IN THE WESTMINSTER MAGISTRATES’ COURT
B E T W E E N:

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Requesting State
v

JULIAN ASSANGE
Defendant
_________________________________
DEFENCE SUBMISSIONS: PART ONE
_________________________________

** All references are to the Defence Core Bundle unless otherwise stated

1.

Introduction

1.1.

These Defence Submissions are in two parts. In Part 1, we provide an overall
summary of the case and briefly set out Mr Assange’s position on each of the
grounds of abuse, including the Treaty point, and each of the statutory bars.
This updates and refines the defence opening; responds to issues raised at
the February hearing about the Treaty point and develops the Article 3 and
Section 91 argument in more detail. In Part 2 (a separate document) we set
out in full the interlinked arguments on Zakrzewski abuse, Article 7 and Article
10, and the related dual criminality point that no extradition crime is made out.
That is because these points require amplification from the earlier
submissions.

1.2.

In these submissions we first summarise the history of this case to
demonstrate that the prosecution is not motivated by genuine concerns for
criminal justice but by politics.

1

 1.3.

We next address the three ways in which these proceedings constitute an
abuse of process, in the following three separate but overlapping categories:

(i)

First, the request seeks extradition for what is a classic “political
offence”. Extradition for a political offence is expressly prohibited by
Article 4(1) of the Anglo-US Extradition Treaty. Therefore, it constitutes
an abuse of this Court’s process to require this Court to extradite on the
basis of the Anglo-US Treaty in breach of the Treaty’s express
provisions.

(ii)

Second, the prosecution is being pursued for ulterior political motives
and not in good faith. That engages the jurisdiction recognised in the
successive cases of R (Bermingham and Others) v Director of the
Serious Fraud Office [2007] QB 727 and R (Government of the
USA) v Bow Street Magistrates' Court [2007] 1 WLR 1157
(“Tollman”).

(iii)

Third, the request fundamentally misrepresents the facts in order to
bring this case within the bounds of an extradition crime; both by
misrepresenting that Julian Assange materially assisted Chelsea
Manning in accessing national security information; and then by
misrepresenting that there was a reckless disclosure of the names of
particular individuals [as alleged in counts 15, 16, 17]. That point
engages the jurisdiction recognised in the successive cases of Castillo
v Spain [2005] 1 WLR 1043, Spain v Murua [2010] EWHC 2609
(Admin), and Zakrzewski v Regional Court in Lodz, Poland [2013] 1
WLR 324.

1.4.

Finally we then turn to the special protections set out in the Extradition Act
2003 (“the 2003 Act”) and the successive bars to extradition which are
relied upon. It is respectfully submitted that extradition should be refused on
the following grounds:-

i.

Firstly, extradition is barred under s81a of the 2003 Act by reason of
the political motivation of the request, which is directed at Mr Assange
because of the political opinions he holds and that have guided his
2

 actions.

Moreover we submit that extradition is barred under s81b

because it exposes Mr Assange to the real risk of discrimination on
grounds of “political opinions” and his foreign nationality at every stage
of the criminal justice process in the US.
ii.

Secondly, it is submitted that it would be unjust and oppressive to
extradite Mr Assange by reason of the lapse of time since the alleged
offences, and the effect that extradition would now have on his family
and young children.

iii.

Thirdly, extradition is barred under s87 of the 2003 Act because it
would expose Mr Assange to a complete denial of his right to a fair trial
under Article 6.

iv.

Fourthly, it would further expose him to a flagrant denial of his Article
10 rights to freedom of expression, to receive and impart information
and to protect his own journalistic sources. It would further expose him
to a violation of Article 7 because it would involve a novel and
unforeseeable extension of the law.

v.

Fifthly, extradition is barred because it would expose Mr Assange to
inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR. That is
because of the risk of a wholly disproportionate sentence, amounting in
effect to a life sentence; and because of the virtual certainty that he will
be exposed to inhuman and degrading treatment in prison in the United
States because of the inevitable impact of those conditions on
someone with his mental vulnerabilities.

vi.

Sixthly, extradition should be refused under s91 because it would be
unjust and oppressive to extradite Mr Assange by reason of his mental
condition and the high risk of suicide if he is extradited.

2. History of the proceedings

2.1.

The background facts are more fully set out in the chronology, the Particulars
of Abuse and Response on Abuse of Process, which are intended to be read
alongside this document [Submissions Bundle, tabs 8, 5 and 7].

The original conduct
3

 2.2.

Extradition is being sought for the receipt and publication of materials
provided to WikiLeaks by Chelsea Manning. All the relevant conduct occurred
between 2010 and 2011, and was known about at that time. Mr Kromberg
effectively recognises this in his second supplemental declaration at
paragraph 12 where he refers to public reporting that the Department of
Justice was “investigating Assange for his acts in connection with the
Manning disclosures” and that “specific concerns of the United States that
Assange’s publications endangered the lives of innocent informants and
sources were well publicised” in 2010 and 2011.

Moreover the basic

allegations in the 17 espionage counts of the present indictment (count 1 and
counts 3-18) remain that Mr Assange obtained and published State
Department cables, rules of engagement, Iraq war logs, and Guantanamo
detainee reports; and that this occurred in the years from 2010 to 2011. Yet,
Mr Assange’s prosecution and the first extradition request were not
begun until December 2017. The superseding indictment upon which the
prosecution principally rely was not issued until 23 May 2019. And during the
intervening period between 2010-2011 and the first indictment in December
2017 there was a well-publicised decision by the Obama administration in
2013 that Mr Assange should not be prosecuted.

Moreover the second

superseding indictment which is the basis of the second request is dated 24
June 2020 but, with the exception of charge 2, is still principally focussed on
the receipt and publication of materials provided to Wikileaks by Chelsea
Manning.

The Nature of the Wrongdoing Exposed by the Publications

2.3.

It is necessary to emphasise here that the publications that are the subject of
the indictment ‘exposed outrageous, even murderous wrongdoing [including]
war crimes, torture and atrocities on civilians’ [Feldstein 1, tab 18, para 4].
This is fully analysed in Part 2 under Submission 4. At present it suffices to
summarise as follows:

2.4.

The US Diplomatic cables (counts 1, 3, 7, 10, 13, 17) exposed inter alia ;4

 i.

Evidence of CIA and US forces involvement in targeted, extra-judicial
killings in Pakistan [Stafford-Smith, tab 64, para 84] [M2/56-69];

ii.

Evidence of US rendition flights [Overton, tab 61, para 14];

iii.

Deliberate killing of civilians [M2/48-54];

iv.

Evidence of CIA ‘black sites’ where detainees were subject to torture
[Overton, tab 61, §14].

2.5.

The Rules of Engagement (counts 1, 4, 8, 11, 14) were sought and
published to demonstrate the significance and illegality of the conduct shown
in the ‘Collateral Murder’ video – see Feldstein 1, tab 18, para 4; Cockburn,
tab 51, paras 5 – 6.

2.6.

The Guantánamo Detainee Assessment Briefs (counts 1, 6, 9, 12, 18)
provided evidence that Guantánamo detainees had been the subject of prior
rendition and detention in CIA ‘black sites’ before their arrival at Guantánamo
and that their detention was arbitrary [Worthington, tab 33, paras 8 and 14].

2.7.

As to the Afghan War Diaries (counts 1, 15, 16) they revealed ‘what seemed
to be war crimes’ [Goetz 1, tab 31, para 11] and included, inter alia:
•

The existence of ‘black unit’ Task Force 373 operating ‘kill or capture lists’
hunting down targets for extra-judicial killings [Feldstein 1, tab 18, para 4];

•

killing of civilians, including women and children;

•

The role of Pakistan intelligence in arming and training terrorist groups;

•

The role of the CIA in the conflict, including participation in strikes and
night raids.

2.8.

Turning to the Iraq War Diaries (counts 1, 15, 16), these exposed inter alia:

5

 •

Systematic torture of detainees (including women and children) by Iraqi
and US forces and a secret order by which the US ignored the abuse and
handed detainees over to the Iraqi torture squad;

•

Helicopter killings, including of insurgents trying to surrender;

•

Details of 15,000 previously unreported civilian deaths, including those of
women and young children, through checkpoint killings,

use of

contractors, targeted assassinations, drive-by killings, executions; showing
that the US Government was hiding the full civilian cost of the Iraq war.
•

Details of 23,000 previously unreported violent incidents in which Iraqi
civilians were killed or their bodies were found.

2.9.

The Iraq War Diaries attracted worldwide opprobrium for torture and war
crimes committed by or acquiesced in by the US, leading to calls for proper
investigations into the conduct of allied troops, as is evidenced by
condemnation and calls for investigation by Amnesty International, the UN
Special Rapporteur on Torture and the UN Commissioner for Human Rights
(see Part 2).

Chelsea Manning’s Court Martial

2.10. Chelsea Manning was arrested in 2010. She was convicted in 2013 and
sentenced to 35 years in prison [Boyle 1, tab 5, para 22]. At her trial, she
explained her motivation for downloading documents and videos which
exposed war crimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the torture of detainees in
Guantanamo [as summarised in the Chronology, see Submissions Bundle,
tab 8, p.3]. In her plea allocution statement to the Court Martial on the 30 July
2013, she stated ‘the decisions I made to send documents and information to
the WLO website were my own decisions and I take full responsibility for my
own actions’ [Core Bundle, Boyle 1, tab 5, p.8, para 21]. At that time no
attempt was made to indict Julian Assange. The prosecution say that Julian
Assange caused Chelsea Manning to obtain the materials referred to in
6

 Counts 2 – 4, 9 – 11, and 12 – 14. But her own account gives the lie to that
false claim.

2.11. In evidence given at the Manning Court Martial General Carr gave evidence
that “after long research, his team of 120 counter-intelligence officers hadn’t
been able to find a single person, among the thousands of American agents
and secret sources in Afghanistan and Iraq, who could be shown to have died
because of the disclosures”. (see paragraph 12 of Patrick Cockburn’s witness
statement of 15 July 2020: tab 51).

2.12. Chelsea Manning’s sentence was subsequently commuted by President
Obama in 2017 so as to allow for her immediate release.

Decision not to prosecute Julian Assange in 2013

2.13. A decision was made under the Obama administration not to prosecute Julian
Assange. That was because of what has been described as ‘the New York
Times problem’, as referred to in the Washington Post article dated 26
November 2013 [Submissions Bundle, Chronology, tab 8, p6]. The US
prosecutors operating at the time concluded that charging Assange would
have been tantamount to prosecuting any journalist who published information
that is alleged to endanger national security, and would thus violate the First
Amendment [Feldstein, tab 18, para 9] [Jaffer, tab 22, para 21] [Shenkman,
tab 4, para 27] [Lewis 2, tab 24, para 15] 1.

2.14. Former Department of Justice (‘DOJ”) spokesman Matthew Miller set out the
main reason for the decision in 2013: “If you are not going to prosecute
journalists for publishing classified information, which the department is not,
then there is no way to prosecute Assange” [Politico, BK, Tab 4; The
Washington Post, BK, Tab 5]. The significance of this statement is highlighted
in the 4th statement of Eric Lewis at paragraph 14 (Lewis 4, tab 70). He
highlights the fact that Miller made the comment on the record in 2013 with

1

Core Bundle.

7

 the Washington Post and then issued confirmations in 2016, 2017, 2018 and
2019 that “the DOJ couldn’t indict Assange in the Manning leaks because he
was a publisher, not hacker.” The same point is made by Mark Feldstein in
his supplemental declaration of 5 July 2020 ( Feldstein 2, tab 57).

2.15. This point is analysed in detail by Professor Feldstein who also refers to the
‘longstanding precedent that publishing secret records is not a crime’ [Core
Bundle, tab 18, para 9, pp.18, 19]. As all the First Amendment experts make
clear, it is for that reason that no journalist had ever been prosecuted for like
conduct in the US despite ‘thousands upon thousands of national security
leaks to the press’ [Feldstein 1, tab 18, paras 5, 8-11] [Shenkman, tab 4,
paras 21, 25-27, 32-34, 41-42] [Jaffer, tab 22, para 21] [Tigar, tab 23, pp1618].

Political war on journalists under Trump

2.16. The principled and consistent stand taken under the Obama administration
was reversed under the present Trump administration from early 2017
onwards. The prosecution initiated later in December 2017 was plainly the
result of President Trump’s effective declaration of war on leakers and
journalists.

2.17. As is clear from the expert reports, President Trump has ‘repeatedly referred
to the press as ‘the opposition party’ and the ‘enemy of the people’ [Jaffer, tab
22, paras 4 and 28]. He has ‘denounced the news media as a whole as ‘sick’,
‘dishonest’, ‘crazed’, ‘unpatriotic’, ‘unhinged’ and ‘totally corrupt’ and attacked
them as ‘purveyors of ‘fake news’’ [Feldstein 1, tab 18, para 2] [Prince 2, tab
13].

2.18. In this context, President Trump met with FBI Director James Comey in
February 2017 and agreed that they should be ‘putting a head on a pike’ as a
message to journalists over leaks and ‘putting journalists in jail’ [Feldstein 1,
tab 18, para 9] [Shenkman, para 30]. As Professor Feldstein shows,
President Trump then instructed his attorney general to ‘investigate
8

 “criminal leaks” of “fake news” reports that had embarrassed the White
House’ [Feldstein 1, tab 18, para 9] [Shenkman, tab 4, para 30]. The Trump
administration has thus set about systemically punishing whistle-blowers in
general, and ‘dramatically escalated the number of criminal investigations into
journalistic leaks’ [Feldstein 1, tab 18, para 2]. President Trump’s ‘use of
government power to punish his media critics’ is further identified as a
‘deliberate attempt to “stifle the exercise of the constitutional protections of
free speech and the free press’’’ such that ‘all journalists work under the threat
of government retaliation’ [Feldstein 1, tab 18, para 2].

Julian Assange targeted to make an example of him

2.19. It was against that background that President Trump and his administration
then decided to make an example of Julian Assange. He was an obvious
symbol of all that Trump condemned, having brought American war crimes to
the attention of the world [Boyle 1, tab 5, para 11] [Tigar, tab 23, p8-9].
Professor Feldstein puts it in this way: ‘On a worldwide scale [he disclosed]
significant governmental duplicity, corruption, and abuse of power that
had previously been hidden from the public... [he] exposed outrageous,
even murderous wrongdoing, including war crimes, torture and
atrocities on civilians’ [Feldstein 1, tab 18, p.7, para 4]. As indicated above,
the sheer scale and significance of the revelations brought about by Julian
Assange and WikiLeaks can scarcely be understated [Feldstein 1, tab 18, p.6,
para 4]. They range from the video of American soldiers shooting unarmed
civilians from a helicopter, to the brutal torture of detainees in Iraq and the
exposure of the true figures of civilian deaths resulting from the invasion of
Iraq. Such revelations obviously put him in the sights of the aggressive
‘America First’ ideologues of the Trump Administration. They targeted him
because of his exposure of American war crimes and because of the threat
that his revelations and continuing work posed to their geo-political agenda.

The denunciations of Julian Assange in April 2017

9

 2.20. That is why the prosecution of Mr Assange, based on no new evidence, was
now pursued and advocated by the Trump administration, led by spokesmen
such as Mike Pompeo of the CIA and Attorney General Sessions. They
began denouncing him in April 2017, as can be seen from the following:

i.

Firstly, the statements of Mr Pompeo, as director of the CIA, on 13
April 2017, denouncing Julian Assange and WikiLeaks as “a non-state
hostile intelligence agency”. [Feldstein 1, tab 18, p.19 and K10]. On
the same occasion, Pompeo also stated that Julian Assange as a
foreigner had no First Amendment rights. [See Guardian article, bundle
K]

ii.

Then came the political statement of Attorney General Sessions on
20 April 2017 that the arrest of Julian Assange was now a priority and
that ‘if a case can be made, we will seek to put some people in jail’
[Feldstein quoting Washington Post article of Ellen Nakashima, tab 18,
p.19].

2.21. The full scale of these denunciations is encapsulated in the report of
Professor Feldstein [Core Bundle, tab 18, p.19].

2.22. These public denunciations reveal the political motivation that fuels the
prosecution of Mr Assange. They violate the presumption of innocence and
prejudice the prospects of a fair trial. And they form the context in which
Attorney General Sessions, a political appointee with a political agenda, was
directly responsible for the First Indictment in December 2017.

2.23. Thus, as Professor Feldstein shows, pressure was then put on prosecutors by
the Attorney General and ‘the new leaders of the justice department’ to bring
an indictment, even in the face of ‘vigorous debate’ from ‘career professionals’
who were ‘sceptical’ about its legality, and despite open objections from
prosecutors directly involved in the case [Feldstein 1, tab 18, paragraph 9,
page 19]. That was the position in April 2017 as confirmed by reports in the
Washington Post and the New York Times on 20 April 2017 [Feldstein 1, tab
18, paragraph 9, page 19].
10

 The Criminal Complaint in December 2017

2.24. That is why on 21 December 2017 a criminal complaint was made of
computer misuse against Julian Assange, and his extradition on a provisional
warrant was sought. The timing is also very significant because it coincided
with the grant of diplomatic status by the Ecuadorian government. The US
were of course well-informed of all developments in the Ecuadorian embassy,
because US intelligence agencies had access to recordings of all
conversations between Julian Assange and his lawyers in the embassy (a
point which will be developed further below). By then, prosecution had
become a political imperative.

