Contents Inhnduction 2 Scope Note 3 Key Tammys 4 The Cyber Threat 3? the Homeland 7 Nation?State Threats 7 Cybercn?m 9 La Cyher Write Democratic Processes In?uence in the Homeland 12 Aan US Soda-Political DiviSiO? 13 - @mqa In?wenae Narratives Introduction August 2020 The evolving Homeland threat landscape includes complex challenges from hostile nation-states, cyber threat actors, terrorists, transnational criminal organizations, and emerging infectious diseases. In this first annual Homeland Threat Assessment, we provide a strategic overview of these and other key threats, and how we anticipate their evolution thr0ugh 2021. While terrorism and criminal threats endure, this Assessment makes clear that great?power competition?often considered in terms of overseas actions and foreign policy increasingly is playing out in the Homeland through cyber, in?uence, and economic means. We See the effects throughout all levels of gov?rnment, industry, academia, and US society. Mast rectantly, the novel coronavims pandemic has pm a new set of challenges to America 8 security, safety, Maud, prosperity. impact on every I WW threat vector underscores the need to . .. uadwb?dbr??atmpe?re?mhnd ?a . ?24- mm??-rv e. 1, Is Intelligauze Enterprise (IE) works every Scope Note This Homeland Threat Assessment (HTA) was produced in response to direction from the Secretary of Homeland Security to prepare an annual strategic forecast of the Homeland threat environment. It is intended to support policymaking, planning, resource allocations, and inter-governmental partnerships. The judgments within the HTA are those of the Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise (DI-IS IE), including two US Intelligence Community elements the Of?ce of Intelligence and Analysis and the US Coast Guard -- and the intelligence elements within US Citizenship and Immigration Services, US Customs and Border Protection, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the ?SSecxet Service, the Transportation Security Administration, Weapons of Mass Destruction Of?ce. Masses Whatthe ~1311-155 lE?judges are top threat ?rem- faumesiorwhaam r" x. We - Key Takeaways Cyber Foreign In?uence Nation-state actors will sustain expansive cyber-enabled espionage and malign in?uence activity aimed at all levels of government and industry, while also advancing offensive cyber capabilities that hold at risk US critical infrastructure. Cybercriminals will continue to find innovative ways to profit ?nancially, including through increased cyber disruption of infrastructure. We judge that state and non-state cyber actors will seek to use cyber means to compromise or disrupt infrastructure used to support the 2020 US Presidential election?such as voter information, state or municipal networks, and election of?cials themselves? and other foundational democratic processes, suchas?leUSCensus. Russia probably will- be the prirmry covert foreign in?uence Wayne at disinformation and misinformatim 1n ?3%meth ptimaryaimism national innovation base, including by leveraging students: professors, and scientists in the United States as non- traditional collectors. . Russia and China will pose the top threats to the integrity of US supply chains, especially in the information and communications technology sector. Terrorism 0 Lone o?enders and small cells of individuals motivated by a diverse array of social, ideological, and personal factors will pose the primary terrorist threat to the United States. Among these groups, we assess that white supremacist extremists? who increasingly are networking with likeminded persons abroad?will pose the most persistent and lethal threat. 0 Al?amgh two decades of counterterrorism pressure has Wat groups overseas, many maintain the intent in strike the Homeland and terrorists have proven they can . adapt qukkly and resurge.Transportatim1 infrastructure? way-?ue avia?maecmr?wi?mmap?mary targetfor use of stimulant drugs?er cocaine and methamphetan?m - as traf?ckers explore new distribution areas beyond traditional hubs and regional cities. Ineguhrh?gn?onto?wUnitedShtes 0' The dura?on and severity of the COVID-19 pandemic and resul?ng-economic, political, and healthcare effects in the Urtited'State??i'a?d within the region? will be the primary "?elder shaping migration to the US Southwest Border. Mass migration from Central and South America might occur if $159345! ..-.. .. . economic and political conditions continue to deteriorate. 1 . We rug-42 . an; WW Wont conditions in Cuba. political Won moose the chances .a *zu. ayam: although wejadge the Ioggall . 935335 .933 - The Cyber Threat to the Homeland Cyber ms to the Windham boil! nation-states and non-shite US threats Fem, strut, sadism! ?errivatesector, w?lexpersmceanarmyof evolving gainer-enabled timats designed to assess sensitive in?mnauhn, shill mey. md?mx ransom payments. Nation-State Threats We fudge that Russia-which possesses some of the most 8933mm oyber capabilities in the world? can disrupt or damagesome HS critiml infrastructure networks via cyber Mummy, Russian state-affiliated actors will continue W115 iindasby and all levels of government with intrusive networks and sophisticated ?zero-day? attacks that mcploit security weaknesses in software, of which vendors China already poses a high cyber espionage threat to the Homeland and Beijing?s cyber-attack capabilities will continue to grow. Chinese cyber actors almost certainly will continue to engage in wideranging cyber espionage to steal intellectual property and personally identifiable information (PII) from US businesses and government agencies to bolster their civil-military- industrial development, gain an economic advantage, and support intelligence operations. 