Case 3:20-cv-00106-M Document 58 Filed 08/21/20

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JANE DOE NO. 1, JANE DOE NO. 2,
JANE DOE NO. 3,

§
§
§
Plaintiffs,
§
§
v.
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§
TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY, DR.
§
DIANE SNOW, DR. ANDREW
§
SCHOOLMASTER, DR. ROB GARNETT, §
DR. DARRON TURNER, RUSSELL
§
MACK, LEIGH HOLLAND, and AARON §
CHIMBEL,
§
§
Defendants.
§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-cv-00106-M

PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO JOIN
UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 20
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
NOW COMES Plaintiffs Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2 and Jane Doe No. 3 who, by
and through undersigned counsel, respectfully move the Court pursuant to the provisions of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20 to join Jane Does Nos. 4 and 5 as Plaintiffs and Drs. Fredrick
W. Gooding Jr. and Karen Steele as Defendants in the above-referenced lawsuit and respectfully
show this Court as follows:
A. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
On August 20, 2020, Plaintiffs conferred with Defendants believing they would be
reasonably amenable to a modification of the Scheduling Order entered in this case to extend
the deadline for joinder because discovery had been abated and the Court had instructed the
Plaintiffs’ Opposed Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Join under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20

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parties that it did not wish to further delay resolving Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. [Dkt. No.
56]. Unfortunately, however, Defendants indicated that they were not amenable to an extension
of the deadline for joinder under any circumstances. Id. Indeed, Texas Christian University
(“TCU”) and the individual Defendants continually demonstrate to this Court and the public that
they are not interested in meritoriously defending against the valid claims brought against them
by Plaintiffs. Instead, Defendants wish to game this litigation in a continued showing of their
deliberate indifference toward the sincere complaints of race and sex-based discrimination
submitted to TCU and TCU agents (including TCU’s Title IX Office) regarding the
discrimination endured by African-American women on its campus.

Therefore, though

Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of its Opposed Motion to Modify Scheduling Order to
Extend Deadline for Joinder of Parties is currently pending before this Court, out of an
abundance of caution and in observance of the deadline for joinder found in the Scheduling
Order in this case, Plaintiffs file this Opposed Motion for Joinder.
Despite Defendants’ opposition and many attempts to confuse the issues before the Court,
this lawsuit has been and remains about the deliberate indifference with which TCU and its
agents respond to the complaints of race and sex-based discrimination occurring on campus and
at TCU sanctioned activities reported by African-American women. Sadly, many of the
underlying facts warranting reports to TCU by African-American women students involve
conduct that constitutes violations of federal and Texas State law. [Dkt. No. 44]. Rather than
treating such complaints with the seriousness necessary to protect its students, TCU and its
agents have either failed to respond at all, responded inadequately, or ratified the conduct made
basis of such reports because the reporting students are African-American women. In fact, TCU
is notorious for such conduct occurring when African-American women report instances of

Plaintiffs’ Opposed Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Join under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20

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discrimination to TCU officials. Thus, in describing the conduct made the basis of Plaintiffs’
and other African-American women’s reports (like Jane Does Nos. 4 and 5), it should come as
no surprise that the extreme and outrageous conduct allowed to fester on campus may also result
in allegations of violations of federal and state law that though different, meet at the same nexus,
or in the case of TCU—in the Chancellors’ or Title IX offices. Put simply, the primary series
of transactions and/or occurrences that form the basis of Plaintiffs’ complaints relate to their
experience when they reported claims of discrimination to TCU officials. Such experiences
were not Plaintiffs alone, but also those of other African-American women enrolled at TCU.
[Dkt. No. 44 at ¶¶ 129-31]. In fact, since the filing of this lawsuit many African-American
women have contacted Plaintiffs and/or undersigned counsel to confirm that they too were met
with deliberate indifference when they reported instances of discrimination to TCU. White
women too have contacted Plaintiffs and/or undersigned counsel in support of Plaintiffs’;
expressing that their reports of discriminatory treatment to TCU were handled with sincere
concern and in contrast to the handling of Plaintiffs’ and other African-American women’s
reports. Plaintiffs hereby seek to add two of the African-American women who also endured
the racially and sexually hostile environment at TCU and reported the same to TCU officials as
Plaintiffs in this case, Jane Does Nos. 4 and 5. Jane Does Nos. 4 and 5 bring identical claims
to Plaintiffs, including claims against TCU for violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964; Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; and state law claims of fraud, violations
of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of express
warranty for services; and against Dr. Karen Steele claims of negligence, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
Plaintiffs’ also seek to add Drs. Fredrick W. Gooding Jr. and Dr. Karen Steele as

Plaintiffs’ Opposed Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Join under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20

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Defendants. With respect to Dr. Gooding, Plaintiffs’ have already fully alleged allegations
against him in their live Complaint. [Dkt. No. 44]. Dr. Gooding’s conduct renders him jointly
and severally liable for at least Jane Doe No. 1’s complaints of negligence, intentional infliction
of emotional distress and conspiracy.

