~ P P R O V E DFOR RELEASE IDATE: 14-Jan-2010 I I - A i - NORTH KODA: FAR EAST SURVEY 24 MAY 1951 AMERICAN AGGWSSOHS HESORT TO FORWHY: BACTERIOLOGICAL W A R F m The c a 6 a i g n against American aggression, the major component of Radio Pyongyang I s broadcast output i n the period under review, i s i n t e n s i f i e d by reference t o the recen-h tlforgc.?diiocumentstt submitted t o the U.N. by the Amei*ican commwd i n Korea and by Foreign Minister Pak Hori Yongls message protesting Anerican use of bacteriological weapons in the Korean ivw. The H:i.d@vay documents, lkomplctely and thoroughly-'exposed" as f a l s e by Pak Hon Yong, e l i c i t an outburst of indignation against the Amcricm llforgers. Commentaries p i c t u r e the presentation of the documents as a U.S. contri.vance designed t o s h i f t the responsibility of aggreosion .to the North Koreans. Typical i s the charge that the U.S. vias compelled -to r e s o r t -to forgery Y n the face of approaching doom" and "in un attempt t o deceive world opinion indignant over the p i l l a g e of Korea by the American troops and demanding a cessation of armed intervention iu Korea." One commentary of 2 1 May declares t h a t Ridgvmyls p r q o t i o n t o f u l l general flwas made f o r h i s contributions i n the forgwy of. documents." A statement on 17 May mentions c)ne other attempt of the U.S. imperialists t o . Ildivert a t t e n t i o n from r e a l i t y by brmding China as an aggressor i n Korea." ... . .. U .S. Emnlates J.manes-BacterioloPica1 Criminals: The f miliar denunciation of U L N. a t r o c i t t o e - t o provided by Pyongyang i n a new context occasioned by Pnk €Ion Yong's 8 Ivlay dispatch protesting American use of bacteriological weapons, Pyorlgynng alleges t h a t the U.S. is folloiving Japanese bactcriological techniques used i n the war against Chiiia, and a6serts t h a t MacArthur used Japan as an intcrrnediary i n the innss production of bacteria. Other comncnt imputcs responsibility f o r the incidence of smallpox i n North P(orea t o the sprced of -the &elm by the Americans during t h e i r temporary occupation. Pyx~ggangconments t h a t the t l b c s t i a l a c t s of the American invading troops against tho Korean people have done nothing but enhance the fighting s p i r i t of the Korean People Is Army u n i t s . It __.. Radio Pyongyang continues t o devote considerable a t t e n t i o n t o the campaign i n behalf of Ileverything f o r t h e f r o n t and everything f o r v:'LctozyI1 i n i t i a t e d 3 M a y t o a l l e v i a t e t h e shortcge of war mirtei*icl. Firm confidence i n ultimate victory is the ke>mo-te i n 311 broadcasts. Together with the appeal t o t h c Korean nationals, broadcasts continue t o express g r a t i f i c a t i o n f o r the a i d received from the Soviet Union m d China. Pyongyang m i l i t m y communiques on the current s i t u a t i o n carry only .general statements on the continuing succcss of the People's Armed Forces and the Chinese volunteers. ' Tho U.N. embargo against China i s reported i n a news item quoting TASS, but Pyongyaig avoids f u r t h e r comment. SOUTH KOREA: EVILS OF ColvMUNISM: POLITICAL CONFUSIOU Pusan broadcasts on t'ne current s i t u a t i o n continue t o d i r e c t attention, i n various coil'texts, t o the c v i l s of Camunism i n contrast t o the noble Specific statements denounce S t n l i n l s enslavement princi.ples of the U.N. of "small nxtions,Il report increasing rebellions within the Communist o r b i t and predict the llj.nevitablo collc.psetl of Cornnunism. -112 . - FAR EAST SURVEY 24 IUY 1951 In connection with the. disturbed po:liticul situation, broadcasts report the e l e c t i o n of K i m Sung So0 t o the office of vice president, but o f f c r .no cormicrit on the circunistmcos which induced Li S i Yozig t o subinit h i s On 15 May Pusan c a r r i e s a statement by FUiee nssuring'the resignation. pi:OplC? t h a t t h e %onfusionl' i n home politics w i l l r e s u l t i n no great change i n the " p o l i t i c a l piclburett and -that %vcsything w i l l work out smoothly. It Another effort, to ensure internal s t a b i l i t y comes i n .a s t a t e ment by thc Public Inf'oima.ixion Office asserting t h a t ilheels refusal t o 'becane a presidential candidktc has nothing t o do with t h e a t t i t u d e of e i t h e r the National. Assc.rnb1.y o r my agency of th'e Government a i d t h a t %ot a single protest i n the National Assembly against the reelection of President Rhce ha6 been reported." Approved For Retook 2007/016ip&9IRT01146A0S00390001-7 14 August 1951 CIA No.49305 Copy No. 33 DAILY DIGEST Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. DIA and PACOM review(s) completed. OSD REVIEW COMPLETE TOP SECRET State Department review completed Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300390001-7 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org Approved Foribiease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146*00300390001-7 25X1 TOP SECRET rumored: A 12 August ointment of new ROK Defense Minister rumor Nationalist news source in Korea reports a dispatch from a Chinese China, is slated to Nationalist that 1ee Bum Suk, present ROK Ambassador Government. The item notes, in thellOK for the post of Defense Minister reluctande to accept any Cabinet office however, that Lee has expressed diplomatic post. and desire to return to his KOREA. A 8. I 25X1 Comment : 25X1 \ of Defense in the Lee; an ex.-Prime Minister and Minister earlY days of the Itepublic. There in the ROK, was considered a strong man President Rhee will replace the present indicate that friend of is no evidence to competent official and personal Minister of Defense Yi Ki Bong, a Rhee, with Lea. limitations are if aerial reconnaissanCe er to UN fo ces FECOM notes da and Coitunist .air capabilities inandtore& the US Far impoied in ceas-f ire agreement: Eastern. Command US Far. Manchuria have been reevaluated by the based on the possibility that hostiliThis new estimate, Eastern Air Force. of the Kaesong talks, notes a ties may cease in the near future as a result Korea should an agreement be reached such considerable danger to the UN forces in over North Korea . In MOW a opinion, reconnaissance limiting UN aerialallow the reoecupation of North Korean- airfields by Commuin limitations might threat to UN aerial nist aircraft, thereby posing a serious the event of renewed hostilities. 9. ' superiorit/ 1 of gas by UN forces: An 11 August radio North Koreans protest use ,Korean note to the UN prothe text of a .North The broadcast iniCoream.teleased "American interventionists:" testing against the use of poison gas by two "bombs" on the city of Yonan broadcast cites the 6 August dropping of August bombing of a North K.orean troav (southwest of Kaesong) and the 7 .".1 atrocities inetallation as usVidenee of these "deliberate IO. , ' 25X1 \ I TOP SECRET 7 14 Aug 51 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300390001-7 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org 25X1 25X1 Approved ForRelet 2007103/07 : ClA-RDP79T01146A0041039000177 .,TOP .8ECRET Consent: Korth Korea has previously accused the,114 of 'employing chenical and biological warfare. These accusationa are-probably for Soviet.Crbit internal consumption in order to atrengthen the "hate America" feeling* TOP SECRET 8 iL Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0003003900U1h118 51 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org Approved For Re leee 2007103107 : ClA-RDP79701146A00010390001-7 TOP SECRET SECTION 3 1. (MES1ERI) FRANCE.. Near pro=US French Government is Vinod iwithout Embassy Paris finds that the Socialists: US replacements of Moch and and Mayer in the Defense Petsphe by Bidault and Finance posts, Cabinet shifts of partidular respectively, are the French rearmament and relations withinterest to the US in connection with France's NATO. . .Bidaalt will have full authérity, ordinate rapidlyFrench policy on North according to press reports to coprespective Contribution. Atlantic defense, including Mile he reportedly Germany's will Minister Schuman in this task, "cooperate" mith Foreign the latter ment of the will be concentrating French position in the Far on deVelopas well as on application East, Indochina, and the of the Mediterranean, coal-steel pool plan, 'The embassy believes that, whatever Bidault's Schaman may turn Out to official relation to be, "it is More than training and interest in probable that Bidault with his desire to be more adtiVe foreign and his long in that field and ill-concealed will exert an influence strictiv domestie asoeits of national beyond the defense", 1 affairs 25X1 d'ointherit: Both Bidault and Mayer, who as amineEtTgrtions in the new Pleven And Strong Vice-Premiers mill hold 'preGovernmentfare ardently pro-American supporterS of NATO. Although of b.:mediate Moch had come to...fever Socialist aims to defense a sacrifice coolneas to US leadership requirements, he:reflected and.Was Socialist generally considered The departure of Petsehe, a difficait however, and his replacement with Mayer, negotiator. narrower political supportl-close who has business quarrels with the Socialists, connections, and a record of mill weaken their present of the government, conditional support While the past syMpathies of Pleven, Bidault, could be and Mayer for De Gaulle expected-to help soften the the diffieult opposition of the General's Months ahead, the Gsullists' party in position whenever the strategy is middle-of-the-road regime can be to joirLthe opdiscredited. 2. AUSTRIA. :Government plans to deny Minister of the Interior residence pertits to 1FTU emple- lie: Helmer informed US High,Commiss Donnelly on 9 AUgust that the World Federation oner declared illegal in Austria, of Trade Unions had been The minister expiration of two-month teMporary residence stated further that after the .(other than permits, all V/FTU employees SoViet nationals who may permits) would be denied remain for permission to reside in seven menths on temporary however, remains Austria. The US 'skeptical that the Austrian legation, government will be able to 117517Ffih \ , . . TOP SE3RET 9 Approved For Release 200710307 : ClA-RDP79T01146A0003090e151. To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org 25X1 Approved For Re lelfe 2007103107 : ClA-RDP79701146A0040390001-7 TOP SECRET take effective action against the WFTU, and expects that achieved other than to Make little can be it clear that the VIFTU Austriartcapital by grace .of contintes in the the Soviet the wishes of the Austrian occvnation authoritils and against people. 25X1 Comment; Although by the US legation effective action againstencouraged to take all possible the WFTU, the in its measures by the Austrian Government has been liMited possibility of Soviet of clear legal justification. intervention.and by the absence Strong support of the WFTU Element in the by the Soviet Allied Commission and consequent the Austrians have led US hesitanay bn the part of observers to believe that move Slowly in declaring the Austrian officials WFTU a "menace to public will register aS required by safety", if it should Austrian law, or an illegal should not. The MOVO to deny residence perMits to secret society, if it probably be regarded, therefore, WFTU pereonnel should as merely part of the general campaign which the Austrian harassing Government is apparently willing to undertake. ' ITALY. De Gasperi trges USSR to return Italian war prisoners: DW-Msperi'has announced that one of his first acts as Foreign in tha nevicabinet Premier was to press the Soviet Minister than 63,000 Union for the retttn of more Italian'prisoners still held in the Government has evidence that USSR. Although the Italian Italian prisoners are Soviet concentration still held-in sane 56 campe, probably as slave labor, replied to previous Italian the Soviet Union has prisoners remain in the USSR.inquiries with the statement that ho Italian bOinthent: -Ite Italipilstatiptics on war prisoners elicited by th&UN were preewnabiy commission investigating the wir in the Soviet Union. status of.Priseners of .Premier De Gasperi timed doindide with: (1) his his announcement to recently inaugurated campaign to strength of Italian Communists,by diminish the (2) Italy's propaganda and restrictive intensified drive for revision means; and of the Italian admission.ihto the UN. Dn seVeral pease'treaty and ifi atteMpts'to occasions former debunk Communist claims that Foreign Minister Sforsa, to Italians, has pointed the SeViet Union is to the retention of friendly the USSR. Sforza has also Italian prisonere of war by dwelt on the admission to the UN. Soviet veto of Italy.'s proposed Govermteht apprehensive aver possible loss of US aheese aneolive oit: market for Italian' The Italian Foreign Office amendment to the Defense Act, has protested the Anderson suspending oils, cheese', or limiting US imports df fats, etc. fromWestern European countries which export materials to Eastern Europe., strategic The Foreign Office points hit two typical Italian out that it would products olive oil and to conflict with US policy cheese, and would appear favoring the economic recovery of countries within ,TOP SECRET 10 Approved For Release 2007103/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0003011a0 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org 91 25X1 . , Approved For Re 1E416007/03W CIA-RDP79T0i14000141,0396.004:7 " TOP:SECRET the framexmrk of ER4.1S.,-13mbassY-Rohe bel*Od..".thejtalian protest:is more than-justified"'-sihaelit,:woul&be.,,most 4iffichlt to explain tb the cheese and oii:prodhOO'PO....P9*,faCed'Ilidth half of their reePective:exPert:Marketa. assists up defense-preductiona the loss of One-third:and oher 25X1 I Comment,: While Italian exports Of cheeSeahdOliVe oil for the first four mopths of 195IMere approxiMately-33'per ta the US Cent and 61 per cent reapectiyely of total Italialt*Perts of thSse doMmodities for: the same period, thei*rd'OplYA:per cent ahd5 Per:bent reePactiva.347 of total Italiamekports to all countries Ori.the other hand; since these two products had a total,yalua ef $1jJ. MilliOn for this:peried, the loss of the US market:lor:Italian Cheese end olive 61r:exporters would have a dignificant effect on Italy"s foreigh exchange.poeitiOn. 5. 25X1 - bWiTZERLAND. Reaesertibn of neUtralist poSitionsfirlEastgibat'trade: A commentator on the Bern radio denies that the recehtJZ-Swiss:conVersations on export Oohtrole involved apy agreement-en:the:Part of the Swiss, and asserta that Switzerland is unwilling triliecoms:,inyolved mith either the East Or the Xest in any kind of enbargo faVor :one side to the detrimentof the other wohld,rhe declares,:hean "giviheup the neutrality mhich is writteriAlito our cohstitutien and interhationaI agreements". He further comments that Switzerland mbuld be taking sides and,forsaking its neutrality if it adopted the US suggestion that it prohibit pXport to the USSR of goada:manufptured et home from rew materials obtained fram the West. . . Commentt The:commentaier'is-editor ot the Small: Liberal Party"s hows paper, -which had 6.relatiVely low.eirculationO Nevertheless, the views expressed represehtl4e_opihionof that large 'segment eftheHphblic composed principally of,bubinesie men,,.which ihaiSts-that Switzerlan4 keep open its normal chdrInels of trade with all countries,: . 25X1A , TOP SECRET- Approved For Re ledge 2007/03/0721:CIA-RDP79T01146A00030033 g To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org Si Approved For Re lasie 2007103107 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0S160390001-7 25X1 TOP SECRET 7. UNITED KINGDOM. Serious decline in steel produotion foreseen: ECA London reports that a critical reduction in British steel output is expected in 1951. This will be due primarily to an estimated lag of one million tons in ingot capacity which has resulted from: (a) drying up of German scrap exports, (b) inability to purchase adequate iron ore supplies in world markets, (c) a shipping shortage, and (d) inadequate blast furnace capacity. The British contend that the US has been getting most of the available German scrap exports.and is the most favored purchaser of continental Steel. 'Although the.British'Oevernment has started a blast furnace expandion program, and hes begun to develop iron ore resources in parts of Africa, UK domestic production is unlikely to exdeed 16 million ingot tons in 1951 and 1952. GodMent: A steel shortage now'appears as an added serious factor in the difs deteriorating economic situation. The latest production estimate now anticipated is 147.2 million tons less than peat long-range estimates for this period. The Government is hard-pressed to'fulfill defense cammitments for the reariament program, whieh by increasing cOnsumption is largely responsible for the steel shortage. 8. BRITISN'GUIANA. Significant gains made by CoMmuniet-oriented party: The Communist-oriented People's Progressive Party (PPP) has gained-wide support in British Guiana in the year-and-a-half since its formation, and all evidenop indicates that it will meet with continuing success in ite current Campaign for recruiting additional members. Formed early in 1950 hy Dr. and Mrs. Cheddi Jagan, a couple with kneWn Pro-SoVidt, anti4S sympathies, it is the only political party which has ever commanded a significant following in the colony. Membership in Marohcas announced by Mrs. Jagan during the party's first congress stood at 3,0607-a figure which was probably not grossly exaggerated and *doh assumes significance with the realizatixv: that the membership fee, although small, ill not easily raised by the average ' TOP SECRET 12 14 Aug 51 Approved For Release 2007103/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300390001-7 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org 25X1 Approved For Re lahieb 2007103107 : CIA-R0P79T01146A0040390001-7 TOP SECRET Guianese. The remarkable strides which the party has made in 18 months are explained by the fact-that it is the first group ever to hold out any hope to British Guiana's poorly paid, inadequately housed workers for improving their miserable standard of living, The party has cleverly used tactics which attract tbe widest possible support fram lower-income groups. Byplaying-up the poor conditions which most of the Colony's peoples under actually do work and live, PEP leaders have created considerable unrest and have rather successfully presented party as tbe rallying point for those the dition, the party has sought to align dissatiefied With their lot. In aditself with some Of the organized labor unions* Its connections with the Guiana IndustrialWorkers' now seem to be firmly established, and Union it is probable that the Jagans at least nartially were responsible for the workers' union from the non-Communist recent separation of the bauxite Man Power Citizens' Association* 25X1. I 1 1 If PPP influence continues to increase (and there is every indication that it will), Com-. munist capabilities for hindering Canada and the US through atrike the flow of British Guiana bauxite to and.sabotage activitiea will'increase respondingly (9% of US requiroments corcome from British Guiana). One slightlyhopeful sign on the British Guiana scene in December 1950 of a second was the formation political partythe National Democratic Party ,organized by hon-Communist leaders and also designed toappeal 'income groups, As yet, however, to lowerit has not had great success, in members, and has given no promise recruiting of beeoming an effective opponent PPP. of the 9. i 4.9.221,_Ngfj. in Aruba oil thatWv:re'Strikery reworOrted ars s ruc on refine The US Consul reports -sow emending A 20 wage increase. The company's per cent counter-offer was refused by the renudiated their, bargaining_committee workers, who which had accepted the offer." The Netherlands Government mediator is negotiating. The refinery operating at reduced capacity on is-now an emergency basis. : I Comment: The Lego Oil and Transport Company, Ztd, Oil OMIT-jersey) operates the world's second largest of Aruba (Standard haa a normal output of oil refinery which approximately 490,000 barrels daily, satisfaction has been present right along in both Aruba and Labor disit apparently is nowcoming Curacao, and to a head as a reSult of the national petroleum situation which general interhas led ths workers to believe are in aistronger bargaining that they position* TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2007103/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300364111g7 51 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org I 25X1 Approved For IRS3/410se 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A81115300390001-7 TOP SECRET The main grievance of labor has been the wage differential and general preferential position given to certain foreign nationalities. During WorldMar II this wage policy operated against the Chinese employees of the tanker fleet and produced a long strike which seriously hampered the importation of crude petroleum from Venezuela. The present cause of dissatisfaetion 12 possibly a sharp rise in the cost of living -which has not been offset by a proportionate upward adjUstment of tagots cost of living bonus to its employees. Lego has exercised rather close supervision of organized labor in its plant. It wisely has encouraged establishment of the Lago Employee Council (employee advisory committee) to .confer with management on labor problems while simultaneously using it as a device to combat the rise of labor unions. Of the numerous sporadic efforts at unionization, one formal Union has managed to risethe ArUba Labor Union. It has been used primarily' to further the political aspirations ot its president, Henry Eman, The union apparently has attracted enough dissatisfied workers to its ranks and has gained sufficient 'strength to declare this strike in an effort to force company recognition. 10. SWEDEN. Government grants asylud to Polish nutineers: The Swedish govern:76=as granted political refuge to the 12 polish naval.mutineers who southern Swedish port of Ystad on 2 August, I 25X1 25X1 The Swedes were able to escape a conflict between their Comment: humanitarian implges and-their pride in strictly observing international law because there is ne extradition treaty between Poland and Sweden, and the Swedish law of 1913 specifically exemptedrmutiny as a crime requiring extradition. In the case of such a conflict, the goVernment would undoubtedly make a great effort to find some legal loophole or overriding political reason to maintain its humanitarian record, 11, ARGENTINA. Peronista Party urges denunciation.of opposition: The Peronista Party has urged all medbers to tell police of any "attempts to promote sabotage" and has advised them that the time has coMe "to wipe out the swine made daring by oUr tolerance". The statement followed the arrest of 80 raillkey engineers and a number of Radicals and Socialists, All of Wham were accused of plotting a campaign of terrorilm and sabotage to spread disorder on the eve of the 11 November elections. I Cednenti Peron has denounced all non-Peronistas as traitors. The constant call for action against the opposition and foreign interests could resUlt in violence, as election activities are intensified. On occasion official newspapers have published names and addesss of anti-Peron elements, TOP SECRET 14 14 Aug 51 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300390001-7 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org . 25X1 Approved For Releka 2007/03107 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0014.0390001-7 TOP SECRET arid often Peron hae advised workers to keep a supply of baling wire "to hang the opposition". . 12. . . . MEXICO. Administration seeks te'avOid publiciiing Military cooperation with OS: In response to a US auggestion'that an exchange of notes might serve to revalidate the US-Mexico reciprocal agreement fer the transit of military aircraft, a Mexican Foreign Office spokesman has indicated that it would be well not to question the validity of the agreement and to assume that it has not expired. In a strictly confidential oral reply, the spokesman stated that the exchange of notes would have to be ratified by the Senate, and--although ratificatiOn would be, likely-tpolitical opposition might be encountered which would lead to undeeirable public debate,; The proximity of the coming presidential electiona was giVen as a factor which "might also complicate matters". The US Embassy comments that these remarks "would seem to confirm the present.well-known policy of the Mexidan government to avoid any action which might:in anyway be interpreted as a military commitment". 25X1 I Cannon: As the 1952 elections approach, the administration Will probahly become increasingly hesitant to admit international obligations which might be regarded as adverse.to'national Sovereignty and welfare. The Mexican public does not appear Convinced, at present, that the Eastlest struggle involves an hmnediate threat to Mexico. Unless a new crisis arises, therefore, it is possible that domestic political'considerations will serve to inhibit'expressions of agreement With, or support of, various US international aims. 13. 25X1 PANAMA. President's new legal advisor: President Arosemena has appointed RTFrilo J. Alfaro as his legal counselor. Alfaro accepted the office without Salary which may indicate-a deSire to remain aloof from the present Weak administratiOn. Clearly, though, he plans to'play an important political role. i 1 Comment: Ricardo J. Alfaro has been prominent in Panamanian governments throughout Panama's history. His first position was that of Under Secretary Of Foreign Relations in 1905, two ysars after the establishmmnt of the Republic. Throughout his career he has maintained a reputation for financial honesty. In recent years, he has been obdurate and ultra-nationalistic in negotiations with the US Embassy. in Panama on,issues of bilateral interest, but has been cooperative withmembers of US delegations at internatienal conferences, especially when problems of international laW were under dipcussion. The Embassy reports that he is currently exerting his influence in favor of strong measures, which are advocated by the US, to ban Panama flag vessels from visiting Chinese Communist or North Korean ports. TOP SECREZ 15 14 Aug 51 Approved For Release 2007/03107 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300390001-7 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org TOP SECRET UNCLASSIFIED 'when bARP-FRYPREERETROleasea2007/03107 4ECIA-WEIPY9410414aUghdii5girded or declossi001-7 fit:id when filled in form is detciched from controlled document. DOCUMENT CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET 0 REG I STRY DOCUMENT DESCR I PT ION -CI A CONTR NO. 50-S OATE'DOCUMENT RICE I VED SOURCE DOC.INO. _DOC . !DATE LOGGED BY COPY! NO . NUMBER OF P AGES NUMB R OF ATTACHMENTS Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Ageney ATTENTION: This form tettl be placed on top of and attached to eachtoTop Or the document until such time as it is downgrade& destroyed, personnel and those individuals whose official Or classified Top Secret Within the CIA and will remain attached limited to Top Secret Control Iran milted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material wilt sign this forM duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and and indicate period of custody in the lelt-hand columns provided. right-hand columns. inchcate the date of handling in the SEEN BY RELEASED RECE I VED DATE OFFICE/DIV. REFERRED TO 5 I GNATURE T IME OFFICE DATE S I GNATURE T IME DATE ed from Top Sec NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detect and transmitted to Central Top Secret Contro for record. below et mate WI it shall be completed In the appropriate space D I SPATCHED DESTROYED DOWNGRADED TO WH(Signature) By (Signature) TO WITNESSED BY (gignatur ) BY (Signature) OFFICE OFFICE Fqkffi (OUTSIDE CIA) DATE proved For Re Wiec2007/03/07: CIA-11415P79T0114 6A000300390001-7 9R ni'pov ! ONYO`iiit ' uTOP SECRET To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org 140) Approved For Relegate 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP_TaT01146A06134100390001-7 TOP SECRET 14 August 1951 CIA No. 49305-A Copy No. 25X1 SUPPLEMENT TO THE DAILY DIGEST Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/NE. Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence- TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300390001-7 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org Approved For Re le 2007103/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00401)0390001-7 SECRET SECTION 2 (EASTERN) 10 MILIPPINES. Government accepts latest draft of Japanese peace.treatv: President Quirino, with the concurrence of his special 15man.advisory committee, has agreed to accept the language of the latest draft of the Japanese peace treaty. 25X1 I 1 2. INACCHIN West weighs choice be-Mien India and Indoehinese states as signatories of Japanese treatv: The UK Foreign Office is opposed to,inviting the Associated States to the San Francisco treaty- conference as Dobservers," feeling that this would stir up the question ofChinese Nationalist observer status. The Foreign Office plans to delay its reply to a formal request from CaMbodia that it be invited to sign at San Francisco pending Indiats response to UK attempts to persuade India to sigh the treaty. Apparently. the Foreign Office believes that India will delay its reply, thereby blocking an invita tion to the Associated States, 25X1 Meanwhile, Minister Heath in Saigon argues against offering the Associated States observer status, stating that such a halfmeasure would cast more doubt on the independence of the Associated States than would their nonattendance at the lonference. I 25X1 SECRET 1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300390001-7 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org 14 Aug 51 . 07;53RM P.2 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AMC! OFFICE OF smainno INIULIGENGE RECORD COPY information Report CCMMUNIST PROPAGANDA CHARGING UNITED STATES VIM In pa or SW IN pas CIA/SI 29-51 20,Apsupt 1951 This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within'the meaning of Title IS, Sections 793 And 794, of Op tr. S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its eontents to or receipt by an unauthorised person is prohibited hy law, RETURN TB ARCHIVES & RECORDS CENTEk IMMRI.Ap AFTER Ugi JoQcsaa 80X y 7- 2/P2 V3/2.APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:APR 2000 To learn about PDF Compression and OCR visit our website MBR.31 :00 P.3 07:53AM COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA CHARGING UNITED STATES WITI USE OF SW IN KOREA 1. Current propaganda takes the form oft a. .b. ct. Outright prevarication Distortion of facts Imputation of insidious motives to innocent acts 2. The majority of propaganda ie directed from Moscow toward the Far East and Western Europe - while a proportionately small amount of material, mostly from newspapers, is planned for ° home" consumption, An effort is underway to reach the Chinese, whose political 3. and military affection need to be solidly won, and those West Europeans whose remilitarisation by and for the West would present a precarious situation for the USSR. Charges of inhuman methods of warfare by bacteriological 4. means would have a definite emotional and:psychological effect upon those nitiens considered !on the edge" in political affiliation. 5. The wide "Bate America pampaign launched by the USSR propagandists endeivora to disillusionand demoralise the defenders of Korea and advance the cause of staunch Communiam in the Far.East. 1. .Shortly before the outbreak of the present Korean hostilities, Kim:Song Tuti, chief of thelpidemid Prevention Bureau MinistrY of Public Health, North Korea, warned Koreens'of the possibility of 'summer epidedics eMenating from Smith Korea Where no preventive measures bad been undertaken to oombat them.. Mk'. Tun stated it would be difficult to foretell what kind of epidemics might be permitted to spread northward from South Korea. ' 2. When the Communist Army captured Seoul, it purported to discomtr in the intelligence offices Of the General.Staff of the South Korean Army documents written in rather techtical detail and. designated "Flan A! and "Plan B." Some chapters entitled Pc7 To learn about PDF Compression and OCR visit our website MAR 31 '@0 P. 4 07:54AM !Destruction," oArson, and "Bacteriological Dissenination,". supposedly Mappedenetreconnalemunmovork for 1950 and described how rivers and reservoirs of North Korea were to be infected with bacteria. Whether the capsules of bacilli were to be obtained from American Camp Detrick or from Japanese stocks was.left in position. USSR press reported an alleged typhus epidemicraging 3. in American occupied areas of Korea and that the population was receiving no-medical aid. It was further claimed that, within two weeks, each village in the region had been penetrated with the disease with an increase in the overall death rate up to Ddiet7(90) per cent. American authorities were reported as in-. Osculating only serviceMen and Syngman Else government officials, and it was also Charged there ban been numerous oases where seriously ill persons had been killed. Actually, the situation iB quite different in that: a. Shortly after the beginning of ths war, ROE Ministry of Health, with vaccine fUrnished by EZA, began a vaccination program against smanpox for civilians, concen.. trating especially upon Children =dem fifteen years of ago. No records were kept, and the efficiency'of the program cannot be aséertained. b. United Nations reported vaccination of millions of Koreans against smallpox, typhus, typhoid, and cholera. 0. There are confirmed reports of typhus epidemics and a subetantiated presence of smallpox in the Wonsan area. Many Communist troops are Suffering film: both diseases. All civilian doctors have been mobilizedi penicillin and other drugs have been confiscated for Communist Army needs; Civilians have'been evacuated. 4. It is also purported that a serious skin disease is caused by a new United Nations' veapon and that the disease, where it is encOuntered, is responsible for fifti (90) per cent casualties. This propaganda may refer. Of course, tic casualties from the United Nationsluse of napalm incendiary weapons. Soviet propaganda also depicts American forces as prepared 5. to use bacteriological weapons against the Korean people to excUse the failure of.their troops in the field. MaCArthur's headquarters in Japan warpurported to have been producing bacteria with the aid and assistance of unpunished Japanese war criminals. For this activity the Yoshida government had appropriated 1.5 million yen. - 2 - To learn about PDF Compression and OCR visit our website mAR 41 'go P.5 07:55AM The propaganda then resolved intota condemnation of MacArthur by Soviet scientists and an assurance that they (the Soviets) are discovering methods to combat such warfare. 6. Reports have also been disseminated by Communist sources that plaguecarrying fleas have been employed by American forces to spread plague in Korea. It is claimed MacArthur sent eighteen Japanese bacteriologists, in 1946, to Whr Department laboratories to continue the culture of BW azents. 7. Chinese Communist radio broadcast from Peiping, allegedly quoting from the American magazine, "Weekly Newspaper" (NEWSWEEK) and Allied war prisoners, states Chinese Communist prisoners vere subjected to bacteriological experiments on a small island outside Wonsan. Moscow, in a broadcaat quoting Peiping sources, states that the Chinese Red Cross has revealed the Americans are testing bac teriological weapons on captured Chinese volunteers and grusiome experiments ars being conducted under the guise of epidemic control. These facts were reportedly admitted bithe United States magazine, NEWSWEEK, 9 April 1951. The Chinese Red Cross called on all the sixtyeight countries belonging to the International Red Gross and on all peaceloving peoples to punish this vicious enemy. Actually, the excerpts 'from the NEWSWEEK item referred to involved an article about a Navy epidemic control laboratory ship eff Wonsan harbor on the east coaat of Korea . . . where Navy landing parties have been capturing a number of Chinese Reds from the tiny island and have taken them back to the ship where they are tested for symptoms of bubonic plague because of reported epidemics among enemy troops .which may endanger ourlroops. The ship.is an infantry landing vessel On'which a laboratory complete with mice and rabt&ts is in 'stalled. An American naval medical officer immediately and publicly denied these charges and stated that the United States does =detain an "epidemic control ship" docked near a small'island off the'coast of South Urea. For the benefit of United Nations' 'Throes, this laboratory provides facilities for etudying all types of diseases oontraoted by the military'pereonnel so that epidemics may be prevented. This officer further stated that no prisioners have been taken aboard nor has any experimental work been performed. 8. Pak Hun Yong, Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, protested in a message to the Chairman.of the United Nations General'Assembly and the President of the Security Council against the use of bacteriological weapons by American forces. Be cited the following inoidents: American Far East Command, under orders from General MacArthur, haa been preparing BW with the aid of Japanese finances and personnel. a. _ 3 7 At7 To learn about PDF Compression and OCR visit our website .t1P1133..1 511 07:56AM P.6 b. Documents, "Plan A" and 'Plan B," found in ROB headquarters in Seoul, outlined, for 1950, sabotage plans, based on use of bacteria, against vital North,Norean installations, towns, and army units. c. American armed forces, temporarily holding areas of North Korea, contaminated the inhabitants of these areas with smallpox. In this connection, Yong pointed oat no cases occurred in areas not occupied by the Americana and that outbreaka in Japan were undoubtedly oaused by infected American troops involved in covert dissemination (of the germs) in North Berea. Yong than concluded that Americans have thereby violated Geneva Protocol of 17 June 19251 Iprohibitlecthauserof.... bacteria in warfare and that the Democratic People's RepUblic of Korea demands the arrest and trial of MacArthur and Ridgway who have followed in the steps of the Japanese tar criminals. The Department of State of the United Statee bap issued 9. to all consular offices a statement of policy guidadoe advising that such charges should not be dignified by'direot refutation. On the contrary, every opportunity should be used to demonstrate that the epidemics were the'result of Communist leaders' disregard of troops and civilian population as shown by their failure to take adequate measures to prevent disease. Eichasis should be directed to the . fact that United Nations forces, BOK civilians, and POW's are sub ject to inoculation and sanitation programs throughout the Republic .,of Korea. (The Deited Nations fosters this preventive measure.) 10. Last March (1951), the UnitedMations command. in Korea knew some sort of epidemic, feared to be bubonic plague, vas raging north'of the 38th parallel; Brigadier General OrawfOrd Sams, United Nations Army Chief 'of Phblic Health and Welfare, volunteered to obtain details. With three other officers, Sams entered North Drees territory and learned that the ePidemic was not plages but hemorregbie smallpox. Nor this exploit,:.be reeeived the D.S.C. The Cemmuniste, learning of his mission, -broadcast the fantastic story that the United.fftates bad deliberately planted germ in North Korea thereby causing the epidemic, and, with the clear intention of pervertieg these faots, IZPUTIA published a statementr suppoeedly attributed to a United Press re lease, which recounted a fantastic story of the "miraculous salvation Of the United Nations forces from a smallpox epidemic, ae the result of a special raid by a group of American doctors in the North Korean rearer yor this 'heroic exploit," according to the purported United Press report, the American Brigadier General Crawford SOAMES (Sams), who is "head of the public health and social security department at the headquarters of the United Nations forces," received a very high . To learn about PDF Compression and OCR visit our website MAR.I. ?gip P.7 07:57AM - military award since Scams' detachment "discovered" the presence of a emallpox .epidemic in North Korea. Moscow propagandist again quoted an alleged Associcated 11. Press dispatch of 18 May 1951, furnishing details of United States preparations for BW by uSinglbrean FW's as guinea pigsabound theAmerican landing vessel No 1091 Off Kbje (Kbje-do) Island, The ship was reported to have installed " a modern laboratory, completely equipped with all gear her scientists would need." TABS, again quoting the alleged Associated Press dispatch of 18 May 1951, adds to the above,the charge that the landing vessel was relocated from Wonsan to Kojede (Kbjedo) Island, 40 kilometers S-W of 'Neap, in order better to utilize the PW's confined in some half-dozen nearby convict prisons. Adcording to TASS's version of the Associated.Press-dispatch, 3,000 experiment= oral bacteria and rectal bacteria are being made daily by a 38-man medical team. Brigadier General Cravford.Same it mentioned again as participating in these experiments. 12. The propaganda picture was further enlarged by a. Moscow Korean-language broadcast Which claimed that 3,000 Korean families have been banished from Japan and that General Ridgwey's headquarters .were makipg wverY possible effort to conceal Where the expelled Koreans were sent and what became of them.after their deportation. The broadcast raised the conjecture that some of these Koreans had been taken to some deserted island and used for testing new types of bacteriological weapons. 13. A special delegation from the Women's International Democratic Federation (CDT), an international Communist organisation, has been dispatched to Korea tO investigate United Nations 'war crimes.' Their report is being widely publicised by Communist propaganda'madia and will, undoubtedly, provide baokgroOnd for additional stories of atrocities. 5 To learn about PDF Compression and OCR visit our website . 1 HR70-14 I ' I 9 9. KOREA. bwtb..Kor,aans: order p r e c a u t i o n a against. against aiIegad. oZXaged KOREA. Noarth..Koreans order'precautions EtWaricilogioal orth K o r e a n battalion b a t t a l i o n commander comander Korean w r i n a i a , a &warfare: warfare: A NNorth was ordered February to was o r d e r e d on-27 on 27 'February t o take t a k e sspecial p e c i a l pprecautions r e c a u t i o n s tto o avoid ccontamination o n t a m i n a t i o n of his h i s Unit's u n i t ' s food and and water because because ""the t h e enemy dropped bacteria" bacteria" in i n central c e n t r a l Korea. Korea. Covering Covering wells and disinfecting d i s i n f e c t i n g United Nations l e a f l e t s were dditional Nations leaflets were aadditional recommendations. These latter l a t t e r measures were i n s p i r e d by were probably inspired by a 16 February message which stated s t a t e d that t h a t "spies " s p i e b are are putting putting poison into i n t o the t h e drinking d r i n k i n g water" water" and and distributing d i s t r i b u t i n g paper paper which causei c a u s e s death d e a t h toltnyone to'hnyone using u s i n g these t h e s e papers p a p e r s for the t h e nose." nose." which (SUEDE AFSA-251, Group Korea, AFSA-251, 15472, 1547Z, 28 Feb; Feb; 501st Corn Comm Recon Group-Korea, 15RSM/6456, 16 1BRSY/0456, 10 ?eb Yeb 52) 52) Comment: T h e r e is no no evidence that a a serious s e r i o u s health health Comment: There evidence that problem exists e x i s t s in i n North North Korea. Korea. Following Following recent r e c e n t charges charges made by both b o t h the t h e North Korean and the t h e Chinese Communist sing b acterioForeign M i n i s t e r s that t h a t the t h e United Nations Foreign Ministers Nations were were u using bacteriollogical ogical w a r f a r e in i n the t h e Korean Korean war, war, the t h e entire e n t i r e Soviet S o v i e t Orbit Orbit warfare has h a s been giving g i v i n g great g r e a t emphasis emphasis to t o this t h i s subject. s u b j e c t . The The American American Embassy in i n Moscow observes o b s e r v e s that t h a t Soviet Soviet p r e s s and a d i o coverage EMbassy press and rradio links l i n k s the t h e BW issue i s s u e with w i t h the t h e Panmunjom Panmunjom truce t r u c e talks. talks. 