Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2020 Sep 10 3:41 PM-11CV011809

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO
DAYTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT
BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.,

:
:

Plaintiffs,
:

Case No. 11 CV 11809

:

Judge Gina R. Russo

v.
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION
OF OHIO, et al.,

:

Defendants.

:

CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN
SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD
OF EDUCATION, et al.,

:
:

Plaintiffs,

:
Case No. 11 CV 13689

v.

:
Judge Gina R. Russo

STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION
OF OHIO, et al.,

:
:

Defendants.
:

TOLEDO CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT
BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.,

:
:

Plaintiffs,
:

Case No. 11 CV 14120

:

Judge Gina R. Russo

v.
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION
OF OHIO, et al.,

:

Defendants.

:

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DECISION AND ENTRY AS TO THE PARTIES’
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RUSSO, J.
I.

INTRODUCTION
Public schools in Ohio are funded through a complex series of statutes contained in Ohio

Revised Code Chapter 3317. In general, public school districts are funded through the School
Foundation Program, which uses a School Foundation Formula, calculated from many variables.
The main variable is known as “Average Daily Membership” or “ADM,” which is comprised of
two components: 1) the number of students in attendance at the district school during the first full
week in October; and 2) the number of students who are entitled to attend a district school, but
who opt to attend a community school in that district. The aggregate of these numbers is known
as the “October Count,” and is reported to the Ohio Department of Education (“ODE”), through a
reporting system called the Education Management Information System (“EMIS”). The October
Count is a “snapshot” in time and is not subject to change during the fiscal year, except the number
is increased for students who later enroll in community schools and who were not included in the
October Count. Those students are known as “Add-In Students.”
Community schools have likewise developed a method for counting students to calculate
community school funding. Unlike the districts, community schools count students monthly and
report the numbers to ODE through a system called Community School Average Daily
Membership (“CSADM”). This system is similar to, but unique from, ADM. To fund a community
school, the district first receives a credit for a residence district community school student and then
a corresponding deduction, which is paid to the community school. Thus, it is important for AddIn Students, who enroll after the October Count, that the district first receives a credit and then a
corresponding deduction.
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The issue before the Court arises from the unilateral decision of ODE to ignore the statutory
structure in place during 2005-2007, and instead, substitute CSADM (“Substitution of CSADM”),
for the community school component of ADM. In doing so, not only did ODE reduce the number
of residence district community school students reported by the districts, but ODE also did not
increase ADM for Add-In Students. ODE believed Substitution of CSADM to be more accurate
and that it captured all Add-In Students. This decision resulted in reductions of school funding for
several districts, including Plaintiffs, for fiscal years 2005-2007.
In response, the Cincinnati City School District Board of Education filed a lawsuit in
Hamilton County, asking the Court to find ODE violated the law by substituting CSADM, despite
the statutory requirements. Cincinnati City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ. of Ohio,
Hamilton C.P. No. A0603908 (Nov. 22, 2006). On November 22, 2006, the court found
Substitution of CSADM to be unlawful and ordered ODE to recalculate funding owed to
Cincinnati for fiscal years 2005-2007. During the pendency of subsequent appeals, Cincinnati and
ODE reached a settlement. Like Cincinnati, Plaintiff, Dayton City School District Board of
Education (“Dayton”), challenged Substitution of CSADM, and resolved a portion of its claims by
entering a settlement agreement with ODE in early 2009. (“Dayton Settlement Agreement”). Later,
the General Assembly passed a provision contained in the 2009 State Biennium Budget, shielding
ODE from further liability as a result of Substitution of CSADM (“Budget Bill”).1
In the instant matter, Plaintiffs argue the Budget Bill is unconstitutional and they are
entitled to recover funding unlawfully withheld during fiscal years 2005-2007. They seek a writ
of mandamus, or alternatively, declaratory judgment, finding ODE violated the law when it
substituted CSADM for the statutorily-mandated ADM, and an order requiring ODE to recalculate

1

See Am. Sub. H.B. 1 (128 G.A.) §265.60.70. The Budget Bill is explained in more detail, infra.

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school funding for fiscal years 2005-2007. Plaintiffs’ Amended Petitions (“Am. Pets.”) at ¶50-68.
Specifically, Plaintiffs contend: (1) ODE unlawfully decreased funding as a result of Substitution
of CSADM (referred to as “Basic Claims”); and (2) ODE failed to increase funding for Add-In
Students (referred to as “Add-In Claims”). Finally, Plaintiffs argue that, even if the Budget Bill is
constitutional, it does not apply to Dayton, pursuant to the terms of the Dayton Settlement
Agreement, nor does it apply to Cleveland or Toledo’s Add-In Claims. ODE argues the Budget
Bill is constitutional and bars Plaintiffs’ Basic Claims. ODE further argues that, without the Basic
Claims, Plaintiffs’ Add-In Claims fail. Finally, ODE argues the Dayton Settlement Agreement does
not exempt Dayton’s Basic Claims and, consequently, they fail.
II.

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs initially filed separate actions. On January 21, 2012, the cases were transferred

to Franklin County and were consolidated on January 31, 2012. On April 27, 2012, ODE filed a
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, alleging Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the Budget Bill.
ODE’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“ODE MJP”) at 3-4, 8-9, 10-12. Plaintiffs
countered that the Budget Bill was unconstitutionally retroactive. Plaintiffs’ May 29, 2012
Memorandum in Opposition at 4-8. On January 16, 2014, the Court agreed. January 16, 2014
Decision at 16-23.2 The parties filed cross-appeals and, on August 28, 2014, the Tenth District
affirmed. See Toledo City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., 2014-Ohio-3741, 18 N.E.3d
505 (10th Dist.). Upon further appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court held the retroactivity clause does
not apply to political subdivisions. See Toledo City Sch. Dist. Of Educ. v. State Bd. Of Educ. Of
Ohio, 146 Ohio St. 3d 356, 2016-Ohio-2806, 56 N.E.3d 950.

2

Plaintiffs also raised a constitutional challenge pursuant to the Uniformity Clause of the Ohio Constitution, but the
Court declined to address it. January 16, 2014 Decision at 23.

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Upon remand, the parties sought a ruling on the remainder of the issues presented in ODE’s
MJP, including, whether the Budget Bill violates the Uniformity Clause, whether the Dayton
Settlement Agreement exempts Dayton’s Basic Claims and whether Cleveland and Toledo’s AddIn Claims survive. The Court found there was insufficient evidence to determine the uniformity
issue. October 18, 2017 Decision at 4-10. The Court further found Dayton’s Basic Claims are
exempt pursuant to the terms of the Dayton Settlement Agreement. Id. at 12-14. Finally, the Court
found the Budget Bill did not preclude Cleveland and Toledo’s Add-In Claims. Id. at 10-12.
III.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND FACTS
The material facts are not in dispute and are detailed in the parties’ Amended Joint

Stipulations (“Jt. Stip.”), filed April 9, 2019.
A.

Parties:

Plaintiffs, Dayton, Cleveland Metropolitan School District Board of Education
(“Cleveland”), and Toledo City School District Board of Education (“Toledo”), are public school
districts organized pursuant to Ohio law with the responsibility to provide public education within
their jurisdictions.3 Jt. Stip. 1. Defendant, State Board of Education, is charged with the general
supervision of public education in Ohio. Jt. Stip. 3. Defendant, Paolo DeMaria, is the acting
Superintendent of Public Instruction and is charged with the administration of the laws governing
public schools in Ohio. Jt. Stip. 4. Defendant, ODE, is the administrative body that implements
the policies and directives of the State Board of Education. Jt. Stip. 2. ODE consists of the State

Plaintiffs’ original Petitions included individual Plaintiffs consisting of parents and employees. On January 16, 2014,
the Court found the individual Plaintiffs lacked standing. January 16, 2014 Decision at 9-16. On appeal, the Tenth
District affirmed and the Supreme Court declined certiorari. See Toledo, 2014-Ohio-3741 at ¶¶53-55; Toledo City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., 142 Ohio St. 3d 1447, 2015-Ohio-1591, 29 N.E.3d 1002. Plaintiffs later
sought to re-raise standing on two occasions, both of which were denied. See February 9, 2017 Decision at 6, October
18, 2017 Decision at 3. Recently, Plaintiffs again requested to raise standing at a hearing on the current cross-motions;
however, for the reasons stated in the Court’s January 16, 2014, February 9, 2017, and October 18, 2017 Decisions,
Plaintiffs’ request is denied.
3

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Board of Education, Mr. DeMaria and support staff. Id. Defendants are collectively referred to as
“Defendants” and/or “ODE.”
B.

School Foundation Program:

School funds are appropriated by the legislature and distributed to school districts through
the School Foundation Program, as established in Ohio Revised Code, Chapter 3317. Jt. Stip. 6.
The program uses a statutory formula based upon various factors (“School Foundation Formula”).
Jt. Stip. 7. Once calculated, the districts receive funding on a fiscal year basis (“School Foundation
Funding”). Jt. Stip. 6. The fiscal year (“FY”) begins July 1, and continues through the following
June 30. Jt. Stip. 17.4 The responsibility for calculating and funding the districts is assigned to
ODE. R.C. Chapter 3317.5
Ohio students generally have two options for receiving an education. Jt. Stip. 5. One, the
student can attend the public school in the district where the student lives (“district student”); or
two, the student can opt to attend a community school in that district (“residence district
community school student” or “community school student”).6 Id. The State funds education in
both districts and community schools through the School Foundation Program. Jt. Stip. 6, 10.
C. Average Daily Membership:
The School Foundation Formula begins with ADM. Jt. Stip. 8. ADM is defined as the
number of students certified to ODE by the districts as being in attendance during the first full
week in October, known as the “October Count.” Id. Pursuant to R.C. 3317.03(A)(1) and
(A)(2)(a), the October Count consists of two parts: 1) the number of students in attendance at the
district school during the first full week in October (“district component”); and 2) the number of

The fiscal years at issue herein are FY 2005 (“FY 05”), FY 2006 (“FY 06”), and FY 2007 (“FY 07”).
In 2005, there were 614 school districts in Ohio. ODE MSJ at 26.
6
A “community school” is a “public school, independent of any school district, and is part of the state’s program of
education.” R.C. 3314.01(B).
4
5

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students who are entitled to attend a district school, but who opt to attend a community school in
that district (“community school component”). Id. The October Count is a “snapshot” in time and
generally remains fixed, subject to statutory adjustments made throughout the year. Id. The result
of the October Count, as adjusted, is defined as “Formula ADM” and is used in the calculation of
School Foundation Funding for that fiscal year. R.C. 3317.02(D). Formula ADM is expressed as
a number of full-time equivalency (“FTE”) students. Jt. Stip. 9.7
The October Count is reported to ODE by the districts through EMIS. Jt. Stip. 13. When
reporting the October Count, the districts identify each student through a Statewide Student
Identifier (“SSID”), a unique number given to each individual student and generated by the
Statewide Student Identifier System (“SSID System”). Jt. Stip. 8, 33. The SSID is used, instead of
personal identifying information, to keep track of students as well as keep their personal
information private. Jt. Stip. 33.8 A student should have a single SSID throughout his or her
education, whether at a district or community school. Jt. Stip. 34. There are instances, however,
that a student has been assigned more than one SSID or an SSID has been assigned to a nonexistent student. Id.
D. Add-In Students:
As mentioned above, the October Count is typically a “snapshot” of attendance and
remains fixed after the October Count. Jt. Stip. 15. However, there is one important exception.
Pursuant to R.C. 3317.03(F)(3), ODE is required to increase Formula ADM throughout the year
for each residence district community school student who was not included in the district’s October

7

This number is generated by taking into consideration many variables for a student, including, age, grade and length
of attendance, and is expressed in a quantifiable number.
8
ODE is generally prohibited from receiving a student’s personally identifiable information. Jt. Stip. 36. On the other
hand, districts have access to the SSIDs and personal identifiable information for both district students and residence
district community school students. Id.

