



October 30, 2020

MR. JASON LEOPOLD  
BUZZFEED NEWS  
7<sup>TH</sup> FLOOR  
1630 CONNECTICUT AVENUE NW  
WASHINGTON, DC 20009

FOIPA Request No.: 1432673-000  
Civil Action No.: 19-cv-01278  
Subject: All 302's of individuals who were  
questioned/interviewed by FBI Agents  
working for the Office of Special Counsel  
Robert Mueller

Dear Mr. Leopold:

You were previously advised we were consulting with another agency concerning information related to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request.

A portion of that information has been returned to the FBI and is enclosed. The documents were reviewed under the FOIA/FOIPA, Title 5, United States Code, Sections (s) 552/552a. Below you will find check boxes under the appropriate statute headings which indicate the types of exemptions asserted to protect information which is exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the enclosed pages next to redacted information. The checked exemptions used to withhold information are further explained in the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions.

<b>Section 552</b>		<b>Section 552a</b>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(1)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> (d)(5)
<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> (j)(2)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(3)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(1)
Please see additional information	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(D)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(2)
_____	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(E)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(3)
_____	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(F)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(4)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(4)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(8)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(5)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(5)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(9)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(6)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(6)		<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(7)

1,199 pages were reviewed and 978 pages are being released.

- The appropriate redactions were made by the Department of State (DOS), Department of Commerce (DOC), National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), United States Custom and Border Protection (CBP), Department of Justice/Office of Information Policy (DOJ/OIP), United States Secret Service, (USSS), Department of Energy Office of the Inspector General (DOE-OIG), United States Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Department of Justice/National Security Division (NSD), Department of The Treasury/Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Office of the Inspector General (FDIC-OIG), National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. "Part 1" of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. "Part 2" includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records about yourself or any third party individuals. "Part 3" includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

Although your request is in litigation, we are required by law to provide you the following information:

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the [www.fbi.gov/foia](http://www.fbi.gov/foia) website under "Contact Us." The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request.

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP's website: <https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at [ogis@nara.gov](mailto:ogis@nara.gov); telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing [foipaquestions@fbi.gov](mailto:foipaquestions@fbi.gov). If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

Please direct any further inquiries about this case to the Attorney representing the Government in this matter. Please use the FOIPA Request Number and/or Civil Action Number in all correspondence or inquiries concerning your request.



See additional information which follows.

Sincerely,



Michael G. Seidel  
Section Chief  
Record/Information  
Dissemination Section  
Information Management Division

Enclosures

**Additional Information:**

The enclosed documents represent the twelfth interim release of information responsive to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request. This material is being provided to you at no charge.

b(3) Statutes Cited:

- Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 6 (e)
- 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1)
- 10 U.S.C § 424
- 50 U.S.C § 3024 (m)
- 50 U.S.C § 3605 (PL 86-36)
- CIA Act of 1949
- 31 U.S.C § 5319
- 8 U.S.C § 1202

For your information, sealed court records are not eligible for release under the Freedom of Information Act. Material responsive to your request has been withheld and marked "OTHER-Sealed" pursuant to appropriate order(s) issued by federal district courts.

As previously indicated, document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning another agency (ies). We are consulting with the other agency (ies) and are awaiting their response. Our office has processed all other information currently in our possession. The FBI will correspond with you regarding those documents when the consultation is completed.

## FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs.

### Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the [www.fbi.gov/foia](http://www.fbi.gov/foia) website.
- (ii) **Intelligence Records.** To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist.

### Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.
- (iii) **Requests for Records for Incarcerated Individuals.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any incarcerated individual pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

### Part 3: General Information:

- (i) **Record Searches.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. A standard search normally consists of a search for main files in the Central Records System (CRS), an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does not include references, administrative records of previous FOIPA requests, or civil litigation files. For additional information about our record searches, visit [www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/requesting-fbi-records](http://www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/requesting-fbi-records).
- (ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative “FBI file.” An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at [www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks](http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks). Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at [www.edo.cjis.gov](http://www.edo.cjis.gov). For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.
- (iv) **National Name Check Program (NNCP).** The mission of NNCP is to analyze and report information in response to name check requests received from federal agencies, for the purpose of protecting the United States from foreign and domestic threats to national security. Please be advised that this is a service provided to other federal agencies. Private Citizens cannot request a name check.

## EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ( A ) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ( B ) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ( C ) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, ( D ) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, ( E ) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or ( F ) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FOI/PA

DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

Civil Action No.: 19-cv-1278 / 19-cv-1626

FOIA: 1432673-000 / 1433273-000

PDF Title:19-cv-1278 Release 12 Bates

Total Withheld Pages = 325

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19cv1278) 1814	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1815	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1816	b3; b7A; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1817	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1818	b1; b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1819	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 1820	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2776	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2777	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2778	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2779	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2780	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2781	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2782	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2783	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2784	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2785	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2786	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2787	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2788	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3063	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3064	b3 per DIA; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3065	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3077	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3078	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3079	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3080	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3081	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3082	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3083	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3084	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3085	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3086	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3087	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E

<b>Bates Page Reference</b>	<b>Reason for Withholding</b> (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19cv1278) 3088	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3089	b3 per DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3721	b3 per DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3722	b3 per DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3898	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3899	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3900	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3901	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3902	b1; b3; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3903	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3904	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3905	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3906	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3907	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3908	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3909	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3910	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3911	b1; b3; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3912	b1; b3; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
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FBI(19cv1278) 3921	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3922	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3923	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3924	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3925	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3926	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3927	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3928	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3929	b7A; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3930	b7A; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3931	b7A; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3932	b7A; b7E
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FBI(19cv1278) 3937	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3938	b7A; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3939	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3940	b3; b7A; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3941	b7A; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3942	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3943	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E


<b>Bates Page Reference</b>	<b>Reason for Withholding</b> (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19cv1278) 3944	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3945	b3 per DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3946	b3 per DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3947	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3948	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3949	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3950	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3951	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3952	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3953	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3954	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3955	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3956	b7A; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3957	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3958	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3959	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3960	b3 per DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3961	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3962	b7A; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3963	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3964	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3965	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3966	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3967	b3 per DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3968	b3 per DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3969	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3970	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3971	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3972	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3973	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3974	b3 per DIA; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3975	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3976	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3977	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3978	b3; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3979	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3980	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3981	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3982	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3983	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3984	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3985	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E



<b>Bates Page Reference</b>	<b>Reason for Withholding</b> (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19cv1278) 3986	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3987	b7A; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3988	b3 per DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3989	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3990	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3991	b3 per DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3992	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b7A; b7D; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3993	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7D; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3994	b3 per FBI and DIA; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3995	b3 per DIA; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3996	b3 per DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4012	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4013	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4014	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4015	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4016	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4095	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4096	b3; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4187	b3 per DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4188	b3 per DIA; b6 per FBI, DIA and USSS; b7A; b7C per FBI and USSS; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4189	b6 per FBI and NSD; b7A per FBI and NSD; b7C per FBI and NSD; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4190	b4; b6; b7A per FBI and NSD; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4191	b4; b6 per FBI and NSD; b7A; b7C per FBI and NSD; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4192	b4; b6 per FBI and NSD; b7A; b7C per FBI and NSD; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4193	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4329	b3 per DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4330	b3 per DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4331	b3 per DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4813	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4926	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4927	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4928	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4929	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
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FBI(19cv1278) 4931	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4932	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4933	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4934	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4935	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E

<b>Bates Page Reference</b>	<b>Reason for Withholding</b> (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19cv1278) 4936	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4937	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4938	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4939	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4940	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4941	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4942	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4943	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4944	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4945	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4946	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4947	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4948	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4988	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4989	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 4990	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5012	b3; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5013	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5014	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5015	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5160	b6; b7A per FBI and NSD; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5161	b6; b7A per FBI and NSD; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5162	b6; b7A per FBI and NSD; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5163	b6; b7A per FBI and NSD; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5164	b6; b7A per FBI and NSD; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5181	b3 per DIA; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5182	b3 per DIA; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5287	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5288	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5289	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5290	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5291	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5292	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5293	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5365	b1 per DIA; b3 per FBI and DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5366	b1 per DIA; b3 per FBI and DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5367	b1 per DIA; b3 per FBI and DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5368	b3 per FBI and DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5369	b3 per FBI and DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5370	b1 per DIA; b3 per FBI and DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5371	b1 per DIA; b3 per FBI and DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5372	b3 per FBI and DIA; b6 per FBI and DIA; b7A; b7C; b7E

<b>Bates Page Reference</b>	<b>Reason for Withholding</b> (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19cv1278) 5452	b3; b6 per FBI and CBP; b7C per FBI and CBP; b7E per FBI and CBP; Other - Sealed per DOJ/OIP
FBI(19cv1278) 5453	b3; b6 per FBI and CBP; b7C per FBI and CBP; b7E per FBI and CBP; Other - Sealed per DOJ/OIP
FBI(19cv1278) 5454	b3; b6; b7C; b7E; Other - Sealed per DOJ/OIP
FBI(19cv1278) 5455	b3; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5456	b3; b6; b7C; b7E; Other - Sealed per DOJ/OIP
FBI(19cv1278) 5458	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5459	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5460	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5461	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5468	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5469	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5470	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5471	b3 per FBI and DOJ/OIP; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5472	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5473	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5474	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5616	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5617	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5632	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5633	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5634	b3; b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E



b7A  
b7E

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/09/2018

Paul J. Manafort, date of birth [Redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents [Redacted]; FBI Intelligence Analyst [Redacted]; and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Greg Andres, Andrew Weissmann and Andrew Goldstein. Present representing Manafort were attorney Thomas Zehnle and paralegal [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information:

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b7C

Manafort believed that the news articles about him all originated from one source of information. Manafort asked [Redacted] to explain how news articles could appear to come from several sources, and look unconnected, but really trace back to a single source. They created a document that [Redacted] gave to Manafort during their in-person meeting in the U.S. [Redacted] did not want to send the document electronically. Manafort does not know why [Redacted] did not want to send it. The document was an example of how such an operation could be run, not how the one against Manafort was run.

b6  
b7C

Manafort sent the hard copy document to his attorney [Redacted] so that [Redacted] would be aware of the [Redacted] work, background and access. The [Redacted] had recommended an international accounting firm to research issues related to Manafort's bank accounts in Cyprus. [Redacted] worked with the international accounting firm on the Cyprus bank account project. When Manafort switched attorneys, Kevin Downing took over managing the project.

b6  
b7C

Manafort reviewed messages between Manafort and [Redacted] wrote on 07/18/2018 that he was "going to discuss with my US colleagues." [Redacted] "US colleagues" were [Redacted] but [Redacted] did not tell Manafort their names.

b6  
b7C  
b3

On 02/02/2018, Manafort messaged [Redacted] "[i]s it possible to do a superficial check on someone for me. I would need bt Tuesday." Manafort does not recall who he asked [Redacted] to check out. [Redacted] responded on 02/05/2018 that [Redacted]

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Investigation on 10/16/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

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b7C  
b7E

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/17/2018

by [Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~b7A  
b7E(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

Continuation of FD-302 of 10.16.2018

, On 10/16/2018 , Page 2 of 8

[redacted] did not tell Manafort any connections that he had with the FBI. Manafort does not recall asking [redacted] to do a background check on anyone.

b6  
b7C

On 02/02/2018, Manafort messaged [redacted] "I am getting solid support from my former team." "My former team" referred to people in the Trump Administration. Manafort did not talk directly with anyone in the Administration. [redacted] told Manafort about the support. [redacted] had been Reince Priebus's [redacted] [redacted] told [redacted] that Priebus was supportive and [redacted] told Manafort. Manafort did not hear any word of support from Jared Kushner.

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b7C

On 02/02/2018, Manafort messaged [redacted] "[k]ey is to keep JK informed." Manafort was opining to [redacted] that Talal should keep Kushner informed because Kushner, not Rex Tillerson or the U.N., was the best way to get a message to President Donald Trump.

b6  
b7C

On 03/04/2018, Manafort messaged [redacted] "Q is still pushing and playing with Mueller." Manafort does not recall any connection between Qatar and Mueller. Manafort does not recall why he wrote the message. Manafort was simply associating the UAE's enemy with Manafort's enemy. It was a self-serving statement, Manafort had no facts to support the connection. After his second indictment, Manafort wanted reassurance from [redacted] that he could still work for the UAE.

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b7C

Manafort had no communication with anyone in the Administration while they were in the Administration. Manafort never asked anyone to try to communicate a message to anyone in the Administration. Manafort spoke with Priebus after he left the Administration. Manafort communicated with Larry Kudlow before Kudlow joined the Administration.

Manafort has traveled once to Cyprus. Manafort traveled to Cyprus because the oligarchs wanted to send his payments to bank accounts in Cyprus rather than wiring money directly to the U.S. Manafort met with [redacted]. Oleg Deripaska introduced Manafort to [redacted] [redacted] helped Manafort set up bank accounts and shelf companies in Cyprus. Manafort distinguishes between the shelf companies that accepted payments for Manafort's Ukrainian political work and the shelf companies that were used as Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) to purchase cable companies. Manafort may also have spoken with [redacted] about [redacted] planned presidential campaign. Manafort believes that [redacted] set up bank accounts in Cyprus for Deripaska. Deripaska definitely had a presence in Cyprus,


b6  
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-1288

[REDACTED]  
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~b7A  
b7E[REDACTED]  
(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul ManafortContinuation of FD-302 of 10.16.2018, On 10/16/2018, Page 3 of 8

which may have been bank accounts or businesses, Manafort does not know. Manafort does not know if Rinat Akhmetov has Cyprus bank accounts or who he would have used to set up the accounts.

Manafort reviewed two documents, one showing he owned 100% of DMP International and one showing that he owned 50% and [REDACTED] owned 50%. Manafort does not know any reason for the difference. Manafort believes that the 100% document was created first. [REDACTED] may have suggested the change for tax purposes. Manafort has no information on how or why the document was changed. Manafort does not recall any conversation about the change. Rick Gates may have given [REDACTED] the 100% document without knowing that [REDACTED] made the change. Manafort 100% operated DMP, [REDACTED] was not involved in any decision making.

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b7A  
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Trump did not like a policy speech drafted by Dimitri Simes. Manafort and Kushner agreed that Simes could not save the speech and Stephen Miller would re-write it. After Trump rejected the speech, Simes was not involved in anything else for the campaign.

Manafort reviewed a 08/10/2016 e-mail from Simes forwarded from Kushner to Manafort and others regarding "Russia Policy Memo." Manafort recalls the e-mail but no follow-up. Simes was not the type of person that Trump embraced. Simes and Trump did not interact well when Trump practiced Simes's draft speech. Kushner wrote in the e-mail that it was a "suggestion only," meaning he was not pushing the policy memo. Kushner would have suggested a meeting if he was pushing it.

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[REDACTED]  
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~b7A  
b7E[REDACTED]  
(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

Continuation of FD-302 of 10.16.2018, On 10/16/2018, Page 4 of 8

Manafort reviewed a 08/10/2016 and 08/11/2016 e-mail chain from Manafort to Simes wherein Manafort first wrote "Dimitri Lets chat" and ended with an e-mail to Manafort's assistant "Pls call Jarred's assistant to get the time and location of my meeting on August 17 with Jared and Dimitri Simes." The meeting never happened. Manafort does not recall why he responded to Simes "lets chat." Manafort probably talked with Kushner that day. Manafort guesses that Kushner must have wanted the meeting. Manafort would not have responded to Simes based on Kushner's "suggestion only." In order of likelihood, Kushner may have wanted the meeting because Henry Kissinger recommended it, because of Simes's information on the Clintons and Russia or because someone liked the policy information in the memo. Simes worked for a think tank that believed the U.S. needed to be firm but also to work with Russia. Simes's ideas were very specific, Trump did not like that sort of detail to box him into a position. Trump and Manafort agreed to focus foreign policy on Iran, North Korea and the U.S. Allies's lack of payments to NATO and the U. N. These policies were easy, Russia and China were more difficult. Simes would have gained Trump's attention with the Clinton information, which was red meat, not the nuances of foreign policy. Manafort and Kushner were both very busy at this time. Manafort was dealing with the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Manafort's issues in the news and preparing the campaign strategy in case he left. Kushner was dealing with social media, scheduling for Trump and Trump's debate practice.

b6  
b7C

Collusion between Russia and Trump was not really a campaign issue. Robby Mook's charges of collusion were not taken seriously within the Trump Campaign because they were wrong. The Campaign's only response was to release Manafort.

From the time he left the Campaign until the election, Manafort met once or twice with Kushner and spoke five or six times with him on the telephone. They both reached out to each other. Trump and the Family knew that Manafort and Kushner were talking. Kushner thought it would be good for Manafort to call Trump. Manafort and Trump talked a few times before the election. As to the substance of their calls, Manafort only recalls that once he gave Trump advice on Trump's performance in the second debate and gave Trump ideas for the third debate.

On November 5, 2016, Manafort e-mailed a "Securing the Victory" document to Kushner. Kushner acknowledged getting the document. Manafort does not recall discussing it with Kushner. Manafort described Trump as vulnerable to attack because people would not understand how Trump won and would be looking for reasons. Manafort had no information that Russia hacked voting machines. Manafort presumed it would be a claim by

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~b7A  
b7E(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul ManafortContinuation of FD-302 of 10.16.2018, On 10/16/2018, Page 5 of 8

Clinton's Campaign. Manafort sent the memo to Hannity because he wanted Hannity to pass the message on television and through the media. Manafort did not expect Hannity to talk with Trump about it. Manafort sent the memo to Trump's executive assistant.

On the day that the Steele dossier came out, Manafort told Trump that the information in the dossier about Manafort was not true, including the payments in the cash ledger. Trump told Manafort that the information about Michael Cohen in Prague and Trump in Moscow was similarly not true. Trump was generally upset that his victory was being undermined. Manafort had first called Priebus to say that the information was false. Priebus arranged a time for Manafort to call and speak with Trump. Manafort did not tell Trump about any of the Steele dossier research by [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Manafort does not know why Yanukovich fled to Russia instead of somewhere in Europe. Manafort believes that after Yanukovich did not sign the Vilnius Agreement that the West aligned against him. Putin had pressured Yanukovich not to sign the Agreement. Yanukovich fled to Russia because he felt Putin owed him. Yanukovich did not sign the Agreement because of the economic pressure that Putin placed on him. Manafort and Serhiy Lyovochkin expected Yanukovich to stand up to Putin. Kilimnik believed that Georgian mercenaries, hired by the West, committed the violence in Maidan because Yanukovich did not sign the Association Agreement. Kilimnik sent Manafort several documentaries on the issue.

Manafort asked Kilimnik to research evidence related to the claims against Manafort in the Steele dossier. Manafort was more concerned with how the information in the Steele dossier was collected than its substance.

[REDACTED] worked with Kilimnik at the International Republican Institute (IRI). [REDACTED] brought Kilimnik to Davis Manafort. Kilimnik started as a translator and someone with local knowledge. Kilimnik rose to manager. Kilimnik lived in Russia when Ukraine split from the Soviet Union. Kilimnik declared himself Russian instead of Ukrainian. Kilimnik understood Americans, had language skills and was smart, outgoing and witty. Manafort and Kilimnik worked long hours and often went to dinner together. Manafort sometimes went to Kilimnik's house for dinner. Manafort knew Kilimnik's [REDACTED] Kilimnik was

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b7C

[REDACTED] Kilimnik now has residences in [REDACTED] and travels back and forth. After Kilimnik was indicted, Kilimnik told Manafort that [REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~b7A  
b7E(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

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Kilimnik did not believe that he was suborning perjury when he contacted [REDACTED]. In Kilimnik's mind, he was only communicating information. Kilimnik did not feel that he exerted any pressure. Kilimnik believed that the Hapsburg Group was a European project. To Kilimnik, Europe was the fulcrum of the project. Kilimnik did not work on the Hapsburg Group's project in the U.S. Kilimnik did not understand why the Hapsburg Group violated the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). Manafort does not recall talking about FARA with Kilimnik while they performed the work.

b6  
b7C

Manafort talked with Kilimnik after Kilimnik was indicted. Kilimnik thought it was crazy that he had been indicted. Manafort agreed that it was outrageous. Manafort offered to help Kilimnik retain an attorney. Kilimnik called back a couple of days later and said he was not going to deal with it.

During a break, Manafort spoke with his attorney.

Manafort conspired with Kilimnik. At the time he pleaded guilty, Manafort understood the elements of the conspiracy. Manafort and Kilimnik agreed to get [REDACTED] to say something that was not true. Kilimnik knew that the Hapsburg Group performed work in the U.S. [REDACTED]

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Manafort first met Trump in 1982 in Trump's office. Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly had been hired to represent Trump. Roger Stone was hired and Manafort came along. They were hired to lobby against FAA approval for fly over rights at Mar-A-Lago. Their firm knew most of the Reagan Administration. Stone and another associate handled the account. At different times, Manafort saw Trump at social and political events in New York City. Manafort saw Trump at Stone's wedding. They had social, not business, conversations. Trump requested VIP status at the Republican conventions worked by Manafort in 1988 and 1996. Manafort is not aware of any other lobbying efforts by Stone on behalf of Trump. Manafort is not aware of any lobbying efforts for Trump's casinos. From about 1980 to 1991, Stone counseled Trump on which candidates to meet and financially support.

In 1981, President Reagan appointed Manafort to the Oversea Private Investment Corporation's Board of Directors. Manafort resigned sometime before Reagan left office. It was a part-time job.

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~b7A  
b7E(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

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Manafort helped fifty or sixty people get inauguration tickets. Manafort reviewed a series of e-mails regarding requests of him for inauguration tickets. [redacted] and good friend. The other people listed in the same e-mail are friends of [redacted] helped with the Vice-Presidential search. [redacted] Manafort's friend and golf professional, recommended the people from Korea and China. [redacted] and wanted to bring his family. Manafort met [redacted] through a third party in the 1990s. [redacted] brought business deals to Manafort periodically, such as a marijuana drink. Manafort never did any of the deals. [redacted] was a former stock broker that wanted to be a businessman. Manafort is not aware of any connection between [redacted] and Trump. [redacted] told Manafort that [redacted] but Manafort does not have any other information regarding criminal activity by [redacted]. Manafort knows that [redacted] owned sex clubs. Manafort met [redacted] at [redacted] club a number of times. Manafort did not participate in the activities at the club. Manafort does not know of any underage women at the sex clubs. [redacted] considered Manafort a member of his club. Manafort has never been a member or participated in a sex club.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] introduced Manafort to President Kabila's representatives. Kabila had extended his presidency in Congo by two terms. Kabila wanted credit from the West if he gave up power. Manafort met twice in the U.S. with Kabila's representatives. They met around the time of Manafort's indictment in 2018. [redacted] attended the first meeting. President Kabila wanted to install a puppet in the Presidency so Manafort refused to help. A local businessman in California connected [redacted] with the opportunity. In 2018, [redacted] needed money and talked with Manafort about different opportunities. [redacted] and Manafort did not discuss whether representing Kabila would require filing under FARA.