10. 10. North Korean major major commands commands ,have have llargeyolitical a r g e p o l i t i c a l unit: unit: A 27 February message to Korean tine HeadHeadt o the t h e North K o r e a n "Front "Front Line quarters" noted n o t e d that t h a t "the,table " t h e t a b l e of of organization o r g a n i z a t i o n of p olitical quarters" political p l a t o o n was was changed....it changed. i t should s h o u l d consist c o n s i s t of of 42 e r s o n s in in platoon 42 p persons c o r p s headqVarters, h e a d q u a r t e r s , while w h i l e 51 51 persons peraons in i n division d i v i s i o n as as before." b e f o r e .lf corps (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Comm Recon Recon GrOup Grbuy Korea, SK-G-919, SK-G-919, 28 28 Feb Peb 52) 52) (SUEDE ... Comment: T h i s disproportionately d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y high h i g h number number of of Comment: This politinTOFionnel p o l i t i c a l p e r s o n n eassigned l a s s i g n e data t stafflevel s t a f f l e v e lisisfurther f u r t h e r evievion iindoctrination dence of the t h e great g r e a t emphasis pplaced l a c e d on n d o c t r i n a t i o n iin n tthe he North Korean Korean army. army. North 111. Supply Supply of of foodstuffs f o o d s t u f f s for f o r three three North North Korean Korean battalions battalions listed: l i s t e d * A North o t t h Korean Korean mesdage mess'age of o 22-Pebruary e b r u a r y -- possibly possTl3y between two rear-area east coast rear-area units u n i t s on the tfhe2%zt coast -- listed l i s t e d the the foodstuffs f o o d s t u f f s on on hand hand for f o r three t h r e e battalions b a t t a l i o n s and and the t h e number number of of days the t h e provisions p r o v i s i o n s are are to t o last. l a e t . Each battalion b a t t a l i o n had had approxiapproximately 11 hand and a ten-day ten-day ssupply 11 days supply s u p p l y of of rice rice on hand upply on requisition. requisition. In g e n e r a l , the t h e battalions b a t t a l i o n s had a a one to to In general, three t h r e e week supply of miscellaneous m i s c e l l a n e o u s grains g r a i n s and vvegetables e g e t a b l e s on hand with w i t h no additional a d d i t i o n a l supplies s u_ _~ ~ l i on e s rrequisition. e a u i s i t i o n . (SUEDE (SUEDE 22 Feb 5501st O l s t Comm C o r n Recon Co Korea, Korea, 15RSM/6760, 15RSM/6760, -22 Feb 52) 52) . --- & kt 6 6 APPROVED PPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: ATE: 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-201 0 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website 52 29 Feb 52 Comment: In a static s t a t i c defensive role on the e ast east Comment: Units in might be expected to maintain a somewhat higher level coast might'be level of ratione rations on on hand. hand. This relatively low low level level may may reflect reflect continued,transportation continued,transportation difficulties. difficulties. :"R 12. 12. 7 7 IL a1 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website Feb 52 52 29 Feb HR7b-14 -120P-SEeRET SUEDt" 2.9 e.13 C2-- FAR FAR EAST 1.. North North Koreans Koreans order precautions against 1 against alleged bacteriological warfare: US Army Army Korea A 6teNsA-?5/ North Koreanbattalion battalioncommander commanderwasordered was ordered US A'2S/ A A North Korean on 27 February takespecial specialprecautions precautions to /3112 on 27 February tototake 16, 28 Feb 52 52 /sV72. SUEDE contamination of of hhis water i s unit's food food and andwater avoid contamination SUEDE {Asbecause "the "the enemy enemy dropped dropped bacteria'' bacteria" in central 1545/41401. - 4/L/-41Thecause - Korea. overing wells and distnfecttng disinfecting United United Nattons Nationsleaflets leaflets were additional addittonal recommendations. recommendations. These latter measures inspired measures were were probably probably inspired by a 16 16 February message message which whtch stated stated that "spies "sptesare areputting puttingpoison poison into into the drinking water" and and distributing distributing paper paper which which causes causes death death to to "anyone "anyone using these papers for the using the nose." nose." 1s no evidence evidence that that aserious a serious Comment: There Is Following recent charges health problem exists in North Korea. Following recent made by exists in North Korea. Chinese Communist Foreign both the the North North Korean Korean and andthe the Chinese Foreign Ministers that both the United Nations were using bacteriological warfare United Nations were using bacteriological warfare in the Korean war, the entire entire Soviet Soviet Orbit has been giving giving great great emphasis to this subject. subject. The American press and in Moscow Moscow observes that Soviet press and radio American Embassy Embassy in coverage links links the the BW BW issue with with the Panmunjom truce talks. talks, NR 3 -TOP-SECRET3 Q H K 3 E P SUEDE SUEDE APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE ,DATE: DATE: 24-Mar-2010 24-Mar-201 0 For more information on PDF Compression and OCR visit our website - z ‘ ---------- 4 7.. 7 Message6 suggest s u g g e s t transfer t r a n s f e r of sseveral e v e r a l MIG-equipped Messages MIG-equipped divisions: of I1 and 2 March M arch disclose d i sc lose "test Ittest flights" flightstt d i v i s i o n s : Messages of by s e v e n MIG-15'8 g1G-1SPs of of the t h e Communist Communist 14th 1 4 t h and and one ransport by seven one ttransport t h e 17th 1 7 t h Division. D i v i s i o n . Similar f l i g h t s have have preceded preceded unit unit of the Similar flights moves in i n the t h e past. p a s t . According t o the t h e rreporting e p o r t i n g agency, agency, these these moves According to meaaages s u g g e s t that t h a t the t h e 17th 17th D i v i s i o n , now now based based at a t Tangshan messages suggest Division, Tangshan i n North China, may may move move to t o Tatungkou Tatungkou near n e a r Antung, Antung, and and that that in North China, tthe h e 14th 1 4 t h which is at a t Takushan, Takushan, another a n o t h e r Antung Antung area area field, field, which is may move move to t o Peiping. PeiRing. (SUEDE e c u r i t y Group Johnson AB (SUEDE 6920 S Security Group Johnson AB JJapan, a p a n , SG 593 and atld SG SG 616, 616, 11 and and 22 Mar Mar 52) 52) 5 TOP SECRET SUEDE APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: 20-Mar-2010 DATE: 20-Mar-2010 For info on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website 4 Mar 52 5 1'1) 5 HR70-14 HR70-14 11:)13 SECRET SUEDr* 'Comment: Another Another Communist division d i v i s i o n of of MIG-15's--the MIG-1Sgs--the 'Comment: 12th-is i n the t h e process p r o c e s s of of transferring t r a n s f e r r i n g from o 12th,iis in from Shanghai Shanghai tto Takushan. Assuming t h a t all a l l these t h e s e moves moves ocCur, o c c u r , Communist Communist Assuming that Takushan. MIG strength s t r e n g t h near n e a r the t h e Korean Korean border b o r d e r will w i l l be increased i n c r e a s e d from from MIG t h e ppresent r e s e n t two-divisions two d i v i s i o n s of the of! about about 50 MIGPs MIG's each tto o three divisions. divisionS. 8.. 8 l l A l l i e d v lMLGss l y tto o Korean o r d e r from Six ""Allied" MIG's ffly Korean b border from Mukden: Mukden: Six a11i e d " MIG-15's -15's flew f l e w from from Mukden Mukden to t o Tatungkou Tatungkou near n e a r the the February, Korean border b o r d e r on 21 21 F e b r u a r y , according a c c o r d i n g to t o a Chinese fflight light message. (SUEDE (SUEDE ASAPAC SPOT SPOT 30961, 29 29 Feb Feb 52) 52) Comment: Inamid-February , 24 "allied" l l a l l i e d ' l (presuMably (presumably Comment: In.mid-February, S o v i mMIC-15's - 1 5 ' s flew f l e w frOm from Tatungkou Tatungkou to t o Mukden. Mukden. The six six menmenSoviet) t i o n e d above above may be part p a r t of of that t h a t group group on a e t u r n fflight, l i g h t , or tioned a rreturn or t h e y may may have have been been replacements'. r e p l a c e m e n t s . Flights F l i g h t s of of Soviet S o v i e t MIG's MIG's they between fields f i e l d s on o n ,.the t h e Korean d e e p e r in in between Korean border border and and ones ones.deeper were not n o t noted noted in i n intercepts i n t e r c e p t s before b e f o r e February. February. Manchuria were I 9. - KOREA. a c t e r i o l o g i c a l warfare w a r f a r e in i n Korea Korea now now major major Communist Communist KOREA. B Bacteriological North theme: A N o r t h Korean K o r e a n east e a s t coast c o a s t defense d e f e n s e unit u n i t was was propaganda theme: a l e r t e d on on I1 March to t o hold hold p r o t e s t meetings among among the t h e ttroops roops alerted protest to intensify bacterioloi n t e n s i f y "hostile " h o s t i l e feelings" f e e l i n g s " against a g a i n s t aalleged l l e g e d bacteriolo: gical g i c a l warfare warfare by by the t h e UN UN forces. f o r c e s . The addressee a d d r e s s e e was admonished "make sure tto o "make s u r e they they (the ( t h e troops) t r o o p s ) are are awake awake at a t the t h e lecture." lecture." w i t h which which the t h e enemy is treating t r e a t i n g the the The seriousness s e r i o u s n e s s with The enemy is ccharges h a r g e s cd of BW is evident e v i d e n t fiom from aa series series of 28 and and 29 February of,28 February as North Korean messages messages which which contained c o n t a i n e d such such instructions i n s t r u c t i o n s aS North Korean ""the t h e contaminated a r e a must must be be covered covered with w i t h snow snow and and spray... spray,.. contaminated area do not n o t go go near n e a r the t h e actual a c t u a l place" p l a c e " and and which o r d e r e d that that do ordered ""injections injections w with.number i t h number nnine i n e (unidentified) ( u n i d e n t i f i e d ) vvaccine a c c i n e wwill i l l be be made." made." Another s t a t e d that t h a t "the " t h e surgical s u r g i c a l institute. institute Another message meSsage stated members lleft e f t hhere e r e to t o investigate i n v e s t i g a t e the t h e bacteria b a c t e r i a bombs bombs dropped dropped -members on the t h e 29th." 29th." on (SUEDE S A 251, e t 151, 15RSM 15RSM (SUEDE UAFSA 251, 10002, 1000Z, 2 2 Mar; Mar; D Det Korea, Korea, CS CS 259, 2 5 9 , I1 Mar Mar 52) 52) Comment: entire S Soviet oviet O Orbit r b i t ccontinues o n t i n u e s tto o ggive ive Comment: The entire unusiiii-Fainence t o the t h e bacteriological b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l warfare warfare charges, charges, u n u s u a l prominence to and Communist China has h a s rreportedly e p o r t e d l y ddispatched. i s p a t c h e d 'Panti-epidemic "antiepidemic teams'' to t o combat combat the the UN's U N P s alleged a l l e g e d BW BW campaign campaign in i n Korea. Korea, A teams" Communist correspondent c o r r e s p o n d e n t at a t the t h e truce t r u c e ttalks a l k s rreported e p o r t e d tthat h a t tthe he ccharges h a r g e s lend l e n d "a m o s t sinister s i n i s t e r aspect a s p e c t tto o tthe h e new'American most new'American d e l a y i n g techniques t e c h n i q u e s in i n the t h e cconference o n f e r e n c e ttent," e n t , ( I and redicted delaying and ppredicted tthat h a t tthe h e ffull u l l eeffects f f e c t s of BW BW will become become evident e v i d e n t as as the the weather gets warmer. warmer, weather gets 6 6 For info on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website 4 Mar 52 I ' 'MP SECRET SUElDr There is is still s t i l l no no evidence e v i d e n c e of o f an in North There an epidemic epidemic in North Korea sufficient to to justify justify the t h e current current all-out all-out propaganda propaganda Korea sufficient effort of of the t h e Communist Communist world. world. effort I 7 TOP SECRET-SUEDE For info on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website 4 Mar 52 52 HR70-14 H R70-14 T 4Tte9PSECRET---SUED& WWEEHFSUEDd eva- 52FAR FAR EAST 2. NR NR Bacteriological warfare warfare in in Korea Korea now now major major Communist Communist propaganda propaganda theme: - Armed Forces Armed Forces Security Secur ity Agency Agency 1, 22 Mar Mar 52 52 SUEDE Qtrft- 11160 SUEDE @/hi1'7b'bQ ~.. A was A North North Korean Korean east east coast defense unit was alerted on on 11March March to hold protest meetings meetings alerted among the among the troops to to intensify "hostile "hostile feelings" warfare by by the the against alleged bacteriological warfare -1 UN was admonished admonished to to UNforces, forces. The addressee addressee was (the troops) aare r e awake awake at the "make sure they (the "make lecture, "'' lecture. seriousnesswith with which which the enemy enemy i The seriousness iss treating BW treating the the charges c h a r g eof XB W is evident in a series seriesof of 28 28 and and 29 February February North Korean messages which containedsuch suchinstructions instructions as as "the conKorean 'messages which contained taminated area donot notgo go near near area must must be be covered coveredwith with snow snow and spray spray ...*. do the actual actual place" place" and and which which ordered ordered that that "injections "injections with with number number nine nine (unidentified) vaccinewill willbe be made. made. " Another message stated that (unidentified) vaccine Another message that "the "the surgical institute institute members members left left here here to to investigate investigate the the bacteria bacteria bombs bombs dropped on the 29th. 29th. " . I' '? - 33 -- TOPSECRETSUEDE -SUEDE APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: DATE: 24-Mar-2010 24-Mar-2010 For info on OCR and PDF Compression go to ThePaperlessOffice.org It1)-SECRK SUEDE' SUEDM Comment: The entire entire Soviet Soviet Orbit continues to Comment: The give and ComComgive unusual unusual prominence prominencetoto€he thebacteriological bacteriologicalwarfare warfare charges, charges, and munist China combat China has has reportedly reportedly dispatched dispatched "anti-epidemic "anti-epidemic teams" teams" to combat A Communist Communist correspondent campaignininKorea. Korea. A correspondent at the UN's alleged BW BW campaign the truce talks reported that the the charges charges lend lend ''a "a most most sinister sinister aspect to the new American the new American delaying delaying techniques techniques in in the the conference conference tent, tent, "and "and predicted that the full effects will' becomeevident evidentaas theweather weathergets gets warmer. warmer. effects of of BW B W will'become s the isstill stillno noevidence evidence of of an an epidemic epidemic in in There is North current all-out all-out propaganda propaganda effort effort of of North Korea Korea sufficient sufficient to to justify justify the the current the Communist world. NR I -4- 4TOP W SSECRET l E H FSUEDE SUEDE For info on OCR and PDF Compression go to ThePaperlessOffice.org , HR70-14 ' I k I SECTION (EASTERN) SECTION 2 (EASTERN) 1 '. NR . 2.. 2 unit orts UN bacteria drop: An KOREA. Chinese u n i t in i n Korea re reports 3. KOREA. 3, m t i ? i e ed Chi ne68 unit on on 26 February e ruary reported r e p o r t e d that that ommun s un nese Communist UnTaati "yesterday "yesterday it i t was discovered that that in i n oar oxr bivouac bivouac area area there there Was a was a real r e a l flood of of bacteria bacteria and and germ8 germs scattered scattered from from aa 3 3 6 Mar Mar 52 93 vs. APPROVED FOR RELEASE \DATE: 22-Mar-2010 DATE: 22-Mar-2010 Ss ;Ng I For info on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website I ' k big plane p l a n e by by the t h e enemy. enemy. P Please l e a s e supply supply u us s immediately immediately w with i t h an an i s s u e of that w t h e menace, t o p tthe h e sspread pread issue of DDT that wee may combat combat the menace, sstop of t h i s plague, p l a g u e , and and eliminate e l i m i n a t e all a l l bacteria." bacteria." (SUEDE 501st 501st of this (SUEDE Comm Recon *Group Korea, K-1221, K-1221, 33 Mar Mar 52) 52) Group Korea, Comment: Reports R e p o r t s such s u c h as as this t h i s from from enemy enemy field f i e l d units units Comment: provide p r o v i d e the the rommunists Communists with w i t h the t h e "proof" t'proof'' which they t h e y apparently apparently require r e q u i r e to t o support s u p p o r t aa propaganda propaganda campaign. campaign. This T h i s is is the t h e second second iinstance n s t a n c e ddUring u r i n g the t h e ccurrent u r r e n t BW scare that a a Communist ffield ield scare that u n i t has h a s actually a c t u a l l y reported r e p o r t e d the t h e discovery d i s c o v e r y of of UN bacteriological bacteriological unit aagents. gents. 4.. 4 Kaesong guard force f o r c e criticized: c r i t i c i z e d : -The The assistant a s s i s t a n t rregimental egimental t h e North Korean 82nd 82nd Regiment, Regiment, charged c h a r g e d with w i t h the the commander of the * s e c u r i t y of a s nnotified o t i f i e d on e b r u a r y by nidenti*security of Kaesong, Kaesong, wwas on 29 29 FFebruary by an u unidentified of your unit u n i t from the highest highest f i e d senior s e n i o r that t h a t "the " t h e spirit s p i r i t of rank r a n k to t o the t h e lowest lowest has h a sdecayed'. decayed. It It h a s been forgotten f o r g o t t e n that that has o u r comrades our comrades at st the t h e front f r o n t lines l i n e s are fighting f i g h t i n g to t o the t h e death." death." T h i s message was w a s apparently a p p a r e n t l y inspired i n s p i r e d by a financial f i n a n c i a l misapmisapThis p r o p r i a t i o n which resulted propriation r e s u l t e d in i n the t h e 82ndls 8 2 n d ' s supply s u p p l y officer officer b e i n g sent s e n t to being t o the t h e provost p r o v o s t marshal. m a r s h a l . (SUEDE 5501st 0 1 s t Comm COMM Recon Group Korea, Korea, 15RSM/7253, 15RSM/7253, 11 Mar Mar 52) 52) Comment: The North N o r t h Korean 82nd Regiment has h a s been in in Comment: tthe h e Kaesong area a r e a almost almost since s i n c e the t h e start s t a r t of of the the truce t r u c e talks. talks. I t s oonly n l y combat d u r i n g this this p e r i o d has been limited l i m i t e d tto o minor Its during period minor p atrols. patrols. 5 5.. North Koreans Koreans will w i l l hold h o l d critique c r i t i q u e on on abortive a b o r t i v e Yang-do Yang-do operation: A A major major North Korean Korean coastal c o a s t a l security s e c u r i t y sstation tation o peration: hinformed f o r m e d aa ssubordinate u b o r d i n a t e sstation t a t i o n on on 29 F February e b r u a r y tthat h a t ""the the training t r a i n i n g documents pertaining p e r t a i n i n g to t o the t h e operation o p e r a t i o n at a t Yang-do Yang-do must be brought you come come up up tto must brought by by you you 'when when you o Pyongyang for for the the 501st CComm Recon Group Group Korea,. Korea, iinstruction.meeting." n s t r u c t i o n , m e e t i n g . " (SUEDE 501st o r n Recon 15RSM/7194,.11 Mar 15RSM/7194, Mar 52) 52) a t t e m p t to t o capture capture Comment: The disastrous d i s a s t r o u s North Korean attempt Comment: Yang off the t h e coastc o a s t nnear e a r Chongjin Chongjin in in n northeastern o r t h e a s t e r n Korea Korea Yang island I s l a n d off was conducted by by elements e l e m e n t s of of the t h e newly identified i d e n t i f i e d 63rd Was conducted Independent Infantry I n f a n t r y Regiment. Regiment, FECOM FECOM reports r e p o r t s suggest s u g g e s t that that t h e assaUlt assault u n i t which attempted a t t e m p t e d to t o take t a k e the the unit t h e island i s l a n d against against Marines suffered ROK marines s u f f e r e d nearly n e a r l y 100 100 percent p e r c e n t Casualties. casualties. 4 6 Mar Mar 52 52 For a comprehensive guide on PDF Compression and OCR visit our website TOP SECRET SUED& J 6 6.. A i r defense d e f e n s e communications communications between between Sariwon Sariwon and and .Pyongyang Pyongyang Air being b e i n g organized: o r g a n i z e d : A 29 2-mesagFebruary e orth K or e a n message from N North Korean Air A i r Headquarters H e a d q u a r t e r s in i n Sinuiju S i n u i j u instructed i n s t r u c t e d an a n air a i r unit u n i t near near Pyongyang t o make make aa topographic t o p o g r a p h i c survey s u r v e y to. t o eestablish-"the stablish "the Pyongyang to direct d i r e c t line l i n e to t o cOnnect c o n n e c t pyongyang Pyongyangand andthe t h eradar radarstation s t a t i of_ri n ;n Sar-.?on .'I (SUEDE 501st Comm Corn Recon Group Korea, 15RSM/7224, 15RSM/7224, Sar.:.von." (SUEDE 1 Mar Mar 52) 1 52) Comment: This Thls intelligence, i n t e l l i g e n c e , in i n addition a d d i t i o n to t o indicating indicating Comment: that and Sariwon Sariwon will w i l l be be laid, laid, t h a t land 'land lines l i n e s linking l i n k i n g Pyongyang Pyongyang and ssuggests u g g e s t s that t h a tthe t h eradar radar station s t a t i oat n Sa.:1,Lwc. a t Sa--.,ii-. is subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to to the N o r t h Korean Korean Air A i r Force. Force. the North 7 7.. N o r t h Korean Korean Air A i r Force F o r c e expands expands its i t s operations: operations: D uring North During a two-week two-week period p e r i o d in i n mia-February, mid-February. 142 142 aircraft a i r c r a f t communicating communicating i n Korean,. Korean, Russian c t i v e on the t h e KoreanKoreanin Russian and and Chinese Chinese were were aactive b+.rated ,..,eratedGCI GCInnet e t iin n North North Korea. Operations O p e r a t i o n s to t o date d a t e on on the the net nel; have been mainly m a i n l y limited l i m i t e d to t o training t r a i n i n g and observation. observation. However, a i r c r a f t controlled c o n t r o l l e a by the t h e Korean ground system system However, aircraft made one o n e possible p o s s i b l e contact c o n t a c t with with a a UN plane, p l a n e , and Korean . have made ground operators o p e r a t o r s have tracked t r a c k e d UN aircraft a i r c r a f t on three t h r e e occasions. occasions. - , IIn n aaddition, d d i t i o n , there t h e r e is is eevidence v i d e n c e tthat h a t some North North Korean a i r c r a f t are are pperforming e r f o r m i n g rreconnak=mce e c o n n a b x c e missions m i s s i o n s and and protecting. protecting aircraft t h e i r airfields. airfields, their US Air A i r force F o r c e concludes c o n c l u d e s that t h a t "allied" " a l l i e d f ' aircraft a i r c r a f t are are The US p probably r o b a b l y active a c t i v e in i n the t h e training t r a i n i n g phasa p h a w of of the the N North o r t h Korean GCI net, n e t , and that t h a t some North Korean air a i r units u n i t s are now participating p a r t i c i p a t i n g in i n combat.(SUEDE USAFSS Brooks AFB, ODD-220694, 20694, 11 Mar Mar 52) 52) 8.. 8 CHINA. CHINA. Poss.i.; Poss.La..ly y ad more G - 1 5 P s t otomove o '..4 moreM IMIG-15's move from from Shanghai Shanghai tto VFilla-border: P -border: Possibly. 38 MIG MIG715's of tthe o s s i b l y 58 -15's of h e CChinese h i n e s e Com, Comm u n i s t 12th 1 2 t h Division Dfv i s i o n were scheduled s c h e d u l e d to t o leave leave Shanghai Shanghai on on munist 4 March on on aa northbound L i a , h t . The:US The US Air A i r Force F o r c e points points o u t that t h a t this t h i s brings b r i n g s the t h e Division's D i v i s i o n ' s strength s t r e n g t h to out t o at a t least least 49 MIG-15's, MIG-l5's, including i n c l u d i n g 11 11which which left l e f t Shanghai Shanghaifor f o rTakushan,' Takushan, nnear e a r the t h e Korean Korean border, b o m d r , in i n February. F e b r u a r y . (SUEDE ir F orce (SUEDE A Air Force Roundup 45, 45, 2133Z, 21332, 44 Mar Mar 52) 52) Comment: The strength Comment: s t r e n g t h of of Chinese C h i n e s e MIG d divisions i v i s i o n s is This usually uaual'ly about a b o u t 50 50 planes. planes. T h i s is is the t h e first f i r s t evidence e v i d e n c e that that tthe h e 12th 12th D i v i s i o n has h a s aa full Division f u l l complement. complement. The t r a n s f e r of of The transfer 5 6 M Mar ar 52 52 To learn about PDF Compression and OCR visit our website the 12th 1 2 t h Division will w i l l raise raise the t h e number number of Chinese jet divisions at at the t h e Korean Korean border border to t o thrfe, t h r e e , although although one one of of divisions them--the 14th--is 1 4 t h - - i s believed b e l i e v e d scheduled s c h e d u l e d to to transfer transfer to t o China them--the soon. Proper soon. Proper 9. 10. 10. 11. 11. ! 66 Mar 52 66 Mar a To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website HR70-14 MR SECRET SUED* SECTION SECTION 2 (EASTERN) (EASTERN) 1.. 1 2.. 2 3 n 4 4 52 7 Mar Mar 52 YD APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: 22-Mar-2010 DATE: 22-Mar-2010 - To learn about OCR and PDF Compression visit ThePaperlessOffice.org -15tiP--SECRET-SLTEDigto,111 NR 4. 4. No sickness sickness from from BW BW reported reported in in North North Korean Korean coastal coastal No unit : AA North North Korean Korean unit unit on on coastal coastal security securitv in in eastern eastern unit Rorsa reported reported to to Naval Naval Defense Defense Headquarters Headquarters near near Wonsan Wonsan on on Korea 2 March March that that although although on on the the 28th 28th insects insects were were again again dropped dropped 2 Paekyang, Sinpung, Sinpung, and and Innam,"no Innam,"no one one has has been been infected infected at Paekyang, yet." (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 501st Comm Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, 15 15 RSM/7413, RSW7413, 33 Mar Mar 52) 52) yet." Comm Recon : Comment: This some indication indication that that no no actual actual Comment: This provides provides some epidemic is current current in in this this area, area, in in which which the the UN UN has has been been epidemic is accused of carrying carrying on on bacteriological bacteriological warfare. warfare. It I t is is also also accused of noteworthy that Communist Communist propaganda propaganda to to date date has has concentrated concentrated noteworthy that on the the actual actual dropping dropping of of infecting infecting agents agents rather rather than than on on the to the the employment employment of of BW. BW. the incidence incidence of of disease disease due due to 5 5.. North Korean Korean east east coast coast unit unit claims claims BW BW caused caused hardships: hardships: A North Korean Korean coastal coastal security security unit unit in A North in eastern-Korea eastern Korea reported reporfed on 3 that UN UN bacteriological bacteriological warfare warfare agents agents in in the the 3 March that surrounding area haa had prevented prevented the the movement movement of of transportation transportation surrounding area since 21 February. February. Later in the day the the unit to since 21 Later in the day unit reported reported to Pyongyang that "Pupyong "Pupyong (just (just southwest southwest of of Hamhung) Hamhung) is Pyongyang that is the area. According to to the the correct correct news, news, no no one one the contaminated contaminated area. can pass through through it. it. If you do not act quickly, 12th and quickly, the 12th 13th guard stations into starvation condistations will have fallen fallen into starvation conditions." 15RSM/7459, tions." (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 501st Comm Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, 15RSM/7459, 5 Mar 52; 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSW7502, 55 Mar 52) 52) 52; 501st Korea, 15RSM/7502, . . . . . . Comment: the possibility that the the These messages raise raise the possibility that Comment: These is blaming blaming the the east east coast coast transportation transportation difficulties, difficulties, enemy enemy is caused the more provocative caused by UN UN air and naval strikes, strikes, on the provocative BW theme. , BW theme. 7 Mar 52 7 52 To learn about OCR and PDF Compression visit ThePaperlessOffice.org L ' 6.. 6 Tea SECRET SUED2r 1 North Korean Korean unit unit has has unidentified unidentified "secret" "secret" weapon: weanon: A North I ._ Marc.. North Korean Korean message, message, possibly possibly from from the the 23rd Z3rd Brigade, Brigade, March Worth informed a a subordinate subordinate unit that the the inspection inspection which be informed unit that which will will be performed very soon soon will mainly concern concern the "special "special weapons which are are being being handled handledsecretly secretlyatat701. go: c unit." (SUEDE which unit." (SUEDE 501st 501st Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, 15RSM/7524, 15RSM/7524, 55 Mar Mar 52) 52) Comm ,.. Comment: have been no indications indications as to to what these these Comment: There have might be. be. The The Soviet S o v i e t Union has previously sought new'weapons might new.weapons Union has previously sought compromise of of new new materiel, materiel, and most weapons weapons and and to avoid compromise equipment encountered to to date date -- with with the the notable notable exception exception of of equipment encountered the MIG-15 MIG-15 -- have have been been World World War War II I1 models. models. -- -- 7. 8. 6 6 7 Mar 52 52 TOP SECRET SUEDE : To learn about OCR and PDF Compression visit ThePaperlessOffice.org HR70-14 TOP SECRET SUEDE* . SECTION SECTION 22 (EASTERN) (EASTERN) 1. KOREA. BW scare scare Continues c o n t i n u e s to t o occupy occupy Communists Communists in i n Korea: Korea: KOREA. BW message from from tthe north IC Korean MMarch a r c h message h e North o r e a n 23rd 23rd i t s subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e battalions b a t t a l i o n s suggested suggested B r i g a d e to t o one one of its Brigade p r e v e n t i v e measures measures to t o be used used against against b a c f e r i a allegedly allegedly preventive bacteria dropped by dkopped by UN U W aircraft. a i r c r a f t . The The report r e p o r t stated s t a t e d .that t h a t "three "three persons. persons. became suddenly suddenly feverish f e v e r i s h and and their t h e i r nervous nervous became s y s t e m have have benumbed." benumbed." A f t e r treatment, t r e a t m e n t , "two "two persons p e r s o n s alive alive' system After and one one dead." dead." The e p o r t concluded h e aastounding stounding The rreport concluded with with tthe s t a t e m e n t that t h a t "the " t h e government government will w i l l soon take take p i c t u r e s of statement pictures s p e c i f i c appearance appearance of of the t h e germs germs collectively c o l l e c t i v e l y and,correct and c o r r e c t specific p h o t o g r a p h i c data photographic d a t a will w i l l be be provided." provided." detailed 66 AY-Taiik l o n g detailed . . . . I Another manifestation.of m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the theme is a 1 1 March query Another query from t o a North i r uunit n i t at n tthe he from Pyongyang Pyongyang to North Korean Korean a air at Sariwon, Sariwon, iin supposedly area, "Have o t had victims supposedly contaminated contaminated area, "Have you nnot had an anjLyictims as a rresult e s u l t of e r t a i n bacteria SUFDEf~XM , as of ccertain bacteria yeapons?" weapons?" ((SUEDEL 324, I 1 Mar; Mar; 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, SK-H-184, SK-H-184, 66 Mar Mar ) ) Comment: Enemy Enemy messages messages have have not n o t yet y e t mentioned mentioned epidemic epidemic Comment: c o n d i t i o n s in i n North North Korea. Korea. There o u b t , however, however, that that conditions There is no no d doubt, tthe h e enemy a s succeeded n cconvincing o n v i n c i n g his r o o p s tthat h a t BW enemy h has succeeded iin his ttroops BW aagents g e n t s are are being b e i n g used used against a g a i n s t him. him. : APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE APPROVED IDATE. DATE: 18-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010 ' 1 2 2 11 1 1 Mar 52 DA) TOP SECRET SUEDE For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit ThePaperlessOffice.org f HR70-14 HR70-14 -'NIP SUED#SECRET SUEDt ear c 1g I FAR EAST 3. Fear of 3. of future future epidemic epidemic suggested suggested in in Communist Communist messages: A A Chinese Chinese Communist Communistartillery artillery unit unit was informed informed w i l l be on on 29 29 February February that "all personnel will be rereinoculated w i t h bubonic inoculated at once" with bubonic plague plague vaccine. vaccine. Healthy r e to take only Healthy individuals, individuals, however, however, aare a half-strength shot shot or may may "temporarily ''temporarily not not be beinoculated." inoculated." Army Security Agency Army Agency 29 Feb, Feb, 44 Mar 29 Mar 52 52 SUEDE Another Another message message from a Chinese Communist artillery regimentreported reportedon on27 27February Februarythat that"we "wehave havenow now fully fullyobtained artillery regiment obtained malaria, and andbubonic bubonic the vaccine vaccinerequired requiredfor for smallpox in the the spring time, time, malaria, plague." The plague." The sender sender notes that the smallpox smallpox and andmalaria malaria shots shots have have alalready been given, "How shall shall we we administer administerthe thebubonic bubonicplague given, but queries, "How plague shots?' shots 'P Comment: The Communists evidently aare re large-scalen-M'--munization immunization program carrying outaalarge-scale carrying out programininKorea, Korea, probably because the the threat threat of of epidemics epidemicswill will be beheightened heightened in in the the coming coming months. months. These messages provide provide further evidence that continued and unthere is isno no serious seriousepidemic epidemic within within these units. units. The continued theme in Communist Communist broadcasts, broadcasts, BW theme precedented coverage given given the BW moreover, supports supportsthe theview view that that propaganda propaganda motives motives aare r e behind behind the charges UN use use of of BW BW in Korea. charges of of UN fNR -4- TOP SECRET SUEDE APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE 31ATE: 24-Mar-2010 0 DATE: 24-Mar-201 If1/4PPROVED For info on PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org _,I," * * * SECTION SECTION 11 (SOVIET) 1. 1. USSR. USSR. Reappearance o v i e t MMiniliReappearance of of messages messages to to Moscow Moscow from from SSoviet is-1.YMiaeion Mission in in Korea: Korea: Messages a d i o sstation t a t i o n which tary Messages from from aa rradio whia ' is beli eved to t o sserve e r v e tthe h e Soviet Soviet m i l i t a r y aadvisers d v i 6 e r a in Korea is believed military Korea t o an a n office o f f i c e in in Moscow Moscow previously p r e v i o u s l y identified i d e n t i f i e d as as the t h e "Mili"Milito t a r y Administration A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of of Areas Areas outside o u t s i d e the t h e USSR" USSR" reappeared r e a p p e a r e d on on tary 21 21 January J a n u a r y 1952 1952 after after a period p e r i o d of of inactivity i n a c t i v i t y since s i n c e 29 39 October October 1951. 1951. The u n u s u a l l y high h i g h volume r a f f i c tto o Moscow unusually volume of this ttraffic on on 12, 1 2 , 20, 2 0 , and and 24 24 February F e b r u a r y may may indicate i n d i c a t e military m i l i t a r y activity activity of some of ieome sort. sort. The s t a t i o n was heard h e a r d a4 e c e n t l y as The station an rrecently as 26 Febrruary. uary, a p p a r e n t correlation c o r r e l a t i o n between between battle battle activity a c t i v i t y and the the An apparent volume of of messages, messages, presumably presumably of of a military m i l i t a r y nature, n a t u r e , from froh volume t h e administrative r d m i n i s t r a t i v d office o f f i c e in in Moscow Moscow to to this t h i s station s t a t i o n in in Korea Korea the ie u g g e s t e d by t h e fluctuation f l u c t u a t i o n of traffic t r a f f i c in i n this this d irection is asuggested by the direction during t h e last l a s t seven seven months; months; traffic t r a f f i c volume volume was high h i g h in in d u r i n g the t h e period p e r i o d from from August August to t o October October 1951 1951 when when fighting f i g h t i n g was was the comparatively c o m p a r a t i v e l y heavy. heavy. The i m e the sstation tation w a s hheard eard The last last ttime was waa October, after a f t e r which which date fighting f i g h t i n g has h a s been been at a t aa was on 28 October, virtual v i r t u a l standstill. standstill. AFSA suggests suggestre that t h a t the t h e resumption r e s u m p t i o n of combat combat activity activity a large l a r g e scale scale might might be accompanied accompanied by reappearance r e a p p e a r a n c e of of on a military m i l i t a r y messages measagee to t o Korea Korea but b u t cautions c a u t i o n s that t h a t such s u c h an a n analysis analysis ie nnot o t definitive d e f i n i t i v e since since the t h e radio r a d i o traffic t r a f f i c is b e l i e v e d to t o be is believed an (SUEDE RU-TIS 1667, an overflow o v e r f l o w from from landline l a n d l i n e traffic. traffic, (SUEDE RU-TIS 1667, 6 Mar Mar 52) 52) Comment: period of high h i g h volume volume of this t h i s traffic t r a f f i c to to Comment: The The period MoscoiERT3 M o s c o mininFebruary F e b r u a r ycoincides c o i n c i d e s roughly r o u g h l y with w i t h that t h a t ot .of "Operation Clam-up", Clam-up", a tactical tactical feint f e i n t by by DN forces to t o develop develop "Operation UN forces indications i n d i c a t i o n s of of enemy enemy intentions. intentions. hPPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE APPROVED FOR DATE: 20-Mar-2010 IDATE. 20-Mar2010 I .. 11 13 Mar Mar 52 52 13 '2 \ For info on PDF Compression and OCR go to our website HR70-14 I i c SECTION SECTION 22 (EASTERN) (EASTERN) 1. 1. 2 2.. 0 3. 3. KOREA. Ex-South Ex-South Korean Korean soldiers soldiers in i n Communist Communist army again again KOREA. l 3 Z G d separately: s e p a r a t e l y : Th listed The North Korean e North Korean 82nd 82nd regImeat, regimedt, h a t ""supplemental sumlemental aguarding u a r d i n n Kaesong, e p o r t e d on Ka6song, rreported on 88 March March tthat iinvestigation" n v e s t i g a t i o n " revealed r e v e a l e d "15 "15 liberated l i b e r a t e d soldiers" soldiers;'' in i n the the oorganization. r g a n i z a t i o n . (SUEDE omm Recon Korea, 15RSM/ 15RSM/ (SUEDE 501st 501st C Comm Recon Grp Grp Korea, 7883, 10 Mar Mar 52) 52) 7883, 10 Comment: ""Liberated L i b e r a t e d ssoldiers" o l d i e r s " is is the t h e term term the f h e ComComComment: t h e 30,000 30,000 to t o 50,000 50,000 ex-South m u n i s t s generally g e n e r a l l y apply apply to t o the munists ex-South Korean s o l d i e r s impressed impressed into i n t o their t h e i r armies. armies. The The enemy's enemy's Korean soldiers of these these p r i s o n e r s suggests s u g g e s t s tthat h a t tthe he s p e c i a l handling h a n d l i n g of special prisoners Communists, may be preparing p r e p a r i n g to to n e g o t i a t e tthis h i s ppressing ressing Communiste may be negotiate issue a t the t h e truce t r u c e talks. t a l k s . They have continued continued to t o deny, deny, They have issue at however, t h e existence e x i s t e n c e of o f any any more r i s o n e r e of han however, the more p prisoners of war war tthan those listed l i s t e d in i n December. December. S i c k n e s s due t o BW r e p o r t e d by by enemy enemy unit: u n i t : AA North Sickness due to BW reported North Korean a n t i - a i r c r a f t unit u n i t in in the t h e liamhung Hamhunrr area Korean anti-aircraft area of of ilorthdortheeastern a s t e r n Korea Korea reported r e p o r t e d on on 10 10 March March that that-"a man who who ate ate "a man 4 5 For info on PDF Compression and OCR go to our website Mar 52 13 Mar \ d ice u using with s i n g the t h e hand w i t h which he had touched tthe h e leaflets leaflets of the of t h e enemy forces, fell f e l l prey to t o the sickness." s i c k n e e s . " (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm C o r n Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/8108, 15BSM/8108, 11 11 Mar Mar 52) 52) rationComment: This would appear to t o be a farfetched rationComment; alization of disease iin North a l i z a t i o n for a possible outbreak of n a North Korean Korean unit.. u n i t .. 4. 4. 5.. 5 6. 6 6 6 13 M ar 52 Mar \ For info on PDF Compression and OCR go to our website W 151MMUMP-- SECTION 22 (EASTERN) (EASTERN) SECTION Soviet strategy in Korea Failing in its attemp to get tiations-Lfore tiations before the UN UN,, the Soviet'Union Soviet ' Union truce negotiators to propose USSR as as truce negotiators to propose the the USSR Dection nationsl nations1 inspection KOREA. 1. I the Korean instructed one of the one of the truce negoCommunist neutral ~~neutral 1 This 1s proposal surprised surprised Korean leaders, leaders, who felt felt that that the the take a more active active part in the negotiations. Soviets would now take I Soviet strategy, apparently is to convince the world population that the Korean conflict is a local problem. Having accomplished this, in addition to reorganizing the North Korean Armed Forces, and having assured themselves that the UN is not contemplating another offensive, the Soviet Union will demand withdrawal of foreign troops -including the Chinese Communists -- from Korea. i 1 Comment: 1 the Soviet role the Comment: I role in the truce negotiations from their very beginning is is generally believed to to have have been been aa major major one. one. Furthermore, Furthermore, the current heavy propaganda campaign on the BW BW theme tends to contradict the theory that the t h e Soviet Union is is trying to localize the the Korean conflict conflict in in the the world's world's eyes. eyes, NR -f3w Rwr CRY 3 3 52 14 Mar 52 bb / ' T S S *APPROVED APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: DATE: 24-Mar-2010 24-Mar-2010 For more information on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org '. z. . - i . w 3 1 "SEM NR I 5. 