With respect to Dr. Steele, her conduct towards Jane

Does Nos. 4 and 5 formed the basis of their reports of discrimination to TCU officials, which
were met with deliberate indifference and thus give rise to their complaints of TCU’s violations
of federal and state law. The underlying conduct of Dr. Steele herself renders her jointly and
several liable for Jane Does Nos. 4 and 5’s complaints of negligence and intentional infliction
of emotional distress.
B. ARGUMENT
Legal Standard
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 controls the permissive joinder of parties to a federal action and allows
the joinder of plaintiffs if “(A) they assert right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with
respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.”
Likewise, Rule 20 also allows the permissive joinder of defendants if “(A) any right to relief is
asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law
or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Id. Thus, Rule 20 allows the joinder of
a plaintiff who has some relation to the action but not as a necessary party. Arrington v. City of
Fairfield, Ala., 414 F.2d 687, 693 (5th Cir. 1969). Permissive joinder is broad in its application,
permitting the court wide latitude to decide the scope of the action and make orders that will
prevent delay or prejudice. Id. Consequently, Rule 20 is focused on trial convenience such that

Plaintiffs’ Opposed Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Join under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20

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plaintiffs or defendants should be joined “whenever there is a common question of law or fact and
the right relief arises out of a single transaction or occurrence or a series of transactions or
occurrences.” Walker v. City of Houston, 341 F.Supp. 1124, 1132 (S.D. Tex. 1971). Indeed, the
policy for Rule 20 is to promote trial convenience and eliminate unnecessary lawsuits. See In re
Silica Product Liab. Litig., 398 F.Supp.2d 563, 650 (S.D. Tex. 2005). While, this Court has not
identified a specific test to satisfy the “same transaction or occurrence,” many district courts in the
fifth circuit have used the Eighth Circuit's “logically related” test for the “same transaction”
requirement. Carter v. Diamond URS Huntsville, LLC, 175 F.Supp.3d 711, 727 (S.D. Tex. 2016).
That test allows all reasonably related claims to be tried in the same proceeding; there is no need
for absolute identity of all the events. Id. (citing Mosley v. GMC, 497 F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (8th Cir.
1974)).
The Court should Join Jane Does No. 4 and 5 as Plaintiffs.
In order to properly join another party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20, there are two prerequisites:
(1) common questions of law and fact (2) whether the causes of action arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence. First, Jane Does Nos. 4 and 5 should be joined in this action because
there are common questions of law and fact relating to their claims against TCU and TCU’s
liability for the same. Specifically, Jane Does Nos. 4 and 5 (like Jane Does Nos. 1, 2 and 3) each
bring suit against TCU for responding to their complaints of discrimination with deliberate
indifference and/or inadequately addressed. There is a legal dispute regarding whether TCU and
TCU agents violated federal and state law through their intentional indifference of racial and sexbased complaints made by African American women students and the resulting harm perpetuated
thereby. Indeed, Jane Does No. 4 and 5 were victims of the same haphazard treatment and racist
and sexist environment that assailed Plaintiffs. Moreover, Jane Does Nos. 4 and 5 bring identical,

Plaintiffs’ Opposed Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Join under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20

