidential Election

Ahead of the 2020 US elections, adversaries are using covert and
overt in?uence measures to try to sway US voters? preferences
and perspectives about candidates, political parties, policies, and
the electoral process itself. In?uence actors almost certainly will
adjust their goals and tactics as the election nears.

Russia already is using online in?uence operations in an attempt
to sway HS voter perceptions. As noted earlier, although some
Russian in?uence activity seemingly is in support of or opposition
to political candidates, we assess that Moscow's overarching
objective is to undermine the US electoral process and weaken the
United States through discord, division, and distraclion?in hopes
that it resulls in an America less able to challenge Russia?s

strategic objectives.

I Russian online in?uence actors have attacked or praised
multiple 2020 US Presidential candidates? both Democrat
and Republican. These Russian actors have opined on a
wide swath of socio-political issues relevant to the 202i!
elections. Based on information released by some] media
platforms, some of these activities disproportionately
targeted ?swing states? and early primaries.

 
     
 

ce actors probably will engage in at
ter turnout and

   

Russian online in?uen .
least limited e?orts to discourage co

     

 

NCLASSIFIED

suppress votes in the 2020 US election using methods they
have deployed since at least 2016. For example, before the
2016 US Presidential election, Russian trolls directed
messages at speci?c audiences with false information
about the time, manner, or place of voting to suppress
votes. Russian in?uence actors also operated virtual
personas posing as US persons and discouraged African-
Americans, Native Americans, and probably other
minority voters from participating in the 2016 election.

 

Evolving Influence Tradecraft and Targeting

Russian influence actors almost certainly are evolving their
methods of interacting with target US audiences and
obfuscating detection of their online in?uence activity.

0 We expect that influence actors will evolve their ability
to create and operate fake social-media accounts,
thereby obfuscating their online in?uence activity.

0 Russian influence actors most likely will use US-based
servers and other computer infrastructure including
virtual private networks? to mask their location,
obscure login activity, and prevent account banning.

II Russian influence actors probably will leverage
artificial intelligence to automate the creation and
distribution of memes with socially divisive messages
on social media. Previously, Russian actors mass
produced politically themed picture memes called
"demotivators," some of which they produced under
the guise of US activist groups.

 

 

 



Beyond Russia, China ahead of the elections likely will continue

includin social
using overt and covert influence operation 

media to denigrate the US Administration and its policies and
I .
shape the US domestic information envrronment in favor of

China China will further use its traditional soft power
in?uence toolkit? overt economic measures and lobbying? to

promote US policies more aligned with China?s interests.

tinue to promote messages supporting its foreign

 

Iran will con . . . in an
policy objectives and use onlme influence operations
17

UNCLASSIFEBD

 

   
      

attemPt to increase societal tensions in theU?tdd-S?tes
most likely considers the current US Administration as 3 -
the regime?s stability and their critical messaging of the flJS?h 
President almost certainly will continue throughout 2020. 

   

2020 vs Census ?f .

Russian in?uence actors probably see divisive issues regarding

., the 2020 US Census, such as the consideration last year of adding
a citizenship question, as an opportunity to target a fundamental
democratic process. In addition to potential cyber operations,
Russia might use social media messaging much like it does in 
the context of US elections to attempt to discourage public 1

 

participation in the census, to promote a loss of con?dence in
census results, or to undermine trust in public institutions.

In?uencing State and Local Governments

Foreign governments -- principally China ?will seek to cultivate
in?uence with state and local leaders directly and indirectly,
often via economic carrots and sticks. We assess that Chinese
officials calculate that US state- and local-level officials enjoy a
degree of diplomatic independence from Washington and
probably plan to leverage these relationships to advance policies
that are in China?s interest and to message Washington during

times of strained relations.

 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
         
       
   
 

0 We assess that China views a state's or locality?s economic
challenges and now their healthcare challenges due to
as a key opportunity to create a dependency,
thereby gaining in?uence. Beijing uses Chinese think tanks
to conduct research into US states and counties to
determine which might be most receptive to China's

overtures.