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Some people in the Party of Regions thought Manafort worked for the CIA and Kilimnik for the KGB. Gates joked with Kilimnik about Kilimnik going to meet with his KGB handler. Upfront, Manafort told Yanukovych that he should have Kilimnik checked out so that they would not have to hold back during their discussions with Kilimnik translating. Manafort and Yanukovych discussed sensitive issues such as NATO and surveillance along the Russian border. Serhiy Lyovochkin translated Manafort's suggestion that Yanukovych have Kilimnik checked out. Yanukovych had Kilimnik checked out in 2010. [redacted] did not believe Kilimnik was an intelligence officer. [redacted] said that Rinat Akhmetov did not believe it either. No one at the U.S. Embassy expressed a concern about meeting with Kilimnik. Kilimnik was irate when such allegations came out in the news. Kilimnik was not in the military branch that moved into the

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[REDACTED]  
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~b7A  
b7E[REDACTED]  
(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul ManafortContinuation of FD-302 of 10.16.2018, On 10/16/2018, Page 8 of 8

KGB. Kilimnik worked in the branch that went into foreign service. Manafort does not have any information about Kilimnik's military service. Kilimnik never talked about being in combat. After his military service, Kilimnik worked as a translator, then at IRI and then for Davis Manafort.

When he stopped working for the Opposition Bloc, they owed Manafort about \$4 million. They paid Manafort \$1.5 or \$2.0 million at the end of 2014 or in 2015.

Manafort does not know [REDACTED] or the PSY Group. Manafort does not recall any proposal to use false online personas for the Campaign. Manafort does not recall any proposal to pay bloggers for the Campaign.

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Manafort reviewed again a 07/18/2017 message from [REDACTED] to Manafort. [REDACTED] wanted to use tweets to get out the Daily Mail story. [REDACTED] "US colleagues" were [REDACTED] Manafort never provided or discussed the [REDACTED] research with Trump. [REDACTED] "findings" were in a document that traced a media report and how the opposition got the story circulated. [REDACTED] had no smoking gun on Manafort's case. Manafort does not recall the name of the [REDACTED] company.


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Manafort does not know Bob Foresman at UBS Bank. Manafort's point of contact with UBS was [REDACTED]

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[Redacted]



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UNCLASSIFIED//~~NOFORN~~ [Redacted] // ~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/03/2018

On 11/27/2018, SA [Redacted] IA [Redacted] Special Counsel Prosecutor Andrew Weissmann and Assistant US Attorney [Redacted] interviewed WILLIAM "SAM" PATTEN at the DC US Attorney's Office. PATTEN was represented by his counsel, Stuart Sears. After being advised of the identities of the interview team, PATTEN provided the following information:

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Before the start of the interview, PATTEN was advised of his obligation to be truthful with federal investigators.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~NOFORN~~ [Redacted] // ~~LES~~

Investigation on 11/27/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/27/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~NOFORN~~ [Redacted] // ~~LES~~

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of WILLIAM "SAM"

Continuation of FD-302 of PATTEN 11/27/2018 , On 11/27/2018 , Page 2 of 5

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] was supposed to have a meeting with MICHAEL FLYNN that had been arranged by [Redacted] but PATTEN believed that it fell through. The purpose of the meeting had been to make contact with the new administration.

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PATTEN did not know of anyone else that [Redacted]

[Redacted]

The last time PATTEN recalled seeing [Redacted] was the night of the inauguration.

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PATTEN had no knowledge of [Redacted]

PATTEN latest contact with [Redacted]

PATTEN last spoke to [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] and PATTEN did not consider it a business expense.

[Redacted]

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PATTEN had been a participant in a Threema chat with Opposition Bloc (OB) member until 2 months ago when they removed him.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]  
UNCLASSIFIED//~~NOFORN~~[Redacted]/~~LES~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of WILLIAM "SAM"

Continuation of FD-302 of PATTEN 11/27/2018 , On 11/27/2018 , Page 3 of 5

Ukraine

PATTEN discussed [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
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PATTEN recalled [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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PATTEN believed that [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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PATTEN and [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
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[Redacted] When conducting polls, PATTEN would occasionally include YANUKOVYCH's name in a poll as a way to gauge other candidates. PATTEN did not consider YANUKOVYCH a viable candidate. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] PATTEN polled on various approaches to a peace deal in Ukraine. PATTEN never heard discussion of YANUKOVYCH running an autonomous region in Ukraine.

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~NOFORN~~[Redacted]/~~LES~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~NOFORN~~ [Redacted] /~~LES~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of WILLIAM "SAM"

Continuation of FD-302 of PATTEN 11/27/2018 , On 11/27/2018 , Page 4 of 5

The last poll that included YANUKOVYCH was conducted in the Fall of 2017. The purpose of the poll had been to support YURI BOYKO.

[Redacted]

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Miscellaneous

[Redacted]

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PATTEN had worked with [Redacted] PATTEN had him place some articles in European press regarding OB. [Redacted] had placed an article in The Hill in late 2016. PATTEN had ghostwritten the article on behalf of [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6 per FBI and DOS  
b7A per FBI  
b7C per FBI

[Redacted]

b6 per FBI and DOS  
b7A per FBI  
b7C per FBI

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6 per FBI and DOS  
b7A per FBI  
b7C per FBI

PATTEN and [Redacted]

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PATTEN met with [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~NOFORN~~ [Redacted] /~~LES~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~NOFORN~~ [Redacted] // ~~LES~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of WILLIAM "SAM"

Continuation of FD-302 of PATTEN 11/27/2018 , On 11/27/2018 , Page 5 of 5

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b7C  
b7E

PATTEN did not know

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Following his testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), PATTEN recalled

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

PATTEN thought he had likely been referring to

[Redacted]


[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/06/2018

Sam Patten was interviewed at the Office of Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. Present at the interview were SSA [Redacted] IA [Redacted] and Senior Special Prosecutor (SP) Andrew Weissmann. Patton was represented by attorney Stuart Sears, Schertler & Onorato, LLP, and paralegal [Redacted]. Patton was presented with a proffer agreement which he and his attorney signed and dated. SP Weissmann explained the proffer agreement to Patton and his attorney, and they stated they had no questions regarding the agreement. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, Patten provided the following information:

Presidential Inaugural Committee (PIC)

In January 2017, sometime in the teens (days), [Redacted]

[Large Redacted Block]

Patten advised that in 2000, while he worked on the Bush campaign, he obtained tickets for the PIC and this was his first "orientation" to the PIC. Patten personally believed that paying for PIC tickets was a waste of money, but pursued the matter because his client, [Redacted] wanted the tickets.

Patten contacted his friend [Redacted] to see if he had any contacts at the PIC who he could leverage to get tickets. [Redacted] advised that he did have contacts at the PIC and eventually he was able to procure four tickets.

Patten, at the time he was attempting to procure PIC tickets for [Redacted] was aware that foreign nationals were prohibited from providing monetary

Investigation on 05/22/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/25/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Sam Patten , On 05/22/2018 , Page 2 of 14

contributions to the PIC. Patten was aware of this rule from an email that [Redacted] sent him from the PIC, which stated that the PIC could not accept contributions from foreign nationals. However, the email stated that a foreign national could attend the PIC as long as they did not provide any financial contribution.

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Patten stated that [Redacted] was utilized as the straw purchaser for the PIC tickets so it would conceal that the tickets were being paid by a foreign national. Patten's expectation was that [Redacted] would pay Patten back for the tickets and Patten would then pay back [Redacted]. Patten stated that he understood that disclosing that a foreign national, [Redacted] was actually paying for the PIC tickets was illegal and wrong.

Ultimately, [Redacted] contributed money to the PIC and obtained four tickets.

[Redacted]

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Patten attended one of the PIC events with [Redacted] Patten and [Redacted] stayed for one drink and one dance, and then they both departed the event. This was the last time Patten saw [Redacted] during this trip to Washington, D.C.

FARA

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Sam Patten , On 05/22/2018 , Page 3 of 14

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b7A  
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Patten also has registered under the LDA exemption for the work he conducted [Redacted] Patten's client, instructed him not to register under FARA and register under the LDA exemption. Patten advised that he initially examined the FARA and LDA requirements, and then consulted with an attorney (Patten was advised by SP Weissmann not to provide any communications he had with his attorney). After Patten consulted with his FARA attorney, he was concerned that he had not register under FARA for his [Redacted] work. However, Patton did not seek FARA legal advice from an attorney regarding his [Redacted] work.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] was a company set up by Patten and [Redacted] for their overseas political consulting work. Patten and [Redacted] They were combining [Redacted] eastern expertise with Patten's western expertise to create a political consulting company. The name [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Sam Patten, On 05/22/2018, Page 4 of 14

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Patten referred to the website as an online business card.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Patten understood that OB supporters were generally Russian speakers, and that OB's voter blocks were mainly in the East and South of the country. During the Viktor Yanukovich (VY) administration, the Party of Regions (POR) was controlled by VY. However, after VY fled Ukraine to Russia, the OB, which was the successor party to the POR, was much more divided with four or five political leaders vying for control.

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[Redacted] first project was in 2015 when they worked on the Kiev mayoral election. The last time Patten travelled to Ukraine was October 2017. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Patten, at [Redacted] direction, [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] (U) Sam Patten, On 05/22/2018, Page 5 of 14

[REDACTED] did not have a written contract for the work they conduct for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] provides [REDACTED] with Ukrainian political advice. In 2015, Patten worked on [REDACTED] mayoral campaign. Patten was paid from an offshore entity, [REDACTED] utilized to pay Patten. However, [REDACTED] told Patten that the money came from him. Patten understood that payments from an offshore account was considered "clean money" which was accountable. Patten had seen other people in Ukraine being paid in cash provided in brown paper bags. Patten stated that this was not "clean money."

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#### Konstantine Kilimnik

Patten's relationship with Kilimnik dates back to 2001 when Kilimnik worked for Patten at the International Republican Institute (IRI) in Russia. [REDACTED] was the IRI employee who hired Patten. Prior to IRI, Patten worked for Senator Collins. At IRI, Patten first reported to [REDACTED] and then [REDACTED] Patten was the only expat who worked at IRI's Russia office. IRI's mission in Russia was to engage with all political parties in Russia, but Patten focused on the Russian liberal parties. Kilimnik was the most senior foreign national working at IRI when Patten arrived. Patten did not know how Kilimnik ended up working for IRI. While at IRI, Kilimnik sometimes traveled to other IRI offices in other countries to help train employees. Patten left Russia to work for IRI in Iraq in 2004. During his time at IRI, Kilimnik and Patten became a friends.

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[REDACTED] had Patten's position at IRI prior to Patten's arrival. Kilimnik told Patten that [REDACTED] introduced Kilimnik to Manafort. Kilimnik worked for Manafort while also working at IRI which violated IRI's policy. Ultimately, this is why Kilimnik was fired from IRI. While working for Manafort, Kilimnik worked with the "bad guys" i.e. VY. Conversely, IRI supported the Orange Revolution [REDACTED] fired Kilimnik from IRI. Patten never heard that Kilimnik was fired because of his connections to Russian intelligence.

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Patten stated that people joked that Kilimnik was a Russian intelligence officer. Patten stated that Kilimnik was a translator when he was in the Russian army for 7 years and then he worked in the Russian

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Sam Patten , On 05/22/2018 , Page 6 of 14

armament industry selling arms/military equipment. Kilimnik had special language training in English and Swedish.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

After Patten left IRI,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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After Manafort was fired from the Trump campaign in August 2016,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

was fired by Rick Davis

when he worked for the McCain campaign.

Patten stated that

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Kilimnik's Trips to the U.S. During the Trump Campaign

Kilimnik's first trip to the U.S. was in May 2016 and Patten does not believe Kilimnik stayed at his house. Kilimnik was busy with other business and Patten did not see him a lot. Patten was shown an email dated 05/07/2016 from Kilimnik to Patten. Patten did not recall where Kilimnik stayed when he was in D.C. Patten did not recall setting up any meetings for Kilimnik while he was in D.C. Kilimnik did have a meeting with the Department of State (DoS) desk officer [Redacted] LNU. Patten stated it possible he (Patten) set up this meeting, or it could have been [Redacted]

b6 Per DOS and FBI  
b7C

[Redacted] After the meeting, Kilimnik told Patten that the people he met with at DoS were "in outer space," which Patten took to mean that they were out of touch regarding what was happening in Ukraine. Kilimnik visited Manafort in NY during this trip, and Manafort may have dispatched a private plane to pick up Kilimnik from D.C. [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Upon further reflection, Patten was not sure if the trip to visit Manafort happened during this trip to the U.S. or the one in late July/early August 2016. Patten recalled that Kilimnik traveled to New York to visit Manafort during the trip where Kilimnik stayed at Patten's house. Subsequently, Patten recalled that

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Sam Patten , On 05/22/2018 , Page 7 of 14

during one of these trips, Kilimnik went to New York to meet Manafort at a cigar bar. This refreshed Patten's recollection that there were two trips to New York by Kilimnik in the spring and summer of 2016.

[Redacted]

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The second trip Kilimnik made to the U.S. was in late July 2016 or early August 2016. Patten thinks Kilimnik stayed at his house for one night. The next morning, Kilimnik traveled to New York to meet with Manafort.

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)

Patten stated that he intentionally did not provide documents or testimony to the SSCI regarding the PIC tickets because he did not want to incriminate himself. Moreover, he did not want to expose his friend, [Redacted] [Redacted] to SSCI or law enforcement scrutiny.

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[Redacted]

b6  
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Patten stated he knew he crossed the line and should have registered for his FARA [Redacted] work. Patten stated that when he testified to the SSCI regarding his FARA work, he knew he was in the grey but at the time he did not want to believe he crossed the line. This is why he told the SSCI that he did not represent foreign governments in the U.S. Patten stated that he

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Sam Patten , On 05/22/2018 , Page 8 of 14

now knows that he did violate the FARA statute and what he told the SSCI was intentionally false.

[Redacted]

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After his SSCI testimony, Patten deleted emails from his account. Patten stated that he did this because he was having computer issues and he needed to delete stuff from his computer to fix the problem. Patten considered the SSCI matter closed because a couple of months had passed and he had not heard back from anyone from the SSCI. Patten acknowledged that he never checked back with SSCI to confirm that matter was closed. Patten stated he knew he was destroying emails and documents that were responsive to the SSCI letter that he had not produced.

Patten found a hard copy document related to Manafort which he did not know he had in his possession at the time he provided documents and testified before the SSCI.

Oleg Deripaska

Patten has never met Deripaska, but he is aware of who he is and that he was one of the wealthiest oligarchs in the world, as well as Deripaska had a connection to Kilimnik. Patten was aware that Kilimnik has met with Deripaska and Deripaska's associates including Victor Boyarkin - who is Deripaska's foreign affairs/political advisor.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Deripaska was interested in Ukrainian politics because of the natural resources in Ukraine.

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[Redacted]

b6  
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Sam Patten, On 05/22/2018, Page 9 of 14b6  
b7A  
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Regarding the SSCI's question related to whether Patten knew who Victor Boyarkin was, Patten stated that he did not lie to the SSCI because he didn't realize at the time that the name they asked about was the Victor who he had previously met online via Skype.

Patten stated that he read a Washington Post article that published an email exchange between Manafort and Kilimnik regarding Deripaska. However, Patten and Kilimnik did not discuss this article very much. Patten stated that when Kilimnik visited Manafort in New York in 2016, during the Trump campaign, and they discussed the money that was owed to Manafort by the Ukraine.

Viktor Yanukovych (VY)

Patten referred to VY [redacted] and that VY went "North," which he stated was a reference to Russia. Patten was aware of VY's criminal past and stated that VY betrayed his political mandate to move Ukraine to the West. Patten also stated that VY had corruption issues. Patten stated that [redacted] was the ring leader of the the [redacted] [redacted] Kilimnik had a different viewpoint of VY than Patten.

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b7C

On March 24, 2015, Patten and Kilimnik had a Skype call with VY. Kilimnik was in Moscow with VY during the Skype call. Patten felt VY was testing Patten's knowledge of Guinea during the call.

Patten met [redacted] and he told Patten that he gave money to both the Democrats/Clinton and the Republicans.

Payments to Journalists/Bloggers

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Sam Patten, On 05/22/2018, Page 10 of 14

Patten stated that paying journalists/bloggers in the Ukraine to write an article on your behalf is common. Patten has paid journalists to write articles not only in Ukraine, but also in Europe and the U.S. Specifically, Patten paid the following people/entities to write and place of articles: (1) A Brussels PR firm - [Redacted] based in London; (2) a French PR firm; (3) [Redacted] and utilizes various aliases to place articles as well assists with social media strategy; and (4) A U.S. journalist, [Redacted] from [Redacted] [Redacted] who was paid [Redacted] to write an editorial supporting the [Redacted] policy agenda. [Redacted] introduced Patten to [Redacted] and Patten then offered to pay [Redacted] to write the editorial. The money came from the [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
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Tabs 1-3, 6 and 15

Patten reviewed the emails in tabs 1-3, 6 and 15, and stated that these emails show that Patten [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]. Patten explained that at the time of these emails, he tried to draw a distinction in his mind

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Sam Patten, On 05/22/2018, Page 11 of 14

between setting up meeting with U.S. government officials and engaging in a full-fledged U.S. campaign where the goal was to change U.S. policy. The latter being more of what he thought of as FARA work.

Patten was then shown an email from him to [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Sam Patten, On 05/22/2018, Page 12 of 14

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Steve Bannon

Patten was introduced to Bannon in July or August 2016 by [Redacted] while Bannon was still the head of Breitbart. [Redacted] was a friend of Patten and Bannon. Subsequently, Bannon offered Patten an opportunity write an op-ed to be published by Breitbart as well as to appear on a Breitbart radio show. Later, [Redacted] was the interlocutor who arranged a meeting between Patten and Bannon when Bannon was working at the White House.

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Patten was shown a text between [Redacted] and Patten where [Redacted] made a reference to [Redacted]

b7A

[Redacted]

[Redacted] referenced in the text. Patten stated he never had any substantive conversations with [Redacted] or Bannan about [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Sam Patten , On 05/22/2018 , Page 13 of 14

[Redacted]

b7A

The last time Patten spoke to [Redacted] was approximately two weeks ago. Patten told [Redacted] and Bannon that [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Bannon asked [Redacted]

b3

Patten utilized Proton Mail, Skype, and iPhone texts to communicate with [Redacted]

Patten's last outreach to the Executive Branch was in August 2017 when he met with Bannon to discuss Patten's work on [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Patten did file an LDA for his work for the [Redacted]

[Redacted] He decided to file under the LDA exemption because it was easier to comply with the LDA requirements, and the filing was not as onerous as a FARA filing.

Patten had dinner with Bannon at Bannon's house approximately during Easter 2018.

FBI Visits

After the first visit by what Patten believed to be the FBI (because [Redacted] spoke to these individuals and told Patten that two men in suits stopped by the house), he deleted more emails. Some of these deleted emails related to Patten's work for Cambridge Analytica (CA) in Mexico. CA told Patten that this engagement was off the books. Patten also intentionally deleted chats he had on Threema.

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During the search warrant executed at Patten's home, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Patten told [Redacted] about the SSCI and FBI matters.

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b7C

Patten told [Redacted] a former reporter, about the FBI's first visit to his house.

[Redacted]

Patten spoke to [Redacted] after [Redacted]

b3

[Redacted] contacted Patten and asked to meet. They met at Union Station.

[Redacted] told Patten that the FBI called him. Patten told [Redacted] that he

b6  
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[Redacted] had not done anything wrong and to tell the FBI the truth. They

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Sam Patten, On 05/22/2018, Page 14 of 14

discussed the tickets [redacted] purchased from the PIC for Patten, and they both stated to each other they did not do anything wrong. They never discussed the issue of who actually paid for the tickets. Patten stated that he did not believe he ever told [redacted] that the true source of the funds were from a foreign source, or that this issue was one of the legal issues.

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Kilimnik told Patten that the Russia investigation is ridiculous, and that they were chasing their tail. Kilimnik often sends Patten press clips about the Russia investigation.



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/06/2018

Sam Patten was interviewed at the Office of Special Counsel (SCO) in Washington, D.C. Present at the interview were SSA [redacted] and Senior Special Prosecutor (SP) Andrew Weissmann. Patten was represented by attorney Stuart Sears, Schertler & Onorato, LLP, and paralegal [redacted]. Patten was presented with a proffer agreement which he and his attorney signed and dated. SP Weissmann explained the proffer agreement to Patten and his attorney, and they stated they had no questions regarding the agreement. SP Weissmann advised Patten that it was a federal crime to knowingly make any false or fraudulent statement to federal law enforcement including the FBI and DOJ. Patten advised he understood. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, Patten provided the following information:

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2007

In 2007, Patten was a contractor for Greenberg, Quinlan, and Rosner, and worked on a campaign in Ukraine for Yushenko. Patten's job was to develop adds for the campaign. Patten did not know how the firm was paid by Yushenko, but there were rumors that one of the Ukrainian oligarchs, potentially Akhmetov, provided the funding. [redacted]

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Patten's First Engagement in Ukraine with [redacted]

Patten and Kilimnik talked about working together in Ukraine for about one year. [redacted]

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Investigation on 05/30/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/31/2018

by [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Sam Patten , On 05/30/2018 , Page 2 of 11

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[REDACTED]

During this time period, Manafort was working for the Opposition Block (OB) in Ukraine and was referred to as the "old owl" because he was known for providing big picture advice. Kilimnik ran Manafort's office, DMP, in Ukraine and set up Patten to work out of DMP's office. The support staff at DMP's office were made up of local Ukrainians. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Rick Gates also frequently worked out of DMP's Ukraine office, and he and Manafort lived [REDACTED] was western leaning - he would inject western leaning comments into his translations, and also worked on the production of media adds they developed. Manafort was aware of Patten's work for [REDACTED] Kilimnik had his own office and Manafort's office had a picture of a trained monkey, which according to Kilimnik was a reference to VY.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Manafort told Patten that he was proud of being involved in Ukrainian politics and the East versus the West conflict. The initial meeting was a breakfast meeting at the Hyatt Kiev. Manafort asked Patten about his background and spoke highly of Kilimnik referring to him as a "powerful little dude." Manafort advised Patten to fight every battle with Ukrainians. He stated that he is considered one of them (Ukrainian) and they trust him like he is one of them. Manafort stated his job was to work on long term campaigns [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Moreover, he stated that [REDACTED] was the boss and that Patten should do what he says.

The second meeting with Manafort was on Ukrainian election night and Patten had dinner with Manafort and Gates. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The results of the election were positive for Manafort and Patten because the OB doubled its expectations regarding the number of seats they won in the election. The discussion at dinner was broad and mostly discussed the election results. Patten brought up that someone, Patten could not remember who, was working for an oligarch. Manafort asked Patten



[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Sam Patten , On 05/30/2018 , Page 3 of 11

how he knew that information, and Patten told him because the person registered under FARA (Patten often reviewed FARA registrations to see who was working in the Ukrainian space). Manafort stated he was surprised Patten knew about FARA. Manafort told Patten that "you've earned your money kid." Patten does not recall any discussions about what Patten was going to work on next. Manafort paid for the dinner.

During this engagement, Patten met with [REDACTED] three or four times and the meetings were in English. At the first meeting, they discussed the assignment, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The second meeting was about halfway through the engagement and Patten gave him an update on his work. The third meeting was at the end of the engagement.

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After the election, Patten returned to the U.S. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Patten got a sense over time that Manafort had two limitations: (1) he would not get involved in the weeds regarding implementation of his ideas - the Ukrainians wanted him more involved in this process; and (2) Manafort was very expensive. There was a view by some Ukrainians, including [REDACTED]

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#### Patten OB Polling at the End of 2014

Patten was hired by [REDACTED] to look at some post-electoral strategies. Patten thought this was a test project. Patten did not believe he traveled to Ukraine for this work. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Patten thought that Manafort's work in Ukraine was waning and Manafort's idea was to create a shadow government (a government in waiting) for the OB.