2.25. In the intervening period Julian Assange continued to have his conversations
with his lawyers and family constantly monitored and recorded by a private
agency acting on the instructions of US intelligence and for their benefit.

Superseding indictment

2.26. Then, in May 2019, a superseding indictment was proffered. That indictment
charged Julian Assange under the Espionage Act. It charged him with
publication of state secrets in a multi-count indictment that dramatically
ratcheted up the scale of the charges, the pressure on him, and the potential
penalties. As Eric Lewis shows, Mr Assange faces up to 175 years in prison if
he is convicted of all offences charged in the Superseding Indictment [Core
Bundle, tab 3, p.10, para 36].

Unprecedented

2.27. This decision to prosecute for the publication of state secrets was
unprecedented. The unprecedented nature of the decision is stressed by
witness after witness whose reports are before the Court. The Court is
referred to:-

11

 i.

Professor Feldstein [Core Bundle, tab 18, paras 5 and 8 – 11].

ii.

Carey Shenkman [Core Bundle, tab 4, paras 32 and 41 – 42].

iii.

Jameel Jaffer [Core Bundle, tab 22, para 21].

iv.

Professor Michael Tigar [Core Bundle, tab 23, pp.16 – 18 and 20].

2.28. As Professor Feldstein says: ‘The Indictment breaks all legal precedents. No
publisher has ever been prosecuted for disclosing national secrets since the
founding of the nation more than two centuries ago...The only previous
attempts to do so were highly politicized efforts by presidents seeking to
punish their enemies’ [Core Bundle, Feldstein 1, tab 18, para 10]. ‘The
belated decision to disregard this 230-year-old precedent and charge
Assange criminally for espionage was not an evidentiary decision but a
political one’ [Core Bundle, Feldstein 1, tab 18, para 11].

2.29. Jameel Jaffer characterises the novel nature of the Superseding Indictment in
equally troubling terms: ‘the government’s indictment of a publisher under the
Act, however, crosses a new legal frontier’ [Core Bundle, tab 22, p.12, para
21].
2.30. Finally Carey Shenkman puts it thus: the ‘indictment of a publisher for the
publication of secrets under the Espionage Act has no precedent in U.S.
history’ and in particular, there has been ‘no known prior attempt to bring an
Espionage Act prosecution against a non-U.S. publisher’ [Shenkman, tab 4,
para 32].
2.31. The attorney for the Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of the Press considers
the prosecution of Assange to represent a ‘profoundly troubling legal theory,
one rarely contemplated and never successfully deployed…to punish the pure
act of publication of newsworthy government secrets under the nation’s
spying laws’ [Feldstein 1, tab 18, para 9(d)].
2.32. The US reply offers no legal precedent for this indictment.

The Swedish investigation and the timing of the superseding indictment
12

 2.33. The timing of the superseding indictment, the 23 May 2019 is also highly
significant. At that time, the Swedish prosecution had just made two
significant statements. On the 13 May 2019, they had announced that it was
their intention to reopen the investigation of Julian Assange for sexual
offences and on 14 May 2019, they specifically announced that they intended
to issue an EAW. [See Defence Reply on Abuse para 54 and the open source
materials cited there]. The Swedish investigation was only later discontinued
in November 2019.

2.34. The full facts are set out in the Defence Reply on Abuse of Process
[Submissions Bundle, tab 7, paras 53 to 54]. As made clear there, the
coincidence is too great. It leads to the inescapable inference that the US
ratcheted up the charges so as to ensure that their extradition request would
take precedence over any Swedish request. The actions taken by the US
government were not about criminal justice; they represented a manipulation
of the system to ensure that the US was able to make an example of Julian
Assange.

2.35. The second superseding indictment dated 24 June 2020 maintains the basic
allegations as to the publication of the Manning materials summarised above.
Insofar as it adds significant materials, these are designed to depict Julian
Assange as a continuing threat to the US and to link him to Edward Snowden.
The Court is referred to paragraphs 83-92 of the second superseding
indictment. The injustice of adding these further allegations at this stage will be
the subject of separate submissions to the Court.

3.

Accompanying abuses of the rule of law

3.1. The means employed in the targeting of Julian Assange further show that he
has been made the object of exceptional extra-legal measures; and that this is
no ordinary case.

Invasion of legal professional privilege
13

 3.2.

First, his lawyers were targeted for surveillance operations and their meetings
with Mr Assange were recorded by private security agents acting on behalf of
the US whilst he was sheltering in the Ecuadorian Embassy. During this time,
his lawyers were under physical surveillance by these agents and their offices
were broken into. Then he was evicted from the Embassy after the
intervention of the US. Finally, his confidential papers were illegally taken from
him at the request of the US [Second Statement of Gareth Peirce, tab 21,
paras 12(v) and (vi)]. Intrusion into Legal Professional Privilege of this nature
is universally recognised as the very height of abuse of power; the Court is
referred to the decisions of Grant and Warren.

3.3.

The clear evidence of illegal monitoring and intrusion is referenced in detail in
the Particulars of Abuse [Submissions Bundle, tab 5, paras 36 – 39] and in
the statement of Witness 2 [tab 12, p7].

3.4.

All this points to an agenda that is not confined to a bona fide prosecution. It
also points to a clear disregard for the rule of law. It violated the sanctity of
diplomatic premises. And it took place in this country, which is relevant to the
question of abuse. The Court is referred to the Reply Submissions on abuse
at paras 42 – 43 [Submissions Bundle, tab 7].

Pressuring Ecuador to expel Julian Assange

3.5.

Then too steps were taken to ensure that he was expelled from the
Ecuadorian embassy by a process of bullying and bribing Ecuador into
expelling him, so as to make him available for extradition [see Particulars of
Abuse, Submissions Bundle, tab 5, paras 43 – 45].

Further breach of legal privilege

3.6.

After the removal and arrest of Julian Assange, his legally privileged papers
were seized and sent to the United States; they have not been returned
[Gareth Peirce’s second statement, Core Bundle, tab 21, paras 12(v) and (vi)].
14

 This again constitutes the most serious breach of one of the most
fundamental safeguards known to the common law. The US has declined to
respond to or challenge the evidence on this point.

The pardon offer

3.7.

Further evidence of the bad faith and abuse of power at the heart of this
prosecution is evidenced by the approach to Mr Assange by Republican
Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, in August 2017. Mr Rohrabacher visited
Julian Assange and discussed a pre-emptive pardon in exchange for personal
assistance to President Trump in the enquiry then ongoing concerning
Russian involvement in the hacking and leaking of the Democratic National
Committee emails [Peirce 1, tab 1, para 28] [Witness 2, tab 12, para 30]
[Peirce 2, tab 21, para 9].

3.8.

The statement of Jennifer Robinson sets out clearly that on 15 August 2017
the visit took place to Mr Assange in the embassy by Mr Rohrabacher and a
man called Charles Johnson (known to be closely associated with President
Trump); that they told Julian Assange and Jennifer Robinson that President
Trump was aware of and approved of them coming to meet with Mr Assange
to discuss a proposal for a deal [Core Bundle, tab 42, para 5]. And as to the
nature of the proposal itself, Jennifer Robinson explains it in this way:

“the proposal put forward by Congressman Rohrabacher was that Mr
Assange identify the source for the 2016 election publications in return
for some kind of pardon, assurance or agreement which would both
benefit President Trump politically and prevent US Indictment and
extradition.’ [Core Bundle, tab 42, para 10]

3.9.

Rohrabacher has publicly stated in February 2020 that he and Charles
Johnson did meet with Julian Assange, and that he did make the proposal
about a pardon deal. [see Guardian article dated 19 February 2020 citing
Rohrabacher’s personal blog that day]. He denies it was at the direction or
with the approval of President Trump and President Trump himself denies
15

 everything. But in the immortal words of Mandy Rice Davies: ‘Well he would,
wouldn’t he?’.

3.10. The proposed pardon deal shows that, just as the prosecution was initiated in
December 2017 for political purposes, so too the Trump administration had
been prepared to use the threat of prosecution as a means of extortion to
obtain personal political advantage from Mr Assange. This accords with the
way in which the Trump administration has manipulated the criminal justice
process in a manner that undermines the rule of law (see Eric Lewis’ 4th
declaration at Core bundle tab 79, paras 44-71).

4.

Abuse by reason of fact that offences are political in nature

4.1.

The basic case is set out in the Defendant’s Note on Political Offence and in
the Defendant’s Response on Political Offence [Submissions Bundle, tabs 2
and 10].

A.

Court’s jurisdiction to stay the proceedings

4.2.

It is submitted that the Court has jurisdiction to stay an extradition request on
the grounds of abuse of process where the request is in breach of the terms
of the treaty which enables extradition to take place. (Mr Assange’s
submissions on jurisdiction are set out in detail in the Defendant’s Reply on
Political Offence [Submissions, tab 10, pp.6 – 7, paras 5.1 – 5.3]).

4.3.

To extradite Mr Assange in reliance on the very treaty which governs the
legality of his extradition whilst disregarding a major protection contained in
article 4(1) of that treaty – namely the protection against extradition for a
political offence – would violate the rule of law, and would render any
extradition both arbitrary and inconsistent with Article 5 (ECHR).

4.4.

Moreover it is contrary to the rule of law and Article 5 ECHR to detain an
individual in breach of the requirements of public international law: see R v
Mullen [2000] QB 520 [Abuse Authorities, tab 7, p535E]. This accords with
16

 the general principle that any deprivation of liberty is arbitrary when it occurs
in a manner that is incompatible with a state’s international legal obligations.
(See Jared Genser The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (“WGAD”) at
page 5 and Deliberation Number 9 of the WGAD Concerning the Definition
and Scope of Arbitrary Deprivation of Liberty Under International Law.)
4.5.

The prosecution rely on the decision in R (Norris) v Secretary State for the
Home Department [2006] 3 All E.R. 1011 and on the terms of the 2003 Act
for the submission that this court must disregard express provisions of the
Anglo US extradition treaty. However the decision in Norris is readily
distinguishable from the circumstances of this case for the following reasons:-

i.

Firstly, the context in Norris was completely different. It concerned a
challenge to the designation by the Secretary of State under section
84(7) of the US as a Part 2 requesting state that did not need to
provide a prima facie case, even though such a requirement was
retained in the 1972 Treaty. In that case there was express provision in
the 2003 Act for the Secretary of State to remove the requirement of a
prima facie case. Here, by contrast, there is no express provision in the
2003 Act to dispense with the requirement not to extradite for a political
offence where the treaty continues to require it. Moreover here the
Court is concerned with a fundamental human rights protection, in the
context of a treaty that retains the protection.

ii.

Secondly, the decision in Norris did not relate to a protection contained
in a treaty that post-dated the 2003 Act as is the case here, but to the
1972 Anglo US Treaty which pre-dated the 2003 Act.

iii.

Thirdly, there was no reliance in the Norris case on the abuse
jurisdiction. This is fundamental since Mr Assange primarily invokes the
abuse jurisdiction to resist extradition for what are undoubtedly “political
offences”. All the leading textbooks and authorities recognise
espionage to be a primary or pure political offence; and there can be
little doubt that the CFAA offence here is also a pure political offence.

B.

The Substantive Protection
17

 Article 4(1) applies because espionage is a pure political offence

4.6.

Mr Assange is protected from extradition because espionage is a “pure
political offence”, and article 4(1) expressly protects from extradition for
political offences. In this connection we summarise Mr Assange’s as follows:

i.

The Court is referred to the Defendant’s Note on Political Offence
[Submissions Bundle, tab 2, paras 2.4 – 2.9]. The numerous cases cited
there, including R v Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Kolczynski
[1955] 1 QB 540, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v
Singh [2002] HCA and Dutton v O’ Shane [2003] FCAFC 195, all identify
espionage as a ‘pure political offence’ in the same category as treason,
sabotage and sedition. So too do all the leading academic commentators,
including Shearer, Extradition in International Law, 151 (1971) and
Bassiouni, International Extradition 512 (3rd ed). Thus there is a great
weight of academic and juridical authority to support the proposition that
the offence of espionage with which Mr Assange has been charged, is
itself well recognised as a pure ‘political offence’, and thus comes within
the category of offences exempted from extradition under Article 4.

ii.

Secondly, as a matter of substance and logic, the allegations against Mr
Assange relate to pure political offences. That is because his alleged
conduct satisfies the established test of conduct directed against ‘the
apparatus of the state’ [See Schtraks v Government of Israel [1964] AC
556 at p588, and T v Immigration Officer [1996] AC 742 at p716D]. This
is dealt with in more detail in the Defendant’s Note on Political Offence
[Submissions Bundle, tab 2, pp.6 – 13, paras 3.1 – 3.12].

The prosecution’s reply that pure political offences are not covered by the
Treaty

4.7.

The prosecution submit that the treaty is not directed at pure political
offences, but only at relative political offences. However, their reasoning
18

 simply focuses on the fact that most of the caselaw decided in the AngloAmerican context prior to the 2003 treaty deals with relative political offences.
That is because the conduct alleged that was analysed in those cases could
not qualify as pure political offences such as treason, espionage and sedition.
But, in all the decided caselaw referred to by the prosecution, it was a basic
premise that “pure political offences” such as treason or espionage were to be
regarded as political in character for the purposes of the statutory exemption
that operated in the UK in respect of political offences. See for example
Schtraks and Cheng. There was no suggestion that such offences were not
covered by the Act and Treaty.

In any event, a “relative” political offence

4.8.

In any event the conduct alleged against Mr Assange plainly qualifies as a
“relative” political offence because the conduct alleged is clearly intended to
‘effect a change in government policy’ and thus comes within the test laid
down in Cheng v Governor of Pentonville Prison [1973] AC 931 at 943C
and 945E-F, per Lord Diplock. For a fuller analysis of this the Court is referred
to part 4 of the Defendant’s Note on Political Offence [Submissions Bundle,
tab 2, pp.13 – 20, paras 4.1 – 4.15].

Prosecution’s claim that conduct does not qualify as a “relative” political
offence

4.9.

The prosecution claim that Mr Assange’s conduct does not even qualify as
constituting a “relative” political offence. This overlooks the obvious fact that
the exposure of detainee abuse in Guantanamo and of war crimes in
Afghanistan and the Iraq war was self-evidently politically motivated and
designed to induce a change in government policy. It is impossible to divorce
the alleged disclosure of the names of sources from the context in which it
occurred. The Court is referred to Daniel Ellsberg’s statement in Tab 55 at
paragraph 24 where he states that the purpose of the publications that gave
rise to this prosecution were precisely “to have effect on US government

19

 policy and its alteration”. This is dealt with in detail below under ‘Political
Opinion’ and further developed in Part 2 under Submission 5.

Conclusion on Political Offence

4.10. For all these reasons, it is submitted:-

i.

There is jurisdiction in the Court to stay these proceedings on the basis
that extradition for political offences is an abuse of process, given that it
would violate the express terms of the Anglo-US extradition treaty.

ii.

The offences of espionage alleged against Mr Assange in count 1 and
in counts 3-18 of the second superseding indictment undoubtedly
constitute pure political offences, in accordance with all the accepted
tests laid down in the academic authorities and the case law, the Treaty
does extend to protect against extradition for pure political offences.

iii.

In any event, the conduct alleged against Mr Assange and indeed the
motives expressly imputed to him, self-evidently confirm that his
alleged offences qualify as “relative” political offences because the
alleged conduct was clearly intended to ‘effect a change in government
policy’, per Cheng p945E- F, and to have a political effect on a global
level.

5. Abuse of process by reason of bad faith and abuse of power

5.1.

The particulars of abuse relied on are set out in the Defendant’s Particulars of
Abuse and in the Defendant’s Response on Abuse of Process [Submissions
bundle, tabs 5 and 7].

5.2.

The Court is respectfully referred to the summary at paragraph 87 of the
Defendant’s Particulars of Abuse, which is repeated below for ease of
reference [Submissions Bundle, tab 5]:

i.

The prosecution and extradition request were initiated and influenced
by ulterior, extraneous considerations rather than purely criminal justice
20

 reasons [Lewis 3, tab 38, paras 18, 23-30, 3738] [Feldstein 1, tab 18,
pp23-24] [Jaffer, tab 22, paras 27-28] [Tigar, tab 23].
ii.

The prosecution and extradition request were pursued for political
reasons and have been accompanied by prejudicial denunciations of
Mr Assange by senior political figures in breach of the rule of law and
the presumption of innocence – see Allenet de Ribemont v France
(1996) 22 EHRR 582.

iii.

The Superseding Indictment, with its additional allegations of
Espionage, was introduced for ulterior and improper purposes so as to
trump the competing criminal allegations in Sweden, make a political
example of Julian Assange and expose him to massive further
pressure. Since it forms the basis of the extradition request it infects
the requests with bad faith and abuse.

iv.

The prosecution and the extradition request are for ‘political offences’.
To seek extradition for ‘political offences’ violates the express
provisions of article 4(1) of the Anglo-US Treaty 2007 which prohibits
extradition for political offences.

v.