0 We expect China?s cyber operations against US companies will focus on the critical manufacturing, defense industrial base, energy, healthcare, and transportation sectors. Beijing also has targeted information technology and comm?cations ?rms whose products and services support government and private-sector networks worldw-ide, all while advocating globally for Chinese information technology companies that could serve as means-lime- a. Vuu. -. Cyberuimcz Cybercriminals increasingly will target [15 critical infrastructure to generate pro?t, whether through ransomware, e-mail impersonation fraud, social engineering, or ma lware. Underground marketplaces that trade in stolen information and increasingly capable cyber tools including for?hire cyber tools and personnel?will continue to thrive and serve as a resource even for s0phisticated foreign adversaries. 0 Ransomware attacks? which have at least doubled since 2017? often are directed against critical infrastructure entities at the state and local level by exploiting gaps in cybersecurity. For example, ransomware attacks against metropolitan governments in Baltimnre and New Orleans in 2019 disrupted government services and cost millions of dollars in lost revenue and network remediation. 0 Victims of cybercriminal activity in 2018 reported over $2.7 billion in losses?more than twice the amount lost in 2017. This ?gure almost certainly does not represent the full scope of loss because some victims do not report incidents. Cyber'l?hreats to US Democratic Processes We judge that some state and non-state actors will seek to use cyber means to compromise or disrupt infrastructure used to support the 2020 US Presidential election and the 2020 US Census. Given the national importance of these events, any related cyber activities?or mere claims or false allegations of compromise? might fuel in?uence operations aimed at depressing voter turnout or census participation, misinforming about democratic processes, or shaping perceptions about the mtegrity or outcome of the election or emails (see Foreign In?uence in the Homeland). Advanced pmistent threat and other malicious cyber actors likely will increase targeting of election~related infrastructure as the 2020 presidential election approaches, focusing on voter PH, municipal or state networks, or state election o??icials directly. Operations could occur throughout the 2020 election cycle? through primary season, the conventions, Election Day, and the post-election period. 0 Adversaries? cyber capabilities vary greatly as does the cyber defensive posture of electoral boards to stymie such actors. Adversaries could attempt a range of election interference activities, including using exploits to attempt to alter voter registration data that could disenfranchise voters or register persons fraudulently; endeavoring to compromise supply chains to affect the functioning of voting machines; trying to exploit wireless connections on voting machines to alter data; or hacking of?cial election websites or social media accounts to disseminate false information about polling locations or false outcomes. Census In?nsirueture State and non-state actors probably will attempt cyber operations against infomation technology systems and the data ?imitated with the 2020 US Census in an attempt to undermine the results, steal sensitive personal data, or disrupt the process. Cyber- actors over at least the last year have engaged in suspicious communications with the US Census public-facing network, Mudmg conducting vulnerability scans and attempting 0 Cyber activity directed at the US Census could include attempts to gain illicit access to cemsus-gathered bulk data totryto altercensus registra?rm data of residents or register residents fraudulently; endeavoring to compromise the census hafrutruchrre supply chain to miscount responses; or - conducting del?alwofs-service attacks. agaimn the US Census Foreign In?uence in the Homeland Foreign in?uence activity most likely will target US foreign and domestic policy, international events such as and democratic processes and institutions, including tin 2020 US Presidential election. Russia probably will be the primoryowert in?uence actorand purveyor of disin?lrmation and misinprmation within the Homeland. We assess that Moscow?s primary objective is to increase its global standing and in?uence by weakening America - domestically and abroad - though e?irrts to sow discord, distract, shape public sentiment, and undermine trust in Western democratic institutions and processes. Amplifying US Soda-Political Division Russia?s cyber and influence activities combine to execute a broader strategy to shape perceptions and manipulate target audiences, including through disinformation, Ir?sinformation, and proPaganda (see The Cyber Threat to the Homeland). We judge that Russian in?uence actors will continue using overt and covert methods to aggravate social and racial tensions, undermine trust in authorities, stoke political resentment, and criticize politicians who Moscow views as anti-Russia. Although some of this activity might be framed in the context of the US election? seemingly in support of or opposition to political candidates? we assess that Moscow? 