2015

[REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Sam Patten, On 05/30/2018, Page 4 of 11

[Redacted]

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Patten made approximately 20 trips to Ukraine in 2015.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] was set up during the [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Sam Patten , On 05/30/2018 , Page 5 of 11

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Patten worked on a project

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

2016 - Current U.S. Policy to the Ukraine and Russia

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Sam Patten , On 05/30/2018 , Page 6 of 11

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Patten told [Redacted] that he was not interested.

The last time Patten was in Ukraine was in October 2017. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] did not like [Redacted] because [Redacted] thought that [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Over the past three months, Kilimnik and Patten have been working on preparing for the anticipated spring 2019 Ukrainian elections. Patten stated that the OB was disjointed and not focused, and were figuring out what the future holds for them. [Redacted]

[Redacted] They also worked on a poll which focused on Boyko's potential presidential campaign. [Redacted]

[Redacted] for the work they did over the past three months.

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Patten and [Redacted]

[Redacted] to Patten. Moreover, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Sam Patten , On 05/30/2018 , Page 7 of 11

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] contacted Patten this past week to travel to Ukraine. Patten declined because Boyko was not in Ukraine. Now Patten is scheduled to travel back to Ukraine on 06/07/2018 or 06/08/2018. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

2017

Patten also worked for [Redacted] on OB matters, which he was paid approximately [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Presidential Inauguration Committee (PIC)

Patten was shown an [Redacted] (Tab 35)

Patten was not aware that a Ukrainian politician was working to get tickets to the PIC, and did not know who [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Patten was shown a [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Patten where they discussed the tickets to the PIC and who they were for.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Patten called [Redacted] and she told him that they were having trouble obtaining tickets to the PIC and asked Patten for help securing tickets.

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Sam Patten , On 05/30/2018 , Page 8 of 11

Patten was shown an email from [Redacted] which stated, "we are unable to accept contributions from foreign nationals. . . Yes. The donor has to attend."

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Patten initially stated that he only focused on the part of the email which stated the donor has to attend and not that they were unable to accept contributions from foreign nationals. At this point in the interview, Patten's attorney asked to take a break and spoke in private with his client. After the break, Patten stated that he was letting the justifications he came up with in his mind get in the way of the truth. Patten stated that this was a "wink and a nod sort of thing" and at the time he did not think it was a big deal to illegally use foreign money to pay for PIC tickets. Patten stated he knew foreign nationals could not donate to the PIC, and that he utilized [Redacted] as a straw donor to hide the fact that the true donor was a foreign national which was illegal.

Patten was shown an email from [Redacted] to Patten dated [Redacted]

Regarding the statement "other avenues", Patten was asking [Redacted] if he had other avenues to get more tickets to the PIC. When SL found out that Patten was able to secure tickets to the PIC, he wanted more tickets. [Redacted]

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Patten was shown an email he sent to [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Patten was shown the email chain in Tab 1

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] Patten has met [Redacted] once. Patten did not know who [Redacted] is that is referenced in the email.

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Patten had a conversation with [Redacted]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Sam Patten , On 05/30/2018 , Page 9 of 11

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[REDACTED] Patten stated there were two components to Patten's analysis of whether it would be worthwhile to register under FARA: (1) Patten would need to make a significantly more money if he was going to register under FARA; and (2) there was a potential negative to filing under FARA because your opponents can use it against you. Patten stated that both times he registered under FARA it resulted in him losing a client and the press wrote negative articles about Patten's work.

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[REDACTED]

Patten stated that VY's [REDACTED] set up a Brussels' based company to help lobby.

Patten was shown an email from Patten to [REDACTED] (Tab 3)

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[REDACTED]

Patten stated that he violated FARA by not registering for these activities. Patten stated he understood he needed to register under FARA, but he justified not registering to himself by creating excuses in his head such as this was not his core business.

Patten was shown documents related to DoS outreach (Tab 15)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Sam Patten , On 05/30/2018 , Page 10 of 11

Patten stated that he drafted the [Redacted] letter [Redacted] [Redacted] After Patten finalized the letter, Patten's understanding was that [Redacted] reviewed the letter, approved the letter and sent it to Nuland.

*Patten was shown documents in Tab 25*

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Patten stated that Threema was a preferred communication tool but not used exclusively.

[Redacted]

*Patten was shown documents in Tab 26*

Patten stated that he wrote the actual letter and believed that the letter was delivered to Nuland.

The Hapsburg Group

Patten has never heard of the Hapsburg Group. Patten was familiar with the name [Redacted] who was part of Manafort's core group.

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Alex van der Zwaan

[Redacted] about Alex van der Zwaan. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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After Manafort was fired from the Trump Campaign, [Redacted]

[Redacted]




[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Sam Patten, On 05/30/2018, Page 11 of 11

[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/07/2018

Sam Patten was interviewed at the Office of Special Counsel (SCO) in Washington, D.C. Present at the interview were SSA [redacted] and Senior Special Prosecutor (SP) Andrew Weissmann. Patten was represented by attorney Stuart Sears, Schertler & Onorato, LLP, and paralegal [redacted]. Patten was presented with a proffer agreement which he and his attorney signed and dated. SP Weissmann explained the proffer agreement to Patten and his attorney, and they stated they had no questions regarding the agreement. SP Weissmann advised Patten that it was a federal crime to knowingly make any false or fraudulent statement to federal law enforcement including the FBI and DOJ. Patten advised he understood. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, Patten provided the following information:

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Patten was advised that [redacted]

[redacted] Weissmann advised Patten that he [redacted]

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Patten has received many inquiries from the media. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] contacted Patten to see if Patten was available to work on a campaign for a Ukrainian candidate. She did not tell Patten the name of the candidate. Patten advised he was not available but referred her to [redacted] - Patten's friend who was a political consultant.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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Investigation on 06/06/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 06/22/2018

by [redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Sam Patten, On 06/06/2018, Page 2 of 4

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Sam Patten, On 06/06/2018, Page 3 of 4

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Patten thinks he may have contacted another lobbying firm to work for [Redacted] but he cannot remember the specifics.

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Patten and [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Patten recalled a conversation [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Patten understood that if he was going to file an accurate FARA registration, he would have to disclose the work he did for the OB [Redacted]. However, Patten did not give a lot of thought as to whether he would have to disclose which oligarch paid for which project.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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
[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Sam Patten, On 06/06/2018, Page 4 of 4

[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/19/2017

Anatoli Samochornov, date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] was interviewed in Manhattan, New York at approximately 3:10pm by Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Agent [Redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, Samochornov provided the following information:

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(U) Samochornov spoke to [Redacted] HRAGIF, telephone number [Redacted] to discuss invoking the indemnity clause of Samochornov's contract. [Redacted] agreed to pay for representation as long as Samochornov was willing to stay within the confines of the information provided by Natalia Veselnitskaya during her interview she gave to NBC. Samochornov was taken aback by the response and was, overall, disappointed with the call. Additionally, he was shocked [Redacted] would openly express such a topic over the phone. It appeared to Samochornov the foundation (HRAGIF) had taken an "every man for himself" attitude. As a result, Samochornov did not want to accept money from HRAGIF and become " beholden to them." He further proclaimed he would not perjure himself just because they (HRAGIF) were a good client. Finally, he stated he would represent himself and be as open and transparent as possible without enough money to retain counsel on his own. Overall, Samochornov did not believe HRAGIF understood what they were dealing with and the seriousness of the implications.

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(U) HRAGIF owed money to Samochornov for his last month of interpreting. Further, Samochornov was told he would receive money originally earmarked as a bonus for [Redacted] the attorney [Redacted] brought in to navigate settlement of HRAGIF's civil case. [Agent note: In previous discussions and the totality of this discussion it was apparent Samochornov was referring to the civil case United States of America v. Prevezon Holdings Ltd, Et al, hereinafter referred to as "civil case."] The bonus of \$1 million USD was for [Redacted] if the settlement resulted in no fines levied against HRAGIF. HRAGIF was fined so the \$1 million USD was supposed to be split amongst the rest of the team. [Redacted] formerly worked for New York City with former Mayor Giuliani.

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(U) Samochornov was hesitant to provide his electronic devices to the Agents without protections or reassurances from the FBI. His concern

Investigation on 07/13/2017 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)  
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/18/2017  
by [Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Anatoli Samochornov, On 07/13/2017, Page 2 of 5

stemmed from his non-disclosure agreements signed with both law firms he worked with during the civil case, and the fact most correspondences had been marked "privileged" or "confidential." [REDACTED]

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(U) Prior to Natalia Veselnitskaya's involvement in the civil case, she knew nothing about the Magnitsky Act. Veselnitskaya was a "commercial arbitration lawyer" by trade. Veselnitskaya was the sole source of the information provided at the meeting with Donald Trump Jr. Samochornov had heard Veselnitskaya give the same speech numerous times before. She was "knocking on every door" to get the information out. Samochornov provided two (2) instances he recalled hearing the speech: the fall of 2015 during the "filing summary judgement" in court and in June 2016 when she attended a talk with [REDACTED] (ph). Samochornov believed during the June, 2016 talk, Veselnitskaya provided a 20 page declaration to the U.S. Congress with the information. Veselnitskaya's information came from three (3) different sources. First, she pulled information from a criminal case in Russia. Second, she searched thousands of arbitration cases that involved HERMITAGE. Finally, she pulled information provided from the Southern District of New York's court submission. In order to gain access to the archived information from previous HERMITAGE litigation in Russia one would need to formally apply to review the material. Veselnitskaya applied and reviewed the material. However, Veselnitskaya believed FNU [REDACTED] (ph), the [REDACTED] illegally reviewed and photocopied the material. She was unable to find a record of his application to review the archives. The information illegally obtained by [REDACTED] was provided to the Southern District of New York for their court filing.

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(U) The morning of the Donald Trump Jr. meeting, prior to meeting Rinat Akhmetshin and Irakli Kaveladze for lunch, Veselnitskaya requested Samochornov translate a request via text message on her cellular telephone to add Akhmetshin to the meeting with Donald Trump Jr. Akhmetshin traveled frequently but happened to be in New York that day. Samochornov did not know who the recipient of message was nor did he see existing communication in the text string. Samochornov believed the recipient was not Kaveladze because he spoke Russian; however, opined the message could be to multiple people, including Kaveladze. Veselnitskaya was excited for the meeting and treated it as a special event. She may have informed Baker

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Anatoli Samochornov, On 07/13/2017, Page 3 of 5

& Hostetler, the law firm associated with the civil case at the time, about the meeting ahead of time.

(U) When Samochornov, Akhmetshin, Kaveladze and Veselnitskaya arrived at Trump Tower for the meeting, Rob Goldstone met them in the lobby. Goldstone escorted the four (4) of them up the elevator to the conference room. Samochornov described Goldstone's as a servant, stating he acted "sheepish." While waiting to enter the conference room Ivanka Trump walked by without acknowledging any of them, to include Rob Goldstone. Once all five (5) of them entered the conference room they exchanged pleasantries with Paul Manafort, Jared Kushner and Donald Trump Jr., without formal introductions. Trump Jr. passed out his business card. The seating was organized in a "C" shaped pattern. Trump Jr. sat at the head of the table, or "the little part of the C," flanked to his left by Manafort and either Goldstone or Kaveladze, with 5th Avenue behind them. Akhmetshin sat to Trump Jr.'s right, around the corner of the table, with Veselnitskaya and Samochornov to the right of him, in order. Finally, either Kaveladze or Goldstone sat across from Samochornov with Kushner to their left, with Central Park behind them.

(U) Once settled, the floor was given to Veselnitskaya who opened, through Samochornov, with bringing up the Ziff brothers who had \$500 million USD that was shielded from tax liability in both Russian and the U. S. Some of the untaxed money was given as a donation to the Democratic campaign or Democratic National Committee. Although Veselnitskaya had given this speech numerous times before Samochornov stated she struggled to convey her message, describing her as "not very coherent." Samochornov opined she may have been nervous given the audience. After finishing the portion of the speech on the "dirt," Manafort was the only Trump Jr. representative to respond. In a dismissive manner he stated something to the effect, "people give money to people everywhere," physically shrugging his shoulders. No follow-up or clarifying questions were asked which, in conjunction with Manafort's response, surprised and flustered Veselnitskaya. As a result, Akhmetshin jumped in and went on for the duration of the meeting discussing the Magnitsky Act and how Veselnitskaya uncovered the information regarding the Ziff brothers through her research of the Act and the people involved. Akhmetshin expressed this as an opportunity to thaw U.S.-Russia relations. At the end of the meeting, Trump Jr. thanked them for their time and stated if his father won the election maybe they would revisit the topic at a later date. Samochornov described Trump Jr. as [redacted] and someone who [redacted]. [redacted] Samochornov perceived Trump Jr.'s parting words as being polite, without true interest in future dialogue.



Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Anatoli Samochornov, On 07/13/2017, Page 4 of 5

(U) Goldstone, at minimum, escorted Veselnitskaya, Akhmetshin, Kaveladze and Samochornov to the elevators and possibly as far as the lobby. During their short time together Goldstone [REDACTED] [REDACTED] how the meeting went. Goldstone was saying "at least you [Veselnitskaya] brought the issue to their attention" and "maybe you can bring it up with them in the future." They separated from Goldstone and went to the bar in the Trump Hotel for drinks. Kaveladze echoed Goldstone's words to Veselnitskaya at the bar before leaving shortly after arrival. Veselnitskaya, Akhmetshin and Samochornov stayed at the bar for approximately 30-40 minutes. Samochornov cannot remember any significant conversation relevant to the meeting after Kaveladze left. Samochornov believed he returned home and Veselnitskaya returned to her hotel once they left Trump Hotel.

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(U) Samochornov believed Veselnitskaya was not under direction by anyone. Additionally, since the meeting, no one from the Trump Jr. team has been in contact with him or Veselnitskaya, to the best of his knowledge. Further, Veselnitskaya did not remember Kushner was present at the meeting until she saw him on television in Samochornov's presence and he brought it up. Samochornov opined if anyone was in continued contact with the Trump Jr. team it would be Kaveladze based on Samochornov's perception that Kaveladze arranged the meeting.

(U) Samochornov understood Akhmetshin to be a lobbyist for HRAGIF. He first met Akhmetshin in the fall 2016 when Akhmetshin came to New York from Moscow with FNU [REDACTED] to work with [REDACTED] on the civil case. Samochornov remembers recommending a restaurant for the four (4) of them, Benoit (ph) on 66th and 1st.

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(U) Samochornov did not believe Kaveladze had any affiliation to HRAGIF. Samochornov first met Kaveladze the day of the meeting with Donald Trump Jr. It was Samochornov's impression that Kaveladze was the person who arranged the meeting with Donald Trump Jr. Since the meeting, Samochornov met Kaveladze approximately 2-3 times. During the subsequent meetings they discovered a connection through [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Kaveladze is Georgian [REDACTED] He previously attended an [REDACTED] while living on the East Coast. Samochornov believed Kaveladze now lives somewhere "west."

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(U) Samochornov was in Moscow, Russia with three (3) lawyers from Quinn-Emanuel, the second law firm associated with the civil case, one of whom was [REDACTED] (ph), to determine witnesses for the case over [REDACTED] [REDACTED] The fourth and final lawyer from Quinn-Emanuel who worked on the case named [REDACTED] LNU stayed in the U.S. Samochornov was in Moscow a total

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Anatoli Samochornov , On 07/13/2017 , Page 5 of 5

of approximately [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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
(U) Samochornov believed he did not tell [REDACTED] fully about the meeting at Trump Tower last year. However, when the meeting recently began airing on the news, she reminded him of her full knowledge. On 07/12/2017, [REDACTED] first informed her supervisor [REDACTED] [REDACTED] of Samochornov's role in the meeting at Trump Tower. That information was relayed to the Director of the U.S. State Department office in New York. [REDACTED] who Samochornov knew from his previous employment as a contractor at the U.S. Department of State, emailed Samochornov on the same day. The email requested Samochornov's permission for the U.S. Department of State to release his previous association with the U.S. Department of State and to identify him as a U.S. citizen. Samochornov acquiesced.

b6  
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(U) On the morning of 07/13/2017, Katie LNU, telephone number [REDACTED] [REDACTED] from the Daily Beast, knocked on Samochornov's door looking for comment. [REDACTED] and left late to work that day.

b6  
b7C

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(C)  
(b)(7)(E)



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Classified by: NSICG [redacted]

Reason: 1.4(C)

Declassify on: 12-31-2042

Date: 09-30-2019

Date of entry 09/26/2017

(S) [Large redacted block]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

(U) Deputy Director Andrew McCabe was interviewed at FBI Headquarters, located at 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, DC. Present for this interview were Special Counsel's Office Attorney Andrew Goldstein and Counsel for the Special Counsel, Michael Dreeben. Having provided him the identities of the interviewing agents and the reason for the interview, McCabe provided the following information.

~~Reason: 1.4 (b)  
Derived From: National  
Security Information SCG  
Declassify On: 20421231~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (S)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

Investigation on 08/17/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

(b)(7)(C)  
(b)(7)(E)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/17/2017

by [redacted] FBI(19cv1278)-1703

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Andrew McCabe, On 08/17/2017, Page 2 of 16

(S)

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(U)

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(S)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Andrew McCabe, On 08/17/2017, Page 3 of 16

(U)

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP  
(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(U)

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Andrew McCabe, On 08/17/2017, Page 4 of 16

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5)  
(b)(7)(E)  
(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(U)

[REDACTED]

(b)(7)(E)  
(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Andrew McCabe, On 08/17/2017, Page 5 of 16

[REDACTED]

(S)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(S)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)  
(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

the conduct might implicate the Logan Act.

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

[Redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Andrew McCabe, On 08/17/2017, Page 6 of 16

(S)

[Redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

[Redacted]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(S)

[Redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

(S)

[Redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

(S)

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(S)

[Redacted]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(b)(3)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)



[REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Andrew McCabe, On 08/17/2017, Page 7 of 16

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(b)(5)

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(S)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(C)  
(b)(7)(E)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Andrew McCabe, On 08/17/2017, Page 8 of 16

(S) [REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP  
(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

(S) [REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(S) [REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)  
(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(S) [REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Andrew McCabe, On 08/17/2017, Page 9 of 16

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(U)Comey telephoned McCabe after leaving his dinner with Trump and expressed shock over his experience. Comey described the request for loyalty, and what generally was discussed.

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Andrew McCabe, On 08/17/2017, Page 10 of 16

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(U)After Comey's dinner with Trump, this group met to discuss the impact of what Trump asked and whether Comey handled it properly.

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

(S)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Andrew McCabe, On 08/17/2017, Page 11 of 16

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(S)

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP  
(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

(S)

FBI(19cv1278)-1713

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Andrew McCabe, On 08/17/2017, Page 12 of 16

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per  
DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

FBI(19cv1278)-1714 (b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Andrew McCabe, On 08/17/2017, Page 13 of 16

(S) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] asked McCabe whether Flynn's conversations with Kislyak violated the Logan Act. McCabe responded he did not know, but because it was a possibility, the FBI was investigating the matter. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(S) [REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

Comey's February 14 Meeting With Trump and Resulting Memorandum

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Andrew McCabe, On 08/17/2017, Page 14 of 16

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(U)Comey would most likely have briefed this meeting with Trump to his usual confidantes.

(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(C)  
(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP  
(b)(5)

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP  
(b)(5)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)



[REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Andrew McCabe, On 08/17/2017, Page 15 of 16

[REDACTED]

(b)(5)  
(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP  
(b)(5)

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5)  
(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Andrew McCabe, On 08/17/2017, Page 16 of 16

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP


[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(b)(3) per NSA

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)



b1  
b3  
b7A  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/15/2017

REINHOLD "REINCE" PRIEBUS, date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed at 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC, by the writer and Special Agent [redacted]. Also present during the interview were Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [redacted], Special Agent [redacted], Senior Assistant Special Counsel Brandon Van Grack, SASC Zainab Ahmad, SASC Andrew Goldstein, and Senior Counselor James Quarles. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, PRIEBUS provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

Agent Note: Special Counsel Robert Mueller III introduced himself to PRIEBUS before the interview was initiated. Special Counsel Mueller did not stay for the interview, but came back and listened without asking questions for approximately one hour later in the morning.

(U//~~FOUO~~) At the outset of the interview. PRIEBUS was advised that it is a violation of federal law to lie to FBI agents. PRIEBUS provided two sets of copies of text messages which he thought were responsive to the original request for documents. The messages were from Congressman DEVON NUNES, NEWT GINGRICH and LAURA INGRAHAM.

[Large redacted block]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted block]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~Reason: 1.4 (b)  
Derived From: National Security Information SCG  
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM~~

FBI INFO.  
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2042  
DATE: 06-19-2019

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

Investigation on 10/13/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/08/2017

by [redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"  
Priebus

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/13/2017, Page 2 of 30

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~) PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7A  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 3 of 30

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~) PRIEBUS thinks FLYNN called and introduced himself to his counterparts in other countries during the Transition period. [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

b1 FBI(19cv1278)-1721  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

(U//FOUO) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 4 of 30

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 5 of 30

[Redacted]

meeting at

[Redacted] with PTT officials and Russian Ambassador SERGEY KISLYAK. **b5 per DOJ/OIP**

[Redacted]

[Redacted] FLYNN had the portfolio on foreign visits, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

**b5 per DOJ/OIP**

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

**b5 per DOJ/OIP**

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

**b5 per DOJ/OIP**

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[redacted]  
(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"  
Priebus

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/13/2017, Page 6 of 30

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b1  
b3

[redacted] (S)

[redacted]

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 7 of 30

[redacted] FLYNN swore he never talked about sanctions. [redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~) RESIGNATION OF MICHAEL FLYNN

[redacted] X

b1  
b3  
(S)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(S) [redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b1  
b3

(S)

(S) [redacted]

b1  
b3

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] Around the time the Intelligence Community publicized the report on Russia's role in the election, TRUMP was concerned people would question the validity of his win.

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"  
Priebus

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/13/2017, Page 8 of 30

(S)

[redacted] (S)

b1  
b3

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(S)

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b1  
b3  
b7E

[redacted]

[redacted] (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~) TRUMP was angered by the news, and thought "not again, this guy, this stuff." TRUMP was clearly irritated and frustrated with FLYNN.

[redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 9 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b1  
b3  
(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7A  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"  
Priebus

, On 10/13/2017 , Page 10 of 30

Continuation of FD-302 of

(S) [redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

(S)  
b1  
b3  
b7E

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(S) [redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] PRIEBUS and PENCE recommended

TRUMP fire FLYNN that day.

[redacted]

[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E  
FBI(19cv1278)-1728

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 11 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(S)

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(S)

[Redacted]

b7E

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

FLYNN

confirmed the FBI told him that he was not under investigation. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7A  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 12 of 30

(S) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b1  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(S) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b1  
b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E  
FBI(19cv1278)-1730

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [ ] (S)

[ ]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 13 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [ ] (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 14 of 30

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 15 of 30

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b7E

(U)

~~(U)~~

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U)

~~(U)~~

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 16 of 30

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 17 of 30

**(U) JANUARY 27, 2017 DINNER**

(U) TRUMP asked PRIEBUS to schedule a dinner with COMEY. TRUMP did not know much about COMEY and intended to ask COMEY if he wanted to stay on as the FBI director.

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U) PRIEBUS said to TRUMP before the dinner something like, "don't talk about Russia, whatever you do." TRUMP promised he would not talk about Russia. [redacted]

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] X

b1  
b3  
b7E  
(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

b1  
b3  
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus , On 10/13/2017 , Page 18 of 30

[redacted] (S)  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U) FEBRUARY 14, 2017 MEETING

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] At the conclusion of the meeting, TRUMP asked COMEY to stay behind and everyone else was pushed out of the Oval Office.