There have been a series of deliberate violations of Mr Assange’s right
to legal professional privilege by agents of the US acting in this country.
These constitute an affront to justice and a violation of the principles of
comity that the courts of this country cannot ignore and justify the
staying of the extradition request in their own right.

vi.

The course of conduct which led to his facing extradition additionally
involved a violation of the sanctity of the asylum, both diplomatic and
political, that Ecuador had granted him in this country, and a denial of
the protections accorded to embassies in international law. That also
justifies the staying of these extradition proceedings.

vii.

The whole history involving the resurrection of allegations which date
as far back as 2010 and which were deliberately not pursued at the
time of Chelsea Manning’s trial in 2013, engage the s82 bar on
passage of time, but also speak loudly to bad faith and abuse.

21

 5.3.

The Court is invited to rule that these allegations are capable of amounting
abuse and that they call for a response. The prosecution have failed to
provide such a response. In particular, and by way of example only:-

i.

There has been no response to the allegations of wholly improper
political denunciation.

ii.

The prosecution have not dealt with the allegation that the Superseding
Indictment was introduced for ulterior and improper purposes.

iii.

The prosecution have failed totally to explain the reason for the long
delay between 2010 and 2017 in bringing the prosecution.

iv.

As to the allegations of the deliberate violation of the Mr Assange’s
right to legal professional privilege by agents of the US, the US has
failed totally to respond to or deny these allegations.

6. Zakrzewski abuse

6.1.

The Zakrzewski abuse argument is dealt with in detail in Part 2. In essence
we submit that the request for extradition is marred by serious and significant
misstatements of fact regarding the three central allegations.

6.2.

First, the ‘passcode hash’ allegation is a necessary part of the US prosecution
in order to escape the long held position that publishing state secrets of itself
is lawful, per the US Supreme Court. Illegality only arises under US law (per
Bartnicki v Vopper (2001) 532 US 514) when the publisher is also involved
in the underlying data theft [Jaffer, tab 22, paras 23-24] [Kromberg 1, para 7,
p71]. This allegation has therefore been made of necessity to the US case,
despite it being flatly contradictory to the evidence given by US government
witnesses before the Manning Court Martial. The evidence of Patrick Eller
demonstrates that the allegation is misleading by drawing on the US
Government’s own evidence, such that there can be no real dispute, and the
misleading facts presented are material because they are central to the
Court’s dual criminality assessment.

22

 6.3. Second, the allegation that Manning’s disclosures were connected to the
WikiLeaks ‘most wanted list’, is again a necessary part of bringing this
prosecution in the US but is directly contradicted by the evidence given in
Manning’s court martial and publically available information. Manning is clear
that her disclosures arose out of a sense of duty, not because Wikileaks had
sought any particular material – this is further demonstrated by the fact she
first tried to provide the disclosures to the Washington Post and the New
York Times.
6.4. Further, material provided by Manning does not correlate to what Mr
Assange is alleged to have sought through Wikileaks. In short summary,
neither the Iraq and Afghan War diaries (counts 1, 15, 16), the Guantánamo
Detainee Assessment Briefs (counts 1, 6, 9, 12, 18), nor the Diplomatic
Cables (counts 1, 3, 7, 10, 13, 17) were ever on the list but rather were all
items of manifest public interest, for which reason they were disclosed by
Manning. The Rules of Engagement (counts 1, 4, 8, 11, 14) were within a
category of materials potentially on the list but were plainly inextricably linked
to her provision of the ‘collateral murder’ video.
6.5. Third, the allegations that WikiLeaks ‘deliberately put lives at risk’ by
deliberately disclosing unredacted materials [Kromberg 1, §§8-9, 20-22, 71]
[Kromberg 2, §10], the ‘intentional outing of intelligence sources’, is also
factually inaccurate. WikiLeaks was in possession of the material referred to
above for a considerable period before publication and went to extraordinary
lengths to publish then in a responsible and redacted manner. WikiLeaks in
fact held back information while it formed media partnerships with
organisations around the world to manage the release of materials.
Unredacted publication of the cables in September 2011 was undertaken by
third parties unconnected to WikiLeaks (and despite WikiLeaks substantial
efforts to prevent it). Those who did reveal unredacted cables have not been
prosecuted nor even requested to remove them from the internet.

23

 6.6. For all these reasons, the extradition request in this case is a paradigm
example of Zakrzewski abuse and meets the framework set out by Lord
Sumption at paragraph 13 of that case.

Statutory Bars

7. Political motivation and section 81(a)

7.1.

Mr Assange’s extradition is being sought on the basis of a prosecution for
Espionage because of his alleged act of publishing state secrets in 2010.

7.2.

As set out above, the prosecution has all the hallmarks of a politically
motivated prosecution:i.

The prosecution initiated at the end of 2017 constitutes a complete
reversal of the decision taken under the Obama administration in 2013
not to prosecute him. The reason for that earlier decision under
President Obama not to prosecute him was that to do so would
constitute a violation of the First Amendment of the American
Constitution.

ii.

It is unprecedented to indict a publisher of official secrets under the
Espionage Act.

iii.

The prosecution was the culmination of an escalating public war on
free speech by the Trump administration which first targeted whistle
blowers and then proceeded to attack investigative journalists and
publishers.

iv.

It was preceded and accompanied by public denunciations of Julian
Assange by senior figures in the Trump administration including Mike
Pompeo and Attorney General Sessions.

v.

Finally, the means adopted to monitor and target Julian Assange and to
strip of his protections in the Ecuadorian Embassy were the actions of
a lawless state bent on adopting any means necessary to ‘bring him
down’. Even if it meant violating public international law. Even if it
meant violating legal professional privilege and the sanctity of the

24

 Embassy’s protection. Even if it meant stealing his newborn child’s
DNA

Political Opinions

7.3.

For the purposes of section 81(a), it is necessary to deal with the question of
how this politically motivated prosecution satisfies the test of being directed
against Julian Assange because of his political opinions. The essence of his
political opinions which have provoked this prosecution are summarised in
the reports of Professor Feldstein, Professor Rogers, Professor Noam
Chomsky and Professor Kopelman [Core Bundle tabs 18, 40, 39 and 6,
respectively] and in Daniel Ellsberg’s statement [tab 55]:-

i.

He is a leading proponent of an open society and of freedom of
expression.

ii.

He is anti-war and anti-imperialism.

iii.

He is a world-renowned champion of political transparency and of the
public’s right to access information on issues of importance – issues
such as political corruption, war crimes, torture and the mistreatment of
Guantanamo detainees.

iv.

More specifically, he advocates the exposure of crimes against
humanity and accountability for such crimes.

7.4.

In his speeches, articles and book, Julian Assange has clearly articulated and
consistently advocated political positions in line with those beliefs. The Court
will be referred to the relevant passages contained in Bundle M. Moreover has
acted to advance those beliefs and influence governmental behaviour.

7.5.

Those beliefs and those actions have inevitably brought him into conflict with
the current US administration, which explains why he has been denounced as
a terrorist and repeatedly identified as an anti-American ideologue. This is
part of the political motivation for the prosecution. Moreover, the current
administration has identified “public disclosure organisations” as “ideologically
motivated” and as a “growing threat”. Finally, targeting him for exposing war
25

 crimes is part of a wider ideological agenda of the current US administration to
punish and deter non-US nationals who seek to expose US war crimes or
advocate accountability for them. That point is developed in detail in Part 2,
(under Submission 7 at paras 214 onwards), which deals with the US agenda
of suppressing and deterring investigation by of the US by the ICC, and those
who assist it.

7.6.

Professor Noam Chomsky puts it like this: - ‘in courageously upholding
political beliefs that most of profess to share he has performed an
enormous service to all those in the world who treasure the values of
freedom and democracy and who therefore demand the right to know
what their elected representatives are doing’ [Core Bundle, tab 39, para
14]. Julian Assange’s positive impact on the world is undeniable. The
hostility it has provoked from the Tump administration is equally undeniable.

The legal test for ‘political opinions’

7.7.

The Court will be aware of the legal authorities on this issue, the key question
being whether a request is made because of the defendant’s political
opinions. A broad approach has to be adopted when applying the test to the
concept of political opinions, per Re Asliturk [2002] EWHC 2326 [Abuse
Authorities, tab 11, paras 25 – 26]. Julian Assange’s ideological positions are
clearly encompassed in the correct, broad approach.

7.8.

Moreover, cases such as Emilia Gomez v SSHD [2000] INLR 549 show that
the concept of “political opinions” extends to the political opinions imputed to
the individual citizen by the state which prosecutes him [Political Offence
Authorities, tab 43]. For that reason the characterisation of Julian Assange
and WikiLeaks as a ‘non-state hostile intelligence agency’ by Mr Pompeo
makes clear that he has been targeted for his imputed political opinions. All
the expert reports on this issue show that Julian Assange has been targeted
because of the political position imputed to him by the Trump administration –
as an enemy of America who must be brought down.

26

 7.9.

There can be no doubt that opposition to and exposure of abuses of
governmental authority can qualify as protected political opinions. Thus in
Suarez [2002] 1 WLR 2663, the Court of Appeal held at paras 29-30 that:

‘…When dealing with the motivation of a persecutor, it has to be
appreciated that he may have more than one motive. However, so long
as an applicant can establish that one of the motives of his persecutor
is a Convention ground and that the applicant’s reasonable fear relates
to persecution on that ground, that will be sufficient.

…Thus, if the maker of a complaint relating to the criminal conduct of
another is persecuted because that complaint is perceived as an
expression

or

manifestation

of

an

opinion

which

challenges

governmental authority, then that may in appropriate circumstances
amount to an imputed political opinion for the purposes of the
Convention. That is made clear in the Colombian context in Gomez at
560 para 22. Although, in the case of Gomez, the acts of persecution of
the appellant were those of non-state actors, namely members of the
armed opposition group FARC, the decision contains an illuminating
discussion, replete with reference to authority, of the problems
associated with the notion of imputed political opinion in a society
where the borderlines between the political and non-political have been
distorted so that it is difficult to draw a distinction between
governmental authority on the one hand and criminal activity on the
other…

7.10. In the current global context, it is obviously outdated to confine the concept of
‘political opinion’, and indeed the concept of a ‘political offence’, to conduct
manifesting adherence to a particular political party within a nation state, or to
the context of an internal political struggle within such a state. An individual
who exposes wholescale abuse and war crimes by a state, and thereby
attracts prosecution for the very act of such exposure, is entitled to the
protection of section 81(a) and also to the protection of Article 4 of the Treaty
(referred to in Part 4 above).
27

 7.11. The key witnesses whose evidence is adduced in relation to the history and
political motivation of the prosecution, and the free speech issues raised by
it, are as follows:-

i.

Professor Mark Feldstein, a distinguished academic specialising in
broadcast journalism [Core Bundle, tab 18].

ii.

Carey Shenkman, an academic who has made a special study of
history of the Espionage Act and the Computer Fraud Abuse Act [tab
4].

iii.

Jameel Jaffer, Executive Director of the Knight First Amendment
Institute at Columbia University [tab 22].

iv.

Professor Michael Tigar, former journalist and academic specialising in
constitutional and criminal law [Core Bundle, tab 23].

v.

Professor Noam Chomsky, Professor of Politics and world renowned
author [Core Bundle, tab 39].

vi.

Professor Paul Rogers, Emeritus Professor of Peace Studies at
Bradford University [Core Bundle, tab 40].

vii.

Patrick Cockburn, a distinguished journalist in his statement of 15 July
2020 [tab 51].

viii.

Daniel Ellsberg, the chief protagonist in the Pentagon Papers
revelations, in his statement [tab 55 para 24].

Prosecution Reply

7.12. The Prosecution submit that there was no earlier decision not to prosecute
and that the experts are wrong to base any opinions on that assertion. Their
position is undermined by the following:

i.

They do not explain in any way the long delay in prosecution between
2010 and 2017. That is despite the fact that Mr Kromberg expressly
states that the evidence of harm was available in 2010 and 2011.

28

 ii.

They do not expressly contradict the assertion that a decision was taken
in 2013 under the Obama administration not to prosecute then.

iii.

They provide no explanation of the decision making process, despite the
fact that memoranda would clearly exist recording the various decisions
taken;

iv.

They do not deny the fact that there were express protests and
resignations by career prosecutors involved in the case when the
Superseding indictment was brought in 2019.

7.13. Mr

Kromberg

makes

some

generalised

assertions

about

the

independence of prosecutorial decisions in the US Federal system and
asserts that they are not influenced by political considerations. However the
overwhelming evidence is that, under the Trump administration, there has
been repeated interference by the President and his political appointees, with
the normal criminal justice process. In particular Mr Assange refers the Court
to:

i.

The Huawei case, in which President Trump has expressly referred to
the possibility of dropping the prosecution in exchange for concessions
by the Chinese state on trade (see Reuters report of 22nd August 2020
which references the defence claim in the Canadian proceedings that
the extradition request of Huawei Chief Financial Officer Meng
Wanzhou is being exploited by President Trump and other senior
members of the administration ‘as a bargaining chip in a trade dispute’.
See also Eric Lewis’ 5th statement at para 4).

ii.

The interference by the President, and the Attorney General in the
normal prosecutorial and sentencing process in the cases of Roger
Stone and Michael Flynn. (Eric Lewis’ 4th declaration at tab 70, paras
44 ff which deals also with the increasing politicisation of the DOJ
under Attorney General Barr and President Trump).

Conclusion

29

 7.14. The prosecution do not dispute the unprecedented nature of the prosecution.
They have not explained or excused the timing of the prosecution, the
accompanying political denunciations or the means adopted to monitor and
target Julian Assange.

Nor have they answered the expert evidence of

political motivation by any independent expert evidence of their own or in any
other way.

8.

Prejudice in his treatment at trial, sentencing and subsequent detention
by reason of political opinions and his status as a foreigner

8.1.

Turning to section 81(b), it is submitted that Julian Assange will be exposed to
prejudice and discrimination both at trial and on sentence and in any
subsequent detention by reason of his political opinions and indeed his
foreign status. That is for the following reasons:-

i.

He has been publicly denounced by the most high-ranking public
officials, including the President, the Secretary of State and the
Attorney General because of his political opinions. Those overtly
intemperate

denunciations

have

irretrievably

prejudiced

the

presumption of innocence and his prospects of a fair trial. That is highly
relevant to section 81(b).
ii.

Furthermore, the US are taking the position that he has no First
Amendment rights as a foreigner. That is clear from the statement of
Mr Pompeo reported in the Guardian on 21 April 2017 that ‘Julian
Assange has no First Amendment Freedoms’ because ‘he is not a US
citizen’ [see Bundle K, tab 11]. Indeed the prosecution attorney Mr
Kromberg indicates an intention to argue that ‘foreign nationals are not
entitled to protections under the First Amendment’ [Prosecution Bundle,
tab 2, para 71].

iii.

Mr Assange’s political status will also result in him being held in
especially harsh prison conditions. He is likely to be placed in isolation
both pre-trial and post-trial, and may well be held under the excessively
restrictive regime of SAMs. That is established by the evidence of the
US lawyer Yancey Ellis and Joel Sickler, the renowned expert on the
30

 US prison system [Core Bundle, tabs 15 and 20]. US Attorney
Kromberg himself accepts the real possibility that Mr Assange will be
put in administrative segregation because of his notoriety [Prosecution
Bundle, tab 2, para 84]. This point is further developed in part 8 below.
iv.

Finally, Julian Assange’s trial, sentence and any subsequent detention
will all take place in the context of a criminal justice system that lends
itself to political manipulation in cases such as this. And all this at a
time when the Trump Administration is blatantly demonstrating its
readiness to interfere in the criminal justice system to harm its enemies
and favour its supporters (such as Roger Stone and Michael Flynn).

Human Rights

9. Flagrant Denial of Justice and Article 6 ECHR

9.1.

The evidence of a number of experts supports the view that there is a real risk
that Julian Assange will be exposed to a flagrant denial of justice both at trial
and at the sentencing stage. The Court is referred to the evidence of:-

i.

Eric Lewis, a practicising lawyer in the US who deals with issues both
of trial and sentence [tabs 3 and 24]

ii.

Barry Pollack, Julian Assange’s lawyer in the US [tab 19].

iii.

Robert Boyle, an expert on grand juries, who deals with Chelsea
Manning contempt proceedings [tab 5].

iv.

Thomas Durkin, a former Federal Prosecutor who will deal with the
history of this prosecution and fair trial issues [tabs 16 and tab 43].

9.2.

The US Federal System operates to secure pleas through coercive pleabargaining powers, swinging sentences and overloaded indictments designed
to increase sentence exposure [Lewis 1, tab 3, paras 36-48] [Durkin, tab 16,
paras 17-23]. These pressures are coupled, in case such as this, with the
effects of pre-trial detention in solitary confinement in a ‘cage the size of a
parking space, deprived of any meaningful human contact’ [Lewis 1, tab 3,
paras 12-23] [Ellis 1, tab 15, paras 7-8]. The result is a system in which the
31

 plea rate is over 97%, higher than any other country, including Russia. That is
confirmed by the evidence of Eric Lewis in his statement [tab 3, para 40] and
by the first statement of Thomas Durkin [tab 16, para 18].

