FILE

THIS OPINION WAS FILED
FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
OCTOBER 15, 2020

IN CLERK’S OFFICE

SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON

OCTOBER 15, 2020

SUSAN L. CARLSON
SUPREME COURT CLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
GARFIELD COUNTY
)
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; )
KING COUNTY; CITY OF
)
SEATTLE; WASHINGTON STATE )
TRANSIT ASSOCIATION;
)
ASSOCIATION OF WASHINGTON )
CITIES; PORT OF SEATTLE;
)
INTERCITY TRANSIT;
)
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT
)
UNION LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL )
OF WASHIINGTON; and
)
MICHAEL ROGERS,
)
)
Petitioners,
)
)
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WASHINGTON ADAPT; TRANSIT )
RIDERS UNION; and CLIMATE
)
SOLUTIONS,
)
)
Intervenor-Petitioners,
)
)
v.
)
)
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
)
)
Respondent,
)
)
)
)
CLINT DIDIER; PERMANENT
)
OFFENSE; TIMOTHY D. EYMAN; )

No. 98320-8

 Garfield County Transp. Auth. et al. v. State et al., No. 98320-8

MICHAEL FAGAN; JACK FAGAN; )
and PIERCE COUNTY,
)
)
Intervenor-Defendants.
)
)
_______________________________)

October 15, 2020
Filed: ________________

GONZÁLEZ, J.— The people of our state have the power to propose and
approve legislation. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1. When the people act in their
legislative capacity, they are, like any other legislative body, bound by
constitutional constraints. Under our constitution, “[n]o bill shall embrace more
than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.” WASH. CONST. art. II, §
19. Initiative Measure 976 (I-976) contains more than one subject, and its subject is
not accurately expressed in its title. Accordingly, it is unconstitutional.
BACKGROUND
I-976 is the latest in a series of initiatives about reducing or eliminating local
motor vehicle excise taxes, including taxes that have been pledged to support
major transportation projects in our state. These efforts are a response to the
legislature’s decision to authorize “counties in the state’s most populous region to
create a local agency for planning and implementing a high capacity transportation
system,” which ultimately resulted in the creation of Sound Transit. LAWS OF
1992, ch. 101 (largely codified in ch. 81.112 RCW); Cent. Puget Sound Reg’l
Transit Auth. v. Miller, 156 Wn.2d 403, 406-07, 128 P.3d 588 (2006). Authorized
regional transit authorities were empowered to ask their voters to approve
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transportation system proposals and financing secured by local taxes and fees,
including local motor vehicle excise taxes. RCW 81.112.030, .050, .130-.150.
The legislature also empowered local transportation benefit districts and other local
governments to impose taxes, including motor vehicle excise taxes, and fees to
fund local transportation projects and to seek voter approval for additional funding.
E.g., LAWS OF 2005, ch. 336; ch. 36.73 RCW; ch. 82.80 RCW.
A “motor vehicle excise tax” is “a tax on the privilege of relicensing a motor
vehicle for use on public roadways.” Sheehan v. Cent. Puget Sound Reg’l Transit
Auth., 155 Wn.2d 790, 802, 123 P.3d 88 (2005). Motor vehicle excise taxes are
“based on the value of the vehicle, as set out by statute in a depreciation schedule.”
Black v. Cent. Puget Sound Reg’l Transit Auth., 195 Wn.2d 198, 202, 457 P.3d 453
(2020) (citing former RCW 82.44.041 (1991)). Whether they are based on the
value of the vehicle or are a flat fee can make a tremendous difference in the
amount an individual will pay. For example, a 1 percent tax on a vehicle worth
$100,000.00 would be $1,000.00. A 1 percent excise tax on a vehicle worth
$1,000.00 would be $10.00. If instead there is a flat fee of $43.25, the relicensing
of every vehicle would cost the same.
Sound Transit was formed in 1993. In 1996, voters in the counties of King,
Pierce, and Snohomish approved a transportation proposal and a funding plan
secured by local taxes and fees, including local motor vehicle excise taxes. Id.
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Based on that vote, Sound Transit issued bonds secured by these local funding
sources. Id. (citing Pierce County v. State, 159 Wn.2d 16, 24, 148 P.3d 1002
(2006) (Pierce County II)). Not long after those bonds were sold, some taxpayers
began challenging the taxes and fees funding Sound Transit and other locally
approved transportation projects through litigation, legislation, referenda, and
initiatives. See, e.g., Pierce County II, 159 Wn.2d 16; Sheehan, 155 Wn.2d at 795;
Amalg. Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wn.2d 183, 191, 11 P.3d 762 (2000)
(ATU).
In 2018, initiative sponsors filed at least 13 initiatives concerning motor
vehicle taxes. The attorney general drafted ballot titles for at least 9 of them.
After receiving these ballot titles, the sponsors chose to proceed with I-976 and a
ballot title that read:
Initiative Measure No. 976 concerns motor vehicle taxes and fees.
This measure would repeal, reduce, or remove authority to impose certain
vehicle taxes and fees; limit annual motor-vehicle-license fees to $30, except
voter-approved charges; and base vehicle taxes on Kelley Blue Book value.
Should this measure be enacted into law?
Yes [ ]
No [ ]

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Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 1131, 316, 1253. The ballot title appears to have been
drawn from the “policies and purposes” section of I-976, which reads in relevant
part:
This measure and each of its provisions limit state and local taxes, fees, and
other charges relating to motor vehicles. This measure would limit annual
motor vehicle license fees to $30, except voter-approved charges, repeal and
remove authority to impose certain vehicle taxes and charges; and base
vehicle taxes on Kelley Blue Book.
CP at 1212.
The initiative passed statewide with about 53 percent of the vote, though it
was rejected by about 53 percent of the voters in the Sound Transit region, about
60 percent of King County voters, and about 70 percent of San Juan voters, who
depend heavily on ferries funded by motor vehicle excise taxes.
Several counties, cities, associations and private citizens (collectively
challengers) challenged I-976’s constitutionality. These challengers argued that I976 violated many provisions of our state constitution. They argued that I-976
contained multiple subjects in violation of article II, section 19’s single subject
requirement. They also argued I-976 violated section 19’s subject-in-title
requirement because the ballot title falsely suggested voter-approved motor vehicle
taxes would not be repealed. In fact, the initiative repealed both current voterapproved taxes and fees, and the existing statutory mechanism for voter approval
in the future. Among many other things, plaintiffs also argued that the ballot title