3 primary aim is to weaken the United States through discord, division, and distraction in hopes it results in an America less able to challenge Russia's strategic otjectives. 0 We assem that Russian in?uence actors will engage in media manipulation? across social media platforms, proxy websites, and traditional media, to include state-controlled outlets ?to exacerbate US social, political, racial, and cultural fault liness I We assess that Russian actors will attempt to undermine national unity and sow seeds of discord that exploit perceived grievances within minority communities, especially among African-Americans. Russian in?uence actors often mimic target audiences and amplify both sides of divisive issues to midmize discord, tailoring messaging to speci?c communities to ?push and pull? them in different ways. Mosimw relies on promulgating misinformation, threats, gasses: narratives amended to incite panic or animosity U63 . .. among social and political groups. For example, Russian actors amplified narratives such as US law enforcement ignoring ICE detention requests and releasing an illegal immigrant accused of rape,- assaults on supporters and opponents of the US President; and portrayals of US law enforcement as racially biased. 1' Russian in?uence actors also have exploited specific national tragedies, such as the 2017 mass shooting in Las Vegas, and protest movements sometimes magnifying both a protest and counter-protest?such as the 2018 protest activity in Charlottesville. Influence Narratives Russian online in?uence actors are advancing in the United States misleading or what they perceive as in?ammatory narratives about the COVID-IQ pandemic probably to stake fear, undermine the credibility of the US Government, and weaken global perceptions of America. Moscow probably will study the American public?s reaction to its COVID-I9 disinformation to improve future in?uence campaigns aimed at shaking public con?dence in Washington, which it can unleash opportunistically during a crisis, hostilities, or a period of degraded relations. a Russian online influence actors have claimed that the US President is incapable of managing the COVID-19 crisis and sought to exacerbate public concerns by amplifying content critical of the US response to the public health crisis and the economic downturn. In contrast, the actors highlighted China?s and Russia?s alleged success against the COVID-19 outbreak and praised President Putin's COVID-19 plan and Russia?s ample supply of tests. Russian online influence actors have spread Moratorium and conspiracy theories about the origin of WED-19, claiming it is a US-engineered biological Weapon that Us military of?cials spread in Gum. (intone operatives probably are waging a disirg?omation Wig? using avert and covert tactim?bwlading social media trolis? to shi? responsibility for the pandemic to other countries, including the United States. China might increase its in?uence activities in response to what it views as anti-China statements from the US Government over China?s role in the pandemic. 0 Since August 2019, more than 10,000 suspected fake Twitter accounts have been involved in a coordinated influence campaign with suspected ties to the Chinese Government, according to a US nonprofit iiwestigative journalism organization. Among these are hacked accounts from users around the world that now post messaging and disinformation about the COVID-19 pandemic and other topics of interest to China, according to the same organization. 0 China?s Foreign Ministry, state media, and of?cial Twitter accounts have promoted overt narratives claiming the coronavirus may have originated in the United States, criticized the US pandemic response, and promoted China?s COVID-19-re1ated medical assistance to US cities and states. China has doubled the number of official government posts disseminating false narratives about COVID-19 and has carried out persistent and large?scale disinformation and in?uence operations that correlate with diplomatic messaging. 0 China most likely will continue amplifying narratives supportive of its pandemic response while denigrating US official criticism that Beijing views as tarnishing its global image. Iranian airline in?uence actors are employing inauthentic social media marks, proxy news websites, and state media outlets to mlifyfalae narratives that?seek to shift the com-1mm to the United States and other Western probably will con?rms to malign the United Shim forms Modem, casting them as hindering Iran?s Who'put forward an appropriate public health response to 11: pander-is H: law ?mats 0 According to a report from a social media analytics company, Iranian actors have been active on Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter spreading COVID-19 disinformation and false narratives by posh'ng videos, cartoons, and news stories from state media outlets to appeal to US and Western audiences. 