9.3.

The system will be skewed even further against Julian Assange, because this
prosecution will be located in Alexandria, Virginia; from which a jury pool
comprised almost entirely of government employees and/or government
contractors is guaranteed [Pollack, tab 19, paras 10-11] [Prince 1, tab 13].

9.4.

He will then be deprived of the supporting evidence of Chelsea Manning
because of coercion by the contempt proceedings, as described by grand jury
expert Robert Boyle [tab 5]. It is also foreseeable that prosecutor will force Mr
Assange to cooperate and identify other sources of WikiLeaks publications.

His trial will be prejudiced by public denunciations violating the presumption
of innocence

9.5.

In addition, his trial will be prejudiced irretrievably by the very fact of the public
denunciations of him made by a series of administration officials from the
President, to the present secretary of state Mike Pompeo and successive
Attorney Generals. These intemperate public denunciations violate the
presumption of innocence, as is clearly established by the European Court
decision in Allenet de Ribemont (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 582.

The unjust sentencing procedure

9.6. Moreover, his sentence can be enhanced on the basis of unproven
allegations even where he is acquitted of those same allegations at trial, as
per the evidence of former federal prosecutor Thomas Durkin [Core Bundle,
tab 16, paras 19 – 24]. The prosecution say that this procedure has been
found to accord with the principles of specialty. That may be so. But the fact
of compliance with the technical rules of specialty is one thing. It is quite
different to assert that a procedure which enables the Court to increase the

32

 sentence on the basis of allegations that were rejected even by the jury
accords with the fundamental principles of a fair trial.

9.7.

For these reasons Mr Assange’s extradition would violate Article 6 ECHR.

10.

Article 7 ECHR

10.1. The inherent unforeseeability of Mr Assange’s prosecution as a publisher of
classified materials, and consequent bar to his extradition, pursuant to Article
7 ECHR, is dealt with in detail in Part 2 of the Defendant’s Submissions.

10.2.

In summary, Article 7 both prohibits the retrospective application of criminal
law and requires legal certainty, such that the law must be applied in a
foreseeable manner. It is an “essential element of the rule of law” which must
be construed in such a way “as to provide effective safeguards against
arbitrary prosecution, conviction and punishment”: S.W. v United Kingdom
(1995) No. 20166/92 at paragraph 35.

10.3. There are substantial grounds for believing an Article 7 violation would arise in
this case if Mr Assange were extradited to face charges under either the
Espionage Act or the CFAA because both are so broad, vague and
ambiguous that they are vulnerable to political manipulation, and are
unforeseeable in their application. Further, they are being used in this case in
a legally unprecedented manner, applying an entirely novel legal theory.

10.4. The Espionage Act as originally drafted and in its most recent iteration has
been widely criticised by legal scholars for its ‘hopeless imprecision’
[Shenkman, tab 4, para 18] as a result inter alia of the following:
i.

The concept of ‘national defense’, which is a key element of the
charges in this case, is excessively vague such that the ordinary
person could not reasonably understand its scope or anticipate how it
will be defined by Courts.

33

 ii.

The statute does not define the central concepts of ‘injury’ to the United
States or ‘advantage’ to a foreign nation. Journalism by its nature
involves the publication of materials which could be ‘useful’ to all sorts
of people’ and which ‘may in some instances be harmful, in the sense
that government officials are embarrassed or people are stirred to
anger’ [Tigar, tab 23, p19].

iii.

The concepts of ‘injury’ or ‘harm’ hinge upon the classification of
documents by the executive where the over-classification of documents
is ‘widely acknowledged as rampant to the point of absurdity’ [Feldstein
1, tab 18, §6] [Chomsky, tab 39, §12] [Tigar, tab 23, p10] but in respect
of which courts almost never question the government’s proffered
reasons’ for classification in a given case [Jaffer, tab 22, §14(c)].

10.5. The CFAA incorporates the concepts of ‘national defense’, ‘injury to the
United States’ and ‘advantage of any foreign nation’ and thus suffers from the
same imprecision and ‘enormous malleability’ as the Espionage Act, allowing
for ‘extreme prosecutorial discretion’ [Shenkman, tab 4, para 35].

10.6. Such discretion has led to ‘extraordinary selectivity in the initiation of
prosecutions’ and leads to ‘severe double standards’ [Shenkman, p17, para
31]. This is in part because thousands of classified documents have been
leaked to the press, so prosecution of all leaks would not be possible, and in
part because many of the leakers are senior government employees who are
rarely made the subject of prosecutions [Jaffer, tab 22, paras 11-12, 17-20].

10.7. Despite the extraordinary breadth of the Espionage Act, which some
commentators have warned means it could theoretically apply to journalists or
publishers [Jaffer, tab 22, paras 8-9] [Tigar, tab 23, pp16-17] [Shenkman, tab
4, para 29], that was never the statute’s purpose and rare, attempted political
prosecutions of journalists have always foundered either due to concerns over
press freedoms or due to political expediency [see detailed summary in
Shenkman, tab 4, paras 33-34 and Feldstein 1, tab 18, paras 8-9].

34

 10.8. Even the Justice Department under the Obama administration, which pursued
leakers aggressively, decided after a three year probe and ‘months of internal
debate’ not to prosecute Mr Assange because of the so-called ‘New York
Times problem’, which (as described by former Justice department
spokesman Mathew Miller) is that if the Justice Department was not ‘going to
prosecute journalists for publishing classified information, which the
department is not, then there is no way to prosecute Assange’ [Feldstein 1,
tab 18, para 9] [Shenkman, tab 4, para 27] [Timm, tab 65, para 36] [Lewis 4,
tab 70, §§2-8, 14] [K4-5].
10.9. Thus the prosecution of Mr Assange, a journalist, ‘crosses a new legal frontier’
[Jaffer, tab 22, para 21] and ‘has no precedent in U.S. history’; certainly there
has been ‘no known prior attempt to bring an Espionage Act prosecution
against a non-U.S. publisher’ [Shenkman, tab 4, para 32]. By this novel and
unforeseeable extension of the law, he is exposed to the real risk of a flagrant
denial of his Article 7 rights.

11.

Article 10 ECHR

11.1. This point is dealt with more fully in Part 2. For the purposes of this part we
will simply summarise the key propositions as to why this prosecution exposes
Julian Assange to the real risk of a flagrant denial of his Article 10 rights.

11.2. Firstly, this legally unprecedented prosecution seeks to criminalise the
application of ordinary journalistic methods to obtain and publish true (and
classified) information of the most obvious and important public interest.
11.3. Secondly, the conduct it seeks to criminalise is investigative journalism. There
is no logical distinction between his conduct and that of the New York Times.
11.4. The prosecution’s attempt to distinguish his conduct from that of other
investigative journalists on the basis that he solicited classified material is
convincingly refuted by the reasoning of Feldstein: ‘The government's attempt
to draw a distinction between passive and active newsgathering – sanctioning
35

 the former and punishing the latter - suggests a profound misunderstanding of
how journalism works. Good reporters don't sit around waiting for someone to
leak information, they actively solicit it...When I was a reporter, I personally
solicited and received confidential or classified information, hundreds of times’
[Feldstein 2, tab 57, §2].

11.5. The means adopted to facilitate the provision of information from Manning are
standard journalistic practices: see paras 60 – 70 of Part 2.
11.6. As further demonstrated in Part 2, Article 10 protects journalists for their
activity in obtaining or publishing leaked information as distinct from to
conduct of state officials under a duty of confidentiality who leak such
information. That is the fundamental distinction from R v Shayler [2001] 1
WLR 2206.

11.7. Finally, it is clear that US law is not Article 10 compliant. It fails to provide any
adequate protection for the exposure of state secrets in the public interest.
See paras 204 – 213 of Part 2. For that reason too Mr Assange faces a real
risk of a flagrant denial of his Article 10 rights.
11.8. Professor Feldstein summarises the threat to Article 10 rights posed by this
prosecution and extradition request thus:
“Julian Assange faces lifetime imprisonment for publishing
truthful information about governmental criminality and abuse of
power, precisely what the First Amendment was written to protect.
In the end, however, this case about more than Assange or
journalism. It is about the right of citizens to have the information they
need to participate in a democracy.

A free society depends on

democratic decision-making by an informed public. And an informed
public depends on a free and independent press that can serve as a
check on governmental abuse of power—the kinds of abuses that
WikiLeaks made public. “In a free society, we are supposed to know
the truth,” a US congressman said when WikiLeaks first began
36

 publishing this batch of documents. “In a society where truth becomes
treason, we are in trouble.” [Feldstein 1, tab 18, para 11]

12. Dual Criminality

12.1. It is further submitted there is no extradition crime for the reasons more fully
set out in Part 2. Put shortly, Mr Assange’s conduct would not constitute an
offence under English law because the prosecution would not be able to
satisfy the reverse burden of demonstrating there was no defence of
necessity.

12.2. Were Mr Assange to be tried in England and Wales, for any offences arising
under the Official Secrets Acts (‘OSA’), the prosecution would need to prove,
to the criminal standard of proof, that Mr Assange’s disclosures were not the
result of duress of circumstance or necessity: see R v Shayler [2001] 1 WLR
2206, §70. The DPP discontinued the prosecution of GCHQ leaker Katherine
Gun, who revealed important information about misconduct surrounding the
invasion of Iraq, on the precise basis that the prosecution could not disprove
the defence of necessity.
12.3. In this case the governmental actions revealed by Mr Assange goes far
beyond misconduct and amounts to evidence of the gravest of crimes,
including illegal rendition, torture and murder.
12.4. The prosecution of any journalist in England and Wales for similar revelations
could never be pursued, due to the availability of the necessity defence, quite
apart from the obvious public interest and human rights considerations. In
such circumstances, the dual criminality bar must operate to prevent
extradition.

13. Article 3 and section 91

13.1. There is a real risk that Julian Assange will be exposed to inhuman treatment in
the United States. In support of the submission that extradition would violate
37

 Article 3 and be oppressive on mental health grounds under section 91, we rely
upon the evidence of:

i.

Eric Lewis, on the issue of sentencing and on prison conditions in his
first declaration at tab 3 of the core bundle and in his fourth declaration
at tab 70.

ii.

Yancey Ellis, an experienced lawyer who practices in the very area of
Virginia in which Mr Assange’s trial and pre-trial detention will take
place. In his first report at tab 15 of the core bundle and in his further
report dated 14 July 2020 at tab 54.

iii.

Joel Sickler, a renowned expert on prison conditions in the Federal
System at tab 20 of the core bundle and in his second statement of 20
June 2020 at tab 62.

iv.

Lindsay Lewis, in her affidavit of 17 July 2020 – which deals with the
treatment of Abu Hamza post extradition, who has been detained long
term in ADX Florence despite express claims by the US government in
his extradition proceedings here that this would not take place.

13.2. Firstly, it should be stressed that Mr Assange is likely to be singled out for
special conditions of administrative segregation, both at the pre-trial stage and
the post-trial stage, because of his political profile. As to the pre-trial stage,
the risk of detention in administrative segregation and even the most
repressive regime of special administrative measures (“SAMS”) is confirmed
by the evidence of Yancey Ellis [Core Bundle, tab 15, paras 6 and 10] and
Joel Sickler [Core Bundle, tab 20, paras 13 – 16]. In fact, Mr Kromberg
expressly recognises the possibility that Julian Assange would be subject to
SAMs in his First Declaration [Prosecution Bundle, tab 2, para 95].

13.3. As to the post trial stage there is then the real risk of detention under highly
restrictive conditions of segregation in a Communications Management Unit
or, worse still, the notorious ADX Florence [Prosecution Bundle, tab 2, paras
102 – 106]. Mr Kromberg does not rule out detention in ADX Florence in
either his First Declaration [paras 102 – 106] or his Second Supplemental
Declaration [para 14 onwards]. The reality is, that this would involve
38

 conditions tantamount to solitary confinement. For prolonged periods. Without
proper review. And without proper consideration of his mental condition.

13.4. The evidence is clear that such a regime precipitates mental breakdowns and
heightens the risk of suicide even for mentally stable prisoners and that such
a regime is inappropriate and dangerous for mentally ill inmates. Mental
health treatment and care in these regimes fails to comply with minimum
Article 3 protections [see for example the report of Joel Sickler in Core
Bundle, tab 20, paras 18 – 19].

13.5. This is significant because there is clear evidence from Professor Kopelman,
Professor Mullen, Dr Deeley and the prosecution expert Professor Fazel that
Mr Assange suffers from serious clinical depression and requires medical
treatment – including prescribed medication for his depression and
psychological support. Moreover, he has now been diagnosed as suffering
from Asperger’s Syndrome (ASD) by Dr Deeley, a psychiatrist with special
expertise in ASD.

Principles of Law applicable under Article 3 and Section 91

13.6.

Mr Assange does not seek to challenge the inhumanity of the US prison
system in the abstract. It is its likely operation in his case and its effect on
him, given his mental and physical problems, that creates the risk of
inhumanity contrary to Article 3 and of oppression under section 91.

This

accords with the approach of the UK courts in such cases as Lauri Love
(2018) EWHC 172 at paras 116-120 and Aswat 2014 EWHC 1216 (Admin)
and of the European Court itself in the same case of Aswat v UK (2014) 58
EHRR 1 at paras 52 – 57. Mr Assange is likely to be detained in the most
restrictive conditions, amounting to solitary confinement, because of his
political profile and perceived threat to the US; and yet these very conditions
will make it virtually certain that he will suffer mental deterioration and commit
suicide given the history of his mental condition.

The recognised risk of pre-trial detention in the US federal system
39

 13.7. The English High Court has already identified the special problems that may
arise in pre-trial detention in the US for those suffering from mental disorder.
That was what led to decisions to discharge the Requested Persons in the
case of Lauri Love [2018] EWHC 172 at paras 116-120 and to require special
assurances in the case of Aswat (2014) EWHC 1216 at paras 38 - 40. Here
there is a real likelihood that Mr Assange will be detained in administrative
segregation and even under special administrative measures at the pre-trial
phase.

He will effectively be subject to solitary confinement, denied

association and have limited contact with the outside world.

And he will

receive no specialist mental health care. The full circumstances are set out in
part 12 below and in the appendix.

Risks of detention post-trial

13.8. Turning to the position post-trial, the US acknowledges that there is a real risk
that Mr Assange will be subjected to the SAMS regime and that he could be
detained in a communications management unit, including even ADX
Florence. But they submit that these regimes would not contravene Article 3;
and they rely on decisions such as Ahmad v UK in 2010 and Pham v US in
2014. However the legal background needs some analysis before accepting
any trite proposition that neither the conditions in ADX nor the SAMS regime
violate Article 3 or render extradition “oppressive” for the purposes of Section
91.

Observations of the High Court in Hamza

13.9.

In the case of Abu Hamza v United States [2008] EWHC 1357 (Admin) the
President of the Queen’s Bench Division stated:

“…like Judge Workman, we too are troubled about what we have read
about conditions in some of the Supermax prisons in the United
States… confinement for years and years in what effectively amounts
to isolation, may well be held to be, if not torture, then ill-treatment
40

 which contravenes Article 3. This problem may fall to be addressed in a
different case” [para 70].

13.10. In the case of Hamza, the question of whether it would be inhuman to subject
a man with his disabilities to the conditions in ADX Florence was not
determined.

But in fact the only reason why it was not determined was

because the High Court, and subsequently the European Court, were wrongly
informed by the US authorities that there was no real prospect of Mr Hamza
being detained in Supermax conditions in ADX Florence for more than a few
months, for administrative reasons, pending allocation to a more suitable
prison. The fact that the European Court acted on the basis of this wrong
information in Mr Hamza’s case was expressly recognised by the European
Court itself in the later case of Aswat v UK (2014) 58 E.H.R.R.1 at para 56.
But, in fact, Mr Hamza has now been detained in ADX Florence since 8
October 2015 (core bundle, Tab 60). The whole history of Mr Hamza’s
treatment is dealt with in the affidavit of Lindsay Lewis dated 17 July 2020 at
tab 60 of the core bundle. As she shows, the representations made by the
US government that Mr Hamza would be extremely unlikely to go to ADX
Florence proved false, and despite protests he has been held there for the
past 5 years. She further makes the point that inmates held under SAMS at
ADX “are housed in a special secure unit of ADX known as H unit which may
result in further limitations on an inmate’s ability to benefit from any remaining
available mental illness treatment options.” She predicts a similar fate for Mr
Assange at paragraph 74 of her affidavit.

The European Court in Ahmad in 2012

13.11. The prosecution have referred to the decision in Babar Ahmad v United
Kingdom (2013) 56 E.H.R.R. 1 [Submissions Bundle, tab 6, para 72] and Mr
Kromberg refers to the evidence before the European Court in that case in his
First Supplemental Declaration [Prosecution Bundle, tab 3, §14]. It is
accepted that the European Court in 2012, on the basis of the evidence then
before it, rejected a challenge to the compatibility with Article 3 of the
conditions in ADX Florence and the regime of segregation there. However:
41

 i.

The European Court recognised in Ahmad that indefinite detention in
conditions of segregation could violate Article 3, depending on the
particular conditions – the stringency of the measure, its duration, the
objective pursued, and its affect on the person concerned [para 209].
They recognised that ‘solitary confinement, even in cases entailing
relative isolation, cannot be imposed on a prisoner indefinitely’ [para
210].

ii.