5. I Communist Communist press echoes echoes charges that t h a t United United States is is The Communists Communiste are g i v i n g great g r e a t press The are gfving p u b l l c i t y to t o stories s t o r i e s from from Korea Korea alleging a l l e g i n g that t h a t the t h e US US is is spreading spreading publicity b bacilli a c i l l i behind behind the t h e North Korean Korean lines. l i n e s . The US US Embassy in i n Rome is is beginning beginning to t o receive r e c e i v e inspired i n s p i r e d "protests" from from local l o c a l labor labor organizations o r g a n i z a t i o n s and and believes believes that t h a t despite d e s p i t e official o f f i c i a l denials. d e n i a l s . the the Communists intend Communists i n t e n d to t o push push their t h e i r campaign. campaign. ITALY. ITALY. rang GZEi@ BW n -Korea: Korea: 13W iin 7 Comment: Communists are are doubtless d o u b t l e s s striving s t r i v i n g to t o fan fan Comment: The Communists anti-American workers in in order o r d e r to to disrupt disrupt anti-American feeling f e e l i n g among among Italian I t a l i a n workers defense production. production. NR -newt-meit53 a8 1.4 Mar Mar 52 52 54 I For more information on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org I- 14 Mar 52 froP SECRET SUEDY SECTION 22 (EASTERN) (EASTERN) SECTION - 1. 1, 2.. 2 I Further F u r t h e r sickness s i c k n e s s blamed blamed on on BW: BW: AA 66 March Marchthinese Chinese states that t h a t one one of the t h e soldiers s o l d i e r s of of the the Communist Communist message message states UN propaganda propaganda leaflet l e a f l e t and and "was "was 3 4 5 t h regiment regiment picked p i c k e d up up aa UN 345th immediately The soldier s o l d i e r was was administered administered immediately poisoned." poisoned." The "fever m e d i c i n e , the t h e fever f e v e r abated a b a t e d and and he he is is now now recovered." recovered.1' "fever medicine, All other o t h e r units u n i t s are are warned warned not not to t o handle h a n d l e leaflets. l e a f l e t s . (SUEDE (SUEDE 5 0 1 s t Comm Recon Recon Grp G r p Korea, Korea, K-1421, K-1421, 11 11Mar Mar 52) 52) 501st.Comm Comment: This T h i s is is the t h e second second instance i n s t a n c e noted noted of of the the 'Communists l'inking sickneSs s i c k n e s s to t o UN UN leaflets. l e a f l e t s . These allegaCommunists linking allegat i o n & itay Aay ddiscourk'ge i s c o u r a g e t hthe e enemy o l d i e r s from e a d i n g UN tionE enemy ssoldiers from rreading UN propaganda. 33.. CHINA/KOREA. Evidence establishes e s t a b l i s h e s that t h a t Chinese Chinese and and Korean Korean CHINA/KOREA. Evidence pilots actually a c t u a l l y engage engag6 in Cn combat: combat: In I n late l a t e February and and early e a r l y March March 'the 'the gground-controlled r o u n d - c o n t r o l l e d iintercept n t e r c e p t net n e t directing directing j e t s in i n combat combat over over Korea Korea was was heard h e a r d -giving g i v i n g specific specific enemy jets combat r d e r s in i n the t h e Chinese Chinese and and Korean Korean languages. languages. Direccombat o orders Directtions i o n s intercepted i n t e r c e p t e d included: i n c l u d e d : "Attack," ''Attack," "Guard "Guard yourselves," y o u r s e l v e s ,*I and "The "The enemy enemy is is just j u s t behind behind you." you.11 The US Air Force F o r c e comments comments that t h a t the t h e first first evidence evidence of o r g a n i z e d Chinese Chinese units u n i t s in i n aerial a e r i a l combat combat occurred occurred organized 27 27 Sktptember Sbptember 1951. 1951. (SWEDE i r Force Roundup Roundup 50 50 and and 51, 51, (SUEDE k kir-Force 20552 and 2128Z, 21282, 11 11 and and 12 12 Mar Mar 52) 52) 2055Z 4 4 PPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE APPROVED DATE: ATE 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-2010 TOP SECRET SUEDE To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR visit our website 14 Mar 52 -1)D -h sS.JC /HR70-14 HR70-14 Comment: usually Comment: Russian ls is the t h e language language u s u a l l y employed messages establlsh e s t a b l i s h that.Chinese t h a t Chinese and on this t h ’ i s .net. n e t . These These. meesages on Korean, pilots p i l o t s are are engaging engaging in in actual a c t u a l combat combat with w i t hInv UN Korean planes p l a n e s -- not not just just flying.patrols flying p a t r o l s over over Korean Korean territory. territory. The 1st 1st Korean Korean Division Division and and the t h e 6th 6 t h Chinese Chinese Division, Division, with w i t h about about. 50 50 MIG's WIG‘S each, each, were were believed b e l i e v e d based based in i n the the Antung area i n February. a r e a in -- 5 5- TOP SECRET SUEDE To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR visit our website 14 MMar a r 52 HR70-14 1 FAR ..EAST FAR.RAST 6.. 6 Russian message message suggests s u g g e s t s typhus typhus epidemic epidemic in i n Korea: Eorea: AA Russian. admi administrative-message an )aI nriXitarp military nnet Russian n i s t r a t f w - m s s s a g e rm e t iin n ' nnbrthnrthwestern.Korea r e p o r t e d that t h a t ". ''. vvillages i l l a g e s an a n epidemic epidemic of of w e s t e r n Korea reported broken o out. ttyphus,Jias yphue 8 broken u t . Please urgently u r g e n t l y send. send. aassistance." ss~stance.'v Mai 52) ((SUEDEL S V E D E p 811331, 1 3 3 1 , 6 Mar 52) .. . . .. . . I . Comment: Comment: The very v e r y fragmen't.ary fragmedtary c condition o n d i t i o n of of tthe h e message message and thepoilition t h e t i o n of the t h e missing m i s s i n g words words could could make make it i t misleadmisleadIf it it describe8 describes actual iing. n g . If a c t u a l epidemic epidemic conditions, c o n d i t i o n s , it it is is the t h e first f i r s t to t o reveal r e v e a l an a n outbreak o u t b r e a k on on such s u c h aa scale s c a l e in i n any any North North Korean area area this t h i s winter. w i n t e r . Louse-borne y p h u s occurred o c c u r r e d in in Louse-borne ttyphus and ccivilians epidemic proportions p r o p o r t i o n s among among 'Communist Communist ttroops r o o p s and ivilians in i n eastern e a s t e r n KOrea Korea during d u r i n g the the winter w i n t e r of of 1950-51. 1950-51. The e i p i n g radio r a d i o denied d e n i e d on on 13 13 March March that t h a t epidemic epidemic The P Peiping cconditions o n d i t i o n s prevailed p r e v a i l e d in i n North.Kprea. Nor Ch Korea. Poor sanitary sari., 'cary conconamong tthe t h e generally g e n e r a l l y low l o w level l e v e l of immunization immuniqation amoqg he dditions, i t i o n s , the c i v i l i a n ppopulation, o p u l a t i o n , and and the t h e lack lack of an f f e c t i v e lousicide lousicide civilian an eeffective makes such s u c h an an outbreak o u t b r e a k aa constant c o n s t a n t possibility. possibility. 7 7. Campaign Campaign againSt.BW a g a i n s t BW continues c o n t i n u e s unabated unabated in i n North North Korea: Korea: A considerable c o n s i d e r a b l e pportin o r t i 6 n of of chinese Chinese and and Korean Korean communications communications still s t i l l are are concerned concerned with w i t h reports r e p o r t s of of BW, BW, with w i t h preventive preventive m e a s u r e s , and and with w i t h incidence i n c i d e n c e of measures, of disease. disease, Two coastal c o a s t a l security s e c u r i t y stations s t a t i o n s in in n o r t h e a s t e r n Korea Two northeastern Korea reported r e p o r t e d on o n 11 11March March that t h a t "the " t h e bacteria b a c t e r i a .bomb bomb cclassified lassified as mosquito, mosquito, ffly l y and and fIlea l e a were were ddispersed" i s p e r s e d " and and,"ansnomy "an ewmy plane plane dropped dropped ants, a n t s , fleas, f l e a s , mosquitoes, mosquitoes, flies f l i e s and and crickets," crickets," A Chinese Chinese Communist Communist unit u n i t commander commander .in.western i n w e s t e r n Korea Korea d e m o n s t r a t e s his conviction c o n v i c t i o n that t h a t Mils BW'isbeing employed against against demonstrates being employed him unit h i m in i n his h i 6 order o r d e r to t o aa subordinate subordinate u n l t who,captured some UN UN soldiers. s o l d i e r s . The The sUbordinate s p b o r d i n a t e unit u n i t is is instructed i n s t r u c t e d to t o ask a s k the the p r i s o n e r s what."type what "type of Of immunization immunization shots s h o t s were were administered administered prisoners recently. recently. i n preparation p r e p a r a t i o n for f o r defense d e f e n s e against a g a i n s t what what in disease," and."what made and "what type t y p e of of cOmmOn common literature l i t e r a t u r e (was) (was) made available a v a i l a b l e regarding regarding: disease d i s g a s e immunization immunization and and prevention." prevention." ... . . . 1 2 March North Korean Korean naval n a v a l messages t o uunits n i t 6 in in Two 12 messages to S o n g j i n and and Chongjin, Chongjin, cities cllties in i n coastal c o a s t a l northeastern n o r t h e a s t e r n Korea, Korea, Songjin ordered with officials o r d e r e d the the units u n i t s to t o cooperate cooperate w i t h city city Q f f i c i a l s .A."have Lo ''have a counterplan c o u n t e r p l a n which includes i n c l u d e s injections, i n j e c t i o n s , Vaccinations v a c c i n a t i o n s and and rat r a t poison" poison" and."to and " t o prevent p r e v e n t an an epidemic epidemic the t h e rats. r a t s . . must must be hunted." hunted 1r . . . . 4 4 17'Mar 53 17 Mar 52 TOP SECRET SUEDE co APPROVED PPROVED FOR FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: 18-Mar-2010 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression go to our website RIP SECRET SUEDr Two 13 13 March March North North Korean Korean meesages, meLaages, one one from fromn'orthn'orthTwo eastern Korea, r e p o r t d e a t h s due due to t o cholera. c h o l e r a . (SUEDE (SUEDE - D Det e t 151 151 e a s t e r n Korea,,reportdeaths 15th 1 6 t h RSM, Korea, Korea, CM CM IN Ik 20412, 20412, 12 1 2 Mar Mar 52, 52, 20791, 20791, 13 13 Mar Mar 52, 52, 21099, 14 Mar 52; 501st Comm Corn Recon Recon Grp Korea, Korea, K-1395, K-1395, 11 11 Mar 52) 52) 21099, 14 Mar 52; - Comment: The cakpaign c a h p a i g n againgt a g a i n g t rats r a t s in i n Sbngjin S o n g j i n and and Comment: C h o n g is m a a sound k e v e n t i v e measure measure insofar i n s o f a r as as these these Chongjin sound pOeventive aanimals n i m a l s are are the t h e primary p r i m a r y vectors v e c t o r s of o$ bubonic b u b o n i c plague. p l a g u e . The The r e p o r t e d incidence i n c i d e n c e of of cholera cholera is is gurprising h u r p r i s i n g since s i n c e this t h i s is is reported normally normalJy cqnsidered c q n s i d e r e d aa summer summer disease. diseise, 8. 8. North N o r t h Korean Korean unit u n i t is is stockpiling s t o c k p i a i n g large large quantities q u a n t i t i e s of of of food f o o d stuffd s t u f f d submitted s u b m i t t e d on 99 March An inventory i n v e n t o r y of N o r t h Korean Korean supply s u p p l y battalion b a t t a l i o n commander to t o hhis i s rregimental egimental "Uri North l i s t s approximately a p p r o x i m a t e l y 8,000 @,OOO metric metric tons t o n s of of rice rice h e a d q u a r t e r s lists headquarters and and 3,800 3,800 metric tons t o n s of of wheat, wheat, in in addition a d d i t i o n to tc) large large quantities quantities of potatoes, p o t a t o e s , meat meat and and vegetables v e g e t a b l e s on on hand. hand. food: food: -- AA 10 10 March March message message -- perhapS p e r h a p s aa reply r e p l y to t o the t h e above above rear regiment r e g i m e n t commander to t o one o n e of his his iintercept n t e r c e p t -- from aa rear s u b o r d i n a t e battaliong b a t t a l i o n e orders o r d e r s that t h a t the t h e food food situation s i t u a t i o n be be subordinate rreported e p o r t e d on o n aa monthly' m o n t h l y ' bbasis,and a s i s , a n d tthat h a t empty bags be tot t h e myon organization. o r g a n i z a t i o n , (SUEDE 5 9 , 9 9 Mar; Mar ; n 2 9 6 0 , to.the 772960, (SUEDE j 2 9 2959, 10 10 Mar Mar 52) 52) I -- i Comment: D e s p i t e the t h e serious serioug food f o o d shortage s h o r t a g e among among Despite Comment: i t appearg a p p e a r d that t h a t this t h i s unit u n i t has has acacN o r t h Kprean civilians, c i v i l i a n s , it North-T5FEEE c u m u l a t e d aa considerable c o n s i d e r a b l e quantity q u a n t i t y of of food f o o d for for what, what, judged judged cumulated by by the t h e stockpile's s t o c k p i l e ' s size, s i z e , is is apparently a p p a r e n t l y aa major major North North Korean Korean command. command. Mention Mention of of tthe h e myon won organization,.a o r g a n i z a t i o n , . a low.level low l e v e l Korean Ibrean p o l i t i c a l subdivision, s u b d i v i s i o n , suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t the t h e North N o r t h Korean Korean armed armed political forces are are permitted p e r m i t t e d to t o deal d e a l directly d i r e o t l y with w i t h local l o c a l civilian civilian forces components t o channel c h a n n e l requests requests components for f o r food f 9 o d without w i t h o u t having h a v i n g to tthrough h r o u g h higher h i g h e r civilian c i v i l i a n authority.' authority. 9.. 9 Additional A d d i t i o n a l facts.reported f a c t s , r e p o r t e d onANorth on,,iNorth Korean Korean operated operated GC1 GCI net; neZt: LISAF USAF aanalysib n a l y s i b of of-communiCations c o m m u n i a t i o n s ttraffic r a f f i c oon n fhe the horth % o r e a noperated operated OCI GCI net n e t in i n nOrthWestern n o r t h w e s t e r n Korea Korea reveals reveals NorthMOrean a i r f i e l d s are are associated.with a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the t h e system s y s t e m and and three three t h a t two airfields that other o t h e r fields f i e l d s May may be be similarly s i m i l a r l y linked. l i n k e d . One field f i e l d is i s pprobably robably near Sunchon, a city Miles south e a r Sunchon, c i t y 40 miles s o u t h of Sinuiju. Sinuiju, iin n Korea n The The analysis a n a l y s i s discloses di'scPoswsthat t h a tone m eofof.the. the Korean Korean GC1 GCI stations s t a t i o n s is is mobile m o b i l e and and Very v e r y likely l i k e l y in in the t h e pyongyang Pyongyang area. area. comprised of otat The ssystem y s t e m is is now comprised a t least least six s i x GC1 GCI stations. stations. 5 5 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression go to our website 17 Mar 52 Mar 52 6-4 WI Vir The Korean Korean early warning warning system, system, however, however, seems to operate independently from the the GCI independently from GCI net. net. An 11 11 March North North Korean Korean air air "transmitter lokkattor," possibly possibly "transmitter lokkattor," may indicate indicate aa D/F D/F installation. installation. RU-AIR-Weekly Digest RU-AIR-Weekly Dlgest 46, 4 6 , 8 Mar AF message mentioned a located at Sariwon, Sariwon, which (SUEDE USAFSS, ADV SUMhf SUMM (SUEDE USAFSS, Roundup RQundup 52, 52, 13 13 Mar Mar 52) 52) Comment: The Korean-operated Korean-operated portion portion of of the the Communist Communist Comment: air defense air darinig-system system in in northwestern northwestern Korea continues continues to expand expand its i t s facilities facilities and and to t o improve improve its its operations. operations. Korean Korean radar installations installations are are now identified identified at.Sariwon at Sariwon and Pyongyang. Pyongyang There are operational airfields no known known operational airfields in northare no western Uiju along.the western Korea, Korea, south south of of .Sinuiju Sinuiju and Uiju along the Korean Korean side of the the Yalu Yalu river, river, except except for for aa sod sod airfield airfield at at side .Pyongyang. PY9ngYang * ,"R , . 6 0 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression go to our website 17 M ar 52 52 17 Mar HR70-14 HR70-14 -----15-SECRET-SUEDhd EAST FAR EAST Epidemics among Communist Communist troops...reported troopn.mqumtred iin n nnorthwestern orthwestern E idemics among Korea: Orean VI11 o r p s , after after reorganizing r e o r g a n i z i n g in i n the the rthe North Korean VIII C Corps, S i n u i j u - U i j u area, area, moved moved during d u r i n g early e a r l y March March to. t o , an east Sinuiju-Uiju an area area east of Pyongyang. Pyongyang. The general g e n e r a l morale the understrength u s d e r s t r e n g t h corps corps morale of the is low and about a b o u t 30 ppercent e r c e n t of of tthe h e troape troops ""are a r e bbedridden edridden w with ith typhoid fever f e v e r or typhus," t y p h u s , " A high h i g h mortality m o r t a l i t y rate r a t e exists e x i s t s among among these diseased d i s e a s e d patients. patients. 3. 3. I I I ' 1 ~. I Comment: Some substance s u b s t a n c e is i s lent l e n t to t o this t h i s report r e p o r t by aa Comment: fragmentary f r a g m e n t a r y 6d March March message message on on the t h e Russian R u s s i a n .GCI GCI nnet e t in n northorthw e s t e r n Korea r ereporting p o r t i n g an u t b r e a k of y p h u s iin n tthis h i s general general western..Korea. anooutbreak of ttyphus area. area. While Korea cannot Whxle -the.existence t h e e x r s t e n c e of of epidemics e p i d e m i c s in in North' N o r t h Korea cannot beAletermined; be determined, aa lack l a c k of,saaitary of s a n r k a r y conditions condatAonts andLpreventiVe and p r e v e n t i v e m e a s u r e s and a shortahe of medical.personnel m e d i c a l p e r s o n n e l have probably measuresand.a.shorta6,e.of have-probably made conditions an epidemic. epidemic. c o n d i t i o n s ripe r i p e for f o r an t h e North N o r t h Korean VIII VI11 Corps Corps The p r e s e n t whereabouts whereabouta of the present are are unknown, unknown, although a l t h o u g h recent r e c e n t reports r e p o r t s have have indicated i n d i c a t e d that t h a t it it was in i n the t h e process p r o c e s s of of reorganization r e o r g a n i z a t i o n in i n northwestern n o r t h w e s t e r n Korea. Korea. was 4.. 4 H i g h - l e v e l inspection i n s p e c t i o n to t o be a r r i e d oout u t iin n N o r t h Korean High-level be ccarried North Korean A Army r m y soon: s o o n : IIn n aa 14 YMarch arch message, message, aan n uunidentified n i d e n t i f i ed N North orth Ibrean k o r e a n regiment r e g i m e n t informed informed aa subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e unit u n i t that t h a t tthe h e "division" "divieiont* April would carry out o u t aa preliminary p r e l i m i n a r y inspection i n s p e c t i o n oon n 1 I A p r i l ""in i n oorder rder tto o ssatisfactorily a t i s f a c t o r i l y meet meet the t h e Supreme Supreme Headquarters H e a d q u a r t e r s inspection." inspeation.** IIn n tthis h i s same egard, a a 16 March message, r o b a b l y from from same rregard, message, p probably the North VII Corps Corps iin N o r t h Korean. Korean VI1 n tthe h e Wonsan-Hamhung area, area, reported r e p o r t e d that t h a t "National " N a t i o n a l inspection i n s p e c t i o n will w i l l be be opened opened from f r o m the the Prepare.for 1 7 t h day. day. P r e p a r e f o r it i t sufficiently." s u f f i c i e n t l y . ' * (SUEDE (SUEDE 330th 3 3 0 t h .Comm Comm 17th Recon.Co Recon Co Korea Korea ALT-845, ALT-845, 15 15 Mar; Mar; 501st 5 0 1 a t Comm Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, SK-H-747, SK-€I-747, 17 17 Mar M U 52) 52) I 3 3 Mar 52 20 par 52 Crt)/5"/S -TOP---SEeR-ET---SUEDE ~ P P R O V E DFOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE [DATE: 22-Mar-201 0 ATE: 22-Mar-2010 VPPROVED 1 I For more information on OCR and PDF Compression go to ThePaperlessOffice.org Comment: This T h i s impending impending high high level l e v e l inspection i n s p e c t i o n may may Comment: i n d i c a t e the t h e culmination culmination of of the t h e extensive e x t e n s i v e training t r a i n i n g and and indicate which has h a s been been going going on on in i n the t h e North North r e o r g a n i z a t i o n program program which reorganization Korean Army A r m y in i n past p a s t months, months. Korean 5. 5. Communists continue continue organizing organizing to t o meet thre.at nf of BW: A Communists meet threat BW: A Chinese Communist Communist message arch r e p o r t e d . %hat ,'la Chinese message on on 13 15 Hdirchreported:that-"a c e r t a i n unit_has u n i t ha6 discovered discovered aa large l a r g e concentration c o n c e n t r a t i o n of of plague plague certain germs. Many Many people people have have been been afflicted afflicted w i t h this t h i s undiagnosed germs. with undiagnosed disease and and already already several s e v e r a l persons persons have have succumbed succumbed with w i t h the the disease i l l n e s s . " Another Another Chinese Chinese Communist Communiat unit u n i t on on 14 14 March_listed March l i E t e d illness." f o u r preventive p r e v e n t i v e measures a r r y i n g oout u t tthemanti-smallh e ' Hanti-smallfour meaSures for for ccarrying t h e "anti-plague "anti-plague program." program." pox campaign" campaign" and and the pox Meanwhile, aa 17 17 March March North North Korean Korean message aessage detailed detailed Meanwhile, p r e v e n t i v e steps s t e p s to t o be be taken taken by by subordinate subordinate units u n i t s "to "to preventive diseases which may i n t r u d e iinto n t o hhere e r e by he p r e v e n t various v a r i o u s Aiseases prevent may intrude by tthe new weapons weapons used used by by ihe t h e enemy." enemy." These These measures. lncluded new measures4ncluded e s t a b l i s h m e n t of of infectious i n f e c t i o u s disease d i s e a s e hospitalt, h o s p i t a l s , cooperation cooperation establishment w i t h local l o c a l governments governments in i n the t h e anti-epidemic anti-epidemic campaign, ampaign, with s t r i c t e r hygienic hygienic .Aiscipline, d i s c i p l i n e , isolation i s o l a t i o n of of infected i n f e c t e d units, units, stricter high p r i o r i t y reporting r e p o r t i n g of the t h e outbreak outbreak of of disease, diseaee, and and high priority s t r i c t observation o b s e r v a t i o n of of "enemy "enemy aircraft aircraft bacterJa1 strict . of of.bacterial bombs.". SOlst Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, K-1499, K-1499, 17 1 7 Mar; Mar; bombs." . (SUEDE (SURDR.501st.Comm K-1500, 17 1 7 Mar; M a r ; SK-B-768, SK-H-768, 18 18Mar M U 52) 52) K-1500, ... . 6. 6.. . North North Korean Korean food food economy economy measures measures not n o t as as harsh h a r s h as as previouielyzepOrtedl accurate transiatign r e v i o u s l y r e p o r t e d : -AA more more 'accwate trans-latfan nf o f aa b March North Korean message message (fiei,Special (eee.Specia1 intelligence lntslligence 15 March North-Korean Supplement, 18 18 March,..Item March, I t e m 4) economy in in food food Supplement, 4) concerning concerning economy conconsumption has h a s been been received. r e c e i v e d . The consumption The message-urges messageAirges cons e r v a t i o n of of provisions p r o v i s i o n s in i n the t h e military m i l i t a r y establishment e s t a b l i s h m e n t and and servation d e c r e e s that t h a t "50 "50 grams grams of of meat meat and and 800 800 grams grams of of rice" rice" will will decrees be Pdeducted" "deductedqqfrom i r o n each each man's man's monthly.ration. monthly r a t i o n . The previous The'previous be t r a n s l a t i o n indicated i n d i c a t e d that t h a t each each man's man's monthly monthly ration r a t i o n would would translation lllimited'' tto o qt509 grams of of rice." rice." be "limited". "509 grams grams of of meat meat and and 800 grams (SUEDE Co Korea, Korea, ALT-897, 17 Mar 52) (SUEDE 330th 330th Corn Comm Recon Recon Co ALT-897, 17 Mar 52) Comment: t h i s new new translation t r a n s l a t i o n still s t i l l indicates indicates While this Comment: While aa shortage shortage o off food in i n North Korea, Korea, the t h e deduction of of roughly d a y ' s ration r a t i o n per per month month is is not not nearly n e a r l y as as severe s e v e r e as as the the one day's one measures suggested by by the t h e previous previous interception. interception. measures suggested 4 TOP SECRET-SUEDE For more information on OCR and PDF Compression go to ThePaperlessOffice.org 20 par Far 52 20 , 7. 7. Chinese MIG-15's MIG-15'6 moye moye to t o Korean Korean border: border: Twenty-seven Twenty-seven Chinese MIG-l'S's, probably probably of o f the. t h e Chinede 1 7 t h Air A i r Division, Division, MIG-1Srs, Chinede Communiet Communist 17th were scheduled scheduled to to fly f l y fröm frbm Tangshan Tangahan in i n North China China to to were Tatungkou near near Antung Antung on on 17 17 March. March. Thirteen T h i r t e e n MIGIs M I G ' s of of this this Tatungkou on 99 March. March. (SUEDE (SUEDE d i v i s i o n left l e f t Tangshan Tangshan for f o r Manchuria Manchuria on division Air A i r Force Force Roundup Roundup 55, 5 5 , 2100Z, 21002, 18 18 Mar Mar 52) 52) Comment: Since Since the t h e 17th 1 7 t h Division D i v i s i o n is is equipped equipped with w i t h about about Comment: SO MIG-15's, YI&lb'S, its transfer t r a n s f e r will will raise raise the t h e total t o t a l enemy enemy jet jet 50 its strength s t r e n g t h at a t Antung Antung and and Tatungkou Tatungkou to t o nearly n e a r l y 250,.a 250, a record r e c o r d number. number. may, however, however, replace replace a a combat-depleted n i t iin n tthe he The 17th 1 7 t h may, The combat-depleted uunit area; rotation r o t a t i o n of of this t h i s nature n a t u r e has has occurred ocuyrred before. before. area; A i r c r a f t of of the t h e 17th 1 7 t h Division D i v i s i o n were were noted noted in i n an an advanced advanced Aircraft stage of training t r a i n i n g in i n February. February. On On 26.February 26 February lhey t h e y practiced practiced stage'of r e l e a s i n g auxiliary a u x i l i a r y fuel f u e l tanks, t a n k s , the t h e first f i r s t intercepted i n t e r c e p t e d reference reference releasing t o auxiliary a u x i l i a r y tanks t a n k s on.MIG-15's. on M I G - 1 5 ' s . to ~~ 5 TOP SECRET SUEDE For more information on OCR and PDF Compression go to ThePaperlessOffice.org 20 20 Var Mar 52 HR70-14 8. 8. Propaganda v a l u e of BW BW scare scare stressed stressed in i n North North Korean Korean Propaganda value uunit: n i t : An 18 18 March Yarch NorIch N o r x h Korean o t e 8 that t h a t in in Korean message message n notes t h e "public " p u b l i c opinion o p i n i o n project: p r o j e c t : progress p r o g r e s s is is slow slow rFagrence e f e r e n c e to t o the a t battalion b a t t a l i o n units. u n i t s . IIn n accordance i t h tthe h e ooutlined u t l i n e d rregulaegulaat accordance w with ttion, i o n , you must r e p o r t public p u b l i c opinion o p i n i o n concerning c o n c e r n i n g the t h e appearappearmust report ance bacteria weapons i n aa wide sphere." sphere." (SUEDE Det D e t 151 151 ance of bacteria weapons in (SUEDE 1 5 t h RSM Korea, CS CS 351, 351, 19 19 Mar Mar 52) 52) 15th RSM Korea, T h i s intercept i n t e r c e p t shows shows that t h a t the t h e current c u r r e n t BW BW Comment: This Comment: p r o p a m a m p s i g n is is intended i n t e n d e d to t o increase i n c r e a s e both both civilian civilian propaiiai-Uampaign and m and military i l i t a r y feeling f e e l i n g in i n North North Korea Korea against a g a i n s t the t h e UN. UN. 9. 9. North Korean IV IV Corps Corps units u n i t s identified i d e n t i f i e d in i n western w e s t e r n Korea: Korea: North Korean series of of! T7 17 Marcfi Y a r c h North Korean messages, o s s i b l y iincludncludA series North-Korean messages, ppossibly iing n g dduplicate u p l i c a t e interceptions, i n t e r c e p t i o n s , indicates i n d i c a t e s that t h a t an an antiaircraft antiaircraft u n i t of of: the t h e "llth " 1 1 t h Regiment" Regiment" shot s h o t down down aa UN UN F-84 F-84 in in western western unit Korea, sbuth s o u t h of of Chinnampo. Chinnampo. An An altercation a l t e r c a t i o n developed developed between between Korea, the "llth "11th Regiment" and aa unit u n i t of of the t h e North Korean Korean 23rd 23rd Regiment" and B r i g a d e , known known to t o be be in in this t h i s area, area, as as to t o the t h e credit c r e d i t for for Brigade, downing the t h e UN UN plane. plane. downing 19 March North North Korean Korean message, message, probably p r o b a b l y from from the the 23rd 23rd A 19 B r i g a d e An , i n westernKorea, w e s t e m K o r e a , reports r e p o r t s the t h e alleged a l l e g e d dropping d r o p p i n g of of Brigade bacteria in in the the area area occupied occupied by the t h e "18th.Regiment, P'18th Regiment, 4th 4th Division." Division.'' (SUEDE 330th Co Korea and 330th Comm Roeon Recon.Co Korea ALT-936 and ALT-837, ALT-937, 18 18 Mar; 501st 501st Comm Corn Recon Recon Grp Korea, Korea, 15 15 RSM/8724 RSM/8724 and 15 and 15 RSM/8725, RSM/8725, 18 18 Mar; Mar; Det D e t 151 1 5 1 15th 1 5 t h RSM Korea, CS-355, CS-355, 19 Mar 52) Mar 52) Comment: The 1 1 t h North i n f a n t r y regiment regiment is Comment: The llth North Korean Korean infantry organ'ic to the t h e 5th 5 t h Division, D i v i s i o n , IV IV Corps. Corps. No r e c e n t information informatian. organic No recent h a s been been received r e c e i v e d On on either e i t h e r the t h e 4th 4 t h or o r 5th 5 t h North N o r t h Korean Korean has D i v i s i o n s , both b o t h good goad combat combat units, u n i t s , which were were last l a s t located located Divisions, in tthe h e Pyongyang-Chinnampo-Sariwon area of western w e s t e r n Korea: Korea; Pyongyang-Chinnampo-Sariwon area 5 21 Mar 52 C11) TOP SECRET SUEDE 54tpp APPROVED PPROVED FOR FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: 18-Mar-2010 To learn about OCR and PDF Compression visit ThePaperlessOffice.org HR70-14 HR70-14 ft5P SECRET SUEDI FAR EAST FAR EAST 4.. 4 North Korean Army unit u n i t disproves d i s p r o v e s police p o l i c e rreport e p o r t of of BW messages from a North North KKorean iincident: n c i d e n t : Two messages orean bbattalion a t t a l i o n iin n Hamhung area rreported March tthat e p o r t e d on 225 5 March h a t aa ccivilian i v i l i a n ppolice olice tthe h e Hamhung officer o f f i c e r had discovered d i s c o v e r e d an a n American American bacteria b a c t e r i a bomb. bomb. The The ppoliceman's o l i c e m a n ' s findings f i n d i n g s apparently a p p a r e n t l y were were based based on on tthe he c coincidence oincidence of a UN bombing attack of "flies" in of a t t a c k and the t h e appearance appearance of i n the the area. A North Korean military m i l i t a r y sanitation sanitation o f f i c e r , ssent e n t to to officer, aaffirm f f i r m this t h i s incident, i n c i d e n t , rreported e p o r t e d that t h a t tthe h e ppoliceman's o l i c e m a n ' s rreport eport was false f a l s e and an@ that t h a t the t h e flies,"were f l i e s "were not n o t ccaused a u s e d from the the bacterial b a c t e r i a l weapon but b u t from the t h e fertilizers f e r t i l i z e r s on tthe h e pplace." lace." Korea, SK-H-1045, SK-H-1045, 25. 25. Mar; et (SUEDE 5 0 1 s t Comm Corn Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, (SUEDE 501st Mar; D Det 151 15th 151 1 5 t h RSM RSM Ebrea, Korea, 26 26 Mar Mar 52) 52) Comment: T h i s is i s the t h e first f i r s t observed observed instance i n s t a n c e in in Comment; This which a a Communist unit u n i t has h a s investigated i n v e s t i g a t e d and eentered ntered a a n e g a t i v e report r e p o r t on on an a n alleged a l l e g e d American American use u s e of of BW BW agents. agents. negative 5. 5. A d d i t i o n a l subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e of of new new Chinese Communist army Additional group g r o u p reported r e p o r t e d in i n Korea: Korea: A recent r e c e n t message, p r o b a b l y passed passed message, probably t h e Chinese Chi n e s e Communist bby y the t a t e s that that Communist 7th 7 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y 'Division, D i v i s i o n , sstates "the " t h e 18th 1 8 t h Army requests r e q u e s t s that t h a t you compute.the compute t h e total t o t a l number of all a l l personnel p e r s o n n e l under under your your command...." command....ll FECOM comments comnients that t h a t the t h e 18th 1 8 t h Army, subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the the FECOM 5 t h Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Army A r m y Group, Group, has h a s been located located in i n Korea Korea 5th by several s e v e r a l collateral c o l l a t e r a l reports. r e p o r t s . The e f e r e n c e to t o "18th " 1 8 t h Army," Army," The rreference c o u l d be be aa garble g a r b l e for f o r "68th "68th Army" ArrnylI known known to t o be be FECOM FECOM warns, w a r n s , could iin n tthe h e general g e n e r a l area a r e a of of the t h e 7th 7 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division. D i v i s i o n . (SUEDE (SUEDE CINCFE CINCFE SIB SIB 468, 468, 26 26 Mar Mar 52) 52) I Comment: Communications Communications intelligence i n t e l l i g e n c e in i n 1952 1952 has has Comment; s u g g e s t e d the t h e presence p r e s e n c e in suggested i n Korea of of four f o u r new Chinese Communist armies--the 10th, 1 6 t h , 18th, 1 8 t h , and and 21st. 2 1 s t . While While it i t is is possible possible armies-the l o t h , 16th, tthat h a t all a l l or o r elements e l e m e n t s of of these these armies armies may may have have entered e n t e r e d Korea, Korea, i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence e v i d e n c e to t o accept a c c e p t ttheir h e i r ppresence r e s e n c e in in t h e r e is insufficient there the t h e combat zone. zone. Q 6. 6. North Korean Korean VV Corps Corps loses loses two two majof major units: units: A A 29 January J a n u a r y North Korean Ko r e a n message message mentions mentions that t h a t "since " s i n c e the the V Corps is transferring of the 46th Division t r a n s f e r r i n g the t h e control c o n t r o l of the 4 6th D ivision 33 27 'War 27'Mar 52 52 () TOP SECRET SUEDE APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: 8-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010 1PPROVED To learn about PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org pe , . u u TOP SECRET SUEDE and the t h e 25th 25th D Division i v i s i o n (probably ( p r o b a b l y 25th 2 5 t h Brigade), B r i g a d e ) , and and since since all of the the b e i n g turned t u r n e d over, o v e r , it i t is is not not p ossible being possible 3003i-29Jan-52) to .I1 (SU~D~[mL130t33, 29 Jan 52) to ." (SUEDE .. . . . . . HR70-14 Comment: Comment: The loss l o s s of of these t h e s e two two major major units u n i t s leaves l e a v e s the the V Corps Corps with w i t h the t h e 6th, 6 t h , 12th, 1 2 t h , and and 32nd 32nd Divisions. D i v i s i o n s . IItt is is possible p o s s i b l e that this this January J a n u a r y transfer t r a n s f e r was was a a ppreparation r e p a r a t i o n for f o r the the V Corps' return Korea, ppossibly rer e t u r n to t o combat in i n eastern e a s t e r n Korea, o s s i b l y to t o relieve l i e v e the t h e II I 1 Corps. Corps. Artillery B r i g a d e has been generally generally The 25th Mechanized Artillery Brigade Identified coast81 defense d e f e n s e role. r o l e . The V Corps has b been een i d e n t i f i e d in i n aa coastal engaged in i n training t r a i n i n g and ccoastal o a s t a l ssecurity e c u r i t y dduty u t y iin n tthe h e WonsanWonsanHamhung Bamhung area, since s i n c e it it was relieved r e l i e v e d from combat combat by I I Corps i n the in t h e fall f a l l of of 1951. 1951. 7. 7. North Korean regiment r e g i m e n t at a t Kaesong h has a s large l a r g e security security eelement: l e m e n t : A poorly p o o r l y translated t r a n s l a t e d 26 20 M March arch message message from the the N North orth Korean 82nd Itorean 82nd rregiment, e g i m e n t , tthe h e Kaesong Kaesong gguard u a r d fforce, o r c e , tto o its i t s parent parent 8th 8 th D Division i v i s i o n rreports e p o r t s the t h e ccurrent u r r d n t sstrength t r e n g t h of of ssecurity e c u r i t y men men iin n t h e re the r e ime ime tt as a8 324, 3 2 4 , organized o r g a n i z e d into i n t o between between 50 50 and and 70 70 nets. nets. 29/7H, 21 (SUEDE (SUEDEvpf29/7&, 21 Mar-52) Mar 52) HR70-14 Comment: Although it it is is not n o t known what what the t h e normal normal Comment: complement North c o m p l of m security s e c u r i t y personnel p e r s o n n e l is is in in a N o r t h Korean rregiment egiment of 3,000 3,000 soldiers, s o l d i e r s , this t h i s figure f i g u r e seems seems high. h i g h . The llshowpiece" "showpiece" role role of of the t h e 82nd Regiment Regiment as the t h e Kaesong guard g u a r d force f o r c e may aaccount c c o u n t for f o r the t h e extra e x t r a security s e c u r i t y precautions. precautions. NR 4 -TOP SECRET SUEDE To learn about PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org 27 M ar 52 Mar Approved RapRelease 2006/03/17 : ClA-RDP79T0116M000900010001-2 SECRET 2 5X1 1 April 1952 OCI No. 5149 Copy No. 25, j 25X1 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY State Department review completed ARMY and USAF review(s) completed. This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence, Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. 2 5X1 SECRET RETURN TO ARCHIVES Ft RECORDS CENTER IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website ciA-RonwrifiaDoWLISAA 2 1 ..* Approved NIRelease 2006103117 : CIA-RDP79T01140A000900010001-2 SECRET 25X1 EASTERN EUROPE 1. Livestock collections lagging in Hungary: Six villages have lost their free marketing privileges for delinquency in crop collection. In announcing this step, Szabad Nep, the Budapest Communist daily, pointed out that in spite of several warnings the villages had not complied with their obligations for months. The US Legation in Budapest noted that the fact that one village was selected in each of six counties indicated that the measure was intended to frighten other delinquents. 25X1 25X1 Comment: The Hungarian Communist concern for production and delivery of crops is seen even in their attitude toward socialization of agriculture. Local officials were warned recently not to let their efforts at increasing the cooperatives interfere with the spring planting. 2. 25X1 American Embass evaluates Yugoslav reaction to Italian Trieste po cy: n commen ng on ugos av coun er emons ra ons an reaction to events in Trieste, the American Charge in Belgrade reports that the "general tone of events in Yugoslavia indicates a firm, well-controlled attitude on the part of the regime designed to impress the West:with Yugoslavia's determination not to yield to solutions arrived at without Yugoslav participation," Bitterness is carefully directed at "fascists and irredentists" in an apparent effort not to worsen inter-governmental relations further, according to the Charge. Comment: On 31 March Tito bluntly warned the West that SECRET 1 1 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2006/03117 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900010001-2 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website 25X1 Approved Nip Release 2006103117 : CIA-RDP79T01149A000900010001-2 SECRET it may "lose the sympathy of our peoples" by supporting Italian territorial claims An the Free Territory of fleste. He asserted that the United: States and Britain are not attempting to correct the mistakes of the:tripartite pledge to Yugoslavia, Italy; but, on the cOntrary, are extolling them. he contended, will never accept a'dictated settlement of the Trieste Aispute in favor of Italy. The Charge warned in a cable last week that the reactiOn of Yugoslav officials to any semblance of Western support for Italian territorial claims would be strong, especially in the ranks of the Slovene members of the Communist Party. - SECRET 2 1 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2006/03117 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900010001-2 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website Approved Fo %Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T0114606:100900010001-2 SECRET FAR EAST 3. 25X1 Koreans incensed over Japanese property claims: Ambassador Muccio reports that, according to the Korean press, ROK Foreign Ministry officials are incensed over Japan's claim to property in Korea, which they consider is a repudiation the Japanese peace treaty. Muccio believes the Japanese of may be underestimating Korean sensitivities on the property issue in the current Japan-Korea talks. Asserting that the Koreans are unlikely to accept any compromise in their present mood, Muccio recommends that Japan be cautioned against impression that it is reoudiati g the terms of giving the the peace treaty. Comment: The San Francisco treaty binds Japan to recognize the validity of Japanese property dispositions made by the US Military Government in Korea. The Japanese Government, however, feels that Korean claims for property in Japan of Japanese corporations whose head offices likewise unacceptable, and undoubtedly is were in Korea are working for a mutual cancellation of claims by both nations. 4. 25X1 North Ebrean Air Force increases activity United Nations aerial reconnaissance on 24 Marchat Sariwon: disclosed that two airfields in the Sariwon area, 35 miles south of Pyongyang, had been repaired and that their runw ys were operational. Comment: Sariwon was reported in October 1951 as a storage area for concealed North Ebrean aircraft. These two airfields, both sod,are believed to be the bases for North Korean-piloted P0-2 biplanes which have madesporadic harassing attacks against UN rear installations. The enemy's unwillingness, thus far, to provide adequate jet fighter coverage this far south would seem to rule out Sariwon's utility as an operational Communist airfield for anything heavier than P0-2's. It is possible, however, that the Communists are seeking to establish air installations within North Korea either in operational conjunction with cease-fire preparations or in preparation for a renewed offensive. 5. Japanese detainees remit funds from Communist China: Three million yen from Japanese nationals in Communist China were SECRET 3 1 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2006103/17 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900010001-2 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website Approved Forlidlease 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T01144000900010001-2 SECRET delivered to the Japan-China Friendship Society in Tokyo on 27 March, according to the newspaper Asahi. The funds, except for ten percent earmarked for the Zengailia theatrical troupe, were addressed to 345 families. This is the first time, according to this account, that the Chinese Communist Government has lie mitted Japanese to remit funds home. 25X1 I Comment: This transfer of appears to be a Chinese Communistfunds, which is unconfirmed, propaganda maneuver. Both the Japan-China Friendship Socie tVand Zenshinza are Communist fronts. 