[redacted]

(U) PRIEBUS said everyone was shoed out "like COMEY said" in his June testimony, [redacted]

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 19 of 30

[redacted] After COMEY testified, TRUMP **b5 per DOJ/OIP** acknowledged to PRIEBUS that he spoke about FLYNN with COMEY, but only said FLYNN was a good guy and, [redacted] [redacted] said he hoped "everything worked out for him."

[redacted] **b5 per DOJ/OIP**

[redacted] **b5 per DOJ/OIP**

[redacted] **b5 per DOJ/OIP**

[redacted] **b5 per DOJ/OIP**

[redacted] **b5 per DOJ/OIP**

[redacted] **b5 per DOJ/OIP**

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 20 of 30

[redacted]

b1  
b3

(S)  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U) APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 21 of 30  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U) PRIEBUS learned SESSIONS later wrote an undated resignation letter and gave it to TRUMP. [Redacted] PRIEBUS [Redacted] thought it was a terrible idea. PRIEBUS told SESSIONS that, as a result of the letter, TRUMP had "DOJ by the throat." PRIEBUS said they needed to get the letter back [Redacted] TRUMP went on a [Redacted] trip, and PRIEBUS remembers saying to TRUMP he needed to get the letter back, and TRUMP responded that the letter was somewhere in the Residence (and not in the Oval Office).

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U) MARCH 20, 2017 HPSCI HEARING

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

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b3  
b7A  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 22 of 30

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E  
FBI(19cv1278)-1740



[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 23 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U) On April 11, 2017, TRUMP told PRIEBUS and MCGAHN, [Redacted]

[Redacted] I talked to COMEY two weeks ago." [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 24 of 30

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U) May 8-9, 2017 MEETINGS REGARDING COMEY:

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U) TRUMP requested that PRIEBUS and others be in the Oval Office [redacted]

[redacted]

Also present in the Oval Office were MCGAHN, [redacted] PRIEBUS was not sure if MILLER was present but it would have made sense for him to be there. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 25 of 30

(U) TRUMP said something to the effect of "I think we're moving forward with COMEY's termination" [Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] TRUMP told the group he wanted to read them a letter [Redacted] PRIEBUS

[Redacted]

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 26 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 27 of 30

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] TRUMP requested the language about "three separate occasions" remain in the final version. PRIEBUS argued the three separate occasions was a separate issue but TRUMP refused to relent.

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 28 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U) PRIEBUS thought the press statement on the COMEY termination was dictated by TRUMP. [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] Someone pointed out in one of the meetings you can fire the Director of the FBI, but you can't fire the FBI.

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

(U//FOUO) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 29 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Reinhold "Reince"

Continuation of FD-302 of Priebus, On 10/13/2017, Page 30 of 30

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]


b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)



[Redacted]

b7E



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI INFO.  
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [Redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2043  
DATE: 06-18-2019

b6  
b7C

Date of entry 02/26/2018

(U) James Comey, former Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street SW, Washington, D.C. in the presence of his attorney, David Kelley, from the law firm Dechert LLP. Present for the interview were Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] SA [Redacted] Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles, III, Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein, Counselor to the Special Counsel Michael Dreeben, and Assistant Special Counsel Elizabeth Prelogar. Comey was advised it is a crime to lie to the FBI in the course of an investigation, which he acknowledged. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, Comey provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~Reason: 1.4(b)  
Derived From: National Security Information SCG  
Declassify On: 20431231~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 11/15/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/22/2017

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of former FBI Director

Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 2 of 25

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U) Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA):

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] on January 6, 2017 [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b5

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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[Redacted]

(U) Interview of former FBI Director

Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 3 of 25

[Redacted] the team went straight to New York City to brief Trump and his team [Redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] there was a matter Comey wanted to discuss privately with Trump. [Redacted] said it was a "sensitive" matter, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] Trump told him in this meeting he (Trump) thought highly of him (Comey) [Redacted] Trump told Comey he hoped he would stay on as FBI Director, and Comey responded he intended to do so. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] Trump seemed defensive, [Redacted]

[Redacted] Comey did not want Trump to think of the conversation as a "J. Edgar Hoover" move.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of former FBI Director

Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 4 of 25

Comey viewed Trump's defensiveness as a reason to feel like he needed to tell Trump he was not under investigation.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U) January 11, 2017 Telephone Call with President Trump:

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Trump called later that day when Comey was in his office and said "nice things" about Comey, words to the effect of, "you're great; I hope you're going to stay."

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Trump complained to Comey about the leak of the dossier [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of former FBI Director

Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 5 of 25

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S) ~~X~~ [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b1  
b3  
b5  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of former FBI Director

Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 6 of 25

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S) b1 b3

(S) [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b1 b3

(S)

(U) January 27, 2017 Dinner with President Trump:

(U) On January 27, 2017, around lunchtime, Trump called Comey and invited him to dinner at the White House.

[Redacted]

b6 b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] Comey became very concerned when he arrived at the White House and saw there were only two chairs at the table.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of former FBI Director

Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 7 of 25

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] Comey thought Trump saw the dinner as an opportunity to get Comey in and "make him ask for his job." [Redacted]

[Redacted] he and Trump had discussed Comey's

staying on as FBI Director twice previously [Redacted]

[Redacted] and he thought this discussion was designed to make him "grateful to his patron." [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Near the beginning of the dinner, Trump said "I need loyalty." [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] toward the end of dinner, loyalty came up again. [Redacted]

[Redacted] Trump said he needed loyalty, and Comey said he would get honesty. Trump said he wanted "honest loyalty" and Comey said Trump would get that. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] In the dinner, Trump told Comey Flynn had "judgment issues," [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(U) Comey thought Trump made it clear he wanted Comey to stay on as FBI Director [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of former FBI Director

Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 8 of 25

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

Comey started the memo that night from home

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of former FBI Director

Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 9 of 25

(S) [Redacted]

b1  
b3

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b1  
(S) b3

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(U) February 14, 2017 Homeland Threat Briefing and Follow-On Discussion with President Trump:

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ On February 14, 2017, Comey attended a homeland threat briefing at the White House, along with others from the IC. [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of former FBI Director

Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 10 of 25

[Redacted]

b3

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] At the conclusion of the briefing, Trump said, "Thanks everybody. I just want to talk to Jim." [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] "Thanks, Jeff, I just want to talk to Jim." He said it maybe once or twice. Kushner also lingered nearby. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Comey interpreted the phrase "I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. He is a good guy. I hope you can let this go" as an order to shut down the Flynn investigation because of the

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] Comey said Flynn was a good guy. Comey said Flynn was a good guy [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of former FBI Director

Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 11 of 25

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] He convened his senior team that day or the next morning so they could discuss [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

[Redacted] The memo was not an interpretation of events, but rather a recording of events. [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] When Comey met with Sessions [Redacted] he told Sessions not to leave him alone with Trump. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of former FBI Director

Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 12 of 25

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] X \_\_\_\_\_

b1  
b3  
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of former FBI Director

Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 13 of 25

(S)

X [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U)

X [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of former FBI Director

Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 14 of 25

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

the Gang of 8 briefing on March 9<sup>th</sup>

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U) Interview of former FBI Director

Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 15 of 25

[Redacted] X

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U) Interview of former FBI Director

Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 16 of 25

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U) March 20, 2017 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) Hearing:

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

the Hill

wanted him to confirm there was an investigation.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U) Interview of former FBI Director  
Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 17 of 25

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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(U) Regarding the March 20 testimony, DOJ "approved every word."

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U) Additional Discussions with President Trump:

(U) March 1, 2017

(U) On March 1, 2017, Trump called

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Comey did not perceive the call as a check in on the Flynn issue. At that point,

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[Redacted]

(U) Interview of former FBI Director

Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 18 of 25

[Redacted]

[Redacted] not related to the Flynn **b5 Per DOJ/OIP**  
investigation. Comey thought Trump was trying to "pull me in." [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

(U) March 30, 2017

(U) On March 30, 2017, Trump and Comey talked on the telephone and Trump asked Comey how to "lift the cloud" of the Russia investigation over his administration. [Redacted] **b5 Per DOJ/OIP**

[Redacted] Trump said the Russia inquiry was getting in the way of his ability to do business. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Comey explained he wanted the investigation to have the FBI's "good housekeeping seal of approval." [Redacted]

[Redacted] Comey documented the telephone call in a memo, which he drafted in the same way he created previous memos. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U) Interview of former FBI Director

Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 19 of 25

[Redacted]

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(U) Interview of former FBI Director

Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 20 of 25

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of former FBI Director James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 21 of 25

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U) Interview of former FBI Director

Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 22 of 25

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Trump told McCabe [Redacted]

[Redacted] how Comey was allowed to take the FBI plane back to Washington, DC. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Trump [Redacted] said

Comey could not go back on FBI property again. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of former FBI Director James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 23 of 25

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U) Interview of former FBI Director

Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 24 of 25

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[Redacted]

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(U) Interview of former FBI Director

Continuation of FD-302 of James Comey, On 11/15/2017, Page 25 of 25

[Redacted]

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
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/16/2018

Richard William Gates III, previously identified, was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] Supervisory Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutors Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres. Present for Gates were Thomas Green, [Redacted] of Sidley Austin LLP. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, Gates provided the following information:

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Gates signed and acknowledged understanding the proffer agreement and was reminded that the interview was voluntary, but if he chose to answer questions he needed to be truthful in his responses.

FARA

Gates' first introduction to the Foreign Agent's Registration Act (FARA) was in 2007. At that time, Gates and DMP were working in Ukraine and meeting with the US Ambassador regarding that work. Gates was tasked with determining whether contact with the US Ambassador in Ukraine triggered FARA. To this end, Gates spoke with different people while searching for a FARA attorney.

During this process, Gates was told that if he, or DMP was not influencing legislation or budget bills, or meeting with a US government official they did not need to register under FARA. At that time, Gates did not read the FARA statute and the explanations he was given were broad. Gates believed he spoke with [Redacted] and [Redacted] lobbyists who previously worked for Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly.

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In 2007, DMP did not register under FARA because it was determined that FARA was not triggered by the meetings with the US Ambassador.

Gates was shown an email from Gates to Manafort dated April 14, 2007 with the subject line, "FARA Registration" in which Gates detailed the FARA statute and broke down DMP's options under FARA.

Gates stated that he wrote this document at Manafort's request. Manafort had asked Gates to reach out to a FARA attorney about

Investigation on 02/02/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 02/07/2018

by [Redacted]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #5, On 02/02/2018, Page 2 of 16

the issue relating to contact with the US Ambassador in Ukraine. This email was Gates' overview of what he had learned. Gates initially stated that the portion of the email with the FARA statute was cut and pasted from information provided by an attorney at Akin Gump.

Gates was directed to the portion of the email which indicated he had not yet met with an attorney at Akin Gump. Gates stated he must have cut and pasted the information from the internet. Gates believed he obtained the information from the US Department of Justice (DOJ) FARA website, but he was not sure.

Gates was asked why he thought FARA was only triggered if he was making direct contact with a government official when this email clearly showed that FARA was triggered when one "engages directly or indirectly" in lobbying or public relations (PR) in the US.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Gates understood now that his indirect engagement would trigger FARA. Gates explained that when he prepared this email in 2007, he did so in the context of work in the Ukraine. In addition, Gates did not review every section and he was not sure he even read every section which was cut and pasted from the internet.

Gates was asked about another section of his email which referred to collecting or soliciting payment in the US. Gates was asked if his role

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Gates stated that he believed it did.

Gates was asked why his role influencing legislation as it related to the Durbin and Inhofe Amendments, Kaptur Resolution and other Senate and /or House resolutions did not trigger FARA. Gates stated he did not directly contact anyone in an attempt to influence these amendments or resolutions, [REDACTED]

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In 2007, Manafort asked Gates to research FARA because this was a new issue for DMP and Manafort wanted to know if the Ambassador contacts triggered FARA. At this time, the McCain campaign was going on and there were a number of articles in the newspaper about lobbyists and their relationship to McCain.

Gates found information on the internet and provided the email analysis to Manafort. Gates also spoke with counsel at Akin Gump about the matter and it was determined that DMP did not need to file FARA.

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #5, On 02/02/2018, Page 3 of 16

Prior to 2012, DMP had not been involved in a US based lobbying effort on behalf of Ukraine. DMP's work was only in Ukraine.

Gates then stated that it was possible that Manafort [REDACTED] lobbied McCain prior to 2012, but he was not sure. Gates believed McCain may have been lobbied as it related to Montenegro. Gates knew McCain traveled to Montenegro and met people there [REDACTED]. Gates was not sure if this had anything to do with US policy, but McCain was a US Senator at the time.

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Gates also thought DMP may have done some US outreach on behalf of Ukraine through Edelman prior to 2012, but he was not sure.

Gates was asked why, when the US based lobbying effort began in 2012, he did not revisit the issue of FARA. Gates stated [REDACTED]

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Gates was asked why he did not contact counsel on the matter, or simply look on the internet like he had before. Gates stated he "should have" looked into it, but he did not because he was not directly lobbying. Gates was told this did not make sense and that he had no basis to believe FARA was only triggered by direct contact. Gates was told he had access to the answers at his fingertips and had shown the ability to locate those answers before.

Gates then stated that the work [REDACTED] Gates did not even contemplate reaching out to counsel about the matter.

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Congressman Dana Rohrabacher

Gates believed the meeting between Manafort and Rohrabacher required DMP to register under the FARA. At the time, Manafort told Gates that the meeting did not require DMP to register under FARA because Manafort and Rohrabacher had [REDACTED]. Manafort said [REDACTED] [REDACTED] allowed Manafort to "circumvent" registering under FARA.

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In addition, after the meeting, both [REDACTED] and Manafort told Gates that they did not talk about the Ukraine. The "Engage Ukraine" strategy was the intended topic of conversation with Rohrabacher, but they ended up not talking about this. According to [REDACTED] and Manafort, Rohrabacher went off on a tangent and talked about China and Russia during the meeting.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #5, On 02/02/2018, Page 4 of 16

Gates was shown an email from Gates to [REDACTED] among others, dated [REDACTED] and further identified by bates number [REDACTED] which read,

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is meeting with the President on Monday of next week. We need to put together a quarterly report with all of the highlights. I need you guys to prepare the draft report by COB Friday. The report should include key progress made, all relevant meetings (State, Rohrabacher [sic], etc). We need to showcase what we have done in the last 3 months. Let's include as much as possible and then we can edit down."

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Gates was asked why he listed the meeting with Rohrabacher as a "relevant meeting" which needed to be included in a report to Yanukovich if Ukraine was not discussed. Gates stated he thought Manafort and [REDACTED] tried to talk to Rohrabacher about Ukraine. Rohrabacher held an important position which was a target of the Engage Ukraine strategy. Gates did not know if any substantive conversations about Ukraine occurred during the meeting with Rohrabacher and Manafort, but thought it was possible there were no such substantive conversations.

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When Manafort said [REDACTED] Rohrabacher could be used to "circumvent" registering under FARA, Gates understood that this was a "grey area" in the FARA statute. Gates believed someone said Manafort was "walking the line" of the FARA statute. Gates did not recall who said this. Gates understood Manafort was looking for a "loophole", or way to avoid registering under FARA.

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Gates was asked why [REDACTED] set up the meeting with Rohrabacher and Manafort if Manafort and Rohrabacher were [REDACTED] Gates stated that the meeting with Rohrabacher was part of the lobbying outreach and therefore [REDACTED] handled the arrangements.

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Gates was asked why Manafort was present at the meeting with Rohrabacher. Gates stated that in addition to having [REDACTED] [REDACTED] with Rohrabacher, Manafort also had the ability to communicate information on Ukraine as it related to recent elections. Gates believed [REDACTED] recommended Manafort attend the meeting to help build the relationship and get Rohrabacher "on board" with the Engage Ukraine strategy. [REDACTED] suggested Manafort do a number of other meetings, but Manafort did not do all of them.

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DMP had no intention of registering under FARA.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #5 , On 02/02/2018 , Page 5 of 16

Gates did not think it was his responsibility to make sure DMP registered under FARA. When Manafort and Rohrabacher met, it was Manafort's decision. Gates believed if Manafort wanted to register, he would register and if Manafort did not want to register, he would not register. It was not Gates' role to enforce FARA on Manafort or DMP.

Gates took Manafort at "face value" when Manafort told Gates Ukraine had not been discussed in the meeting with Rohrabacher. Gates did not think it was his job to contradict what Manafort had said.

Gates was asked why the meeting with Rohrabacher was included in the memorandum to Yanukovych if they did not discuss Ukraine. Gates stated the memorandum listed any substantive meetings with people in targeted positions in the US.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #5, On 02/02/2018, Page 6 of 16

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #5, On 02/02/2018, Page 7 of 16

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #5, On 02/02/2018, Page 8 of 16

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #5, On 02/02/2018, Page 9 of 16

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #5, On 02/02/2018, Page 10 of 16

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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#### The Trump Campaign

In January 2016, Gates was working mostly on [REDACTED] film project. Gates was also doing some work on films with [REDACTED] looking for new DMP clients, and helping Manafort pull material together to pitch Donald Trump on becoming campaign manager. Roger Stone and Tom Barrack were acting as liaisons between Manafort and Trump in an effort to get Manafort hired by the campaign. Barrack had a good relationship with Ivanka Trump.

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During this time, Gates was paid his normal salary by DMP. Gates also made some money doing film projects with [REDACTED] including receiving payment for a Swiss documentary in which he invested in 2015. Finally, Gates received the proceeds of an investment in ID Watchdog (IDW) in 2016.

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Manafort had few US political relationships at the time and other than working to help Manafort with his pitch to Trump, Gates was not doing much for DMP.

In March 2016, Manafort went to Mar a Lago to meet with Trump, Hope Hicks and Corey Lewandowski. After this meeting, Manafort told Gates "we're on board". The following week, Manafort and Gates went to New York to meet with others from the Trump Campaign.

Gates and Manafort talked about what it would mean for Manafort to be hired by the Trump Campaign. Manafort told Gates it would be "good for business" and a potential way for DMP to be made whole for work done in Ukraine for which they were not paid. Manafort thought being hired by the Trump Campaign would get him back on his feet and help develop future business.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #5, On 02/02/2018, Page 11 of 16

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Gates was shown an email between Gates and Kilimnik dated March 20, 2016 and four letters which were attached to this email. Gates stated he was the person who drafted the letters on Manafort's behalf. Manafort reviewed and approved the letters.

Manafort wanted Gates to draft letters announcing he had joined the Trump Campaign. Manafort thought the letters would help DMP get paid by OB and possibly help confirm that Deripaska had dropped his lawsuit against Manafort. Manafort wanted Kilimnik to let Deripaska know he had been hired by Trump and he needed to make sure there were no lawsuits against him.

Gates was asked why Manafort could not have employed counsel to find out if the Deripaska lawsuit had been dropped. Gates stated Manafort wanted to send Deripaska a personal note and to get a direct answer from Deripaska. Gates also thought this letter was a bit of "bravado" on Manafort's part.

Gates was asked if the purpose of the letter to Deripaska was to determine if the lawsuit had been dropped, why didn't the letter mention the lawsuit. Gates stated that Manafort did not want to put anything about the lawsuit in writing. Manafort discussed the idea of getting Deripaska to drop the lawsuit with Kilimnik verbally.

Gates was shown an email between Manafort and Kilimnik dated April 8, 2016, on which Gates was copied. Gates explained that at Manafort's direction, he reached out to Kilimnik to find out information on OB. Manafort wanted to know if there was a future for Manafort in Ukraine if the work with Trump did not work out.

Gates was asked if he and Manafort ever discussed the optics of Manafort as Convention Manager making these contacts in an effort to monetize his position. Gates stated he "surmised" these contacts would be made known. Gates believed everyone was trying to monetize their position early on in the campaign. Had Trump not won the nomination, the opportunity to monetize the position would have passed. That said, Gates and Manafort never talked about how these contacts would be viewed.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #5, On 02/02/2018, Page 12 of 16

Manafort and Gates did talk about how to answer questions from reporters regarding Manafort's work in Ukraine. Manafort asked Gates to draft a letter to Trump describing Manafort's work in Ukraine. The initial version of this letter was drafted shortly after the meeting in Mar a Lago. There were subsequent iterations of the letter in anticipation of questions potentially posed by the media.

Gates was shown an email between Gates, Manafort and Kilimnik dated April 11, 2016 in which Manafort asked if Kilimnik had "shown our friends the coverage" and how it could be used to "get whole". Manafort made specific references to Deripaska's operations seeing the coverage on Manafort's work for Trump.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Gates was asked what Deripaska had to gain from Manafort's position. Gates stated that Deripaska wanted a visa to the US and having Manafort in a position inside the campaign might be helpful to Deripaska. Manafort's position could help Deripaska develop a relationship with Trump, which could have been helpful to Deripaska in other ways as well. Manafort never told Gates anything specific as to what he was offering Deripaska.

[REDACTED]

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Gates was shown an email thread between Kilimnik to [REDACTED] Purcell at the US State Department dated April 26, 2016 through May 4, 2016. Gates was asked to whom "Boyko" was a reference.

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Gates stated that Boyko was Yuri Boyko, a senior PoR official who was aligned with [REDACTED] and Lyovochkin. Boyko had assets in the gas industry and was close with Yanukovych. Boyko was a pro-Russian PoR official who pretended to be pro-European.

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Gates was directed to the May 4, 2016 email which referenced a meeting between Kilimnik and Manafort. Gates stated that he was not present for

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #5, On 02/02/2018, Page 13 of 16

this meeting. Manafort told Gates that Kilimnik was coming to the US for a meeting. Gates could not recall if he even knew that Manafort and Kilimnik were meeting. Gates did not think he talked to Manafort about the meeting.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Gates believed the message from Yanukovych was delivered to Manafort by Kilimnik during the meeting in August. Gates did not know if this was also a topic of discussion in a May meeting. Gates did not talk to Manafort about this topic prior to the August meeting.

Gates was shown an email thread between Kilimnik and Manafort dated July 7, 2016 through July 29, 2016.

Gates stated he saw some of these email in the news. Gates did not talk to Manafort about the emails when they were leaked to the press. In July 2016, the topic of conversation with Manafort was the Deripaska lawsuit.

Gates was asked what was meant by the following statements in the email: "any movement on this issue with our friend?" and "I'm carefully optimistic on the question of our biggest interest". Gates stated "our friend" was likely a reference to Deripaska. Gates did not know what the "question of our biggest interest" meant.

Gates believed "V" referred to Viktor Boyarkin and "V boss" referred to Deripaska. Gates did not know why Deripaska would have been reaching out to Manafort regarding a "time sensitive matter". Gates was reminded that these emails were written just before the Republican National Convention.

Gates was asked about Manafort's statement, "Tell V boss if he needs private briefing we can accommodate". Gates stated he thought Manafort was trying to curry favor with Deripaska to make the lawsuit go away. Gates was asked why Manafort would need to curry favor with Deripaska to make a dormant lawsuit go away and why such a topic would be "time sensitive". Gates stated that Manafort and Deripaska's relationship had been dead a long time and Manafort was probably using his position within the Trump Campaign to reach out to Deripaska.

When Gates first saw this email, he was surprised Manafort would write something so [REDACTED] in an email. Gates never asked Manafort about the

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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email and Manafort never told Gates what he meant when he said he would offer Deripaska "private briefings". When this email came out in the news, Manafort told Gates, Brad Parscale and [Redacted] that the article was "B.S."