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falsely suggested vehicle license registration fees would be reduced to $30.00
when, in fact, the lowest would be $43.25.
The challengers successfully sought a preliminary injunction in King County
Superior Court to block its implementation. The trial judge initially concluded that
the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the grounds that the ballot title was
misleading. Meanwhile, several parties, including the initiative sponsors, a group
of taxpayers, Pierce County, transit groups, and environmental groups were
granted leave to intervene.
Most parties moved for summary judgment. At summary judgment, the trial
judge largely upheld the initiative. The trial judge did find that the initiative
violated the privileges and immunities clause of the state constitution by giving
Kelley Blue Book a legislative privilege, but also that those provisions were
severable. Those provisions would have replaced a statutory depreciation schedule
for valuing vehicles with the values established by Kelley Blue Book. LAWS OF
2020, ch. 1, § 8 (I-976). The trial judge allowed further factual development on the
city of Burien’s impairment of contract claim under article I, section 23. The
primary parties stipulated that direct review of the remaining issues was
appropriate, and we accepted review. Amicus briefs in support of the challengers
have been filed by the International Municipal Lawyers Association and Legal
Scholars; San Juan County; the League of Women Voters of Washington; and the
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Puyallup Tribe of Indians, the Nisqually Indian Tribe, and the Tribal
Transportation Planning Organization Transit Subcommittee.
ANALYSIS
This case is here on appeal from summary judgment. Our review is de novo.
Wash. Ass’n for Substance Abuse & Violence Prevention v. State, 174 Wn.2d 642,
652, 278 P.3d 632 (2012) (WASAVP) (citing Pierce County v. State, 150 Wn.2d
422, 429, 78 P.3d 640 (2003) (Pierce County I)).
In our state, the people have a constitutional power to propose and pass
legislation. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(a). When acting in this legislative capacity,
the people are subject to the constraints laid out in our constitution. ATU, 142
Wn.2d at 204 (citing State ex rel. Heavey v. Murphy, 138 Wn.2d 800, 808, 982
P.2d 611 (1999)). We presume initiatives are constitutional, and the challenger
bears the burden of establishing otherwise. Id. (citing Brower v. State, 137 Wn.2d
44, 52, 969 P.2d 42 (1998); Heavey, 138 Wn.2d at 808). Initiatives are read as the
average informed lay voter would read them. WASAVP, 174 Wn.2d at 662
(quoting W. Petrol. Imps., Inc. v. Friedt, 127 Wn.2d 420, 424, 899 P.2d 792
(1995)).
1. Article II, section 19 single subject requirement
Under our constitution, “[n]o bill shall embrace more than one subject, and
that shall be expressed in the title.” WASH. CONST. art. II, § 19. The challengers
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contend that I-976 violates article II, section 19’s single subject requirement. This
constitutional provision is liberally construed in favor of upholding legislation.
WASAVP, 174 Wn.2d at 654 (citing ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 206).
Article II, section 19 serves three purposes. State ex rel. Wash. Toll Bridge
Auth. v. Yelle, 32 Wn.2d 13, 24, 200 P.2d 467 (1948). First, it prevents
“logrolling,” where a popular measure is attached to an unpopular one to ensure
passage of the unpopular measure. Pierce County I, 150 Wn.2d at 429-30 (citing
Wash. Fed’n of State Emps. v. State, 127 Wn.2d 544, 554, 901 P.2d 1028 (1995)).
Second, it “enlighten[s] the members of the legislature [and voters considering
initiatives] against provisions in bills of which the titles give no intimation.” Yelle,
32 Wn.2d at 24. Third, it informs the public through the regular publication of
legislative proceedings about the subjects being considered. Id. Initiatives that
contain more than one subject are void in their entirety. City of Burien v. Kiga,
144 Wn.2d 819, 825, 31 P.3d 659 (2001) (citing Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wn.2d
191, 200, 235 P.2d 173 (1951)). We construe legislation liberally to avoid a
multiple subject problem, but we do not shirk from our responsibility to enforce
the constitution’s mandates. See, e.g., Lee v. State, 185 Wn.2d 608, 622-23, 374
P.3d 157 (2016) (finding a two subjects violation in an initiative that both set a
sales tax rate and proposed a constitutional amendment requiring a supermajority
vote or voter approval to raise taxes); ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 217 (finding a two
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subjects violation when an initiative set car tab fees at $30 and required a
supermajority vote or voter approval to raise taxes).
I-976 has 17 sections. Briefly, section 1 of the initiative states that its
purpose is to limit vehicle licensing costs. LAWS OF 2020, ch. 1, § 1 (I-976).
Specifically,
This measure and each of its provisions limit state and local taxes, fees, and
other charges relating to motor vehicles. This measure would limit annual
motor vehicle license fees to $30, except voter-approved charges, repeal and
remove authority to impose certain vehicle taxes and charges; and base
vehicle taxes on Kelley Blue Book rather than the dishonest, inaccurate, and
artificially inflated manufacturer’s suggested retail price (M[SR]P). Voters
have repeatedly approved initiatives limiting vehicle costs. Politicians must
learn to listen to the people.
Id.
Sections 2-5 are in the portion of the initiative labeled “LIMITING
ANNUAL MOTOR-VEHICLE-LICENSE FEES TO $30, EXCEPT VOTERAPPROVED CHARGES.” LAWS OF 2020, ch. 1.
Section 2 creates a new section in chapter 46.17 RCW that provides, among
other things, “State and local motor vehicle license fees may not exceed $30 per
year for motor vehicles, regardless of year, value, make, or model.” Id. § 2(1). It
defines “state and local motor vehicle license fees” as “the general license tab fees
paid annually for licensing motor vehicles” but not “charges approved by voters
after the effective date of this section.” Id. § 2(2). “Vehicles” are broadly defined