The Court further recognised that solitary confinement must be
accompanied by procedural safeguards guaranteeing the prisoner’s
welfare and the proportionality of the measure [para 212]. They
emphasised the need for review procedure, reasons for any review,
and regular monitoring of the prisoners physical and mental condition
[para 212].

iii.

The Court recognised also that it was important to ensure monitoring
and appropriate medical treatment for those suffering from mental
illness, detained in conditions such as ADX Florence [para 212].

iv.

However, the Court found that there was scope for procedural review
[para 220], that conditions were not unduly restrictive given the security
risk posed by the Applicant in that case, and that there were well
established procedures for reviewing the continuation of detention so
that detention need not be indefinite [paras 221 – 223].

13.12. Thus the findings of the European Court were premised on the mistaken
assumption that detention would not be long-lasting or indefinite; that
there was a proper system of review in place and that appropriate
treatment would be assured for those with mental illness. None of these
assumptions hold good today.

13.13. Furthermore, the Wylie affidavits referred to by Mr Kromberg in his First
Supplemental Declaration at paragraph 14 - which were relied upon by the
European Court in Ahmad - were filed in 2007 and 2009, so that they are
over a decade out of date. Subsequent events and further revelations have

42

 demonstrated that the contents of those affidavits is no longer an accurate
reflection of the conditions there.
High Court Decision in Pham (December 2014)

13.14. It is true that the English High Court in its decision in the case of Pham v US
[2014] EWHC 4167 (Admin), in December 2014, rejected the submission
that detention in ADX Florence under SAMS would violate Article 3, despite
the evidence adduced by Laura Rovner at an earlier hearing. The High Court
relied on the findings of the US Federal Court of appeal in Rezaq v Nalley
677 F.3d 1001 (2012) [see paras 48 – 49]. On the basis of the Rezaq
decision, the High Court found as follows in Pham:-

i.

Placement in ADX Florence is not indeterminate [para 49];

ii.

It is subject to periodic reviews, so that there is no real risk of indefinite
detention in ADX Florence.

The current situation

13.15. Since the decisions in Ahmad and Pham the situation in ADX Florence has
either changed or been clarified by further developments and further
revelations. These include:i.

The Amnesty report of 2014 ‘Entombed…Isolation in the US Federal
System’ which observed that conditions for prisoners at ADX had
become increasingly restrictive and isolated in recent years (see page
12)

ii.

The report of Allard Lowenstein, dated September 2017, for the Centre
of Constitutional Rights ‘The Darkest Corner: Special Administrative
Measures and Extreme Isolation in the Federal Bureau of Prisons’.

iii.

Clear evidence that the BOP does not set an upper limit on the amount
of time a person can spend in isolation including evidence that one
man with mental illness spent 19 years in ADX Florence before he was
finally transferred out. (See the July 2017 Review of the Federal
43

 Bureau of Prisons use of restrictive housing for inmates with mental
illness).
iv.

The history of the case of Abu Hamza himself as set out in Lindsay
Lewis’s affidavit.

v.

The up to date report of Joel Sickler which deals with the situation as it
is now and makes clear that “were Mr Assange to be given a SAM or
sentenced to a CMU, his time in federal prison in the United States
would be a de facto sentence of solitary confinement”. (see paragraph
48).

vi.

The lawsuit filed by a group of inmates at ADX Florence in the case of
Cunningham v BOP is analysed by Sickler in his second declaration
dated 20 June 2020 [tab 62]. This shows in shocking detail that
inmates with mental illness housed at ADX Florence suffered “a near
complete lack of mental health care”, that “suicide attempts were
common”, and that “many have been successful” [tab 62, paragraphs
63 – 67]. Despite a settlement approved by the federal district court in
2017 2 which included promises of various improvements in conditions,
Sickler shows that the problem of severe lack of medical treatment
persists at the prison and that there remains a high rate of suicide [tab
62, paras 65 – 66].

13.16. Thus the true position is now clearer, in that:-

i.

The reports referred to above have shown the real risk of indefinite
detention in ADX Florence.

ii.

There is evidence that detention in ADX Florence in segregation can be
indefinite, as shown by the facts of Abu Hamza’s case (see Lindsay
Lewis’ affidavit and see Sickler at paragraph 56, where he refers to
“one man with mental illness spending 19 years in ADX before he was
finally transferred out”).

2

https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2017/aug/30/federal-court-approves-landmark-bop-adx-mentalhealth-settlement/

44

 iii.

There is no proper system of review of detention (see Sickler at paras
55 – 57 of his second statement of 20 June 2020 at tab 62 ).

iv.

This case itself shows the real risk that such detention will be imposed
not on a convicted terrorist, but on a troublesome whistleblower –
which is wholly disproportionate and arbitrary.

Lack of Medical Care Pre-Trial and Post Trial

13.17. Both the English High Court in the case of Love and the European Court of
Human Rights in Ahmad have expressed profound concerns about the
potential inhumanity of conditions in so-called administrative segregation in
the US prison system, amounting effectively to solitary confinement,
particularly in relation to those with special mental vulnerability.

13.18. In the case of Aswat v UK (2014) 58 E.H.R.R. 1 at paras 52 - 56 the
European Court found that extradition to the US would violate Article 3
because there was no sufficient evidence that Mr Aswat would receive an
appropriate location and appropriate treatment for his mental disorder in the
US system. At para 56 the Court took account of the fact that:-

“there is no guarantee that, if tried and convicted he would not be
detained in ADX Florence, where he would be exposed to a highly
restrictive regime with long periods of social isolation. In this regard,
the Court notes that the Applicant’s case can be distinguished from that
of Mustafa (Abu Hamza). While no ‘diplomatic assurances’ were given
that Abu Hamza would not be detained in ADX Florence the High Court
found on the evidence before it that his medical condition was such
that, at most, he would only spend a short period of time there. The
Court notes, however, that there is no evidence to indicate the length of
time that the present Applicant would spend in ADX Florence.

While the Court in Ahmad did not accept that the conditions in ADX
Florence would reach the Article 3 threshold for persons in good health
or with less serious mental health problems, the Applicant’s case can
45

 be distinguished on account of the severity of his mental condition.
The Applicant’s case can also be distinguished from that of Ben Said v
United Kingdom as he is facing not expulsion but extradition to a
country where he has no ties, where he will be detained and where he
will not have the support of family and friends. Therefore in light of the
current medical evidence, the Court finds that there is a real risk that
the Applicant’s extradition to a different country and to a different, and
potentially more hostile prison environment, would result in a significant
deterioration in his mental physical health and that such a deterioration
would be capable of breaching the Article 3 threshold.”

13.19. The English High Court in its decision in 2014 Aswat v UK EWHC 1216
(Admin) followed the European Court’s decision. And it was only after specific
guarantees were given that Mr Asfaw would be sent to an appropriate mental
health institution that his extradition went ahead. Nonetheless, after he was
extradited, he was only briefly detained in a psychiatric institution and then
almost immediately sent to MCC New York.

13.20. More recently in 2018 the English High Court in the case of Lauri Love has
found that the pre-trial conditions in Metropolitan Correctional Centre (“MCC”)
and Metropolitan Detention Centre (“MDC”) in New York are so defective and
inappropriate for someone suffering from depression and autism as to render
extradition oppressive.

13.21. Those cases are significant because here we are dealing with an extremely
vulnerable person with a long history of clinical depression, a diagnosis of
Asperger’s Syndrome, and an established risk of suicide. Detention in such
conditions for Julian Assange would be the height of inhumanity.
13.22. There is clear evidence that Mr Assange suffers from serious clinical
depression and requires medical treatment – both in the form of prescribed
medication for his depression and in the form of the support of a psychologist
and group therapy, which he has been receiving in HMP Belmarsh. There is
clear evidence that he will not receive the necessary medical care either pre46

 trial or post-trial. Yancey Ellis refers to the very limited medical support that
will be available to Mr Assange in Alexandria, as does Joel Sickler [Core
Bundle, tab 15, para 11 and tab 20, paras 54 – 57].

13.23. As to the general lack of medical care in the US federal prison system for
those suffering from mental illness, the Court is respectfully referred to the
following official US reports:i.

The 2014 Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) report as to the acute lack of
appropriate psychiatric care and the dramatic under-diagnosing of
mental illness (see Sickler 2, tab 62, at para 15);

ii.

The 2017 Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Report from the Office of the
Inspector General, ‘Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons use of
restrictive housing for inmates with mental illness’. This makes clear
that the mental disorders of the inmate population are grossly under
recorded and, as a consequence, ‘the BOP is unable to ensure that it is
providing appropriate care’ to those with mental disorder (see Sickler 2,
tab 62, at para 18);

iii.

The November 2018 report of the Marshall Project, a prominent
criminal justice NGO, which revealed that ‘increasingly, prison staff are
determining that prisoners – some with long histories of psychiatric
problems – don’t require any routine care at all’. Moreover the report
found that though the BOP itself states that 23% of incarcerated people
have a diagnosed mental illness, it classified just 3% as having a
mental illness serious enough to require regular treatment. Mr Sickler
drew attention to the consequences of the “steep drop in mental health
treatment” including the increased number of suicides and suicide
attempts. (see Sickler 2 tab 62, at paras 19 – 21).

Course to be taken

13.24. In what follows we will first summarise why the regime Mr Assange faces
both pre-trial and post-trial would constitute inhuman and degrading treatment
contrary to Article 3. And then go on to deal with the oppressiveness of the
47

 extradition to face such conditions in the light of Julian Assange’s mental
condition.

14.

Article 3: the risk of inhuman and degrading conditions

14.1. In respect of Article 3 we will deal in turn with the conditions pre-trial, the risk
of inhuman conditions post-conviction, and the general lack of appropriate
medical care.

Conditions Mr Assange faces pre-trial

14.2. The likelihood is that Mr Assange will be detained pre-trial in wholly
inappropriate and dangerous conditions for someone in his mental state thus:
i.

He will be detained in the Alexandria jail’s equivalent of a housing unit.
(see Sickler’s second declaration at paras 8 – 9).

ii.

He will be confined to a windowless small cell for 22-23 hours a day in
ADSEG. This effectively amounts to solitary confinement.

iii.

He will not be able to associate with other prisoners even when he is
out of his cell (see Ellis’s second declaration at para 4 bundle O tab 7;
and see Lewis fourth statement of 18 July 2020 at tab70 at para 14).

iv.

Kromberg’s account at paras 86-87 of his first declaration as to the
ability of inmates to speak through the doors and windows of their cells
is emphatically contradicted by Yancey Ellis in his second declaration
of 14 July 2020 (tab 54).

14.3. There is the additional risk that Mr Assange will be placed under SAMS.
Mr Kromberg accepts this as a real possibility at paragraphs 95 of his first
declaration. This will place yet further restrictions on his contact with other
prisoners and with the outside world – as confirmed by Sickler in his second
declaration at para 37. The combination of ADSEG and SAM is equivalent to
solitary confinement. Mr Kromberg’s denial of solitary confinement at paras
86-87 of his first declaration is contradicted by all of the defence experts on
pre-trial prison conditions (Lewis, Sickler, and Yancey Ellis).

48

 14.4. Therefore the likely conditions of detention pre-trial would be both
inappropriate and dangerous for someone with Mr Assange’s medical history.
As the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture commented, the practice of solitary
confinement during pre-trial detention is “meant to bludgeon people into cooperating with the Government, accepting a plea or breaking their spirit”. Mr
Sickler declared that due to the stress of this type of confinement, the
Government has found inmates will often change their plea and co-operate
with the Government.

(see Sickler’s first declaration tab 20 core bundle

paragraph 60). A regime of detention which is designed to break one’s spirit
is clearly contrary to Article 3 (Lewis first declaration para 23).

Post-trial detention

14.5. Post-trial there is a likelihood that Julian Assange will be detained in a CMU in
conditions of severe restriction and constant monitoring such as those
described by Sickler in his second statement at paras 43 ff; a real risk that he
will be subjected to virtual solitary confinement under SAMS (and Kromberg
himself accepts the real possibility that SAMS will be applied at para 95 of his
first declaration.) Moreover there is a very real risk, even a likelihood, that
Julian Assange will be detained in the very restrictive conditions of H-Block at
ADX Florence. We will deal with each of these in turn.

Placement in a CMU

14.6. Firstly, there is clear expert evidence that Julian Assange could well be
detained in a CMU. (see part 4 of Sickler’s second statement of 20 June
2020 at tab 62). Mr Sickler deals with the very restrictive conditions in a CMU
at paras 39-43 of his second statement at pages 28-30. As he states there:-

“CMUs are highly restrictive federal prison units that segregate certain
prisoners from the general prison population and the outside world,
closely monitoring and controlling those prisoner’s communications.
Prisoners in CMUs are banded from any physical contact with friends

49

 and family and their access to phonecalls and work and educational
opportunities are extremely limited.”

At para 41 he sets out the extent of monitoring. At para 42 he deals with the
fact that such prisoners in the isolation units are barred even from contact with
other prisoners in the general population in what is widely known as the
‘terrorist unit’. Finally, he explains that inmates in CMUs suffer significant
levels of depression as a result of the constant monitoring.

SAMS

14.7. Sickler goes on to explain, at part 6 of his report, that there is actually a
likelihood that Mr Assange would be subjected to SAMS and the
dehumanising regime under SAMS.

14.8. At part 7 Sickler addresses the real risk, if not likelihood, that Mr Assange will
be detained at ADX Florence in circumstances of extreme isolation that
effectively amount to solitary confinement. At para 52 he sets out the fact that
prisoners detained at ADX “spend from 22-24 hours per day locked alone in
their cells” and that a psychologist at ADX has stated that “it’s a form of torture
on some level” and “I would say they are in fact in solitary confinement”.

14.9. The prison regimes described above, the accompanying isolation and the lifethreatening effects are likely to be imposed on Mr Assange arbitrarily and
despite the fact that he is alleged to be neither a violent offender or a terrorist.
He is not even a Category A prisoner in the UK, in contrast to the prisoners
whose cases were considered in Ahmad and Ors. Moreover, he will be
exposed to these regimes irrespective of his mental condition and suicidal
tendencies as is clear from the long history of inappropriate use of isolation in
general and the ADX regime in particular on those suffering from mental
illness.

14.10. For the reasons summarised above it is submitted that earlier cases such as
Ahmad v UK and Pham relied on by the prosecution do not address the
50

 particular type of situation here or the evidence that is now available on the
prison conditions that Julian Assange will face in the year 2020 and the
effects that these prison regimes will have in his particular case. In summary,
the prison regimes he faces and in particular the risk of detention under
SAMS and in ADX Florence are inhuman for the following reasons:i.

They are wholly inappropriate in his case given the actual nature of his
alleged offending.

ii.

the imposition of such regimes would be inhuman given his mental
vulnerabilities.

iii.

The SAMS regime and detention in ADX Florence could be potentially
indefinite as shown by the examples Joel Sickler cites and the case of
Abu Hamza himself.

iv.

Despite Kromberg’s assertions to the contrary, placement under SAMS
and subjection to the ADX regime is not subject to any realistic or
effective review. This is clearly shown by Sickler’s evidence.

v.

Inevitably the subjection of Julian Assange to these draconian and
dehumanising regimes will inevitably increase the high risk of suicide
that already exists.

14.11. The Court is respectfully referred to the Appendix for a more detailed analysis
of the prison condition issues, including the lack of proper procedural review
for those detained in ADX Florence.

15.

Section 91: unjust and oppressive to extradite by reason of Julian
Assange’s medical condition

15.1.

Section 91 affords a protection from extradition where extradition would be
rendered unjust or oppressive by reason of physical or mental disorder. In this
context Mr Assange relies upon the evidence of expert psychiatrists and
psychologists who deal with Mr Assange’s history of clinical depression and
trauma, and the risk of suicide if he is extradited to the US. They are, in turn:-

51

 i.

Professor Kopelman, a distinguished forensic psychiatrist [Core
Bundle, tab 6].

ii.

Dr Sondra Crosby, who examined Mr Assange in the Ecuadorian
Embassy [Core Bundle, tab 7].

iii.

Professor Mullen, a psychiatrist who assessed Mr Assange in
Australia [Core Bundle, tab 8].

iv.

Dr Quinton Deeley, an expert in the diagnosis and treatment of ASD in
his report of August 14th 2020 [Core Bundle, tab 80].

15.2. This is a classic case for invoking the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
in the case of Love pursuant to s.91 of the 2003 Act. That case provides this
Court with a precedent for protecting a person suffering from mental illness
from the high risk of suicide posed by extradition to, and detention in, the
oppressive conditions of the US prison system.

History of Clinical Depression and Trauma

15.3. It is plain that Julian Assange suffers from a long history of clinical depression
that dates back many years. There is a family history of mental illness [Core
bundle, tab 6, para 2].