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As far as the reference to "Black Caviar", Gates recalled Manafort telling a story about a party thrown by Akhmetov. Manafort told Gates that at the party, Akhmetov gave Manafort a very large bowl of black caviar worth between \$20,000 and \$30,000. Based on this story, Gates assumed "Black Caviar" was a reference Akhmetov.

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Meeting at Havana

When Gates joined Manafort and Kilimnik at the Havana restaurant in August 2016, Kilimnik said he had come to deliver Yanukovych's message. In addition to Yanukovych's presidential run, Kilimnik and Manafort also discussed the Deripaska lawsuit, the money due to DMP and the Trump Campaign.

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Manafort looked at internal, external and digital polling data to identify the battleground states. Internal data came from Fabrizio & Ward and Kellyanne Conway's polls. Internal polling data was confidential information. External data came from Gallup, Rasmussen and Real Politics polls. Digital data came from Parscale's online polls.

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Gates was asked why confidential polling data derived from internal polls was released to Kilimnik. Gates stated that the internal polling data did not differ from the external polling data very much and it was used mostly to confirm the external polling results.

Post Manafort Resignation

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Gates explained that in Ukraine, Manafort had created a "parallel system" of people loyal to him inside PoR. Manafort did the same thing in the Trump Campaign with Parscale, [REDACTED] Dearborn and others. Manafort maintained these connections when he left the campaign. [REDACTED] the campaign after Manafort left, but Parscale, Dearborn [REDACTED] all stayed on the campaign.

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Gates believed Manafort also had some contact with Kushner about strategy after Manafort left. Gates knew Manafort sent strategy memos to Kushner prior to the election.

Gates had minimal contact with Manafort after Manafort left. [REDACTED]

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Gates also talked to Manafort about the US policy on Ukraine. Manafort claimed President Poroshenko was behind the media campaign to "smear" Manafort. Manafort said Poroshenko had fabricated the "black ledger" and was supporting Hilary Clinton.

Manafort asked Gates to reach out to [REDACTED] who had a relationship with the Ukrainian Ambassador. Manafort offered to assist the Ambassador in repairing relationships Poroshenko had damaged. Gates was aware that Poroshenko had been trying to set up meetings with Trump at Trump Tower. Manafort said the Ambassador needed to get involved in those meetings.

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2017

In January 2017, Manafort reached out to Gates through [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Gates heard Manafort was doing business in China and South

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[REDACTED]

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America. Gates heard Manafort had traveled to Madrid sometime in or around December 2016 with [REDACTED]. Gates believed this trip was to look at a telecommunications company.

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In February 2017, while Gates was working for Barrack, Manafort reached out to ask Gates about Trump's policies in Cuba. Manafort had work in Cuba and wanted to know what Trump's intended stance on the country was. Gates did not know if Manafort had any foreign travel, meetings with [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Gates did not know if there was ever any resolution to the Deripaska lawsuit. Gates did not follow up with Manafort about this matter.

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#### Dates

Gates reviewed his financial records and calendar to determine the following:


On February 2, 2016, he was in Chicago. On February 3, 2016, he returned from Chicago to Richmond, Virginia where he stayed until February 5, 2016. From February 5, 2016 through February 7, 2016, Gates was in New York. From February 7, 2016 through February 9, 2016, Gates was in Richmond, Virginia except for the day of February 8, 2016, when Gates was in Washington, D.C.

On February 23 -24, 2016, Gates was in Richmond. On February 25, 2016, Gates was in Washington, D.C.

On March 10, 2016, Gates returned from Turks and Caicos to Richmond. Gates remained in Virginia through March 16, 2016.

On October 20, 2016, Gates returned from Las Vegas, Nevada to Richmond where he remained through October 22, 2016.

[Redacted]



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/21/2018

Richard William Gates III, previously identified, was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] Supervisory Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutors Andrew Weissmann, Greg Andres, Jeannie Rhee and Aaron Zelinski. Present for Gates were [Redacted] [Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, Gates provided the following information:

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Gates signed and acknowledged understanding the proffer agreement and was reminded that the interview was voluntary, but if he chose to answer questions he needed to be truthful in his responses.

April 27, 2016 Foreign Policy Speech

Gates was involved in the planning and preparation of Donald Trump's foreign policy speech at the Mayflower Hotel on April 27, 2016. The Mayflower Hotel speech was the first major policy speech for Trump. The idea for the speech originated during a conversation between Manafort, Jared Kushner and Steve Miller about which policy initiatives needed to be tackled. Kushner and Manafort were tasked with handling foreign policy decisions for the campaign.

Kushner appointed Gates and Dmitri Simes to be in charge of planning and logistics for the speech. Specifically, they needed to determine where, when and who.

Gates first met with Simes in Simes' office in Washington, D.C. a few weeks before the date of the speech. Gates had not met Simes before this. Simes was a Trump supporter who ran a think tank called the Nixon Foundation, or something similar to that.

Initially, the speech was supposed to take place at the National Press Club. The list of participants was generated partially by a list from Simes and partially by a list from the Trump Campaign. Manafort, Kushner, Miller, and Gates all reviewed and had input on the list from the campaign. Gates believed Kushner invited some people from New York in addition to people from the campaign.

Investigation on 02/07/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)  
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 02/08/2018  
by [Redacted]

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[REDACTED]

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After reviewing the initial list of RSVPs, it was determined that the National Press Club was too small of a venue. Gates believed the National Press Club only sat 120 people and the RSVP list showed 110 confirmed. For this reason, the venue changed to the Mayflower Hotel at the last minute. There were three or four other venues considered before settling on the Mayflower Hotel. Ultimately, it was decided that the location needed to be in the same area as the National Press Club. There were no discussions about using the Trump Hotel as it was not yet open.

Gates may have tried to obtain additional space at the National Press Club, but beyond that, Gates did not play a role as it related to this venue. The campaign's Advance Team, which was led by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were the people responsible for looking at venues.

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#### DOCUMENT 1

Gates was shown an email from Manafort to Kushner and others dated April 19, 2016 and further identified by bates number NOSC00005959-NOSC00005960 which read, "Rick Gates will be the internal point of contact for us. He and our Comm Dir will then interact with the National Press Club."

Gates served as the campaign's internal point of contact for the event. Gates helped Simes organize the event and introduced Simes to the campaign's Advance Team.

The decision to move the venue from the National Press Club to the Mayflower Hotel was made by Kushner and Manafort based upon information Gates relayed from the Advance Team. Gates could have made the decision on his own, but he did not. Gates ran it by Manafort and Kushner because this was the first policy speech and it was important to get it right.

The belief was that the original location could not fit the number of attendees. Also, the initial plan was to offer a lunch and that definitely would not have been feasible in the National Press Club space.

The list of invitees from Simes was circulated by Gates to Manafort and Kushner. Additions were made to the list and sent back to Gates. The issue of who needed to handle foreign attendees arose. It was decided that Jeff Sessions, Kushner and Rick Dearborn would handle any outreach and communication with foreign attendees, such as ambassadors.

Gates indicated the goal was to get as many ambassadors as possible to attend. Simes took the "first pass" at reaching out to


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #6, On 02/07/2018, Page 3 of 15

ambassadors. Sessions and Dearborn followed up on ambassador invites, but Gates was not clear which ambassadors were contacted by Simes and which ambassadors were contacted by Sessions and/or Dearborn.

In preparation for the speech, Gates went to the Mayflower Hotel on the morning of the event. Gates entered off Connecticut and looked at the first room on the left which accommodated approximately 200 people.

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### DOCUMENT 3

Gates was shown an email from Gates dated April 25, 2016 with the subject line "FP Prep Meeting".

Gates did not specifically recall the meeting referenced in his email. Gates speculated the meeting was to review the content of the foreign policy speech. The email was addressed to Corey Lewandowski, Hope Hicks, Kushner, Miller, Dearborn and Manafort.

Lewandowski had minimal involvement in the content of the speech, but he was the point of contact for Trump as they always traveled together.

Hicks was the Communications Director who coordinated with the press.

Kushner was involved in the content of the speech. Kushner had input on the topics on which the speech was focused.

Miller was the speech writer and he drafted the first version of the speech.

Dearborn was involved in inviting participants to the event.

Gates was responsible for sending the list of invitees around to people inside the campaign to see if there were any additional requests for people to attend. Gates primarily coordinated with Manafort, Dearborn and possibly Kushner to finalize the list of invitees.

[REDACTED]

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**April 27, 2016**

Gates began the morning of April 27, 2016 at Trump Tower in New York with the entire Trump Campaign team. Gates clarified that Dearborn, Manafort and possibly Kushner were already in D.C. on that day. Gates flew to D.C. with Trump, Hicks, Lewandowski, and Miller on the campaign plane.

During the flight, Trump read the speech. Gates initially thought this may have been the first time Trump read the speech. Gates then recalled that Manafort and Miller had met with Trump at Trump Tower on either April 25th or April 26th to review the speech. Gates was not present for this meeting, but he heard about it from Miller. Miller told Gates that Trump made a number of changes and he needed to work on a new draft to circulate. Gates would have seen the various iterations of the speech, but he could not recall exactly what changes had been made.

During the flight, Trump made additional edits and "tweaks" to the speech.

When they landed in D.C., they went to the Capitol Hill Club. Manafort, Sessions, Dearborn and the Advance Team were there as well. Dearborn was introduced to Trump at this time. Kushner may have been present at the Capitol Hill Club, but Gates was not sure.

Gates did not talk to Sessions about the speech. Gates and Sessions talked about some Congressional meetings with Senators Mitch McConnell, Paul Ryan, the National Republican Senate Committee (NRSC) and the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRSCC). During the Congressional meetings, Gates, Manafort, Dearborn and the Advance Team were in the hold room.

From the Capitol Hill Club, the motorcade traveled to the Mayflower Hotel. Gates then recalled that there may have been a luncheon on the Hill first. Gates went directly to the Mayflower Hotel by himself in an Uber to view the venue. Gates met up with Dearborn at the Mayflower Hotel. Gates could not recall if Manafort was there or not. Gates looked at the storage and reception rooms.

Gates left the Mayflower Hotel and later returned in the motorcade with Trump, Lewandowski, Hicks, Dearborn, Sessions, Miller, and [REDACTED] Kushner and Ivanka Trump came separately from the motorcade.

[REDACTED]

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Originally, the plan was to have a VIP line or reception, but it never materialized. Due to the long list of VIPs in attendance, it was going to be too difficult to accommodate a VIP line. The decision was made to focus on the speech instead.

The layout of the venue was a stage which looked out onto the ballroom. Adjacent to the ballroom was a room where a standing luncheon was held. Behind the stage, there was a very small backstage area. There was not a hold room behind the stage like in most venues. Linking the backstage and the other rooms was a long hallway.

When Gates entered the venue with Trump, he remained with Trump until Trump took the stage. Miller, Dearborn, Manafort, Lewandowski, Hicks and [REDACTED] were all waiting behind the stage with Trump prior to the speech. There were no "outsiders" behind the stage with Trump prior to the speech.

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The 20-30 minutes prior to Trump taking the stage was spent with Trump preparing to speak. Manafort checked the podium and [REDACTED] checked the sound. This was the first time Trump was using a teleprompter so people were making sure that was working properly. Some of the campaign team left the backstage area and took seats in the first two rows of the ballroom. Gates watched the speech from the backstage area.

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There was a section of seating blocked off for the ambassadors. Gates did not see any of the ambassadors meet with Trump. Gates did not recall any meetings between Trump and anyone outside the campaign team prior to the speech. However, at one point, Gates left the backstage area to check something. Gates estimated he was gone for 10-15 minutes and when he returned, Trump was still backstage with only campaign staff.

Typically, Trump would do a "meet and greet" prior to the event, but that did not happen at the Mayflower Hotel. It was possible there was a reception after the speech, but Gates did not know for sure.

#### DOCUMENT 4

Gates was shown an email from Kushner to Gates, Manafort, Lewandowski, Miller, and Hicks dated April 27, 2016 and further identified by bates number NOSC00012319. Gates was directed to the portion of the email which read, "We worked through some curveballs, but by communicating and adjusting as a team, we made it happen." Gates was asked what Kushner meant by "curveballs".

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #6, On 02/07/2018, Page 6 of 15

Gates thought Kushner was referring to the fact that Trump edited the speech up until the last minute. Miller was uploading the edited speech to the teleprompter at the last moment. The speech started a little bit late, but other than that, there was nothing out of the ordinary with the venue or media. Gates noted there was a significant number of members of the media present and the space had to be reorganized to accommodate all of their cameras.

Simes was backstage prior to the speech along with campaign staff. Simes was introduced to Trump by Kushner at that time. Sessions may have been introduced to Simes as well. Gates did not think Simes had met Trump previously. Gates did not recall any specific reaction by Trump to meeting Simes.

After the speech, Trump went backstage. Sessions brought a few Senators and Congressmen backstage to meet Trump. Trump stayed backstage for approximately 30 minutes prior to the luncheon. During this time, there were a number of people moving in and out of the backstage area, but Gates believed they were mostly campaign staff. Gates went into the ballroom area immediately after the speech to say hello to people before going backstage. Gates saw Trump come off the stage and head backstage. After approximately 15-20, when Gates returned backstage, Trump was still there.

Trump returned to New York after leaving the Mayflower Hotel. Gates was still at the hotel when Trump left out the side entrance. Gates explained that he saw Trump walk out the stairs which led to the side entrance, but he did not actually see Trump leave the hotel. Gates, Dearborn, Sessions, and Simes stayed backstage for a bit after Trump left and before returning to the D.C. campaign office.

Gates was asked again if anyone, other than campaign staff, was backstage, in the hallway, in the luncheon room or anywhere other than the ballroom prior to the speech. Gates stated that only campaign staff, US Secret Service, the Advance Team, Sessions and Simes were in these areas. Gates believed Kushner was in the hallway area prior to the speech. US Secret Service was controlling access to the backstage areas.

#### **SPEECH CONTENT**

Miller wrote the first draft of the speech. Gates believed he received a copy of the first draft either directly from Miller or from Kushner. Gates then thought he may not have seen the first draft at all, but may have only seen the second draft. Gates recalled Manafort telling him about the first draft and that it needed a lot of work.

[REDACTED]

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Gates believed he reviewed the second draft and circulated it to Manafort and Kushner. Gates had to send Miller a few emails in order to get a copy of the second draft. Gates thought the second draft was "pretty good". The purpose of the foreign policy speech was to show Trump as knowledgeable on the topic and the speech did a good job of showing broad knowledge. Gates edited the second draft for grammar, but not content. Manafort and Kushner made content edits.

Gates did not know if Manafort ever met with Trump to discuss any edits to the speech. Gates was only aware of meetings with Trump on either April 25th or 26th which was discussed earlier and the plane ride to D.C. on the 27th.

Gates did not believe Simes, or anyone at Simes' think tank had any input on the content of the speech. However, Simes would have received an advanced copy of the speech. Simes reached out to Gates multiple times to get a copy of the speech, but Gates did not send one until shortly before the day of the speech. Gates wasn't sure what day he first sent Simes a copy.

Gates recalled Trump wanted a "tougher" speech which portrayed a "stronger" stance on foreign policy. Virtually everyone on the Trump Campaign viewed President Obama as weak on foreign policy and viewed Obama's inaction in this area as damaging to the country. The goal was to make Trump seem like he was coming in to fix the issues created by Obama's inaction. There was focus on statistics, such as the number of US deaths in the Middle East and the economic damage weak foreign policy had caused.

Prior to the Mayflower Hotel speech, Trump's speeches had been "great on optics, but weak on policy". Trump's policy team was not strong with only Dearborn and Manafort.

In April 2016, there was virtually no vetting process on the campaign. Gates did not think Simes or Simes' think tank was investigated prior to the Mayflower Hotel speech. Simes was a Trump supporter who was friends with Kushner. Gates did not think any further due diligence was done on him. After the Mayflower Speech, Simes was not very involved in the campaign. Gates estimated he spoke with Simes 1-2 times after April 27th.



[REDACTED]

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Gates was also shown an email from Kushner to Gates, Manafort and Miller dated August 10, 2016 and further identified by bates number NOSC00005369. This email contained a forwarded email from Simes and an attachment titled "Russian Policy".

Gates did not recall the email or Russian Policy talking points from Simes. Gates did not recall Simes having any substantive involvement in the campaign after the Mayflower Hotel. Thousands of emails per day were sent to people on the campaign with ideas about policy and other topics. This email may have been circulated because it was sent by Kushner, but Gates did not recall this.

Gates noted that Kushner regularly "flooded" Gates' inbox with forwarded emails. This was Kushner's way of delegating tasks. It was not uncommon for Kushner to send emails from a non-campaign email account.

[REDACTED]

Manafort and Simes may have known each other prior to the Mayflower Hotel event, but Gates was not sure of this.

Gates did not get involved in foreign policy matters and did not recall being interested in any Russian Policy talking points that may have been circulated. Trump did not take much interest in foreign policy and did not have much interest in having meetings about foreign policy either.

Gates was directed to Simes' forwarded email which read,

"Dear Jared,

As we have discussed, attached is my memo on what Mr. Trump may want to say about Russia. We will call your office tomorrow to try to schedule an appointment. As I mentioned to you, there is an interesting and in many respects well-documented story of highly questionable connections between Bill Clinton, the Clinton Foundation and current Hillary [sic] Clinton advisors with not just Russian oligarchs, but also with the Russian government, and earlier, with Soviet Intelligence. Apparently, parts of the story were even discussed with the CIA and the FBI in the late 1990s and shared with the special prosecutor at the end of the Clinton presidency."

Gates did not recall discussing these issues with Simes. Similar information was coming from other avenues, but unrelated to Simes.

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[REDACTED]

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Gates speculated that Simes may have had a meeting at which Gates was not present. Gates did not recall hearing about any such meeting. Gates was traveling a lot with Trump around the time of this email.

In August 2016, there was a daily discussion about Clinton's connection to Russia. Trump's beliefs were that the reporting on this matter was a "joke", but he knew the media was running with it.

In general, when it came to Russia, Trump's view was "why have an enemy when you can have a friend?" Kushner and Sessions advised Trump on how to approach Russia. Gates described Trump's approach to Russia as "softer" than one would expect. Gates clarified that Trump did not really take it seriously. Trump did not push back much when claims circulated about Trump and Russia being "friends".

There was the feeling that Trump could mend the US relationship with Russia and other foreign countries and people on the campaign may have taken steps to encourage this. However, Trump was not really interested in foreign affairs.

There were people on the campaign that took Russia more seriously and advocated for Trump to take a stronger stance, but Trump had no initiative when it came to this topic. Sessions and Flynn were among those advocating for a firmer stance on Russia.

Eventually, Sessions "bent" to Rudy Giuliani and Steve Bannon's views that the relationship with Russia needed to be repaired, but if Russia was going to "play games" then "screw them". Gates then clarified that Bannon felt like Russia was a "bully" and Trump needed to deal with them and not give into their demands. Bannon had "hostile" views on Russia and was generally and "anti-globalist".

Gates was asked what he meant when he said Sessions' views on Russia bent. Gates stated that during the debates, Sessions helped formulate foreign policy talking points with Keith Kellogg, Flynn, Bannon and Gates. Over time, Session was less interested in Russia and more interested in fighting ISIS and immigration issues.

Gates' personal views on Russia were more pragmatic. Gates thought Trump should build up the US image and avoid addressing any Russia-specific issues, such as the invasion of Crimea. Gates believed the lack of US leadership under Obama allowed for Crimea to occur. Gates wanted Trump to exude an image that he would act in such a situation. Gates was opposed to sanctions "across the board" because he did not believe they worked. That said, Gates believed if sanctions were going to be used,

[REDACTED]

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they had to be "all or nothing", rather than partial like they were under the Obama Administration. Gates also believed in sending more NATO troops to the border and building up a larger international presence in the area to keep Russia in check.

Most people on the National Security Council favored sanctions against Russia.

Gates was asked how sanctions on Russia or anyone else for the invasion of Crimea would have impacted those oligarchs who owed Manafort money. Gates stated that the conflict in Crimea had affected the Ukrainian oligarchs "very badly". Crimea was Ukraine's resource base and much of Ukraine's industry was located there. Resources were getting looted, industry was being stifled and generally Ukrainian businesses were profoundly impacted by the conflict.

Gates was not aware of any outreach from [REDACTED] to assist in a resolution to the conflict or the sanctions. Gates then stated that [REDACTED] once or twice. The first time was to discuss a [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Gates was not aware of any other contact from [REDACTED] Gates thought it may have happened had [REDACTED]

Gates was asked if Manafort tried to use his position and/or influence within the Trump Campaign to [REDACTED] Gates stated that Manafort never told Gates this. Gates was aware of Manafort's [REDACTED] but Manafort never mentioned this to Gates. Manafort did not talk about sanctions because it was "taboo".

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Gates was asked why he referred to the topic of sanctions as "taboo". Gates stated that the National Security Coalition took the position that Trump needed to deal with Russia and the issue of sanctions in an effort to repair the US/Russian relationship. As a result, sanctions became a "key word" on the campaign. The constant question was whether Trump supported the continuation of sanctions or not. Some advisors advocated for a less stringent approach and some advocated for a more stringent approach.

Ultimately, Trump had to revisit the sanctions against Russia because they were implemented by Obama. Trump's stance was that Obama had screwed up the relationship with Russia and Trump was going to fix it. In order to do this, the topic of sanctions had to be revisited. The logical answer seemed to be to lessen sanctions.

[REDACTED]

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Gates was asked again why he referred to the topic of sanctions as "taboo". Gates stated that "internally" the word sanctions was avoided because it implied a connection to Russia. The experienced members of the campaign staff realized sanctions had to be discussed.

Gates did not recall if the Mayflower Hotel speech dealt with the topic of sanctions. Gates believed the concept of repairing the relationship with Russia was conveyed. Gates recalled talking points relating to extending an olive branch to Russia and bringing them to the table.

Gates did not know for sure, but speculated that Manafort was pro-sanctions because Manafort understood the optics involved. Specifically, Manafort understood that he was seen as connected to Russia because of his [REDACTED]. This frustrated Manafort because the media assumed Manafort's work for [REDACTED] was inherently pro-Russian. Gates explained that some [REDACTED] were not pro-Russian, [REDACTED]. That said, Manafort was probably very conscious of not seeming sympathetic to Russia. Gates never specifically asked Manafort what his view on this matter was, but he based his speculation on many discussions related to this topic. If Manafort were to have discussed policy with anyone, it would have been Miller.

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Manafort alluded to Gates that his position within the Trump Campaign and, if Trump won, his connection to President Trump could be used to make Manafort money. Manafort thought he could go back to [REDACTED]. Gates believed [REDACTED] would want Manafort because they thought Manafort had access to Trump. However, Manafort did not influence policy to his financial benefit while working on the campaign. Manafort's idea was to leverage Trump's win in order to [REDACTED].

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Manafort and Gates talked about what they would do after a Trump win. Gates intended to work for the administration while Manafort intended to work [REDACTED]. Had Trump lost, Gates still believed he would not have gone [REDACTED]. When Manafort left the campaign, Gates stayed because he knew [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] Gates' only hope was to see the Trump campaign through.

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Gates was asked why Manafort did not [REDACTED] [REDACTED] after leaving the Trump campaign. Gates speculated that [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] That said, Manafort did not have the ability to leverage his work with Trump because he was fired.