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as including cars, sport utility vehicles, light trucks, motorcycles, and motor
homes. Id.
Section 3 reduces license fees on snowmobiles, some trucks, and
commercial trailers. Id. § 3(1).
Section 4 also reduces license fees on light trucks. Id. § 4(1)(b).
Section 5 reduces fees that had been charged on electric and hybrid vehicles
to mitigate their impact on the state’s highways. Id. § 5(1).
Sections 6 and 7 are in the section labeled “REPEAL AND REMOVE
AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE CERTAIN VEHICLE TAXES AND CHARGES.”
LAWS OF 2020, ch. 1.
Section 6 repeals the statutes that authorized transportation benefit districts
to impose annual vehicle fees of up to $100 per vehicle and that authorized
imposition of a local motor vehicle excise tax to support passenger-only ferries.
Id. It also repeals a statute that imposed fees on motor home vehicles, a statute that
imposed a passenger weight fee, and a statute that directed the use of those funds.
Section 7 repeals a sales tax on motor vehicles. Id.
The remaining 10 sections are in a section titled “BASE VEHICLE TAXES
USING KELLEY BLUE BOOK VALUE.” LAWS OF 2020, ch. 1.
Section 8 creates a new section in chapter 82.44 RCW that requires taxes to
be based on Kelley Blue Book values. Id.
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Section 9 requires the use of Kelley Blue Book values in taxpayer appeals.
Id.
Section 10 removes regional transit authorities’ power to levy and collect a
special motor vehicle excise tax after a public vote. Id. § 10(4)(a)(ii). Sound
Transit is currently the only regional transit authority in our state. By virtue of
section 16, this provision takes effect only after outstanding bonds secured by the
tax are retired, defeased, or refinanced. Id. § 16(1).
Section 11 eliminates the special motor vehicle excise tax previously
approved by voters in the Sound Transit region, as well as some sales and use
taxes. Id. § 11(2). It also eliminates the existing motor vehicle excise tax valuation
method based on purchase price instead of Kelley Blue Book values. Id. § 11(1). It
also takes effect only after outstanding bonds are retired, defeased, or refinanced.
Id. § 16(1).
Section 12 creates a new section in chapter 81.112 RCW requiring Sound
Transit to retire early, defease, or refinance existing bonds funded by previously
voter-approved special motor vehicle excise tax funds if permissible under the
bond contracts. Id. § 12(2). The initiative drafters may have been trying to avoid
the impairment of contracts problem that was fatal to Initiative 776 (I-776) in
Pierce County II, 159 Wn.2d at 24. Sections 10 and 11 come into effect only if
Sound Transit can lawfully retire, defease, or refinance the bonds. Id. § 16(1).
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Section 13 changes the maximum motor vehicle excise tax Sound Transit
can seek approval from voters to impose from eight-tenths of a percent to twotenths of a percent of a vehicle’s value. Id. § 13(1). It comes into effect if Sound
Transit does not retire, defease, or refinance existing bonds by March 31, 2020. Id.
§ 16(2).
Section 14 requires liberal construction. Id. § 14.
Section 15 makes any invalid provision of the initiative severable. Id. § 15.
Section 16 sets forth the time limits relevant to §§ 10, 11, and 13. Id. § 16.
Section 17 declares that the initiative shall be called “Bring Back Our $30
Car Tabs.” Id. § 17.
Our single subject analysis is framed differently depending on whether the
ballot title is general or restrictive. ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 209-211 (collecting cases).
The parties agree that I-976 has a general title. In such cases, all that is required is
“‘rational unity between the general subject and the incidental subdivisions.’”
WASAVP, 174 Wn.2d at 656 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.
Grisby, 97 Wn.2d 493, 498, 647 P.2d 6 (1982)). “[T]he existence of rational unity
or not is determined by whether the matters within the body of the initiative are

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germane to the general title and whether they are germane to one another.” Kiga,
144 Wn.2d at 826 (citing ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 209-10).1
While the parties agree that the title is general, they disagree on how to
articulate the subject of the initiative. The State suggests I-976 has a general title
that expresses its subject as “motor vehicle taxes and fees.” Corrected Br. of
Resp’t State of Wash. at 17. Based in part on the sponsor’s title, the challengers
suggest the general title expresses the subject of “‘limiting’ vehicle taxes and fees
paid at vehicle registration.” Opening Br. of Appellants at 17 (noting that the
sponsors title the initiative “AN ACT Relating to limiting state and local taxes,
fees, and other charges relating to vehicles”).

1

We take this opportunity to overrule this court’s opinion in Price v. Evergreen Cemetery Co. of
Seattle, 57 Wn.2d 352, 357 P.2d 702 (1960). We may overrule a prior case when it is both
incorrect and harmful. Deggs v. Asbestos Corp., 186 Wn.2d 716, 727-28, 381 P.3d 32 (2016)
(quoting In re Rights to Waters of Stranger Creek, 77 Wn.2d 649, 653, 466 P.2d 508 (1970)).
Price is both. Price considered the constitutionality of a 1953 law that said, “It shall be unlawful
for any cemetery under this act to refuse burial to any person because such person may not be of
the Caucasian race.” LAWS OF 1953, ch. 290, § 53, at 838. Section 53 was part of a larger bill
with the title “AN ACT relating to the regulation of cemeteries.” Id., ch. 290. The majority
concluded the bill had two subjects in violation of article II, section 19: “(1) civil rights, and (2)
the endowment care funds of private cemeteries and the creation of a cemetery board.” Price, 57
Wn.2d at 354. This was a strained and incorrect way to divide the subjects in the bill, all of
which were germane to the subject of cemetery regulation. It is harmful for two reasons: first,
because it suggests a more stringent standard than is required to survive an article II, section 19
challenge, second, and more importantly, the case is harmful because of Justice Mallery’s
concurrence, which condemns civil rights and integration. Id. at 355-58. “As judges, we must
recognize the role we have played in devaluing black lives.” Letter from the Wash. State
Supreme Court to the Members of the Judiciary and the Legal Cmty. 1 (June 4, 2020)
(addressing racial injustice). The Price concurrence is an example of the unfortunate role we
have played.
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We faced a somewhat similar situation in Pierce County I. There, the ballot
title said:
“Initiative Measure No. 776 concerns state and local government charges on
motor vehicles. This measure would require license tab fees to be $30 per
year for motor vehicles, including light trucks. Certain local-option vehicle
excise taxes and fees used for roads and transit would be repealed.”
Pierce County I, 150 Wn.2d at 427 (quoting record). We found that the subject
was “limiting license tab fees on cars and light trucks.” Id. at 436. However,
while the parties disputed the subject, it was not a major issue in the case.
By contrast, determining the subject of the initiative was a major issue in
Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 149 Wn.2d 622, 71 P.3d 644
(2003). In that case, the ballot title read, “‘Shall it be a gross misdemeanor to
capture an animal with certain body-gripping traps, or to poison an animal with
sodium fluoroacetate or sodium cyanide?’” Id. at 627 (quoting record). The
challengers argued that the initiative contained two subjects, killing animals with
poison and killing animals with body-gripping traps. Id. at 635. The State argued
that the subject was the humane treatment of animals. Id. We rejected both the
challengers’ distillation as overly restrictive and the State’s as overly broad. Id. at
635-36. Instead, we made “[a] more moderate interpretation” and found the
subject “deals with banning methods of trapping and killing animals.” Id. at 636.
Given that, we found that the different provisions relating to traps and to poison