6. British firms in China now plan to close immediately: The British Government is preparing to allow immediate arrangements to be ask Peiping authorities to made for closing most of the remaining British firms in China. This approach has been requested by the principal British business interests operating in China, and will probably be made early in April because of their fear that the Communist authorities have learned of their intention to withdraw eventually and may be planning retaliation. I Comment: Most British interests believe that the Chinese Communisti'are operating in China now determined to eradicate all foreign economic influence, and that it is therefore futile to attempt to continue their mainland operations under existing handicaps' However, these rirms remain powerrul advocates or a non-provocative" British policy toward China, since they are in most cases based at Hong Kong, and anticipate continued profitable conditions elsewhere in the Far East this year. 25X1 7. French industrialists may force withdrawal French Industrial and export interests from Indomay initiate a press campaign against the continued drain of wealth and manpower in Indochina if they fail to obtain substantial tariff preferences in the trade discussions scheduled to start 18 April with the Associated States. The Economic Counselor of the French High Commission, who has just returned to Saigon from Paris, is convinced that French troops would be withdrawn from Indochina within three months after the launching of such a press campaign by big business. china: SECRET 4 1 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : ClA-RDP79T01146A000900010001-2 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website 25X1 25X1 Approved Far Release 2006/03117 : CIA-RDP79T01144IA000900010001-2 SECRET Minister Heath comments that extensive preferences for French interests would defer the development of stable political institutions in the Associated States and also further reduce the number of adhere ts to the Bao Dai government. 25X1 Comment: French business interests have supported the militaiinriort in Indochina on the assumption that France would retain economic dominance when peace is established. Even with business hostile, a complete withdrawal is unlikely for reasons of prestige. Nevertheless, a fettering of French economic activity in Indochina would probably result in determined efforts by France to arrive at a negotiated peace with the Viet Minh. 25X1 9. Burmese Government's anti-Communist campaign continues: The Burmese War Office reports that its operations against the Communist insurgents in north-central Burma are lontinuing "with much success." I Comment: Even if the success of these operations is exaggerated, the campaign indicates an increased determination to combat the Communists. This determination is also reflected in recent statements by the Premier and the Defense and Home Ministers rejecting Communist peace feelers and again demanding that the Communists lay down their arms. 10 Anti-Communist campaign in Malaya seen endangered by American rubber policy: The American Consul General in 8ingapore reports that Malayan officials and rubber producers are arguing strongly that the present American rubber policy, if continued, will dangerously impair the Malayan and will play into the hands of the local Communists. economy They emphasize that this policy, which involves decreased natural SECRET 5 1 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2006103/17 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900010001-2 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website , 25X1 Approved Fl "'Release 20,06/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T011S000900010001-2 SECRET rubber purchases in Malaya and support of synthetic production, will not only reduce the vitally important dollar contribution which Malaya makes to Britain but will also reduce the living standard of thousands of Malays who are highly vulnerable to Communist influence. I 25X1 Comment: Although the arguments reported by the Consul Generir-iYnlausible, they are influenced by self-interest. The extent to which the rubber industry and the anti-Communist campaign may be endangered by American rubber policies cannot now be assessed. SOUTH ASIA 11. 25X1 Maharajah of Bhutan is dead: The 50-year old Maharajah of Bhutan died on 24 March after a brief illness, according to a Reuters dispatch from Gangtok in nearby Sikkim. I 25X1 1 25X6 Comment: The late Maharajahl t Isuccessfully prevented the expansion of both Chinese Communist and Indian influence in Bhutan. He established border posts and a system of travel permits to check Chinese infiltration from Tibet, and also resisted Indian requests to send troops and a mapping mission into Bhutan because of his fear of eventual Indian domination. The length of time Bhutan remains outside Chinese or Indian control willrrobably depend in large part upon the strength of character of the Maharajah's successor. 1 The Crown Prince of Bhutan, about 25 years old, has until recently displayed no great interest in governmental affairs. Since 1950, helms governed a portion of the country and has won much popularity because of his liberalism. He is married to a daughter of Bhutan's capible Foreign Minister, who has been responsible for much of his country's foreign policy. The Crown Prince is Iqualified to succeed his father. However, his ability to oppose foreign pressure is still questionable. I The southern border of Bhutan is less than 50 miles from all major road, rail, and river communications routes connecting the province of Assam directly with the rest of India. SECRET 6 1 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2006/03117 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900010001-2 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website 25X6 25X1 Approved kw Release 2006103/17 : CIA-RDP79TONS6A000900010001-2 SECRET 12. Reported Afghan-Pakistani border raid still unconfirmed: No Afghan or American source in Afghanistan has heard ot the attack alleged by the Pakistani Foreign Secretary to have been made on 24 March by 3,000 Afghans on a Pakistani border post near Chaman, close to the southern Afghan frontier. The Pakistani Charge in Kabul has been informed of the incident by his government but has received no instructions to protest it. 25X1 some sort of conflict between nomadic and settled Afghan tribesmen occurred on or about 23 March, during the course of the nomads' annual migration to the hills of central Afghanistan. The American Embassy in Kabul comments, however, that such incidents are regular occurrences and that they seldom have political signi- 25X1 ficance. 1 I 1 Comment; Neither the Afghan nor the Pakistani press has The Pakistani Foreign taken notice of the alleged raid. Secretary appears to have reported it to the American Embassy as part of a political maneuver to influence American thinking on the Kashmir issue in favor of Pakistan. NEAR EAST - AFRICA 13. Iranian Prime Minister reportedly will remain in otfice: Prime Minister Mossadeq apparently has decided not to resign when the new Majlis meets, according to Minister of Court Mossadeq, in conversation with Ala, spoke as though he Ala. intended to remain in office indefinitely, and indicated that he will abandon efforts to revive Iran's oil industry and concentrate on balancing the national budget without the oil income. 25X1 The Shah has left Tehran for a ten-day rest. According to Ala, the Shah had been counting on Mossadeq's voluntary resignation. 1 Mossadeq's conversation with Ala appears to Comment: foreshadow a serious attempt by the Prime Minister to collect taxes from recalcitrant merchants and landlords. The government, however, may choose to expand the note issue and to use the gold cover to finance its operations. Either move would arouse strong opposition. SECRET 7 1 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900010001-2 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website Approved Rap !Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900010001-2 SECRET Meanwhile, Iran's financial situation is steadily growing for the month worse, and the funds available to the government and wage ending 21 March barely covered government salaries commitments. 14. 25X1 Libya not considering Arab League membership: Libya has time, according no intention of joining the Arab League at this The Minister noted that to the American Minister in Tripoli. opening of Parliament contained the King's speech at the friendly references to other Arab states, but no mention of the When the American Minister commented on this Arab League. omission, the King smilingly said that it was enough to know .one's friends without loining an organization for that purpose. I While there is considerable sentiment among Comment: Libyans generally favoring Arab League membershiP, Libya resents the interference of the League, particularly of Egypt, in its domestic affairs. Since the new Libyan Government recently invited the construction of American military installations in Cyrenaica and expressed interest in joining the proposed Middle East Command, King Idris may consider it more profitable now to strengthen Libya's ties with the West rather than those with the Arab countries. SECRET 1 Apr 8 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00090001000172 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website 52 Approved Faso Release 2006103117 : CIA-RDP797011116A000900010001-2 SECRET WESTERN EUROPE 15. 25X1 1 ' Although Possible Soviet moves in Berlin examined: American officials in Berlin believe thar Ireports of a Russian plan for another Berlin blockade were planted by the USSR as part of a "scare campaign," they anticipate increased harassing in Berlin at the time of West Germany's signing or ratification of the contractual agreements. These officials doubt that the Russians will step up interference in Berlin at the present time, however, par-. ticularly while they are trying to attract West sympathy for their unity and peace proposals. 25X1 1 25X1 25X1 1 Soviet harassing measures in Berlin have Comment: slackened in recent months, although the USSR is still causing some inconvenience by delaying the approval of export permits and by the occasional closing of some canal locks on the routes to Berlin. 25X6 SECRET Approved For Release 2006/03/1? : CIA-RDP79T01146A000/9068f00-2 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website Approved Rig/Release 2006103117 : CIA-RDP79TOnli6A000900010001-2 SECRET 25X6 17 25X1 United Nations investigating commission bolsters Berlin American observers report that the reactions of West morale: Berliners to the recent Berlin visit of the UN commission were characterized by restrained satisfaction and some disThe appearance of the commissioners, whose task appointment. is to investigate the feasibility of free all-German elections, provided a "psychological shot in the arm" for most residents by focusing world attention on the problems of Berlin. Many residents, however, felt let down because the commission did not exert some kind of dramatic pressure on the East German Government to be admitted to its territories. Such pressure would have clearly put that government on the propaganda defensive. I When denied admission to East Germany, the commiss on returned to Geneva. It plans to wait several weeks before reporting to the UN Secretariat -- at least until the Soviet Union has had an opportunity to reply to the 25 March Allied note concerning a German peace treaty and Should the commission file a negative all-German elections. report immediately, it might appear as though the UN were closing the door to Soviet acceptance of the Allied position. Comment: 18. 25X1 Major Communist propaganda effort anticipated in Vienna American officials in Austria conference on child welfare: report direct Soviet participation in the intense propaganda build-up for the Vienna International Conference for the Protection of Children scheduled for 12 to 16 April. As a part of the preparatory campaign, the Soviet Deputy High Commissioner delivered a protest to the American Embassy in Vienna on 25 March regarding the alleged "abduction" of children of Soviet nationality from the US Zone of Austria. Local Communist propaganda links the conference with such current issues as biological warfare and Western rearmament. Invitations have been sent to major United Nations and non-Communist international welfare agencies. The official Soviet organ in Austria boasts that delegates from 45 countries will attend the meeting./ Local preparation for this conference closely Comment: parallels that which preceded the World Peace Conference SECRET Approved For Release 2006/03/1W CIA-RDP79701146A000e0MOR2 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website Approved Faii Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP791-01WA000900010001-2 SECRET last fall. That meeting was also prefaced with an official Soviet denunciation of Austrian remilitarization followed by an elaborate propaganda effort on the part of the Austrian Peace Committee. International meetings called by the WFTU in Vienna are also notable for recent efforts to obtain respectable international participation. 19 Austrian officials complain of Soviet unilateral interThe Austrian Minister of Interior complained at a recent cabinet meeting of the "continued unilateral interference" of Soviet occupying forces in internal Austrian affairs. He cited in particular the obstruction of roads in the vicinity of the Czech border, property requisitions, the harassment of local officials with personal questionnaires, and the interrogation of Austrian citizens at border crossing points. vention: 25X1 I 1 Austrian efforts through publicity to discourage unilateral Soviet intervention in Austrian affairs may give an exaggerated impression as to the number of such episodes. Despite the increased vigor with which the Russians have in recent months pursued their economic and political objectives in Austria, a major shift in Soviet .-ccupation policy has not yet been indicated. Comment: 20. Belgian budgetary deficit interfersag with military production: Although Belgian officials generally believe that their country can balance its ordinary budget, the deficit in its extraordinary, defense budget, which has already caused the government to suspend new commitments, has seriously interfered with the forward production planning of such important military suppliers as Fabrique Nationale and Poudreries Reunies. The Belgian Finance Minister has stated that it is impossible to finance 26 million dollars of the extraordinary budget of 596 million dollars without unblocking Belgium's EPU credits or raising loans above those now contemplated. Although government officials responsible for defense and foreign policy state that NATO commitments must be met, those responsible for financial policy insist that expenditures must not lead to inflation. 1 Comment: It is widely accepted within the Belgian Government that no substantial reduction in budgetary expenditures can be obtained without cutting into military allotments, and SECRET 11 1 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900010001-2 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website 25X1 Approved Fthae lease 2006/03/17 : ClA-RDP79T011440o00900010001 -2 SECRET the Finance Minister has asserted that he will not agree to inflationary measures to meet rearmament needs. The government also has refused to raise taxes. This attitude toward defense is also probably an attempt to obtain sympathetic consideration of Belgium's in the EPU, currently being negotiated, as well as a position favorable reception for its proposal for pre-financing defense production. 21. 25X1 London Embassy comments on Communist BW propaganda campaign: Explaiangthat the impact o/ the Communist BW propaganda campaign in Britain has been "negligible to slight," the American Embassy in London comments that heavy counterpropaganda from Washington would be unnecessary, but not harmful in effect, as far as the United Kingdom is concerned. Pointing out that Foreign Office sources indicate the Communist had a more substantial effect in the Far East campaign has the Embassy recommends that the countercampaignand other areas, be continued, with primary responsibility remaining with Washington. I I 25X1 LATIN AMERICA 25X1 SECRET Approved For Release 2006/0412 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0p0e1018g01-2 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website Approved ForW lease 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP791-0114641,000900010001-2 SECRET 25X1 24. US Embassy suggests military grant aid to Dominican Republic: Since the Dominican Republic has been considered as an alternate for the receipt of military grant aid, the US Embassy in Havana is interested in knowing whether the availability of funds originally allocated for Mexico and possibly other countries will make it possible to grant aid to the Dominican government during the offer current fiscal year. The Embassy has been unofficially informed that Dominican efforts to have the arms production facilities of the country used in the collective defense effort have just been turned down. It feels that this will undoubtedly result in an unfortunate reaction on -the part of the Dominican authori- 25X1 ties which might be largely counteracted if any contem lated military grant aiti offered without delay. SECRET 13 1 Apr 5 2 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-R0P79T01146A000900010001-2 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website 25X1 Approved fa; Release 2006/03/17 : ClA-RDP79T01466A000900010001-2 TOP SECRET 25X1 1 April 1952 CIA No, 49597 Copy No. 4 6 25X1 TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST 25X1 Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/NE. Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete cav2rage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. 25X1 TOP SF.CRET Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : LIA-RU 79101146A000900010001-2 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website 4. Approved cg p Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900010001-2 TOP SECRET TEC NATIONAL THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING MEANING OF THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE 793 AND 794v THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. MANNER TO AN OF WHICH IN ANY TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. NEAR EAST-AFRICA 1. us support: Former Former Iranian Prime Minister seeks approached the American Iranian Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam has should he be named Prime Embassy in Paris seeking US support he.does not want the premiership Minister. Qavam said that the-full confidence unlese he is drafted by the pills and has of the Shah and Parliament. I for Prime Comment: Qavam is the strongest candidatee his advanced Ministe7-754..iside the National Front andv despite He is, howin Iran. agew he is pne of the few able leaders to approve eVer,.distrusted by the Shah; who would be unlikely him except AR last resort. 25X1 ' ' 2. question: Britain and Egypt unable to agree on Sudan their talks in EgYptand Britain have made a little progress Eastv but the Egyptian defense of the Middle on the proposed agreement is possiForeign Minister has reiterated that no real title as King of recognition of Farouk's ble withoui BritiSh the Sudan. "practically an The Foreign Minister issued what was Sudan by 1 April ultimatum" that Britain give its answer on the determine what action in order that Prime Minister Hilali might elections. :Me American he shOuld take in regard to the 18 May official not to intends to advise Ekvot's AmbasSador, however, insist on the 1 April time limit. I TOP SECRET 1 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79701146A000900010001-2 To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website 25X1 4F. Approved For lateagniltr2ROQ0200100001-9 _ SECRET Security Information OCI 4885 1 April 1952 DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN I. Military Operations AMY Scattered patrol clashes and several enemy probes up to platoon size reported across the Eighth were Army:front. Occasional including 26 shells with enemy mortar and artillery fire, propaganda leaflets, was encountered. . Naval air units flew 269 tion targets. Shore bombardment sorties, principally against east coast transportacontinued on both coasts. Air The Far East Air Force flew 313 sorties, ers against the including 26 missions by medium bombChinnampo and west and northeast of Sinanju. Ramhung marshalling yards and traffic choke points In three engagements with 7-86's destroyed six MIG's and damaged two. a total of 40 MO's, 88 One 7-86 sustained minor damage. II, Military Intelligence Air US natal aircraft pilots observed on 27 March that in northeastern an airfield at ChOngjin Korea was being resurfaced with dence of much vehicular traffic a black material. There was eviin the vicinity a hangar framework of the airfield and supplies for were seen in the Chongjin railyard. farther from the front lines (Chongjin airfield,much than Antung, offers little air operations advantage for Communist against UN ground installations. situated for operations against It is, however, strategically UN naval forces operating off This airfield has been northeastern Korea, almost continuously ever been noted there. operational, but little activity Unconfirmed intelligence has North Korean airforce reports have indicated that a unit with some unidentified tioned here.) operational aircraft is sta- SECRET Security Information 1 viz C. T. A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION THIS DOCUMENT. OF Approved For Release 2001108/09 : CIA-RDP91A919 To learn about PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org 271 IBM.i_______48o0a-97> Approved Foetase 2001/08109 : CIA-RDP91T0117200200100001-9 SECRET Security Information III. General Situation Cease-fire South Korean Foreign Minister Pyun, commenting on the cease-fire talks, stated that if the Russians were allowed as a neutral inspection team, "it would be tantamount to.moral defeat. .and succumbing to the USSR." On the question of prisoners of war, Pyun held that no prisoners should be forcibly repatriated. He added that the Chinese Nationalist Government had requested the ROK to, retain custody of those Chinese prisoners who do not wish to return to Red China until such time as they can be transferred to Formosa, . Propaganda Radio pyongyang on 31 March gave an interim report on the alleged US biological warfare effort in Korea. The broadcast charged that from 20 January through 25 March, the US had dropped germ-laden insects on more than 400 occasions The broadcast concluded with a summary of the detailed preventive measures taken in pyongyang, SECRET Security Information 2 Approved For Release 2001/08/09 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000200100001-9 To learn about PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org . . HR70-14 HR70-14 FAR EAST EAST FAR 3. 3. Enemy u n i t s still s t i l l reporting r e p o r t i n g BW BW agents a g e n t s in i n Korea: Korea: An An Enemy units its battalions battalions u n i d e n t i f i ed North N o r t h Korean Korean regiment regiment notified n o t i f i e d its unidentified o n 30 30 March March that t h a t "the " t h e enemy enemy is is actively a c t i v e l y dropping d r o p p i n g bacterial bacterial on ll u n i t s were t o rreport e p o r t promptly weapons i n general g e n e r a l now." now.'( A weapons in All units were to promptly UN biological b i o l o g i c a l warfare w a r f a r e attacks. attacks. A Chinese Chinese Communist Communist, artillery a r t i l l e r y division'reported d i v i s i o n ' r e p o r t e d the the A f o r m a t i o n of of aa five f i v e man man "health 'lhefslth program" program,' committee committee "in " i n an an formation attempt to t o check c h e c k the t h e spread spread of of bacteria." bacteria." attempt P r e v e n t i v e measures measures are are still s t i l l being b e i n g pushed a c t i v e l y in in Preventive pushed actively N o r t h Korea Korea as a8 indicated i n d i c a t e d by by continuing c o n t i n u i n g reports reports of of unit u n i t inocuinocuNorth l a t i o n s . One One Chinese Chinese Communist Communist unit u n i t on on 24 24 March March reported, reported, lations. however, t h a t inoculations i n o c u l a t i o n s have have not n o t been been made and that that a a however, that made and l'grave s i t u a t i o n v 1has has developed developed because because "the " t h e friendly f r i e n d l y troops troops "grave situation" ((probably p r o b a b l y North (some ssort ort o f d isease?).,, North Koreans) Koreans) have have developed developed (some of disease?)." (SUEDE 5 0 1 s t Comm Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, SK-H-1226, SK-H-1226, 30 30 Mar; Mar; K-1813, K-1813, (SUEDE 501st Mar; K-1729, K-1729, 29 29 Mar Mar 52) 52) 26 Mar; 26 4. 4. C h i n e s e Communist Communist unit u n i t helps h e l p s North N o r t h Korean Korean civilians: civilians: Chinese g h t of of aa 27 27 March M arch message message from from the t h e Chinese Chinese Communist Communist The gist 7th A rtillery D i v i s i o n , deployed deployed in i n central c e n t r a l Korea, reveals 7th Artillery Division, Korea, reveals two members of that that u n i t on on 23 23 March " p a r t i c i p a t e d in in t h a t two that members of unit March "participated a n attempt attempt to t o alleviate a l l e v i a t e the t h e sufferings s u f f e r i n g s of of the t h e North Korean an North Korean p e o p l e , who who anaat areat aa loss loss to t o supply s u p p l y themselves themselves w i t h food." foodot' people, with (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, K-1797, K-1797, 30 30 Mar Mar 52) 52) (SUEDE Comment: On On previous p r e v i o u s occasions, o c c a s i o n s , Chinese Chinese Communist Communist Comment: t r o o p s have have assisted a s s i s t e d North North Korean Korean farmers f a r m e r s in i n their t h e i r harvesting. harvesting. troops messages have have indicated indicated However, recent r e c e n t Chinese Chinese Communist Communist messages However, are requisitioned r e q u i s i t i o n e d directly d i r e c t l y from from the the t h a t certain c e r t a i n supplies s u p p l i e s are that North Korean Korean civilian c i v i l i a n population. population. North The d i s t r e s s of of civilians c i v i l i a n s in in Communist-held Communist-held areas areas of of The distress N o r t h Korea Korea is is believed b e l i e v e d to t o be be serious. s e r i o u s . All A l l indications i n d i c a t i o n s point point North i n 1951 1951 and and 1952 1952 and and to t o the t h e ccontinued ontinued t o lower lower grain g r a i n yields y i e l d s in to o v e r the t h e civilian c i v i l i a n economy. economy. p r i o r i t y of priority of military,!:aupply militarysupply over 5.. 5 C o n v e n t i o n a l North N o r t h Korean Korean aircraft a i r c r a f t division d i v i s i o n mentioned: mentioned: Conventional A 29 March message from from aa North North Korean Ko r e a n air a i r unit u n i t near n e a r Pyongyang Pyongyang A March message t o air a i r headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s at a t Sinuiju S i n u i j u mentioned "seed to t o %he LA to mentioned "seed the LA D i v i s i o n . g 1 (SUEDE 1 5 1 15 15 RSM RSM Japan Japan CS CS 397, 397,30 30,Mar .Mar 52) 92) Division." (SUEDE Det Det 151 3 3 2 A p r 52 52 2 Apr TOP SECRET SUEDE APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: APPROVED 18-Mar2010 18-Mar-2010 To learn more about PDF Compression and OCR visit our website ct,yio TOP SECRET SUEDr Comment: The term t e r m "LA "LA Division," Division," named after a f t e r the t..e Comment: Soviet-made c o n v e n t i o n a l fighter f i g h t e r aircraft, a i r c r a f t , has long long Soviet-made LA-9 conventional i d e n t i f i e d with w i t h the t h e North Korean Korean Air A i r Force, Force, although although been identified tthe h e term term has h a s not n o t recently r e c e n t l y been been observed. observed. R Recently, e c e n t l y , however, however, have referred r e f e r r o d to t o numbered numbered divisions: divisions: North Korean messages messages have the MIG-15-equipped 1 s t ; and and the t h e 2nd, 2nd) 3rd, 3 r d , and 10th, l o t h , which M1G-15-equipped 1st; have not n o t been been definitely d e f i n i t e l y identified. i d e n t i f i e d . Probably t h e "LA "'LA have Probably the D Division" i v i s i o n " also also boars bears aa numbered numbered designation. designation. 6 6.. bombers: A North Communist "command lvcommand post" p o s t " hit by UN bombers: Korean message passed Between between two two unlocated units u n i t s on on 27 27 March sstates t a t e s that t h a t the the "Pyongyang "Pyangyang (?) (?) command post was was directly directly hit h i t with w i t h four four one-ten ona-ten bombs....on bombs,...on 25 25 March, March ting t i n g in in tthe h e injury i n j u r y of a number of of persons." p e r s o n s m t g (SUED ( S U E D m 018, 28 Mar Mar 3018, 52) /NM 4 TOP SECRET SUEDE To learn more about PDF Compression and OCR visit our website 2 Apr 52 1 Approved Esa,Release 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T011410A000900050001-8 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION 7 April 1952 US OFFICIALS ONLY OCI no. 5153 Copy No. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. NIN 10 WINES a BECONS State Dept. review completed wmoimaY SECRET ThP 7 CENT& AV1ER NthARCHIVAL RECORD PLEASE ICTIIMI TO SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146AOMMOthinigEs' BLDG. t- I- For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website 77e2 6 WI__ Approved Far Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP791011.46A000900050001-8 SECRET THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS, 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW, GENERAL 1. Committee positions are allotted at the World Economic Conference: THe US Minbassy in Moscow reports that the sessions of the World Economic Conference will be equally divided between plenary meetings and committee meetings. Three committees have been formed: International trade, with Lange as chairman and vice chairmen from Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Communist China and Italy; economic cooperation, with Boyd-Orr as chairman and vice chairmen from the Soviet Union and Pakistan; under-developed areas, with the chairman from India and vice chairmen from France and Italy. British and French delegates are reported to have had private meetings with Chinese Communist delegates. (C Moscow 1587, 3 Apr 52) Comment: The organization of the conference into committees is a concession to non-Communist criticism of conference plans for mass meetings. The committee on international trade, possibly the crux of the whole conference, will be directed by an Orbit chairman and vice chairman. Western Europe is the best represented of the non-Orbit areas on the committees, while the Middle East, Latin America and Southeast Asia have apparently been given no committee positions despite the interest shown in these areas for the conference. This lends support to the various estimates that Western Europe is the primary target of the Soviet Union's economic counteroffensive. The private meetings between French and British and Chinese Communist delegates may be for the purpose of exploring trade possibilities between these countries recently suggested by conference organizers in Moscow. SECRET 1 7 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900050001-8 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website Approved Far Release 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0009000500014 SECRET SOVIET UNION 2. Soviet retail price cuts offset by heavier taxes in The US Embassy in Moscow reports official estimates TUT the people of the Soviet Union will save 28 billion rubles in 1952 because of the reduction in retail prices (C Moscow 1577, 2 Apr 52) effected on 1 April. 1952: Comment: The alleged 28 billion savings is more than cancelled out by increases of 15.1 billion rubles in turnover taxes, 4 billion rubles in direct taxes, and 9.1 billion rubles in compulsory loans , which will amount to at least 28.2 billion rubles. EASTERN EUROPE 3, Finnish Premier regains unanimous support of his party: Finnish Premier Kekkonen has withdrawn his resignation following a unanimous vote of confidence accorded him on 2 April at a meeting of his political party, the Agrarians. The Agrarian Party also fully approved Kekkonen's economic stabilization policy. The US Legation in Helsinki comments that these developments appear to represent a sweeping repudiation of Kekkonen's critics within his own party at least for the time being. (R Helsinki 401, 3 Apr 52) Comment: Well informed observers believed when Kekkonen offered his resignation that it was merely a tactic to bring his party back into line. During recent months the Premier has suffered most criticism from his own party group in the Finnish Diet. SECRET 2 7 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900050001-8 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TOM6A000900050001-8 5!:(111..T FAR EAST There under Chinese direction: Communists not exercises any r y Japanese nese ommun st enceta te according is no ev Japanese Communist Party, direct control over the that the Japanese and Chinese Commuof It is known primarily for the exchange to CINCFE. seeks and maintain liaison, nist Parties indications that the JCP CINCFE and there are propaganda, its policies and prOgrams. approbation of heavily been more values CCP that the JCP has always mainnotes, however, Communist Party, and thatinitTokyo. the Soviet influenced by Soviet representatives tains direct liaison with (S Tokyo 1208, 28 Feb 52) criticism of the Japanese reversal of JCP Comment: The Cominform's 1950, which forced a to the Moscow proComma-FigIn January continuing adherence Sovietcontrol over the JCP. policy, as well as a amply demonstrates paganda line, 1950, nowever, in enjoining indicates Peiping's success in September of the party to unite, the two opposing factions to Chinese influence. that the JCP is responsive 4. 25X1 5. in Korea, reported: orea Preparations for Communist offensive ommun or a Pre ara ions began moving southeast on the Two Chinese Communist armies in east zentral Korea near staging areas additional Four 28 March from according to this report. offensive. Four 39th Parallel, been alerted for the have also are scheduled Chinese armies now in the east coast area corps North Korean to participate. firm indications that Communist Comment: There are nolaunch another major offensive in obintend to forceg-117roirea possible, however, that a limited It is the the near future. undertaken in eastern Korea, where UN jective offensive may be reported preParations, terrain. point of the apparent focal amount of North Korean forces hold a considerable On 6. missioulallovet-ea: cu. au-, obCommunist MIG-15 fliesphoto ITRI-SiNaii-analutn AprITT-W-WITTCYETt' in two mid-wing fuel 2 jet fighter with Communist MIG-15 22,000 feet to 17,000 served a altitude of The MIedived from an tanks. SECRET .3 si 7 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900050001-8 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website 25X1 Approvedjpr Release 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79TOW46A000900050001-8 SECRET another feet over Suwon airbase, then proceeded to Kimpo, jet turned Over Kimpo, the enemy important UN airfield altitude. toward Seoul, where it again dived to a lower 25X1 7. The UNCURK decides to observe South Korean elections: Rehabilitation United Nations Commission for Unification and formal in Korea (UNCURK) decided in late March to conduct25a April and elections scheduled for observation of the local South Korean officials 10 May, according to Ambassador Muccio. intention informally of the Commission's are being notified but no invitation from the ROK is baing requested. the ROK to Muccio comments that it is in the interest of The scrutiny, have its elections held under international Plimsoll, high UN official, and Ambassador credits Cordier, a for this the Australian delegate, with responsibility both (C decision and for putting new life in the Commission. Pusan 966, 4 Apr 52) This UNCURK actiOn is the first result of a concenenTfort to improve the calibre of the UN organization all which, since the outbreak of war, had gradually lost UNCURK to observe the ROK failure to invite effectiveness. UNCURK early 1952 by-election indicated the low ebb of influence. Comment: 8. The Peiping may agree to investigation of its BW charges: impression from Indian Ambassador to Peiping has received the is a "considerable a Chinese Vice Foreign Minister that there possibility" that the Chinese will agree to an impartial intercharges. national investigation of their biological warfare with Peiping's Pannikar expected to discuss this subject Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, on 5 or 7 April. that any The Indian Foreign Office advised Pannikar body should have full freedom to international investigative concerned, investigation in the localities undertake independent (S New Delhi evidence submitted to it. as well as to review 3617, 4 Apr 52) SECRET 7 Apr 52 4 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900050001-8 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website Approvedtpr Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T011216A000900050001-8 ::!ECRET 25X1 9. 25X1 raids" in China: reports on "American germ air newly arrived at Hong Kong from raids alleged American germ air has supplied detalig on the single searchthere on 5 and 8 March. During the alerts, a while antiairlight played in one direction for two hours, all directions. No planes craft batteries fired wildly in were heard or seen on either date. face masks and On 9 March, hundreds of children wearing thousands of equipped with fly swatters and bottles, and For days afterwards, soldiers were led out to collect insects. the police led people on insect hunts. lis convinced that there While\ Chinese believe the were no raids, he states that many (C Hong Kong 2802, 2 Apr 52) Communist BW charges. I I 25X1 The Desperate plight of Americans in China reported: I reports that American Torisrifteneral in Hong Kong lin Shanghai telephoned the G/ that the plight of company's Hong Kong office and declared He was afraid, not so American businessmen was desperate. much of jail, as of. "the other thing." authentic report The Consul General calls attention to an missionary on 7 arrest of an American from Tsingtao of the indicating that the seizure might March under circumstances (C propaganda campaign. be connected with the germ warfare Hong Kong 2791, 3 Apr 52) in China are subjected Comment: All Western businessmen condition for permisfinancial demands as a to exrciFft6Eate are still in sion to leave the country. Over 200 Americans arrest. Communist China, nearly 40 of them under 10. 25X1 1 11. I for Indochina Letourneau considered best man available the French GovernSaigon believes that post:--Mlnister Heath in appointing Minister for ment' made the best possible choice in Commissioner in IndoAssociated Sttes, Jean Letourneau, High has the personal Heath explains that Letourneau china. familar with the qualifications necessary for the post, is of American situation, and has a "friendly understanding" 52) (C Saigon 1935, 4 Apr policy. position as a Since Letourneau retains his Comment: assignment may be member of the Pinay government, his new SECRET 5 7 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900050001-8 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website 25X1 25X1 Approved Ex Release 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP791-01145A000900050001-8 SECRET interpreted as an indication of French determination to push for a solution of the Indochina problem. The important decisions on Indochina policy, however, which will still be made in Paris, aretpt to suffer by his absence from the capital. LetourneaU's appointment is not being received with much enthusiasm in Vietnam. He has a rather low opinion of the ability of the Vietnamese to maintain their independence, is identified in the minds of many Vietnamese with and he French equivocation on the subject of negotiations with the Viet Minh. 12 French plan to reduce training program for Vietnamese recruits: A French defense official informed the American Legation in Saigon that the call-up of the fourth increment of Vietnamese draftees under the two-month training program Lack of money and the need will be postponed indefinitely. to use the camp training cadres in the activation of regular Vietnam Army units were given as the reasons. The Legation considers the French decision evidence that the mobilization program has proved less useful than anticipated and that it was designed principally forrsychological (C Saigon 1931, 4 Apr 52) purposes. This report indicates that the time and effort Comment: expended since the training program started last Octoberdmight have been more advantageously employed if existing irregular units had been transferred into regular army formations. These irregulars number over 200,000. 13 Netherlands condemns Indonesian imprisonment of its Prompted by strong pressure in Parliament, a Dutch 17276-TOtTl5ffice official has asserted that the nationals of no other country in the "free world" have received as bad treatment as the Dutch have in Indonesia. As of last November, 108 Dutchmen were under arrest and awaiting trial, about half of whom had been detained longer than six months. Indonesian Foreign Office promises of information have not been forthcoming. natioHYMT Attributing the situation to an "exaggerated Indonesian conception of its newly won sovereignty," the Dutch official stated that his government prefers not to take reprisals which are allowable under international law. Privately, the SECRET 7 Apr 52 6 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79701146A000900050001-8 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website Approved Cy Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T014146A000900050001-8 SECRET Foreign Office admits that it probably will not submit the problem to the Union Court of Arbitration, hoping that the new Indonesian Government will be more effective in controlling its local authorities, who ordered most of the arrests. (R The Hague 1043, 2 Apr 52) Parliamentary attacks, especially by the rightComment: wing groups, against the passivity of the Dutch Government's policy toward Indbnesia have been increasingly severe. A specific target is expected to be the government's failure to take action against Indonesia for its seizure of Dutch vessels enroute to New Guinea. With the appointment of the Sultan of Jogjakarta as Indonesian Defense Minister, two serious difficulties -- the lack of internal security and the absence of administrative efficiency on a local level -- may be substantially ameliorated. SOUTH ASIA 14. 