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claims against TCU for its discriminatory treatment of them and other African-American women.
Therefore, there is a common question of law and fact at play.
Second, there is also a common series of occurrences central to Jane Does Nos. 4 and 5
claims against TCU. Plaintiffs and Jane Does Nos. 4 and 5 are all African-American women who
encountered the same deliberate indifference that lead to and/or perpetuated the physical and
physiological harm from resulting from the hostile and racist and sexist environment at TCU.
TCU’s conduct in responding to Plaintiffs’, Jane Does Nos. 4 and 5 and other African-American
women’s complaints ratified and—to-this-day—encourages TCU’s agents to perpetuate jarringly
hostile and discriminatory acts toward African-American women. Thus, absent unnecessary and
self-serving complication from Defendants, there is a clear common series of occurrences central
to the claims presently against TCU by Plaintiff’s and Jane Does Nos. 4 and 5.
The Court should Join Jane Drs. Fredrick W. Gooding Jr. and Karen Steele as Defendants.
Similarly, the court should add Drs. Fredrick W. Gooding Jr. and Karen Steele as
defendants in this lawsuit. Much like the permissible joinder of plaintiffs, Rule 20 provides for
the permissible joinder of defendants if there are (1) common questions of law and fact and (2)
the causes of action arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20. As
stated above, with respect to Dr. Gooding, Plaintiffs’ have already alleged facts against him in
their live Complaint. See [Dkt. No. 44]. Moreover, Dr. Gooding’s conduct, as already alleged
renders him liable to Jane Doe No. 1 for the underlying conduct necessitating her reports of
discrimination to TCU officials. Specifically, Dr. Gooding’s conduct as alleged renders him
liable for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy—all claims
which are brought against other individual Defendants and for which Dr. Gooding is jointly
and severally liable. Thus, the addition of Dr. Gooding arises out of the same transaction or

Plaintiffs’ Opposed Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Join under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20

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occurrence. See In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed.Cir.2012). With respect to Dr.
Karen Steele, the facts underlying both Jane Does Nos. 4 and 5’s reports of racist and sexist
discrimination to TCU officials include allegations of the racist conduct perpetuated against
them by Dr. Steele. Should this Court join Jane Does Nos. 4 and 5 as plaintiffs’ it should also
join Dr. Steele as a defendant given that the underlying operative facts leading to TCU’s
deliberate indifference toward Jane Does Nos. 4 and 5’s reports and pleas for relief from TCU’s
unyieldingly hostile environment were spawned by Dr. Steele’s behavior.
Plaintiffs’ have adequately alleged that they and other African-American women are
regularly met with deliberate indifference when they submit reports of discrimination to TCU,
Jane Does Nos. 4 and 5 have previously fully laid out the underlying factual basis for such
reports to this Court. [Dkt. No. 40]. In the interest of judicial efficiency and because Plaintiffs
have already pled that other African-American women—like Jane Does Nos. 4 and 5—are also
victims of TCU’s deliberate indifference towards their reports of discrimination, Plaintiffs’
submit this Motion to the Court without the amended factual allegations contained in their prior
pleadings. Plaintiffs, however, defer to the guidance of the Court and will submit an amended
pleading if the Court so requires.
C. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff prays that the court Grant this
Motion for Joinder and that the Court award Plaintiff such further relief as it deems just and
proper.

Plaintiffs’ Opposed Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Join under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20

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Respectfully submitted,
ANOZIE, LLP
/s/ Nnamdi M. Anozie
Nnamdi M. Anozie
State Bar No. 24087107
nma@anoziellp.com
6120 Swiss Avenue, #140383
T: (214) 606-3440
Keron A. Wright
State Bar No. 24075311
Keron.wright@wrightlegalpllc.com
Wright Legal Services PLLC, Of Counsel for
Anozie, LLP

ATTORNEYS FOR JANE DOE NO. 1,
JANE DOE NO. 2, & JANE DOE NO. 3
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
I hereby certify that on August 20, 2020, Plaintiffs’ Counsel, Nnamdi Anozie, conferred
with Defendants counsel, George Haratsis. Mr. Haratsis indicated that Defendants oppose
Plaintiffs’ Opposed Memorandum in Support of Motion to Join under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 20.

/s/ Nnamdi M. Anozie
Nnamdi M. Anozie
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing pleading has been served on counsel identified
below in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the 21st day of August, 2020:
Via E-mail: gharatsis@mcdonaldlaw.com
Via E-mail: rdivin@mcdonaldlaw.com
Via Email:jlittman@mcdonaldlaw.com
George C. Haratsis
Rory M. Divin
Jennifer N. Littman
McDonald Sanders,
A Professional Corporation
777 Main Street, Suite 2700
Plaintiffs’ Opposed Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Join under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20

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Fort Worth, Texas 76102
Telephone: (817) 336-8651
Facsimile: (817) 334-0271

/s/ Nnamdi M. Anozie
Nnamdi M. Anozie

Plaintiffs’ Opposed Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Join under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20

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