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were germane to each other and that the initiative did not violate article II, section
19’s single subject requirement. Id.
Similarly, in WASAVP, we rejected a single subject challenge to an initiative
that privatized liquor sales. 174 Wn.2d at 659-60. The ballot title for that
initiative read:
“Initiative Measure No. 1183 concerns liquor: beer, wine, and spirits (hard
liquor).
“This measure would close state liquor stores and sell their assets; license
private parties to sell and distribute spirits; set license fees based on sales;
regulate licensees; and change regulation of wine distribution.
“Should this measure be enacted into law?
“[ ] Yes
“[ ] No”
Id. at 647 (quoting record). The challengers argued that the subject of the initiative
was liquor sales privatization and that provisions in the initiative that earmarked
revenue for public safety, privatized wine distribution, impacted liquor advertising,
and modified the State’s policy on liquor were all unconstitutional separate
subjects. Id. at 656. Without specifically accepting or rejecting the challengers’
formulation of the subject, we rejected their challenge. Id. at 656, 660. We found
“an obvious connection” between liquor sales and public safety. Id. at 657. We
found a close connection between liquor and wine, especially as they “share the
common distinction of being liquor and have been governed as such by the same
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act for decades.” Id. at 659. We concluded that advertising was clearly germane
and that policy changes were not separate subjects for purposes of article II,
section 19. Id. at 659-60.
Similar to the initiative at issue in Pierce County I and II, here, we conclude
that the subject expressed in the ballot title is “limiting vehicle taxes and fees.”
The challengers contend that several provisions in I-976 are not germane to
each other or to the general subject. Without reaching all of their arguments, we
agree that section 12, which requires Sound Transit to retire, defease, or refinance
bonds, is not germane to limiting vehicle taxes and fees, and the provisions of the
initiative that carry out that subject. Thus, section 12 is an unconstitutional second
subject.
This court faced a very similar challenge to I-776 in Pierce County I and II.
150 Wn.2d at 432-33; Pierce County II, 159 Wn.2d at 48-49. That case involved
an initiative that reduced motor vehicle excise taxes and fees, and repealed taxes
that had been pledged to repay bonds. Pierce County II, 159 Wn.2d at 21-22;
LAWS OF 2003, ch. 1 (I-776). In addition to the operative sections of the initiative
that repealed or reduced taxes and fees, two sections called for, but did not require,
existing bonds secured by those taxes to be retired and a future vote held before

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any further sale. LAWS OF 2003, ch. 1, §§ 1, 7.2 The trial court found these
sections created a second subject in violation of article II, section 19. Pierce
County I, 150 Wn.2d at 432-33. Over a forceful dissent, this court reversed on the
grounds “that policy expressions in a bill or initiative measure do not contribute
additional ‘subjects’ within the meaning of article II, section 19.” Id. at 433. The
dissent disagreed, characterizing the initiative as containing
at least two subjects. First, it limits the amount state and local governments
may charge for motor vehicle licensing. Initiative Measure 776 (I-776) §§ 2,
3, 4, 6 & 8. Second, it calls for four counties to halt development of a voterapproved light rail transit system until the funding mechanisms are revisited
and reapproved. I-776 §§ 1, 7. These subjects are not rationally related, and
therefore the initiative violates our constitution.
Id. at 443 (Chambers, J., dissenting). In Justice Chambers’ view,
[t]he evils of logrolling are not eliminated (though they may be
diminished) merely because some text is inoperative. Further, the proponents
of future legislation will be encouraged to add inoperative subjects to sell
their proposal with empty (and probably unfunded) promises. Results could
range from whimsical to menacing. A group seeking the decriminalization of
certain drugs would be wise to seek votes from older voters by adding an
inoperative subject demanding legislation legalizing the production of

2

Section 7 said:
If the repeal of taxes in section 6 of this act affects any bonds previously issued for any
purpose relating to light rail, the people expect transit agencies to retire these bonds
using reserve funds including accrued interest, sale of property or equipment, new voter
approved tax revenues, or any combination of these sources of revenue. Taxing districts
should abstain from further bond sales for any purpose relating to light rail until voters
decide this measure. The people encourage transit agencies to put another tax revenue
measure before voters if they want to continue with a light rail system dramatically
changed from that previously represented to and approved by voters.