25X1C Ceylonese Government dissolves parliament and calls immediate electionsfloid Soulbury, Governor General of Ceylon, proclaimed dissolution of parliament effective 8 April 1952 and set new elections for 28 April to 31 May 1952. The new parliament will meet 10 June 1952, The Governor General 25X1C believes that the United National Party now in power will retain its position by holding immediate elections. says that the Akuressa by-elections, in sonthern Ceylon, (S Colombo 558, 3 Apr; R FBIS, 4 Apr 52) will be cancelled. Before the recent death of popular Prime Minister Comment: D. S. Senanayake, the United National Party planned to delay the elections as long as possible so that party forces could By calling parliamentary elections consolidate their position. at once, the party can take advantage of the personal popularity andmemory of the late Prime Minister whose aura now falls about his son, Dudley Senanayake, the new Prime Minister. Also, dissolution of parliament and timely elections may discourage defections from the United National Party and prevent leftist-Communist parties from gaining strength, particularly in Akuressa -- the heart of Communist Party The Akuressa parliamentary seat beenme influence in Ceylon. vacant upon the death on 30 December 1951 of W. P. A. Wickramasinghe, brother of the secretary-general of the Ceylon Communist Party, and a supporter of that party. SECRET 7 7 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900050001-8 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website Approved fa Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01446A000900050001-8 SECRET NEAR EAST - AFRICA The Iranian financial collapse not necessarily imminent: Iranian Government, by resorting al special devices such as indirect loans from the National Bank, floating an internal loan, and transfer of uncommitted foreign exchange, has raised sufficient funds to cover its salary and wage commitments for the last two months of the Iranian year which ended on 20 March and will probably be able to meet its other year-end obligations without unusual difficulty. 15. The Ministry of Finance is considering expansion of the note issue and use of the gold note cover reserve. The American Embassy believes that Prime Minister Mossadeq might be able to persuade the Majlis to dilute the currency on the basis of "patriotic expediency." Even without such Majlis action, the Embassy believes it possible that the government could carry on financially through May 1952. (C Tehran 3636, 24 Mar 52) In order to meet current financial obligations, has improvised successfully for months. It would be difficult to estimate the length of time it could continue to function by reducing the government payroll and facilities. However, the increasing financial and economic deterioration has forced the government to consider the unpopular step of debasing the currency. The new Majlis, with its strong National Front representation, might be amenable to taking such a step as the only means of maintaining Iran's freedom, Comment: the IniTrii Government Egyptian King may be planning new government under present The Egyptian Minister of Interior has ra strong implication" that he and King Farouk are planning the Minister's accession to 16. Minis-fol.-MTinterior: 25X1C givenl power. The Minister, Maraghi Bey, apparently expects the resignation of Hilali, the postponement of elections, his own accession to power on the basis of a strong program for social reform, and, should the Anglo-Egyptian dispute still not be settled, an ultimatum from Farouk giving the British 60 to 90 days to satisfy national aspirations. Should these not be 'concludes that "a national struggle 25X1C satisfied, I would begin upder Maraghi's direction." 1 25X1A SECRET 8 7 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900050001-8 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website 25X1A Approved For Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP791111146A000900050001-13 SECRET that the possible This is the first indication be followed by Comment: government might resignation of the Hilali Maraghi is considered chaos. something other than general able and ambitious. "absolutely untrue" by There have been rumors, termed Farouk is not fully Cabinet, that rumors is the Chief of the Royal Lending some credence to these Hilali. to take supporting resisted royal pressure a report that Hilali has King's friends who are notoriously into his cabinet two of the corrupt. 17. 25X1 elections likely to be postponed: Egyptian parliamentary that the Egyptian'parliawill King,FaTiouk has stated categorically to take place on 18 Ma now scheduled mentary elections, rot be held! previous indications that Comment: There have been date. Farouk would postpone the 18 May election 18 19. in Sudan: British Governor General Egypt denounces action ofhas the British Governor denounced The Egyptian Foreign Minister constitution to submitting a new General in the Sudan for considered The Foreign Minister, who breaking off the Legislative Assembly. seriously contemplated the act "provocative," British Ambassador. talks with the censorseverely limited by its Egyptian newspapers, though imperBritain of extending ship, have unanimously accused from Egypt. separate the Sudan ialisn and of a new move to 1728, 4 Apr 52) 3 Apr; C Cairo (S Cairo 1718, does not lead If the Governor General's action Anglo-Egyptian Comment: current preliminary to a complete breakdown in harden the Hilali government talks, it will at least certainly Sudan and Suez issues. against making concessions on the in talks with Egypt: British see less promising outlook conversation between the Egyptian The results of the 1 April Ambassador make the prospect Foreign Minister and the Britishto the British Foreign Office. for agreement look less bright to a formula that would not The Foreign Office is agreeable Egypt to participate in a specifically and publicly commit objects to the Egyptian regional defense arrangement, but SECRET 9 7 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900050001-8 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website 25X1 ApproveWr Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TOW46A000900050001-13 SECRET the removal of all British phrasing, which would necessitate military units from Egypt. if Britain and Egypt Office hopes that The British Foreign statement as a basis for negotiations, can agree on a joint will agree to call offthe elections the the Egyptian Prime Minister constitution in order to conduct stands and perhaPs suspend the As the situation negotiations in a calm atmosphere. feel that Hilali could not win now, Foreign Office officials agreement would become useless. the elections, and a negotiated 2 and 4 Apr 52) (S London 4384 and 4450, of the British Foreign Officein Comment: The willingness promise of Egyptian participation not tinnWitcm a public East is a concession from the position the defense of the Middle 13 March, according to which taken by the British Cabinet on only in exchange for British combat troops would be withdrawn to regard the estabBritain still seems strategic necessity. such a commitment. air defenses in Egypt as a lishment of joint 20 face severe criticism Turkish Republican Party leaderse ur is epu ican arty, ongress o e from mem ers p: 26 March to 30 March and founded by Kemal Ataturk, met from and administration. strongly criticized the party's program emerging as the strongest and Former Prime Minister Gunaltay, the Republican leaders, directlyand most popular figure among organizational failures attacked the Secretary-General's President-General Inonu's leadership. less openly criticized that the Republican leaderThe American Embassy believes for the 1954 hold the party together at that ship will attempt to Failure to make a better showing general elections. unlikely that would make it time than in the 1950 elections present form. (C Ankara 995, the party could continue in its 1 Apr 52) PartY's continued popularity ranks over Comment: The Democratic in the Republican Party's effort has en-FM-fed dissensionadopted latter in its by the the proper policy to be Party's traditional The Republican to return to power. Erim and Kasim Gulek, have been leaders, such as Inonu, Nihat more liberal group increasingly criticized by the younger, Despite the recent resignations led by GunaltaY and Cavid Oral. who protested the "chief of several Republican deputies there is no evidence that mentality" of Inonu and his group, groups is yet great enough to the dissension between the two party. bring about dissolution of the SECRET .A17 52 Appro vedForRelease200V05/20 1?CIA-RDP79T01146A000900050700 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website Approved gar Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900050001-8 SECRET WESTERN EUROPE 21. Anti-Communist French labor campaign suffers setback: A "severe blow" may be dealt efforts toward collaboratiob among the principal non-Communist French labor organizations by a sharp split in the leadership of the rightist Independent Labor A failure to mend this split would benefit Confederation. considerably the Communist-led General Labor Confederation. The moderate majority of the Independent Labor Confederntion's executive committee recently defied an attempt by the minority and the organization's principal financial backer to (S Paris 6055, place ex-Vichyites in certain top positions. 3 Apr 52) Comment: The Independent Labor Confederation seeks an inter-confederal grouping of non-Communist labor representatives. The present leaders of Force Ouvriere, one of the two principal non-Communist labor organizations in France, would be excluded because of their unaggressiveness and deep distrust of the Catholic Labor Confederation. 22. Gaullists no longer considered a French opposition party: The Gaullists can no longer be considered part of the parliamentary opposition to the Pinay government, in the opinion of The Embassy sees in the strong the American Embassy in Paris. Gaullist support for Pinny's budgetary program evidence that the RPF is badly divided and that its leaders are afra.id to (C Paris 6089, call for opposition tactics at this time. 0 Apr 52) In the past De Gaulle's strategy has permitted Comment: his followers to support the government on specific measures consonant with his own program. While De Gaulle is probably wary of running counter to public opinion, in view of the current interest in giving Pinay a chance, it is unlikely that he has modified to any degree his basic opposition to cooperation with "the parties." 23. French leadership in agricultural pool planning weakened: The Pinay governmenT-Eis greatly weakened France's leadership in the planning for a European agricultural pool by supporting the position of the French National Management Association, which opposes the "green pool" because it would destroy the SECRET Approved For Release 2002/05h6 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0009000114?-52 8 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website Approved far Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01.446A000900050001-8 SECRET association's exploitation of cartels based on restricted The future French position will depend upon farm markets. leaders' ability to consolidate forces and overcome this political opposition. A high French Government official predicts that the plenary "green pool" session, now due to open about 23 April, of will end without decision, but will appoint a committee and make recommendations, as was experts to study problems (C Paris done in the preliminary stages of the Schuman Plan. 6081, 3 Apr 52) alleged that Comment: Non-Communist labor leaders have himself, opposes all current Pinay, a conservative businessman His such as the agricultural pool. long-range economic plans government, moreover, has the support of deputies repreSenting conservative rural elements, apt to reflect the narrow qpinions of many French farmers rather than farm organizations which fully appreciate the advantages of agricultural integration. 24 Netherlands regards continuance of European Payments Union essential: The Dutch Government considers the European Payments Union essential for the preservation and expansion of intra-European multilateral trade, which it holds is a necessary basis for rearmament and for maintaining a standard of living high enough to resist further Communist inroads. The possibility is of a return to bilateralism and quantitative restrictions considered real in view of the present low level of western European gold reserves. The functioning of the EPU indicates that its reserves within the existing quota system are inadequate, and the Netherlands regards these reserves, which provide for swings in creditor-debtor positions, as the key to the importance of the Payments Union, The Dutch feel that each EPU member should contribute a fair share toward the proposed additional reserves (C The Hague TOMUS 184, 1 Apr 52) of 178 million dollars. 25. American Embassy believes Irish budget proposals may precipitate general election: The American Embassy in Dublin believes thate is a strong possibility of an early general election in Ireland because of widespread hostile reaction been to price increases provided for in the budget which has To fill a 42-million-dollar gap presented to Parliament. between estimated revenues and expenditures, the government SECRET 7 Apr 52 12 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900050001-8 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website Approved Ear Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01446A000900050001-8 SECRET has proposed higher taxes, lower subsidies on bread and flour, and the elimination of subsidies on tea, sugar, and butter. (R Dublin 153, 3 Apr 52) Comment: So long as the De Valera government has to depenfliZE-the support of five independents to maintain its parliamentary majority, there is the prospect of a general election; but there is no indication of any clear-cut policy differences between the two major parties. The presentation of the "harshest budget in the history of the state" follows conferences in London between Irish and British Treasury officials on the necessity for improving the sterling area's financial position. The Irish Government, evidently impressed by the seriousness of the country's balance of payments deficit last year, which was equivalent to 185 million dollars, has announced its intentions of also reducing non-sterling imports. The Opposition, on the other hand, has maintained consistently that there is no economic crisis, but has made no clear statement of its own financial policy for Ireland. 26 Norway insists on maintaining trade with Orbit: Officials of the Norwegian Foreign Office and Ministry of Commerce insist upon importing 275,000 metric tons of coal from Poland rather than increasing coal shipments from the United States. While Norway could finance increased imports of American coal in 1952, the government argues that it cannot afford to use dollars indefinitely to meet its coal deficit, particularly in view of the uncertainty of US economic aid and its limited extent. Norwegian officials believe that if they fail to reach an agreement with Poland now it will be difficult to reopen negotiations later. (S Oslo 865, 2 Apr 52) Comment: Like Denmark, Norway hesitates for both political and economic reasons to sever trade relations with eastern Europe. Norwegian officials are currently willing to pay for the Polish coal with 750 tons of aluminum. 27. Swedish Defense Minister proposes extended training period: Swedish Defense MInister gilsson has proposed that the period of conscription be extended from 10 to 13 months. Noncommissioned officers, officers, and those assigned to special duty, would receive further instruction. (U FBIS, Stockholm, 2 Apr 52) SECRET 13 7 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900050001-8 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website Approved Ear Release 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79TODK6A000900050001-8 SECRET Comment: As part of its postwar demobilization program, Sweden in 1g48 reduced the period of compulsory military service Subsequently the increasingly precarious from 12 to 9 months. international scene stimulated a demand for more extensive training and a token increase of one month was made in 1951. The American Army Attache, however, considers an extension to 18 months as the minimum need of the Swedish Army. LATIN AMERICA 28. Bolivian President appeals to President Truman on tin President Ballivian has sent a personal letter to issue: President Truman asking his aid in obtaining a "remunerative" price for Bolivian tin. The letter, friendly in tone, stressed Bolivia's urgent need for a prompt solution of differences impeding US-Bolivian negotiations. Ballivian's action indicates that the junta is approaching Further unproductive sessions between the end of its patience. the negotiators can "break the camel's back," and result in a wave of anti-US sentiment not only in Bolivia, but throughout (R La Paz Joint Weeka 13, 28 Mar 52) Latin America. Negotiations for a long-term US-Bolivian tin Comment: contract have extended over a year, and the junta apparently believes that Bolivia's strained political and economic situation would not support another prolonged delay. Thus far there is no evidence that Bolivia has prepared to renew its campaign to mobilize Latin American support for charging the United States with "economic aggression" under article 16 of the Organization of American States. The Bolivian Foreign Minister stated in March that his country would consider taking the case before international organizations only if the subsequent decision on the tin price should be unfavorable. 29. Leftist opposition parties in Mexico sign campaign pact: The Popular Party, the Federation of People's Parties, and the Party of the Revolution have signed a pact to draft a "minimum political platform for the present electoral campaign." Once this has been approved by these three Mexican parties, they will discuss the formulation of a list of congressional candidates to be given joint support in the coming elections. PHIS Radio, Mexico, 31 Mar 52) (R SECRET 7 Apr 14 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900050001-8 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website 52 Approve Wr Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01446A000900050001-8 SECRET the possibility of The reputed "pact" suggests the pro-Communist supporters of a worY51(Wrangement between opportunistic General Lombardo Toledano and those of the of People's Parties includes Henriquez Guzman, whose Federation Should the working agreement both leftists and conservatives. able to elect a few materialize, extreme leftists may be coalition is unlikely to the congressional deputies. However, of the administration party political dominance threaten the Institutions) which will undoubtedly (the Party of Revolutionary and whose presidential win most of the congressional seats is virtually certain to be candidate, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, elected. Comment: SECRET 15 7 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900050001-8 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website Approved ur Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01,46A000900050001-8 TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION 7 April 1952 US OFFICIALS ONLY CIA No. 49606 Copy No. 4E TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST (including S/S Cables) Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/NE. Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY prepared primarily reports has been This summarY of significant Intelligence. It does for the internal use of the Office of Current of all current reports in CIA not represent a complete coverage Comments represent the or in the Office of Current Intelligence. immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900050001-8 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website Approved,Ur Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T014.46A000900050001-8 TOP SECRET THE NATIONAL pus MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING MEANING OF THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE 794, THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND TO AN TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. FAR EAST 1. status of Japanese official reiterates views on futureTreaties In the opinion of the Soviet Mission in Tokyo: Japanese Foreign Office, any attempt by Bureau Chief of the occupying power, the Soviet Union to remain in Japan as an would be contrary after the peace treaty becomes effective, Headquarters to the 1945 Moscow Agreement which named SCAP The official also as the sole organ of occupation control. of SCAP would that the dissolution told a Diet committee for remaining in leave the 3oviet Mission no legal basis unable to force its views Japan. Admitting that Japan was of armistice beon the USSR, he contended that the state (R S/S Tokyo 2107, tween Japan and the USSR will continue. 4 Apr 52) Peace Treaty Comment: The provision in the Japanese of the members of the requiFTERFiltification by a majority USSR or designed to prevent the Far Eastern Commission was the position of any other FEC member nation from inheriting SCAP. if no The Japanese Government on 16 March indicated that date of allied decision were forthcoming by the effective Mission the peace treaty regarding the status of the Soviet personnel would treat the Soviet in Japan, the government status. as ordinary foreign nationals without diplomatic 2. United States urges Japan to modify its position in The Department of the Sino-Japanese peace negotiations: American Political Adviser in Tokyo State has requested the Government that its proposals at to inform the Japanese with the Sino-Japanese peace negotiations are inconsistent letter the commitments expressed in Yoshida's 24 December The Department points out that the Japanese to Dulles. conformity with the are committed to negotiate a treaty "in TOP SECRET 1 7 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900050001-8 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website Approved e2y Release 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01446A000900050001-8 TOP SECRET principles set out in the multilateral treaty of peace," and, in the view of the United States, the Japanese Government should not attempt to exclude mention of these principles, including that of Japan's obligation to pay reparations. (S S/S to 1nkyo 2646, 3 Apr 52) Negotiations at Taipei are stalemated due to Comment: JapanTrEETUMpt to conclude a treaty which would not extend "victor" status to the Chinese. China, for reasons of presthis tige and its international legal status, cannot accept limitation. 3. Japanese to propose simplified treaty with Chinese In an attempt to resolve the impasse in the Nationalists: Sino-Japanese treaty negotiations, Japan will propose that maincertain controversial matters pertaining to the Chinese This under negotiation. land be dropped from the treaty now will permit an immediate resumption of full diplomatic relations between Japan and Formosa, leaving controversial substantive matters to be left for subsequent separate negotia(S S/S Tokyo 2123, 4 Apr 52) ion. It is noted that the Japanese have proposed Comment: a similar technique in their negotiations with the Republic of Korea. The Japanese undoubtedly feel that their bargaining position vis-a-vis their former colonies will be considerably strengthened after Japan regains its sovereignty. The Chinese however, hoping for United States assistance, are likely to hold out for whatever concessions can be gained during the current negotiations. 4. Japanese urging Koreans to conclude limited treaty: The Japanese are pressing the Koreans to conclude agreements on only three of the five issues currently under negotiation: amity and basic "relations," the nationality of Korean residents in Japan and the transfer of vessels, according to Acting US Political Adviser Bond in Tokyo. Fisheries and claims would be deferred pending further "fact finding." Wording of the documents covering the first three issues is substantially agreed upon and thus the Koreans are maneuvered into a corner as a result of the imminence of Japanese sovereigntY,which may force them to accept Japanese Bond believes Japanese appreciation of this situproposals. ation accounts for continued Japanese optimism on the out(C Tokyo 2118, 4 Apr 52) come of negotiations. TOP SECRET 7 Apr 52 2 Approved For Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900050001-8 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01446A000900050001-8 TOP SECRET sensitive to any slight The South Koreans, remain particularly touch), relations, While in thriTigternational of Japanese superiority. manifestation any that the South as regards a remote possibility outmaneuvered by the not probable, it is enraged at being the negotiations. Government, Korean indefinitely from Japanese, might withdraw Comment: WESTERN EUROPE 50 overnment is r e inaL2E9492.111),LnaltarpWr-n---lentonairfields in Eng an : agreement for used_y_xisaLl_orces Eil-aigglited a new an more comprehensive in England for the of airfields financing the construction In an endeavor to maintain force. use of the American air partnership and to maximize dollar desire a "rephasing" the concept of USAF-RAF 1953, the British receipts in 1952 andparticipation the program. in of their financial Britain was to share to be Under the present agreements 1951 slice, and the US was equally in the cost of the cost of the 1952 slice. These, responsible for the entire 1953 program, may reach the together with the proposed dollars, but no payments have yet equivalent of 280 millionhave now offered in effect to pay 49 been made. The Britilh to a total contribution of of all costs up S London 4372, 20 percent (TS London 4234, 25 Mar:, million dollars. 1 Apr 52) represents a distinct policy Comment; This offer British suggestions that the United change from two previous capital cost as well as responsiThe States assume the whole of the airfields. bility for the subsequent maintenance to contribute the UK might agree method American Embassy believes of the total cost, provided a as much as 25 percentmaximize British dollar receiPts in can be worked out to 1952 and 1953. . . TOP SECRET 3 7 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900050001-8 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79701146A000900050001-8 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79701146A000900050001-8 For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website 1 i FAR EAST Front F r o n t line l i n e Chinese Communist division d i v i s i o n prepares p r e p a r e s for f o r action action in Korea: A rrecent e c e n t message, message, passed-from p a s s e d from the t h e 21st 2lst i n eastern e a s t e r n Korea: Chinese its parent p a r e n t 7th 7th C h i n e s e Communist COmmunist Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment Regiment to t o its Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division, D i v i s i o n , indicated i n d i c a t e d that t h a t the t h e 21st 2 1 s t had had been attached attached to t o the t h e artillery a r t i l l e r y group of the t h e 203rd 303rd Chinese Communist Infantry Infantry D i v i s i o n in i n eastern e a s t e r n Korea. Korea. The message I n d i c a t e d that t h a t the the Division message indicated rregiment e g i m e n t was moving forward f o r w a r d together together w with i t h the t h e mortar mortar and artillery a r t i l l e r y elements e l e m e n t s of of the t h e 203rd's 2 0 3 r d ' s artillery a r t i l l e r y group. g r o u p . The forward forward d i s p l a c e m e n t of of the t h e command command post p o s t of of the t h e 203rd D i v i s i o n was displacement Division aalso l s o suggested. suggested. 5 5.. The F a r East E a s t Command stated s t a t e d that t h a t "the " t h e placing p l a c i n g of Far of a ccomplete o m p l e t e CCF CCF artillery a r t i l l e r y regiment r e g i m e n t of of an an independent independent artillery artillery division of an an infantry i n f a n t r y division d i v i s i o n suggests s u g g e s t s that that d i v i s i o n under u n d e r control c o n t r o l of t h e latter lat.ter di*ision d i v i s i o n may be be assigned a s s i g n e d aa task task where the t h e utilizautilizathe c o n t r o l of of a a large l a r g e amount amount of a r t i l l e r y is is ttion i o n and and complete complete control of artillery required." r e q u i r e d . " (SUEDE (SUEDE CINCFE, CINCFE, SIB SIB 477, 477, 88 Apr Apr 52) 52) Comment: The 68th Army, of of which the the Comment: 6 8 t h Chinese Communist Army, 203rd Divr-sion D i v i s i o n is is aa component, component, ooccupies c c u p i e s tthe h e eeastern-most astern-most p o r t i o n of portion of the t h e Chinese-held Chinese-held front. f r o n t . Recent r e p o r t s have have indiindiRecent reports ccated a t e d that it i t was was about a b o u t to t o be relieved r e l i e v e d by a sister sister army--the army--the 67th--which has deployed deployed into i n t o this t h i s sector. sector. 67th--which has While this t h i s activity a c t i v i t y cannot c a n n o t be be interpreted i n t e r p r e t e d definitively, definitively, While of recent r e c e n t reports r e p o r t s have have indicated i n d i c a t e d an a n impending impending a flurry of i n f o r m a t i o n suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t such such ""offensive." o f f e n s i v e . 1 1 The bulk b u l k of information place in i n the t h e eastern e a s t e r n sector. sector. aaction c t i o n would take t a k e place T h e r e continues c o n t i n u e s to t o be a lack l a c k of of firm f i r m indication i n d i c a t i o n of of There Communist intentions i n t e n t i o n s to t o launch l a u n c h a "general " g e n e r a l offensive" o f f e n s i v e " along along I t is eentirely n t i r e l y possible, p o s s i b l e , however, however, that that t h e entire e n t i r e front. f r o n t . It the a limited l i m i t e d objective o b j e c t i v e offensive o f C e n s i v e of some some size s i z e might be launched launched in In eastern e a s t e r n Korea Korea by by Chinese Chinese and and North North Korean Korean forces. forces. 6.. 0 , , Chinese Communist 40th_Army 40th.Army may may be be preparing p r e p a r i n g for f o r combat: combat: A recent r e c e n t message, message, probably p r o b a b l y passed p a s s e d on the t h e 2nd 2nd Chinese Chi n e s e ComComm u n i s t Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division's.net, D i v i s i o n ' s , n e t , reported r e p o r t e d that t h a t "today " t o d a y personpersonmunist nel t h e artillery a r t i l l e r y unit u n i t of of the t h e 40th 4 0 t h Army A r m y arrived a r r i v e d (and (and n e l of the i n s p e c t e d ? ) my battalion. b a t t a l i o n . They were introduCed i n t r o d u c e d to to u s by the the inspected?) us 115th 1 1 5 t h Division." Division The Far F a r East E a s t Command commented that t h a t an inspection i n s p e c t i o n of aan n aartillery rtillery u unit, n i t , currently c u r r e n t l y in i n ssupport u p p o r t of the the 3 39th 9 t h Chinese ' 4 1 0 Apr 10 AOr 52 TOP SECRET SUEDE ~ P P R O V E DFOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: 1 1 8-Mar-201 0 8-Mar-2010 1PPROVED I I To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org elb m=-w. 5"..54r-r mir Communist Army, Army, by by another a n o t h e r major unit--the u n i t - - t h e 40th 4 0 t h Army--may Army--may iindicate n d i c a t e an an impending impending relief r e l i e f of of the t h e 39th. 3 9 t h . More ominously, ominously, tthe h e ssuggested uggested p r e s e n c e of of the t h e 40th 4 0 t h Army in i n the t h e immediate rear rear presence of of the t h e 39th, 3 9 t h , poses p o s e s aa considerable c o n s i d e r a b l e offensive o f f e n s i v e threat t h r e a t in i n this this ssector., e c t o r . , (SUEDE (SUEDE CINCFE, CINCFE, SIB SIB 478, 478, 99 Apr Apr 52) 52) Comment: A number of of reports r e p o r t s have recently r e c e n t l y been rreceived eceived Comment: A Communist general general iindicating n d i c a t i n g the the p o s s i b i l i t y Of bf a:renewed a.*renewed Communist possibility offensive. pointed t o the t h e eastern eastern o f f e n s i v e . The bulk b u l k of of them have p o i n t e d to sector sector as as the t h e focus f o c u s for f o r such s u c h an an operation. operation. T This h i s is i s the t h e first first i n d i c a t i o n received r e c e i v e d of a significant indication s i g n i f i c a n t strengthening s t r e n g t h e n i n g of enemy forces deployed d e p l o y e d in i n the t h e west. west. 7 7. - _. I n f o r m a t i o n program D r o f z r a m on, on atom o n d u c t e d bv Information atom bomb bomb Drobablv probably by " cconducted Chinese Communists in Chinese-Communists i n Korea: Korea': On 4 April A p r i l aa message I I I directs d i r e c t s that t h a t "should " s h o u l d Army Army ddistribute i s t r i b u t e any material m a t e r i a l that t h a t has h a s the t h e powers of of the t h e atom bomb, bomb. notify uss to piCk them u up May be iimmediately mmediately n t o pick p - so s o that t h a t they t h e y may btify u rreturned e t u r n e d to t o the t h e education e d u c a t i o n unit." unit." (SUEDE Comm Recon (SUEDE 501st Comm - v r I r-- - Apr 52) 4 qpr 52) I t is i s pprobable r o b a b l e that t h a t this t h i s message message refers r e f e r s to to Comment: It Comment: i l l be be lliteriTUFF-irid i t e r a t u r e and propaganda propaganda on on atomic atomic weapons weapons which which w will t o educate e d u c a t e Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Communist troops t r o o p s in i n Korea. Korea. u s e d to used IIt t is n o t e w o r t h y that that a C h i n e s e Communist noteworthy Chinese Communist propaganda bbroadcast r o a d c a s t on o n 30 30 March charged c h a r g e d that t h a t since s i n c e the the U n i t e d States States United a l l e g e d l y tested t e s t e d BW and.CW and CW agents a g e n t s in i n Korea, Korea, the t h e use u s e of hhas a s allegedly atomic weapons would would be be aa logical l o g i c a l step. step. 8. 8. C h i n e s e Communists believed b e l i e v e d training t r a i n i n g 2,500 2 , 5 0 0 pilots p i l o t s aa Chinese year:,An Air Force F o r c e analysis a n a l y s i s of of intelligence i n t e l l i g e n c e relating r e l a t i n g to t o the %Tie trainlng r a n An tag of o f Chinese C h i n e s e pilots indicates i n d i c a t e s that t h a t there t h e r e were were 2,800 2,800 g r a d u a t e d pilots p i l o t s in i n the t h e Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Communist Air A i r Force F o r c e as as of of graduated 1 a n u a r y 1952, 1932, and the t h e training t r a i n i n g effort e f f o r t in i n China should should 1 JJanuary produce 2 , 5 0 0 pilots p i l o t s annually. annually. p r o d u c e 2,500 The number of of aircraft a i r c r a f t employed in i n primary, primary, basic b a s i c and are 93, 9 3 , 63 63 and 44, 44, respectively. respectively. advanced stages s t a g e s of of training t r a i n i n g are r e l a t i v e l y small s m a l l number number of of advanced advanced trainers t r a i n e r s suggests suggests The relatively some of this t h i s training t r a i n i n g is is done,in d o n e . i n the t h e Soviet S o v i e t Union, Union, or or tthat h a t some t h a t part p a r t of of the t h e conventional c o n v e n t i o n a l fighter f i g h t e r regiments r e g i m e n t s of the t h e CCAF CCAF that are are actually a c t u a l l y advanced advanced training t r a i n i n g units. units. (SUEDE US A i r ' Force (SUEDE US Air'Force SRTS SRTS Cont 2-30803, 2-30803, 44 Apr Apr 52) 52) 55 TOP SECRET SUEDE To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org 52 10 Apr 52 IS of Communist Communist a air Comment: i r sschools c h o o l s and Comment: Expansion of has been pronounced pronounced iin six n tthe h e ' ppast a s t six ttraining r a i n h g activity activity h a s been months. However, However, recent months. r e c e n t performance in i n the t h e Korean air a i r war war of MIG15 MIG-15 pilots of p i l o t s believed b e l i e v e d to t o be be Chinese Chinese shows shows that t h a t they t h e y are are less pproficient less r o f i c i e n t than t h a n Russian R u s s i a n pilots. pilots. 9.. 9 Message refers r e f e r s to t o unknown Sino-Soviet S i n o - S o v i e t ,enterprige e n t e r p r i s e in in Manchuria: AA message from Moscow to t o Mukden rreferred e f e r r e d to to a shipment of goods sent s e n t to t o the t h e "Daldok "Daldok works" works" on a contract contract with cconcluded oncluded w i t h the t h e "Sino-Soviet "Sino-Soviet Shipbuilding S h i p b u i l d i n g Joint J o i n t Stock Stock (SUEDE APSA-261 APSA-261 Weekly Intelligence Company." (SUEDE I n t e l l i g e n c e Notes 14-52, 14-52, Company." 2 Apr 52) 52) Comment: Nothing is known of Comment: of this "Sino-Soviet "Sino-Soviet ShipShipbuilding Joint Joi'nt Stock S t o c k Company." Company." The only o n l y large large shipyard s h i p y a r d in in Manchuria is is Daldok Daldok in i n Dairen, D a i r e n , which which was was aa Sino-Soviet Sino-Soviet trust trust until u n t i l early e a r l y 1951 1961 when when it i t was was returned r e t u r n e d to t o full f u l l Chinese Chinese ownerownerC h i n e s e Changchun Changchun Railway R a i l w a y is is the t h e only o n l y other o t h e r SinoSinosship. h i p . The Chinese Soviet S o v i e t economic economic organization o r g a n i z a t i o n presently p r e s e n t l y identified i d e n t i f i e d in i n Manchuria. 10. 10. C h i n e s e Communists Communists change change weather w e a t h e r cipher: c i p h e r : On 11 April A p r i l the the Chinese Chinese used by by tthe t h e ccipher i p h e r used h e PPeiping eiping C h i n e s e Communists Communists changed changed -the ccollective o l l e c t i v e weather w e a t h e r broadcasts. broadcasts. A p r e l i m i n a r y study s t u d y of of the the preliminary alteration larger supply s u p p l y of of cipher c i p h e r books books has has a l t e r a t i o n indicates i n d i c a t e s that t h a t aa larger been distributed. d i s t r i b u t e d . This T h i s increase i n c r e a s e was was necessitated, n e c e s s i t a t e d , in i n part, part, by the t o be by t h e establishment e s t a b l i s h m e n t of of new new stations. s t a t i o n s . Changes Chahges were were to expected, e x p e c t e d , since s i n c e they t h e y previously p r e v i o u s l y occurred o c c u r r e d in i n April A p r i l and and September September 1951. 1951. (SUEDE AFSA-271 WIB 15-52, 15-52, 11 Apr Apr 52) 52) Comment: Comment: Changes in i n major major Chinese Chinese meteorological m e t e o r o l o g i c a l ciphers ciphers were were reported r e p o r t e d in i n November November 1950 1950 prior p r i o r to t o Chinese Chinese entry e n t r y into into the t h e Korean war, war, and and in i n April A p r i l 1951 1951 prior p r i o r to t o the t h e Communist Communist spring s p r i n g offensive. offensive. 6 6 TOP SECRET SUEDE To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org 10 10 Apr A p r 52 52 HR70-14 HR70-14 A Te/P SECRET SUEDhNR I I 5.. 5 Unidentified U n i d e n t i f i e d Chinese Chinese artillery a r t , i l l e r y unit u n i t in i n Korea awaits orders: o r d e r s : On 6 April Ap r i l an a n unidentified u n i d e n t i f i ed Chinese Chi n e s e Communist artillery artillery m n Korea Korea was was ordered o r d e r e d to t o report r e p o r t daily d a i l y on the t h e enemy situsituunit in aation t i o n and b a t t l e rresults, e s u l t s , "to "to dispatch d i s p a t c h a crew o sselect e l e c t new battle crew tto positions t o prevent prevent p o s i t i o n s and and then t h e n proceed with w i t h the t h e camouflage to d e t e c t i o n .I1 The message-concluded message .concluded with w i t h "after " a f t e r discussions discussions detection." are completed completed a att our pplace l a c e rrentive e l l t i v e to t o your your situation, s i t u a t i o n , we we shall s h a l l advise a d v i s e you you by by wire w i r e of of our o u r decision." d e c i s i o n . 1 1 (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 501st Comm Korea, K-2244, K-2244, 16 16 Apr Apr 52) 52) Comm Recon Grp Grp Korea, Comment: T h i s is is another a n o t h e r of the t h e many recent r e c e n t intercepted intercepted Comment: This ChinelITTUERunist Chinese Communist messages which have indicated i n d i c a t e d an a n eexpectancy xpectancy of imminent change. Its n nature a t u r e remains unidentified. unidentified. of change. Its 6. 6. BW drop: drop: An An unidenunidenNorth Korean Korean' unit u n i t reports r e p o r t s suspected s u s p e c t e d BW tified Ko r e a n unit u n i t in i n the t h e WonsanWonsan area rreported e p o r t e d on 14 14 t i f i e d North North Korean A p r i l that t h a t "enemy planes" p l a n e s 1 *dropped flour f l o u r mixed w i t h arsenic. arsenic. April with statement conCluded concluded that t h a t "we "we are are not n o t sure s u r e whether it i t is is The statement the t h e bacterial b a c t e r i a l weapon or or not." not." (SUEDE 0 1 s t Comm Recon Grp (SUEDE 5 501st Korea, SK,201422, SK-201622, 15 15 Apr Apr 52). 52) Comment: This T h i s is is the t h e first f i r s t enemy report r e p o r t of of a a suspected suspected d r o p h e past p a s t three t h r e e or or Aore i o r e weeks. weeks. It BW driTrIE-The I t is possible p o s s i b l e that that t h i s report r e p o r t might revive r e v i v e the t h e lagging l a g g i n g BW BW campaign in i n Korea, but this Korea, but iit t ~ seems e e m smore likely l i k e l y that t h a t this t h i s is jjust ust a a rresidual e s i d u a l eeffect f f e c t of of tthe h e now-subsiding now-subsiding campaign. 7. Size and and equipment of Chinese Communist artillery a r t i l l e r y rregiegiment, easteniKorea presented: p r e s e n t e d : Th The e 21st 2 1 s t Chinese Ch i n e s e Communist ment iin n eastemKorea Artillery Regiment, attached A r t i l l e r y Regiment, a t t a c h e d for operations o p e r a t i o n s to t o the t h e 203rd ChAnese Communist. April n 15 15 A p r i l that that Chanese Communist IInfantry n f a n t r y DDivision, i v i s i o n , rreported e p q r t e d oon "at present "at p r e s e n t our o u r regiment r e g i m e n t has.2,305 has.2 , 3 0 5 men." men . I 1 ' ' The armament message armament of of the t h e 21st 2 1 s t is is indicated'in i n d i c a t e d i n aa 13 13 April A p r i l mbssage parent.7th Division from its p a r e n t 7 t h Artillery Artillery D i v i s i o n to t o tthe h e ddivisional i v i s i o n a l ssupply upply installation t h a t from from 11 to t o 10 10 April A p r i l the t h e "21st t121st i n s t a l l a t i o n which stated s t a t e d that Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment (fired) ( f i r e d ) 204 204 rounds rounds of of Soviet S o v i e t 122 122 (mm) (mm) h howitzer o w i t z e r ammunition." ammunition." (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, K-2253, K-2253, K-2254, K-2254, 16 16 Apr Apr 52) 52) , 44 \ TOP SECRET SUEDE APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: FOR RELEASEDATE: 8-Mar-2010 18-Mar-201 0 IPPROVED For a comprehensive guide on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org 18 Apr Apr 52 db si.sce RR SECRET SUEDe 21st Chinese Chinese Communist Communist Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment Regiment The 21st Comment: Comment: The was 203rd Infantry Division was attiched a t t a c h e d for f o r operations o p e r a t i o n s to t o ttle t p e 203rd Infantry D i v i s i o n in in early I t may be noted noted that t h a t the t h e 21st, 2 1 s t , together together with with e a r l y April. A p r i l . It the t h e other o t h e r elements e l e m e n t s of of the t h e 7th 7th Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division, Division, received r e c e i v e d 120 120 gas masks in i n late l a t e March. March. g a s masks ' Organization O r g a n i z a t i o n of of North NorthKorean Koreaneastern e a s t e r ncoastal c o a q t asecurity l s e c u r i t.x A North o r torean o r e a n message message on on 15 April p r i l mentions mentions TI the 3rd, 17th (probably the 37th Division !7tih&obably t h e 7th), 7 t h ) ,’3”7:h D i v i s i o n and and the t h e 24th 2 4 t h Brigade B r i g a d e loaded loaded the t h e rice rice on on the t h e vehic1e0 v e h i c l e s on o n the t h e 13th." 13th.w The message continues c o n t i n u e s that t h a t rice r i c e for f o r the t h e 3rd 3rd Division D i v i s i o n was ununThe message loaded l o a d e d at a t aa major supply s u p p l y depot d e p o t southwest southwest of of Wonsan. Wonsan. (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, 15RSM/10817, 15RSM/10817, 16 16 Apr Apr 52) 52) 8. 