0 Iranian operatives have covertly used proxy networks and sites to advance narratives suggesting that the United States created the virus as a bioweapon, that Western media is spreading lies about COVID-19 in Iran, and that Iran resPonded better to the pandemic than the United States. 2020 US Presidential Election Ahead of the 2020 US elections, adversaries are using covert and overt in?uence measures to try to sway US voters? preferarces and perspectives about Candidates, political parties, policies, and the electoral process itself: Influence actors almost certainly will adjust their goals and tactics as the election nears. Russia already is using online in?uence operations in an attempt to sway US voter perceptions. As noted earlier, although some Russian in?uence activity seemingly is in support of or opposition to political candidates, we assess that Moscow? 3 overarching objective is to weaken the United States through discord, division, and distrac?on?in hopes that it results in an America less able to challenge Russia?s strategic objectives. 0 Russian social media troll accounts have attacked or praised multiple 2020 US Presidential candidates?both Democrat and Republican. Covert accounts have opined on a wide swath of sociopolitical issues relevant to the 2020 elections. Based on information released by social media platforms, these in?uence activities have disproportionately targeted "swing states? and early 5 Funnies. I. Hessian airline 1'me actors probably will engage in at least lbnited?egforts to discmgeyolertwm and 3? 16 h" suppress votes in the 2020 US election using methods they have deployed since at least 2016. For example, before the 2016 US Presidential election, Russian trolls directed messages at specific audiences with false information about the time, manner, or place of voting to suppress votes. Russian in?uence actors also operated virtual personas posing as US persons and discouraged African- Americans, Native Americans. and probably other minority voters from participa?ng in the 2016 election. 1ts MW ?soft poWef? in?uence toolkit overt economic I i Am: lobbying?to promote US policies more aligned sndim?wmmisl?amlastyearofaddmg a citizenship question, as an opportunity to target a fundamental democratic process. In addition to potential cyber operations, Russia might use social media messaging? much like it does in the context of US elections? to attempt to discourage public participation in the census, to promote a loss of confidence in census results, or to undermine trust in public mstitutions. In?uencing State and Local Governments Foreign governments principally China will seek to cultivate in?uence with state and local leaders directly and indirectly, o??en via economic carrots and sticks. We assess that Chinese of?cials calculate that US state- and local-level of?cials enjoy a degree of diplomatic independence from Washington and probably plan to leverage these relationships to advance policies that are in China's interest and to message Washington during times of strained relations. I We assess that China views a state?s or locality? 5 economic challenges and now their healthcare challenges due to COVID-19 ?as a key opportunity to create a dependency, thereby gaining in?uence. Beijing uses Chinese think tanks to conduct research into US states and counties to determine which might be most receptive to Cluna?s overtures. We expect the Chinese Government to continue using carefully choreographed trips to China for US of?cials and business leaders with offers of lucrative investment projects and business deals as their initial hook. Although visits this year largely have been postponed due to the Chinese Government probably will 9 con?rms, to a??vate state and local relationships virtually and by offering m?cements, which might include bailing mummi?ed to keep jobs in an area, investing in real .I . . in ecorwnumlly hard-hit areas, and selling medical Wad supplies at reduced cost. Counterintelligence and Threats to US Economic Security The pandemic is creating new opportunities for US economic competitors to exploit. In the near term, disruption, and reconstitution of manu?zcturing and logistic supply chains will present a key challenge. Meanwhile, China will continue its whole-of?government approach to targeting intellectual property and technology from US companies and research and academic institutions that America?s national innovation base and are critical to the vitality of the US economy. Russia and Cliina will pose the top nation-state threats to US supply chains, especially in the in?irmation and communimtions technology sector. COVID-19 Effects on Economic Security The COVID-19 pandemic will lead more companies and countries to reduce their supply chain vulnerabilities by changing supplier networks and developing their national industrial bases. These efforts will lead to dramatic and sustained disruptions to the global economy and, in some cases, challenge US economic and supply chain security. a In response to measures to control cross~border ?ows of people and goods that have signi?cantly disrupted littornational trade and global supply chains, we assess that countries will invest in domestic industries and in countries they perceive as more reliable suppliers. The effect of social distancing in many countries will continue to strain and disrupt the goods supply chain at multiple levels. 