15.4. He was diagnosed with depression by Professor Mullen in 1995, following an
earlier history of self-harm in 1990 [Core Bundle, tab 8, para 4]. Professor
Mullen saw him again in HMP Belmarsh in 2019 and recorded that he has “a
history of episodes of significant periods of depression dating back to his
teens” which “were for the most part of mild to moderate severity” and that his
“current depression was precipitated by the distress and fear occasioned by
his imprisonment and threatened extradition” [Core Bundle, tab 8, para 38].
He concluded that he “will remain at risk of suicide while the depression
continues in its current form” [Core Bundle, tab 8, para 38]. Finally, he gave
this view as to the effects of extradition to the US: “in my opinion his mental
health will likely deteriorate further and his risk of suicide will increase if he
continues to be subject to the current level of isolation, or to potentially even

52

 more isolation and restriction in the US prison system” [Core Bundle, tab 8,
para 40].

15.5. Professor Kopelman carried out a series of interviews with Mr Assange over
a long period in 2019 and concluded in his report dated 17 December 2019
that “Mr Assange suffers from recurrent depressive episodes sometimes with
psychotic features present, and often with ruminative suicidal ideas” [Core
bundle, tab 6, p33, para 9]. This report drew on an extensive consideration of
Mr Assange’s family history, medical history and consultation with Professor
Paul Mullen’s case history of Mr Assange’s treatment in Australia. Professor
Kopelman recorded symptoms relevant to Mr Assange’s mood disorder that
included loss of sleep, loss of weight, a sense of pre-occupation and
helplessness as a result of threats to his life, the concealment of a razor blade
as a means to self-harm and obsessive ruminations on ways of killing himself
[Core bundle, tab 6, pp11-12 and 33, para 9]. At that time, Julian Assange
expressed frequent suicidal ideas and a constant desire “to self-harm or
suicide” [Core bundle, tab 6, p33, para 9]. Professor Kopelman’s conclusion
was that:

“(a) Mr Assange is indeed suffering from mental disorders, namely a
severe depressive episode with psychotic (hallucinatory) and somatic
symptoms, in the context of a history of recurrent depression, as well
as PTSD and anxiety disorder. (b) In my opinion, there is a very high
risk of suicide, should extradition become imminent. Mr Assange
shows virtually all the risk factors which researchers from Oxford have
described in prisoners who either suicide or make very lethal attempts.
I would add that he is telephoning the Samaritans regularly. He has
received Catholic absolution, and he wants to prepare a Will. He has
had potential suicidal implements confiscated. He is very aware of the
example of relatives and friends who have suicided. He has been
preparing the ground, like his grandfather, by (in effect) saying
Goodbye to those closest to him. (c) This suicide risk arises directly
from Mr Assange’s psychiatric disorder (his severe depression). He
finds it difficult to cope in HMP Belmarsh, particularly with his relative
53

 isolation in Healthcare, and he thinks of suicide “hundreds” of times a
day. …I reiterate again that I am as certain as a psychiatrist ever can
be that, in the event of imminent extradition, Mr Assange would indeed
find a way to commit suicide.” [Core Bundle, tab 6, p35, para 14 (iv);
emphasis added]
15.6. Dr Sondra Crosby confirms the diagnosis of a major depression [Core
Bundle, tab 7, para 48]. On the issue of suicide risk, she assesses a high
likelihood of suicide if he is extradited to the United States :-

“It is my strong medical opinion that extradition of Mr Assange to the
United States will further damage his current fragile state of health and
very likely cause his death. This opinion is not given lightly.” [Core
Bundle, tab 7, para 49; emphasis added]
15.7. We rely further on the recent report of Dr Quinton Deeley dated 14th August
2020 [Core Bundle, tab 80]. At paragraph 29.13 (at page 25) Dr Deeley
confirms Professor Kopelman’s diagnosis of a depressive condition. He
highlights that this is of a fluctuating nature; that Mr Assange was suffering
from ‘a severe depressive episode with psychotic symptoms’ when Professor
Kopelman assessed him; and that he was suffering from a ‘moderate
depressive episode’ in July 2020. He identifies a succession of symptoms of
depression at paragraph 10 of his report.

15.8. Dr Deeley, who is a leading expert on Autism Spectrum Disorder, further finds
that Mr Assange satisfies the criteria for Asperger’s Syndrome Disorder (at
paras 27.1 to 27.2) and explains that diagnosis fully thereafter. He further
explains that the capacity for forming relationships that led Dr Blackwood to
discount ASD does not in fact discount such a diagnosis on the basis of Dr
Deeley’s comprehensive experience in this field. (paras 27.6 to 27.9)

15.9. Dr Deeley finally addresses the risk of suicide ‘should a determination be
made to extradite him to the United States’. He indicates that his history of
depression (31.2 to 31.8), and his Asperger’s Syndrome condition (para 31.9)
54

 greatly increase the risk of suicide if a decision to extradite is taken. He
concludes that, if a decision to extradite is taken, ‘he is likely to try to kill
himself’ (para 31.14). Still worse, Dr Deeley goes on to assess that there is a
high risk of attempted suicide if he is actually extradited, detained and tried in
the US; and that this risk would be due to a significant degree to the fact that
his Asperger’s condition ‘would render him less able to manage’ conditions in
US prisons.(para 31.18)

15.10. Taken as a whole therefore the defence expert evidence satisfies the test laid
down in Turner v United States for discharge under s.91 in cases of suicide
risk, in that:i.

There is a high risk of suicide, as established by the evidence of Professor
Kopelman, Dr Sondra Crosby and Dr Quinton Deeley.

ii.

That risk of suicide arises out of the diagnosed mental conditions of
depression and Asperger’s Syndrome as expressly found by both
Professor Kopelman and Dr Quinton Deeley.

iii.

The evidence is that this risk would not be addressed and obviated by
appropriate precautions in the US system.

iv.

Moreover for the reasons set out in part 12 above, the US system does not
have “appropriate arrangements in place… so that [the US] authorities can
cope properly with the person's mental condition and the risk of suicide”
[Turner v US, para 28 (6)].

v.

Indeed, for all the reasons set out in part 12 above, the real risk of
indefinite detention in solitary confinement and also the denial of human
contact under a SAMs regime are likely to exacerbate the deterioration of
his mental state and increase the risk of suicide.

15.11. Moreover, is a very real risk that Julian Assange will be driven to take his own
life by the very prospect of extradition or the very fact of being extradition to
the US, given the lengthy detention in inappropriate and inhuman conditions
that he knows await him there. In this context the Court’s attention is drawn to
the likely disastrous effects on him of being separated from his family and
support system. It is significant that the European Court in Aswat attached
significance to the separation of a mentally ill person from all family support in
55

 the alien and hostile prison system of the US [para 56, supra]. So too did the
English High Court in Love [para 104D]

The evidence of Dr Nigel Blackwood

15.12. The prosecution rely on the evidence of Dr Blackwood who (somewhat
surprisingly, given the limited ambit of appropriate expert comment) ventures
his own opinion as to section 91 that Mr Assange’s “mental health condition
is not such that it would not [sic] be unjust and oppressive on mental health
grounds to extradite him” [Blackwood, p15, para 56]. This somewhat
incoherent assertion is founded on a number of highly questionable
assertions and assumptions:i.

Firstly, his view that Mr Assange’s only mental health problem is a
moderate depressive disorder and that he suffers from no other mental
health conditions [para 56]. This is contrary to the expert evidence of
Professor Kopelman, Dr Crosby, Professor Mullen and Dr Deeley, who
have far more in-depth and longitudinal knowledge of Mr Assange.

ii.

Secondly, his view that there is a risk of suicide, but it is not a
substantial risk [para 56]. Again this is contrary to the view of all the
defence experts, and of the prosecution’s own expert Professor Fazel,
that Mr Assange presents a high risk of suicide. And it is based on only
two interviews with Mr Assange during a particular week in March.

iii.

Thirdly, his view that any suicide risk can be managed in the US since
“there appears to be an equivalent multi-disciplinary approach in the
Virginia prison system” [para 56]. In this respect Dr Blackwood simply
takes at face value Mr Kromberg’s claims as to the nature of the regime
in the Virginia state system and uncritically repeats those claims at
para 55, including the assertion that “there is no solitary confinement in
the ADC”. Notably, he does not address the question of the federal
prison regime outside Virginia that Mr Assange will face post-trial at all.

iv.

Finally, that his “current mental condition … does not remove his
capacity to resist the impulse to commit suicide” [para 56]. This crude
assertion does not even begin to address the risk of deterioration if
extradition is ordered and if Mr Assange faces the harsh and isolating
56

 conditions he is likely to face in the US prison system and the hostile
foreign environment. This is simply brushed aside by a slighting and
blithe reference to the fact that “access to his support network may be
restricted in Virginia correctional system, such that he interacts with his
support net work to an increased degree through his attorneys” [para
57].

15.13. In all the circumstances the Court will be invited to prefer the evidence of the
defence experts; to reject Dr Blackwood’s optimistic acceptance of all Mr
Kromberg’s assertions as to prison conditions in the States and the
management of suicide risk there; and to apply the same critical approach
that the High Court of England adopted in the case of Love to the US
system’s capacity to manage the suicide risk of a mentally ill foreign
extraditee in their judgment at paragraphs 116 – 119.

Evidence of Professor Fazel

15.14. The prosecution further relies on the recent report of Professor Seena Fazel
dated 30th July 2020 who was requested to address both the diagnosis of
depression, and the comparative suicide rates as between US prisons and
UK prisons generally.

15.15. Professor

Fazel

records

Mr

Assange’s

history

of

depression;

the

antidepressant medication he has received in prison (3.10-3.15); the
deterioration in Mr Assange’s condition by the 20th June 2020 at part 4, and
he confirms a ‘clinical diagnosis of depression, which is of moderate severity’
(5.2).

15.16. Professor Fazel concludes that Mr Assange’s suicide risk is currently high but
modifiable whilst he is in a UK prison (5.6). Turning to the position if Mr
Assange is extradited he recognises that his extradition, conviction and
sentence in the US ‘would further increase his suicide risk’. He goes on to
say:- ‘if Mr Assange is moved to a US prison, his suicide risk may be
57

 modifiable but his risk will depend on other circumstances, some of which
cannot be anticipated with any certainty’. (5.6)

15.17. Professor Fazel states at paragraph 5.9 that currently ‘Mr Assange’s mental
condition is not sufficiently severe that it removes his capacity to resist
suicide’. But clearly that position could alter if he is extradited. And Professor
Fazel does not address the extent to which the fact of extradition is likely to
exacerbate his present condition and the resultant risk that sooner or later he
would then commit suicide or at the very least his condition would ‘gravely
worsen’ and he would ‘be at permanent risk of suicide’. Yet this is precisely
the scenario that was addressed in the context of oppression in Love v USA,
2008 1WLR 2889. And it was this risk that led the High Court to conclude in
that case that extradition would be oppressive in the comparable context of a
person suffering from both depression and Asperger’s Syndrome and likely to
suffer a mental deterioration in the US prison system.

15.18. Professor Fazel refers to the comparative statistics on suicide in US and UK
prisons. But he does not address the specific risk of suicide in the case of a
mentally disordered foreign national extradited to the United States and
detained in conditions of solitary confinement there. The evidence is that
there is a high risk of suicide amongst the mentally disordered in US prisons;
a vastly enhanced risk in conditions of solitary confinement as noted by
Professor Kopelman at page 20 of his second report [cited below]; and a
particularly high risk of suicide in conditions of isolation such as those in ADX
Florence [see appendix at paragraph 2.33].

15.19. For these reasons we submit that the evidence of Professor Fazel actually
supports the case that extradition is oppressive by its recognition that Mr
Assange suffers from depression, that he has a currently high risk of suicide;
and that that risk of suicide is likely to be increased in the US prison system
though Professor Fazel understandably recognised that it is not possible to
predict the exact circumstances in which he would be detained in the US [see
para 5.6]
58

 Professor Kopelman’s response
15.20. In his most recent report of August 13th Professor Kopelman has reaffirmed
his diagnosis of severe depression and his conclusion that there is a high risk
of suicide in the US. This is after a careful analysis of the reports of the
Prosecution experts Dr Blackwood and Professor Fazel.

15.21. In confirming his diagnosis it is important to stress that Professor Kopelman
draws on a deeper knowledge of the case that the Prosecution psychiatrists.
In particular:i.

He draws on the extensive family history of depression set out as point
2 of his opinion on page 16 of his second report.

ii.

He draws on detailed and contemporaneous accounts of Mr Assange’s
history of earlier depressive episodes including Professor Mullen’s
1996 report as to his depressive episode in Australia then and the
records of depression and suicidal ideation during the years 2003 to
2005 when he was further treated in Australia.

iii.

He extensively analyses the prison medical records and the significant
evidence of an improvement after he was removed from seclusion in
Healthcare in single cell occupancy (Paragraph 4, page 17).

iv.

He further relies on Dr Humphreys’ conclusions on the basis of
psychometric tests that Mr Assange has suffered an impairment of his
cognitive functions whilst in custody (see findings under the heading
Neuropsychological Assessment at pages 4 – 5).

v.

Moreover, Professor Kopelman has given this case comprehensive
consideration. He had a series of interviews with Mr Assange over a
long period of time in 2019, two further interviews in January and
February 2020 and has further conducted a telephone interview in May
2020.

15.22. Professor Kopelman’s conclusions are based on profound knowledge and
careful clinical research in relation to Mr Assange.

59

 15.23. As to Professor Kopelman’s findings on the question of suicide risk, his finding
that there is a high risk of Mr Assange’s suicide in the US is soundly based on
a comprehensive review and the following factors:i.

The family history of depression and suicide (pages 5-6, page 16 and
at page 21 (iii) of the second report).

ii.

Mr Assange’s own past history of self-harm and suicidal ideation (set
out at pages 16-17 of the second report).

iii.

His current expression of suicidal intentions over a long period of time
(first report at pages 11-12 and page 33 at para 9).

iv.

The fact that he now has a confirmed diagnosis of Asperger’s/ASD and
that the study of Cassidy, Baron-Cohen et al (2014) found that an
Asperger’s/ASD diagnosis in adults increases the risk of suicidal
ideation by 9 times compared with the general population (pages 21-22
(iii) of second report). The Court is further referred to the additional
statistical studies supporting Professor Kopelman’s risk prediction set
out in the same paragraph.

v.

The further statistical evidence that there is a high risk of suicide in the
case of those subject to solitary confinement in the US. As Professor
Kopelman points out at page 20 of his second report, the research of
Terry Kupers shows that ‘approximately 50% of all successful suicides
within US prisons occur in the 3.8% of prisoners who are held in
segregation or isolated confinement’. Similarly, the rate of ‘threatened
bodily harm’ in ADX facilities was almost 10 times the overall Bureau of
Prisons (BoP) prison rate during 2016-17 (8.7 per 100 inmates versus
0.9 per 100) (Id). These statistics completely place in context the more
general suggestion of Professor Fazel that the US prison suicide rate is
lower generally than the rate of suicide in UK prisons. If one is placed
in solitary confinement in the US then the risk of suicide in is very high.

vi.

Finally, there is the clear evidence from the prison experts (Joel Sickler,
Yancey Ellis, Eric Lewis and Lindsay Lewis) that he is likely to face
conditions amounting to solitary confinement in custody in the US. This
is most important evidence that cannot be discounted.

60

 15.24. For all these reasons the Court will be invited to conclude that Professor
Kopelman’s assessment of the high risk of suicide in Mr Assange’s particular
case if he is extradited to the US is well founded on a comprehensive
consideration of the case, the overall clinical picture, the statistical evidence
and a careful consideration of the prison conditions he is likely to face in the
US.

The overall oppressiveness of extradition

15.25. In dealing with the question of oppression under s91, the Court is entitled to
look at all factors, including the nature of the charges (see Obert v Greece
[2017] EWHC 303 (Admin), para 40 and Kakis v Cyprus [1978] 1 W.L.R. 779
per Lord Diplock at p784G). Here the charges are, to say the least, highly
controversial. Moreover, the actual lack of gravity of the offences, and the lack
of any actual (as opposed to potential) harm, is apparent from the very fact
that the US did not even consider it right to prosecute until December 2017.
Thus, though the relevant facts were known in 2010, it was not even
considered proper to pursue them until 2017, after current President Trump
took office and appointed Mike Pompeo as head of the CIA. In determining
this issue of oppression, the Court can have regard to all these matters. It can
take account of the delay and the highly unusual and unprecedented nature of
the case against him. In the light of all these factors taken together it is our
case that it would be “oppressive and “unfair” to expose Julian Assange to the
very high risk, if not certainty, of suicide if he is extradited to the US.

Additional Risk of Covid in US Prisons

15.26. The Court is already familiar with the evidence as to Mr Assange’s physical illhealth and the factors that make him particularly vulnerable to deterioration or
death if he contracts Covid. These were fully set out in the reports of Dr
Fluxman and Dr Crosby served for the purposes of the bail application. In the
light of a body of publicly available materials demonstrating that the US prison
system in general affords inadequate safeguards against Covid the European
Court has recently granted rule 39 protection against extradition in the case of
61

 Hafeez v UK. In the circumstances the special risks of Covid infection in the
US prison system affords an additional reason to decline extradition on
section 91 grounds. Mr Assange reserves his right to pursue this point in the
light of the fast changing position in the US and the pending application to the
ECtHR.

16.