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Count. Jt. Stip. 15-16. ODE is required to fund each district based on Formula ADM as increased
by Add-In Students. Id.; see also R.C. 3317.03(F)(3). For FY 05, Cleveland reported a total of
700 FTE for Add-In Students, Dayton reported 1,154.35 FTE and Toledo reported 246.59 FTE.
Jt. Stip. 67. These FTEs represent residence district community school students who were not
included in Plaintiffs’ FY 05 October Count. Id.
E. Guarantee Provisions:
The School Foundation Program is subject to certain "guarantee provisions,” which operate
to ensure a level of revenue to a district regardless of Formula ADM. Jt. Stip. 81. The guaranteed
amounts are based, in part, on funding received in prior years. Jt. Stip. 82. Here, each Plaintiff
was eligible for guarantee funding in FY 06 and 07. Id. The amount of the guarantee funding was
based, in part, on the amount of funded in FY 05. Id. Consequently, once Plaintiffs’ funding for
FY 05 was reduced, funding for FY 06 and 07 was likewise reduced. Id.
F. Community School Average Daily Membership:
CSADM refers to residence district community school students, on an FTE basis,
attending a community school for which the community school is claiming funding for some
portion of the year. Jt. Stip. 10. CSADM is reported to ODE using the CSADM Reporting System.
Jt. Stip. 13, 38. To pay community schools, Formula ADM is first calculated per statute and set
for the year (except for increases due to Add-In Students). Jt. Stip. 31. Thereafter, community
schools report student attendance to ODE monthly through CSADM. Id.

Funding for the

community school is completed by first crediting the district for the student (if not already counted
in the October Count), and then deducting the amount from the district and paying the community

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school. Jt. Stip. 11, 15, 16.9 Thus, ODE needs a precise count of residence district community
school students who have not been counted in the October Count. Jt. Stip. 30.
Residence district community school students have SSIDs just like district students. Jt.
Stip. 30. Community schools report SSIDs and district of residence to ODE through the CSADM
Reporting System. Jt. Stip. 31. To access the CSADM Reporting System, community school
personnel must be employees of the community school, approved by the fiscal officer and issued
passwords by ODE. Jt. Stip. 45. ODE required no formal training to access the CSADM Reporting
System, nor did it impose a limit on those provided access. Id. During FY 05, those who had
access to the CSADM Reporting System had the ability to report enrollment or withdrawal of
students and to delete student records. Jt. Stip. 46. Plaintiffs allege this system suffered from
numerous flaws, including (1) deleting student records; (2) changing a student’s district of
residence; (3) creating new student records that may not reflect actual attendance; (4) creating
phantom students; and (5) individual students being counted in multiple district student counts.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pls’ MSJ”) at 8-10.
G. School District Review of CSADM:
ODE does not review CSADM data before making it available to the districts. Jt. Stip. 57.
However, a school district may review CSADM for accuracy and may "flag" inaccurate
information, which will trigger a further review. Id. A district may confirm (via a checkbox),
whether a residence district community school student was included in the October Count or is an
Add-In Student. Jt. Stip. 59. The parties refer to this as the "Already-Funded Checkbox” system.
Id. According to the CSADM User Manual, "[a] check indicates the student was included in the

9
If a student's enrollment in a community school terminates before the end of the school year, the community
school's annual payment for that student is adjusted to reflect a lower amount, representing the portion of the
school year during which the student was enrolled and attending. Jt. Stip. 32; see also OAC 3301-102-06(C)(1).

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resident district's EMIS October count week." Id. Therefore, if the Already-Funded Checkbox is
checked, the student was included in the October Count and the district already received funding.
Id. If unchecked, the student is an Add-In Student, and the district is entitled to an increase in
funding. Jt. Stip. 59, 60.10
H. School Funding Reports:
Twice a month, ODE calculates and pays School Foundation Funding to districts. Jt. Stip.
18. In connection with the payments, ODE prepares "SF-3 Reports" detailing the amount of
funding due to each district. Jt. Stip. 19. There are multiple SF-3 Reports issued throughout the
fiscal year. Id. After a fiscal year ends, ODE issues a Final Version SF-3 Report showing ODE' s
final calculation. Jt. Stip. 26. Although titled as "final" there can be multiple “Final Version SF-3
Reports,” as data may continue to change. Id.
I. Substitution of CSADM:
Prior to and during FY 05, ODE calculated and paid districts based on their October Count
plus Add-In Students, as reported in FY 05 June No. 2 SF-3 (the last report issued during FY 05
and prior to Substitution of CSADM). Jt. Stip. 19, 68. In February 2006, a decision was made to
disregard the statutory requirements for funding districts due to an alleged “discrepancy” between
the number of residence district community school students reported by the districts in the October
Count and the number of residence district community school students reported by community
schools through CSADM. Jt. Stip. 70-71. Instead of using the statutory-mandated Formula ADM,
ODE substituted CSADM for the community school component of the October Count. Id. This

10

The Already-Funded Checkbox is checked by default, meaning all residence district community school students
reported in the CSADM Reporting System were included in the district’s October Count and the districts have already
been funded for such students. Jt. Stip. 59.

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change was made based on the belief that CSADM more accurately reflected the number of
students attending a community school. Jt. Stip. 68-71.
In August 2006, ODE readjusted the payments due to the districts as a result of Substitution
of CSADM and issued a final calculation in FY 05 Final SF-3 Version 3 (final version of the SF3 reports issued after the close of FY 05 and after Substitution of CSADM). Jt. Stip. 76. As a
result, Plaintiffs’ funding was reduced pursuant to a lower Formula ADM than that reflected in the
FY 05 June No. 2 SF-3 Report. Id. Indeed, the reductions can be seen by a comparison of Formula
ADM as reported in the FY 05 June No. 2 SF-3 and the FY 05 Final Version 3 SF-3 Report. Id.11
Toledo’s Formula ADM was reduced by 560.61 FTE (Jt. Stip. 79); Dayton’s by 688.28 FTE (Jt.
Stip. 78); and Cleveland’s by 575.22 FTE (Jt. Stip. 80). Collectively, Plaintiffs’ October Counts
were reduced by 1,800 FTEs. Consequently, Plaintiffs’ school funding was recalculated for FY
05, which resulted in large reductions to each Plaintiff. Jt. Stip. 78-80. Pursuant to the guarantee
provisions, funding for FY 06 and 07 were likewise reduced. Jt. Stip. 82-84.
The parties provide alternate tables to demonstrate the overall financial effect of
Substitution of CSADM. See, Jt. Stip. 100 (the amount Plaintiffs should have received prior to
Substitution of CSADM, including Add-In Students); Jt. Stip. 101 (amount received by Plaintiffs
after Substitution of CSADM); Jt. Stip. 102 (amount Plaintiffs should have received prior to
Substitution of CSADM, excluding Add-In Students); Jt. Stip. 103 (amount Plaintiffs should have
received prior to Substitution of CSADM, including Add-In Students for whom districts
unchecked the Already-Funded Checkbox).

The reduced funding can be seen by comparing ODE’s FY 05 June No. 2 SF-3 (issued prior to Substitution of
CSADM) (See, JS-Exhibit 06(Dayton), JS-Exhibit 07(Cleveland) and JS-Exhibit 08(Toledo)), with FY 05 Final SF-3
Version 3 (issued after Substitution of CSADM) (See, JS-Exhibit 09(Dayton), JS-Exhibit 10(Cleveland) and JSExhibit 11(Toledo)).

11

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J. The Cincinnati Case:
On April 28, 2006, Cincinnati filed a lawsuit in Hamilton County, alleging that ODE
unlawfully substituted CSADM. Jt. Stip. 74; see also Cincinnati, Hamilton C.P. No. A0603908.
On November 22, 2006, the court found ODE violated the law by disregarding the statutory
Formula ADM and substituting CSADM. Id. The court ordered ODE to recalculate Cincinnati’s
school funding for FY 05-07 using the October Count as originally established by law. Id. On
March 28, 2008, the First District affirmed the trial court’s decision. Cincinnati City Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ. of Ohio, 176 Ohio App. 3d 157, 2008-Ohio-1434, 891 N.E.2d 352
(1st Dist.). On September 10, 2008, the Ohio Supreme Court accepted the appeal. Cincinnati City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., 119 Ohio St. 3d 1443, 2008-Ohio-4487 (collectively
“Cincinnati”). In the interim, on October 24, 2008, Cincinnati and ODE settled. Jt. Stip. 74.
K. The Dayton Settlement Agreement:
After Cincinnati, but before this action, Dayton attempted to resolve its claims with ODE.
On May 4, 2009, the parties entered into a partial settlement agreement. Jt. Stip. 86; see also
Dayton Settlement Agreement (Jt. Stip., JS-Exhibit 28). The parties settled a portion of Dayton’s
Basic Claims, totaling $7,177,694.17, but failed to resolve the entire dispute. Dayton Settlement
Agreement at ¶1(B). The parties reserved Dayton’s right to seek restitution for the remainder of its
claims, referred to as the “Remaining Dispute.” Dayton Settlement Agreement at ¶3.
L. The Budget Bill:
On July 17, 2009, after Cincinnati and the Dayton Settlement Agreement, but before this
action, the General Assembly passed a provision, as part of an appropriations bill, shielding ODE
from further liability as a result of Substitution of CSADM.12 This provision states:
12

This provision was originally contained in Am. Sub. H.B. 1 (128 G.A.) §265.60.70, and was part of the 2009 State
Biennium Budget.

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(A) Except as expressly required under a court judgment not subject to further
appeals, or a settlement agreement with a school district executed on or before June
1, 2009, in the case of a school district for which the formula ADM for fiscal year
2005, as reported for that fiscal year under division (A) of section 3317.03 of the
Revised Code, was reduced based on enrollment reports for community schools,
made under section 3314.08 of the Revised Code, regarding students entitled to
attend school in the district, which reduction of formula ADM resulted in a
reduction of foundation funding or transitional aid funding for fiscal year 2005,
2006, or 2007, no school district, except a district named in the court’s judgment or
the settlement agreement, shall have a legal claim for reimbursement of the amount
of such reduction in foundation funding or transitional aid funding, and the state
shall not have liability for reimbursement of the amount of such reduction in
foundation funding or transitional aid funding.
The provision is uncodified and expires with each successive biennium budget. Therefore, the
General Assembly has re-enacted the Budget Bill in each subsequent biennium budget.13
M. Current Motions:
On April 14, 2019, ODE filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (“ODE MSJ”), and on
April 15, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. In Pls’ MSJ, they raise additional
challenges to the constitutionality of the Budget Bill. The parties filed their respective Memoranda
in Opposition on May 10, 2019 and Reply Memoranda on June 7, 2019.14 On September 11, 2019,
the Court held an oral argument. These Motions are now ripe for decision.
IV.

MANDAMUS STANDARD
Pursuant to R.C. 2731.02, the Court is permitted to entertain a petition for a writ of

mandamus ordering a public institution, such as ODE, to comply with its duties under the law.
Mandamus is a “writ, issued in the name of the state to an inferior tribunal, a corporation, board,
or person, commanding the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty

13
See Am. Sub. H.B. 153 (129 G.A.) §267.50.60; Am. Sub. H.B. 59 (130 G.A.) §263.410; Am. Sub. H.B. 64 (131 G.A.)
§263.450; Am. Sub. H.B. 49 (132 G.A.) §265.430; Am. Sub. H.B. 166 (133 G.A.) §265.430.
14
On July 3, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to file a Sur-Reply. On July 19, 2019, Defendants filed a
response. On August 22, 2019, the Court accepted Plaintiffs’ Sur-Reply and Defendants’ response.

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resulting from an office, trust, or station.” R.C. 2731.01. To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a
party must show: (1) that they possess a clear legal right to the requested relief; (2) a clear legal
duty on the part of the opposing party to provide such relief; and (3) a lack of an adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. State ex. rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St. 3d 55,56, 2012-Ohio69, 960 N.E.2d 452, 454, ¶6. "Mandamus is an extraordinary writ and will not lie unless the relator
can establish a clear legal right thereto.” State ex rel. Shafer v. Ohio Turnpike Com., 159 Ohio St.
581, 589, 113 N.E.2d 14, 19 (1953).
V.

STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment was established through Civ. R. 56 as a procedural device to terminate

litigation when there is no need for a formal trial. Norris v. Ohio Std. Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 1, 433
N.E.2d 615 (1982). The rule mandates the following: (1) there is no genuine issue of any material
fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can
come to but one conclusion and, viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the non-moving
party, that conclusion is adverse to the non-moving party. Bostic v. Connor, 37 Ohio St.3d 144,
524 N.E.2d 881 (1988). Summary judgment will not be granted unless the movant sufficiently
demonstrates the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. A “party seeking summary
judgment, on the ground that the nonmoving party cannot prove its case, bears the initial burden
of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record
that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential element(s) of the
nonmoving party’s claims.” Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293, 662 N.E.2d 264, 274 (1996).

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VI.

DISCUSSION
A.