LAWS OF 2003, ch. 1, § 7 (emphasis added).
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generic versions of currently patented and highly priced drugs to reduce the
costs of medications. The same group might seek votes from tax foes by
demanding legislation repealing the sales tax on all pharmacologically
related products. . . . [T]he confusion and distraction will not serve our State
and is prohibited by our constitution. The potential and temptations for
creative logrolling have few limits. Our constitution, read properly, forbids
embracing two subjects in one bill whether the subjects are operative or not.
Id. at 445 (Chambers, J., dissenting). Because of the way the case was presented in
Pierce County I, a majority of the court never reached whether an operative
requirement to retire bonds secured by repealed taxes would have violated the
single subject rule.
But in Pierce County II, the parties’ arguments did require the court to reach
whether an operative requirement to retire bonds secured by repealed taxes was
germane to limiting taxes and fees. Pierce County II primarily concerned whether
I-776 violated article II, section 23 of the state constitution by impairing contracts
with bondholders by repealing taxes that secured existing bonds. 159 Wn.2d at 2223. Defenders of I-776 suggested that any unconstitutional impairment of
contracts could be resolved by making section 7 of the initiative mandatory and
directing Sound Transit to retire its bonds. We rejected that argument, concluding
that crucial to our determination was section 7 of the initiative being precatory,
mere “policy fluff” and not enforceable. Section 7 of the initiative provided in part
that “[i]f the repeal of taxes in section 6 of this act affects any bonds previously
issued for any purpose relating to light rail, the people expect transit agencies to
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retire these bonds.” LAWS OF 2003, ch. 1 § 7 (I-776). The intervenors ask this
court to “revive” this inoperative part of the initiative, contrary to both the contract
clause and article II, section 19 of the constitution. See Pierce County I, 150
Wn.2d at 444 (Chambers, J. dissenting) (suggesting that I-776 violates Washington
Constitution article II, section 19 because section 7 of the initiative constitutes a
second subject: “$30 license tabs across the entire state are not germane to the
financing” of a local transit system).
The law should not be construed to do indirectly what it cannot do
directly. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 192, 17 L. Ed.
520 (1864) (“It is almost unnecessary to say, that what the legislature cannot
do directly, it cannot do indirectly. The stream can mount no higher than its
source.”); W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 516, 12 L. Ed.
535 (1848) (“All the powers of the states, as sovereign states, must always
be subject to the limitations expressed in the United States Constitution . . . .
What is forbidden to them, and which they cannot do directly, they should
not be permitted to do by color, pretence, or oblique indirection.”). We will
not give effect to a provision that would result in a violation of the single
subject requirements by directing the parties to order their financial affairs in
a manner that coerces compliance with unlawful legislation. To do so would,
in Chief Justice Marshall’s words, “subvert the very foundation of all written
constitutions.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178, 2 L. Ed. 60
(1803).
Pierce County II, 159 Wn.2d at 48-49 (alteration in original). I-976 suffers from
the same flaw. Simply put, section 12 is a separate subject in violation of article II,
section 19. It is not mere “policy fluff” as was the similar provision in I-776. Id.
at 48. Section 12 is a specific directive to retire, defease, or refinance existing

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bonds, if possible. This is a separate subject from “limiting vehicle taxes and
fees.” Accordingly, I-976 violates article II, section 19’s single subject rule.
While Pierce County II is dispositive, there are other difficulties with
combining a requirement to retire, defease, or refinance existing bonds that secure
a specific existing project with more general statutory changes. We have regularly
found two subjects in violation of article II, section 19 when a measure both
contained a one-time required action (for example, building a toll road from
Tacoma to Everett) and a broader systematic change in the law (for example,
empowering a state agency to establish and operate a system of toll roads). Wash.
Toll Bridge Auth. v. State, 49 Wn.2d 520, 521, 523-25, 304 P.2d 676 (1956).
Similarly, we found two subjects when an initiative combined a one-time refund of
taxes with systematic changes to the property tax assessment system. Kiga, 144
Wn.2d at 827. We also found two subjects when an initiative set car tabs at $30
and required voter approval for tax increases. ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 217. A specific
direction to Sound Transit to retire, defease, or refinance the bonds is akin to a onetime refund of taxes, the setting of car tabs at $30, and the building of a single toll
road; the larger changes to the motor vehicle excise tax system are akin to the
systematic changes to the property tax system, the change to the requirements for
tax increases, and the creation of a toll road authority, rendering it unconstitutional.