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #6, On 02/07/2018, Page 12 of 15

Gates and Manafort never talked about how to leverage the Trump Campaign if Trump lost. The reason Manafort [REDACTED] in April 2016 was because he knew Trump might not get the nomination and then he would have no leverage. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Gates speculated [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Gates did not know if Manafort [REDACTED] after April 2016. Gates didn't understand how Manafort was going to get paid while working on the campaign. Gates asked Manafort this question and Manafort said he was going to talk to the campaign attorney about the matter.

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Gates was asked if in light of the June 2016 Trump Tower meeting with Russians and the Simes Russian Policy memo, there were discussions among campaign staff about the Clintons and Russia. Gates stated he did not recall receiving Simes' email or memo. As for the Trump Tower meeting, Gates recalled Manafort's reaction to the meeting was "don't put too much stock in it". Manafort only attended the Trump Tower meeting because he felt obligated to since Donald Trump Jr. had arranged it and invited Manafort.

In Gates' opinion, the Clintons were "politically savvy" and "masters" at covering their tracks and dealing with the media. In contrast, the Trump Campaign was inexperienced and not politically savvy.

There was an extreme lack of experience on the campaign when Manafort and Gates first joined. Gates believed this inexperience caused people to focus on the Clinton/Russia issue. The more experienced people on the campaign did not focus on this issue.

A lot of information came to the campaign about the Clintons' connection to Russia, but nothing ever materialized from this information. Gates stated that "9 times out of 10" there was no proof, such as documents. Even if there had been documents, they could have been forged. People didn't understand how Eastern Europe worked and how easily documents could be falsified. People also didn't "consider the source" of the information. For example, if it was a random person or someone inside the Clinton Campaign. Ultimately, the Trump Campaign was interested in any opposition research or intelligence which could be used to sway the polls.

Gates was asked what he meant when he said, "9 times out of 10" there was no proof. Gates was asked what the 10th time was. Gates stated that the DOJ Investigation into the Clinton Foundation was the 10th time.

[REDACTED]

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### **Sam Clovis**

Gates saw very little of Sam Clovis during the campaign. Gates thought he saw Clovis once the Campaign Headquarters.

Clovis was involved in the first round of National Security Coalition prior to Manafort and Gates coming on board. Clovis was an early supporter of Trump, but he did not play a substantive role in the campaign.

Clovis did not have an active role in the Mayflower Speech.

A break was taken from approximately 3:35 PM to 3:45 PM.

### Yanukovych

Once the Maidan riots started, Yanukovych fled to Russia. Gates heard Yanukovych [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

### Other

After the Mayflower Hotel speech, Manafort and Simes talked about doing another event which Simes' think tank would sponsor.

Gates was not aware of Henry Kissinger having any input on the Mayflower Hotel speech. KT McFarland had set up a meeting with Trump and Kissinger in mid-April 2016 in New York. The purpose of the meeting was to talk about foreign policy. Gates did not know if the speech was influenced by this meeting. Gates recalled McFarland saying Trump went off topic and talked about real estate during the meeting.

### Polling Data

As early as March 2016, states were categorized as "must hold", "battleground" and "potential". States were put into one of these categories based upon polling data. Manafort was a strong believer in polls.

It was believed that the best chance for Trump to win traditionally Democrat states was to focus on those states with a large contingency of blue-collar Democrats. Historical data along with earlier polling data was used to whittle the states down. Then Brad Parscale's digital campaign was used to focus in on those states.

Parscale's digital polling model differed from traditional polling in that it was more simplistic, cheaper and gave insight into millennial and

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #6, On 02/07/2018, Page 14 of 15

elderly demographics. The digital polls were used to balance the traditional polls and to micro-target specific groups.

Gates brought Parscale to New York so he could integrate with Fabrizio, Kellyanne Conway and Cambridge Analytica's polling teams. [REDACTED] worked for Cambridge Analytica and was brought in to represent their polling product.

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b7C

Conway's polls targeted specific demographics in certain states and were issue-specific. Generally, they dealt with issues which were important to women voters. Conway was able to identify key words which resonated with female voters and then use these words in speeches.

Cambridge Analytica did a more comprehensive online poll. They claimed to be able to do "psychological polling". Gates did not know if psychological polling worked.

Data Trust was the Republican National Committee's (RNC) polling shop. They used a combination of traditional and online polling.

All of the data was compiled and analyzed to identify states in which Trump was close. Parscale, [REDACTED] Gates, [REDACTED] Avi Berkowitz, [REDACTED] Fabrizio and others from the RNC participated in this analysis. Manafort focused mostly on Fabrizio's data as Manafort did not really understand the digital data. The analysis was done by discussion and not by an algorithm. Once the team had discussed the raw data, it was moved up the chain to a larger group including Eric Trump, Ivanka Trump, Bannon, Kushner, Conway, Priebus, Donald Trump Jr., Sean Spicer, [REDACTED] Steve Miller, Hicks, [REDACTED] and Mark Short among others.

b6  
b7C

For the most part, the data drove decisions made on the campaign, but there was some divergence. For example, polling data showed Trump was close in Virginia, but those who understood how Virginia worked knew Trump could not win in Virginia in spite of the data.

Fabrizio's polling questionnaires were traditional and more specific than the other forms of polling. Fabrizio's polls identified Wisconsin as a "steal state" early on. Cambridge Analytica and Data Trust were consistent with this as well. In general, Fabrizio's model was the most conservative and Cambridge Analytica's was the most aggressive. Data Trust was more level and had a more historical basis.

In early to mid August, Kushner directed campaign resources to concentrate on Florida and Pennsylvania. Trump thought he could win Florida because of his business connections there. Florida was a "must

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #6, On 02/07/2018, Page 15 of 15

win" state. Pennsylvania, on the other hand, was "fool's gold" and Trump was unlikely to win there.

Manafort instructed Gates to send Kilimnik information from Fabrizio's polls. Gates sent Kilimnik both publically available information and internal information from Fabrizio's polls.




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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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FBI Info.

Classified by NSICG [redacted]

Reason: (C)

Declassify on: 12-31-2042

Date: 01-07-2020

Date of entry 07/12/2017

Admiral Michael Rogers, Director, National Security Agency; and Commander, United States Cyber Command, was interviewed at National Security Agency (NSA) Headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. Participating in the interview were FBI Special Agents (SAs) [redacted] [redacted] NSA General Counsel Glenn S. Gerstell, and Deputy Special Counsel Aaron M. Zebley. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the purpose of the interview, Gerstell advised he was participating in the interview in his capacity as the General Counsel for the NSA, not as personal counsel for ADM Rogers, given the substance of the interview related to ADM Rogers' interactions in his capacity as NSA Director. SA [redacted] advised ADM Rogers that it is a violation of criminal law to lie to the FBI in the course of an investigation, and ADM Rogers said he understood. ADM Rogers provided the following information:

(b)(6)  
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[redacted]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

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(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

~~Reason: 1.4(c)  
Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 20421231~~

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Investigation on 06/12/2017 at Fort Meade, Maryland, United States (In Person) (b)(3)  
File # [redacted] Date drafted 06/15/2017 (b)(6)  
by [redacted] (b)(7)(C)  
(b)(7)(E)

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[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ Interview of Admiral Michael  
Continuation of FD-302 of Rogers

On 06/12/2017 Page 2 of 9

(b)(5) per  
DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(5)  
per DOJ/  
OIP

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(b)(1) per NSA  
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per  
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~~(S//NF)~~ Interview of Admiral Michael

Continuation of FD-302 of Rogers, On 06/12/2017, Page 3 of 9

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per DOJ/  
OIP

[Redacted]

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per  
DOJ/  
OIP

March 26, 2017 telephone call with POTUS:

[Redacted]

(b)(5) per  
DOJ/OIP

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[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ Interview of Admiral Michael

Continuation of FD-302 of Rogers

, On 06/12/2017 , Page 4 of 9

[REDACTED]

he received a call from his staff in which he was told President Trump wanted to speak to him. ADM Rogers went to the office and placed the call to the White House. He made the decision to have his Deputy, Richard Ledgett, listen to the call, [REDACTED]

Following the telephone call, Ledgett authored a memo on the content of the conversation. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b)(5)  
per  
DOJ/  
OIP

[REDACTED]

According to ADM Rogers' recollection of the call and the memo, President Trump expressed frustration with the ongoing investigation into Russian interference, saying that it made relations with the Russians difficult. [REDACTED]

(b)(5) per  
DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(1) per NSA  
(b)(3) per NSA  
(b)(5) per NSA

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[REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~(S//NF)~~ Interview of Admiral Michael Rogers, On 06/12/2017, Page 5 of 9

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[Redacted]

(b)(1) per NSA  
(b)(3) per NSA  
(b)(5) per NSA

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(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

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(b)(3) per NSA

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[Redacted]

(S//NF) Interview of Admiral Michael

Continuation of FD-302 of Rogers, On 06/12/2017, Page 6 of 9 (b)(3) per NSA

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(b)(5)  
per  
DOJ/  
OIP

[Redacted]

(b)(5) per  
DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(b)(5)  
per DOJ/  
OIP

April 13, 2017 meeting with POTUS:

[Redacted]

President Trump asked ADM Rogers to stay behind to have a private conversation.

[Redacted]

ADM

Rogers described the conversation as President Trump "venting" and recalled President Trump saying something like the "Russia thing has got to go away." He also recalled President Trump saying something similar to "I have done nothing wrong."

(b)(5) per  
DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ Interview of Admiral Michael  
Continuation of FD-302 of Rogers

, On 06/12/2017 , Page 7 of 9

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per  
DOJ/  
OIP

[Redacted]

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per DOJ/  
OIP

[Redacted]

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DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(b)(5)  
per  
DOJ/  
OIP

[Redacted]

(b)(5) per  
DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~S/NFT~~ Interview of Admiral Michael Rogers, On 06/12/2017, Page 8 of 9 (b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

(b)(1) per NSA  
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
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Continuation of FD-302 of ~~(S//NF)~~ Interview of Admiral Michael Rogers, On 06/12/2017, Page 9 of 9

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/10/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Daniel Ray Coats, date of birth [Redacted] cell phone number [Redacted] home address [Redacted]

b6 per ODNI

[Redacted] was interviewed in his office at Liberty Crossing, 1500 Tysons McLean Drive, McLean, Virginia.

b6  
b7C

Participating in the interview were Associate Special Counsel James L. Quarles and FBI Special Agents [Redacted] Also present was Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) acting General Counsel Bradley Brooker. Before the interview began, SA [Redacted] advised Coats that lying to the FBI in the course of an investigation is a violation of federal law. Coats said he understood. He then provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Investigation on 06/14/2017 at McLean, Virginia, United States (In Person)

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b6  
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b7E

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/15/2017

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Daniel Coats Interview , On 06/14/2017 , Page 2 of 5

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

On January 26, 2017, Coats attended a dinner at the White House with the President.

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] the President also asked the group what they thought he should do with Comey.

[Redacted] The consensus was not positive, but no one openly advocated terminating Comey.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] he thought Comey was a good director [Redacted] Coats encouraged the President to meet Comey face-to-face and spend time with him before making a decision.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Daniel Coats Interview , On 06/14/2017 , Page 3 of 5

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

March 22, 2017 was one of Coats' first daily briefings as DNI. [Redacted]

[Redacted] the President to ask Coats and Pompeo to stay behind after Oval Office meetings and he did on that day. [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

no link between the President and Russia, and he asked if that was something they could say. [Redacted]

[Redacted] Coats said he could not, [Redacted]

[Redacted] Coats deflected the issue by saying the DNI had nothing to do with investigations and it was not his role. [Redacted]

[Redacted] The President never asked Coats to speak to Comey about the [Redacted] investigation [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Daniel Coats Interview, On 06/14/2017, Page 4 of 5

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] His job was only to provide intelligence and not get involved in investigations. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Coats specifically recalled the President's March 25, 2017 telephone call

b6 per ODNI

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] "I can't do anything with Russia, there's things I'd like to do with Russia, with trade, with ISIS, they're all over me with this. [Redacted]

[Redacted] Coats responded, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] The investigations are going to go on and the best thing to do is let them reach resolution as soon as possible. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3 per NSA

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Daniel Coats Interview, On 06/14/2017, Page 5 of 5

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3 per NSA

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP


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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/13/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

b6 per ODNI

Mike Dempsey, born [Redacted] personal mobile telephone [Redacted] [Redacted] personal e-mail [Redacted] was interviewed at his place of employment, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), located at Liberty Crossing II, McLean, Virginia. Present for this interview was the ODNI's Principal Deputy (and Acting) General Counsel Bradley A. Brooker, office telephone [Redacted]. Also participating in this interview were Associate Special Counsel James L. Quarles and FBI Special Agents [Redacted]. After providing them the identities of the interviewing agents and the reason for the interview, Dempsey was admonished regarding 18 USC § 1001 and the potential consequences for making false statements during a federal investigation. Having indicated his understanding of this admonishment, Dempsey thereafter provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

b3 per ODNI  
b6 per ODNI

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6 per ODNI  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Investigation on 06/14/2017 at McLean, Virginia, United States (In Person) b3  
 File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/15/2017 b6  
 by [Redacted] b7C  
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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Michael Dempsey interview, On 06/14/2017, Page 2 of 4

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

Coats expressed [Redacted]

Trump brought up the Russia investigation, and because Trump asked Coats to contact Comey and see if there was a way to get past the investigation, get it over with, end it, or words to that effect. Coats described it as "somewhere between musing about hating the investigation and I want you to



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Michael Dempsey interview , On 06/14/2017 , Page 3 of 4

do something to stop it." [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] Coats made it clear to Dempsey he had no intention of getting involved.

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] Coats told Dempsey he repeatedly told Trump the fastest way to "get it done" was to let it run its course. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP


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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Michael Dempsey interview, On 06/14/2017, Page 4 of 4

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b5 per DOJ/OIP



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/10/2017

Edward "Ted" Gistaro, born [Redacted] residing at [Redacted] mobile telephone [Redacted] office

b6

b7C

telephone [Redacted] e-mail [Redacted] was interviewed at his place of employment, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), located at Liberty Crossing II, McLean, Virginia. Present for this interview was the ODNI's Principal Deputy (and Acting) General Counsel Bradley A. Brooker, office telephone [Redacted]. Also participating in this interview were Associate Special Counsel James L. Quarles and FBI Special Agents [Redacted] and [Redacted]. After providing them the identities of the interviewing agents and the reason for the interview, Gistaro was admonished regarding 18 USC § 1001 and the potential consequences for making false statements during a federal investigation. Having indicated his understanding of this admonishment, Gistaro thereafter provided the following information:

b3 per ODNI

b6 per ODNI

b3 per ODNI

b6 per ODNI

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] President's Daily Briefing (PDB) [Redacted]

[Redacted] which started with Trump stating "you guys know there's no collusion, can't you guys put out a press statement" or words to that effect. [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 06/14/2017 at McLean, Virginia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/14/2017

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Edward Gistaro , On 06/14/2017 , Page 2 of 4

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

After the PDB ended, they left the West Wing and returned to [Redacted]

b3 per ODNI

[Redacted] As they walked, Coats told him Trump "kept me behind" and asked him what he could do to "help with the investigation."

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Edward Gistaro, On 06/14/2017, Page 3 of 4

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]


Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Edward Gistaro , On 06/14/2017 , Page 4 of 4

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/12/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

Michael Pompeo, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was interviewed in his office at CIA Headquarters, Langley, Virginia. Pompeo was accompanied by his personal attorney, [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]  
[Redacted] Participating in the interview were Deputy Special Counsel James L. Quarles and FBI Special Agents [Redacted]

[Redacted] After providing the identities of the interviewing agents and the reason for the interview, Pompeo was admonished regarding 18 USC § 1001 and the potential consequences for making false statements during a federal investigation. Pompeo said he understood and provided the following information:

[Redacted]

b3 per CIA  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

It was not unusual for the President to ask Pompeo [Redacted] to stay behind after the daily brief [Redacted] Pompeo could not recall if that happened March 22. [Redacted]

b3 per CIA  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

Investigation on 06/28/2017 at McLean, Virginia, United States (In Person)

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/29/2017

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Michael Pompeo interview, On 06/28/2017, Page 2 of 3

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

There were several occasions when the President "expressed enormous frustration with the Russia thing" to Pompeo and others, [Redacted]

b3 per CIA

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

The President frequently vented about the Russia investigation saying there was no evidence against him and that nobody would publicly defend him. [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] the President's belief that the purpose of the investigation was to delegitimize his presidency. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3 per CIA  
b5 per DOJ/OIP



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Michael Pompeo interview, On 06/28/2017, Page 3 of 3

b3 per CIA  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

The President clearly and regularly urged everyone to get whatever information "out" they could [Redacted]


[Redacted]

[Redacted] the President would <sup>ask</sup> them if they could get the word out that he hadn't done anything wrong: b3 per CIA  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/12/2018

(U) On 1/24/2018 GENERAL CHARLES BOYD, Chairman of the Board for the Center for the National Interest (CNI), was interviewed by Special Agent [Redacted] Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein at the law offices of Baker Hostetler 1050 Connecticut Avenue NW, #1100, Washington, DC 20036. Accompanying BOYD were attorneys [Redacted] and [Redacted] from [Redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing officials and the nature of the interview, BOYD provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

Investigation on 01/24/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 01/24/2018

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Charles Boyd , On 01/24/2018 , Page 2 of 6

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] CNI held an event in New York, NY hosted by Richard Plepler [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Charles Boyd , On 01/24/2018 , Page 3 of 6

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Charles Boyd , On 01/24/2018 , Page 4 of 6

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] BOYD did not see Sessions and Kislyak interact. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] the 5/23/2016 CNI Distinguished Service Awards dinner, [Redacted] BOYD thinks he may have seen Kislyak there [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Charles Boyd , On 01/24/2018 , Page 5 of 6

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Charles Boyd , On 01/24/2018 , Page 6 of 6

b3  
b6  
b7C


[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C



b7E

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/01/2018

AVRAHM JOEL BERKOWITZ, aka AVI BERKOWITZ, date of birth [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, Washington, D.C. Also present were BERKOWITZ's attorneys, [Redacted] Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20036-1564, telephone 202-887-4000; Senior Assistant Special Counsel Jeannie Rhee; Senior Assistant Special Counsel Zainab Ahmad; and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein. At the request of his attorneys, BERKOWITZ was provided with and signed a proffer letter at the beginning of the interview. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, BERKOWITZ voluntarily provided the following information:

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 01/12/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 01/12/2018

b6  
b7C

by [Redacted]



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Avrahm Joel Berkowitz , On 01/12/2018 , Page 2 of 10

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Avrahm Joel Berkowitz , On 01/12/2018 , Page 3 of 10

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Avrahm Joel Berkowitz , On 01/12/2018 , Page 4 of 10

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Avrahm Joel Berkowitz , On 01/12/2018 , Page 5 of 10

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Avrahm Joel Berkowitz , On 01/12/2018 , Page 6 of 10

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Avrahm Joel Berkowitz , On 01/12/2018 , Page 7 of 10

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

BERKOWITZ met KISLYAK

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Avrahm Joel Berkowitz , On 01/12/2018 , Page 8 of 10

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] BERKOWITZ had "googled" GORKOV and told KUSHNER that he appeared to be a banker. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Avrahm Joel Berkowitz , On 01/12/2018 , Page 9 of 10

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Avrahm Joel Berkowitz , On 01/12/2018 , Page 10 of 10

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]


b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]



(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(C)  
(b)(7)(E)

FBI INFO.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified by: NSICG [redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reason: 1.4 (C)

Declassify on: 12-31-2042

Date of entry 07/18/2017

Date: 01-23-2020

**DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS**

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

(U) Richard H. Ledgett, Jr., former Deputy Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), telephone number [redacted] email account [redacted] was interviewed in an office of the FBI's Washington Field Office. Participating in the interview were Deputy Special Counsel Aaron M. Zebley and FBI SAs [redacted] Before the interview began, SA [redacted] advised Ledgett that lying to the FBI in the course of an investigation is a violation of federal law. Ledgett said he understood. He then provided the following information:

(b)(6) per NSA and FBI

(b)(7)(C)

(U) Ledgett retired from government service on April 28, 2017, but prior to that was NSA Deputy Director for a little over three years.

**(U) I. Call on March 26, 2017**

(U) Ledgett was present and overheard both sides of a telephone conversation NSA Director Admiral Michael Rogers had with President Donald Trump on March 26, 2017. [redacted]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(U) [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(7)(C)  
[redacted] (b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(S//NF) [redacted] (b)(5) per DOJ/OIP  
The President told Rogers "the thing with the Russians is [redacted]"

~~Reason: 1.4 (b)  
Derived From: National Security Information SCG  
Declassify On: 20421231~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 06/13/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person) (b)(3)  
File # [redacted] Date drafted 06/30/2017 (b)(6)  
by [redacted] (b)(7)(C)  
(b)(7)(E)  
FBI(196v1278)-2142

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Richard Ledgett, On 06/13/2017, Page 2 of 5

messing up" his ability to get things done with Russia.

(S)

The President then asked Rogers

if there was "anything

[Rogers] can do to discount it publicly" or otherwise "beat this down in the press."

(b)(1) per NSA  
(b)(3) per NSA

(b)(5)  
per  
DOJ/  
OIP

(b)(5) per  
DOJ/OIP

(U) The President's request was the most unusual thing Ledgett had seen in 40 years of government service. he decided to write a memorandum documenting the call.

(b)(5) per  
DOJ/OIP

Ledgett added a place for Rogers to sign.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Richard Ledgett, On 06/13/2017, Page 3 of 5

[Redacted]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(U) [Redacted]

(b)(7)(E)

(U) [Redacted]

(b)(3) per NSA  
(b)(7)(E)

(U) [Redacted]

(b)(3) per NSA  
(b)(7)(E)

(S) [Redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) per NSA and FBI  
(b)(7)(E)

[Redacted]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Richard Ledgett, On 06/13/2017, Page 4 of 5

[Redacted]

(b)(5)  
per  
DOJ/  
OIP

[Redacted]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(b)(5)  
per  
DOJ/  
OIP

[Redacted]

(b)(5) per  
DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(b)(5)  
per  
DOJ/  
OIP

[Redacted]

(b)(5)  
per  
DOJ/  
OIP

(S)

[Redacted]

(b)(1)  
per NSA  
(b)(3)  
per NSA

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)  
(b)(7)(E)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Richard Ledgett, On 06/13/2017, Page 5 of 5

[REDACTED]

(b)(5)  
per DOJ/  
OIP

(S)


[REDACTED]

(b)(1) per  
NSA  
(b)(3) per  
NSA

[REDACTED]

(b)(5)  
per DOJ/  
OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/15/2018

RINAT AKHMETSHIN, date of birth [Redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, Washington, D.C. Also present were AKHMETSHIN's attorneys, Michael Tremonte and Michael Gibaldi of Sher Tremonte LLP, 90 Broad Street, 23rd Floor, New York, New York 10004, telephone 212-202-2600; Supervisory Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] Staff Operations Specialist [Redacted] Assistant Special Counsel L. Rush Atkinson; and Special Agent [Redacted] U.S. Department of State/Bureau of Diplomatic Security. At the request of Tremonte, AKHMETSHIN was provided with and signed a proffer letter at the beginning of the interview. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, AKHMETSHIN voluntarily provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

b6 Per DOS  
b7C Per DOS

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP  
b3 Per DOS  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6 Per DOS

Investigation on 11/14/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] [Redacted] Date drafted 11/14/2017

by [Redacted]

b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Rinat Akhmetshin , On 11/14/2017 , Page 2 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6 Per DOS

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6 Per DOS

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6 Per DOS

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6 Per FBI & DOS

b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6 Per DOS



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Rinat Akhmetshin , On 11/14/2017 , Page 3 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6 Per DOS

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6 Per DOS

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6 Per FBI & DOS

b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6 Per FBI & DOS

b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6 Per FBI & DOS

b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6

b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Rinat Akhmetshin , On 11/14/2017 , Page 4 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

AKHMETSHIN's [Redacted] clients were PREVEZON and [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Rinat Akhmetshin , On 11/14/2017 , Page 5 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] AKHMETSHIN

advised that [Redacted] the Magnitsky Act [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Rinat Akhmetshin , On 11/14/2017 , Page 6 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Rinat Akhmetshin , On 11/14/2017 , Page 7 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Rinat Akhmetshin , On 11/14/2017 , Page 8 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Rinat Akhmetshin , On 11/14/2017 , Page 9 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Rinat Akhmetshin , On 11/14/2017 , Page 10 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP



[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Rinat Akhmetshin , On 11/14/2017 , Page 11 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Rinat Akhmetshin , On 11/14/2017 , Page 12 of 18

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

They

were told that because they [the TRUMP side] were not yet in government, there was nothing that they could do. AKHMETSHIN said that DONALD TRUMP, JR said, "When we win, come and see us again."