5 Protective equipment and pharmaceuticals sourced from abroad or that depend on glow supply chains will remain especially vulnerable to disruptions due to sustained denur?, foreign government actions to secure supplies of goods for their country? 5 use, and the length of time required to reconstitute these production capabilities 0 Counterfeiters and other malicious actors have exploited the high demand for essential goods during the outbreak to sell substandard or non-approved items to desperate customers, posing a threat to public health and under-training legitimate businesses. 0 China is collecting information on US supply chain shortages and using the crisis to build leverage with the United States, given that Beijing controls many critical commodities. China could exploit future shortages of critical supplies by conditioning their provision on US acquiescence in other matters important to Beijing. Exploiting US Academic Institutions and Research We assess that China will continue seeking research and expertise vital to its economic and military advancemnt by using a wide range of government, non-government, and private actors and platfomrs. China - which has mobilized vast resources to support its industrial development and defense goals?almost certainly will continue exploiting US academic institutions to transfer valuable research and intellectual property (IF) that Beijing calculates will provide a military or economic advantage over the United States and other nations. Beijing uses some visiting professors, scholars, and students in the United States as non-traditional collectors (NTCs) by virtue of their participation in targeted research and development activities. These NTCs most often include a subset of graduate and post-graduate level researchers studying in certain science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) ?elds. Although some NTCs are unwitting, others are cognizant of their role and some have admitted to stealing research from US laboratories to advance Chinese research. I Inlune 2020, a Chinese student was arrested at Los Angeles International Airport for visa fraud, having failed to disclose on his visa application that he was a major in the People?s Liberation Army (PLA). During an outbound interview with US Customs and Border Protection, he 20 University of California, San Francisco (UCSF). He said that his supervisor? ?the director of his military university lab In China? -insl1?ucted him to observe the UCSF lab layout and bring the information to replicate it' in China. In another instance, a Chinese post-graduate researcher in Boston was indicted in January 2020 for allegedly attempting to smuggle stolen vials of biological research; he allegedly stated that he planned to bring them China to conduct research in his own laboratory and publish the results under his own name. We assess that China?s government-run talent recruitment programs also facilitate licit and illicit transfer of US technology, 11?, and imaw~how to further China?s 581? development and military modernization. The programs recruit overseas academics, scientists, and other experts and reward them for stealing preprietary information; recipient contracts in many cases require them to keep the terms secret and transfer IP rights to the sponsoring Chinese institution Some program participants are itmrtivized or obligated to establish ?shadow laboratories" in China that mirror US taxpayer-funded research to provide China with a competitive advantage by gaining early insights into US research before discoveries are shared globally. Several US profesmmleeted by these programs have been charged with m?ndudhlg fraud and theft of trade secrets. atom W.wmiated with Chan?s nulitary?civil fusion News? watl?asiammd amby US industry, -- . Claire?s tactics for acquiring IP?we expect NTCs will adjust their methods, Ewlihm tummy m?wfw . domestically, to develop its own industrial base, and t0 access to critical supply chains. 0 Some Chinese firms almost certainly will adapt to enhanced US national security vetting of foreign direct investment? introduced as part of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act-by using new types of investment structures and legal methods. Foreign companies seeking to invest in US businesses might bolster efforts to obfuscate their links to intelligence or security services, such as by using cutout organizations for acquisitions. Threats to US Supply Chain Integrity We assess that China and Russia will continue to represent the top threats to H8 supply chain security, given their sophisticated intelligence and cyber capabilities that they can use to in?ltrate trusted suppliers and vendors to target equipment and systems. Criminal actors also will engage in efforts to compromise supply chains, such as by inserting malicious code in a third party? 