Section 82

16.1. Finally, the Court must consider the passage of time and whether to apply the
protection against extradition where it has become unjust and oppressive by
reason of the same. The position of Mr Assange is as follows:-

16.2. Firstly, there clearly has been a long passage of time. No explanation has
been given by the US for bringing the charges as late as December 2017 in
respect of conduct known as long ago as 2010. Mr Kromberg has made no
less than four declarations. But none of them even attempt to explain the
delay in bringing charges, despite the fact that he expressly claims in his
Second Supplemental Declaration that it was well publicised as early as 2010
‘that the department of Justice had confirmed it was investigating Assange for
his acts in connection with the Manning disclosures’ and that ‘the specific
concerns of the United States that Assange’s publications endangered the
lives of innocent informants and sources were well publicised’ [para 12]. [The
Court is referred to paragraph 12 of Kromberg’s Second Supplemental
Declaration and to footnote 2 which quotes articles published in 2010 and
2011].
16.3. If it really is self-evident that Mr Assange should be the subject of prosecution
(and the section 81(a) argument is rejected) the Court is still left with the
question as to why there has been such a long delay in prosecution Mr
Assange for publications that took place in 2010 and 2011. That is relevant
because “culpable delay on the part of the state seeking extradition” is a
factor to be taken into account in deciding whether it would be unjust or
oppressive to extradite now [La Torre v Italy [2007] EWHC 1370, at para 37].
The relevant authorities are all summarised in the case of Obert. The Court is
62

 referred to Lord Edmund Davies’ judgment in Kakis at p785C, Lord Woolf’s
judgment in Osman No.4 (1992) 1 AER 579 at p587D- 587H and Lord Justice
Henry’s judgment in Ex Parte Patel [1995] Admin 7 LR 56 p66 – 67:
‘All the circumstances must be considered in order to judge whether
the unjust/oppressive test is met. Culpable delay on the part of the
state may certainly colour that judgment (as to whether it would be
unjust or oppressive to extradite him by reason of the passage of time)
and may be decisive not least in what is otherwise a marginal case (as
Lord Woolf indicated in Osman (No.4). And such delay will often be
associated with other factors such as the possibility of a false sense of
security on the extraditee’s part’.

16.4. If the decision to prosecute now, that was taken from December 2017
onwards, has to be presumed as a matter of law to be justified, then the long
delay does require explanation. Absent explanation, the Court is entitled to
conclude that there was culpable delay in bringing the prosecution for these
offences – which the US now say are very serious – when all the relevant
factors were known at the latest by 2012.

16.5. Secondly, there has been an earlier considered decision not to prosecute, in
2013. The fact of an earlier inconsistent decision not to pursue a prosecution
was recognised to be a highly significant factor in determining injustice and
oppression in the leading case of Kakis v Cyprus [1978] 1 W.L.R. 779, where
the requested person’s belief that he was covered by an amnesty and the
long delay in initiating proceedings against him, taken together, were held to
render it oppressive as well as unjust to extradite [see Lord Diplock (at p.784)
and Lord Scarman (at p.790)]. The Court is further referred to the decision in
Obert, where again delay in seeking extradition was held to be a relevant
factor in rendering extradition oppressive [per para 39].

16.6. Thirdly, there is a real risk of prejudice given the great difficulties in
reconstructing the events of 2010 and 2011, which will be necessary in order
63

 to rebut the US’s misleading allegations as to recklessness to the causation of
harm. There are grave problems in now attempting to reconstruct and prove
the sequence of events in 2011 which led to the eventual publication of
unredacted materials after publication by others [Peirce Core Bundle, tab 36,
paras 10 – 18]. Equally Mr Assange faces real difficulty in rebutting the
allegations that individuals in various countries were exposed to danger as a
result of the revelations [Ibid, paras 15 – 17]. This plainly gives rise to a real
risk of prejudice at any forthcoming trial.

16.7. Fourthly, during the intervening period, Julian Assange’s mental state has
deteriorated such that there is a real risk he could not effectively participate in
his trial. That is in no small part due to the prolonged period of uncertainty
caused by the original decision not to prosecute followed by repeated calls for
prosecution in 2017 and the eventual bringing of a criminal complaint in
December 2017.

16.8. Finally, it is oppressive to seek his extradition now after the well-publicised
decisions in 2013 not to prosecute him for espionage or any other offences. In
dealing with this issue of oppression, the Court can also take into account the
very grave effect of all this on Julian Assange’s own fragile mental condition.

17. Conclusion

17.1. For all of these reasons and each of them individually, the Court is invited to
refuse extradition and discharge Mr Assange.

Edward Fitzgerald QC
Mark Summers QC
Ben Cooper QC
Florence Iveson

24 August 2020

64

 Appendix on prison conditions relevant to Article 3 and oppression
1. Likely conditions pre-trial
1.1.

It is likely that Mr Assange will be held in solitary confinement at the ADC, either in
administrative segregation, protective custody or subject to “Special
Administrative Measures” (SAMs). Importantly, Mr Kromberg has confirmed this as
a possibility (Declaration Kromberg, Assistant US Attorney, 20 January 2020, para
84-85 and 95).

1.2.

Administrative segregation (ADSEG) is a detention regime in which inmates spend
22-23 hours per day in their windowless, single-occupancy cells. Even during their
out-of-cell time, they cannot talk to other inmates or take part in
educational/recreative programmes. They must spend their out-of-cell time alone,
using it to shower or make a phone call. (Ellis 1 para 8; Lewis para 14)

1.3.

Special Administrative Measures (SAMs) is a detention regime with the same
characteristics as administrative segregation and additional restrictions on inmates’
communication with the outside world. Non-legal visits and phone calls are sharply
curtailed; information redacted and censored. Communications with visitors and
attorneys are monitored; with attorneys and family subject to prosecution if they
make any of the detainee’s messages public. (Lewis 1 para 20-21; Sickler 2 para 4042)

1.4.

Both these regimes are recognised as forms of solitary confinement, as detainees
are confined to their cell for 22-23 hours per day (Lewis 1 para 18).

1.5.

Mr Kromberg’s statement that there is no solitary confinement at ADC refers solely to
the fact that none of the ADC’s different detention regimes is formally named “solitary
confinement”, as he concedes in the following sentence that the aforementioned
regimes are employed at the ADC (Declaration Kromberg, Assistant US Attorney, 20
January 2020, para 83).

Administrative segregation
1.6.

The ADC regularly houses high-profile defendants and is well-known for assigning
them to the jail’s administrative segregation unit (ADSEG) (Sickler, para 52; Ellis,
para 7; Lewis 1 para 8). Despite warnings from the US Department of Justice that
administrative segregation should be used rarely and fairly, ADC uses it as a “default
solution” for federal defendants awaiting trial (Lewis 1, para 16).

1.7.

According to the 2017 ADC Inmate Handbook, an inmate may be placed in ADSEG
for the following reasons (Lewis 1, para 12):
a.
b.
c.

being a safety risk to other inmates, guards, or himself;
concerns about how well an individual handles being in jail;
an extensive criminal history or a “serious charge”.

65

 1.8.

Mr Assange will almost certainly be held in segregation, in view of the charges
against him and the possibility of being sentenced up to 175 years in prison, in
combination with the usual practice to keep defendants charged with national
security offences in segregation (Lewis 1, para 12; Sickler 2, para 8). Mr Ellis and Mr
Sickler add that in their experience, the Alexandria Sheriff would not place Mr
Assange amongst the general population due to safety concerns and that it is thus
much more likely that he would be placed in “protective custody” in one of the
ADSEG units (Ellis 1, para 7; Sickler 2, para 8). In addition, Mr Kromberg recognises
that “it also is possible that Assange could be placed in administrative segregation
status if, for example, he presents as a safety risk to himself” (Declaration Kromberg,
Assistant US Attorney, 20 January 2020, para 85. See also (Sickler 2, para 8).

1.9.

Inmates are even placed in administrative segregation for 24-48 hours at ADC
immediately upon arrival (Sickler 1, para 54).

1.10. In administrative segregation, Mr Assange would be confined to a single occupancy
cell of less than approximately 4.5 sq metres, containing a sleeping area, a small sink
and a toilet (Ellis 1, para 8). Inmates eat inside their cell, the doors are of thick steel
and the “windows” are thick, non-transparent plexiglass material with no slots or
wholes in ADSEG units (Ellis 1, para 8; Ellis 2, para 5). This setting makes it
impossible to communicate with other inmates through their doors or “windows”,
contrary to Mr Kromberg at para 87 in his first statement (Ellis 2, para 5). Mr Ellis
found it impossible to communicate with his clients through these doors, unless they
are screaming throughout the entire conversation or the guard opens the food tray
(Id.).
1.11. He would be allowed to exit his cell for 1-2 hours per day to the common area, which
is about 9 sq m (Ellis 1, para 8). However, even during this time he would still remain
largely deprived of all social contact and recreational or educational activities (Id.,
para 8). These 1-2 hours are intended for phone calls or tending to hygiene needs
(Lewis 1, para 14). Mr Ellis’ clients have also reported receiving their break late at
night when other inmates are sleeping (Ellis 2, para 12).
1.12. Only one inmate can leave his cell at one time and the doors and food trays of other
ADSEG inmates remain closed (Ellis 1, para 8). Mr Kromberg has stated that
inmates may be in the day room together “when it is safe to do so”, but Mr Ellis has in
the more than two dozen occasions that he has visited the unit never seen inmates
being permitted to be in the common room at the same time (Ellis 2, para 4;
Declaration Kromberg, Assistant US Attorney, 20 January 2020, para 87). In fact, Mr
Ellis has on occasions been told to wait when he was meeting clients, because
another inmate had a break and had to be placed in his cell again first (Ellis 2, para
4).
1.13. At some points in the past there has been a television or an exercise bike, at other
moments the common room was empty (Ellis 1, para 8). There is no outdoor
recreational area at ADC and ADSEG inmates have no access to the limited
educational programmes run in the jail (Id., para 8). Whilst Mr Kromberg has stated

66

 that inmates can participate in programmes, Mr Ellis has never had a client in
ADSEG who was allowed to participate in them (Ellis 2, para 4). As he leaves open
the possibility that his clients may well have been deemed security risks, he “cannot
envisage any situation in which the jail would allow Mr Assange in the common room
with another ADSEG inmate. For inmates that are in protective custody, the jail does
not allow these inmates to congregate.” (Ellis 2, para 4).
1.14. Mr Ellis adds that Mr Kromberg may be alluding to two administrative segregation
units for inmates who committed disciplinary violations, which is supervised by
deputies and for which his statement may be true (Ellis 2, para 3). However, Mr
Assange is not likely to be placed in those, but will instead be placed in the protective
custody ADSEG units, where contact with others through cell doors, in the common
room or during programmes is ruled out, and no supervision by deputies is necessary
for this reason (Ellis 2, para 4).
Special Administrative Measures
1.15. As the authorities have a considerable degree of discretion to impose SAMs, ranging
from protecting against bodily injury to protecting national security information, Mr
Assange is very likely to be subject to SAMs (Sickler 1, para 59; Lewis 1 para 19)
1.16. In fact, the government expressly recognises the possibility of these measures being
imposed, both pre-trial and post-conviction (Declaration Kromberg, Assistant US
Attorney, 20 January 2020, para 95).
Regime
1.17. Detainees under the SAMs regime also have a right to 1-2 hours out-of-cell time per
day, however, due to the manner in which this is organised, it does nothing to
temporarily alleviate their isolation (Lewis 1, para 20). Many inmates reject their outof-cell time, because it is scheduled in the middle of the night and disturbs their sleep
(Id., para 20). Moreover, walking around in a small, dark and empty exercise area
without any natural light, fresh air or contact with other prisoners is a very similar
sensory experience to being alone in an isolation cell (Id., para 20).
1.18. Aside from being socially isolated from the other detainees, the non-legal visits of
SAMs inmates are sharply curtailed and they can only call for 15 minutes per month
(Id., para 20). These calls are monitored, as are their visits with lawyers (Id., para
20). SAMs inmates’ access to information is also heavily restricted, with material
being censored and redacted (Id., para 21). Ms Lewis’ statement illustrates how
these extreme measures make it nearly impossible to have adequate client-attorney
interaction. Abu Hamza was not allowed to email her, no regular legal visits were
assured and between the period of October 2012 and January 2013, she was able to
have two legal phone calls with him, despite her attempts to set up regular calls
(Lindsay Lewis, para 54-55).

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 1.19. Moreover, family members and counsel can be prosecuted and incarcerated for
repeating anything an inmate told them, even further impeding Mr Assange from
making his defence or reporting ill-treatment (Sickler 2, para 40).
1.20. Attorneys self-censor out of fear of being incarcerated themselves for violating SAMs
(Sickler 2, para 41, CCR 2017 Report). As one attorney stated: “The lines are not
clearly drawn, so it ends up sort of amplifying the fear because it’s hard to know
whether you’re going to say something that is going to sort of trip someone’s wire.
The consequences of [violating SAMs] are so significant and frightening that most
lawyers err on the side of caution even with things that would be beneficial to their
clients.” (Id.). Defence attorney Lynne Stewart’s sentence to a decade in prison for
revealing her client’s statements to the press, in violation of his SAMs, illustrates the
real risk for defence lawyers bringing a SAMs defendant’s case (Sickler 2, para 42,
CCR 2017 Report).
1.21. SAMs also hamper candid conversations about trial strategy, as under certain
circumstances, SAMs regulations permit monitoring of
attorney-client
communications (CCR 2017 Report, p17). Accordingly, defendants and their
attorneys must operate in an environment where everything they say, write, or signal
may be monitored by the government (Id.). While SAMs regulations purportedly
create a firewall whereby no official involved in prosecuting a case can listen to these
privileged conversations, attorneys’ conversations are hampered nonetheless (Id.).
Some lawyers avoid speaking with clients on the phone because they worry that
listeners will hear confidential information and even in-person visits are not
necessarily secure (Id.). (The latter are currently banned due to the Covid-19 crisis.)
(Sickler 2, para 33). In similar facilities to where Mr. Assange would be held pretrial,
cameras mounted to the walls in attorney-client visiting rooms stare down throughout
the visit, creating the appearance – if not the reality – that interactions are constantly
watched (CCR 2017 Report, p 17). This monitoring, whether perceived or actual,
leads to self-censorship (Id.). Lawyers avoid certain questions, fearing they will tip
off the government about their trial strategy, and defendants withhold information that
could help with their defence (Id.).
1.22. Lastly, the isolation will “dehumanize [Mr Assange as a] defendant” as it ultimately
“eliminate[s the inmates] as participants in their defence” (CCR 2017 Report, p 16).
This is particularly problematic with respect to his right to testify, as one attorney
reported: “The first time [a defendant] talk[s] to anyone besides me after two and a
half years in solitary confinement is the jury. There is no way to prepare [him] for it. It
really discourages the client from testifying.” (Id).
1.23. Experts believe these additional measures are designed to create psychological
pressure on the defendant (Lewis 1, para 23). As the UN Special Rapporteur on
Torture commented, the practice of solitary confinement during pre-trial detention is
“meant to bludgeon people into cooperating with the government, accepting a plea or
breaking their spirit”. A regime of detention which is designed to break one’s spirit is
clearly contrary to Article 3 (Lewis 1, para 23).

68

 2. Likely conditions post-trial
2.1.

Upon conviction, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) would designate a postsentencing facility; a prisoner’s request or a court’s recommendation would not be
binding (Sickler para 61; Lewis, para 49; Declaration Kromberg, Assistant US
Attorney, 20 January 2020, para 100). Mr Assange’s charges and potential sentence
will most likely prompt the BOP to detain him at one of the Communication
Management Units (CMU’s) in Marion, Illinois, or Terre Haute, Indiana, or,
alternatively, at ADMAX Florence, Florence, an “ultra-maximum-security” prison
(Sickler 1, para 62 and 66). Mr Kromberg appears to accept that he may be detained
in these facilities, adding that “it is possible that Assange will be placed under
Special Administrative Measures for at least a portion of his sentence” (Declaration
Kromberg, Assistant US Attorney, 20 January 2020, para 101-103).

Communication Management Units
Regime
2.2.

Communication Management Units (CMUs) are designed to strictly limit the
detainee’s contact with the outside world and typically hold prisoners with politically
sensitive profiles like Mr Assange, which is why it is widely known as the “terrorist
unit” (Sickler 2, para 46).

2.3.

If detained in a CMU, Mr Assange would be subject to constant monitoring, with
almost no opportunities to contact family. In a CMU, every communication made by a
prisoner, except with an attorney, is actively monitored (Sickler 2, para 45; Centre for
Constitutional Rights [CCR] 2014 Report). Prisoners in CMUs are banned from any
physical contact with friends and family, receive only 4 hours of noncontact visiting
time, written correspondence is limited to one letter per week to and from a single
recipient and the BOP may reduce calls to three 15-minute calls per month (Sickler 2,
para 44, CCR 2014 Report).

2.4.

Mr Assange’s conversations with other prisoners would also all be recorded by the
BOP with cameras and listening devices (Sickler 2, para 45). He would also be
barred from contact with other prisoners in the general population and have limited
access to educational and other opportunities, isolating him even further (Sickler 2
para 46).

Ability to challenge designation/review
2.5.