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While not dispositive, combining such general and specific provisions in a single
bill raises article II, section 19 concerns.
Similarly, we have found constitutional concerns in bills that combine
unrelated local and statewide effects, as was the case in Washington Toll Bridge
Authority, 49 Wn.2d at 523-24. Again, in that case, a single act directed a state
agency to build a toll road between high-population cities and dramatically
increased that state agency’s powers. Id. at 523 (citing LAWS OF 1955, ch. 268).
The challengers argue this is analogous to the relationship between section 12,
which, in effect, directs a single regional transportation district, Sound Transit, to
retire, defease, or refinance bonds, and the bulk of the rest of the initiative, which
makes significant changes to motor vehicle excise taxes generally. Again, while
not dispositive, it is evidence of two subjects.
Consistent with our opinion in Pierce County II, we find section 12 creates a
separate subject from the main subject in the initiative, limiting vehicle taxes and
fees. We do not reach whether the other challenged provisions of I-976 create
unconstitutional separate subjects.
2. Article II, section 19 subject-in-title requirement
The challengers, joined by the League of Women Voters of Washington,
argue the initiative also violates article II, section 19’s subject-in-title requirement.
They contend the ballot title is misleading because, among other things, it
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incorrectly suggests motor vehicle excise taxes will be reduced to $30, that taxes
previously approved by voters will survive, and that voters can still approve taxes
in the future.
The ballot title of an initiative is the title for purposes of an article II, section
19 analysis. WASAVP, 174 Wn.2d at 655 (citing Wash. Fed’n of State Emps., 127
Wn.2d at 555). The ballot title consists of the subject statement, the concise
description, and the question of whether the measure should be enacted into law.
Id. (citing RCW 29A.72.050). Words in a ballot title are given their common,
ordinary meanings, and not a hypertechnical legal interpretation. See id. at 661-62
(quoting ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 226). Instead, it is read as the average informed voter
would read it. Id. at 662 (quoting W. Petrol. Imps., 127 Wn.2d at 424).
For the purpose of a subject-in-title analysis, “a title complies with the
constitution if it gives notice that would lead to an inquiry into the body of the act,
or indicate to an inquiring mind the scope and purpose of the law.” Young Men’s
Christian Ass’n v. State, 62 Wn.2d 504, 506, 383 P.2d 497 (1963); ATU, 142
Wn.2d at 217. “ʻThe title to a bill need not be an index to its contents; nor is the
title expected to give the details contained in the bill.’” Wash. Fed’n, 127 Wn.2d
at 555 (quoting Treffry v. Taylor, 67 Wn.2d 487, 491, 408 P.2d 269 (1965)).
While the title need not be an index to the contents of the bill, it must not be
misleading. “[T]he material representations in the title must not be misleading or
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false, which would thwart the underlying purpose of ensuring that ‘no person may
be deceived as to what matters are being legislated upon.’” WASAVP, 174 Wn.2d
at 660 (quoting Seymour v. City of Tacoma, 6 Wash. 138, 149, 32 P. 1077 (1893)).
“ʽ[A] title which is misleading and false is not constitutionally framed.’” Id. at 661
(alteration in original) (quoting Howlett v. Cheetham, 17 Wash. 626, 635, 50 P.
522 (1897)). “[O]bjections to the title must be grave . . . before we will hold an act
unconstitutional.” N. Cedar Co. v. French, 131 Wash. 394, 419, 230 P. 837 (1924)
(citing Lancey v. King County, 15 Wash. 9, 45 P. 645 (1896)).
This court found a bill’s title was unconstitutionally deceptive and
misleading in DeCano v. State, 7 Wn.2d 613, 630-31, 110 P.2d 627 (1941). There,
the measure was titled “ʻAN ACT relating to the rights and disabilities of aliens
with respect to land.’” Id. at 623; LAWS OF 1937, ch. 220. Chapter 220 amended a
previous act that had denied many civil rights to “aliens,” including the right to
own real property. LAWS OF 1937, ch. 220 (amending LAWS OF 1921, ch. 50). The
1921 act had exempted from its denial of civil rights anyone “who has in good
faith declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States.” LAWS OF
1921, ch. 50, § 1(a). The 1937 act significantly limited who could own property by
also requiring the person to be a citizen or be eligible for citizenship. LAWS OF
1937, ch. 220, § 1(a). The Court found the 1937 act violated article II, section 19
because
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the title . . . is not sufficiently broad and comprehensive to warrant inclusion
within the subject matter of the act of ‘non-citizens . . . ineligible to
citizenship by naturalization,’ . . . [and,] by adopting a term defined in the
earlier statute without giving any indication that its meaning has been
changed and broadened by statutory definition, actually, although
inadvertently no doubt, tends to be misleading and deceptive.
DeCano, 7 Wn.2d at 630-31. Relying in part on DeCano, we found that the ballot
title for Initiative Measure 695 (I-695) was inadequate for failing to give notice of
the measure’s contents in ATU. ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 226. That ballot title said:
“ʻShall voter approval be required for any tax increase, license tab fees be $30 per
year for motor vehicles, and existing vehicle taxes be repealed.’” Id. at 193. The
body of I-695 said that “‘tax’ includes, but is not necessarily limited to . . . impact
fees, license fees, permit fees, and any monetary charge by [the] government.”
LAWS OF 2000, ch. 1, § 2(2). The court concluded:
I-695 violates the subject-in-title rule of article II, section 19 on the basis
that the ballot title of I-695 states “[s]hall voter approval be required for any
tax increase” without any indication in the title that “tax” has a meaning
broader than its common meaning. Nothing about this ballot title gives any
notice that would indicate to the voters that the contents of the initiative
would include voter approval for charges other than taxes or suggest inquiry
into the act be made to learn the broad meaning of “tax.”
ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 227 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted). In contrast, we
found no subject-in-title problem with the liquor privatization bill, Initiative 1183.
That title said that
“Initiative Measure No. 1183 concerns liquor: beer, wine, and spirits (hard
liquor).
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“This measure would close state liquor stores and sell their assets; license
private parties to sell and distribute spirits; set license fees based on sales;
regulate licensees; and change regulation of wine distribution.”
WASAVP, 174 Wn.2d at 647 (quoting State of Washington Voters’ Pamphlet,
General Election 19 (Nov. 8, 2011)). The challengers argued that the ballot title
was inadequate and misleading because some of those fees were in fact taxes. We
rejected that challenge because
[a] common understanding of the term “fee” is “a charge fixed by law or by
an institution (as a university) for certain privileges or services <a license
[fee]>. . . .” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 833
(2002). The license issuance fees under I–1183 correspond with this
common meaning, as they are charges for the privilege of selling liquor in
Washington State.
Id. at 664 (alterations in original). Thus, that ballot title was not deceptive or
misleading. Here, the ballot statement for I-976 says:
Initiative Measure No. 976 concerns motor vehicle taxes and fees.
This measure would repeal, reduce, or remove authority to impose certain
vehicle taxes and fees; limit annual motor-vehicle-license fees to $30, except
voter-approved charges; and base vehicle taxes on Kelley Blue Book value.
CP at 1131 (emphasis added). The challengers argue that the initiative violates the
subject-in-title rule because it misleadingly implies that local vehicle excise taxes
and fees previously approved by voters will survive passage of the initiative, when
in fact sections 6, 10, 11 and 13 would eliminate a large number of voter-approved
charges and remove the very statutory mechanism by which voters could approve
charges in the future. The State concedes that I-976 cancels voter-approved taxes
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and removes the mechanisms for voters to approve them in the future. It contends,
however, that the ballot title is not misleading because it says that certain taxes are
repealed and because, under our constitution, the legislature or the people, via
initiative, could reenact such authority in the future.
We read ballot titles as the average informed lay voter would. WASAVP,
174 Wn.2d at 662 (quoting W. Petrol. Imps., 127 Wn.2d at 424). The average
informed lay voter would not think that “[t]his measure would . . . limit annual
motor-vehicle-license fees to $30, except voter-approved charges” would mean
charges previously approved by voters would be eliminated. CP at 1131. As the
League of Women Voters notes, many voters have voted on such measures in the
past, and “the average-informed voter encountering the phrase ‘except voterapproved charges’ would expect that these earlier votes were the reason for the
‘except’ clause [and] would have no reason to anticipate that I-976 would
implicitly repeal their votes while telling them that ‘voter-approved charges’ were
‘except[ed].’” Amicus Curiae Br. of League of Women Voters of Wash. at 12
(second alteration in original). 3