5 software to conduct operations against ?rms that use the software. 0 We are especially concerned about adversaries? exploitation of information and communications technology supply chains given that the goods that rely on these supply chains play a vital role in most aspects of life. Some actors might exploit ICT through ?white labeling" - rebranding equipment or altering equipment 5 visual appearance to obfuscate the original manufacturer- to get compromised goods into supply chains. As Chinese ?rms become more competitive globally and achieve market dominance in key sectors, we assess that the United States will be less able to source and supply key goods and services that are not dependent on Chinese investment or suppliers, to include from firms in allied nations. demwmm Wej?dge that China will win ?ue leading source oflIS trade Mic? violatiom. Actions by China based crimiml organizations certainly pzzincipalchallenge to aimed at addressing a. . -- -- billion mutually; .mrding to US Trade Represenmtive data, and admdyimpacts USiIIdusu-ies andcompertltiveness. in am (Mme Flam - Violent extremists almost certainly will continue their efforts to exploit public fears associated with to incite violence, intimidate targets, and promote their violent extremist ideologies. 0 Simple tactics ?such as vehicle ramming, small arms, edged weapons, arson, and rudimentary improvised explosive devices? probably will be most common. DVE: An individual based and operating primarily within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power who seeks to further political or social goals zonally or in part through unlawful acts of force or violence. The mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics may not constitute extremism, and may be constitutionally protected. 24 However, lone offenders could employ more saphistlcahed means, to include using crude chemical, biological, and radiological materials. n?ghtseektotarget events related to the 2020 Presidential campaigns and the election itself bothreabmorengagein violenCe. 0 campaigmrelated activities, candidates? public statements, and policy issues connected to speci?c candidates, judging domesuc terrorism plots since 2018 targeting individuals based on their actual or perceived political pig?sical elecuon mfrastructure; such as campaign? 1? ts,w01?dbe?iemost1ikely?a?hpdm tor Wm violence. WSEB, in reference or reaction to COVID-IQ, have advocated for violence against a range of targets, Mum .- Taw enforcement, critical infrastructme, and ful?l-based and minority comm??es. WSEs also have called for infected individuals to intentionally spread COVID-19 in diverse neighborhoods and in houses of worship, Elle-h mosques and synagogues. TMAMBPmingameatmLifeinthe UnitedStath?lO-MS i 3 llAttacks lKi?ed pied We??h?w mm WWQIWM ?re-Mm marry 5 coma; q, The primary threat to the Homeland from pro'bably" . will manifest as ?inspire attacks. FTOs con?nue to use social media and other online platforms to call for attacks against the United States and seek to inspire violent extremism in the Homeland. Despite territorial defeats in Iraq and Syria, ISIS continues to draw support from foreign terrorist inspired extremists in the United States and the group?s global calls for attacks have intensified since the death last year of senior leader Abu Bakr a1- Baghdadi. Transportation infras tracture? especially the aviation sector?almost certainly will remain a primary target for terrorists plotting overseas. While terrorists continue to pursue ?ight school training and the use of insiders, plotting against domestic aviation targets most likely will remain aspirational among FTOs and their supporters over the next year. Terrorists and other criminal actors might look to unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to threaten critical infrastructure. In 2019, there were nearly 4,000 reports of unique incidents of UAS activity near US critical infrastructure or public gatherings. Although we have no indication that any of these events were terrorism?related, we are concerned that malicious or criminal actors will turn to UAS tactics. Iran and lebanese Hizballah We assess that Iran will continue to develop and maintain terrorist capabilities as an option to deter the United States from taking what Tehran considers regime-threatening actions or to retaliate for such activity, real or perceived. The Government of Iran and its proxy, Lebanese Hizballah (LH), have demensu- . . ., the intent to conduct an arrayr of operations in the-Homeilan 1?1. - . 3.. that the Iranian Government or coma-km?kg}: . ?mil continue to undermine public Ma Hom'eiamt and threaten US natiOnal security are -: i organizations? maiign activities will remain an enduring challenge US safety and security. i Mexico-based Cartels Among transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), we judge that Mexico-based cartels pose the greatest threat to the Homeland because of their ability to control territory?including near the HS Southwest Border? and coopt parts of government, particularly at a state and local level. Although cartel operations at present have been disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic, their ability to move large quantities of illicit goods into and i throughout the Homeland is unparalleled and presents an enduring challenge to US safety and security. 