Constitutionality of the Budget Bill:

The pivotal issue for the Court’s decision is whether the Budget Bill is constitutional; not
whether Substitution of CSADM was lawful. The latter issue was decided in Cincinnati, and this
Court will not disturb that holding. Furthermore, the parties have not re-raised that issue here. See
Transcript of September 11, 2019 Hearing (“Hrg. Trans.”) at 86, 137-138.15 If the Budget Bill is
constitutional, Plaintiffs’ Basic Claims are barred.16 If the Budget Bill is unconstitutional,
Plaintiffs are entitled to an order requiring ODE to recalculate funding for FY 05-07, in compliance
with the law in 2005.
There is a strong presumption that a statute is constitutional. Sorrell v. Thevenir, 69 Ohio
St. 3d 415, 418-419, 633 N.E.2d. 504, 508 (1994); see also Desenco, Inc. v. City of Akron, 84 Ohio
St. 3d 535, 538, 706 N.E.2d 323, 328 (1999). “It is always the duty of a court to construe a statute,
if possible, in a manner to give it a constitutional operation.” Winslow-Spacarb, Inc. v. Evatt, 144
Ohio St. 471, 475, 59 N.E.2d 924, 926 (1945). “All reasonable doubts as to the constitutionality
of a statute must be resolved in its favor.” Desenco at 538. To declare a statute unconstitutional, it
must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are
incompatible. State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 142, 147, 128 N.E.2d 59 (1955).
Plaintiffs raise the following constitutional challenges to the Budget Bill: (1) it violates the
Uniformity Clause of the Ohio Constitution; (2) it usurps judicial authority (i.e. violates the

15

The Court notes the constitutionality of the Budget Bill and the merits of Substitution of CSADM often overlap.
However, the Court must only decide whether the Budget Bill is constitutional and not whether ODE’s Substitution
of CSADM was lawful.
16
Dayton argues that even if the Budget Bill is constitutional, its Basic Claims are exempt from the Budget Bill
pursuant to the Dayton Settlement Agreement. The Court has already ruled in favor of Dayton on this issue in its
October 18, 2017 Decision. In the same Decision, the Court found Cleveland and Toledo’s Add-In Claims are not
precluded by the Budget Bill. These two issues will be more thoroughly addressed infra.

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doctrine of separation of powers); (3) it violates the one-subject rule; and (4) it violates the
Thorough and Efficient Clause of the Ohio Constitution.
1. Summary Judgment is Granted in Favor of ODE on Plaintiffs’ Uniformity
Challenge.
Plaintiffs argue the Budget Bill is unconstitutional as it violates the Uniformity Clause of
the Ohio Constitution. They argue the Budget Bill does not operate uniformly as it “carves out”
districts who suffered a reduction in school funding as a result of Substitution of CSADM from
those who did not. Pls’ MSJ at 18-21. Plaintiffs argue that, prior to Substitution of CSADM and
the passage of the Budget Bill, every school district was entitled to funding pursuant to the School
Foundation Formula and a remedy if an error occurred. Id. at 18-19. Plaintiffs further allege ODE’s
unlawful actions caused some districts to suffer massive reductions, while others did not, and the
Budget Bill only perpetuated the disproportionate treatment by preventing those who lost funding
from an available remedy. Id. at 19-20.
In response, ODE argues the Budget Bill has no geographical or similar limitations, and
therefore, operates uniformly throughout Ohio. ODE MSJ at 24-25. ODE suggests Plaintiffs’
argument requires the Court to compare school funding before and after passage of the Budget
Bill to determine uniformity, rather than to consider whether the Budget Bill in-and-of-itself
applies uniformly across the state. ODE Memorandum in Opposition (“ODE Memo Opp.”) at 13.
ODE concedes that Substitution of CSADM may have created distinctions, but the Budget Bill
does not. Id. at 15. Rather, the Budget Bill applies to every district that lost funding regardless of
location. Id. at 13.
a. The Budget Bill Operates Uniformly Throughout Ohio.
Article II, Section 26 of the Ohio Constitution provides, “[a]ll laws of a general nature,
shall have a uniform operation throughout the State.” This provision is “mandatory, and not merely
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directory.” State ex. rel. Wirsch v. Spellmire, 67 Ohio St. 77, 81, 65 N.E. 619, 620 (1902). To
determine whether a legislative enactment operates uniformly, the Court performs a two-step
analysis: (1) whether the statute is a law of a general or special nature, and (2) whether the statute
operates uniformly throughout the state. Desenco, 84 Ohio St. 3d at 541; see also Simmons-Harris
v. Goff, 86 Ohio St. 3d 1, 11-12, 711 N.E.2d 203, 212-213 (1999). The parties agree the Budget
Bill is a general law. Therefore, the Court need only address whether the Budget Bill operates
uniformly throughout the state.
Uniform operation throughout the state “means universal operation as to territory; it takes
in the whole state.” Spellmire at 86; see also Austintown Twp. Bd. of Tr. v. Tracy, 76 Ohio St. 3d
353, 356, 667 N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (1996). As to persons, uniform operation “means universal
operation as to all persons and things in the same condition or category.” Spellmire at 86; see also
Kelleys Isl. Caddy Shack, Inc. v. Zaino, 96 Ohio St. 3d 375, 377, 2002-Ohio-4930, 775 N.E.2d
489, 492, ¶15. “When a law is available in every part of the state as to all persons and things in the
same condition or category, it is of uniform operation throughout the state.” Spellmire at 86.
Finally, “[i]f a law is sufficiently general in its terms to comprehend all localities, persons, and
things, it is not defeated and rendered void because there are certain localities in the state where
conditions are such that there is no person or thing to which the law can be applied.” State ex rel.
Stanton v. Powell, 109 Ohio St. 383, 386-387, 142 N.E. 401, 402 (1924).
In Desenco, supra, the Supreme Court addressed a statute that allowed for the creation of
districts to promote economic development. 84 Ohio St. 3d at 536. A Township could petition for
the creation of a district, but only if it adopted a required charter. Id. Once created, the district
could levy a special income tax. Id. at 537. The plaintiffs argued the statute was non-uniform as
it was limited to counties that adopted the required charter. Id. at 543. The Court disagreed and
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noted a law is uniform if “it contains provisions which permit it to operate upon every locality
where certain specified conditions prevail." Id. at 542. The Court found the law permitted any
county to adopt the appropriate charter and, and therefore, the law was uniform. Id. at 543.
Like Denesco, the Budget Bill operates uniformly throughout Ohio. The Budget Bill makes
no distinction based upon geographical location. Rather, its terms are broad and apply to “every
part of the state.” It applies to all school districts in Ohio who lost funding as a result of Substitution
of CSADM, regardless of location. In fact, when the Budget Bill was enacted, 253 of Ohio’s 614
school districts lost funding as a result of Substitution of CSADM and were precluded from
seeking a remedy. Hrg. Trans. at 25-26; see also ODE MSJ at 26. The Budget Bill “contains
provisions which permit it to operate upon every locality where certain specified conditions
prevail.” Denesco at 542. It is enforceable in every part of the state and as to all persons and things
in the same condition or category as Plaintiffs. It is immaterial that some districts suffered more
significant losses than others as the Budget Bill applies to all of them equally.
Yet, Plaintiffs argue the Budget Bill arbitrarily “carves” them out for separate treatment
and is therefore, non-uniform. In Stanton, supra, the Ohio Supreme Court considered the
uniformity of a law that only applied to counties having two or more common pleas judges:
The fact that the majority of the counties of the state have only one common pleas
judge, and that there is therefore nothing upon which the act can operate in those
counties, is not by any means conclusive of this inquiry. Section 26, Art. II of the
Constitution, was not intended to render invalid every law which does not operate
upon all persons, property or political subdivisions within the state. It is sufficient
if a law operates upon every person included within its operative provisions,
provided such operative provisions are not arbitrarily and unnecessarily restricted.
And the law is equally valid if it contains provisions which permit it to operate upon
every locality where certain specified conditions prevail. A law operates as an
unreasonable classification where it seeks to create artificial distinctions where no
real distinction exists.

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109 Ohio St. at 385-386. The Court found the distinction created by the statute was merely a
recognition of the condition that existed for years and was not arbitrary. Id.
Like Stanton, the Budget Bill does not arbitrarily “carve out” Plaintiffs for separate
treatment. The Budget Bill did not change the calculation of school funding in Ohio nor did it
create the distinction between those districts who lost funding and those who did not. Substitution
of CSADM changed the funding and caused some districts to lose funding while others did not.17
The Budget Bill merely addressed those existing “conditions” or “categories” and insulated ODE
from future liability.
Assuming arguendo, the Budget Bill arbitrarily “carved out” Plaintiffs, it is still
constitutional. In Austintown, supra, the Supreme Court considered a law governing the allocation
of tax revenues. 76 Ohio St. 3d at 354. The law resulted in both small and large townships
receiving the same amount of revenue. Id. The plaintiffs argued the allocation system violated
uniformity. The trial court agreed and held the “distribution and allocation of taxes … solely based
on political subdivision boundaries is an artificial and unreasonable classification and distinction.”
Id. at 354. On appeal, the Supreme Court explained the allocation system applied throughout Ohio
with no geographical exceptions. Id. at 357. The Court rejected the argument that the Uniformity
Clause prohibits “the adoption of any statute that contains arbitrary or irrational classifications
when posited against the stated purpose of the laws in question.” Id. at 358. The Court noted the
Uniformity Clause “does not bar classifications which are neither arbitrary nor unreasonable”:
[T]he fact that the Uniformity Clause does not bar classifications which are neither
arbitrary nor unreasonable does not necessarily mean that a classification which is
deemed to be arbitrary or unreasonable, necessarily violates the Uniformity Clause.
This is so because arbitrary classifications violate the Uniformity Clause only
where those classifications are contained in a statute first deemed to be special
The only issue before the Court is whether the Budget Bill is constitutional and not whether ODE’s Substitution of
CSADM was lawful. This Court must accept there were negative consequences as a result of Substitution of CSADM.
The Court need only decide if the General Assembly responded to those consequences in a constitutional manner.

17

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or local as opposed to general. We recognize that the gasoline tax distribution
scheme is neither "special" nor "local," but rather affects every municipality and
township in the state.
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 358-359. The Court continued:
[A]cceptance of the contention that the Uniformity Clause bars all legislatively
created classifications deemed by the judiciary to be arbitrary would improperly
and unnecessarily expand the scope of that constitutional provision. Traditionally,
and more appropriately, it is equal protection analysis, rather than Uniformity
Clause analysis, which mandates inquiry into whether legislatively created
classifications of similarly situated persons bear a rational relationship to legitimate
governmental purposes.
Id. at 359. See also City of Dayton v. State, 176 Ohio App. 3d 469, 487, 2008-Ohio-2589, 892 N.E.
2d 506, 520, ¶99 (2nd Dist.) (it is irrelevant to uniformity whether distinctions are arbitrary); see
also City of Youngstown v. State, 2009-Ohio-5679, ¶31 (7th Dist.) (whether classifications are
arbitrary is irrelevant if the law is general in nature).
The Budget Bill did not create categories. Even if the Court were to agree the Budget Bill
“perpetuates” or “condones” arbitrary categories, as suggested by Plaintiffs, Austintown holds that
categories, even if arbitrary or unreasonable, will not render a statute unconstitutional if it is first
deemed general. In other words, arbitrary classifications only affect the constitutionality of “local”
or “special” laws; they do not affect the constitutionality of general laws. Since the parties agree
the Budget Bill is general, it is immaterial whether the Budget Bill created, “perpetuated,” or
“condoned” arbitrary or unreasonable categories. Finally, as Austintown suggests, any such
argument that the Budget Bill creates arbitrary categories is more appropriately addressed pursuant
to an equal protection challenge, which has not been raised.
b. The Budget Bill is Not Required to Have Prospective Application.
Plaintiffs next argue the Budget Bill lacks future application. Pls’ MSJ at 20; Plaintiffs’
Memorandum in Opposition (“Pls’ Memo Opp.”) at 22-23. Plaintiffs argue the categories were
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created entirely upon ODE’s past conduct and districts cannot move from one category to the other
in the future. Pls’ MSJ at 20. Plaintiffs concede, however, that a “future application” analysis
only arises if a statute is first found to be non-uniform and, even then, it may only be used to “save
a law from invalidation under the Uniformity Clause.” Pls’ Memo Opp. at. 23.
ODE acknowledges a law may be non-uniform if both: 1) it applies to only one location
or entity and 2) there is no prospect for future application. ODE MSJ at 26, citing Simmons-Harris,
86 Ohio St. 3d at 12-13. ODE concedes the Budget Bill has no future application, however, it is
not in need of “saving” as it “applie[s] to all 614 districts … without selection or distinction among
them.” Id. In other words, the Budget Bill is not a “local” or “special” law; rather it applies
generally to every location throughout the state, and therefore, the Court need not consider lack of
“future application.” Id.
A “future application” analysis only arises if the Court first finds the Budget Bill is nonuniform. In Simmons-Harris, the Court considered a school voucher program. Simmons-Harris at
12. The original enactment solely applied to Cleveland City School District. Id. This version of
the statute was found to be non-uniform. Id. The legislature amended the statute to apply to any
school district in Ohio, but at the time of the amendment, the statute still only applied to Cleveland.
Id. The Supreme Court found that even though the statute only applied to one district, it could
apply to others in the future, and therefore was constitutional. Id. at 12-14; see also State ex rel.
Zupancic v. Limbach, 58 Ohio St. 3d 130, 138, 568 N.E.2d 1206, 1213 (1996) (“[A] statute is
deemed to be uniform despite applying to only one case so long as its terms are uniform and it
may apply to cases similarly situated in the future.”); see also Kelleys Isl., 2002-Ohio-4930 at ¶19
(statute that had a possibility of applying to other municipalities in the future held constitutional).18
18