We expect the Chinese Government to continue using
carefully choreographed trips to China for US of?crals and
with offers of lucrative investment

business leader
projects and business deals as their initial hook. Although

visits this year largely have been postponed due to
COVID-19, the Chinese Government probably wall

 
 
 



out US companies to keep jobs inanm -.
estate in economically hard-hit areas, and
equipment and supplies at reduced cost.

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Counterintelligence and Threats to US
Economic Security

The CO pandemic is creating new opportunities for US economic
competitors to exploit. tn the near term, disruption, and reconstitution of
manufachoing and supply chains will present a key challenge.
Meanwhile, China will continue its whole-of?gooernment approach to
targeting intellectual property and technology from Lt companies and
research and academic institutions that form America's national
innovation base and are critical to the vitality of the US economy. Russia
and China will pose the top nation-state threats to US supply chains,
especially in the in?irmation amt communications technology sector.

Effects on Economic Security

The CO pandemic will lead more companies and countries
to reduce their supply chain vulnerabilities by changing supplier
networks and developing their national industrial bases. These
efforts will lead to dramatic and sustained disruptions to the
global economy and, in some cases, challenge US economic and

supply chain security.

0 In response to measures to control cross-border ?ows of
people and goods that have significantly disrupted
international trade and global supply chains, we assess
that countries will invest in domestic industries and in
countries they perceive as more reliable suppliers. The
effect of social distancing in many countries will continue
to strain and disrupt the goods supply chain at multiple

levels.

  
 

nd pharmaceuticals sourced from

otective uipment a 
. lobal supply chains W111 remam

abroad or that depend on .
especially vulnerable to disruptions due to sustained
demand foreign government actions to secure supplies of
such goods for their country? 5 use, and the length of tune
required to reconstitute these production capabilities

elsewhere.

  
 
 
     
   
       
     
       
        
   

 
 

teiters and other malicious actors-have exploited
for essential goods during the outbreak
'tosell substandard Or non-approved items to desperate
customers, posing a threat to public health and
undermining legitimate businesses.

0 China is collecting information on US supply chain
shortages and using the crisis to build leverage
with the United States, given that Beijing controls many
critical commodities. China could exploit future shortages
of critical supplies by conditioning their provision on US
acquiescence in other matters important to Beijing.

Exploiting US Academic Institutions and Research

We assess that China will continue seeking US research and

expertise vital to its economic and military advancement by using

a wide range of government, non-government, and private actors

and platforms. China - which has mobilized vast resources to

support its industrial development and defense goals almost

certainly will continue exploiting US academic institutions to

transfer valuable research and intellectual property (IP) that

Beijing calculates will provide a military or economic advantage .
over the United States and other nations. 1:

Beijing uses some visiting professors, scholars, and students in the 

United States as non-traditional collectors (NTCs) by virtue of
l' their participation in targeted research and development
activities. These NTCs most often include a subset of graduate-
and postgraduate-level researchers studying in certain science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) ?elds. .
Although some NT C5 are unwitting, others are cognizant of their
ve admitted to stealing research from US

 
  

role and some ha
institutions to advance Chinese research.

In June 2020, a Chinese student was arrested at Los . 
An eles International Airport for visa fraud, havmg failed
tion that he was a major in

to disclose on his visa applica . 
the People?s Liberation Army (FLA). During an outhongd

intendew with Us Custom .d Border Proth?orL, v: 

Warsaw ?ermwaaes .
.. . . . .. .. ?Mutant.-. - -

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- UEiuniversity. He said that his supervisor?~the director
of his military university lab in China ?-instruciaed him to
observe the US lab layout and bring the information to
replicate it in China.

0 In another instance, a Chinese post-graduate researcher in
Boston was indicted in January 2020 for allegedly
attempting to smuggle stolen vials of biological research;
he allegedly stated that he planned to bring them China to
conduct research in his own laboratory and publish the
results under his own name.

We assess that China?s government-run talent recruitment
programs also facilitate licit and illicit transfer of US technology,
IP, and know-how to further China?s development and
military modernization. The programs recruit overseas
academics, scientists, and other experts and reward them for
stealing proprietary information. Recipient contracts in many
cases require them to keep the terms secret and transfer IP rights
to the sponsoring Chinese institution. Some program participants
are incentivized or obligated to establish ?shadow laboratories? in
China that mirror US taxpayer-funded research to provide China
with a competitive advantage by gaining early insights into US
research before discoveries are shared globally. Several US
professors selected by these programs have been charged with
crimes, including fraud and theft of trade secrets.