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Rinat Akhmetshin , On 11/14/2017 , Page 13 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Rinat Akhmetshin , On 11/14/2017 , Page 14 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Rinat Akhmetshin , On 11/14/2017 , Page 15 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Rinat Akhmetshin , On 11/14/2017 , Page 16 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Rinat Akhmetshin , On 11/14/2017 , Page 17 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]


Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Rinat Akhmetshin, On 11/14/2017, Page 18 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C





UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/29/2018

Avrahm "Avi" Berkowitz was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street SE, Washington, DC, pursuant to a proffer agreement. Berkowitz was accompanied by his attorneys

[Redacted] Present for the interview were Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] SA [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

and Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Andrew Goldstein. Berkowitz signed a proffer agreement prior to the interview. SASC Zainab Ahmad and SASC Brandon Van Grack were present for parts of the interview. After being advised and acknowledging it is a crime to lie to the FBI in the course of an investigation, Berkowitz provided the following information:

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 03/22/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 03/23/2018

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Avrahm Berkowitz, On 03/22/2018, Page 2 of 13

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Avrahm Berkowitz, On 03/22/2018, Page 3 of 13

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Avrahm Berkowitz, On 03/22/2018, Page 4 of 13

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] Berkowitz did not respond to Gorkov's assistant's meeting request [Redacted]

[Redacted] At the time, Berkowitz was aware of the press coverage regarding the Russia investigation and therefore did not respond to the meeting request. Berkowitz did not tell Kushner

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Avrahm Berkowitz, On 03/22/2018, Page 5 of 13

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6 per DOS

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6 per DOS

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

b6 per DOS

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Avrahm Berkowitz , On 03/22/2018 , Page 6 of 13

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6 per DOS

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6 per DOS

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Avrahm Berkowitz, On 03/22/2018, Page 7 of 13

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Avrahm Berkowitz, On 03/22/2018, Page 8 of 13

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Avrahm Berkowitz, On 03/22/2018, Page 9 of 13

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Avrahm Berkowitz, On 03/22/2018, Page 10 of 13

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Avrahm Berkowitz, On 03/22/2018, Page 11 of 13

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Avrahm Berkowitz, On 03/22/2018, Page 12 of 13

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Avrahm Berkowitz, On 03/22/2018, Page 13 of 13

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C


[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b3 Per ODNI  
b6 Per FBI & ODNI  
b7C

Date of entry 07/10/2017

John Culver, born [Redacted] residing at [Redacted]  
[Redacted] personal mobile telephone [Redacted]  
office telephone [Redacted] was interviewed at his place of employment,  
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), located at  
Liberty Crossing II, McLean, Virginia. Present for this interview was the  
ODNI's Principal Deputy (and Acting) General Counsel Bradley A. Brooker,  
office telephone [Redacted] Also participating in this interview were  
Associate Special Counsel James L. Quarles and FBI Special Agents [Redacted]  
[Redacted] After providing them the identities of the  
interviewing agents and the reason for the interview, Culver was  
admonished regarding 18 USC § 1001 and the potential consequences for  
making false statements during a federal investigation. Having indicated  
his understanding of this admonishment, Culver thereafter provided the  
following information:

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3 Per FBI & ODNI  
b6

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 06/14/2017 at McLean, Virginia, United States (In Person)  
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/14/2017  
by [Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of John Culver , On 06/14/2017 , Page 2 of 4

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
[Redacted] b3  
[Redacted] b6 Per FBI & DOS

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] After the briefing concluded, Trump asked  
Coats and CIA Director Pompeo to stay behind. [Redacted]

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
[Redacted] b3 Per FBI & ODNI  
[Redacted] b6 Per FBI & DOS

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of John Culver, On 06/14/2017, Page 3 of 4

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
[Redacted] Gistaro [Redacted] said Coats was upset because Trump asked Coats to contact Comey to convince him there was nothing to the Russia investigation.

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of John Culver, On 06/14/2017, Page 4 of 4

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP


[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/07/2018

On or around 10/10/2018, SA [Redacted] SA [Redacted] Assistant United States Attorney [Redacted] Trial Attorney [Redacted] [Redacted] from DOJ's Counterintelligence and Export Control Section, and Special Counsel Prosecutor Andrew Weissmann interviewed RICK GATES at the offices of his counsel, Tom Greene. Greene was present for the interview. After providing the identities of the interview team, GATES provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

Call with [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Someone at [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

The goal in talking to [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

Prior to the call with [Redacted] GATES had indicated to [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 10/10/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

b6

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/21/2018

b7A

by [Redacted]

b7C

b7E

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b7A  
b7E

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICHARD GATES III

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_ on 10/10/2018 SDNY , On 10/10/2018 , Page 2 of 12

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted] should have been informed that GATES would [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b7A

EX 119 [Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted] GATES had [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b7A  
b7E

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICHARD GATES III

Continuation of FD-302 of on 10/10/2018 SDNY , On 10/10/2018 , Page 3 of 12

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

EX 12 [Redacted]

b7A

[Redacted]

b7A

EX 13 [Redacted]

b7A

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b7A  
b7E

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICHARD GATES III

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] on 10/10/2018 SDNY, On 10/10/2018, Page 4 of 12

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted] wanted his role to be secret. GATES suspected that if [Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] There was no legitimate business reason for [Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

EX 129

It was never specified to GATES who [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

EX 15 [Redacted]

b7A

GATES was the main person coordinating [Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b7A  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICHARD GATES III

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] on 10/10/2018 SDNY, On 10/10/2018, Page 5 of 12

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

EX 16 [Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

It was clear to [Redacted] that GATES and MANAFORT were receiving direction from YANUKOVYCH.

EX 18 [Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b7A  
b7E

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICHARD GATES III

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_ on 10/10/2018 SDNY , On 10/10/2018 , Page 6 of 12

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

EX 108

GATES did not recall

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

EX155

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

EX 20

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

Information about

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

At around this time,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

EX 156

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b7A  
b7E

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICHARD GATES III

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_ on 10/10/2018 SDNY , On 10/10/2018 , Page 7 of 12

It could be true that [Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

EX 30 [Redacted]

b7A

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

EX 49 [Redacted]

b7A

The Ukrainians were able to get information through their embassy before MANAFORT, GATES and the other lobbyists. In this instance, the embassy had been notified by the Department of State.

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b7A  
b7E

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICHARD GATES III

Continuation of FD-302 of on 10/10/2018 SDNY , On 10/10/2018 , Page 8 of 12

[Large Redacted Block]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

EX 122

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

At the time of this document, it was known to

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

It was likewise known that

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Large Redacted Block]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

EX 74

[Redacted]

b7A

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b7A  
b7E

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICHARD GATES III

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] on 10/10/2018 SDNY, On 10/10/2018, Page 9 of 12

At this time, [Redacted] GATES did not know if [Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

At this time, [Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

EX 82 [Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

At this time, [Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

EX 110 [Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

After this [Redacted]

Those included on the [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

Because the [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b7A  
b7E

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICHARD GATES III

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] on 10/10/2018 SDNY, On 10/10/2018, Page 10 of 12

EX 84

[Redacted]

b7A

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

EX 88

[Redacted]

b7A

[Redacted]

GATES did not recall which

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

EX 112

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b7A  
b7E

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICHARD GATES III

Continuation of FD-302 of on 10/10/2018 SDNY, On 10/10/2018, Page 11 of 12

GATES

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b7A  
b7E

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICHARD GATES III

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_ on 10/10/2018 SDNY, On 10/10/2018, Page 12 of 12

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

EX 175 (Government Exhibit 714)

MANAFORT had asked GATES

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

MANAFORT and

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

MANAFORT and GATES called

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

GATES

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

GATES talked to

[Redacted]

and they determined that

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

At the time,


[Redacted]

was disclosed, they

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/22/2019

On or around October 10, 2018, SA [Redacted] and Department of Justice (DOJ) attorneys James Mann, Nicole Lockhart, and Ryan Ellersick interviewed RICHARD GATES III at the offices of Sidley in Washington DC. Present for the interview, was GATES' counsel, Thomas Greene. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties, GATES provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

Introduction to [Redacted] and work in Gabon

GATES had been introduced to [Redacted] through a project in Gabon. In late 2014, [Redacted]

b6  
b7A per DOJ/OIP  
b7C

[Redacted] provided GATES a binder full of information from [Redacted]. Their initial investigation had been complex and determined that the Minister of Energy for Gabon was close to [Redacted] but [Redacted] and would likely take away [Redacted] s concessions. At that point in time, [Redacted] had worked for 3 or 4 months to reach a solution. [Redacted] was trying to get JOSEPH BIDEN to reach out to the president.

b6  
b7A per DOJ/OIP  
b7C

GATES was brought in to help for his contacts on congressional foreign relations committee, including BOB CORKER and others. [Redacted] offered a significant success fee to clear the issue but would not pay unless GA was successful.

b6  
b7A per DOJ/OIP  
b7C

GATES tried but there was not a lot that he could do. GATES tried to set up a meeting with the US ambassador to Gabon and also brought the issue to [Redacted] to get BIDEN involved. GATES realized it would be a difficult endeavor.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A per DOJ/OIP  
b7C

Trump Campaign

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 10/10/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted]

Date drafted 11/20/2018

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICK GATES 10/10

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 PIN [Redacted], On 10/10/2018, Page 2 of 7

In June 2016, [Redacted] b6

[Redacted] b7A per DOJ/OIP  
[Redacted] b7C

GATES saw [Redacted] and they spoke for approximately b6  
20 minutes. They met again in Washington, DC two weeks later. At that b7A per DOJ/OIP  
[Redacted] b7C

The campaign set up approximately twelve finance vice chairs with [Redacted] b6

[Redacted] as the lead finance chair. [Redacted] b7A per DOJ/OIP  
[Redacted] b7C

[Redacted] knew STEVE MNUCHIN. [No further information (NFI)]

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b7A per DOJ/OIP  
b7C

Inauguration

The Trump Campaign's fundraisers received tickets for the inauguration based on the amount of money they brought in. [Redacted]

[Redacted] and would have kept a list of every event. Later, [Redacted] b6  
[Redacted] from the RNC took over as record keeper. The RNC should have records b7C  
including how much money was donated and who received credit for the donations.

The RNC would vet any entities or individuals who donated but would not have looked into who received tickets to the events.

Post-Campaign

GATES formed Konik Madison (KM) as a lobbying firm with [Redacted]

[Redacted] KM had multiple clients. b6  
b7C

America First Policies (AFP) was an outside entity used to advertise for policy initiatives. AFP was unrelated to the work GATES performed for b6

[Redacted] b7A per DOJ/OIP  
[Redacted] b7C

[Redacted] did not know the logistics of Washington. In or around April of 2017, [Redacted] GATES for [Redacted]

[Redacted] GATES was [Redacted] b6  
[Redacted] b7A per DOJ/OIP  
[Redacted] b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] b4 per DOC  
[Redacted] b6  
[Redacted] b7A per DOJ/OIP  
[Redacted] b7C

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICK GATES 10/10

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018 PIN , On 10/10/2018 , Page 3 of 7

[Redacted]

b4 per DOC  
b6  
b7A per DOJ/OIP  
b7C

[Redacted]

b4 per DOC  
b6 per FBI/DOC  
b7A per DOJ/OIP  
b7C

In the Spring or Summer of 2017, a Romanian governmental delegation attended a dinner with approximately 25-30 people at Trump Tower.

[Redacted]

were among the attendees. According to [Redacted] one of the Romanians at Trump Tower dinner had attended the inauguration. GATES tried to get [Redacted]

b6 e  
b7A per DOJ/OIP  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] had connections in Washington DC and "on the Hill" and, around time of the Inauguration, took Romanian individuals to "the Hill" for introductions and meetings. [Redacted] was rising up in the government Romania and had come to the US, but GATES never met him.

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b7A per DOJ/OIP  
b7C

[Redacted]

b4 per DOC  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A per DOJ/OIP  
b7C

[Redacted] and DONALD TRUMP had played golf in 2009 and had hit it off. In April 2017, Malaysia was scheduling bilateral meetings in the US. [Redacted] had talked to TRUMP about playing a round of golf with [Redacted] and had told to organize it with REINCE PREIBUS. PREIBUS had been blowing off [Redacted] [Redacted] said he would only come for the bilateral meetings if golf was involved.

b6  
b7A per DOJ/OIP  
b7C

In August 2017, JOHN KELLY took over as TRUMP's Chief of Staff. Around this time, [Redacted] saw TRUMP at a fundraiser in Dallas. TRUMP told [Redacted] that he would play a round of golf with [Redacted] Later, H.R. MCMASTER and KELLY both vetoed the idea.

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b7A per DOJ/OIP  
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[Redacted] came to the US for a half-day bilateral meeting.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICK GATES 10/10

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In the Fall of 2017, [Redacted]

[Redacted] TRUMP was taking a trade miss**b6**  
to Malaysia and [Redacted] **b7A per DOJ/OIP**  
[Redacted] **b7C**

GATES helped [Redacted] edit talking points for a meeting with REX TILLERS**b6**  
The talking points covered topics related to Malaysia and were written **b7A per DOJ/OIP**  
TILLERSON's meeting with [Redacted] **b7C**

1MDB

The 1MDB project was tied to the Malaysian delegation that arrived for the bilateral meetings.

GATES understood that DOJ was seizing money related to ongoing litigation against 1MDB in the US. [Redacted] told GATES to have it taken care of. GAT**b6**  
understood this to be a request for GATES to find out where DOJ was wi**b7A per DOJ/OIP**  
regards to the investigation. GATES understood that [Redacted] was **b7C**  
willing to give up assets, but that he wanted the investigation to be resolved.

After [Redacted] saw TRUMP at the Dallas fundraiser, [Redacted] arranged a meeting for [Redacted] with TRUMP in the White House. [Redacted] went to GATES for advice before the meeting. The meeting occurred sometime around May. KELLY had attended a portion of [Redacted] meeting but had left before the **b6** discussion of 1MDB. [Redacted] later told GATES that he brought 1MDB up wi**b7A per DOJ/OIP** TRUMP and that TRUMP responded that he would take care of it. [Redacted] **b7C** asked if he should bring it up with JEFF SESSIONS and TRUMP responded that he absolutely should not. TRUMP was willing to help because TRUMP liked [Redacted] left with no action items.

After his meeting with TRUMP, [Redacted] and GATES discussed strategy. GAT**b6** informed [Redacted] that the people at DOJ with the most influence over th**b7A per DOJ/OIP** 1MDB case would be the head of civil division, RACHEL BRAND, and the **b7C** of the National Security Division, JOHN DEMERS.

DEMERS had worked for [Redacted] before joining DOJ. [Redacted] **b6**  
[Redacted] **b7A per DOJ/OIP**  
**b7C**

[Redacted] asked GATES if he should get SESSIONS to address the issue, and GATES said no. [Redacted] told GATES he was thinking about writing an emai**b6** o Sessions. To the best of GATES' knowledge, [Redacted] did not meet with **b7A per DOJ/OIP** SESSIONS. **b7C**

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[redacted]  
(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICK GATES 10/10  
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GATES understood [redacted] was helping resolve 1MDB as a favor to [redacted] b6  
[redacted] did not tell GATES that [redacted] b7A per DOJ/OIP  
[redacted] GATES did not believe that [redacted] sh b7C l  
a personal stake or interest in 1MDB.

[redacted] had a contact in Malaysia but never mentioned the name of who i b6  
was. [redacted] referred to this contact as his guy. b7A per DOJ/OIP  
b7C

By the time news came out about 1MDB, the issues had been resolved. [redacted] b6  
told that GATES that if anyone asked to tell them that they never got b7A per DOJ/OIP  
anything off the ground. b7C

When [redacted] GATES had asked [redacted] if he should  
be concerned. [redacted] told GATES not to worry and that he did not have b6  
[redacted] with GATES because they only used Whatsapp. GATES asked what ti b7A per DOJ/OIP  
[redacted] did not know. The biggest b7C  
concern had been the fact of GATES and [redacted] being connected.

GATES did not press [redacted] was GATES' only b6  
[redacted] b7A per DOJ/OIP  
[redacted] b7C

[redacted] b6  
[redacted] b7A per DOJ/OIP  
[redacted] b7C

Other Appointments

Early on, [redacted] for an appointment as a United  
States Attorney. [redacted] b6  
[redacted] b7A per DOJ/OIP  
[redacted] b7C

[redacted] b6  
[redacted] b7A per DOJ/OIP  
[redacted] b7C

FARA and other GATES troubles

GATES had legal concerns of his own and was contemplating pleading guilty  
to the charges against him. As [redacted] b6  
[redacted] GATES talked to [redacted] b7A per DOJ/OIP  
[redacted] b7C

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICK GATES 10/10

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[Redacted] But the two did not discuss the specifics of the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA) charges against GATES. But GATES believe that [Redacted] was aware of FARA [NFI].

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b7A per DOJ/OIP  
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Miscellaneous

GATES had last spoken to [Redacted] in August 2018.

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b7A per DOJ/OIP  
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The Viceroy Hotel in California had been bought and sold by THOMAS BARRACK.

GATES and [Redacted] had used Whatsapp, Wickr, and Confide to communicate. Documents usually came through Whatsapp.

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b7A per DOJ/OIP  
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[Redacted]

GATES advocated using encrypted communications and had been using [Redacted] previously.

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[Redacted]

b7E

This was information from a colleague of [Redacted] close to someone in GRASSLEY's staff.

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[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted] had asked for information over the phone for the top two people at DOJ who could influence the 1MDB case. GATES had conducted research.

b6  
b7A per DOJ/OIP  
b7C

[Redacted] had reached out to someone regarding [Redacted] but GATES did not follow-up.

[Redacted]

b7E

At some point after [Redacted] meeting with TRUMP, [Redacted] and GATES had conversed telephonically about talking points for a future [Redacted] meeting. GATES had drafted the talking points as they spoke.

b6  
b7A per DOJ/OIP  
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The National Security Council at this time was headed by MCMASTER. GAT told [Redacted] that ultimately the 1MDB lawsuit would be resolved by DOJ.

b6  
b7A per DOJ/OIP  
b7C

TRUMP support would ensure that [Redacted] was re-elected.

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The first of GATES' talking points was not true. The third and fourth points were accurate to GATES' understanding, but there was no corroboration beyond [Redacted] statements.

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b7A per DOJ/OIP  
b7C

References to DEMERS were puffery.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICK GATES 10/10

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[Redacted]

b7E

The "M" issue referred to Malaysia.

At this time, [Redacted] was still looking for a contact at DOJ regarding 1MDB issues. RACHEL BRAND was known to be a supporter of President Trump at DOJ and could be friendly contact.

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b7A per DOJ/OIP  
b7C

[Redacted] was reaching out to DOJ on behalf of [Redacted] was aware of what they were working on but did not have as much detail as GATES. outreach never materialized as [Redacted] cooled off on the issue.

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b7A per DOJ/OIP  
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[Redacted] referred to putting out headlines related to US Senator DIANE FEINSTEIN.

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[Redacted] referred to Malaysian companies involved in the summit.

b7E

[Redacted]

b7E


[Redacted] had considered joining Mar-a-lago at GATES' suggestion.

b6  
b7A per DOJ/OIP  
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[Redacted]

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 03/15/2018

Richard William Gates III, previously identified, was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] Supervisory Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutors Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres. Present for Gates were Thomas Green, [Redacted] of Sidley Austin LLP. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, Gates provided the following information:

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Gates signed and acknowledged understanding the proffer agreement and was reminded that the interview was voluntary, but if he chose to answer questions he needed to be truthful in his responses.

US Consultants Program Background

After Viktor Yanukovych won the 2010 Presidential election in Ukraine, Manafort began presenting the idea of creating a US and European government relations (GR) and public relations (PR) campaign aimed at promoting Ukraine's entry into the European Union (EU). Manafort was the driver behind Ukraine's Association Agreement and Free Trade Agreement with the EU.

When Yanukovych agreed to Manafort's idea to implement a coordinated GR /PR strategy, Manafort and Gates began doing research on which firms in Europe and the US would be used. During this process, Manafort and Gates learned some members of the Party of Regions (PoR) had already hired their own GR/PR firms to represent individual business interests. For example,, the Minister of Finance had hired APCO; another PoR minister had hired Edelman; yet another PoR minister had hired [Redacted] and the Minister of Agriculture had hired a different GR/PR firm.

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In response to the disorganization caused by different PoR ministers having different GR/PR firms, Yanukovych held a "big meeting". Gates was not present at this meeting, but Manafort was. Manafort relayed to Gates that during the meeting, Yanukovych decided to consolidate the GR/PR effort. Yanukovych appointed Sergei Kluyiev to manage the effort with Manafort. The program was referred to as the "Anti Crisis" program.

Investigation on 02/01/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

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File # [Redacted] Date drafted 02/01/2018

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by [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4, On 02/01/2018, Page 2 of 23

Manafort and Gates made a list of various firms in Europe and the US and came up with a budget for the Anti Crisis program. Project Hapsburg was included under the umbrella of this program.

#### The ECFMU

When Manafort and Gates began working with Kluyiev, they learned he had already created the European Centre for a Modern Ukraine (ECFMU). It was typical for Ukrainian politicians to set up non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like the ECFMU to handle lobbying efforts. The reason for this was to avoid Ukraine's procurement process. Ukraine's procurement process prohibited the hiring of lobbying firms in general and also limited the budget for government contracts to \$1 million. To get around these limitations, government officials would use NGOs as the vehicle to hire lobbying firms, or manage contracts in excess of \$1 million. Generally, the NGOs were established outside of Ukraine. By way of example, Rinat Akhmetov's had an NGO in the US in which US Senators were involved.

Kluyiev asked Manafort to meet with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was also involved in the

[REDACTED] Prior to this, Gates had never met [REDACTED]

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b7C

Later, [REDACTED] started working for Prime Minister Azarov. In contrast to Kluyiev, Azarov did not believe in aligning Ukraine with Europe. This caused tension because [REDACTED] was trying to do the bidding of both Azarov and Kluyiev, but their missions were not aligned.