Further, it is questionable as to whether a statute needs to have future application to be uniform at all. In Assur v.
Cincinnati, 88 Ohio St. 181, 102 N.E. 702 (1913), the Supreme Court addressed a statute that provided relief to all

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Thus, future application is only a factor if a statute is first found to be non-uniform. Because the
Court has found the Budget Bill to be uniform, the Court declines to address “future application.”19
Plaintiffs have not shown, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Budget Bill violates Article II, Section
26 of the Ohio Constitution.
2. Summary Judgment is Granted in Favor of ODE on Plaintiffs’ Violation of
Judicial Authority Challenge.
Plaintiffs next argue the Budget Bill usurps judicial authority in violation of Article II,
Section 32 of the Ohio Constitution. Plaintiffs argue the Budget Bill seeks to “cure” the unlawful
Substitution of CSADM (as found in Cincinnati), with subsequent “curative” legislation. Pls’ MSJ
at 22-23, citing Bartlett v. State, 73 Ohio St. 54, 75 N.E. 939 (1905). Plaintiffs argue “the
legislature has, on one hand, required ODE to utilize Formula ADM in the calculation of School
Foundation Funding for all school districts and, at the same time, excused the failure of ODE to
do so for some school districts.” Id. at 23. They further argue the Budget Bill intends to “erase”
Plaintiffs’ claims previously found meritorious in Cincinnati. Id. at 23-24, citing Cowen v. State,
101 Ohio St. 387, 129 N.E. 719 (1920).
In response, ODE argues that a distinction must first be drawn between constitutional
review versus statutory interpretation. ODE Memo Opp. at 17-18. ODE concedes the General

areas affected by the Great Flood of 1913. The Supreme Court first rejected the argument that a lack of prospective
application renders a law non-uniform. It stated, “[i]f this court is correct in its former holdings that a general law that
operates in every locality where the conditions exist is a law of uniform operation throughout the state, then this
argument must fail, for this law operates in every such locality.” Id. at 187. The Court further held “[t]he fact that [the
statute] applies to present conditions only, does not affect its uniform operation throughout the state.” Id. at 188.
19
ODE also raises a “reasonableness” argument to save the Budget Bill if found to be non-uniform. ODE MSJ at 27.
ODE argues that in passing the Budget Bill, the General Assembly had a legitimate interest in achieving financial
certainty from claims arising from Substitution of CSADM and acting on in its belief that Substitution of CSADM
was a more accurate method of funding schools. Id. at 28-30. In response, Plaintiffs argue the Budget Bill is
unreasonable as it condones the unlawful Substitution of CSADM. Pls’ Memo Opp. at 25-28. They argue that
Substitution of CSADM is not more accurate, but rather, manifestly unreasonable. Id. at 27. Plaintiffs further argue
the Budget Bill results in a disparate impact upon them and others similarly situated. Id. at 32-33. As the Court has
found the Budget Bill is uniform, it need not consider a reasonableness argument. These arguments are re-raised in
connection with Plaintiff’s thorough and efficient challenge and will be addressed, in Section VI(A)(4) infra.

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Assembly cannot undo constitutional decisions or final judgments. Id. at 17. It argues, however,
that when a court finds flaws in a statute, the General Assembly is free to enact statutory
enactments to address those flaws. Id. at 18. Further, ODE argues the Budget Bill does not disturb
Cincinnati, nor does it disturb any final judgment in this case, as Plaintiffs have not yet reached a
final judgment. Id. at 19. Rather, ODE argues the Budget Bill was passed in 2009, prior to the
instant action filed in 2011. Id.
“’The separation-of-powers doctrine implicitly arises from our tripartite democratic form
of government and recognizes that the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of our
government have their own unique powers and duties that are separate and apart from others.’”
State v. Ritchey, 2016-Ohio-2878, 64 N.E.3d 599, 604, ¶24 (3rd Dist.), citing State v. Thompson,
92 Ohio St. 3d 584, 586, 752 N.E.2d 276, 278 (other citations omitted). The doctrine establishes
a system of checks and balances so all three branches work together. Ritchey at ¶24, citing
Thompson at 586. Article II of the Ohio Constitution governs legislative powers whereas, Article
IV governs judicial powers. The power of the legislature and the judiciary often intertwine; the
legislature has the power to establish and define the law, while the judiciary has the exclusive
authority to interpret it. Ritchey at ¶25, citing State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St. 3d 266, 277, 2010Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, 764, ¶48 (“’the legislative branch plays an important and meaningful
role in the criminal law by defining offenses and assigning punishment, while the judicial branch
has its equally important role in interpreting those laws.’”); see also Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson,
116 Ohio St. 3d 468, 483-484, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, 439, ¶¶73-76 (the legislature
does not invade the judicial power to legislatively define the amount of damages available in
certain types of cases as the court retains the power to decide the facts and the amount of
recoverable damages in individual cases).
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Plaintiffs argue the Budget Bill violates the legislative power in Article II, Section 32 of
the Ohio Constitution, which states “[t]he general assembly shall grant no divorce, nor exercise
any judicial power not herein expressly conferred.” This prohibits the legislature “from exercising
any judicial power not conferred upon it in the Constitution.” Ritchey at ¶24. Specifically,
Plaintiffs argue the Budget Bill illegally attempts to “cure” the unilateral decision to Substitute
CSADM, found to be unlawful in Cincinnati. Pls’ MSJ at 22-23. In Bartlett, supra., the Supreme
Court considered a law that attempted to create a special school district. 73 Ohio St. at 56. The law
was previously found to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, but the General Assembly
passed the law again, and declared it to be constitutional. Id. In considering the second passage,
the Court held “it is well-settled that the legislature cannot annul, reverse or modify a judgment of
a court already rendered, nor require the courts to treat as valid laws those which are
unconstitutional.” Id. at 58; see also State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio
St. 3d 451, 474, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1084 (1999) (General Assembly cannot declare constitutional
what the court has found unconstitutional).
ODE concedes where “a court finds legislation to be unconstitutional, the legislature may
not later pass a law … declaring that it disagrees with the finding and that the legislation
nonetheless [is constitutional].” ODE Memo Opp. at 17. ODE argues, however, there was never
a ruling as to the constitutionality of Substitution of CSADM; rather, the Budget Bill is a statutory
enactment to address the flaws of Substitution of CSADM. Id. at 18-19. The Court agrees. By the
passage of the Budget Bill, the General Assembly did not render constitutional what had previously
been held to be unconstitutional. Cincinnati did not address or determine the constitutionality of
Substitution of CSADM or of the Budget Bill itself. Rather, Cincinnati’s holding-that Substitution
of CSADM is unlawful-was based entirely on statutory interpretation. The General Assembly
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merely enacted legislation to address the flaws identified by Cincinnati. Thus, the General
Assembly did not “cure” a constitutional defect by passing the Budget Bill.
Plaintiffs next argue the Budget Bill is unconstitutional as it “erases” the claims that were
found to be meritorious in Cincinnati. Pls’ MSJ at 23-24. In Cowen, supra., a trial court found a
bid for road construction was deficient and enjoined the county from performing the work. 101
Ohio St. at 388. The judgment was subsequently upheld by the court of appeals. Id. Later, the
General Assembly passed a law declaring the actions of the county to comply with the law. Id. at
393. In finding the General Assembly usurped the court’s authority, the Court held: “It is wellsettled that the legislature has no right or power to invade the province of the judiciary, by
annulling, setting aside, modifying, or impairing a final judgment previously rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 394.
Here, unlike Cowen, the General Assembly did not reverse a previous judgment of the
Court. The Budget Bill was enacted in response to the holding in Cincinnati, and did not disturb
the final judgment rendered in that case. Rather, the Budget Bill was enacted on July 17, 2009,
almost three years after the Cincinnati decision. Further, Plaintiffs’ claims were not filed until
2011, two years after the passage of the Budget Bill, and therefore, there was no final judgment
rendered in these cases. Consequently, the Budget Bill did not “erase” Cincinnati or a final
judgment in this case. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
Budget Bill violates Article II, Section 32 of the Ohio Constitution.
Moreover, pursuant to Article IV, Section 4(B), the General Assembly has the power to
define the jurisdiction of Ohio courts. “The constitution itself confers no jurisdiction whatever
upon the [court of common pleas], either in civil or criminal cases. It is given a capacity to receive
jurisdiction in all such cases, but it can exercise none, until ‘fixed by law.’” Seventh Urban, Inc.
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v. Univ. Circle Prop. Dev., Inc., 67 Ohio St. 2d 19, 22, 423 N.E.2d 1070, 1073 (1981); citing
Stevens v. State, 3 Ohio St. 453, 455 (1854). “[T]he power to define the jurisdiction of the courts
of common pleas rests in the General Assembly and that such courts may exercise only such
jurisdiction as is expressly granted to them by the legislature.” Seventh Urban at 22; citing
Cincinnati v. Bossert Mach. Co., 16 Ohio St. 2d 76, 79, 243 N.E.2d 105, 107 (1968) (“[T]he power
to grant jurisdiction includes the power to withhold it.”).
In Cent. Ohio Tran. Auth. v. Transp. Wkrs. Union, Local 208, 37 Ohio St. 3d 56, 524
N.E.2d 151 (1988) (“COTA”), the Supreme Court analyzed a statute preventing judicial review of
decisions of the State Employment Relations Board (“SERB”). Id. at 50-60. The lower court found
the statute unconstitutional as it impeded the court’s jurisdiction and blocked its exercise of power.
Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court found the statute did not violate separation of powers. Id. at 62.
The Court noted the trial court’s jurisdiction is created by Article IV, Section 4(B), which states:
The courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original
jurisdiction over all justiciable matters and such powers of review of proceedings
of administrative officers and agencies as may be provided by law.
COTA at 60 (emphasis). The Court further found the jurisdiction of the common pleas court is
“limited to whatever the legislature may choose to bestow.” Id. The Court found that while the
common pleas court is a court of general jurisdiction, “the Constitution itself limits their
jurisdiction to that which is expressly conferred by the General Assembly.” Id. at 60. It noted the
constitutional presumption may be overcome only in the most extreme cases and “works to protect
the domain of the legislature from encroachment by the judiciary.” Id. at 62. The Court held the
General Assembly appropriately exercised its authority to limit the court’s jurisdiction.
Similar to COTA, by enacting the Budget Bill, the General Assembly chose to limit the
jurisdiction of the courts to decide issues arising from Substitution of CSADM. The power to limit
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the court’s jurisdiction is within the powers of the legislature and does not encroach upon judicial
powers. Plaintiffs have not shown, beyond a reasonable doubt, the Budget Bill violates Article IV,
Section 4(B)of the Ohio Constitution.
3. Summary Judgment is Granted in Favor of ODE on Plaintiffs’ One-Subject
Rule Challenge.
Plaintiffs next argue the Budget Bill violates Article II, Section 15(D) of the Ohio
Constitution, known as the “one-subject rule.” Pls’ MSJ at 24-30. Since it was enacted as a part
of an appropriations bill, Plaintiffs argue the primary purpose of the Budget Bill must share a
common purpose or subject matter as the other general provisions of the bill. Id. at 26-30. Plaintiffs
argue the purpose of the Budget Bill – to insulate ODE from liability for Substitution of CSADM
– and the general topic of state appropriations – the expenditure and restriction of state spending
– do not share a common subject matter. Id. at 26-27. They argue the Budget Bill is clearly a
“rider,” given it has been re-enacted in at least five budget bills and constitutes only one page out
of thousands. Id. at 28-29. Finally, Plaintiffs argue the Budget Bill, first enacted in 2009, does
not relate to or address the budget in FY 05-07. Id. at 29.
ODE argues the Budget Bill precludes the state from liability for the unlawful Substitution
of CSADM, which would be paid directly from state appropriations, and therefore, relates to the
state budget. ODE Memo Opp. at 20-25. It argues “the Ohio Supreme Court and Tenth District
have made clear that if a provision in an [appropriations] bill can be rationally traced to a direct
impact on the state budget, there is no one-subject violation.” Id. at 21. ODE argues that if the
Budget Bill is unconstitutional, the state will be required to appropriate $50 million in new funds