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
     

Considering the US Presidential Proclamation banning the entry
of certain students associated with China?s military-civil fusion
strategy as well as increased awareness by US industry,
academia, and local governments of China?s tactics for acquiring
technology and lP?we expect NTCs will adjust their methods,
including by taking different paths to travel to the United States
or shifting their studies abroad while still aiming to collect US

information.

Foreign Investment in the United States

ign direct investment in the United States

has decreased from record highs, we assess
rsue select investment in the United
technologies that it cannot produce

Although Chinese fore

over the last two years
that China will continue to put

States as a means to gain new



  
  

   

ii?iie?s?tiica?ily: to develop-its own industrial base,
access to critical supply chains.



and to secure

   
  

Some Chinese firms almost certainly will adapt to
enhanced US natioual security vetting of foreign direct
inveshnent?introduced as part of the Foreign Investment
Risk Review Modernization Act? by using new types of
investment structures and legal methods. Foreign
companies seeking to invest in US businesses might bolster
efforts to obfuscate their links to intelligence or security

services, such as by using cutout organizations for
acquisitions.

Threats to US Supply Chain Integrity

We assess that China and Russia will continue to represent the
top threats to US supply chain security, given their sophisticated
intelligence and cyber capabilities that they can use to infiltrate
trusted suppliers and vendors to target equipment and systems.
Criminal actors also will engage in efforts to compromise supply
chains, such as by inserting malicious code in a third party? 5
software to conduct operations against firms that use the software.



0? i

0 We are especially concerned about adversaries?
exploitation of information and communications
technology (ICT) supply chains given that the goods that
rely on these supply chains play a vital role in most aspects 
of life. Some actors might exploit ICT through "white

   
 
 
 
 
 
  
  

-

labeling? rebranding equipment or altering equipments
visual appearance to obfuscate the original
manufacturer? to get compromised goods into supply
chains.

0 As Chinese ?rms become more competitive globally and
achieve market dominance in key sectors, we assess that
the United States will be less able to source and supply key
goods and services that are not dependent on Chinese
investment or suppliers, to include from ?rms in allied

nations.

 

We judge that China will remain the leading source oflIS trade
policy violations. Actions by China-based Criminal organizations
almost certainly will continue to present the principal challenge to
US enforcement of trade laws and policies in the year ahead,

deepite progress in USS-China negotiations aimed at addressing
this issue.

     

Chinese entities? infringement of the IP rights of US
entities costs the US economy as much as $600 billion
annually, according to US Trade Representative data, and
adversely impacts US industries and competitiveness.

0 DHS in Fiscal Year 2019 seized more counterfeit goods
originating from China than any other country.
Counterfeit goods from China and Hong Kong pose the - 3 "9
greatest challenge to IP enforcement and present health 
and safety risks to the public clue to the sub-standard
quality of most counterfeit products.

0

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u?iw? that "31? I . .7 . 4.

 

   

 
  
  

 

   

  

. . tidEQGOgicallyf-mmioated lone o?ienders and smallgmups
will. pose the greatest terrorist threat to the Homeland through 2021,
with Domestic Violent Extremists presenting the most persistent and
lethal threat. Foreign terrorist organizations will continue to call for
Homeland attacks but probably will remain constrained in their ability to
direct such plots over the next year. Iran will maintain terrorist
capabilities, including via Lebanese Hizballah, as an option to deter the
United States from taking action Tehran considers regime-threatening.

  
      
 
  

Violent Extremism in the United States

We assess that the primary terrorist threat inside the United

States through 2021 wil stem from lone o??enders and small cells

of individaa ls, including Domestic Violent Extremistsc (DVES)

andforeign-terro?st inspired Homegrown Violent Extremists? 
(HVEs). Some US-based violent extremists have capitalized on
increased Social and political tensions in 2020, which we assess
will drive an elevated threat environment at least through early
2021. Violent extremists likely will continue to target individuals
or institutions that represent symbols of their grievances, as well

A:

as grievances based on political affiliation or perceived policy

   
  
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
    
 

positions.