0 Of the Mexico-based TCOs, we assess that the Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation cartels pose the greatest cross? border smuggling and trafficking threat in the near-term; they dominate the lucrative trafficking of cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, and methamphetamine to the United States. 0 Mexican TCO fracturing, disruption of previous drug supply chains, and territorial disputes ?especially over important cross-border plazas almost certainly will lead to increased violence along the US Southwest Border in the year ahead. Mexican border states experienced nearly 12,000 homicides in 2019, most of which involved TCOS. As US-based gangs which provide retail-level drug distribution and sales for Mexican TCOs-vie for access to new users, we might face increased criminal violence in some areas of the country. Social distancing measures, however, probably will moderate any increase in $531" term, as opportunistic crimes become less in FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 Cocaine Mediamphelamine Heroin Fentanyi q?Marijuana Illicit Drugs The COVID-IQ pandemic has slowed the pace of trafficking into the United States; however, we judge that the threat of illicit drugs including high rates of ooerdose? will persist as tra??ickers adapt and drug compositions become more potent. TCOs continue to distribute narcotics such as fentanyl and methamphetamine, although their operations have been degraded because of the pandemic. a Potent opioid narcotics like fentanyl and heroin almost certainly will continue to cause excessive levels of overdose in the United States over the next year. We assess that the use of stimulant drugs like methamphetamine and cocaine will continue, and distributors will explore new markets in the United States beyond major transportation hubs and regional cities. TCOs engaged in the manufacturing of fentanyl and methamphetamine probably will experience at least mid- term disruption due to COVID-19 reSponse measures that may hinder their receipt of chemical precursors from international suppliers. Production and transportation of. heroin, cocaine, and marijuana also has been affe COVE-19 response measures because tr'a?v- reef - ?rat-home orders within thew -5- . .1- The duration and severity of the pandemic including subsequent economic and political instability and effects on beal?tcare systems in Centml and South America almost certainly will be the primary ?zctor shaping migration to the US Southwest Border. COWB- 19's impact on Caribbean nations probably will increase the chance of a mass migration event from Cuba or Haiti. Irregular Land Migration The duration and severity of the COVID-19 pandemic? including subsequent economic and political instability and healthcare e?ects in Central and oath America almost certainly will be the primary factor shaping migration to the 118 Southwest Border into 2021. 0 Migratiou flows within the Western Hemisphere have begun to increase after a short?term curtailment as countries instituted border transit restrictions. Over the medium term, mass migration might occur if Central and South American countries? economies COntinue to decline and health and humanitarian response capabilities deteriorate due to COVID-19?especia11y if coupled with an economic resurgence in the United States. 9-related international travel restrictions that many countries have instituted have curtailed migration from outside the Western Hemisphere. So long as those restrictions remain in place, we expect to continue to see diminished migration from outside the hemisphere. In addition to the uncertain effects of traditional push. and pull factors will affect irregular migration northward and increase international displacement. High crime rates, weak jab . markets, and governmental or non-state repression will -a "l era of US.bound migration from Latin America bated- COVE-19 SB. 3? v, - - ., {Hipster of co Vin-19 very likely will wear. migration?om both migrant origin and transit countri Caribbean through 2021. Weak socio-economic conditions if Cuba, political instability and food insecurity in Haiti, and the uncertainty of in the region will increase the chances of a maritime mass migration event, although we judge the overall risk will remain low in the near term. Interviews of interdicted migrants reveal that some are still desperate to come to the United States regardless of the risk of COVID-19, rather than face the deteriorating economic conditions and potential starvation in their home country. Measures such as border closures, quarantines, and a reduction in legitimate vessel traffic can disrupt migrant ?ow; however, increased food insecurity and unemployment, reduced economic opportunities, a lack of medical infrastructure, and other second- and third-order effects might serve as push factors resulting in increased maritime migration to the United States.