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or utilize funds previously appropriated to other agencies in the state’s budget. Id. at 24-25. As
such, the Budget Bill directly relates to the state’s budget. Id.20
Article II, Section 15(D) of the Ohio Constitution provides: “No bill shall contain more
than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.” “The purpose of the rule is to
prevent logrolling, which occurs when legislators combine disharmonious proposals in a single
bill to ensure passage of proposals that might not have won acceptance on their own.” State ex rel.
Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn. v. State, 146 Ohio St. 3d 315, 319, 2016-Ohio-478, 56 N.E.3d 913,
919, ¶15 (“OCSEA 2”). While mandatory, the court’s role in the enforcement of the one-subject
rule is limited. Id. at ¶16; see also City of Athens v. Testa, 2019-Ohio-277, 119 N.E.3d 469, 481,
¶31 (10th Dist.). “To accord appropriate deference to the General Assembly's law-making
function, we must liberally construe the term ‘subject’ for purposes of the rule.” OCSEA 2 at ¶16;
citing State ex. rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062
(1999). “[E]very presumption in favor of [a law’s] validity should be indulged.” Sheward at 496.
The one-subject rule does not prohibit a plurality of topics, rather “a disunity of subjects.”
OCSEA 2 at ¶17; citing State ex. rel. Hinkle v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elect., 62 Ohio St. 3d 145, 580
N.E.2d 767 (1991). The fact that a bill embraces more than one topic is not fatal “as long as a
common purpose or relationship exists between the topics.” OCSEA 2 at ¶17; citing Hoover v.
Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 19 Ohio St. 3d 1, 6, 482 N.E.2d 575, 580 (1985). A statute will only
violate the one-subject rule when it contains "a manifestly gross and fraudulent violation.”21 State

20

Plaintiffs suggest any restitution ordered here may be paid pursuant to a separate Ohio Revised Code section which
governs civil liability for the state, and thus, may not directly impact the state’s budget. Plaintiffs’ Reply at 11, citing
R.C. 2743.19. However, R.C. 2743.19 governs monetary judgments awarded by the court of claims. At the hearing,
Plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged they instituted the action in this Court to pursue a writ of mandamus instead of a
monetary recovery in the court of claims. Hrg. Tran. at 8. Thus, R.C. 2743.19 has no applicability herein.
21
The Supreme Court does not provide a firm definition of a “manifestly gross and fraudulent violation.” However,
Ohio courts have found provisions within a bill that lack a common purpose or relationship satisfy the definition. See,
e.g., Akron Metro. Hous. Auth. Bd. of Tr. v. State, 2008-Ohio-2836 (10th Dist.); see also In re Nowak, 104 Ohio St.
3d 466, 2004-Ohio-6777, 820 N.E.2d 2004.

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ex. rel. Dix v. Celeste, 11 Ohio St. 3d 141, 145, 464 N.E.2d 153, 157 (1984). “Assessment of an
enactment’s constitutionality will be primarily a matter of ‘case-by-case, semantic and contextual
analysis.’” Cuyahoga Cty Vets. Servs. Commn. v. State, 159 Ohio App. 3d 276, 280, 2004-Ohio6124, 823 N.E.2d 888, 891, ¶10 (10th Dist.), quoting Dix at 145. Further, “[i]n order to find a
legislative enactment violative of the one-subject rule, a court must determine that various topics
contained therein lack a common purpose or relationship so that there is no discernible practical,
rational or legitimate reason for combining the provisions in one Act.” Beagle v. Walden, 78 Ohio
St. 3d 59, 62, 676 N.E.2d 506, 507 (1997).
The Supreme Court has noted “[a]pplication of the one-subject rule is complicated when
the challenged provision is part of an appropriations bill, which of necessity contains many
different provisions.” State ex. rel. Ohio Civil Serv. Emps. Assn, Local 11 v. State Empl. Rels. Bd.,
104 Ohio St. 3d 122, 130, 2004-Ohio-6363, 818 N.E.2d 688, 697, ¶30 (“OCSEA 1”).
“[A]ppropriations bills . . . are different from other Acts of the General Assembly [because they]
encompass many items, all bound by the thread of appropriations." Id.; citing Simmons-Harris, 86
Ohio St. 3d at 16. The Supreme Court has also made clear “[b]iennial appropriation bills, which
fund the state’s programs and departments, necessarily address wide-ranging topics” and “can bind
many topics to the common thread of appropriation.” OCSEA 2 at ¶18. These topics are bound
by the single subject of “balancing of state expenditures against state revenues to ensure operation
of state programs.” Id. at ¶27. 22

22

Where a single subject does not exist, courts have found provisions in an appropriations bill to violate the onesubject rule. See State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 69 Ohio St. 3d 225, 230, 631 N.E.2d 582, 587 (1994)
(provisions creating a new intentional tort and child labor laws did not share a common thread with an appropriations
bill for the BWC); see also Simmons-Harris, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 17 (provision creating substantive program in an
appropriations bill violates the one-subject rule); see also Gallipolis Care, L.L.C. v. Ohio Dep't of Health, 2004-Ohio5533, ¶37 (10th Dist.) (provision for the transfer of nursing home beds to another county did not share a common
thread with an appropriations bill); and OSCEA 1, 104 Ohio St. 3d at 130 (state failed to demonstrate that provision
restricting state employees from collective bargaining did not share a common thread with general appropriations bill).

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In OSCEA 2, the Supreme Court considered an appropriations bill that included a statute
allowing state and local governments to contract for private operation of prisons. The plaintiff
challenged the statute on one-subject grounds. The Court noted it previously refused to find a onesubject violation where the provisions of the appropriations bill “relate to funding the operations
of programs, agencies, and matters described elsewhere in the bill.” OCSEA 2 at ¶23. The Court
found the statute required a private operator of a prison to show it would the save costs for the
state before a contract would be granted. Id. at ¶29. The Supreme Court found “the prison-sale
provisions are rationally related to budgeting for the operation of the state government.” Id. at ¶33.
The Supreme Court held the prison-sale provisions were intended to generate revenue, and
therefore, inclusion in the appropriations bill was reasonable. Id.
In City of Riverdale v. State, 190 Ohio App. 3d 765, 2010-Ohio-5868, 944 N.E.2d 281
(10th Dist.), the Tenth District addressed a statute precluding the plaintiff from taxing the income
of non-resident civilian employees working at a local air force base. Id. at ¶4. The trial court found
the statute violated the one-subject rule. Id. at ¶5. On appeal, the Tenth District stated “[a]lthough
appropriations bills encompass many items bound by the thread of appropriations, revenues and
expenditures compose the core of an appropriations bill.” Id. at ¶44. It noted the “challenged
provision does not generate funds for the state, but, instead, restricts the City's ability to generate
revenue, and that restriction has a direct effect on the State's funding for the City.” Riverdale at
¶45. The Tenth District found that “[r]estricting funding is as much a part of an appropriations bill
as granting funds.” Id., citing Cuyahoga, supra., 159 Ohio App. 3d at 281. It held the statute
related to state appropriations and did not violate the one-subject rule. Riverdale at ¶52.
The Court finds the purpose of the Budget Bill (i.e., to insulate ODE from liability for
Substitution of CSADM), and the general topic of appropriations (i.e., money expenditures and/or
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restrictions on funding), directly impact the state’s budget. See OCSEA 2 at ¶27 (“The general
purpose of an appropriations bill is “balancing … state expenditures against state revenues to ensure
operation of state programs.”). Like OCSEA 2, the Budget Bill aims to save the state funds. The
purpose of the Budget Bill is to prevent ODE from having to pay restitution as a result of Substitution
of CSADM. It restricts the state from paying millions of dollars in restitution owed to Plaintiffs for
school funding. As such, it is a measure restricting state expenditures, and thus, is related “directly –
not just rationally – to budgeting for the operations of state government.” Id. at ¶ 29.
There is no genuine issue of material fact that if Plaintiffs were to recover, the state would be
required to pay restitution from state appropriations:
THE COURT: Wouldn't the schools already have their appropriation, though?
MR. COLE: So there is a funding formula, and the General Assembly appropriates
money that, hopefully, will be enough to cover all the funding formula.
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. COLE: And they may need to do a new appropriation if they fall short, or they
may need to -- they may have it carried towards the next year if they don't spend all
the money, but this would be 50 million in new dollars that would be needed to be
paid to these three school districts, new dollars. It isn't sitting there. What the General
Assembly appropriates is its best estimate of what the funding formula is going to
provide in the aggregate for school districts across the state. This would be 50 million
new dollars, and that's a direct impact on the appropriation function, and that
makes it highly appropriate to be in the budget bill.
(Emphasis added.) Hrg. Trans. at 145-146. Plaintiffs do not dispute this material fact:
THE COURT: Where would the state pay these claims from? If they’re - - if I
order … restitution, in this case, where would that come from?
MR. PITTNER: It would come from funds allocated, I believe, to ODE. For
example, ODE has already paid around $13 million to some plaintiffs, Cincinnati
and Dayton, because of their wrongful conduct in this case. ***** But they paid
it, and I believe they paid it from state funds allocated to the State Board of
Education.

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THE COURT: Well, if there are state funds allocated to ODE, does that not impact
then the budget - - the state’s budget?
MR. PITTNER: Yes, it would have an impact…
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 42-43.23 Consequently, the Court finds the purpose of the Budget Bill
can be rationally traced to the general purpose of state appropriations and has a direct impact upon
the state’s budget. The Court finds Plaintiffs have not shown the Budget Bill constitutes a manifestly
gross and fraudulent violation of the one-subject rule. Thus, Plaintiffs have not shown, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the Budget Bill violates Article II, Section 15(D) of the Ohio Constitution.
4. Summary Judgment is Granted in Favor of ODE on Plaintiffs’ Thorough and
Efficient Challenge.
Plaintiffs next argue the Budget Bill violates the Thorough and Efficient Clause. Pls’ MSJ
at 30-32. Plaintiffs argue the Budget Bill creates two school funding systems, one lawfully funded,
and the other, unlawfully funded by Substitution of CSADM. Id. at 31. They argue this distinction
resulted in a reduction of school funds below the constitutional floor. Plaintiff’s Reply (“Pls’
Reply”) at 7. Plaintiffs further argue the guarantees provided by a “thorough” and “efficient”
system must consider the unique demographic of their districts, which have a “disproportionally
high percentage” of “economically disadvantaged” students and “students with disabilities.” Pls’
Memo Opp. at 34. They note their districts are large urban areas with significant populations of
minority, impoverished and special needs students. Id. at 32-33. Plaintiffs argue the reduction in
funding had a “substantial adverse impact” and “[fell] most heavily” upon their districts due to the
unique and special educational and programing needs of their students. Id. at 33-34. In other
words, the Budget Bill “most harms the school districts with the greatest needs.” Id. at 34. Finally,

While arguments of counsel are not “evidence,” neither party submitted an affidavit or other evidence to demonstrate
that restitution would be paid from any other source. Given the consistent statements of counsel, the Court finds no
genuine issue of material fact that any restitution ordered here would be paid from state appropriations.