0 Violent extremist media catering to these persons almost
certainly will spread violent extremist ideologies,

 

DVE: An individual based and operating primarily within the-United States or its
territories without direction or inspiration from aforetgn terrorist group or other
foreign power who seeks to further political or social goals wholly or report through
anlaw?al acts of force or violence. The mere advocacy of political or social positions,

olitical activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized pl?lGSURhIC-memoe of
ideal tactics may not constitute extremism, and may be constitutionally protected.
HVE- A person ofany citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the

. 'ts territories who advocates, is engaged m, or is preparing to .

United States or: . . din ding support to
a in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (me a .
Sinism) in furtherance of political or social oinectwes promoted by aforeiggTo
at anization (PTO), but is acting independently of direction byfg?d acts .
erron rg_ . from traditional domestic terronsts who mgage in an . .- . 
HVEE are distingn'd to civilian populations or attempt to in?uence dmneshopohqg

molence tom a . .
Soithoat direction from or in?uenoe?-om a?mlgn ?do" .



 
     

   

. .. mommies melamine 
. thence action within the United States 

.11, Violent extremists almost certainly will continue their
efforts to exploit public fears associated with 
and social grievances driving lawful protests to incite
violence, intimidate targets, and promote their violent
extremist ideologies.

  
 

        
 
       

Simple tactics? such as vehicle ramming, small arms,
edged weapons, arson, and rudimentary improvised
explosive devices probably will be most common.
However, lone offenders could employ more s0phisticated

means, to include using crude chemical, biological, and
radiological materials.

Some DVEs and other violent actorse might target events related
to the 2020 Presidential campaigns, the election itself, election
results, or the post-election period. Such actors could mobilize
quickly to threaten or engage in violence. Violence related to -
government efforts to mitigate the pandemic and
amidst otherwise ongoing lawful protests most likely have
exacerbated the typical election-season threat environment.

 
 
   
  
 
 
 
  
 
 

0 Some DVEs have heightened their attention to election? or
campaign-related activities, candidates? public statements,
and policy issues connected to specific candidates, judging
from domestic terrorism plots since 2018 targeting
individuals based on their actual or perceived political
af?liations.

We assess that open-air, publicly accessible parts of
physical election infrastructure, such as campaign-
associated mass gatherings, polling places, and voter 
registration events, would be the most likely flashpomta
for potential violence.

 
 
    
   
  
  

 

 
   

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giggii??h?wls ?30 facilitate or engage uwgg?af mo . 
illicit?ecmurserims bodily km .3.

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i Wong?DVE?s, we Judge that white supremacist mistsf
(WSEs) will remain the most persistent and lethal threat in the
Horneiand through 2021. Spikes in other DVE threats probably

will depend on political or social issues that often mobilize other
ideological actors to violence,

environmental, and police-rel

I
in- --

such as immigration,
ated poliCy issues.

WSEs have demonstrated longstanding intent to target
racial and religious minorities, members of the 
community, politicians, and those they believe promote
multi?culturalism and globalization at the expense of the
identity. Since 2018, they have conducted more
attacks in the US than any other DVE movement

Some WSEs have engaged in outreach and networking
opportunities abroad with likeminded individuals to
expand their violent extremist networks. Such outreach
might lead to a greater risk of mobilization to violence,
including traveling to con?ict zones.

0 ideologies often are reinforced by a variety of online
content, including conspiracy theories and political
commentary they View as controversial. Current events
that DVES perceive as infringing on their worldviews often
contribute to periods of increased ideologically-motivated
violence, including most recently during the 
pandemic and nationwide, lawful protests.

 

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1? WSE: A group or individual who?iali a 

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. ethnic minorities, 03'] 
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smarts *Mmameam Life
States: 2013-2019

. I .
HVE IF I . 
WSE 
All Other DVE -

0 1? 20 30 40 so

    
   
    

'93 Attacks I Killed

This chart depicts DVE and homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) attacks in the US
8 since 2018 that posed a threat to li?, based on DHS data. 2019 was the most lethal
year for domestic violent extremism in the United Stains since the Oklahoma City
bombing in 1995. We are still evaluating data ?n incidents occurring in 2020.