8. cor 8 given': ivencorps . . Comment: Comment: This This message massage confirms confirms the t h e general g e n e r a l location l o c a t i o n and and organization of the t h e North N o r t h Korean KoreanVII VI1Corps Corpsini nthe t h e.Wonsan Wonaan area. area. o r g a n i z a t i o n of The at The unloading u n l o a d i n g of of the t h e 3rd 3rd Diitision's Diui9ioa’s rrice ice a t a ssupply u p p l y depot depot responsible r e s p o n s i b l e for f o r supplying s u p p l y i n g North North Korean Korean combat combat corps c o r p s at a t the the f r o n t may may indicate i n d i c a t e that t h a t this t h i s division d i v i s i o n is is south s o u t h of of the t h e Wonsan Wonsan front area, possibly possibly in i n aa reserve reserve capacity. capacity. .“R 5 . ' For a comprehensive guide on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org 18 18 Apr 52 52 . ....... HR70-14 FAR EAST 9 9.. Communists continue defenses c o n t i n u e to t o strengthen s t r e n g t h e n antiaircraft antiaircraft d efenses i n eeastern a s t e r n Korea: in Korea: /lie l'he NNorth.Kbrean o r t h , K o r e a n Z21st lst A Antiaircraft n t i a i r c r a f t AArtillery r t i.l r e r y Regiment is is to t o establish e s t a b l i s h an an ammunition ammunition depot d e p o t in i n the t h e WonsanWonsanHamhung area by by 10 10May, May, accOrding a c c o r d i n gto.a.i"top t o a " t o p secret". secret" North North Hamhung area Korean message of 55 May. May. message of The order The, o r d e r says that t h a t the t h e depot d e p o t should be ""secure s e c u r e from strafing s t r a f i n g by enemy planes," p l a n e s , " adding:that'the a d d i n g t h a t t h e "rear area area department d e p a r t m e n t started s t a r t e d transporting t r a n s p o r t i n g ammunition ammunition on on the t h e 4th 4 t h of of May. . .11 May. .. North Regiment, also bbuilding The N o r t h Korean 23rd AAA Regiment, u i l d i n g an ammunition depot d e p o t in i n the t h e area, area, apparently apparent1.y is to t o rrelinquish elinquish this t h i s ffunction u n c t i o n tto o tthe h e 221st 1 s t bbecause.thatdnit e c a u s e t h a t u n i t is is ordered o r d e r e d to to (SUEDE 5 501st:Comm "take " t a k e in in their t h e i r tasks." tasks." (SUEDE 0 1 e t Comm Recon Grp, Grp Korea, Korea, May 52) r 1 3 _13255, 2 5 5 , 66 May 52) Comment: A buildup b u i l d u p in i n enemy enemy antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t defenses. d e f e n s e s in in ' Comment* eeastelii-Viga a s t e r n Korea has h a s been been Underway Underway for f o r the t h e past past month. month. Recent prOtecting messages messages have have stressed s t r e s s e d the t h e importance i m p o r t a n c e of p r o t e c t i n g the t h e lines lines of communication in i n this t h i s area and of ensuring e n s u r i n g the flow of ssupplies u p p l i e s to t o the t h e front. front. 5 8 May 52 52 5Lctpp FOR RELEASE RELEASE APPROVED FOR DATE: 18-Mar-2010 18-Mar2010 DATE: To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression visit our website alin of BW BW again Korea: An An. r e p o r t s use u s e of Communist unit u n i t reports a g a i n in i n Korea: o r e a n naval n a v a l uunit-reported n i t r e p o r t e d in a 55 May uunidentified n i d e n t i f i ed North North K Korean May message message that t h a t "on "on the t h e second second of of May, May, at a t night n i g h t (they?) (they?) dropped bacteria weapons at a t Chongpyong (near ( n e a r Hamhung in in p r e v e n t i o n disease d i s e a s e committee committee The prevention n o r t h e a s t e r n Korea). Korea). The northeastern k i l l e d it." i t .Iv (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Comm Recop Recon Grp Grp Korea,r---13254, Iforea,p254, killed 6 6 May May 52). 52), 10. 10. Comment: l a s t intercepted i h t e r c e p t e d enemy rreport e p o r t of of an Comment: The last alleged United RW occurred April. Since U n i t e d States S t a t e s drop d r o p of BW o c c u r r e d on 14 A p r i l . Since that t i m e , the t h e Communist all-out a l l - o u t propaganda campaign has has t h a t time, lost l o s t much of its its intensity. i n t e n s i t y . The bulk b u l k of of recent r e c e n t Communisti Communisti commentary on the t h e subject s u b j e c t has h a s dealt dealt w i t h the t h e findings f i n d i n g s of with of v a r i o u s committees committees and and the t h e accumulation accumulation of "evidence." Itevidence various ." IIt t is o s s i b l e that t h a t this t h i s report, r e p o r t , plus p l u s other o t h e r similar similar is ppossible o n e s , will w i l l renew renew the t h e vigor v i g o r of of the t h e BW BW propaganda propaganda theme. theme. ones, 11. 11. a s s e s s i n g transportation t r a n s p o r t a t i o n capabilities capabilities Chinese Communists assessing in The Artillery Division e i- Chinese n e s e Communist 7th 7th A rtillery D ivision i n Korea: Th~ an "urgent wire from from Army rear" on 33 May demanding -areceived n l l u r g e n t wire a ""detailed d e t a i l e d report" r e p o r t v 1on on the t h e vehicle v e h i c l e situation s i t u a t i o n in in Korea. Korea. The The wire asked for f o r the t h e information i n f o r m a t i o n to t o be broken down by manumanuvire asked f a c t u r e and and mileage m i l e a g e of of the t h e vehicles. vehicles. (SUEDE 501st facture (SUEDE 501st Comm Comm Recon Recon Korea, K-2656, K-2656, 55 May May 52) 52) Grp Korea, Comment: This T h i s message may mean mean only o n l y that t h a t the t h e Chinese Chinese Comment: r e g u l a r reporting r e p o r t i n g system as as aa Communists have instituted i n s t i t u t e d aa regular maintenance requirement. requirement. o t h e r reports r e p o r t s of of increased i n c r e a s e d Communist Communist IIn n view of other aactivity, c t i v i t y , however, however, this t h i s urgent u r g e n t wire wire may may indicate i n d i c a t e a desire to assess assess truck t r u c k transportation t r a n s p o r t a t i o n capabilities c a p a b i l i t i e s ffor o r a ffuture uture operation. operation. 12. 12. . Manchuria-based aircraft a i r c r a f t adopt adopt new system of indicating indicating Manchuria-based new and and more more pprecise of indicating level: .AAnew r e c i s e ssystem y s t e m of i n d i c a t i n g aa ffuel u e l level: p l a n e ' s fuel f u e l level l e v e l has h a s been used on the t h e Russian-language F-: plane's Russian-language g-: g r o u n d - c o n t r o J l e d intercept i n t e r c e p t net n e t on on the t h e Korea-Manchuria Korea-Manchuria border border ground-controlled since 20 20 March. March. The new system uuses s e s the t h e numbers tthree, h r e e , ffour our since immediate landing landing o r d e r e d if i f an irplane's and five, five, w i t h an a n immediate with ordered an aairplane's fuel three. P r e v i o u s l y only only general g e n e r a lterm's, terms, f u e l level l e v e l drops d r o p s below below three. Previously ssuch u c h as as "watch ''watch your fuel," f u e l , I 1 were were used. used. (SUEDE AFSA JCAFE-30, AFSAJCAFE-30, 2 May May 52) 52) 2 6 6 8 May 52 52 TOP SECRET SUEDE I To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression visit our website "f013 SECRET SUE&E Comment: The attention a t t e n t i o n the enemy ground ccontroller o n t r o l l e r is is paying to t o the t h e fuel supply supply of com4at combat aircraft suggests that the t h e Communists Communists have been losing losing planes'which p$@nes'whichhave have run run out out of fuel. S i m p l i f i e d instruments instruments and ilots of fuel. Simplified and inexperienced p pilots may be beresponsible map r e s p o n s i b l e for for this t h i s problem. problem. . ! ''77 8 May 52 52 TOP SECRET SUEDE To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression visit our website I HR70-14 TbP SECRET SUEDr FAE FAR EAST 12. 12. Communist units u n i t s renew charges c h a r g e s of BW attacks in North ong in ci Korea: T hsey e y dropped s p i ders e r s an and an a n tss over o v e r Songjin c i t y. y. Korea: roppe sp 763/17," today," a North Korean coastal security s e c u r i t y station s t a t i o n in northThe e a s t e r n Korea Korea reported r e p o r t e d on on 66 May. Yay. The message continues continues eastern that t h a t the alleged a l l e g e d drop area a r e a has been isolated isolated and is is being investigated i n v e s t i g a t e d by b y "the " t h e plague plague prevention p r e v e n t i o n work work committee." comitteeOf4 (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon (SUEDE Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, 15RSM/12019, 15RSM/l2019, 66 May May 52) 52) .. . Coment: In I n February and March, PI a ttacks March, reports of B BW attacks Comment: sent North s e n t FriF59.-Communist by many Communist units u n i t s in in N o r t h Korea Korea were used in in propaganda charges charges against a g a i n s t the t h e United United States. S t a t e s . During the propaganda During the p a s t few weeks, Communist Communist propaganda has has made little l i t t l e reference reference past t o specific BW BW incidents, i n c i d e n t s , although although some some enemy enemy units u n i t s reported reported to such attacks a t t a c k s as as late l a t e as as mid-April. mid-April. such 6 9 May 52 52 cCX> /b PP APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE APPROVED 18-Mar-2010 DATE: 18-Mar-2010 For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit our website HR70-14 HR70-14 rF SUEDW --T&P SECRET SUEDhar) 91/675 FAR EAST EAST I.. Communist units renew charges 1 charges of of BW BW attacks in in North North Korea: Korea: US US Army Army Korea Korea "They dropped ants over over Songjin Songjin "They dropped spiders spiders and ants today," a North Korean coastal city.. . . today," Korean coastal security station in in northeastern northeastern Korea Korearerel/SA.50/110 S R 5 f l / I L 0 1/f f ported on on 66 May. May. The message continues continues that the alleged drop area area has has been been isolated isolated and and is isbeing being investigated investigated by "the '*theplague prevention work committee." committee." 5, 6 May 52 5,6 SUEDE, SUEDE .. Farther in the the Wonsan-Hamhung Wonsan-Hamhung area, area, Farther south south in Iton the second of another North Korean unit on 5 May May reported reported that "on May, at night, night, they theydropped droppedbacteria bacteriaweapons weaponsata Chongpyong." t Chongpyong." May, at In February February and and March, March, reports reports Comment: In of attacks sent sent by by m marifro-iiinunist of BW BW attacks m i i u n i s t units in North Korea were propaganda charges charges against against the the United United States. During the used in propaganda Communist propaganda past few weeks, weeks, Communist propaganda has has made made little little reference reference tO to specificBW incidents, although some enemy suchattacks, incidents, although enemy units units reported such attacks as as late as as mid-April. mid-April. t 2. 3 I TOPSECRET- SUEDE SUEDE APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: 24-Mar-201 0 ATE: 24-Mar-2010 IDPPROVED To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website Tc,13SEGMT SUEDbee i I1 II NR /NR I I ' I - 44 -- SUEDE 'POPSECRESUEDE To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website . . HR70-14 MO/ FAR EAST 2. American BW BW drop d r o p reported r e p o r t e d by by Chinese Chinese unit: u n i t : A Chinese Chinese Communist rocket launcher l a u n c h e r artillery a r t i l le r y uunit n i t rreported e p o r t e d on 6 May that (was observed) observed) d dropping r o p p i n g . ppropaganda ropaganda t h a t "an "an enemy pplane l a n e (was and germicidal g e r m i c i d a l bombs." bombs." The message c o n t i n u e d that that l e a f l e t s and leaflets message continued "the e r e spread e p r e a d over o v e r an area 150 m e t e r s wide and "the germs w were meters combat in west 600 meters long" long" and that t h a t the"42nd the"42nd Army (in ( i n combat in w est ccentral e n t r a l Korea) was w a s dispatching d i s p a t c h i n g personnel p e r s o n n e l to t o take take some some specispecimens." (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 501st C o r n Recon Grp Korea, K-2757, K-2757, 11 11 May May 52) 52) mens." Comm Comment: a r i o u s North Korean units u n i t s rreported e p o r t e d the the Comment: V Various aallegga-iiirrof l l e g e d u s e of bbiological i o l o g i c a l warfare warfare by by tthe he U United nited S States t a t e s earlier earlier i n May. May. It I t is i s entirely e n t i r e l y possible p o s s i b l e that t h a t these these messages messages may may be be in used t o ccontinue o n t i n u e the t h e momentum of the t h e Communist BW propaganda used to campaign. 3 3. Lumbering job job occupies o c c u p i e s Chinese.Communist Chinese Communist artillery a r t i l l e r y unit: unit: Lumbering Communist uunit, On 5 May Kay an a n unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d .Chinese Chi 11888 Communist n i t , ppossibly o s s i b l y an an anti-tank o r d e r e d to t o "pull out o u t one a n t i - t a n k artillery a r t i l l e r y battalion, b a t t a l i o n , was Ordered platoon men, from the c o n S i s t i n g of 20 men, t h e fourth f o u r t h company p l a t o o n each, conSisting and the t h e anti-aircraft a n t i - a i r c r a f t company company to t o proceed p r o c e e d to. to. .where they .where they will w i l l assist assist in i n the t h e chopping choppipg and and gathering g a t h e r i n g of of lUmber.". lumber." The The w i l l be utilized u t i l i z e d in the the message added added that,"this t h a t " t h i s wood will repairing of installations." installations." (SUEDE 501st.Comm 501st C o r n Recon Grp r e p a i r i n g of (SUEDE Recon'Grp Korea, Korea, K-2759, K-2759, 11 11 May May 52) 52) . . Comment: T h i s is is further f u r t h e r eevidence v i d e n c e that t h a t the t h e Communists Comment: This are rrepairing e p a i r i n g and building b u i l d i n g semi-permanent semi-permanent facilities. f a c i l i t i e s . While not a conclusive c o n c l u s i v e indication i n d i c a t i o n of of enemy enemy intentions,sit i n t e n t i o n s , i t would. would doubtful personnel diverted aappear ppear d o u b t f u l that t h a t combat p e r s o n n e l would be d i v e r t e d by the unit defensive the u n i t commander to t o lumbering lumbering operations o p e r a t i o n s to t o rrepair epair d efensive installations were aware aware of of aa pending pending major major offensive. offensive. i n s t a l l a t i o n s if.he i f he were $4. 4. .Chinese C h i n e s e aattillery k t i l l e r y ddivision i v i s i o n inactive i n a c t i v e since s i n c e late l a t e Aprill April: The Chinese 2nd AArtfllery r t i l le r y D Division; i v i s i o n , rrelieved e l i e v e d from from Chinese Communist Communist 2ria i n mid-April, mid-April, instructed,"all i n s t r u c t e d . " a l l regiments" r e g i m e n t s " on 27 April April combat in that 28 April, A p r i l , Division D i v i s i o n station s t a t i o n will w i l l cease t h a t "beginning " b e g i n n i n g 28 contact c o n t a c t with w i t h all a l l stations." stations." According to E a s t Command, the t h e 2nd 2nd Artillery Artillery t o the t h e Far F a r East.Command, Division as of 9 May. May. FECOM FECOM believes believes D i v i s i o n net n e t had had not n o t reappeared r e a p p e a r e d as that period t h a t this t h i s net n e t being b e i n g closed c l o s e d for f o r an indefinite indefinite p e r i o d indicates indicates 22 13 May 52 52 13 C/D >=*7? APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE. 8-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010 IPPROVED For more information on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website "no aactive operations were eenvisaged tthat h a t "no ctive o p e r a t i o n s were n v i s a g e d ffor o r tthe h e uunit n i t iin n SIB 499, 99 MaY; May; tthe h e immediate future." future." (SUEDE CINCFE CINCFE.SIB CCM-1109, 52) CCM-1109, 27 27 Apr Apr 52) Comment: When combat l e m e n t s of tthe h e 2nd rtillery combat eelements 2nd A Artillery Comment: r e l i e v e d in i n west central c e n t r a l Korea Korea by elements elements D i v i s i oon n were relieved Divis 1st Artillery Artillery D i v i s i o n between 20 and 24 April, A p r i l , it it oof f the t h e 1st Division was w a s speculated s p e c u l a t e d that t h a t the t h e 2nd 2nd Artillery A r t i l l e r y might remain r e m a i n in i n combat. combat. IIt t now p p e a r s tthat h a t tthe h e ddivision i v i s i o n hhas a s been now aappears been withdrawn withdrawn from tthe h e front. front. 5. 5. Record number of Chinese C h i n e s e jet j e t divisions d i v i s i o n s believed believed based a l y s i s of messages p a s s e d on on the the b a s e d on o n Korean border: b o r d e r : An Analysis messages passed C h i n e s e Communist ground-controlled g r o u n d - c o n t r o l l e d intercept i n t e r c e p t net n e t during during Chinese April indicates i n d i c a t e s that t h a t four f o u r Chinese Communist MIG-15 MIG-15 d ivisions divisions are are based b a s e d on on Manchurian Manchurian fields f i e l d s near n e a r the t h e Yalu Yalu River. R i v e r . They They are the t h e 4th 4 t h Division D i v i s i o n probably p r o b a b l y at a t Antung, Antung, the t h e 6th 6 t h and and 17th 17th are at a t Tatungkou, and and the t h e 12th 1 2 t h at a t Takushan. Takushan. (SUEDE (SUEDE USA-38 Ap 741, 741, USA-38 AP 9 May 52) 52) Comment: Four Chinese jet Jet d i v i s i o n s are are the t h e largest largest divisions Comment: n o t e d in i n this t h i s area, area, and and they t h e y represent r e p r e s e n t aa doubling d o u b l i n g of number noted strength s t r e n g t h since s i n c e February. February. IIn n aaddition d d i t i o n to t o these t h e s e four f o u r divisions, d i v i s i o n s , with w i t h an a n average a v e r a g e of of are believed b e l i e v e d to t o be ggne n e Korean and three three 50 pplanes l a n e s eeach, a c h , there are Soviet WIG-15 units, u n i t s , of of unknown unknown strength, s t r e n g t h , in i n the I h e Antung area. area. S o v i e t MIG-15 '6. .Soviet S o v i e t Jjet e t uunit n i t indicated i n d i c a t e d at a t Mukden: Several S e v e r a l messages messages i n eearly a r l y May reported r e p o r t e d flights f l i g h t s of of as as many many as a s 34 34 "allied" ltallied" in MIG-15's MIG-15's on on-round-robin round-robin flights f l i g h t s at a t Mukden. Wukden, R u s s i a n flight flight Russian l e a d e r s were leaders were mentioned. (SUEDE (SUEDE USA-38 AP 741, 741, 9 May; Air May; Air Force F o r c e Roundup Roundup 92, 92, 12 1 2 May May 52) 52) messages provide p r o v i d e the t h e first f i r s t indication i n d i c a t i o n of Comment: These messages Comment: a a Soviet S o v l e t MIC-15 M I 6-15 unit u n i t at a t Mukden. Mukden. Soviet S o v i e t MIG's M I G ' s are are also also based based at a t Antung, Anshan Anshan and and Tungfeng. Tungfeng. The ones o n e s at a t Antung Antung and and Anshan have flown combat missions b u t the the m i s s i o n s over o v e r Korea, but function of the t h e units u n i t s at a t Tungfeng and and Mukden is I s not n o t yet yet f u n c t i o n of determined. determined. 7. 7. Chinese policy" C h i n e s e admit a d m i t Pmishandling ?'mishandling of of p o l i c y t 1 in i n san-fan san-f a n campaign:. A 15 April message from.Chinese from Chinese "volunteer" "volunteer p r i l message headquarters =er: in Korea torea deals d e a l s with w i t h "cases "cases of of suicide s u i c i d e and ani :t 3 3 For more information on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website 13 May 52 52 I ri.013 SECRET SUElpe: self-mutilation resulting resulting from from mishandling of of policy policy and and of evidence" during during the the san-fan san-fan campaign campaign among among extortion of "volunteer" forces. lvvolunteerll forces . The report has been sent to to "all *la11 party committees" committees'* with with the explicit aim of preventing the recurrence recurrence of such such incidents. (SUEDE incidents. (SUEDE Chinese Chinese Communist Communist Military Military Identifications Bulletin No. 69, 69, CC/CAP-217, CC/CAP-217, 77 May May 52) 52) Comment: An intercepted Intercepted message of of early early February February of aa "quota" rcquotall of major major and and minor minor revealed the establishment of of offenders to be discovered in each llvolunteerll "volunteer" unit unit during during the campaign against corruption, corruption, waste waste and and bureaucracy. bureaucracy. Moreover, Moreover, all units were urged to exceed exceed the established established quotas. 15 April report confirms confirms that that this this misuse misuse of of the the The 15 of quota system, in in particular encouraging encouraging fabrication fabrication of resulted as as expected expected in in new new expressions expressions of of evidence, has resulted corruption, waste, and and bureaucracy. bureaucracy. ."R 4 ~ I For more information on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website , 13 M May ay 52 Approved For Release 2006/11/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000700130001-8 TOP SECRET 25X1 27 May 1952 25X1 j Copy No. 25X1 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 25X1 a DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 111( ARMY and DOS review(s). cornpleted. USAF review(s) completed. 0 DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO:git2Sa_ 22X1 NEXT REVIEW DATE Office of Current Intelligence AUTH:setIfigFilia /1 PIEVIEWER: DATE! / CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25X1 25X1 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2005/11/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000700130001-8 To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression visit our website Approved For 25X1 Gc1bW . 97 A0007 0130001-8 Mlv ARY FAR EAST 2. Chinese take initiative from North Koreans at Panmunjom (page 3). Communists may be using airborne intercept radar in Korea 3. Peiping believes Chinese Communist prisoners soon to be sent to 1. (page 3). Formosa (Da MP 41 NEAR EAST - AFRICA 25X1 6. Iranian National Bank refuses loan to government (page 5). WESTERN EUROPE 7. 8. 9. 10. Party official reports dissension among Trieste pro-CominformiEts (page 6), Germans prefer contractual agreement to present Soviet unity proposal (page 7). East Germans draft law for establishment of national army (page 8). France titing initiative on concessions to Saar (page 8). 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/11/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000700130001-8 To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression visit our website 25X1 Fo Ildcoac 200C/11/05 : CM RD1'70T00075A0007 0130001-8 IApproved FAR EAST 1 25X1 Chinese take initiative from North Koreans at Paninunjom: Ithe 25X1 Chinese Communists have taken the initiative from the North Korean delegation in conducting the Panmunjom talks, and that Diam IL is now merely their spokesman. Chinese Communist delegates are in constant communication with Soviet political advisers. The Koreans are said to have abandoned their demand for the withdrawal of Chinese "volunteers" along with that of all non-Korean UN troops. The Chinese reportedly believe that a Soviet "political feint" directed at Britain, France, India, and Japan will impel some favorable "change in American plans." Comment: Peiping's views are presumed to determine the North Korean line in the talks, because the over-all military position in Korea depends upon Peiping's willingness to continue its commitment. Communist China has indicated an intention to hold its "volunteers" in Korea at least until all UN forces are withdrawn. 2. Communists may be using airborne intercept radar in Korea: 25X1 The Far East Air Force reports that it has reason to believe the enemy may now be using airborne intercept radar in the Korean area, I 25X1 25X1 -325X1 Approved For Release 2006/11/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000700130001-8 To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression visit our website 25X1 Approved For ri c c c .., . 90007 1130001-8 The Far East Air tofore the Communists have been severely Force comments that herein night operations due to their non-employment of this type ofhandicapped radar. If the enemy chooses to employ planes equipped with such radar, he will have a capability not considered available to date in the Korean theatre. 3. Peiping believes Chinese Communist prisoners soon to be sent to Formosa: 25X1 25X1 Lninese officials claim to have information that Chinese prisoners held in South Korea are "about to be sent to Formosa." 25X1 Comment: Peiping is probably aware that many Chinese prisoners, particularly those once served in the Nationalist armies, have asked to be sent to who Formosa and that the Taipei government is urging such a transfer. The claim I may be introduced at any time into Peiping's propaganda about Korea and alleged American plans for "aggression" in Asia, possibly in an attempt to block any plans for a transfer. 25X6 -425X1 Approved For Release 2006/11/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000700130001-8 To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression visit our website 25X1 L111. 2 25X1 NEAR EAST - AFRICA 6. 25X1 Iranian National Bank refuses loan to government: Prime Minister Mossadeq informed Ambassador Henderson on 22 May that Nasser, Acting Governor of the Iranian National Bank, had refusedto advance funds to help the government meet its monthLy payroll. The r nie Minister was furious at Nasser and insisted that he be replaced even thoughhis removal might shake public confidence in the bank and thus increase Iran's financial difficulties. -525X1 Approved For Release 2006/11/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000700130001-8 To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression visit our website 25X1 Approved Foi Release 2008/ I 1/05 CIA-RDP79T0097M000 700130001-8 . Mossadeq, who claimed that Britain and the United States had brought pressure on Nasser to refuse the loan in order to cause the government's downfall, insisted that the bank could afford to lend the money. The American Ambassador reported that the British Embassy had confirmed his opinion that it had not put pressure on Nasser. He commented that Mossadeq would undoubtedly create additional opposition if he were to remove Nasser, since the latter is widely respected. Comment: Nasser's refusal to grant the loan, which would total about ten million dollars, is undoubtedly due to his concern for the bank's stability. It may also reflect the growing lack of confidence throughout Iran in the Prime Minister, WESTERN EUROPE 7. 25X1 Party official reports dissension among Trieste pro-Cominformists: A dissatisfied official of the pro-Cominform Communist Party in Trieste has indicated that it may be necessary for elements of the party to break away from the leadership of Vittorio Vida li. The official states that Vida li has been controlling the party through a special unta established about 1 April 1952. This group Is "sacrificing old comrades for new members who automatically obey directives without question." Comment: Vidali's party has been losing In addition, considerable dissension recently was generated among party officials when reports reached them that Vidali had advocated the return of the Free Territory to Italy in pre-election speeches in southern Italy. Large elements of the party desire for various reasons to maintain the present line calling for an independent Trieste. members steadily for morr a year. -67 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/11/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000700130001-8 To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression visit our website 25X1 Approved Fo Rcicosc 200C/11/06 : CIA fIDP70T00076A000 00130001-8 8. 25X1 Germans prefer contractual agreement to present Soviet unity proposal: Reporting the views of both East and West Germans on the Soviet unity proposals, American observers in Bonn state that the proposals have apparently elicited no more support in East Germany than they have in the West. East Zone residents interviewed in West Berlin believe that the proposals are nothing more than propaganda and should be rejected. Even if the USSR were to drop its insistence on the Oder-Neisse border, opposition would still outweigh approval among East Zone respondents. Among West Germans, however, Soviet concession of the territory east of the Oder-Neisse line would make the proposal acceptable to better than half of those interviewed, including not only those of neutralist inclinations, but also those who have previously supported the West. Comment: There has never been any evidence of substantial East Germai suxw of the Soviet proposals; there have, on the other hand, been reports of uneasiness among Socialist Unity Party functionaries for fear that their party might be sacrificed for unity. The one reported declaration by the East German radio in March that the USSR was willing to reopen the OderNeisse question was refuted by subsequent Soviet statements that the border was final. The latest Soviet note on a German peace treaty serves as another clear indication that the USSR is not yet prepared to make any significant concessions in Germany. Although it was the last chance to prevent Allied signature of the contractual agreement and the EDC treaty, the Soviet Union not only did not meet the Western condition that there be agreement on free all-German elections prior to a four-power conference; it also did not advance from its position as stated in the Soviet note of 10 April. -725X1 Approved For Release 2006/11/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000700130001-8 To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression visit our website Approved F or Release 2006/11/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0007(0130001-8 25X1 9. 25X1 East Germans draft law for establishment of national army: Ithe East German Government has drafted a law for the establishment of a national army. UnitedStates Army observers in Heidelberg believe this action was taken in anticipation of the signing of the contractual agreement. Comment: The recently reported allocation of heavy weapons to the parity police, an acceleration in recruiting, and vigorous propaganda on the need for an armed force to counteract West German contingents all suggest that the 24 Alert Police units may soon be formally unveiled as a national army. This probability is supported by a governmental reorganization which may culminate in the establishment of a defense or armaments ministry. The paramilitary police, a force of 52,000 which includes 14,000 to 16,000 officers, can easily be expanded at least to keep pace with the growth of a West German defense force. The formal establishment of an East German national army would not preclude continuation of the unity campaign. 10. 25X1 France taking initiative on concessions to Saar: The French Ambassador and the Saar Government have decided on the immediate formation of a mixed commission to revise the 1950 conventions governing French-Saar relations. The commission will file a report early in July for the French Assembly's consideration. The French Ambassador at Saarbruecken is said to favor "substantial concessionsr provided strengthening the Saar as an autonomous state does not prejudice French economic interests. -825X1 Approved For Release 2006/11/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000700130001-8 To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression visit our website 25X1 . 25X1 Approved F 200C/11/05 CIA RDr73T00075A000 00130001-8 . iRufec,...= Saar demands will be in the direction of greater autonomy, particularly in the fields of taxation, banking, social welfare, and labor relations. Comment: France and Germany have been keeping the Saar issue in ibTiruntil the signing of the contractual agreement and the EDC treaty. The latest move seems to be a new French approach designed to win local goodwill and promote autonomy for the Saar as the alternative to reintegration with Germany. -925X1 Approved For Release 2006/11/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000700130001-8 To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression visit our website HR70-14 HR70-14 I DziP SECRET SU-MaoFAR EAST EAST 4 4.. Two-month Two-month supply s u p p l y level l e v e l scheduled s c h e d u l e d for for North N o r t h Korean Korean unit: unit: A 13 13' 3une June message message from aa unit u n i t that t h a t may' may be the t h e supply su.pply component component of the t h e 10th 1 0 t h North North Korean Korean Mechanized Mechanized Division, D i v i s i o n , near n e a r Pyongyang, Pyongyang, of sstated t a t e d that t h a t "the " t h e guarantee g u a r a n t e e of the t h e service s e r v i c e of of supply s u p p l y of the t h e army unit u n i t in in the t h e rainy r a i n y season. Beason. .wheat l o u r for a y s and and nights, nights, .wheat fflour for 14 ddays and 40 days days and and nights. nights. .(had .(had been been and subsidiary s u b s i d i a r y foods f o o d s for f o r 40 received). .from .from the t h e General G e n e r a l Service S e r v i c e of of Supply, Supply Bureau." bureau." received). Another 1 2 June J u n e message message from from the the same same unit u n i t indiciated i n d i c b t e d that that Another 12 " p r o v i s i o n e for f o r 60 days d a y s and and nights nights w i l l be p r o v i d e d by June 30." 30." "provisions will provided by June (SUEDE ROK ROK Int Int G Grp r g M Korea, Korea, SK-K-205 SX-IC-205 and and SK-K-211, SK-K-211, 13 13 June J u n e 52) 52) . . . . . . Comment: Comment: A similar s i m i l a r supply s u p p l y level l e v e l was was decreed decreed recently r e c e n t l y for for chine7J-CUiRunist evidence C h i n e s e Communist units u n i t s in i n the the battle b a t t l e line, l i n e , and and there t h e r e is evkdence tthat h a t at a t least least some some units u n i t s have have already a l r e a d y achieved a c h i e v e d this t h i s level. level. I of whether whether this this stockpiling s t o c k p i l i n g was undertaken u n d e r t a k e n in in Regardless of a i n s and and ffloods, lOOd6, i t is eevident v i d e n t tthat hat a a n t i c i p a t i o n of summer anticipation summer rrains it ssubstantial u b s t a n t i a l improvement improvement in enemy enemy logistical l o g i s t i c a l capabilities ill capabilities w will have have been been effected e f f e c t e d when when this t h i s program program is is completed. completed. 5 5., Communists remain , cconcerned oncerned w with i t h WI BW in i n Korea: Korea: An unidentunidentCommunists Zemaill CUmmunfitirtillery on 102 June iified f i e d CChinese h i n e s e mmmunist ,%art ille r y rregiment e g i m e n t on June informed informed s u b o r d i n a t e elements e l e m e n t s that."an t h a t "an investigating investigating committee. committee. its subordinate is comipg t o Korea Korea to to investigate i n v e s t i g a t e the t h e releasing r e l e a s i n g of of germs germs and and coming to enemy planes p l a n e s and and artillery. a r t i l l e r y . Request Request that t h a t men men be iinsects n s e c t s by enemy found who who can c a n verify v e r i f y the t h e releasing r e l e a s i n g of of germs. germs. 11 found ." .. . . . . 11 On 13 13 June J u n e another a n o t l k r Chinese Chinese artillery a r t i l l e r y rregimental e g i m e n t a l commander On commander stated 'in message tthat h a t "Army e g i m e n t ttonight o n i g h t and and stated 'in aa.message "Army called called my my rregiment oordered r d e r e d all a l l chairmen chairmen and aad assistant a s s i s t a n t chairmen chairmen of of tthe h e aanti-plague nti-plague commission commisSion to t o attend a t t e n d the t h e meeting." meeting.'g The The sender s e n d e r continued c o n t i n u e d that that the m e e t i n g will bbe.anti-plague e . a n t i - p l a g u e pproject r o j e c t and ""the t h e topic of the meeting and eestablishment s t a b l i s h m e n t of of anti-plague a n t i - p l a g u e program h e summer program for tthe summer and and autumn autumn seasons." s e a s o n s . " (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 501st Comm Corn Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, K-3837. K-3837 and K-3838, and K-3838, 14 June June 52) 52) Comment: Comment: The The enemy enemy is is continuing c o n t i n u i n g to t o accumulate accumulate data data to to support s u . p p o Wks m c hcharges a r g e s that t h a t the t h e UN used biological b i o l o g i c a l warfare weapons weapons iin n Korea. Korea, It I t is noteworthy noteworthy that t h a t Malik on 16 1 6 June J u n e requested r e q u e s t e d aa UN UN Security S e c u r i t y Council C o u n c i l meeting m e e t i n g to t o discuss d i s c u s s these t h e s e same same charges. charges. 3 3 17 June June 52 52 17 Cf D Cl RET SUEDE APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: ,18-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010 I To learn more about PDF Compression and OCR visit our website 5/ air J- 6.. 6 . --TzT-SECRET-SUEDEr Possible Mechanized D Division command P o s s i b l e North North Korean Korean 1.0th 1 0 t h Mechanized i v i s i o n command "Tfie'conference of tthercommanders. cconference o n f e r e n c e held:. held: lT?% e c o n f e r e n c e of h e commanders of the the uunits n i t s under under my control c o n t r o l shall s h a l l be convened convened on on the t h e 17th 1 7 t h and and on North Korean Korean message, message, p possibly tthe h e 18th," 1 8 t h , " states s t a t e s aa 14 1 4 .June J u n e North ossibly ssent e n t bby y the t h e commander commander of the t h e 10th 1 0 t h Mechanized Mechanized Division. Division. on tthe same communication communication h i s regard, r e g a r d , messages: messages ssent e n t on h e same IIn n tthis ssystem y s t e m on o n 11 11 and and lp 13 June June suggest s u g g e s t that t h a t possibly p o s s i b l y subordinate subordinate eelements l e m e n t s of of the t h e 10th 1 0 t h were were participating p a r t i c i p a t i n g in i n joint joint reconnaissance reconnaissance with ct the 4th i t h eelements l e m e n t s of t h e North Korean 4 t h and and ttraining r a i n i n g aactivities ctivities w Divisions, 55th t h Infantry Infantry D i v i s i o n s , stationed s t a t i o n e d in i n the the Pyongyang Pyongyang area, area. AA related 12 1 2 June June message message indicatea i n d i c a t e s that t h a t another a n o t h e r subordinate subordinate unWis."making .participate in. in. ,.tobe t o be carried carried u n i t : i s "makingpreparations p r e p a r a t i o n siot oparticipate out o u t from.June from June 15. 15. , .'l ." (SUEDE 3330th 3 0 t h Comm Recon r p Korea,BLT-252, Recon G Grp Korea,BLT-252, 13 June; Recon 13 J u n e ; RI* ROK Int I n t Grp G r p MM Korea, Korea, SK-K-217, SK-K-217, 131%June; J u n e ;501st 501etConlin Corn Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea', SK-K-224, SK-K-224, 14'June; 14 June; ROK ROK Int'Grp Int Grp MM Korea, Korea, SK-K-236, SK-K-236, 14 14 June J u n e 52) 52) . . Comment: Comment: The The recently r e c e n t l y mechanized mechanized North Korean Korean 110th 0th D ivision Division personnel, hhaa a s bbeen e e n ,receiving r e c e i v i n g equipment equi.pment and and p e r s o n n e l , and and has been been in in its conversion c o n v e r s i o n from from an a n infantry I n f a n t r y unit u n i t . These T h e s e A4 I? ttraining r a i n i n g since s i n c e its messages suggest messages s u g g e s t that t h a t the t h e unit unit has h a s reached r e a c h e d aa fairly f a i r l y advanced advanced sstate t a t e of preparedness p r e p a r e d n e s s for for combat. combat. . 17 17 June June 52 52 4 ' D To learn more about PDF Compression and OCR visit our website IP 111 111, HR70-14 HR70-14 I . * IseP SECRET SUED.Er FAR EAST 22.. I Chinese d i g atom atom bomb bomb shelters shelters in i n Korea: Korea: A badly b a d l y garbled Chinese dig Chinese Communist uunit Korea message from an uniaentified unidentified C h i n e s e Communist n i t iin n Korea on 13 13 June J u n e reported reported that t h a t "construction " c o n s t r u c t i o n of of atom atom bomb bomb defenses" defenses" began on on 13 13 June. June. The a d d i t i o n a l repairs repairs began The message message mentioned mentioned additional on artillery on a r t i l l e r y and and air a i r defenses defenses and and preventive p r e v e n t i v e measures m e a s u r e s being being t o guard guard against a g a i n s t damage damage from from rain. r a i n . (SUEDE ttaken a k e n to (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp G r p Korea, Korea, K-3874, K-3874, 16 16 June June 52) S2) Comment: T This h i s meseage message probably is a progress report on on message, sent tthe h e May message, s e n t over o v e r a Chinese Chinese 8th 8 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division Division net n e t which outlines o u t l i n e s aa seven-point seven-point defense d e f e n s e program. program. IIt t referred referred tto o a air i r defense, d e f e n s e , with w i t h emphasis emphasis on on esimouflage qdmouflage and and ddefenses e f e n s e s aagainst gainst tthe h e atom atom bomb. bomb, A 4 April A p r i l Chinese Chinese message message indicated i n d i c a t e d that t h a t literature l i t e r a t u r e about about tthe h e atom atom bomb was was to t o be be distributed, d i s t r i b u t e d , and and on on 30 30 March March aa Chinese Chinese propaganda s t a t e d that t h a t it i t would would be be aa "logical " l o g i c a l step" step" propaganda broadcast b r o a d c a s t stated ffor o r the t h e United United States, S t a t e s , following f o l l o w i n g the t h e alleged a l l e g e d BW-CW campaign, campaign, to t o use the t h e atom atom bomb. bomb, 3. 