23

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Plaintiffs argue they “faced significant operating deficits, meaning that they either had to reduce
expenditures or receive additional revenue to avoid incurring deficits.” Id. at 35.
In response, ODE argues that while the Thorough and Efficient Clause limits the
legislature, it also provides the legislature broad discretion in determining how to properly allocate
funds for education. ODE Memo Opp. at 26. ODE argues Substitution of CSADM made the school
funding system more efficient because it was a more accurate method of counting students. Id. at
26-27. It argues by enacting the Budget Bill, “[t]he General Assembly… approved and condoned
this improvement in school funding accuracy. When the General Assembly acts to make school
funding more thorough and efficient, it is empowered by the Thorough and Efficient Clause, not
hamstrung by it, even if that improvement means that some districts receive less than they would
have under a less-accurate funding practice.” Id. at 27.
Article VI, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution states:
The general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as,
with the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and
efficient system of common schools throughout the state …
Pursuant to this provision, the General Assembly has broad authority over public schools.
Youngstown City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 2018-Ohio-2532, 104 N.E.3d 1060, 1071, ¶26
(10th Dist.). “Under Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Article VI of the Ohio Constitution, the General
Assembly is given exceedingly broad powers to provide a thorough and efficient system of
common schools by taxation, and for the organization, administration, and control thereof.” Id.;
quoting State ex rel. Core v. Green, 160 Ohio St. 175, 180, 115 N.E. 2d 157, 160 (1953). The
Supreme Court has long held this provision is mandatory. Miller, 107 Ohio St. at 297. “A thorough
system means that each and every school district has enough funds to operate.” Derolph v. State,
89 Ohio St. 3d 1, 10, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1001 (2000). “An efficient system means one in which each
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and every school district in the state has an ample number of teachers, sound buildings that are in
compliance with state building and fire codes, and equipment sufficient for all students to be
afforded an educational opportunity.” Id. “[W]hile the General Assembly has wide discretion in
meeting the mandate of Section 2, Article VI, this discretion is not without limits.” Derolph v.
State, 78 Ohio St. 3d 193, 204, 677 N.E.2d 733, 741 (1997).
Plaintiffs first argue the Budget Bill creates two school funding systems. They argue
Substitution of CSADM diverted funds resulting in their districts being funded below the
constitutional floor as established by the School Foundation Program. The Supreme Court has
previously rejected a thorough and efficient challenge based on a similar argument. In State ex rel.
Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. Of Educ., 111 Ohio St. 3d 568, 2006-Ohio-5512,
857 N.E.2d 1148, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Ohio’s system for the
creation and funding of community schools. Id. at ¶¶5-10. The plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of statutory provisions that provided for the diversion of funds from district
schools to community schools. Id. at ¶4. The plaintiffs argued the provisions violated the Thorough
and Efficient Clause. Id. at ¶35. In finding the challenged statutes constitutional, the Supreme
Court noted that public schools receive money from both state and local property taxes. Id. at ¶¶3738. Community schools, however, only receive money from the state. Id. at ¶38. Therefore,
community schools did not divert local money from public schools. Id. at ¶39. Further, the
Supreme Court explained:
The state treats community-school students in the same way it has treated any
student who has ever left a school district. It reduces its per-pupil funding to the
school district, just as it does when students leave for private schools, for other
school districts, or for home schooling.
The mere increase or decrease in the local share percentage does not violate the
Thorough and Efficient Clause, because the district still receives state funding for
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the children actually attending the district traditional schools. Community schools
never receive any local tax money …
Id. at ¶¶ 37-38. Finally, the Supreme Court stated, “[w]hen a student leaves a traditional school to
attend a community school, the state funds follow the student.” Id. at ¶39. The Supreme Court held
that community schools did not unconstitutionally divert state funds from the plaintiffs. Id.
As set forth above, the October Count consists of two parts: (1) the district component; and
(2) the community school component. Jt. Stip. 8. It is undisputed that Substitution of CSADM only
impacted the community school component – it did not impact the district component. Jt. Stip.
71. Therefore, Plaintiffs did not lose funding for students “actually attending [their] traditional
schools.” Ohio Cong. at ¶38. Further, assuming the Budget Bill “perpetuated” or “condoned”
Substitution of CSADM, as Plaintiffs suggest, it only resulted in decreased funding in relation to
residence district community school students and not district students. 24 As in Ohio Cong., such a
decrease in the estimate of residence district community school students (the community school
component), does not violate the Thorough and Efficient Clause.
Plaintiffs next argue the Budget Bill results in a more substantial adverse impact to their
demographic of students, which are large populations of minority, impoverished and special needs
students. Pls’ Memo Opp. at 32-33. Plaintiffs suggest that the Budget Bill, which they claim
“drastically” reduced funding, significantly harmed their students who were in the greatest need
of special educational opportunities and programming. Id. at 34. ODE characterizes this argument
as a disparate impact challenge. ODE MSJ at 28.25

24

Again, the only issue before the Court is whether the Budget Bill is constitutional, not the lawfulness of Substitution
of CSADM. Since the Budget Bill did not alter the allocation of school funding in Ohio, Plaintiffs have not shown
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Budget Bill is unconstitutional pursuant to the Thorough and Efficient Clause.
25
As the Court previously stated, a disparate impact argument is more properly brought as an equal protection
challenge, which has not been raised. See Austintown, 76 Ohio St. 3d at 359.

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The Supreme Court has not identified the minimal requirements of the Thorough and
Efficient Clause. In Derolph, supra., the Ohio Supreme Court considered a challenge to Ohio’s
school funding statutes. 78 Ohio St. 3d at 197. The challenged system relied heavily on local,
rather than state, revenue. Id. at 199. The plaintiffs consisted of numerous lower income school
districts. Id. at 193. The Court found the plaintiffs suffered from deteriorating buildings, were
unable to provide basic resources, lacked adequate supplies and technology, had insufficient
teachers, and limited curricula. Id. at 208-209. The Court held the facts “lead to one inescapable
conclusion – Ohio's elementary and secondary public schools are neither thorough nor efficient.”
Id. at 209. The Court stated:
[R]ather than following the constitutional dictate that it is the state's obligation to
fund education (as this opinion has repeatedly underscored), the legislature has
thrust the majority of responsibility upon local school districts. This, too, is
contrary to the clear wording of our Constitution. The responsibility for maintaining
a thorough and efficient school system falls upon the state. When a district falls
short of the constitutional requirement that the system be thorough and efficient, it
is the state's obligation to rectify it.
Id. at 209-210. The Supreme Court clarified that the Ohio Constitution does not require equal
amounts of funding among school districts, but only requires a system that ensures adequate
funding for all districts. Id. at 211. Therefore, while the Thorough and Efficient Clause guarantees
a basic minimum level of funding for each student, the basic minimum level is the only
requirement for the system to be thorough and efficient.
Like Derolph, the fact that Plaintiffs’ funding was decreased is insufficient to support a
thorough and efficient challenge. Unlike DeRolph, they do not allege, much less prove, that, as a
result of Substitution of CSADM and/or the Budget Bill, their districts suffer from deteriorating
buildings, are unable to provide basic resources, lack adequate supplies and technology, have
insufficient teachers, or a limited curriculum. Further, Plaintiffs have not presented evidence to
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demonstrate the Budget Bill caused them to suffer a disparate impact. There is no evidence, beyond
blanket allegations, that the Budget Bill caused a more “significant adverse impact” or that the
reductions “fell most heavily” upon their large populations of “economically disadvantaged” or
“students with disabilities.”26 They have presented no evidence that the Budget Bill caused them
to cut any special educational opportunities or programming. They have not proven that Budget
Bill “most harmed” their districts “with the greatest needs.” Moreover, Plaintiffs have not shown
the Budget Bill caused them to incur an operating deficit or that they have had to reduce
expenditures or raise additional revenue to avoid a deficit. Plaintiffs have not shown, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the Budget Bill violates Article VI, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution.
B. Dayton is Entitled to Summary Judgment on its Basic Claims.
Although the Dayton Settlement Agreement resolved a portion of Dayton’s claims against
ODE, ODE argues the “Remaining Dispute” is barred by the Budget Bill. This issue has previously
come before the Court and it held:
The Court holds that the Budget Bills do not preempt Dayton’s claims because of
the Agreement’s straightforward language. As quoted above, section 3 of the
[Dayton Settlement Agreement] expressly reserves Dayton’s ability to pursue
resolution of its Remaining Dispute. The Budget Bills therefore exempt the
Remaining Dispute because those unresolved claims stem from a settlement
agreement executed prior to June 1, 2009. Furthermore, section 5 of the Agreement
plainly states that “no legislation *** shall have any effect whatsoever on the
claims *** under *** this Agreement as it pertains to FY 05, 06, and 07 school
foundation payments to Dayton *** Where, as here, a settlement agreement is
“clear and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the agreement’s express
terms *** Stoner v. Salon Lofts, LLC, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-838, 2012Ohio-3269, ¶ 8. The Court does so in the instant matter by holding that the Budget
Bills do not preclude Dayton’s claims.

26
“When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported …an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleadings, but … must set forth specific facts showing that there is no genuine issue for
trial.” King v. K.R. Wilson Co., 8 Ohio St. 3d 9, 11, 455 N.E.2d 1282, 1283 (1983).

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(Emphasis added.) October 18, 2017 Decision at 13-14. The Court unequivocally ruled the
Remaining Dispute (i.e., Dayton’s Basic Claims) are exempt from the Budget Bill.
ODE now asks the Court to reconsider and find Dayton’s Basic Claims are precluded by
the Budget Bill. ODE MSJ at 20-23. The Court is not prohibited from reconsidering its prior
decisions. Clymer v. Clymer, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4303, *9 (10th Dist.) (“[T]he law-of-thecase doctrine should not be taken to imply that a trial court can never, under any circumstances,
reconsider its prior ruling.”). “A motion for summary judgment, as well as a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, are interlocutory orders subject to reconsideration by the trial court at any time
before final judgment is entered in the case.” S.O.S. Constr. Indus. v. Columbus Metro. Hous.
Auth., 2003-Ohio-15, ¶24 (10th Dist.). The Court finds the law-of-the-case doctrine does not
preclude the Court from reconsidering its prior decision as to the Dayton Settlement Agreement.
The October 18, 2017 Decision was a denial of ODE’s MJP and, as such, is interlocutory in nature
and not subject to immediate appeal. However, as seen below, the Court finds its October 18,
2017 Decision legally sound and will not disturb it.
1. The Dayton Settlement Agreement is a Valid Contract and Exempts Dayton’s
Basic Claims from the Budget Bill.
The Dayton Settlement Agreement is a contract between Plaintiffs and ODE. “The goal of
construing contract language is to effectuate the parties' intent.” Stoner v. Salon Lofts, LLC, 2012Ohio-3269, ¶8 (10th Dist.). “The intent of the parties to a contract is presumed to reside in the
language they chose to employ in the agreement.” Kelly v. Med. Life Ins. Co., 31 Ohio St. 3d 130,
130, 509 N.E.2d 411 (1987). “[W]hen the parties' agreement is integrated into an unambiguous,
written contract, courts should give effect to the plain meaning of the parties' expressed intentions.”
Stoner at ¶8; citing Aultman Hosp. Ass'n v. Comm. Mut. Ins. Co., 46 Ohio St. 3d 51, 55, 544 N.E.2d
920, 924 (1989). “If a contract is clear and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the
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agreement's express terms and it need not go beyond the plain language of the agreement to
determine the rights and obligations of the parties.” Stoner at ¶8.
The Dayton Settlement Agreement’s terms are clear and unambiguous. Paragraph 3 states:
The Parties each acknowledge and agree that a dispute remains with regard to the
amount that Dayton believes it is still owed (“Remaining Dispute”) and that if the
Parties have not reached an agreement as to the Remaining Dispute, each Party
shall have the right to pursue any lawful remedy, including, but not limited to
litigation, in order to resolve any claims(s) arising out of the Remaining Dispute.
(Emphasis added.)
This paragraph specifically grants the parties the right to pursue litigation if the Remaining Dispute
cannot be settled. ODE argues the Budget Bill extinguished this right, but the Dayton Settlement
Agreement goes on to state in Paragraph 5:
The Parties agree and hereby acknowledge that this Agreement is and remains in
full force and effect and that no legislation … has or shall have the effect
whatsoever on the claims and obligations under, or the application,
implementation, and/or enforcement of this Agreement as it pertains to FY 05, 06
and 07 school foundation payments to Dayton. (Emphasis added.)
This paragraph clearly states no legislation, current or future, will affect the application of the
terms of the agreement.
On May 4, 2009, before the passage of the Budget Bill, Dayton and ODE entered into the
Dayton Settlement Agreement, resolving some of their claims, but reserving others. The terms are
clear and unambiguous and the Court need not go beyond their plain language to determine the
intent of the parties. Paragraph 3 specifically reserved the right to litigate the “Remaining
Dispute.” Paragraph 5 clearly and unequivocally states that “no legislation,” shall affect the parties
right to litigate any “claims” covered thereby, including the “Remaining Dispute.” The Court must
construe the clear and unambiguous terms of the Dayton Settlement Agreement to effectuate the
intent of the parties. The parties clearly intended that the Dayton Settlement Agreement reserved