DVEs perpetrated 16 attacks, killing 48, whereas HVEs conducted .5 attacks and
killed 1 person. Among DVE actors, WSEs conducted half of all lethal attadrs (80f
16), resulting in the majority of deaths (39 of48).

  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 

All the DVE attackers had a dominant violent extremist ideology, with many
motivated by multiple violent extremist ideologies or violent extremist ideologies
unconnected to global violent extremist groups.

Foreign Terrorist Threats

We assess that foreign terrorist organizations (ITOs), including
al-Qa?ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), will
maintain interest in attacking the Homeland but we expect the
primary threat from these groups to remain overseas in the
coming year because of sustained HS counterterronsm pressure.
Nevertheless, these groups have proven they can adapt-quickly
and resurge, and we expect terrorists overseas will conhnue to 
probe for vulnerabilities in US immigration and border secuntym . -

 
 
     

programs. 4 - 

   

- The primary threat to the Homeland from 
will manifest as ?inspire attacks. on.
social media and other online platforms to .
against the United States and seek to umpire vi c;

I land. Despite mnita? l. .

   

  
 
     
 

extre??sm 1'11 the Home

 
   

 11} the United Statee and the group?s global calls for amakk 7v. -.

. hate intensi?ed since the death last year of senior leader 
Abu Bakr al?Baghdadi. - I 

    

Transportation infrastructure-especia lly the aviation
sector?almost certainly will remain a primary target for
terrorists plotting overseas. While terrorists continue to
pursue ?ight school training and the use of insiders,
plotting against domestic aviation targets most likely will
remain aspirational among FTOs and their supporters over
the next year.

0 Terrorists and other criminal actors might look to
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to threaten critical
infrastructure. In 2019, there were nearly 4,000 reports of
unique incidents of UAS activity near US critical
infrastructure or public gatherings. Although we have no 
indication that any of these events were terrorism-related, I
we are concerned that malicious or criminal actors will
turn to UAS tactics.

 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 

lran and Lebanese Hizballah

We assess that Iran will continue to develop and maintain
terrorist capabilities as an option to deter the United States from
taking what Tehran considers regime-threatening actions or to
retaliate for such activity, real or perceived. The Government of
Iran and its proxy, Lebanese Hizballah (LH), have demonstrated
the intent to conduct an array of operations in the Homeland and
that the Iranian Government or LH could advance an

attack plot- with little to no warning?in response to heightens; .
tensions. The US Government in recent years has arrested sever . 

individuals acting on behalf of the Governmant of Iran LH
have conducted surVeillance indicative of contingency: 
for lethal attacks in the United States.

  

we judge

  
  
  
  
 

     

 
  

Transnational Organized Criminal
Threats to US Security

     

Transnational criminal organizations eSpecially those based in

Mexico will continue to public health ana1r sa?ty in the
Homeland and threaten US national security interests. Countering these
organizations? malign activities will remain an enduring challenge to
US safety and security.

 
 

Mexico-based Cartels

Among transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), we judge
that Mexico-based cartels pose the greatest threat to the
Homeland because of their ability to control territory?including
near the US Southwest Border? and coopt parts of govemment,
particularly at a state and local level. Although COVID-19 has
disrupted some cartel operations, their ability to move large
quantities of illicit goods into and throughout the Homeland is
unparalleled and presents an enduring challenge to US security.

0 Of the Mexico-based TCOs, we assess that the Sinaloa and
Jalisco New Generation cartels pose the greatest cross-
border smuggling and traf?cking threat in the near-term;
they dominate the lucrative traf?cking of cocaine, heroin,
fentanyl, and methamphetamine to the United States.

 
 
 
 
   
   
  
   
   

0 Mexican TCO fracturing, disruption of previous drug
supply chains, and territorial disputes ?especially.over
important cross-border plazas - almost certainly Will lead
to increased violence along the US Southwest Border 1n the
year ahead. Mexican border states experienced nearly
12,000 homicides in 2019, most of which involved TCOs.