3. North Korean mechanized mechanized. unit u n i t visited v i s i t e d by by Supreme Supreme Headquarters: Headquarters: North Korean An 11 from-an 'elementofoft hthelbth North 11 June June meSsage, message, proflably ,probably from an element e 10th N orth , Korean Mechanized Mechanized Division,.stated D i v i s i o n , s t a t e d that t h a t "Supreme "Supreme Headquarters Headquarters .Tank OfficerS?) Tank ((Headquarters Headquarters O f f i c e r s ? ) of the t h e Supreme Supreme Headquarters H e a d q u a r t e r s are. are. and and are are going going out o u t to t o the t h e battalions b a t t a l i o n s for f o r the t h e (plans?) ( p l a n s ? ) of of the the units ." The u n i t s (for?) ( f o r ? ) this t h i s month month on on 10 10 June. June. The message message reported reported construction c o n s t r u c t i o n activity a c t i v i t y of of elements e l e m e n t s in i n the t h e division, d i v i s i o n , including including the (SUEDE t h e Ncaves " ( c a v e s for?) for?) the t h e tanks t a n k s received. received. .'I (SUEDE ROK Int Int .", Grp $ M Korea, Korea, SK-K-169, 8K-K-169, 13 13 June June 52) 52) , .. . . . . . - Comment: Comment: Although Although garbled and and badly translated, t r a n s l a t e d , thisthis message armored sstaff meseage suggests'the s u g g e s t s t h e existence e x i s t e n c e of of a a sspecial p e c i a l qrmored t a f f oorr command command at a t North North Korean Korean Headquarters, H e a d q u a r t e r s , charged charged with w i t h armored armored affairs. affairs. . 4. 4. Armor Armor continues c o n t i n u e s to t o arrive a r r i v e in i n North North Korea: Korea: "This " T h i s is to to report r e p o r t that t h a t 12 12 tanks t a n k s out out, of of the t h e 24 24 tanks t anks were were unloaded unloaded from from cars t h e Chongchon Chongchon River). River). .on June June llth, llth, cars at a t Sunchon Sunchon (south ( s o u t h of of the .on and .the remaining 12 i t tthe h e (unit?). (unit?). . t h e remaining 1 2 tanks t a n k s are are and arrived a r r i v e d 'OA expected e x p e c t e d to t o be be unloaded unloaded from from cars cars tonight," t o n i g h t , " reported reported possibly possibly the t h e supply s u p p l y unit u n i t of of the t h e 10th 1 0 t h North North Korean Korean Mechanized Mechanized Division Division on 12 June. June. (SUEDE (SUEDE ROK ROK Int I n t Grp Qrp M, SK-K-207, SK-K-207, 13 13 June June 52) sz3 on 12 . . . . 22 TOP SECRET SUEDE APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: 8-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010 r1/4PPROVED To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website 18 June June 52 52 18 C t) 5.119) L 111 , 4 Commen : The The North North Koreans Koreans received r e c e i v e d at a t least least 43 43 tanks tanks Commen.1: and 2 self-propelled se - p r o p e l l e d guns guns in i n late l a t e April. A p r i l , On On 55 June June aa .shipshipand 22 ment of of 16 16 self-propelled s e l f - p r o p e l l e d guns guns arrived. arrived. ment The F.ar F a r EEast a s t Command n early h a t the the The Command estimated estimated iin early May May tthat N o r t h Koreans Koreans had had sonly o n l y 384 a n k s and e l f - p r o g e l l e d guns, guns, North 384 ttankS and 134 134 sself-propelled Iindicating n d i c a t i n g that t h a t they t h e y were 59 tanks t a n k s and e l f - p r o p e l l e d guns were 59 and 29 29 sself-propelled guns of the t h e number number of of allOted a l l o t e d armored armored vehicles. vehicles. s h o r t of short 3 3 TOP SECRET SUEDE To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website 18 June June 52 52 18 1314.e.9 Approved For ReIealks/21162/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00140/010001-9 SECRET 25X1 25 June 1952 25X1 OCI No. 6427 Copy NO. 276 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This digest of significant reports has been prepared for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency.primarily It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports received. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. DIA AND DOS RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY RETURN TO FAMES IMMEDIATELY SECRET I JOB Approved For Releasi zuun08/2 I : CIA-kuP7u i u1146A00110001 0 For a comprehensive guide on PDF Compression and OCR visit our website 6- WOOS CE:V791 AFTER OSE 25X1 -v Approved For Re leemb 2002108121 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00*(10010001-9 SECRET FAR EAST 4. Japanese press reaction favorable to treaty with India: Ambassador Murphy reports that Japanese metropolitan papers and prefectural dailies both reacted favorably to the treaty with India. Papers in Osaka, a major export trade center, viewed the treaty as an "extraordinary" gesture of friendship and contrasted its generous terms with the multi-lateral San Francisco treaty. One prefectural paper foresaw an opportunity for a new "third force" built around Japan and India. The Ambassador concludes that India gained great popular support by the treaty terms and Japan obtained a model treaty to be employed in negotiations with other Asian nations, although development of either potential will prove difficult. 25X11 1 Comment: The treaty, originally proposed by India in December l9hl was signed on 9 June,and contains many articles based on the San Francisco treaty. Reportedly, however, it contains no provisions on territorial, adjustments or reparations. Both of these factorsappeal to the Japanese as well as the symbolism of friendship on the part of an important Asian nation. 5. 25X1XCommunists agree to continue stalling at Panmuniom: A that he was informed of an 8.and 9_June_meeting between Soviet, Chinese and North Korean leaders on the cease-fire and the military situation by a North Korean Irepresentative at the meeting. Allegedly all parties agreed to "continue stalling tactics at Panmunjom." The North Koreans argued at the meeting that they could never give in on the POW issue. The argument was opposed by both the Chinese and the Russians. The Chinese criticized North Korean emphasis on the Koje incidents saying that the BW issuewas a "more effective longterm propaganda line." The Soviet representative stated that his country was "determined" to take the Korean problem to an "International Conference table." SECRET 3 25 June Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001100010001-9 For a comprehensive guide on PDF Compression and OCR visit our website 52 Approved For Re lets 2602/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001410010001-9 SECRET November. Political integration would mollify the Gaullists, however, and could reverse the bitter opposition of some to the EDC, thus making ratification certain. Defense Minister Pleven has recently pledged that the Pinay government will push vigorously for political integration to embrace both the Schuman Plan and the EDC, but the French Government has no illusions that Britain would surrender its sovereignty to a supranational authority. 20. Swiss reportedly ship arms to Rumania: A report from Vienna the latter part of May reveals the probable of an unknown quantity of machine pistols to'Rumaniashipment from Haemerli, a Swiss export firm. I 25X1 Comment: The US Military Attache in cently that in the last few months Swiss Bern reported remateriel have increased rapidly and are exports of war now of considerable magnitude. There is no record, however, that significant exports have been made to Iron Curtain countries. The US Air Force has discounted recent reports that the Oerlikon 8-cm guided missile was being used against UN aircraft in Korea. 21. 25X1 Swiss Communists stressing SW charges: The American Minister in Switzerland has requested the State Department to send him dodumentary evidence against the-Communist biological warfare charges. A Swiss Communist organization has been holding Meetings in Bern, accusing the United States using BW in Korea. At its latest meeting on 20 June there of r_Nagia capacity audience of 100 people. Comment: Reports indicate the Communists are having limitia-iiieEess with their campaign in Switzerland. The nonCommunist preis there has vigorously assailed the Swiss Commur nist-front Peace Partisans' SW charges, .of the fact that the Chinese Communists particularly in view rejected the first proposal in March 1952 for an investigation of the charges by the International Red Cross. That the Communist BW campaign appears to be relatively 'lite in getting under way in Switzerland the internal dissensions which have beset may be attributed to the Communist party there. TSECRET 11 25 June 52 Approved ForRelease 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001100010001-9 For a comprehensive guide on PDF Compression and OCR visit our website 25X1 ApprovedZoraMe 25X1 1+72R000200110001-8 Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 8013, 16 July 1952 DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN I. Military Operations . Army Employing five tanks in the role of artillery, delivering 25-minute of the preparatory fire, two small Chinese Communist groups attacked elements front. The of Kumsong on the east central ROK 6th Division two miles southeast After this engagement four enemy withdrew following the three-hour engagement. the support of 1,224 attacked another ROK outpost with more Chinese groups Elsewhere along The enemy was again repulsed. rounds of mortar and artillery. Across the the front, small probes and patrol clashes dharacterized the action. rounds of artillery and mortar. entire front, the enemy employed 4,027 UN carrier-based aircraft flew 213 sorties against enemy troop and supply installations in the northeastern Tanchon area and in western Hwanghae blockade and bombarded enemy province. Naval surface vessels maintained the shorelines on the east and west coast. Air UN aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 562 combat sorties in flown a total of 880 effective sorties flown. Of the 14 medium boMber missions railroad marshalling yard near the Chinese during the period, 12 were against a attacked an area border in northwestern Korea. Yesterday 175 UN fighter-bombers east of Pyongyang containing a cement factory, a locomotive repair shop, a transformer yard, and various barracks and buildings. Considerable damage to these installations was reported. Military Intelligence Air ler East Air Force reports that in enemy MIG encounters during the week ending 13 July, the pattern of aggressiveness remained sUbstantially unchanged: MIG pilots appeared willing to initiate attacks only when the prospects of escaping damage were heavily in their favor. Although MIG's were airborne an 11 July during the UN raid on Pyongyang, they did not attempt to interfere. Enemy night interception effort remained ineffective, as no damage resulted ton friendly aircraft, THEC.I.A.HASNOOBJECTION SECRET 0 THE W,CLASSIFICATION OF HI;IDUOUMEAT. v C JUL 197 Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : tlA-RDP91T0111t2R00020911-0080t 8 For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org 25X1 25X1 Approved gap Ra lease 2004/094WRA-RDP91TO tlavaao no 110 01 -8 25X1 UN aerial observers reported on 15 July that bomb craters on the lightplane airstrip near Hoeyang ',ehind the central battle front have been filled in. (The Communibts nave shown considerable facility in constructing and maintaining emall air strips, suitable for light planes, throughout Korea, It is probable that these strips, when used, are for liaison craft and/or reconnaissance flights.) III. General Situation Political The executive committee of the Liberal Party has announced that Syngman Rhee Ind Yi Pom-sok wil/ be nominated for president and vice president respectively at the party's convention scheduled to open 19 July. The US EMbassy comments that if Rhee endorses Yi as a running mate, the latter's election would be a "shoo in." (Rhee continues to maintain that he is "not disposed" to run. Several. sources have indicated that the president is reluctant to accept Yi as vice president, preferring instead Ham Taeyong, the elderly nondescript chairman of the BOK Board of Audits.) The BOK National Assembly on 15 July completed voting on the governmentproposed bill for election of a president and a vice president. Some of the amendments put forward by the opposition were voted down, but the provision that "all officials who announce their candidacy" for office would resign their government jobs was upheld. Candidates far president, vice president and assemblymen were specifically exempted. The law is expected to be promulgated on 17 July with elections scheduled for early August. (The provision requiring resignation of officials prior to running for office was ineffectually aimed at the current Home Minister Yi Pom-sok, who will probably run for vice president.) Propaganda Peiping and Pyongyang radios were stressing on 15 July all the customary allegations on American atrocities to prove that the "adventurist policy" of anploying "so-called military pressure" can never attain the UN's objectives. A new Communist line with suggested propaganda overtones is the report in the American press that Communist China is conditionally aocepting the Geneva Conventions banning germ warfare, 25X1 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/09/a : CIA-RDP91T01172R000200110001-8 For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org Approved Fonaolease 2004/0NelailA-RDP91T011751141100200110001-8 25X1 Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 8038, 14 August 1952 DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN I. Military Operations Alm On 13 August, the fight for Hill 122 (Bunker Hill), southeast of Punji in the western sector continued. A reinforced Chinese battalion, supported by a heavy concentration of artillery and mortar fire, twice attacked elements of the US 1st Marine Division in an attempt to retake the hill. The five-hour and onehour enemy attacks failed. Elsewhere along the front, patrol clashes and probes were reported. Ian Naval air operations were suspended on August 13 as the task forces engaged in resupply. UN navel surface vessels boMbarded the enemy coast in the vicinity of Songjin Tanchon and Wonsan in the east and Choda in the west. Enemy troop and supply installations were destroyed and transportation was hindered. Aix land-based aircraft flew 916 effective sorties of which 561 were combat. Of the 207 close-support sorties flown, 168 were in the US I Corps sector in the west with the bulk of these being flown by Marine Corps aviation. Medium bombers flew 25 sorties against an enemy Supply area south of Sariwon in the west. During the morning of 13 August, the pilots of a flight of UN conventional aircraft observed 6 MIG-15's in the Chinnampo region. NO contact was reported. UN Military Intelligence No significant reports have been received during the past 24 hours III. General Situation Fbjjtical Ambassador Nuncio, commenting on the whereabouts of the remaining three National Assemblyman in hiding since the crisis, reports that Om Sang-sop 25X1 SECRET 3g THEC.I.A.HASNOOBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION THVeOCUMSNT. Approved For Release 2004/09A3 : CIA-RD:391 TO1,172R0l1620631;00)14 For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org OF 25X1 Approved Fosaplease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011784000200110001-8 25X1 SECRET appeared in the AsSembIy Hall on 13 August for the first time. '0 Wiyong also emerged from hiding, but is reported to have "gone to the country." Kim Iongsen still remains unaccounted for. has A Nationalist Chinese news service reports that Kim Hongil, the South 'Korean Ambassador in Taipei, revealed on lA August that Korea, Nationalist China, and the Philippines have been exchanging opinions on the possibility of forming an antiCommunist defensive alliance. Nothing concrete has resulted from the negotiations. (These three countries have exchanged opinions on an anti Communist alliance in the past with negligible results). , frooattands Radio Pyongyang broadcast on 9 August that six members of the "Inter national Committee of Scientists" went to Korea on 28 July to investigate "the actual state of affairs concerning the germ warfare being carried out by the American imperialist aggressors in Korea and China." The mission left Korea on 5 August. The six "scientists" are from Great Britain, France, Italy, Sweden, the USSR, and Brazil. (Undoubtedly the report of these scientists will be added to the mountain of "proof" on US employment of germ warfare). 25X1 SFZELET Approved For Release 2004/091Q3 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000200110001-8 For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org Approved For %lease 2004/09/9260?-RDP91T0117217,990200110001-8 25X1 Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 8056, 5 Septedber 1952 DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN I. Military Operations ALM After two very minor probes on 4 September, the US 1st Marine Division outpost on Bunker Hill in western Korea was subjected te an attack by two Chinese companies in the early hours of 5 September. This Chinese probe, supported by 2,250 rounds of artillery and mortar fire, was repulsed after a fight of nearly 2 hours.. Other Marine outposts to the north and east of Bunker Hill received minor enemy probes during the period. Small enemy probes took place in the lst Commonwealth and US 3rd Marine Division sectors in the west and in the ROK 2nd and US 25th Division areas in central and eastern Korea. LTEX UN naval aircraft on the Korean west coast flew 97 reported sorties on 4 September with the total flight tally incomplete. Air activity by carrier based planes on the Korean east coast ceased as Task Force 77 engaged in re plenishing operations. Enemy targets were bombarded by naval surface vessels in the vicinity of Songjin and Tanchon on the east coast, and in the Amgak area on the west coast. Air On 4 Septenber landbased aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 853 effective sorties of which 565 were combat. Installations in Sonchon, located in MIG alley, were attacked by 279 of the fighters. During the period, 110 MIG's were observed and 73 encountered by UN aircraft. A total of 13 M1G's were reported destroyed and 7 damaged. The UN lost four Sabres with one other suffering minor damage. There were only four bomber missions flown on the night of 4,5 Septenber. Three of the aircraft flew leaflet and close support missions while the remaining aircraft bombed Hwangju, a town located on the main supply route between Pyongyang and Haeju. II. Military Intelligence No significant reports have been received during the past 24 hours..(_ .t.)r THEC.I,Arnr?;T-077021 25X1 syninn, TO 717n Tir, .0 - ;JUL wit Approved For Release 2004/09/01: CIA-RDP91T01172R000200110 For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org 25X1 Approved ForMease 2004/09gThiCSA-RDP91T01172111000200110001-8 25X1 III. General Situation Economic The US Army representative on the US-ROK Combined Economic Board believes that the won-dollar exchange rate should, "as an opening wedge," be changed from 6,000 Won to One US dollar to 18,000 to 1 beginning 1 October. Army representatives point out that American and foreign nationals are receiving 24,000 to 1 in the open market and the exchange rate based on the present world market price of rice would be about 45,000 to 1. They add that the present rate is unrealistic and works against fair treatment for US troops. (The Republic of Korea,innegotiating the economic agreement which established the board,was adamant in demanding the retention of the current 6,000 to I rate. Although the rate is unrealistic, the US AMbassador feels that because the board has just started to operate and the US payment of $35,000,000 was made only recently.,the US should wait a few months for these arrangements to have some effect.) Propaganda Radio Peiping on 4 September quoted an article by Alan Winnington of the London Belly Worker in which the correspondent accused American top negotiator General Harrison with threatening an extension of bacterial warfare against North Korea. While the article emphasized thii, the propaganda point was hinged on a five4tord quote, "disease and dislocation of homes," which Harrison may have employed in connection with the devastation created by bombing. (The Communist negotiators at Panmunjom have never brought up the question of bacterial warfare during the negotiations. It is possibly of propaganda significance that the Communists have gone to such lengths to associate the UN negotiators with threatening BW. 25X1 Approved For Re lea For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org 01172R000200110001-8 Approved For 111614ase 2004/09/03 : ClA-RDP91T01172421060200110001-8 SECRET 25X1 Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 9308, 15 September 1952 DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN I. Military Operations Action continued heavy over the weekend in the ROK Capital Division sector in east central Korea. The focus of fighting was "Finger Ridge" near Mina which the Chinese captured over a week ago, Early Sunday morning ROK elements succeeded in driving the enemy from the hill, only to be driven back themselves by a fierce Chinese counterattack later in the morning. The South Koreans attacked again before noon on Sunday, but were stopped just short of the crest. At 1100 hours the Chinese unleashed a heavy mortar and artillery barrage and at present hold the position. During Sunday's engagement, the Chinese used nearly 15,000 rounds of mortar and artillery fire. Elpewhere along the front there were minor enemy probes and patrol clashes. Carrier-based aircraft on both the east and west coasts flew 317 sorties on 13 September and 301 sorties on the following day against enemy transportation and supply installations, a cement factory, and an unidentified enemy freighter. Surface vessels bombarded enemy troops and gun emplacements between Songjin and Wonsan on the Korean east coast and in the vicinity of Chodo and the Ongjin Peninsula on the west coast. Air Land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 813 sorties on 13 Septetber of which 491 were combat. Only eight enemy MIG's were observed airborne and two were mmountered, with no damage to either UN or enemy aircraft. Some 200 enemy jets were observed by F-86 pilots on Antung, Tatungkou and Takushan airfields. The 5 bomber sorties flown on the night of 13 SepteMber engaged in Photo reconnaissance and leaflet drop missions. On 14 September 373 combat out of a total of 629 effective sorties were flown. A total of 96 MIG's was observed in the Yalu River area of which 41 were encountered. Two enemy aircraft were destroyed, two probably destroyed and two damaged. One UN Sabre was destroyed and another damaged during the encounters. There were 16 effective bomber sorties on the night of 14,15 September, 14 of which attacked a supply center at Sopo near Pyongyang. SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/09101 : ClA-RDP91T011921138601283/49f800p 1-8 For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org 25X1 Approved For Reese 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172RIA9200110001-8 SECRET 25X1 I/. Military Intelligence No significant reports have been received during the past 48 hours. III. General Situation Political American Charge Lightner reports that the Korean press and officials during the past week have engaged in an inspired campaign to convince the Korean people that (a) the flow of UN aid goods has been reduced, with a consequent acceleration of inflation; (b) the transfer of the librean problem to the UN and continuation of the truce negotiations are detrimental to Korean unification and the free world's stand against Communism; and (c) US-UN economic and military aid to South Korea is insufficient. (In line with this criticism, Assembly Vice Speaker Yun Chi-yong on 10 September blamed the US for the lose of China to the Communists, and expressed fear that the UNGA discussion might result in a similar error. He asserted that the CB should give more attention to Korea than Japan, and called for a five billion dollar loan, assistance in two million South Koreans., and inclusion of the ROK in a Pacific defense pact. Proraganda Radio Peiping on 14 September announced the conclusion of the work of the International Scientific'Commission far the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China The Commission "confirmed" that American armed forces have waged bacteriological warfare against Korea and China. Committee members included scientists from Sweden, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Brazil, as well as from the USSR. On 13 September Radio Peiping announced that the US Air Force from 26 August to 11 September flew a total of 740 sorties over Northeast China. The Chinese people are quoted as being "extremely indignant." 25X1 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/09/Oa : CIA-RDP91T01172R000200110001-8 For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org Approved For Re %ate 2004/09/03 : ClA-RDP91T01172R019200110001-8 SECRET 25X1 Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 9312, 19 September 1952 DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN I, Military Operations Amaz The western front in Korea erupted during the night of 18.September. In the US 3rd Division sector north of Kangso-ari, two outposts late in the evening. Communications with Chinese companies attacked US the beleaguered unit were broken and a patrol was sent out to re-establish contact, but was forced back by heavy fire. At the same time all along the 3rd Division front, there was heavy artillery and mortar fire. To the northeast, the Chinese launched another push to take "Old Baldy." An enemy battalion, supported by artillery, tortar and tank fire hand-to-hand combat and forced the closed to withdrawal of defending US 2n1 Division infantrymen from the left side of the hill. LB oounterattaCk this morning was meeting heavy resistance. Action continuedA. in both the US 2nd and 3rd Division sectors at the close of the report period. In the east central sector, the Chinese again attempted to drive the ROC Capital Division from "Finger Ridge" near Tulsa. Two determined attacks company strength were launched during the in night of 18 Septembers but were repulsed by the South Koreans. ,Lil Sn Naval air sorties on 18 September totaled 294, Targets frcm Nanat to Yangdok on the east coast were attacked while on the west coast, aircraft from the British carrier Ocean strafed installations in the Chinnampo-Eaeju area, Surface units maintained the blockade and bombarded supply and troop installs. tions on both Korean coasts, ALL' landbased aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 964 effective sorties on 18 September of which 591 were combat. In a daylight raid, bombers attacked a railroad bridge 24 light near Yangdok in central Korea. During the period, 32 MIG's were observed and 9 encountered in the Chongchon-Yalu River area, There was no damage to UN aircraft while one RIG was reportedly damaged. During the night, 16 effective medium bomber missions were flown; 12 of which botbed a supply center Just north of Pyongyang. 25X1 SECI1ET THE C.I.A. F74f; MO OBJECTION TO THE DECIASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCIWNT. Approved For Release 2004/09/0/3 : CIA-RDP91T0g3729441901,10001-8 tvg For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org \4 25X1 Approved Fon& lease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117911d00200110001-8 - SMUT 25X1 II, Military Intelligence Air On 16 September UN pilots obserted two enemy aircraft taking off from Antung airfield which trailed white smoke siOilar to *MCP .- jet-assisted takeoff, The silver.Ooldred aircraft cliMbed rePidIy fres' 3,000 to 8,000 feet Far East Air Force OamMents that while the Communists are believed to hate developed JATO there has been no confirmation of its use in the Korean air War. It is con,cleded that the details of the above report are insufficient to confirm this sighting as JATO0 III, General Situation. Prot:agenda The ES Embassy in Stockholm reports that in a press conference sponsored by the International Scientific Ccamthedxm4 most of the newspapermen -- some of them Communists -- were visibly or outspokenly critiaal of the Commission's "findings" concerning the DN's use of BW in the Korean war, The Embassy believes that the presentation of the "evidence" of germ warfare by the Swedish member of the Commission was a complete flop. 25X1 nem 2 Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91701172R0002001100014 For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org "--" Approved For Rogias 1721%00200110001-8 25X1 Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 9315, 23 September 1952 DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN I. Military Operations The heaviest fighting along the front on 22 September eastern sector where North Koreans attacked outpost positions occurred in the of the ROK 8th Division at Hill 812. The enemy company withdrew after a seven-hour fight. Later in the day, the North Koreans, reinforced to battalion strength, again attacked and temporarily secured the objective. ROK companies counterattacked and ejected the enemy early in the evening. A total of 7,900 rounds of artillery and mortar fire fell during these encounters. Elsewhere along the front the action was characterized by patrol and probing action. Zia n UN naval aircraft flew 80 sorties on 22 September witil the total tally incomplete. Air targets, primarily transportation facilities, on the Korean west coast were in the vicinity of Hanchon and Haeju. No report was received regarding east coast air activity of Task Force 77. SurfaCe vessels bombarded enemy troop and supply installations between Chongjin and Wonsan on the Korean east coast and in the vicinity of Cho Island on the west coast. On 22 September, land-based aircraft flew 825 effective sorties of which 486 were combat. In a daylight raid 208 fighter-bombers attacked supply and troop installations near the enemy front line in the east and east central zones. During the report period, UN fighter pilots observed 19 MIG's and encountered 9 in the Chongchon-Yalu River area. In the encounters five 11I01s were damaged with no damage to friendly aircraft. During the night, Far East Bomber Command mounted 14 effective sorties. A supply area in Sopo, near Pyongyang, was bombed hy 10 of the aircraft. Military Intelligence Air On three occasions UN pilots have observed anF-84 Thunderjet which the Communists apparently have recovered and made operational. The first two sightings occurred on 18 and 19 September near the front line in the US I Corps 25X1 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/09101 : CIA-RDP911(11172R009260,/g 00 . For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org 25X1 Approved ForiWiease2004/09/03 CIA-RDP91T0117M1000200110001-8 stain 25X1 sector. The third observation took place on 20 September in "NIG Alley." In two of the three observations, the UN pilots stated the plane had the standard US Air Force star insignia on the fuselage and wings. The Directorate of Intelligence, Far East Air Force, comments that a sufficient number of 7-841s have been lost in enemy territory to enable the Communists to recover and make operational this type of aircraft. (This is the first report of the enemy using an 7-84. There have been a number of previous occasions when hostile 7-801s were reported.) III. General Situation Political The South Korean Office of Public Information announced on 19 September that a delegation representing pro-Rhee Koreans in Japan had arrived in Pusan to discuss several "problems" with the ROK Government. The delegation submitted a petition which, inter alia, sought permission for the representatives of these Koreans to attend the now suspended Korean-Japanese talks, the granting of loans by the Bank of Korea to Koreans in Japan, and the improvement of relations between the Korean diplomatic mission in Japan and the residents there. (This right-wing group controls less than 30 percent of the 800,000 Koreans in Japan, who are predominantly North Korean sympathizers.) ' Pronaganda A 21 September Peiping broadcast stated that the "International Scientific Committee" presented "incontrovertible evidence" that the UN has engaged in bacteriological warfare in Korea. The harangue said the US "had the nerve" to repeat its call for an impartial investigation even after the findings of this unbiased group. (Newsmen, including leftists, indicated that a recent Committee press conference, held in Stockholm to present proof of the BW allegations, was a complete flop.) SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/09/03 CIA-RDP91T01172R000200110001-8 For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org HR70-14 HR70-14 110f SECRET CANCYE FAR EAST FAR EAST 4, North Nor,th Korean unit u n i t receives r e c e i v e s large l a r g e shipments s h i p m e n t s .of o f infantrx infantry weaponsl A,North Korean%init, to t he orth K o r e a n ' u n i t , ssu6ordinate u b o r d i n a t e to h e V COrpe, rps, m&Eaged on o n 20 20 July J u l y listing l i s t i n g the t h e amounts amounts of, gweapons iapons sent two meSsage4 and equipment which it i t had received. r e c e i v e d . The shipments s h i p m e n t s la^ icnrand celuded: l u d e d : 132 1 3 2 light and 8 heavy machine guns, g u n s , 12 1 2 445mm 5 m m antiantittank a n k guns, 214 rifles rifl,es and and some some 929 boxes boxes of of "light "light Korea, ALT 255 ammunition." (CANOE 330th 3 3 0 t h Comm Recon Co Korea, ammunition." (CANOE and ALT ALT 252, 262, 21 21 July J u l y 52) 52) OF I Comment: Comments This T h i s is tthe h e first firsttime t i m e in i n over o v e r aa year.that year t h a t North-tiFe'WE:u n units haver ereceived a r g e sshipient h i p m e n t of of Northi t s have c e i v e d ssuch u c h aa llarge basic b a s i c infantry i n f a n t r y equipment, equipment. 5,. 5 Attempted poisoning p o i s o n i n g of of North N o r t h Korean Korean troops troops revealed: reveqled: The commander commander of'an o f ' a n artillery a r t i l l e r y hattalien, b a t t a l i o n . possibly D o s a i b l v subiordiT sub'ordir nate nate td t d the t h e 8th 8 t h North N o r t h Korean K o r e a n -Division,.informed D i v i s i o n , Informed his superior superior J u l y that t h a t "in ';in the-troop t h s troop area area arsenic a r s e n i c was u t into i n t o the the on 20 July was p put well." w e l l . " There T h e r e wai was no "damage," "damage,1' but b u t the commander sstated t a t e d that that a search search for f o r the t h e culprits c u l p r i t s was.under wa6 u n d e r way. way. (CANOE 3 0 t h Comm a (CANOE 3330th Comm Recon Co C o Korea, Korea, ALT-260, ALT-260, 21 2 1 July J u l y 52) 52) - Comment: Communicatioqs i n t e l l i g e n c e rrecently e c b n t l y rrevealed. eveaied Communications intelligence t h a t -th r e a n ssoldiers o l d i e r s ddied i e d from o o d obthat TiriNET-th KKorean from ,poisoned poisOned ffood tained t a i n e d from from civilians. c i v i i a n s . This T h i s first f i r s t incident I n c i d e n t also ccurred' also ooccurred' on t h e east east coast coast but b u t farther f a r t h e r north n a r t h in i n the t h e Vreorps V Corps area. area. on the P I t is is possible, p o s s i b l e tthat h a t these t h e s e poisonings. p o i s o n i n g s were were perpetrated, perpetratedl It b y NOrth NortP Korean civilians. c i v i l i a n s . These These messages messages may, may, however, however, by iindidate n d i c a t e ground'work ground work for f o r further f u r t h e r propaganda propaganda blasts b l a s t s charging. charging t h e UUnited n i t e d NNations a t i o n s with s i n g BW and CW CW warfare, warfare, the. with uusing BW and - 6, Enemy rreportedly e p o r t e d l y concentrates d e f e n s e of'Manchurian of'Manchurian ,Enemy concentrates on defense border: between 114 and 20 20 J July b o r d e r : Colimunications Coinmun'ications ppassed a s s e d between 4 and u l y oon n -sian GCI e t at n d i c a t e that t h a t enemy planes planes th9T.ussian GCI nnet at Antung Antung iindicate t o be mote more active a c t i v e in In protecting p r o t e c t i n g the t h e Manchurian c o n t i n u e to continue b o r d e r than t h a n in i n defending d e f e n d i n g Pyongyang. Pyongyang. When UN bombers border 10 July, J u l y , 23 23 Communist Communist planes p l a n e s were, were r a i d e d Pyongyang Pyongyang on on 10 raided airborne. Instead I n s t e a d of of protecting. p r o t e c t i n g Pyongyang, h e y concenPyongyang, tthey concenairborne. t h e Antung Antung area. area. (CANOE (CANOE Air Foree Force t r a t e d on on patrolling p a t r o l l i n g the trated Roundup 22 July J u l y 52) 52) Roundup 141, 1 4 1 , 22 Comment; Russian-manned Russian-manned jet j e t units u n i t s incllanchpria'have. in U a n c h p r i a have ComMent: bombers in In p u r s u m r r a t i c ppolicy o l i c y iin n iintercepting n t e r c e p t i n g UN bombers pursuW3-071.grratic r e c e n t weeks. weeks. While While failing f a i l i n g to t o disrupt d i s r u p t UN UN attacks attacks on o n the the recent 33 J u l y 52 52 24 july TOP SECRET CANOE APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: .18-Mar-2010 18-Mar2010 For info on OCR and PDF Compression go to our website Ci s/..5 w ' ' Mt' SECRET CANGt: 5 "'t tS in in late late June June and and on on Pyongyang Pyongyang on on 10 10Julyi. Julyd power plVits power they made, mad aa determined to break up the the they determined effort effort on on 4 4 July July-to break.uP on aa Nbrth North Korean Korean military military academy academy near near pakchu Sakchq in in attack on northwest Korea. Korea. NR 4 4 TOP SECRET CANOE For info on OCR and PDF Compression go to our website 24 July July 52 52 24 HR70-14 HR70-14 TOP SECRET CANCt FAR EAST 6. On North Koxeans Ky!eans expect use use of of BW BW by by United United Nations: Nat-ions: On 17 August tfie'North the Nor'th K Ibrean o r e a n m21st s t Brigade Brigadenotified notaied aA battalion battalion commander of of aa Chinese Chinese Communist Communit intelligence commqnder intelligence report report that that on 13 August for experiment" experiment" August the the US US Army Army shipped shipped ."creatures "creatures for from aa Seoul Seoul suburb suburb to to Taegu. Taegu. On the the same same day, day, the the Chinese Chinese report report continued, continued, another another American Army unit u n i t transported transported five f i v e tons tons of of "experimental "experimental material," probably dead rats, from Taegu to an unspecified air base. all units units should should be be on on base. The sender sender cautions cautions that that all the watch for for the the "anticipated" lsanticipated"enemy enemy use use of of bacteriological bacteriological warfare. (CANOE 15118M/2253 Korea; 330th 330th Comm Comm Recon Recon Co Korea, 15RsM/2253 Korea; Korea, warfare. (CANOE ALT-765, 17 ALT-765, 17 Aug A u 52) ~52) Comment: Comment: On several several occasions occasions during during the the Korean Korean war, war, the Communist C m t device device of of passing passing this this type type of of intelligence intelligence to subordinate units has been a sufficient cue for return reports which are then used as "proof" of Communist propaganda charges. 4 TOP SECRET CANOE APPROVED APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: 18-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010 For more information on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org 21 Aug Aug 52 52 21 Cib '5469 I Approves:149r Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TOW16A00120030o001-6 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION 19 September 1952 US OFFICIALS ONLY OCI No. 9382 Copy No. 297 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re- ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office 43f Current Intelligence. DOS AND DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File RETURN TO ARCHIVES 8 RECORDS CENTER IMMEIATELY AFTER USE SECRET JOB 77- //si Box_ SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004,0q;30-101 To learn about PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org 6' 6 Approved Apr Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T0106A001200300001-6 SECRET THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. GENERAL 1. Peiping's reaction to Moscow talks: Chinese Communist comment to date on the announced results of the Sino-Soviet talks reveals sensitivity to possible charges that Peiping was outmaneuvered by its ally. Official Chinese Communist releases argue that the two agreements are to the "practical interest" of China. From Peiping's point of view, the reasons cited for extending the Port Arthur agreement -- the threat posed by Japan and the possible expansion of the Korean war -- are valid. Peiping's assertion that the USSR "is prepared to shoulder all responsibilities beneficial to peace" in the Far East hints at the possibility that a larger Soviet military guarantee resulted from the talks. Peiping's position in Chinese eyes would be greatly improved by announcement of agreements on further Soviet economic and military aid. Moscow and Peiping may still be working out the details of such agreements. (Factual data from: C Hong Kong 729, 18 Sept; R FBIS Peiping, 17 Sept 52) 2. Communist bacteriological warfare campaign being revived: Soviet propaganda media publicized Peiping's 15 September announcement that the International Scientific Commission has "concluded its work and confirmed that the armed forces of the United States have waged bacteriological warfare against Korea .and northeast China." The Peiping radio on 14 September broadcast the scientists' statement made at a press conference held on 31 August, and subsequently began to broadcast "confessions" of recentlycaptured American officers and contents of the commission's report,. This report consists of 19 chapters and 46 appendices SECRET 1 19 Sept 52 Approved For Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001200300001-6 To learn about PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org ApprovedUt Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01446A001200300001-6 SECRET containing 300,000 words, and has been published in English, French, Russian and Chinese. Embassy officials in Stockholm reported that the presenta7 tion of the "evidence of germ warfare in Korea" at a press conference given by Dr. Andrea Andree, a member of the investigating commission, was a "complete flop." (R Stockholm 341, 17 Sept; R FBIS Moscow, 17 Sept; II Moscow 509, 17 Sept 52) Comment: The report of this investigating commission is among-THU-Wet serious efforts to date to substantiate the familiar BW charges. The release of this material seems timed to coincide with the Asian Peace Conference, where the BM issue most likely will be discussed. The document may be presented at that time as "authoritative scientific proof" of Communist charges. 3 . 