The State does not dispute that under I-976, no person would pay less than $43.25 to renew
their car tabs. At oral argument, the State suggested that voters might have well understood
“$30.00 car tabs . . . is a political phrase, it’s like promising a ‘chicken in every pot.’ It’s not a
promise.” Wash. Supreme Court oral argument, Garfield County Transp. Auth. v. State, No.
98320-8 (June 30, 2020), at 42 min., 33 sec., video recording by TVW, Washington State’s
Public Affairs Network, http://www.tvw.org (available at
https://www.tvw.org/watch/?eventID=2020061188). While ballot titles may not be promises,
3

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Similarly, the average informed lay voter would not think the initiative
eliminates the statutory mechanism for voters to approve charges in the future. We
are unpersuaded by the State’s argument that this clause is not misleading because
future legislation could create a new mechanism to permit voters to approve taxes.
The ballot statement of an initiative concerns the effect of the initiative. It is not
the place for truisms about legislative power. We hold that the initiative violates
the subject-in-title rule because it is deceptive and misleading since the average
informed lay voter would conclude voter approved taxes – such as those used to
fund local and regional transportation projects across our state – would remain.
3. Remaining arguments
We do not reach the remaining constitutional arguments and dispose of the
nonconstitutional arguments briefly. One of the intervenors contends that the trial
judge should have recused himself since he works for, and stands for election in,
King County. Nothing in the record suggests any party made a motion for the trial

they must be accurate. To the extent the State argues that $43.25 can be understood as $30.00,
the argument is not well taken.
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judge to recuse himself. Any error is unpreserved, and we decline to reach it. See
RAP 2.5(a).
An intervenor also contends that county and municipal plaintiffs who have
challenged I-976 have violated RCW 42.17A.555. That statute says in most
relevant part:
No elective official nor any employee of his or her office nor any person
appointed to or employed by any public office or agency may use or
authorize the use of any of the facilities of a public office or agency, directly
or indirectly, for the purpose of assisting a campaign for election of any
person to any office or for the promotion of or opposition to any ballot
proposition.
RCW 42.17A.555.
A “‘[b]allot proposition’ means . . . any initiative . . . proposed to be
submitted to the voters.” RCW 42.17A.005(4). At the time of the court challenge,
I-976 was no longer “proposed to be submitted to the voters.” It was an enrolled
piece of legislation. LAWS OF 2020, ch. 1. Finally, we decline to consider whether
I-976 unlawfully interferes with bonds issued by the city of Burien as it was not
designed for our review.
CONCLUSION
We hold that that I-976 violates article II, section 19 because it contains
multiple subjects and an inaccurate ballot title. Accordingly, we reverse in part
and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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____________________________

WE CONCUR:

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No. 98320-8

MADSEN, J. (concurring)—I agree with the majority that Initiative 976 (I-976)
violates the single subject rule of our state constitution. Majority at 15; WASH. CONST.
art. II, § 19. The initiative’s requirement to retire early, defease, or refinance existing
bonds is not rationally related to I-976’s subject of limiting vehicle taxes and fees. See
majority at 15. I also agree that Pierce County I and II instruct and resolve this case. 1 Id.
at 15-19.
The majority further holds that I-976 violates the subject-in-title rule because the
title is unconstitutionally misleading. Id. at 21, 26; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 19. I
disagree because the ballot title alerts voters that local revenue options would be affected
and prompt further inquiry into the body of the act. Thus, in my view, I-976 does not
violate the subject-in-title requirement of article II, section 19.
1. Single Subject Rule
The majority correctly applies our decisions in Pierce County I and II. Pierce
County I concerned Initiative 776 (I-776), which limited license tab fees and called for

1

Pierce County v. State, 150 Wn.2d 422, 78 P.3d 640 (2003) (Pierce County I); Pierce County v.
State, 159 Wn.2d 16, 148 P.3d 1002 (2006) (Pierce County II).

 No. 98320-8
Madsen, J., concurring

but did not require the early retirement, refinance, and defeasement of existing bonds.
See, e.g., 150 Wn.2d at 432-33 (citing section 7 of I-776 entitled, “Legislative Intent
Relating to Outstanding Bonds”). We upheld the initiative against a single subject
challenge, holding that these nonenforceable statements of policy are not separate
subjects and do not violate the single subject rule. Id. at 433 (citing WASH. CONST. art.
II, § 19).
Pierce County II dealt with contract impairment. There, we held that I-776
unconstitutionally impaired contracts with bondholders because it repealed taxes pledged
to repay existing bonds. Pierce County II, 159 Wn.2d at 31-32. We went on to address
the additional claim that if I-776 impaired bondholder contracts, this court should revive
and make legally binding the sections requiring early retirement of bonds. Id. at 46-48.
Relevant to the present case is our reasoning for rejecting this argument. We noted that
giving force to nonbinding policy statements to retire bonds would violate both the
contracts clause and, importantly, article II, section 19. Id. at 48.
Pierce County II rejected the invitation to create in I-776 the exact situation we are
faced with here. I-976’s operative sections require the early retirement of existing bonds.
As Pierce County II noted, such sections would constitute an additional subject because
bond financing is not germane to limiting vehicle fees and taxes—the subject of I-976.