0 As USS?based gangs -which provide retail-level drug
distribution and sales for Mexican iol sages. 
new users, we might face increased cnnunal v10, I
some areas of the country. Social distancmg 3:
however, probably will moderate any Imc 
term, as opportunistic crimes become ess -.

 
  

   
 
 

 
      
 

  

     

d-a?J



   

 

      
        

. . Drug Seizures along the US Southwest Border"
80,000
1,000,
70,000 0?00
.c
60.000 800,000 
50000 
a 40,000 000000 
\v
30.000 400,000 
20000 
10000 200?000 
0 0
FY15 FY16 FY17 FY13 FY19
?Cocaine ?Methamphetamine Heroin ?Pentanyl ?Maiijuana

 

 

 

Illicit Drugs

The COED-19 pandemic has slowed the pace of drug trafficking

into the United States; however, we judge that the threat of illicit

drugs? including high rates of overdose?will persist as I:
traffickers adapt and drug compositions become more potent.

TCOs continue to distribute narcotics such as fentanyl .
and methamphetamine, although their operations have been 
degraded because of the pandemic.

I Potent opioid narcotics like fentanyl and heroin almost
certainly will continue to cause excessive levels of
overdose in the United States over the next year. We assess
that the use of stimulant drugs like methamphetamine and
cocaine will continue, and distributors will explore new
markets in the United States beyond major transportation

hubs and regional cities.

 
  
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
   
  
 
 
 
  
  
 

0 TCOs engaged in the manufacturing ofoentanyl and -d
methamphetamine probably will expenence at-Ileast. nutm- 
term disruption due to response meazrures- 3 t.
may hinder their receipt of chemical precursors?om
international suppliers. Production and ?(11.15139 
heroin, cocaine, and marijuana also has been; .
COVID-19 response measures because of trav 

and stay?at-home orders within the western .

 

  
 


m- t? a ?some.
7w1r4Irr 



 :hregular Migration to the United
States

 

The duration and severity of the CO VI D-19 pandemic will shape
migration to the US Southwest Border into 2021, along with traditional
push?pull factors stemming from weak economic and political conditions
in the region. COVE-19's impact on Caribbean nations might increase
the chance of a mass migration event from Cuba or Haiti.

Irregular Land Migration

The duration and severity of the pandemic in the
United States and within Central and South America will shape
migration to the Southwest Border into 2021. However, we
judge that underlying economic and political conditions in the
region will remain the primary driver. As related
citizen mobility restrictions ease, we expect to see increased
migration flow to pro-pandemic levels.

0 Migration flows within the Western Hemisphere have 7
begun to increase after a short-term decline as countries 3
instituted border transit restrictions. Over the medium I
term, mass migration might occur if Central and South 
American counlries? economies continue to decline and
health and humanitarian response capabilities deteriorate
due to COVID-19-especially if coupled with an economic
resurgence in the United States.

 
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
   
       
  

COVID-19-related international travel restrictions that
many countries have instituted have curtailed migration

from outside the Western Hemisphere. As these measures

sunset, we expect sporadic of migration into and through

the region,

High crime rates, weak job markets, and governmental or -

non-state repression will remain key drivers of a;
migration from Central and South America, esPecia? 

related citizen mobility restrictions -

region. Seasonal weather changes and percepuo

 
 

 
 
      

 

Irregular Maritime Migration

 

. The impact of COWD-IQ very likely will affect maritime

. migration from both migrant origin and transit countries in the
Caribbean through 2021. Weak socio-economic conditions in
Cuba, political instability and food insecurity in Haiti, and the
uncertainty of COVID-19 in the region will increase the chances of
a maritime mass migration event, although we judge the overall
risk will remain low.

0 Interviews of interdicted migrants reveal that some are still
desperate to come to the United States regardless of the
risk of rather than face the deteriorating
economic conditions and potential starvation in their home . 6

country.

0 Measures such as border closures, quarantines, and a 
reduction in legitimate vessel traf?c can disrupt migrant 
?ows; however, increased food insecurity and 
unemployment, reduced economic opportunities, a lack of 5,
medical infrastructure, and other second- and third-order
effects might serve as push factors resulting in increased
maritime migration to the United States. in'

 

UNCLASSIFIED



'r

UNCLASSIFIED