25X6 SOVIET UNION 4. French delegation visits Soviet Union: According to the French Communist press, a sixteen-member delegation from the Franco-Soviet Friendship Association left Paris on 11 August for a visit to the Soviet Union. This was the second such French group to go to the Soviet Union in a month and a half. SECRET 2 19 Sept 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001200300001-6 To learn about PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org Security IxIThrmation Central Intelligence Agency Central I n t e l l i g e n c e hemy Office of of Current Current IIntelligence Offiue ntelligence 9902, 13 13 October October 1952 1952 9902, DAILY KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N D A I L Y Military Omrations Orerations:8 Military Army grnor 11 positions on Hill Hill 395 395 iin 9th ROK ROK Heavy ffighting i g h t i n g raged on on 1 1 October October for positions n tthe h e 9th Chinese Commdats, Communists, attacking attacking in in battalion battalion Division sector sector on on the t h e central c e n t r a l front, front. Chinese strength, succeeded iin 100;yard penetration of of ROK ROK positions positions in in tthe strength, n eeffecting f f e c t i n g a lOO-prd he late afternoon. =troops contained l a t e afternoon. UlRi troops containedthe thepenetration penetrationand andfighting f i g h t i n g continued oontinued with with the enemy in of the hill hill iin the early early morn= morni n possession possession of of positions positions on tthe h e ecrest r e s t of n the In the ROK Division Division sector iing n g of of 12 12 October. October. In t h e third t h i r d ROK seotor on on the t h e east e a s t central a e n t r a l front, front, the South South Koreans Koreans repulsed repulsed attacks a t t a c k s after after severe severe fighting. fighting. On 9th ROK ROK Division Division eection section ffor O n 12 October heavy ffighting i g h t i n g continued iin n tthe h e 9th or hill positions, The 30th 30th ROK ROK regiment regiment attacked attacked through through positions positions of of the the 29th 29th MU. positions. The Friendly regiment regiment and and succeeded succeeded in in reaching reaching the the forward farward slope elope of of Hill H i l l 395. 395. Friendly Els* elements elements were were continuing aontinuing the t h e attack a t t a c k at a t the the close close of of the t h e report report period. period. Elsewhere scattered where scattered probes probes and and patrol p a t r o l clashes clashes occurred. occurred. Navy lJavg n tthe he On NO air activity No rreport e p o r t was received received regarding regarding naval navalair a c t i v i t y for f o r 12 12 October. October. O previous day carrier-based planes flew 75 sorties against North Korean.transportaprevious day oarrier-based p h n e a flew 75 s o r t i e s a g a i n s t North Korean traneportaof Tanohon, Tanchon, Iwon and and Wonsan Wonoan on tthe east ttion i o n and supply supply targets t a r g e t s iin n the vvicinity i c i n i t y of h e east surface vessels coast Naval surface vessels u o a s t and and between between Chinnampo Chinnampo and and Ongjin Ongjin on on the t h e west west coast. coast. Naval on 11 and 12 bombarded enemy enemy gun gun positions positions and and supply supply routes routes iin on 11and 12 October October bombarded n tthe he Songjin Cho Island Ongjin west, Songjln and and Chaho Chaho areas areas in i n the t h e east east and at a t Cho Island and O n g j i n iin n tthe h e west. Air Air On On 11 ll October October aa total t o t a l of of 945 945 effectif6 effectifre sorties s o r t i e s by by land-based land-based planes planes was was flown flown of of which whiuh 554 554 were were coMbat. oombat. UN Il1y pilots p i l o t s observed observed 95 95 eneqy enemy MIGtS MIG's and and encountered encountered 45, all all in i n the t h e Ialu-Chongchon YalucChongohon River River area. area. Six S i x MIGIs MIWs were deetrayed, and 6even 45, were destroyed, and seven damaged with with aa loss lass of of one one UE E4 F-86, F a , During D u r i n g the the night night Far Far East Egst Bomber Bomber Command Command damaged mounted mounted 16 16 effective e f f e c t i v e sorties sorties, attacking attacking ground ground installations installations a Pongchongol in In att Pongchongol north central o e n t r a l Korea Korea and and TaegUmi Taegumi on on the t h e east east coast coast and l o s e support north and f'urnishing furnishing c close support for f o r the the US u6 II IX Corpe. C o r p s . On On the t h e following following day, day, 1,407 1,407 sorties sorties by land-based planes planes by land-based were were flown, flown, including including 991 991 coMbat. combat. During D u r i n g these these sorties sorties 147 147 MIGIs NIGta were were observed observed and and 69 69 encountered, enoountered. Ulf uI1 ppilots i l o t s destroyed four others. others. destroyed four four MIG's MIGIs and and damaged damaged.four One UN UW F-51 a 6 was h e aair i r battles. One 1-51 was was destraged destroyed and and one one FP-86 was damaged damaged during during t the battles, A A t o t a l of of 29 29 bomber bomber missions flown, 26 of tthe h e aircraft total missions wa8 was flown, 26 of aircraft attauldng attacking troop troop concon, centrations centrations on on Haeju Haeju Peninsula, Peninsula. I\ ~ e c ~ i ~ Security Inforination 1 1 For a comprehensive guide on PDF Compression and OCR visit our website THE C.I.A. C. I . A . HAS HAS NO THE NO OBJECTION OBJECTION TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION OF TO DECLASSIFICATION OF ~THIS NoD THISt DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. i * ~ ,, ,9 Nob 7 J10 197A h 0 V 's\acR$,tion ICRETtm Security s e o n r i t y Info Info w- tion General General Situation: Situatioqr Political The Central Committee of the South South Korean Korean pro-gwermment pro-government Uberal Liberal The Central Executive &ecutive Conmdttee of the 'Party addressed aa lletter on 1 10 October tto General lrkrrk Nark Clark Clark b bitterly Party addressed e t t e r on 0 October o General i t t e r l y protesting protesting the employment the employment of of Japanese Japaneee stevedores etevedoree and and barges bargee in In South South Korean Korean porta. porta. Propaganda -Fagaada The delegate tto Asian Peace Conference In in Peiping Peiping The principal prlnclprl North North Korean Korean delegate o the Asian Eeace Conference informed that body, acoordlng according tto Radio pyongyang on 9 9 Ootober, October, of of tthe "concrete informed that body, o Radio Pp-ongyang on h e "concrete The aotions actions advocated advocated were weme the the s t e p for steps for putting putting an an end end to t o the the Korean Korean war," war." The rreturn e t u r n of of a all l l POW's, R"e, an an Immediate immediate seeetXtion cessation of of 06 DS germ germ warfare warfare and and indisclYlminate indiscriminate boMhing, punishment withdrawal of of all all foreign foreign troop troops bombing, punishment of of war criminals, criminale, and the uithdrawal (The addition of the and war addition of the BU, BW, bombing, bombing, and war from Korea from Korea after after aa truce t r w e is l e reached, rewhed. (The first lintroduction of these these eleslents elements ab as oondicondic r i m i ~ punishment punishment l lines iS 16 the the first n t r o d w t i o a of criminal lines %ions for for the the successful eucceaeFul conclusion conclusion of o f the t h e war.) war.) tions Security Izionatton. 2 For a comprehensive guide on PDF Compression and OCR visit our website Approved Apr Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T0106A001200300001-6 SECRET THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. GENERAL 1. Peiping's reaction to Moscow talks: Chinese Communist comment to date on the announced results of the Sino-Soviet talks reveals sensitivity to possible charges that Peiping was outmaneuvered by its ally. Official Chinese Communist releases argue that the two agreements are to the "practical interest" of China. From Peiping's point of view, the reasons cited for extending the Port Arthur agreement -- the threat posed by Japan and the possible expansion of the Korean war -- are valid. Peiping's assertion that the USSR "is prepared to shoulder all responsibilities beneficial to peace" in the Far East hints at the possibility that a larger Soviet military guarantee resulted from the talks. Peiping's position in Chinese eyes would be greatly improved by announcement of agreements on further Soviet economic and military aid. Moscow and Peiping may still be working out the details of such agreements. (Factual data from: C Hong Kong 729, 18 Sept; R FBIS Peiping, 17 Sept 52) 2. Communist bacteriological warfare campaign being revived: Soviet propaganda media publicized Peiping's 15 September announcement that the International Scientific Commission has "concluded its work and confirmed that the armed forces of the United States have waged bacteriological warfare against Korea .and northeast China." The Peiping radio on 14 September broadcast the scientists' statement made at a press conference held on 31 August, and subsequently began to broadcast "confessions" of recentlycaptured American officers and contents of the commission's report,. This report consists of 19 chapters and 46 appendices SECRET 1 19 Sept 52 Approved For Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001200300001-6 To learn about PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org HR70-I 4 CANUE 9DeLsX FAR EAST 1. North Koreans lay groundwork for renewal of BW charges: Two recent North Korean military messages may lsdicate a revival of the Orbit's BW propaganda campaign. The first mesaage, on 20 November, was a report of "insects" November and Whtch have been positively tdentlfied as belng unusual," The sender added that there had been "no cases of illnessTvand that preventlve measures were being taken. US Army Korea 20 NOV,7 Dec 62 A second message, on 6 December, located "quantities of.insects that carry bacteria" in the North Korean sector of the front lines and attributed their spread to the %arbarous United States empire." Preventive measures against smallpox and typhus, both endemic in North Korea, were stressed in the message. Similar "discoveries" by enemy ' field units in early 1952 p r m basis for a major Communist propaganda theme'of 1952--American use of BW in Korea. The primary purpose of that campaign was to further the "hate America" theme with a secondary aim of improving sanitation and controlling '.diseasein North Korea. Comment: The timing of this effort may be intended to coincide with the scheduled consideration of Communist BW charges in the UN. 2. -3- FA' CANOE PPROVED FOR RELEASE ATE: 24-Mar-2010 'APPROVED FORRELEASEDATE:,,, RELEASEDATE, APPROVED FOR 20-Jan-2010 I cCON1DENTIAL o v U SSR SURVEY USSR SURVEY -- 1 1 TTWO W O 1 1 DECEMBER 11 DECEMBER 1952 1952 CAMPS CAMPS /{p WAA KOREAN WAQ */ Moscow continues on the the U.N. U.N. debate debate of of the the Moscow continues its i t s concentration concentration on Korean question. question. Vishineky Vishinsky's denunciation of of tthe Indian propoeal proposal '6 denunciation h e Indian Korean on 24 24 November November is is followed followed by by aa temporary temporary increase increase iin comment n comment on while the Soviet proposal, proposal, also also.introduced while the amendments amendments to t o the the Soviet introduced on 24 24 November, November, occasion on occasion renewed renewed attention attention to t o the the positive positive feature of However, anticipating anticipating the feature of the the Soviet Soviet stand. stand. However, the adoption of resolution, Moscow Mbscow reduces reduces the the adoption of the the Indian Indian resolution, volume of the U.N. U.N. a as well as as tto other s well o other volume of attention attentian related related tto o the aspects of of the the Korean war war even even before before the the 4 4 December December aspects Assembly vote. Peking comment in i n general general coincides coincides with with the the Assembly vote. Peking comment Mbscow h b S C 0 W position. pO6itiOn* -t -49- P d L'J &dimzjiaUxamull_Le_Amalc_Trici_s22._ctverdiaan.itace: Pro~os a1 is Amerl. can Trick t o Prevent Peace: Moscow broadcasts Moscow broadcasts continue o attack Indian proposal f t e r it continue tto attack the the Indian proposal aafter it was was categorically categorically rejected rejected o the charge that t h a t the the by by Vishinsky Vishinsky on on 24 24 November. November. In In addition addition tto the original original charge proposal American resolution,11 resolution," broadcasts broadcasts proposal adhered adhered to t o the the "notorious Wotorious American allege tthat the proposal proposal (1) (1) does does not not insure insure the the solution solution of of the the WW POW allege h a t the (2) delays delays the the repatriation re a t r i a t i o n of of a l l POWs, PWs, (3) (3) makes for problem, (2) problem, all makes no no provision provisiOn for n tthat h a t the immediate cease-fire, cease-fire, and immediate and $4) (4) is is unrealistic unrealistic iin the mediator mediator called called Since f o r in i n the the India-proposed India-proposed commission.would commission would be be appointed appointed by by the the U.N. U.N. for Since the U.N. U.N. considers considers itself i t s e l f part part of of the the Korean Korean wwar, a r p "how %ow then then can can it it aact c t as the as arbitor a r b i t o r or.judge or'judge in i n this this dispute?" dispute?I1 TThis h i s reference,to reference to the the United United Nations Nations a8 aa belligerent belligerent in i n the the Korean Korean fighting fighting is is in i n contrast o the as contiast tto the usual usual singling out out of of the the United United States States as as the the enemy. enemy. It singling It may may be be an an indication indication of of Moscow'e,efforts to t o fully f u l l y explain explain its its rejection rejection of of the the Indian I n d i a n proposal. proposal. Moscow's,efforts . ~ . , I ' In Moscow reVeRls reVeRls Xn aa further further attempt attempt to t o explain explain the the Soviet Soviet rejection, rejection, Nbscow that--in view view of of the the more more independent independent attitude a t t i t u d e of that--in of the the Arab-Asian Arab-Asian delegates delegates at sessionthe United a t this session--the UnitedStates Stateswas was forced foraed to t o resort resort to to trickery trickery tto o gain Arab-Asian Arab-Asian support. gain support. The Soviet Soviet amendment amendment calling calling for for an an immediate immediate cease-fire cease-fire and and settlement settlement The of the the P W question question by by two-thirds two-thirds vote in the is of POW vote in the proposed proposed Korean Korean compliseion commission is stressed in i n what w h a t seems seems to t o be be an an attempt attempt to t o exploit exploit the the belief belief that t h a t "the "the stressed peoples of of India India and and other other Asian Asian nations nations would would be be concerned concerned if i f their their peoples delegates voted voted against against an an armistice armistice in i n Korea." Korea.I1 delegates - t o bolster bolster Soviet Soviet rejection rejection of of the the Indian Indian resolution resolution NIoscow further i b r t h e r seeks eeeks to Moscow of Chou Chou En-lai and Pak Pak Hun Hun Yong. Yong. by broadcasting broadcasting the the official o f f i c i a l statements statements of by En-lai and ligy_Ej§_Zoozp_y_gw_z_Confessio.edcw: lew Bw Confessions ltcmo r e d bv Moscow: Pyongyang Pyongyang on on 44 December December reports reports the the in the the confessions of of two two more.American more American officers o f f i c e r s who admitted their t h e i r part part in cOnfessions who admitted One is is aa alleged alleged use use of of bacterial bacterial warfare warfare by by American American forces foraes in i n Korea. Korea. One member of of the the Air member A i r Force, Force, as as were were the the other other confessers, confeesere, while while the the second second is is Althoughdetail's d e t a i l s as a8 to to identified only only as as aa member member of of a."dhemical a %hemica1 wit.11 identified unit." Although place and time t i m e of of the the use Use of of BW BW are are not.mentioned, not mentioned, the the Charges aharges presumably presumably place and r e f e r to t o recent recent developmenta developments inasmuch inasmuch as gs one one of of the the officers o f f i c e r s arrived arrived in in refer the Far East East on on 77 July July 1952, 1952, Neither Neither Moscow Moscow nor nor Peking Peking has'reported has reported these these the Far confessions. confesslone. I C4311DEIN'T`.1-41. For a comprehensive guide on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org t I USSR SURVEY 'USSR SURVEY 1 1 DECEMBER 11 DECEMBER 1952 1952 CONFThRTIAL -- 22 -- Peking however on 88 December s part e r i e s of Peking however on December broadcasts broadcasts aas part of of its its present present sseries of message8 messages from from U.S. U.S. prisoners, prisoners, one one addressed addressed tto o the the people people of of South South Carolina by Floyd O'Neal, which repeated repeated h his confession of of pparticipation by Lt. L t . Floyd O'Neal, which i s confession arthipation Carolina iin n the use of e f e r s ttoo the the the alleged alleged use of bacterial bacterial warfare. warfare. O'Neal O'Neal also also rrefers American and appeals appeals tto the American bombing bombing of of North North Korean Korean civilians civilians and and cities c i t i e s and o the residents of South South Carolina Carolina to t o support support peace peace in i n Korea. Korea. residents of Intended Use Use of Having previously previously ignored ignored Jntendsd of AAslatic B h t i C TrOODS TrooDs Reporte4: Renort eq: Having speculation--which arose during during the S . election speculation--which arose the U U.S. election campaign--over campaign--over the the use use of Asian Asian troops Asians, Moscow Moscow notee notes aa Tokyo Tokyo press press report report tthat of troops to t o ffight i g h t Asiane, hat 8,300 are already n Korea h a t the 8,000 JaFane5e Japanese volunteers volunteers are already iin Korea end and tthat the National National Security Security Corps Corps will w i l l soon soon be be dispatched dispatched to t o Korea. Korea. Moscow Moscow also also repeats repeats charges h e t Assistant charges tthat Assistant Secretwy Secretary of of State State Allison Allison mught sought new new mercenaries mercenaries during his h i s visit v i s i t to t o Japan. Japm. Krainov are now now in in during Krainov reports reports that that negotiations negotiations are progress of Chiang Chiang and and David David Bruce, Bruce, progress in i n Washington Washington between between the the representative representative of of State, State, for f o r the the use use of of Kuomintang Kuomintang troops troop8 in i n Korea. Korea. acting Secretary of acting Secretary These charges oharges are are grouped grouped with with other other reports concerning the These reports concerning the expnding expanding South South Korean army army and and the the American American intention intention to t o force and Chinese Korean force Korean Korean and Chinese t o serve serve in in the the Chiang Chiang and and Rhee Rhee armies. armies. Although Although Moscow Moscow reports reports prisoners to prisoners of intended ilse of the the use use and and intended use of of Japanerae Japanese and and Kuornintang Kuomintang troops troops have have n news appeared through9ut the o r them o appeared throughout the year year iin news stories, stories, it it is is unusual unusual ffor them tto be be reported reported in i n commentary commentary form. form. But But the the present commentary does present commentary does not not passing reference reference is is made made to t o General General present detailed argumentation; present detailed argumentation; only only passing Eisenhowerts t o Korea. Korea. Eisenhower's trip t r i p to Anti-Aircraft e : Moscow Anti-Aircraft Capabilities. Canabilities. POW POW Outra Outr s e Moscow continues continues to to report the Communist Communist forces forces report the the increased increased anti-aircraft anti-aircraft cap ilities of the North Korea. iin n North Korea, AA Borzenko Borzenko dispatch dispatch to t o PRAVDA PR4VDA reports reporto that t h a t travel t r a v e l over over Korean roads roads is i s now now safe safe even even in i n the the daytime dsytime because because "Korean "Korean aanti-aircraft nti-aircraft Korean units aremow are?nowsosogood good that t h a t American American flying flying fortresses fortresses are are keeping keeping well well out out . units of of range." range.!' This azid other other Korean Ic$rem strength This and strength references references have have not not yet yet been been broadcast broadcast to t o Korea. Korea. Mbscow Moscow has has also also revealed revealed more POW outrages, outrages, with 1400 more pow with 1400 Communist prisoners prisoners killed killed in in atomic atomic experiments experiments in i n ' l1951 9 5 1 and and hundreds hundreds more more Communist k i l l e d by by more more conventional conventional weapons weapons such such as flamethrowers, machine killed as flamethrowers, machine guns guns ,. .w.d.. grenades.. ..:. . . ... . . ~ . .. .,..._.~...._ ...._._...._......__._... _...._...._......-.. ~ . ~ .. : a For a comprehensive guide on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org I ...._.._......j.......l.._. ~ se 20536962kfrelittiyeT00,e 19 December 1952 25 Copy No. 25, 25X1 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. o DECLASSIFIED Clit4WPHANGED TO: TS N43.11r14,13.AJT Aa A 70- Dr. 25X1 Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25X1 Id / State Department review completed Sae 204X1P2SEXAMPF9TorlyeleS 1 To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression go to ThePaperlessOffice.org Approve For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-R0P79T00975A00090 0580001-8 25X1A SUMMARY GENERAL 1. Communist literature on BW distributed in Vienna (page 3). FAR EAST 25X1 2. January (page 3). 25X1 major Korean political crisis in NEAR EAST - AFRICA 4. Serious rioting in Morocco expected within 30 days (page 4). EASTERN EUROPE 5. Yugoslays believe they have excellent bargaining position on Trieste issue (page 5). WESTERN EUROPE 6. Schuman sees Saar settlement by late February (page 5). 25X1 25X1A -225X1A Appro d For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0009 00580001-8 To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression go to ThePaperlessOffice.org Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00090 0580001-8 25X1A GENERAL 1. 25X1A Communist literature on BW distributed in Vienna: Several publications summarizing "evidence" on the American use of biological warfare are being distributed at a BW exhibition currently being held in Vienna under the sponsorship of the Chinese and us r n peace councils. Comment: There is no evidence that the recent revival of Communist charges of American use of biological warfare foreshadows another concerted Communist propaganda campaign of proportions similar to the one earlier this year. The current accusations seem designedto up-date such charges in order to document Soviet arguments on the subject in current international forums. FAR EAST 25X1 Imajor Korean political crisis in January: 2.1 25X1 25X1A 25X1 'Mee undoubtedly faces another major political battle with opposition Assemblymen during January. The forthcoming political crisis, which will probably be similar to last spring's, will involve the appointment of a prime minister by Rhee and elections for the upper house of the National Assembly. 25X1 Rhee's choice for prime minister, either Pam k Tu-chin or vi Ki-pong, will not be acceptable to the Assembly while the creation of the upper house will meet with "blast-furnace resistance" by the legislators, who realize that a second house would limit their powers. I Comment: American officials in Korea believe that Rhee's recent public threats against the Assembly are the opening moves in another attempt to curb its powers. With the Assembly apparently as intractable as Rhee, there is little likelihood that it would be susceptible to Rhee's requests. - 3 -25X1A Approve cl For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-R0P79T00975A000900580001-8 To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression go to ThePaperlessOffice.org APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE; -.. FAR EAST SURVEY F . -Al- 4 .--BW A N D THE K O R E A N 27 FEBRUARY 1953 W A R New l i f e has been infused i n t o the quiescent bacteriological warfare campign by charges made on 20 February t h a t gerwwarfsre a c t i v i t y over Korea and Northeast China contindss uabe'csd, and by the release of the "confessions" of two Zield-grade American Marine o f f i c e r s a t t e s t i n g t o t h e i r direction of various phases of +,he campaign. The following coneiderations derive from t h i s l a t e s t deveI.o;ullent: a, The pressnt revival is i n many wa73 reminiscent of the short-term s9L-t of midSeptember 1952 occasioned by the isouaiize of the InternatAonal S c i e n t i f i c Commissionts detailed b r i e f on American BW criminall.ty and the confessions of Lieutenants Kzlies and OsNezl. However, e s s e n t i a l differences 2n coatent aod me:bode of exp l o i t a t i o n suggest t h a t the present phaae may have a more apecif i c scope and direction. b. Although the new confessions go i n t o conoiderable d e t a i l concerning names, places, datas and pollcy implementation, they lack the precise attention t o minutiae and the insight i n t o Amerlcan psychology which endowed t h e Knios -0 *Neal revelations with the veneer o f extreme objectivity. c. Other elements which seem primarily intended t o buttress fundamental Communist propaganda l i n e s f u t h e r detract from the c r e d i b i l i t y of the charges. d. Although the revival of mid-September 1952 d i d not h3ve the expected bearing on U.N. sessions and other majog events that immediately fol.lowcd because of i t s .-+ extremely short-term duration, there ape firm indications t h a t the present resurgence is related t o tho resumption of the U.N. sessions. I*'( sores Germ Warfare over Northeast China. Continues lhabated: A major rev,!€ of the EN campaign seems i n the offing as a r e s u l t of new aharges that American plane6 during the l a s t quarter of 1952 have repeatedly waged germ warfare over Northeast China, and the reletwe of the purported confessions of two field-grade Marine o f f i c e r s a t t e s t i n g t o t h e i r direction of various 2hases of the biological warfare operations. The confessions, t h a t of F i r s t Marine D i v i s i m Chief of Staff Colonel Frank Schwable and of Ordnance Officer Major Roy Bley, have been widdg bzoailmrb. The pattern of oimultaneous exploitation of various new elements i s i n many Ways reminiscent of t h a t noted i n the short-term revival of the BW campaign after the 14 September 1952 issutince of the International S c i e n t i f i c Commission*s detailed brief on American germwarfare criminaiity and the "confessionst1 of Lieutenants Knios and O!Neal Then as now there was an c Q * m . . co* -A2-4 FAR EAST SURVEX 27 FEBRUARY 1953 accompanying rash of peripheral allusions t o BW not related t o the major new items of evidence. In t h e present instance, Peking has reported t h a t : a. Research operations in West Germany have l e d t o 8n epidemic of typhus among t h e German people; b. General V i W l e e t during h i s tenure i n Tokyo admitted t o a member of the Belgian mission t h a t bacteriological warfare operations were taking place i n Korea; c. American support operations i n Japan f o r t h e BW campaign are an open s e c r e t i n Tokyo, where c o r p ~ e s of infected persons are used t o develop more virulenf strains. Absence of Precise Detail Affects Ob-iecti-: Although the %onfessionsll go i n t o considerable d e t a i l concerning name8, pI.aces, da.t;es, code designations, opecislieed jargon, and considerations concoming policy hpl.ementation, they lack t h ? a t t e n t i o n t o minutiae and the insight i a t o normal American psychology which endowed t h e Kniss and OINeal confessions with a veneer of objectivity. Some of t h e difference may be la:d t o the basic d i s s i m i l s r i t i e s between actions a t t h e working l e v e l and at l e v e l s concerned primarily with giving and interpreting orders, Since Schwhble and Biey were allegedly concerned with the inpiementation of directives from higher authority but not with the a c t u a l operations of dissemination, the extent t o which they could discws operations i n precike d e t a i l is probably limited; conversely, since h i s s and OINeal were not privy t o t h e high-policy daeisions which put the operations i n t o e f f e c t , t h e i r confessions miglit necessarily be limited t o t h e r e c i t a l of minute d e t a i l s concerning the actual operation. Although such considerations may have been taken i n t o account ifl the attempt t o crea+,e t h e i l l u o i o n of t n i t h , the studied avoidance of other'elements that would have l o g i c a l l y appeared a t the commanc! l e v e l would seem t o indicate (a) a faulty knowledge of American psychoicgy, o r (b) %!le sacri.f$ce of o b j a z t i v i t y i n t h e i n t e r e s t of exploiting basic Communist l i n e s . Credibalitv Impaired by A t t - t p t t o SUPDO rt-(&m~istLines: The followipg elements provide the major indices of t h i s possibly unintentional distortion: a. The s t r e s s upon t h e f a c t t h a t the Americans knew t h e campaign was ineffectual. b, The frequent allusions t o t h e o f f i c e r s ' d i s t a s t e f o r germ-warfare operations, and t h e i r r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t it was morally reprehensible. c. The implication t h a t no attemgt was ever made t o provide a rationale f o r the use of biological weapons other than the f a c t t h a t it was ordered by the highest levels-the U.S. J o i n t Chiefs of S t a f f , *C - A 3'd FAR EAST SURVEY 27 FEBRUARY 1953 d, The u n r e a l i s t i c ihfiistence t h a t there bad been no slackening of the campaign o r a reassessment of i t a value despite the clemor r c i m d by the Communist charges, and t h e generel world-wide ac\?eptance of t h e i r r e l i a b i l i t y . e. The iaordinate s t z e s s upon the f a c t t h a t mmimum Eecurity was maintained a t a l l timeo t o prcvent non-involve8 m i l i t a r y personnel from learning of the campsign. Escause Communist media have consistently maintained t h a t the campaign aerved no purpose and completely f a i l e d to a f f e c t Sino-North Korean b a t t l e c a p a b i l i t i e s , Peking apparently f e l t call.ed czlon t o have t h e confessions s t ~ e s st h a t the r e s u l t s of the campaign had not been "worth a damn." The p a r a l l e l insistence t h a t a l l the officerfi called upon t o put t h e J o i n t Chiefs! d i r e c t i v e i n t o action realized its moral impermiuoibility echoes Communist contentions given wide currency during the height of t h e denunciatory camqaign and is rendered especially o u o p c t by t h e f a i l u r e of t h e confessions t o make any allusion t o cLn attenpt t o rationalize the need for such a weapon. Thix, while Peking attempts t o lend added conviction t o its indictment of American hlgh-level b e s t i a l i t y by noting a recognition of that depravity even among American o f f i c z r s , it imTlies t h a t those who o r i g i n a l l y formulated t h e policy were so infected t h a t they were unconscious o f t h e e f f e c t it would have on the subordinate personnel and the need t o f i n d a plausible excuse f o r its implementation. In t h i s Peking s e e m t o have bscome a victim of its own dichotomous view of the world, i n which the Amaricanfi a c t without deviation i n accordance with t h e unalloyed black picture of them preoented t o the wozld. In t h i s case Peking was e i t h e r unaware of the lack of c r e d i b i l i t y invoived i n making Americme t a l k l i k e Comunistr;, or was willing t o s a c r i f i c e t h i s contribution t o o b j e c t i v i t y i n i t a disinclination t o suggest t h a t any mitigating considerr* a t i o n s impelled t h e Americans t o use such a weapon. c I' 0' * I Similarly i n a t t e r q t i n g t o picture the Americans a s beasts '&restrained and unrepentent i n t h e face of world opprobrium, the f l i e r s a r e made t o provide no indication t h a t t h e wor1.d-wide a t t e n t i o n and c r e d i b i l i t y accorded t h e campaign caused a slackening or re-evaluation of the BW program. To prevent any d l s t o r t i o n of the picture of tlx? Americans unregenwated depravity, Peking seems l i t t l e concerned that had the charges been true, t h e tremendous clamor raised by thz campaign should have given the Amerlcane pause, a t l e a s t until t h e hue and cry had subsided. To intimate, tco, t h a t t h e campaign is being maintained witbout s e s p i t e t o t h i o very moment i n the face of categorical U.S. and U.N. denials t h a t BW was ever perpetrated s e e m t o indicate t h a t the Communists ascribe t o the Americans t 3 e i r own willingness t o a O E w 9 tho pcyc3uXdg;oal b m d a ~f 3 o h g ca!igM, isl an obwioua fabvication. '? The repeated allusions t o the maximum security t h a t was maintained a t a l l times t o prevent i>uhlic r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t germ wea,mns were being used seem primarily intended t o explain the f z c t thaS the 3roopt3 i n Korea generally have no knowledge of the cmpaign. T3e weaknsss of t h i s contention i s apy;arent i n view of tho p a r a l l e l a l l e g a t i o s s t h a t support operatiorls f o r t h e cm2aign i n Toicyo and i n Gemany @rean Itopen secret" with l i t t l e attempt a t concealment. .. . --. t cow .' FAR EAST SURVEI! 27 FEBRUARY 1953 .b Present Phase Seems Re1ated t o U.N. Session&: The simultaneous release of the International Scientific Commission 1 s report and the Kniss-0 Neal confessions on l.4 September 1952 evoked speculation t h a t the revivsl of the campaign a t that time had a possible bearing on three approaching events: the opening of the Asian Peace Conference i n Peking on 2 October, the schedaled reconvening of the U.N. on 14 October, and the 25 October anniversary of Chinese participation i n t h e war, The extremely short-term nature of t h a t phase of the campaign-within 10 days allusions had dropped t o barely one percent of a l l items from Peking-seemed effectively t o gainsay the existence of any such relationship. Therefore i t seems poesible t h a t the expansion,of the campaign a t t h a t moment was intended t o place the report "on the record" rather than t o create a peg f o r further exploitation i n connection with a r,pyc:ifj.c e v e n t . f n t h e present case, the indications seem considerably firmer that the present revival of the campaign is specifically linked t o t h e resumption of the U.N. sessions. The following elements appear pertinent: a. Peking and Moscow know that BW w i l l be discussed a t t h i s session i n connection with the U.S.-sponsored probe of the chargee. The new charges and confessions may be intended t o burden the Americans with new contentions t o refute while pzoviding them with l i t t l e time topmyH;"e a comprehensive rebuttal. b. Both PRAVDA and the Peking PEOPLE'S DAILY have called f o r immedlate U.N. action t o h a l t t h e 9nonstrous American crimes, and havs woven the various % ~ i d e n c e sof~ ~ America inhumanity i n t o a summary indictment of the United States as a basis f o r the demand that the U.S. be forced t o sign the Geneva Convention outlawing,BW. c. Moscow has given considerable publicity t o the new -,.;.a. confessions; i n contrast Soviet broadcasts have cons i s t e n t l y deem@asised t b 6 e of KniSS and O'Neal.( d. Accompanying Moscow comment has been extremely pointed and widely broadcast. In contrast, t h e ISC report was given only piece-meal distribution by both Pokhg and Moscow after the original announcement, and seemed primarily intended t o place the information 'Ion the recordll f o r subsequent use rather than t o provide a propaganda device t o dissipate the doubts of the skeptical, G - -.. -_ I e. FAR EAST SURVEY 27 FEBRUARY 1953 4 NORTII * K O R E A WnmanP: Remrt Reviews Atrocity Chargeg: Pyongyang's own contribution to the upsurge i n a t r o c i t y cha;.ges appears in the form of a "Fifth Communique on Atrocities Co.mmL.tV&dby t h e American Aggressors and the Syngman Rhee Gang." The communique, also broadcast by Moscow and Peking, reviews the record of UoSe a t r o c i t i e s , l i s t i n g them i n t h e followin categories: destruction of urban and r u r a l areas through bombing; use o weapons f o r wholesale massacre; ioeo, poison gas and BB; and the destruction of CUIt u r a l and s o c i a l i n s t a l l a t i o n s , ngcin through wanton bombing, A long comp€lation of alleged incidents i s used'to document each chargeo Although no appeal is made to t h e UeN. f o r condemnation of these a t r o c i t i e s , Pyongyang once again c a l l s f o r a Ilpeople*s trial" of the responsible criminals , F ,Ameal to Korean Residents Warns of _Rhee-Yoshida Aereement: Concern over t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of Japanese participation i n the Korean struggle, both actively and through the coercion of Korean residents i n Jzpan, is voiced i n an appeal from t h e Committee f o r t h e Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland addressed to Korean residents i n Japan, The message elaborates on the chwges voiced a t the time of the January v i s i t of Syngman Rhee to Tokyo, alleging that a s e c r e t agreement was made a t t h a t time c a l l i n g f o r the dispatch of Japanese mercenaries to Korea and t h e I1forcible repatriationll of the 600,000 Koreans i n Japan, with Fihee i n return promising Japan t h e r i g h t to f i s h i n Korean waters, to deprive Koreans domiciled i n Japan of their property, and to claim property i n South Korea, The committee c a l l s upon the Koreans i n Japan t o oppose their !!forcible repatriationll as well as Japanese intervention i n the war and to e s t a b l i s h a llfirm understandingt1 with t h e peace-loving Japanese peOpl$. Use of the term V o r c i b l e repatriationt1 i n connection with a c€vilimz.&pulation is i n direct contrast w i t h Pekingls insistence i n its comen-t/on the r e t u r n of Japanese c i v i l i a n s now i n China t h a t llrepatriationtl only applies t o prisoners . &€'A Relies on Red Axmy Tactics and Experiens: Pyongyang devotes considerable a t t a t i o n to the 35th anniversary of the Soviet Red Army, ennphasiaing the dependence of the Korean Peoplets Army on advanced S o v i e W t a l i n i s t m i l l tary science and experience, a s t r e s s also noted i n allusions t o t h e f i f t h anniversary of the Korean People's Arqy on 8 February, Particular attent i o n is paid to t h e Stclingrad phase of the Second world War. Moscow, b, has recently directed a series of commentaries on the Stalingrad cornpaign t o the Korean audience, apparently to provide encouragement and inspiration i n the face of anticipated U,N. offensive action, This grei3ter stress on adoption of Soviet military t a c t i c s is aoupled w i t h familiar reference t o the Soviet peace policy. The NIINJU CHOSUN, however, adds e d i t o r i a l l y the warning that "if anyone tckes the Soviet peace policy as a sign of Soviet weakness o r a lack of confidence i n its might, he i s committing a grave mistake, f o r the Soviet people cannot be frightened by armed th!eat, and i f called upon t o do so, the Soviet armed forces w i l l a t t a c k any and a l l aggressors.11 T h e p is no e x p l i c i t coupling of this t h r e a t With the Korean war, however, __ - E. &*OC I -B2- FAR EMT SURW 2" FEBRUARY 1953 A Anniversary Comment S l i P h t s Recent A i r Operations : Continuing a t t e n t i o n the anniversary of t h e KPA includes a t t e n t i o n to the a i r force, omitted i n previous comment, Detailed exploits and heroization a r e used t o describe North Korean a i r action during the opening phases of the war i n 1950, b u t present a i r a c t i v i t y i s given only s u p e r f i c i a l mention, Pyongyang also f a i l s to mention Chinese p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the a i r war, as has been t r u e i n reviews of ground action. The f a i l u r e to elaborate on present a i r action and t o mention Chinese p a r t i c i p a t i o n may well indicate Pyongymgas s e n s i t i v i t y to f a i l u r e of t h e a i r force to provide adequate protection against continued American bombing, Greater ViPilcnce Is Needed to Conbat Enew I M i l t r a t i o n : Pyongyang cont i n u e s t o prod t h e North Korean populaticn into g r e a t e r vigilance, placing increasing emphasis on the dangers of i n f i l t r a t i o n by spies and saboteurs behind t h e l i n e s o Reports of t h e capture of enemy agents generally attribute their apprehension t o the vigilance of c i v i l defense u n i t s and p a r t i c u l a r l y of women p a r t i c i p a n t s i n these units, r e f l e c t i n g an apparent continued lack of adequate security personnel to cope w i t h the danger. The MINJU CHOSUN inveighs against t l l a x i t y and loosenesst1 among the population which makes possible the enemy e f f o r t t o u t i l i z e ltmalcontentst1 i n its espionage and subversiono Other c r i t i c i s m involves p o l i t i c a l propaganda Norkers who f a i l t o arm themselves with Marxism-Leninism, public health workers who possess an "irresponsible a t t i t u d e 1 t toward the anti-epidemic drive now i n progress, and cadres of the Ministry of Commerce with tlformal and bureaucratictt a t t i t u d e s who have f a i l e d to follow instructions and have compromised on d i s agreeable aspects of t h e i r work, +New Currency Will Increase Distress; The new currency reform ;4n South Korea is c i t e d a6 proof of the reports of the desperate strai$d of South Korean economic life,, Pyongyang predicts t h a t t h e new tthvmnttw i l l Y n t e n s i f y economic disorder1I and indeed has already resulted I n increased b l a a - m a r k e t a c t i v i t y , p r i c e rises, and a new police t e r r o r designed t o impose confidence i n the new currency. Other comment on South Korean l i f e reports opposition t o conscription, t h e lldemoralisationtl of South Korean troops, and the popular and e f f e c t i v e a c t i v i t y of the South Korean partisans, ' . . " , . ... . *-. . i , .... FAR EAST SURVEY 27 FEBRUARY 1953 * B 3 SOUTH .. K O R E A Pusan Urges Public Confidence i n New Currencj: Pusan broadcasts explaining the new currency reform s t r e s s the Government intention to a l l e v i a t e t h e e f f e c t s of i n f l a t i o n on the South Korem economy and c a l l f o r t h e t r u s t and confidence of t h e people Od the new llhwEul,ll The prevalence of hoarding, misunderstanding, lack of public bowledge, and of attempts by merchants and black marketeers t o take advantage of the interim period i s acknowledged; however, Government action against these d i f f i c u l t i e s is promised and the establishment of r e l i e f stations and distribution of r i c e is announcedo Pusan broadcasts indicate disngreement i n the National Assembly ovei8 the technique of President Rhee in decreeing the change-over, but Assembly approval on 21 February i s reported, phee Asks SocktnBe, l l a i n l m d A t t a a : Syngman Rhee i n two.recent statements on 13 and 22 February has called respectively for a blockade of China and the use of Chimg Kai-shek troops in 8 campaign t o recover the China m a i land. Rhee claims t h c t a blockade of China would not provoke the Soviets nor lead to a world wcr, and intimates t h a t President Eisenhower $8 decided upon such a blockade and I f w i l l not change h i s m b d m 1 I I n his stntem a t of 22 February President Rhee diplomatically reports t h a t a general feeling exists t h a t N P t i o n a l i s t troops should be used to recover t h e mainland avd he revezls t h a t he suggested t h a t U,S, a i r support be provided to make t h i s possible, .. \ CONFE TIAL '