If designated to a CMU, Mr Assange risks remaining there for a prolonged period of
time, as the opportunities to challenge the BOP’s designation or to have it reviewed
mostly exist on paper only (Sickler 2, para 49).

69

 2.6.

First, it is highly unlikely that Mr Assange will be provided a full account of the
reasons why he has been designated to a CMU, which is crucial to enable him to
challenge his designation.

2.7.

There is no requirement that the BOP’s Assistant Director of Correctional Programs
(prior to 2015 this was the Regional Director), who determines which prisoners shall
be sent to CMUs, document his reason(s) for doing so (Sickler 2, para 55; CCR 2014
Report). Officials who recommend (though do not determine) that certain prisoners
be sent to a CMU do document their reasons (CCR 2014 Report). However, they
often do not include all of the reasons for their recommendation (Id.). One official
testified that he omits some of his reasons because there is not enough space on the
form (Id.).

2.8.

Only after arriving at a CMU, Mr Assange would receive his “Notice of Transfer”.
Even then, the reasons provided in the notice are frequently vague, incomplete,
inaccurate, and/or completely false (Sickler, para 55, CCR 2014 Report). When
prisoners have requested further details about the explanation provided for their
designation (such as specific facts they could admit or deny), their questions were
completely ignored and/or they have received a duplicate of the initial explanation
(CCR 2014 Report). When prisoners have pointed out that the facts purportedly
underlying their CMU designation are false, including by referring the BOP to
documentation, the BOP has ignored this entirely and continued to assert those facts
as true (Id.).

2.9.

Second, Mr Assange would have no real opportunity to challenge his designation
and no judicial review would be available, as was recently confirmed by Congress
(Sickler 2 para 54). He can challenge CMU placement only through the BOP's
Administrative Remedy Program, a purely written process (Sickler 2, para 55). An
inmate has no right to a live hearing, no right to call witnesses or present evidence,
and no right to representation of any kind (Id.).

2.10. The administrative process is lengthy and cumbersome, consisting of many steps
during which the original recommendation of the staff members who directly interact
with the inmate can get lost (Sickler 2, para 56). Lower-level staff members working
in a CMU first make a recommendation to the warden of the institution where the
prisoner is incarcerated (Id.). The warden then decides whether to forward the
recommendation to BOP's Counterterrorism Unit, a division with functions that
include "identifying inmates involved in terrorist activities" and monitoring "terrorist
inmate communications" (Id.). The Counterterrorism Unit then forwards its own
recommendation to the BOP’s Assistant Director of Correctional Programs "for
further review and consideration", who makes the final decision (Id.).
2.11. Third, it is unlikely that he would be able to leave the highly restrictive regime within
the next few years through the regular review process. Prisoners are given false, and
even impossible, instructions for earning their way out of a CMU (CCR 2014 Report).
Some prisoners have been baldly lied to and told that they could earn their way out of
the CMU by completing 18 months of clear conduct, but after meeting that goal their

70

 requests for transfer were repeatedly denied without explanation (Id.). Even on those
occasions when a prisoner is transferred from a CMU back to the general prisoner
population, he is not told why he was in the CMU or why he was transferred out, so
he does not know what behaviour to avoid so as not to be sent back (Id.). Moreover,
as two out of five of the designation criteria make reference to the inmate’s
conviction, and there are no separate review criteria, there seems no incentive for the
BOP to release the inmate from the CMU, as the original reason will never lapse (28
CFR 540.201).
2.12. Special Administrative Measures
2.13. There is a real risk that Mr Assange will also be subjected to SAMs post-conviction,
as now recognised by Mr Kromberg (Declaration Kromberg, Assistant US Attorney,
20 January 2020, para 95). He would be subject to the same solitary confinement,
far-going restrictions on communication and visits, and difficulties to have them
reviewed.
ADX Florence
2.14. The US Government states that if Mr Assange does not have SAMs imposed the US
might seek to limit his communications in other ways in which case he may be
designated to a CMU. It also recognises that many inmates under SAMs are held at
ADX Florence (Declaration Kromberg, Assistant US Attorney, 20 January 2020, para
95 and 102). Administrative Maximum-Security United States Penitentiary (“ADX”) is
the US’ strictest prison and is perceived critically even within BOP ranks (Sickler 2,
para 59). Robert Hood, who has worked for the BOP over 20 years and was ADX’
warden from 2002-2005, has described it as “not built for humanity. I think that being
there, day by day, its worse than death” (Sickler 2, para 59).
Regime
2.15. Mr Assange is most likely to be held in H-Unit, the special unit for detainees under
SAMs, which is even more restrictive than the General Population (GP) at ADX
(Sickler 2 para 61). Both regimes are created to reduce human contact to a minimum
and amount to solitary confinement. As a psychologist at ADX stated to the
Department of Justice: “[Y]ou have no contact, you don’t speak to anybody, and it’s a
form of torture on some level.… [Inmates] still talk to officers and stuff like that, but
they don’t really get a chance to see anybody…. They rec[reate] alone; we don’t
even have to be back there to rec them. So, yes, I would say that they are in fact in
solitary confinement.” (Sickler 2, para 52; DOJ 2017 Report
2.16. Prisoners at ADX are locked for 22-23 hours per day in their cells, which are
designed to prevent any contact with detainees in adjacent cells ((Sickler 2, para 60;
DOJ 2017 Report; AI 2014 Report p 8; Lewis 2 para 31). Meals are eaten inside cells
and limited recreation time consists of being alone in individual cages (Sickler 2 para
60; AI 2014 Report, p 9-10).

71

 2.17. Similarly, the US government’s claim that inmates have daily contact with
correctional counsellors, medical and mental health and religious staff, in reality
comes down to only a few words per day by staff (AI 2014 Report, p 16). Amnesty
International observed that conditions for prisoners at ADX have become increasingly
restrictive and isolated in recent years, with, for example, group recreation being
banned (Id., p 12).
2.18. Prisoners in the GP units may write letters and make two 15-minute non-legal phone
calls a month (or, six hours per year in total to speak with their family) (Id., p 16). All
social and legal visits at the facility take place in a non-contact setting, behind a thick
plexiglass screen (Id., p 16). Even though visits are non-contact; detainees are
shackled and in pain nonetheless (Id., p 16). Other than when being placed in
restraints and escorted by guards, prisoners may spend years without touching
another human being (Id., p 16). Nevertheless, due to ADX’ remote location, visitors
will only rarely be able to meet Mr Assange, a problem that has been reported by
other prisoners as well (Id., p 16).
2.19. There is a real risk that Mr Assange will be held under SAMs at ADX, subjecting him
to even further restrictions.
2.20. Visits and correspondence for SAMs prisoners at ADX are typically limited to
approved attorneys and approved immediate family members only (Sickler 2, para
53; AI 2014 Report). There is a real risk that even his close family members will not
be approved: in Abu Hamza’s case, the majority of his children and grandchildren are
not approved- the oldest grandchild being 6 years old (Lindsay Lewis, para 91).
Correspondence to or from approved contacts, which is monitored along with the
twice-monthly non-legal phone calls allowed, may be limited to only one letter a week
(Id.). Abu Hamza described in his own case how he is only allowed to send one letter
a week, subject to various controls, due to which its writing and receiving a reply
takes 6 months (Lindsay Lewis, para 92).
2.21. These conditions of solitary confinement are likely to have a detrimental effect on Mr
Assange’s already very fragile mental health. A study of prisoners in solitary
confinement at ADX found that all prisoners interviewed exhibited memory problems
and extreme lethargy, and most prisoners suffered from chronic insomnia and
headaches (CCR 2017 Report, p11). All of these are well-known physical symptoms
cause by solitary confinement (Id.).
2.22. Despite Mr Assange’s well-documented record of mental health issues, this would
not prevent him from being held in isolation at ADX with no or highly limited access to
mental health services. Also post Cunningham v BOP, a class-action suit concerning
the detention of mentally ill detainees at ADX, ADX still houses mentally ill detainees
in isolation, if their security status requires so (Lindsay Lewis para 70-71).
Lack of physical and mental health care post-conviction

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 2.23. If Mr Assange were to be convicted and sent to one of the Federal Bureau of Prison’s
(BOP) facilities, it is highly likely that he will not receive any mental healthcare at all.
Various reports (CNA 2014 Report commissioned by the BOP; Department of Justice
2017 Report; The Marshall Project 2018 Report) all document the BOP’s systematic
underdiagnosing of inmates requiring mental health care to avoid the expenses that
this care requires. Numerous testimonies of (ex-)detainees corroborate the
impossibility of receiving mental health care. It is also highly unlikely that the BOP
can protect Mr Assange’s weak physical health, as the BOP’s physical health care
suffers from the same root problems, understaffing and a lack of resources.
Systematic underdiagnosing
2.24.

A report commissioned by the BOP in 2014 on the failings in mental health care for
inmates in restrictive housing (e.g. administrative segregations, special administrative
measures, as Mr Assange will most likely face), first highlighted the issue of dramatic
underdiagnosing and an absolute lack of treatment (Sickler 2, para 17; Report
Commissioned by BOP, CNA, Federal Bureau of Prisons: Special Housing Unit
Review and Assessment, 2014). The report relied on independent psychiatrists
reviewing records and interviewing incarcerated people (Id.). The reviewers
“disagreed with the BOP diagnosis in nearly two thirds of the cases reviewed” and
found numerous incarcerated people exhibiting symptoms of serious mental illness
were not diagnosed by medical staff, and thus were not receiving treatment (Sickler 2
para 15; CNA 2014 Report, p 117 and 121-122).

2.25. A 2017 report from the Department of Justice affirmed the issue in plain wording:
“The BOP cannot accurately determine the number of inmates who have mental
illness because institution staff do not always document mental disorders (Sickler 2,
para 18; Lewis 2 para 21). The BOP’s FY 2014 data estimates that approximately 12
percent of inmates have a history of mental illness; however, in 2015, the BOP’s
Chief Psychiatrist estimated, based on discussions with institutions’ Psychology
Services staffs, that approximately 40 percent of inmates have mental illness,
excluding inmates with only personality disorder diagnoses.” (Sickler 2, para 18; DoJ
2017 Report, Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Use of Restrictive Housing for
Inmates with Mental Illness, p ii).
2.26. Lastly, the Marshall Project not only further documented the underdiagnosing, but
also the policy reasons for doing so. After being subject to strong criticism about its
mental health care system, in 2014, the BOP introduced a new policy aimed at
providing better care. However, in order to implement the system without increasing
the budget, the BOP also lowered the number of detainees in need of care by 35%,
effectively depriving a third of those with mental health issues of care (Sickler 2, para
19-21; Lewis para 22). The BOP classified only 3% of the inmate population in need
of regular care, despite officials having admitted that more than 20% suffers from
mental health issues (Sickler 2, para 20). A former BOP psychologist stated: “You
doubled the workload and kept the resources the same. You don’t have to be
Einstein to see how that’s going to work.” (Sickler 2 para 21; Marshall Project 2018

73

 Report) For the sake of comparison, California provides mental health care for a
“serious mental disorder” to more than 30% of people incarcerated in its state
prisons, while New York and Texas provide mental health treatment to roughly 20%
of incarcerated people (Sickler 2, para 20).
2.27. It was also alleged in Cunningham v Federal Bureau of Prisons, in the class action
addressing the mental health care at ADX Florence which ended in a settlement in
2016, that the BOP routinely disregards mental health evaluations of prisoners it
wishes to send to ADX. Moreover, it was stated that the mental health screenings of
prisoners who are transferred to ADX are woefully inadequate and that the BOP also
fails to recognise mental health issues which arise after they arrive at the facility. The
plaintiffs also alleged that detainees with a mental illness are often held in the Control
Unit, where they are isolated 24 hours per day, for extended terms, such as periods
of 6 years or more, without any mental health care or psychotropic medication. This
is plainly unacceptable as recognised by the Lord Chief Justice in Love. It has also
been reported regularly, as documented in Cunningham, that ADX staff provides
medication irregularly and distributes the wrong medication.
Inadequate care/lack of care
2.28. Even if the BOP recognises Mr Assange’s mental and physical health issues, he is
likely to face woefully inadequate treatment, or simply no treatment at all.
2.29. The 2014 CNA Report indicated that the treatment being offered by the BOP was
insufficient or inappropriate in over half of the cases reviewed (Sickler 2 para 15,
CNA 2014 Report, 117). Medications were prescribed in doses inadequate to treat
the targeted conditions, and there was often little or no follow up to ensure the
medications were working (Sickler 2 para 15, CNA 2014 Report, 125). One inmate
reported he had not seen a health care provider about his medications in two years
(Id.). Psychologists had caseloads so great that they had to “prioritize psychiatric
review to only a handful of the least stable mentally ill inmates on their caseloads.”
(Sickler 2 para 15, CNA 2014 Report, 123) Psychiatrists were often available on a
limited basis by teleconference only, and even then “the hours provided are so
limited that the referral system is delayed and insufficient to meet the health needs of
the inmates.” (Sickler 2 para 15, CNA 2014 Report, 125).
2.30. Several of Mr Sickler’s clients have also provided him first-hand accounts about how
the BOP’s health care system, which looks excellent on paper, is failing in practice
(Sickler 2 para 17-21). A recently released client informed him that at no time could
an inmate at his facility get treatment for on-going mental health issues (Sickler 2
para 18). The mental health professional would occasionally walk the grounds of the
prison and ask inmates how they were doing (Id.). Another client reported that no
anti-depression mediations were available, that there was a lack of inhalers for
asthma patients, or that inmates with broken bones go untreated (Sickler 2 para 17).
2.31. Mr Assange will also not have access to appropriate care for his Autism Spectrum
Disorder. The BOP’s “Skills Program” is only available for inmates in low to medium

74

 security prisons, and is also highly inadequate for Mr Assange, as it targets inmates
with very low cognitive abilities- which the High Court considered to be an important
issue in Love (Sickler, para 25-27; Lauri Love, para 81).
2.32. Whilst the Cunningham v BOP settlement has mainly improved the lives of mentally
ill prisoners by allowing them to leave ADX if they can be housed in another secure
facility, it has not meaningfully improved mental health care at ADX (Lindsay Lewis,
para 70). The 2017 District of Colombia’s Corrections Information Council’s ADX
Inspection report documents that apart from transferring inmates to another secure
facility, they could participate in the STAGES programme (Lindsay Lewis, para 71).
This is a form of group therapy, which nevertheless requires the inmates to be
shackled in cages when participating (Lindsay Lewis, para 72; Sickler 2, para 65).
However, such therapy would most likely not be available to Mr Assange, since
inmates under SAMs are prohibited from communicating with most other prisoners
(Lindsay Lewis, para 73). Those not permitted to take part in group therapy, may be
provided with individual therapy- which is also unlikely to be accessible or effective
for Mr Assange. Individual therapy is offered on a very limited basis (5 patients per
week), inmates under SAMs are likely to be ineligible, and conversations with SAMs
inmates are likely to be monitored, which prevents the patient from effectively
engaging (Lindsay Lewis, para 75).
2.33. The Report also documents that inmates often have difficulty accessing medication
for their psychological disorders and are being taken off medication (Sickler 2 para
65). ADX’s alarmingly high rates of documented “Threatening Bodily Harm” incidents
(8.7/100 inmates at ADX compared to the overall BOP rate of 0.9/100 inmates)
indicates that mental health care at ADX is still highly inadequate, even compared to
the BOP’s own poor standards (Sickler 2, para 65). According to the report, those
committing self-harm or suicide are treated not seriously, but as “attention seeking”
(Id).
2.34. Also in a recent case from February 2020, the Court also held the care at ADX to be
“dramatically short of medically acceptable standards of care, even for prisoners”
(Sickler 2, para 66). Whilst the case concerned physical care, the underlying
complaint demonstrated a lack of health care generally (Sickler 2, para 66).
Understaffing
2.35. The precipitous decline in mental health treatment by the BOP appears directly linked
to understaffing; and is for this reason unlikely to be resolved soon.
2.36. The BOP has failed to increase staffing levels since it mandated more intense mental
health treatment (Sickler 2, para 19-21). In March 2016, the US Department of
Justice reported that 17% of the medical care positions in the BOP were vacant, and
that only 24 of 97 BOP institutions had a medical staffing vacancy rate of 10% or
less, the minimum acceptable threshold established by BOP policy (Sickler 2, para
16). 20 BOP institutions had a medical staff vacancy rate of 25% or more, and 3
institutions had a vacancy rate of 40% or more (Id.). As of October 2015, the BOP

75

 had filled only 28 of 49 (57%) of its authorized fulltime psychiatrist positions
nationwide (Id.). The BOP’s former Assistant Director for Health Services and
Medical Director, who oversaw the BOP’s provision of medical care until his
retirement in October 2015, described the staffing as “crisis level” (Id.) By 2017,
nothing had improved: 18% of BOP’s authorized medical positions were vacant (Id.).
2.37. The BOP’s systematic failure to provide health care can have detrimental
consequences for Mr Assange, as the BOP’s suicide statistics illustrate. The
combined number of suicides, suicide attempts and self-inflicted injuries increased 18
percent from 2015 through 2017 (Sickler 2 para 21; Lewis 2 para 23).

76