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the Remaining Dispute for subsequent litigation and that no legislation would otherwise impact
those claims.
2. Dayton is Entitled to a Writ of Mandamus.
The Court finds Dayton is entitled to a writ of mandamus. The Dayton Settlement
Agreement exempts Dayton’s Basic Claims. In Cincinnati, the First District upheld the lower
court’s finding that ODE violated the law when substituting CSADM for the community school
component of the October Count. Cincinnati, 176 Ohio App. 3d at 161. The parties have chosen
not to re-litigate that issue, and therefore, the Court relies upon it.
Pursuant to the request for relief, the Court finds Dayton has a clear legal right to have
Defendants: (1) fund Dayton for FY 05 in compliance with the law in effect in 2005; (2) fund
Dayton for FY 05 Add-In Students in compliance with the law in effect in 2005; and (3) fund
Dayton for FY 06 and FY 07 pursuant to guarantee provisions in effect in 2005. See Dayton Am.
Pet. at ¶¶51, 53, 55. Further, the Court finds ODE has a clear legal duty to: (1) fund Dayton for
FY 05 in compliance with the law in effect in 2005; (2) fund Dayton for FY 05 Add-In Students
in compliance with the law in effect in 2005; and (3) fund Dayton for FY 06 and FY 07 pursuant
to guarantee provisions in effect in 2005. Id. at ¶¶52, 54, 56. Finally, the Court finds Dayton has
no adequate remedy at law other than a writ of mandamus.
3. Dayton is Entitled to Equitable Restitution.
Pursuant to the Court’s finding above, Dayton is entitled to a writ of mandamus and
payment of equitable restitution. “Restitution is available as an equitable remedy ‘where money
or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be traced to
particular funds or property in the defendant's possession.’” Santos v. Ohio Bur. of Workers'
Comp., 101 Ohio St. 3d 74, 77, 2004-Ohio-28, 801 N.E.2d 441, 445, ¶13. “Cases in which a
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plaintiff claims a state agency has wrongfully collected certain funds are characterized generally
as claims for equitable restitution." Cullinan v. Ohio Dep't of Job & Fam. Servs., 2016-Ohio-1083,
¶15 (10th Dist.). “Even where a claimant seeks relief that will ultimately result in the payment of
money by the state, ‘a cause of action will sound in equity if 'money damages' is not the essence
of the claim.’” Cristino v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp., 2014-Ohio-1383, ¶13 (10th Dist.).
Any calculation of restitution owed to Dayton for its Basic Claims includes amounts for its
Add-In Students. Hrg. Tran. 60-61; see also Pls’ MSJ at 35-38. As stipulated, the amount owed to
Dayton is determined by subtracting the amount paid to Dayton for FY 05-07 (Jt. Stip. 101), from
the amount Dayton was entitled to prior to Substitution of CSADM (Jt. Stip. 100), which yields
$30,849,589. Pls’ MSJ at 35. The Court notes Dayton was previously paid $7,177,694, pursuant
to the Dayton Settlement Agreement, which leaves a remainder of $23,671,895 owed to Dayton.
Pls’ MSJ at 35, fn. 29; see also Dayton Settlement Agreement at ¶1(B).
C. Cleveland and Toledo are Entitled to Summary Judgment on their Add-In
Claims.
The Court has previously ruled Cleveland and Toledo’s Add-In Claims are not barred by
the Budget Bill. Specifically, the Court held:
[T]he Budget Bills attempt to preclude claims that relate to, or arise from,
reductions in the Districts’ ADM as calculated under R.C. 3317.03(A) and R.C.
3314.08. The Budget Bills do not reference R.C. 3317.03(F)(3), and they only
address reductions, not additions, in funding…Consequently, the Court . . . holds
that the Budget Bills do not bar the Add-In Claims.
October 18, 2017 Decision at 12. ODE asks the Court to reconsider, but the Court declines to do
so. Based upon strict statutory construction, the Add-In Claims are not barred by the Budget Bill.
“[I]n interpreting a statute, [the Court’s] attention is directed to the terminology employed.” Penn
v. A-Best Prods. Co., 2007-Ohio-7145, ¶32 (10th Dist.). The Court is not permitted to “speculate
apart from the words as to the probable intent of the legislature.” Id. “The canon expressio unius
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est exclusio alterius tells us that the express inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of the
other.” Myers v. City of Toledo, 110 Ohio St. 3d 218, 222, 2006-Ohio-4353, 852 N.E.2d 1176,
1180, ¶24. The Budget Bill specifically addresses R.C. 3317.03(A) and not R.C. 3317.03(F)(3),
which governs ODE’s obligation to increase funding for Add-In Students. Since the General
Assembly did not expressly include R.C. 3317.03(F)(3), the Court finds the General Assembly’s
intent was to exclude it. ODE had an obligation to increase funding for Cleveland and Toledo
based upon their Add-In Students, pursuant to R.C. 3317.03(F)(3), and the Budget Bill did not
extinguish that obligation.

The Court notes there has been no new evidence or changed

circumstances. Further, the Court’s prior decision is legally sound and will not be disturbed.
1. ODE is Required to Increase Funding for Add-In Students Pursuant to R.C.
3317.03(F)(3).
Plaintiffs argue ODE violated R.C. 3317.03(F)(3) by failing to properly adjust FY 05
Formula ADM upward to account for Add-In Students. Pls’ Memo Opp. at 36-38. Plaintiffs ask
the Court to compare Jt. Stip. 100 (October Count plus Add-In Students as identified in Jt. Stip.
6727), with Jt. Stip. 101 (Substitution of CSADM), to demonstrate Plaintiffs received no increase
for Add-In Students over the October Count. Id. Because each Add-In Student must generate an
upward increase, Plaintiffs assert FY 05 Formula ADM – their baseline – must be increased and
adjusted upward by these numbers. Pls’ MSJ at 32-33. Plaintiffs also assert ODE’s failure to adjust
FY 05 Formula ADM upward reduced the amount of guarantee funding for FY 06 and 07. Id. at
34. Finally, Plaintiffs argue ODE’s waiver argument is irrelevant as ODE admits it disregarded the
Already-Funded Checkbox when calculating Add-In Students. Pls. Memo Opp. at 39-40.

27

The following FTEs represent community school students reported in CSADM as enrolled after the October
Count, regardless of the value that the districts provided through the Already-Funded Checkbox: Cleveland –700
FTE; Dayton –1,154.35 FTE; and Toledo –246.59 FTE. Jt. Stip. 67.

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ODE argues that once the Basic Claims are dismissed, Plaintiffs’ Add-In Claims are
without merit. ODE MSJ at 30-32. ODE argues that every Add-In Student was accounted for by
Substitution of CSADM. Id. at 32. ODE suggests that the parties agree “ODE provided a funding
credit for all community school students then appearing in the CSADM Reporting system
regardless of whether the Already-Funded Checkbox . . . was checked or unchecked.” Id. at 32,
see also Jt. Stip. 71. Further, ODE argues that even if the Court finds the Add-In Claims survive,
Plaintiffs have not provided evidence to prove they were not funded for all Add-In Students. ODE
MSJ at 37-38. Finally, ODE argues that if Plaintiffs are entitled to additional funding for Add-In
Students, they should only receive funding for those students for whom the Already-Funded
Checkbox was unchecked, or they have waived their right to recover. Id. at 33, 36-37. 28
As this Court previously held, the districts had a substantive right to funding under the law
as it existed during FY 05-07. January 16, 2014 Decision at 22. ODE’s statutory obligation to
make payments for Add-In Students was to be calculated pursuant to former R.C. 3317.03(F)(3),
which states:
If a student attending a community school under Chapter 3314 of the Revised Code
is not included in the formula ADM certified for the school district in which the
student is entitled to attend school under section 3313.64 or 3313.65 of the Revised
Code, the department of education shall adjust the formula ADM of that school
district to include the community school student in accordance with division
(C)(2) of this section, and shall recalculate the school district’s payment under
this chapter for the entire fiscal year on the basis of that adjusted formula ADM.
(Emphasis added.).

28

Specifically, ODE claims the Already-Funded Checkbox was unchecked for the following number of FTEs:
Cleveland 637.05 FTE, Dayton 77.85 FTE, and Toledo 193.73 FTE. Jt. Stip. 65. Those numbers represented the AddIn Students, on an FTE basis, that ODE credited to each as reported in the FY 05 June No. 2 SF-3. Id. Notably, when
ODE later implemented Substitution of CSADM, it ignored the checkbox system and did not use it to identify AddIn Students in the calculation funding as reported in the FY 05 Final Version 3 SF-3. Jt. Stip. 66. Instead, ODE
provided a funding credit for all community school students then appearing in CSADM. Jt. Stip. 71.

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Pursuant to this provision, ODE was required to do the following: (1) adjust a district’s Formula
ADM upward to include the residence district community school students not included in the
October Count; and (2) readjust a district’s Formula ADM and pay school funding based upon the
adjusted amount. Indeed, ODE acknowledges each Add-In Student must generate an upward
increase in a district’s funding and ODE had a statutory obligation to fund the districts based on
their Formula ADM as increased. Jt. Stip. 15. This means “Add-In Students are statutorily required
to generate a funding credit to a student’s residence district.” Jt. Stip. 16.
In February 2006, ODE unilaterally decided to disregard these clear statutory mandates
due to an alleged “discrepancy” between the number of residence district community school
students reported in the October Count and the number of residence district community school
students reported through CSADM. Jt. Stip. 70-71. Instead of using the statutory-mandated
Formula ADM, ODE substituted CSADM. Id. In August 2006, ODE readjusted the payments as a
result of Substitution of CSADM and Plaintiffs’ funding was reduced. Jt. Stip. 76. Indeed, the
parties agree that when ODE substituted CSADM, it removed over 1,800 FTE, collectively, from
Plaintiffs’ Formula ADM. Jt. Stip. 78-80. Yet, ODE argues that Substitution of CSADM was more
accurate and accounted for each and every Add-In Student. ODE notes that the districts cannot
“identify a single SSID, reported by a community school, for which they have not already been
paid through the Substitution of CSADM process.” (Emphasis added.) ODE MSJ at 30. As a
result, ODE maintains that if the Court were to grant Plaintiffs’ Motion and order Add-In Student
funding, ODE would be required to pay the districts twice for hundreds of students. Id. at 4.
ODE’s arguments are nothing more than a fundamentally flawed attempt to evade the
application of the funding formula set forth in R.C. 3317.03(F)(3). They are based upon an
unsupported belief that ODE may oppose Plaintiffs’ claims by relying upon Substitution of
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CSADM and only pay for students who, in its view, were identified and “educated.”
Consequently, ODE’s assertion that it paid for all the Add-In Students ignores its statutory
obligation to pay for them by adding them to Formula ADM as required by the funding formula
established by the General Assembly. ODE was not entitled to use Substitution of CSADM to
figure out the “universe of possible Add-In Students” and only pay for those students. ODE MSJ
at 31. ODE was not permitted to reduce Plaintiffs’ Formula ADM based upon CSADM and then
assert that Add-In Students were included in those re-calculated, reduced numbers. Nor does ODE
get to substitute its judgment – or ask the Court to substitute its judgment – for that of the General
Assembly. See Johnson’s Markets, Inc. v. Dept. of Health, 58 Ohio St.3d 28, 36, 567 N.E. 2d
1018, 1026 (1991) (“[A]ll powers of governmental agencies are legislatively granted, and such
agencies have only such regulatory authority as is granted.”). The General Assembly decided the
proper way to calculate Formula ADM and to pay for Add-In Students as set forth in R.C.
3317.03(C)(2) and (F)(3). The Budget Bill did not change R.C 3317.03(F)(3) to allow ODE to use
Substitution of CSADM to account for Add-In Students. While ODE may believe Substitution of
CSADM results in better, more accurate numbers, the fact remains, pursuant to R.C.
3317.03(F)(3), Formula ADM is not to be recalculated and/or reduced using the data reported by
community schools through CSADM.29
The undisputed evidence establishes ODE did not calculate and pay for Add-In Students
as required by R.C. 3317.03(F)(3). The stipulated facts show the total funding paid to Plaintiffs

29

The legislature did not enact a new law redirecting distribution of tax proceeds before ODE changed the way it
calculated funding or adjusted the amount of funding due Plaintiffs for Add-In Students. Rather, ODE acted and then,
several years later, the legislature passed the Budget Bill to remove certain claims under laws that were valid and in
force when the distribution decisions were made. The Budget Bill did not change or amend the statutory method for
calculating Plaintiffs’ Add-In Claims under R.C. 3317.03(F)(3). January 16, 2014 Decision at 22-23 (“the [Budget
Bill] did not change the substantive law under which school funding was calculated; nor did the [Budget Bill] simply
divert the school funding tax proceeds.”). Consequently, the Budget Bill does not exempt ODE from liability for
ignoring the statutory formula under R.C. 3317.03(F)(3) for calculating Add-In Student funding.