2

 No. 98320-8
Madsen, J., concurring

See majority at 18. For that reason, I agree that Pierce County II resolves the current
case. 2
2. Subject-in-Title Rule
The majority concludes I-976’s ballot title is misleading and therefore
unconstitutional under the subject-in-title rule. Majority at 26; WASH. CONST. art. II, §
19. I disagree.
Article II, section 19 is to be liberally construed in favor of the legislation. Amalg.
Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wn.2d 183, 206, 11 P.3d 762 (2000). A title is
misleading if it is not constitutionally framed. Wash. Ass’n for Substance Abuse &
Violence Prevention v. State, 174 Wn.2d 642, 661, 278 P.3d 632 (2012) (quoting Howlett
v. Cheetham, 17 Wash. 626, 635, 50 P. 522 (1897)). A title is constitutional “if it gives
notice which would lead to an inquiry into the body of the act or indicates the scope and
purpose of the law to an inquiring mind.” Amalg. Transit, 142 Wn.2d at 217.
I-976’s ballot title states that it would repeal or completely remove “authority to
impose certain vehicle taxes and fees; limit . . . fees to $30, except voter-approved
charges.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 1131. We interpret the plain language of initiatives in
the same way as laws passed by the legislature, which includes grammatical rules. State

2

The majority quotes extensively from the dissenting opinion in Pierce County I, which would
have held that legislation containing a mandatory subject and an unrelated, nonmandatory one
violates article II, section 19. 150 Wn.2d at 444 (Chambers, J., dissenting). We noted these
concerns in Pierce County II, 159 Wn.2d at 48. Here, the majority’s reliance on Pierce County
I’s dissent is instructive for the unique issue before us, yet it is important to note that the majority
in Pierce County I remains good law as to the issues it addressed.

3

 No. 98320-8
Madsen, J., concurring

v. Bunker, 169 Wn.2d 571, 578, 238 P.3d 487 (2010) (“[W]e employ traditional rules of
grammar in discerning the plain language of the statute.”). The ballot title divides its
actions with semicolons, and the phrase “except voter-approved charges” is in the
sentence fragment related to $30 car tabs and separate from the terms on repealing
authority to impose vehicle taxes. Section 2 of I-976 amends chapter 46.17 RCW to
provide that motor vehicle license fees are limited to $30, except voter-approved charges;
and the section defines “‘motor vehicle license fees’” to mean “‘general license tab fees
paid annually for licensing motor vehicles,’” which do not include “‘charges approved by
voters after the effective date of this section.’” Corrected Br. of Resp’t/Cross-Appellant
State of Wash. at 33 (quoting LAWS of 2020, ch. 1, § 2). I-976 told voters it would
remove authority to impose taxes and separated that statement from voter-approved
charges.
The construction of this ballot title may have generated some confusion as to
whether the initiative would remove or reduce authority concerning voter-approved
charges. The subject-in-title rule, however, does not require absolute clarity. Ballot titles
need not be “‘an index to its contents; nor is the title expected to give the details
contained in the bill.’” Wash. Fed’n of State Employees v. State, 127 Wn.2d 544, 555,
901 P.2d 1028 (1995) (quoting Treffry v. Taylor, 67 Wn.2d 487, 491, 408 P.2d 269
(1965)). A title complies with the constitution if it provides notice leading to inquiry into
the body of the act. Amalg. Transit, 142 Wn.2d at 217.

4

 No. 98320-8
Madsen, J., concurring

Critically, I-976’s ballot title alerted voters that the measure would affect the
authority to impose vehicle taxes and fees, and limit annual vehicle fees to $30, except
voter-approved charges. CP at 1131. Although a voter may be unsure as to the meaning
of the words—whether local add-on fees remain or are repealed—these words indicate
the scope of the initiative would impact local revenue options, prompting a voter to look
to the body of the act for further inquiry. Amalg. Transit, 142 Wn.2d at 217.
The right to initiative and referendum are guaranteed by our constitution. WASH.
CONST. art. II, § 1(a), (b) (reserving to the people the authority to enact laws through
initiatives and referenda). This court cannot interpret the initiative in such a manner that
it deprives the people of acting in their legislative capacity. See id.; Amalg. Transit, 142
Wn.2d at 225 (“[L]egislation should be construed to preserve its constitutionality where
possible.”).
The majority likens I-976’s ballot title to those found defective in Decano v. State,
7 Wn.2d 613, 630-31, 110 P.2d 627 (1941), and Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wn.2d at
226. Majority at 22-24. But both of these cases are distinguishable.
DeCano concerned a measure “‘relating to the rights and disabilities of aliens with
respect to land.’” 7 Wn.2d at 623. The bill amended an act that denied civil rights to
aliens, including the right to own real property, but exempted anyone who “in good faith
declared” an intention to become a United States citizen. Id. at 623-24. The measure at
issue included a clause redefining “alien” to include all persons who are noncitizens of
the United States and who are ineligible for citizenship by naturalization. This court
5

 No. 98320-8
Madsen, J., concurring

found the measure unconstitutional: “the title of the 1937 statute states that it pertains to
the rights of ‘aliens’ with respect to land, but it gives no intimation whatsoever that the
body of the act contains an amended definition of the word ‘alien’ which brings within its
purview a whole new class of persons who are not in fact aliens in common
understanding, by judicial construction, or under the express definition contained in the
prior law.” Id. at 624. The bill title was deceptive in that it gave no indication that the
measure broadened the term “alien.” Id. at 630-31.
Amalgamated Transit reviewed Initiative-695. 142 Wn.2d at 193. The ballot title
at issue stated “‘[s]hall voter approval be required for any tax increase’” without any
indication in the title that tax has a meaning broader than its common meaning. Id.
“Nothing about this ballot title gives any notice that would indicate to the voters that the
contents of the initiative would include voter approval for charges other than taxes or
suggest inquiry into the act be made to learn the broad meaning of ‘tax.’” Id. at 227.
DeCano and Amalgamated Transit concern ballot titles using terms that are
broadened without notice in the body of the act. The term “alien” in DeCano gave the
voter no indication the measure used a different definition; similarly, in Amalgamated
Transit, the term “taxes” was broadened. In this case, however, I-976’s title did not
contain a term that was then broadened in the body of the initiative without notice.
Rather, as discussed above, the title indicated that I-976 would impact local revenue
options. I would hold I-976’s ballot title, unlike those in DeCano and Amalgamated
Transit, is not unconstitutionally misleading.
6

 No. 98320-8
Madsen, J., concurring

Though I disagree with the majority that I-976 violates the subject-in-title rule, I
agree that the measure contains an impermissible separate subject and is unconstitutional
for that reason. Accordingly, I concur.

______________________________________

7