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for FY 05 was less than the monetary value of Plaintiffs’ October Count. Jt. Stip. 100-101. Further,
ODE did not increase Plaintiffs’ Formula ADM after the October Count by the amount of the FTEs
set forth in Jt. Stip. 67. Thus, ODE never increased Plaintiffs’ Formula ADM by the addition of
Add-In Students. Instead, ODE removed over 1,800 FTE from their Formula ADM. Jt. Stip. 7880. Plaintiffs did not receive their statutorily-mandated increase for a single Add-In Student for
FY 05, even though the parties’ numbers show there were Add-In Students for each district in FY
05. Jt. Stip. 65, 67. The Court finds this was a direct violation of R.C. 3317.03(F)(3).
2. Plaintiffs Did Not Waive Their Entitlement to Add-In Funding Through the “AlreadyFunded Checkbox” System.
Finally, ODE argues that even if this Court holds that Cleveland and Toledo are entitled to
funding for Add-In Students, they are only entitled to funding for those who were “not included in
the formula ADM certified for the school district [i.e. the October Count].” ODE Reply at 19. ODE
asserts it was entitled to determine how best to identify those students, which it did through its
Already-Funded Checkbox system, and Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking additional Add-In
funding beyond each student for whom the district unchecked the Already-Funded Checkbox. Id.
at 19-20. ODE claims because it relied on the checkbox information, “whether characterized as
waiver or estoppel or merely statutory interpretation,” Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking
additional Add-In funding beyond what they claimed. Id. at 19.
Once again, ODE’s arguments seek to divert the Court from its unilateral decision to fund
Plaintiffs through Substitution of CSADM. The School Foundation Program, which directed the
reporting and use of Formula ADM, statutorily measures the October Count. It does not involve
the use of CSADM. It does not permit ODE to use CSADM to reduce the October Count to
eliminate students ODE considered to be phantom or double counted. Nor does it allow ODE to

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recalculate Formula ADM to ensure only Add-In Students who were “unchecked” via the AlreadyFunded Checkbox were added under R.C. 3317.03(F)(3).
Further, ODE admits it did not actually use the checkbox system to identify and pay for
Add-In Students, and it did not use the data generated by the checkboxes when it substituted
CSADM. ODE concedes it “no longer cares whether the district is telling us [a student] was part
of their October Count because we’re not relying on the October Count with respect to community
students.” Hrg. Tran. at 95. ODE cannot, on the one hand, say the checkbox information is
irrelevant for ODE’s calculations, but on the other, argue it is relevant to Plaintiffs’ Add-In Claims.
The Court finds, having abandoned its Already-Funded Checkbox methodology to calculate AddIn funding, ODE cannot claim waiver or estoppel by Plaintiffs and force them to be bound by the
checkbox responses ODE ignored and disregarded.30
Additionally, the Court finds ODE’s waiver argument unavailing because, as a matter of
law, school districts are governed by a board of education that acts by resolutions duly adopted at
its legally convened meetings and memorialized by written minutes. See R.C. 3313.18 and R.C.
3313.26. There is no evidence before the Court of any such resolutions by Plaintiffs’ boards of
education related to their Add-In Claims.
Finally, the Court finds ODE’s arguments are without merit given its stipulation to the
number of FTEs included in CSADM, but not in EMIS, as of the FY 05 June No. 2 SF-3, regardless
of the value the districts provided through the Already-Funded Checkbox. Jt. Stip. 67. ODE further

The nonsensical nature of ODE’s waiver argument is borne out by parties’ stipulations. In Jt. Stip. 67, the parties
agree that Dayton had 1,154.35 FTE for Add-In Students not in its FY 05 October Count. However, Jt. Stip. 85
establishes that the Add-In Students based upon Dayton unchecking the Already-Funded Checkbox in the CSADM
Reporting System is 77.9 FTE. A difference of over 1,000 Add-In Students that ODE contends Dayton somehow
agreed to waive their right to collect funding for because the person completing a form didn’t uncheck over 1,000
boxes. This argument makes no sense given ODE’s own data showed Dayton had more Add-In Students than
unchecked boxes that ODE was statutorily obligated to fund.
30

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stipulated these numbers “represent the community school students as reported in the CSADM
Reporting System for each District in FY 05 who were not in the Districts’ FY 05 October Count.”
Id. This is essentially an admission that ODE knew Add-In Students were excluded from FY 05
Formula ADM and it did not increase Plaintiffs’ Formula ADM by the number of Add-In Students
it knew were excluded from the October Count. These excluded Add-In Students should have
been used by ODE to increase Plaintiffs’ Add-In funding as required by R.C. 3317.03(F)(3).
3. Cleveland and Toledo are Entitled to a Writ of Mandamus.
The Court finds Cleveland and Toledo are entitled to a writ of mandamus. As sated above,
in Cincinnati, the First District upheld the lower court’s finding that ODE violated the law when
using Substitution of CSADM. Cincinnati, 176 Ohio App. 3d at 161. The parties have chosen not
to re-litigate that issue, and therefore, the Court relies upon it.
Pursuant to the request for relief, the Court finds Cleveland and Toledo have a clear legal
right to have Defendants: (1) fund Cleveland and Toledo for FY 05 Add-In Students in compliance
with the law in effect in 2005; and (2) fund Cleveland and Toledo for FY 06 and FY 07, solely in
relation to Add-In Students, pursuant to guarantee provisions in effect in 2005. See Cleveland Am.
Pet. at ¶¶51, 53; see also Toledo Am. Pet. at ¶¶51, 53. Further, the Court finds ODE has a clear
legal duty to: (1) fund Cleveland and Toledo for FY 05 Add-In Students in compliance with the
law in effect in 2005; and (2) fund Cleveland and Toledo for FY 06 and FY 07, solely in relation
to Add-In Students, pursuant to guarantee provisions in effect in 2005. See Cleveland Am. Pet. at
¶¶52, 54; see also Toledo Am. Pet. at ¶¶52, 54. Finally, the Court finds Cleveland and Toledo have
no adequate remedy at law other than a writ of mandamus.

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4. Cleveland and Toledo are Entitled to Equitable Restitution
Pursuant to the Court’s finding above, Cleveland is entitled to a writ of mandamus and
payment of equitable restitution. As stipulated, the amount owed to Cleveland is determined by
subtracting the amount of Cleveland’s October Count (Jt. Stip. 102), from the amount it was
entitled to prior to Substitution of CSADM (Jt. Stip. 100). Pls’ MSJ at 37. This yields a total of
$13,776,885 owed to Cleveland. Id. 31
Similarly, pursuant to the Court’s finding above, Toledo is entitled to a writ of mandamus
and payment of equitable restitution. As stipulated, the amount owed to Toledo is determined by
subtracting the amount of Toledo’s October Count (Jt. Stip. 102), from the amount it was entitled
to prior to Substitution of CSADM (Jt. Stip. 100). Id. This yields a total of $4,886,540 owed to
Toledo. Id.32
VII.

CONCLUSION:
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED IN PART, in

accordance with the above-decision. The Court finds the Budget Bill does not violate Article II,
Section 26 of the Ohio Constitution (Uniformity Clause); Article II, Section 32 or Article IV,
Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution (judicial authority challenge); Article II, Section 15(D) of

31

Unlike Dayton, identifying the amount owed to Cleveland and Toledo for Add-In Students is not as straightforward.
Plaintiffs argue the total amount of Add-In funding should be calculated by subtracting the amount of Cleveland and
Toledo’s October Count (Jt. Stip. 102), from the amount they were entitled to prior to Substitution of CSADM (Jt.
Stip. 100). Pls’ MSJ at 36-37. For FY 05, this calculation method is logical. Therefore, for FY 05 Cleveland is entitled
to $4,592,287 and Toledo is entitled to $1,628,885. Id. at 37. However, for FY 06 and 07, issues arise in identifying
the precise amounts directly attributable to Add-In Students. For these years, Plaintiffs did not lose any Add-In
Students, yet, Plaintiffs funding was lowered due to the guarantee provisions. Id. As to the amounts claimed by
Plaintiffs, the Court is unclear as to the precise amount of guarantee funding directly attributable to Add-In Students.
Id. Cleveland claims it lost $4,592,379 for FY 06 and $4,592,219 for FY 07, but Cleveland does not identify which
portion of this amount is directly attributable to Add-In Students. Id. Similarly, Toledo claims it lost $1,628,832 for
FY 06 and $1,628,823 for FY 07, but again, Toledo does not identify which portion of this amount is directly
attributable to Add-In Students. Id. The Court is unsure how these numbers were computed, but outside of arguing the
Court should use the Already-Funded Checkbox, ODE does not object to their authenticity, and as such, the Court
will rely upon these numbers.
32
See fn. 31, infra.

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the Ohio Constitution (one-subject challenge); or Article VI, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution
(Thorough and Efficient Clause).
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED IN PART in accordance
with the above-decision. It is ORDERED that Dayton is granted a writ of mandamus requiring
Defendants to recalculate Dayton’s school funding for FY 05-07 in compliance with the law in
existence in 2005, as detailed above. The Court ORDERS Defendants to pay Dayton equitable
restitution in the amount of $23,671,895, plus interest, from the date of judgment at the statutory
rate, plus costs. Further it is ORDERED that Cleveland and Toledo are granted a writ of
mandamus requiring Defendants to recalculate Cleveland and Toledo’s Add-In funding for FY 0507 in compliance with the law in existence in 2005, as detailed above. The Court ORDERS
Defendants to pay Cleveland equitable restitution in the amount of $13,776,885, plus interest, from
the date of judgement at the statutory rate, plus costs. The Court hereby ORDERS Defendants to
pay Toledo equitable restitution in the amount of $4,886,540, plus interest, from the date of
judgement at the statutory rate, plus costs.33
This is a final appealable order and there is no just cause for delay. The Clerk shall serve a
copy of this decision on all parties in accordance with Civ. R. 58(B).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Since the Court is issuing writ of mandamus, there is no need to address Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory judgment,
and it is hereby rendered MOOT.
33

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Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

Date:

09-10-2020

Case Title:
Case Number:

DAYTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD EDUCATION -VSOHIO STATE BOARD EDUCATION
11CV011809

Type:

ENTRY

It Is So Ordered.

/s/ Judge Gina Russo

Electronically signed on 2020-Sep-10

page 51 of 51

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Court Disposition
Case Number: 11CV011809
Case Style: DAYTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD
EDUCATION -VS- OHIO STATE BOARD EDUCATION
Case Terminated: 18 - Other Terminations
Final Appealable Order: Yes
Motion Tie Off Information:
1. Motion CMS Document Id: 11CV0118092019-04-1599960000
Document Title: 04-15-2019-MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT - PLAINTIFF: DAYTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT
BOARD EDUCAT
Disposition: MOTION GRANTED IN PART
2. Motion CMS Document Id: 11CV0118092019-04-1599700000
Document Title: 04-15-2019-MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT - PLAINTIFF: DAYTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT
BOARD EDUCAT
Disposition: MOTION GRANTED IN PART
3. Motion CMS Document Id: 11CV0118092019-04-1599760000
Document Title: 04-15-2019-MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT - PLAINTIFF: DAYTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT
BOARD EDUCAT
Disposition: MOTION GRANTED IN PART
4. Motion CMS Document Id: 11CV0118092019-04-1599850000
Document Title: 04-15-2019-MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT - PLAINTIFF: DAYTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT
BOARD EDUCAT
Disposition: MOTION GRANTED IN PART
5. Motion CMS Document Id: 11CV0118092019-04-1599900000

 Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2020 Sep 10 3:41 PM-11CV011809

Document Title: 04-15-2019-MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT - PLAINTIFF: DAYTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT
BOARD EDUCAT
Disposition: MOTION GRANTED IN PART

 Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2020 Sep 10 3:41 PM-11CV011809

6. Motion CMS Document Id: 11CV0118092019-04-1599950000
Document Title: 04-15-2019-MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT - PLAINTIFF: DAYTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT
BOARD EDUCAT
Disposition: MOTION GRANTED IN PART
7. Motion CMS Document Id: 11CV0118092019-04-1499980000
Document Title: 04-14-2019-MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT - DEFENDANT: OHIO STATE BOARD EDUCATION
Disposition: MOTION GRANTED IN PART