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b6  
b7A  
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[REDACTED] ended up working together a lot as they were both on the ground in Ukraine, but they did not get along. Gates described [REDACTED]

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b7C

Manafort and Gates met with [REDACTED]. It was decided that [REDACTED] would handle the European based firms while Manafort and Gates handled the US based firms. Gates and [REDACTED] interviewed a number of consulting firms in Brussels, London and Paris. Kluyiev had strong ideas as it related to the European firms. Gates and [REDACTED] looked at Fleischman Hillard, APCO, Burson Marsteller and other firms Gates could not recall. Gates believed

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4, On 02/01/2018, Page 3 of 23

he and [REDACTED] looked at 7-8 different firms and ultimately settled on 3 or 4 of them. b6  
b7C

Manafort chose the US consultants. Manafort felt strongly about hiring

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Manafort also identified 3 firms for the Democrat side and ultimately settled on [REDACTED]. Gates recalled he and Manafort looked at [REDACTED] Prime Policy, as well as

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Gates looked at a firm in New York called NP3, or something similar to that, [REDACTED]. There was one other firm in New York which Manafort looked at, but they already had a contract with Gazprom and therefore had a conflict of interest. b6  
b7C

When asked what [REDACTED] was in choosing the consultants, Gates stated he and Manafort took the lead on interviewing the firms in the US, but [REDACTED] joined in that effort at some point. Gates stated that [REDACTED] was "in control", but she deferred to Manafort on the US firms. b6  
b7C

Gates made the initial contact with [REDACTED]

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Gates was asked why the ECFMU was used as the [REDACTED]. Gates explained that Manafort was "mandated" to work with Kluyev on the Anti Crisis project. Kluyev had already set up the ECFMU prior to Manafort and Gates working with him. The ECFMU had been set up so Kluyev could avoid procurement issues. Gates did not know if Yanukovych even knew what the ECFMU was, or that it existed. b7A

Gates learned about Ukraine's procurement process when he started working on the Skadden Report. Gates was reminded that the client for the Skadden Report was the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice.

Gates was asked why an NGO was not used for the Skadden Report if the purpose was to avoid procurement issues. Gates stated that the GR/PR campaigns were going to cost more than the \$1 million allowed by the Ukrainian procurement process and therefore an NGO was used to avoid this

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4, On 02/01/2018, Page 4 of 23

limitation. Gates was reminded that Skadden was paid more than \$1 million for the Skadden Report.

Gates stated that Skadden was paid \$1 million directly by the Ministry of Justice and then paid an additional \$4 million through Manafort controlled accounts in Cyprus. Manafort and [REDACTED] arranged for the additional payments through Manafort controlled accounts in Cyprus to supplement the payments which came directly from the Ministry of Justice.

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Gates was asked why an NGO was used for the GR/PR firms, but not for Skadden Report if the purpose for using an NGO was to allow for payments in excess of \$1 million. Gates stated that the Ministry of Justice paid Skadden a "nominal amount", but an oligarch funded the additional \$4 million paid to Skadden through Manafort's accounts.

Gates explained that the GR/PR firms were paid between \$3-\$5 million total. For this reason, an NGO was needed to bypass Ukraine's procurement process. Oligarchs financed the payments to the GR/PR firms by wiring money to Manafort controlled accounts in Cyprus. Manafort then wired the money to the GR/PR firms. Gates believed some of the funding from the oligarchs also went to the ECFMU which was responsible for paying the GR/PR firms in Europe.

Gates was asked again why an NGO was used for [REDACTED] but not for the Skadden Report since both avoided the procurement issue by funneling oligarch money through Manafort's accounts in Cyprus.

b7A

Gates stated that the Ministry of Justice needed to be the client for the Skadden Report. The purpose of the Skadden Report was to make it appear that the Ukrainian government was hiring Skadden to do an independent review of the Tymoshenko matter.

[REDACTED] b7A

Kluyiev was using the ECFMU for the lobbying campaigns in Europe and he directed Manafort and Gates to use the ECFMU for the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Gates initially said he did not know why Kluyiev wanted this. Gates then said, the ECFMU provided the appearance of an arms length distance [REDACTED]

b7A

[REDACTED] The ECFMU provided an appearance that the positions for which [REDACTED] the government of Ukraine and PoR. One reason for using the ECFMU was for this air of legitimacy.



[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4 , On 02/01/2018 , Page 5 of 23

The use of the ECFMU was not Manafort or Gates' decision, it was Kluyiev's. The ECFMU served a dual purpose, it helped avoid the procurement issue and it legitimized the message [Redacted]

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The ECFMU was originally designed for work in Europe, hence the name and the mission statement being focused on outreach to Europe. The reason lobbying shops in the US were hired was because the US had the ability to leverage their influence on European governments in favor of Ukraine.

The ECFMU was a small organization with 4 staff members: [Redacted] [Redacted] had good contacts within European parliaments. [Redacted] was aggressive, but her English was weak and she had to hire a translator to work with the ECFMU. [Redacted] spoke German and Ukrainian.

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Gates' relationship with [Redacted] was "pretty good" as they spent a considerable amount of time together. Gates thought [Redacted] was "competent", but rough around the edges. [Redacted] did not understand the nuances of politics, but she was tough.

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The ECFMU was supposed to pay [Redacted] but Kluyiev and Manafort decided that they would be paid through Manafort controlled accounts instead. Gates believed this was because one oligarch paid for the US lobbying campaign and a different oligarch paid for the European lobbying campaign.

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This became a problem in 2013 and 2014 when the Cypriot banking crisis occurred and Manafort and Gates had difficulty moving large sums of money out of the Cypriot accounts.

There were discussions with [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b7A

[Redacted]

b7A

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4, On 02/01/2018, Page 6 of 23

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The Client

Gates was shown an email from him to

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b6  
b7A  
b7C

b6  
b7A  
b7C

By the time of the email above, Gates already knew that the ECFMU was being used for the European lobbying firms, but he did not think the decision to use the ECFMU for the US lobbying firms had been made yet. Gates believed sometime in, or around March 2012, Manafort and Kluyiev had a conversation in which it was decided that the ECFMU should be used for the US lobbying firms as well.

Regardless of whether the client was the ECFMU or the government of Ukraine, the lobbying firms would be representing the government of Ukraine. Yanukovich had designated Kluyiev to handle this matter and Kluyiev wanted to use the ECFMU. With, or without the ECFMU, the lobbying campaign was for PoR and was authorized specifically by Yanukovich.

Gates was shown an email from

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"In a short conversation with Rick Gates this evening I have the following update:

1. The contracting body will be the newly registered European Centre for Modern Ukraine. This was recently registered in Brussels. Rick said that its basis is to be open and transparent as possible.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4 , On 02/01/2018 , Page 7 of 23

2. It has been established by the ruling Party of the Regions. The actual money "will come from the Government". Payment will be in advance."

Gates had contact with [Redacted] when he was interviewing Fleischman Hillard to be one of the European based lobbying firms. [Redacted] [Redacted] Fleischman Hillard to handle the entire European campaign as they had good contacts in the UK parliament and cabinet positions and had affiliates in Paris, France.

Ultimately, Burson Marsteller ended up doing a better job on the GR side and Fleischman Hillard was used primarily to do the digital campaign.

[Redacted] about the ECFMU. Gates told [Redacted] the ECFMU had been established by PoR and that the government of Ukraine was the client. Gates clarified that the ECFMU was established by Kluyiev and not by PoR. Kluyiev established the ECFMU on behalf of the government of Ukraine and in his capacity as the First Prime Minister of Ukraine. PoR was the ruling party at the time, but Gates thought it was more accurate to describe the ECFMU as established by the government of Ukraine as opposed to by PoR.

With respect to how Fleischman Hillard would be paid, Gates believed he told [Redacted] that the funds would come from various business interests, but he could not recall for sure. Gates did not think he would have provided specific information to [Redacted] about who was funding the lobbying campaign. Gates understood that the paymaster oligarchs did not want to be named.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b7A

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4, On 02/01/2018, Page 8 of 23

[REDACTED]

b7A

Gates was also shown email communication between Gates and [REDACTED] dated [REDACTED]

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Gates was asked if [REDACTED] Gates stated that per [REDACTED] Kluyiev, in his capacity as an individual, financed the ECFMU. [REDACTED] told Gates funding for the ECFMU did not come from PoR or the government of Ukraine. Gates explained that "perception can be muddled" because Kluyiev was both the First Prime Minister of Ukraine and a private citizen. Gates believed Kluyiev was working as a private citizen with regards to the ECFMU.

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Gates was asked if the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was done for Kluyiev, as a private citizen, or for PoR or the government of Ukraine. Gates stated that there was "no question" the government of Ukraine, including Kluyiev and other government officials "weighed in" on how to direct [REDACTED]

b7A

Gates was asked why he and Manafort updated Yanukovich on [REDACTED] activities and communicated with Yanukovich on strategy for the lobbying effort in the US if [REDACTED] were working for Kluyiev as a private citizen. Gates stated that these updates were to Yanukovich, in his capacity as President of Ukraine. Furthermore, Yanukovich had designated Kluyiev to handle the Anti Crisis program on behalf of PoR.

b7A

Gates was the day-to-day point of contact for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Gates provided directions and feedback [REDACTED] Gates was not employed by the ECFMU and did not work for [REDACTED] Gates was not paid by the ECFMU either. Although [REDACTED] had some input on the direction of the Anti Crisis program in the US, Gates did not take orders from her.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4, On 02/01/2018, Page 9 of 23

Gates' orders came from Manafort. Gates also relayed information to Manafort. On occasion, Gates updated [redacted] as well.

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Gates worked for DMP. DMP worked for PoR. Gates' work as it related to the Anti Crisis program was on behalf of DMP and DMP's contract with PoR.

[redacted] was minimally involved in the Anti Crisis program in the US. [redacted] were chosen by Manafort and Gates, not [redacted] Gates recalled [redacted] questioning Manafort about the decision to hire [redacted] Specifically, [redacted] asked Manafort if he was comfortable with the the [redacted]

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Given the fact that the ECFMU was under the direction and control of the government of Ukraine and/or PoR, Gates was asked if he told [redacted] [redacted] Gates did not tell [redacted] clear who was behind the ECFMU. Gates had originally represented to [redacted] [redacted] that the client would be the government of Ukraine. When the ECFMU was brought up, nothing changed but the name of the client. [redacted] [redacted] knew the client was still the government of Ukraine.

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While working with the ECFMU, Gates took direction from Manafort who was relaying instructions from Kluyiev, Lyovochkin and sometimes [redacted]

The instructions were for Gates to implement the "mission" of the ECFMU. At the time the [redacted] Gates did not know anyone within PoR was involved, other than Kluyiev.

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Gates was reminded that he knew Yanukovych had approved the Anti Crisis program and designated Kluyiev to lead that effort on behalf of the PoR and government of Ukraine. Gates stated that he knew Yanukovych had "green lighted" the Anti Crisis program and put Kluyiev in charge of it. Gates also understood that DMP was tasked to work with Kluyiev and the ECFMU to further the Anti Crisis program.

Gates was asked again [redacted]

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Gates was reminded that he previously said Yanukovych directed the Anti Crisis program and the ECFMU was only used to avoid procurement issues and provide legitimacy to the lobbying campaign as being independent from PoR and/or the government of Ukraine. Gates was also reminded that he previously said the lobbying effort was originally going to be for the government of Ukraine directly until it was decided that the ECFMU could be used. Finally, Gates was reminded that he told [redacted] the ECFMU was an arm of PoR and/or the government of Ukraine.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4 , On 02/01/2018 , Page 10 of 23

Gates stated he knew [Redacted]

[Redacted] Gates knew Kluyiev reported to Yanukovych. Kluyiev may have had some personal reasons for being involved, but ultimately, Kluyiev was acting under the direction of Yanukovych.

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Gates was shown email communication between Gates, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Gates stated that in this email the reference to the "client" was the government of Ukraine and not the ECFMU.

Gates was clear with [Redacted] that the client was the government of Ukraine. Gates made references to information provided to Yanukovych and gave a clear understanding that updates from [Redacted] were going to those inside Yanukovych's government like Lyovochkin and Kluyiev. Gates told [Redacted] about Manafort's meetings with the "President", or the "big guy" and made references to instructions coming from "Kiev", Yanukovych, or Yanukovych's office. Gates did not hide the fact that the government of Ukraine was the client. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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FARA Versus LDA

[Redacted]

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Gates stated "in the end, we got cute". The ECFMU was an NGO based in Brussels and it was funded by oligarchs. However, the oligarchs financing the ECFMU were doing so as instructed by Yanukovych and on behalf of the government of Ukraine. Initially, the ECFMU "checked the boxed" to avoid

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4, On 02/01/2018, Page 11 of 23

FARA, [REDACTED]

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Break

A break was taken from approximately 12:10 PM until approximately 1:40 PM. During that break, not in the presence of his counsel and without any question posed to him, Gates made the following statements to SA [REDACTED]

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Gates asked SA [REDACTED] how FD 302s were approved. Gates heard allegations in the media that Andrew McCabe had directed agents to alter their FD302s. When Gates reviewed the FD302 from his 2014 interview with the FBI in discovery, he noted inaccuracies. Gates' attorney's notes from the interview corroborate the fact that the FD302 had inaccuracies. Gates asked if he was permitted to review the FD302s from his interviews. Gates asked what his recourse was if the information in the FD302s was inaccurate.

Gates was told the following by SA [REDACTED]:

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FD302s were prepared by agents and approved by supervisors before being finalized in the FBI's database. Witnesses did not review their FD302s. As to Gates' question about what recourse he had if an FD302 was inaccurate, if an agent testified to information that Gates deemed inaccurate, Gates' attorney could cross examine the agent on the information. In addition, in Gates' defense, he could bring in evidence, such as attorney notes, or testimony by anyone present during the interview.

When the interview resumed at around 1:40 PM and Special Counsel Prosecutors and Gates' counsel were present, the above information was relayed to Gates' counsel, in Gates' presence. Gates confirmed that the relayed information was accurate and represented the totality of the substantive conversation which occurred outside the presence of counsel.

FARA Versus LDA Continued

Gates was asked if the [REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4 , On 02/01/2018 , Page 12 of 23

In the first meeting with [Redacted] sometime in March or April 2012, the details of the GR and PR work were laid out to [Redacted] said FARA needed to be filed. Sometime after this, [Redacted] went back to [Redacted] with more information on the ECFMU. [Redacted] if the ECFMU was not a foreign government or political party, they would not need to file FARA.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Gates was asked if he ever affirmatively told [Redacted] that the ECFMU was not connected to the government of Ukraine. Gates stated he could not recall. Gates believed it was possible he told [Redacted] there was no connection between the two, but he could not recall for sure. Gates then stated he "could easily have represented this" to [Redacted]

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Gates characterized the misrepresentations and/or omissions regarding the ECFMU's connection to the government of Ukraine as "being cute". Gates said the argument could be made that the ECFMU was not connected to the government of Ukraine. However, Gates knew the ECFMU was indeed connected to the government of Ukraine. The goal was to make the ECFMU the direct client for the lobbying campaign and keep the government of Ukraine out of it. The lobbying campaign needed to appear to be at arms length from the government for its message to be more credible.

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[Redacted]

A break was taken from approximately 2:38 PM until approximately 2:48 PM.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4 , On 02/01/2018 , Page 13 of 23

[Redacted]

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The main issue was having the GR/PR message appear legitimate and at arms length from the government of Ukraine. Central to the ECFMU's legitimacy was that they appear independent from the government of Ukraine.

[Redacted]

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Gates added that disclosure on the FARA filing is more detailed than disclosure on the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) filing. In addition, to the other reasons stated, registering under FARA gives your opponents insight into your firm's activities.

Originally, Gates did not care if [Redacted] This was why Gates initially proposed the representation as for the government of Ukraine.

[Redacted]

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Gates talked to [Redacted] about the options of FARA and LDA. [Redacted] was concerned that FARA would disclose the names of various Ukrainians controlling and financing the ECFMU. Specifically, [Redacted] did not want Kluyev's name on the filing. [Redacted] was also concerned that the disclosures in FARA would undermine the ECFMU's credibility.

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Ultimately, the decision to not file FARA and use the LDA option instead was made by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Gates was shown an email dated January 29, 2013 from [Redacted]

[Redacted]

which read as follows:

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4 , On 02/01/2018 , Page 14 of 23

Gates reiterated that [Redacted] knew from the very beginning of the representation that the client was the government of Ukraine. Gates recalled a conversation with [Redacted] in which [Redacted] asked to whom Manafort was relaying information about the GR/PR campaigns. Gates told [Redacted] that Manafort was communicating with the President of Ukraine.

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Congressman Dana Rohrabacher

Gates was shown an email between him and [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Gates asked [Redacted] to assist in finding an American to put on the ECFMU's board. This conversation arose from concerns that there were two PoR members on the ECFMU's board. [Redacted] told Gates that it was difficult to make the ECFMU look independent from PoR when the board was PoR. Although there was talk of putting someone from the US and someone from Europe on the board, it never happened. Gates believed [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Gates stated that [Redacted] asked him to obtain strategy documents from [Redacted] told Gates the contracts with the lobbying firms were renewed on an annual basis and the strategy document was needed to understand a summary of the previous year's activities to "pass up the chain". [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4 , On 02/01/2018 , Page 15 of 23

[Redacted]

b7A

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Congressman Rohrabacher was named as the Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe & Eurasia, House Foreign Affairs Committee.

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The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe & Eurasia was important to the lobbying campaign because Ukraine was handled by this committee.

Gates was shown an email from him to [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Gates helped set up a dinner between Manafort, [Redacted] Rohrabacher. [Redacted] had given Gates a list of potential people for Manafort to meet with and Rohrabacher was one of the people on that list. Gates believe [Redacted] and one other person were identified by [Redacted] for meetings with Manafort. [Redacted]

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Gates was shown an email between Gates, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4 , On 02/01/2018 , Page 16 of 23

[Redacted]

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Gates stated the

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Gates was shown an email thread dated April 19, 2013 between Gates,

[Redacted]

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Gates stated he was asking [Redacted] for updates on what had been done so Manafort could brief Yanukovich. These updates included meetings with [Redacted] at the State Department and Congressman Rohrabacher.

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[Redacted] was the Deputy Chief of Staff to John Kerry. The purpose for reaching out to [Redacted] was to discuss the State Department's policy issues as it related to Ukraine and Ukrainian government officials. One of the reasons the government of Ukraine commissioned the Skadden Report was to combat the US State Department's view that Ukraine had violated Tymoshenko's rights and the fear that the State Department was going to take action against Ukraine, or Ukrainian government officials in response.

b6 per DOS

Skadden attorneys told Gates they found evidence that Tymoshenko's due process was violated during her trial. In addition, they found legal procedural violations by Tymoshenko's defense team. Skadden found that

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4, On 02/01/2018, Page 17 of 23

the statute under which Tymoshenko was charged was not appropriate because Tymoshenko did not have the authorization to sign the contract in question. Skadden looked at a series of other government officials in Europe who had done similar acts to Tymoshenko, but had not been prosecuted. Ultimately, the Skadden Report did not go as far as the government of Ukraine would have wanted in justifying Tymoshenko's imprisonment. However, the government of Ukraine and Skadden went back and forth "to massage" how the report was worded.

As for the meeting with Rohrabacher, [REDACTED] told Gates the meeting went well, but was focussed on Russia and China. Rohrabacher felt strongly that the only way to keep China "in check" was to work with Russia. [REDACTED] did not tell Gates that Ukraine came up during the meeting.

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Manafort later told Gates that Ukraine did not come up during the meeting with Rohrabacher.

The original intention of the meeting between Manafort, [REDACTED] and Rohrabacher was to talk about Ukraine. Rohrabacher was named the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia and was an important contact for the lobbying campaign. However, Manafort said the conversation never turned to Ukraine. Manafort told Gates that Rohrabacher only talked about China and Russia.

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Gates was shown email communication between Gates and [REDACTED] dated January 16, 2013 which included an attached memo from Manafort to Yanukovych and if further identified by bates number MercGJ2\_16855-MercGJ2\_16857.

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Gates stated that the purpose of the memorandum from Manafort to Yanukovych was to address the resolutions proposed in US Congress which condemned Ukraine for the handling of Yulia Tymoshenko's imprisonment.

Gates was directed to the portion of the memorandum which read,

**"In addition, we have reached out to Rep. Rohrabacher, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia and Emerging Threats, as an added measure in case H.R. 28 is referred to his subcommittee. We will brief his office and staff on the resolutions and ensure that they are not considered."**

Gates stated that Representative Marcy Kaptur had introduced two resolutions regarding Ukraine. Kaptur was the Co-Chairman of the Ukrainian Caucus and her resolutions were not that strong. [REDACTED] had been directed to reach out to Representative Smith, who headed the Helsinki Commission, as well as Congressman Rohrabacher in an effort to influence Kaptur to "back off".

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4, On 02/01/2018, Page 18 of 23

Most of Congress was against the government of Ukraine. Gates had [redacted] [redacted] create a target list of potential allies who could be used to obtain information on potential resolutions and who would influence other Congress members' views. Prior to Kaptur's resolution, Senators Durbin and Inhofe had proposed resolutions which were supported by Senator McCain. [redacted] reached out to allies in the Senate, to include Mnuchin and Corker to try and stop the Durbin and Inhofe resolutions. Mnuchin and Durbin ended up getting in a fight over this matter so Mnuchin backed down.

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The strategy shifted from influencing senators directly to influencing constituents in districts with large Ukrainian-American populations. This was done in Illinois.

Attempts were made to lobby McCain as well. The feeling was that McCain would be more open to the conversation after the Skadden Report was released and he could see there were two sides to the story. Gates did not know if Manafort ever reached out to McCain directly, but [redacted] did. [redacted] told Gates he met with McCain and tried to talk to him about Ukraine. [redacted] said McCain's response was not good.

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In the US, the ECFMU was seen as a "front" for PoR, or at least PoR-leaning. There were some who thought the ECFMU was at least a good start.

#### The FARA Unit

In 2016, after Manafort had left the Trump Campaign, the FARA Unit began looking into DMP's work as it related [redacted] and the ECFMU. In response to requests for documents related to this representation, Gates provided DMP's [redacted] with a document titled, "Email Retention Policy".

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Sometime in or around 2012 or 2013, DMP had been hacked. As a result, Manafort had Gates contact DMP's [redacted] to implement an email retention policy. Gates downloaded a copy of an email retention policy from the internet. Gates believed he created this document in or around April 2014.

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In response, [redacted] put parameters and settings on DMP's server which deleted emails after a set period of time. Gates believed the emails were deleted every 30 days. If Manafort or Gates wanted to keep the emails, they could archive them by putting them into a folder. However, if not moved to another folder, the emails would be permanently deleted from the server.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4, On 02/01/2018, Page 19 of 23

In addition to this policy, which automatically deleted many emails, Gates had also "purged" ECFMU related emails prior to 2016.

When the FARA Unit requested documentation, Gates provided some documents and Manafort said he did not have any to provide. Gates provided [redacted] with a copy of the email retention policy to explain why so few documents were provided. b6 b7C

In Gates' search for emails and/or documents relevant to the FARA Unit's inquiry, he did not "scour" his files and did not reach out to [redacted] for assistance in searching or retrieving emails and/or documents. Gates only searched on the key word "ECFMU". Gates found some documents as a result of this search. Gates did not look for, or provide, any documents or emails related to DMP's work for PoR. Gates did not search his laptop for any emails which may have been saved. Gates did not conduct a search for any key words other than ECFMU. b6 b7C

The email retention policy implemented by Manafort was "not very adhered to". The original reason for the policy was to clean up DMP's server.

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[redacted] arranged for the server to delete emails ever 30 days, but Manafort and Gates could maintain emails on their computers and/or phones, or put the emails into folders to keep them from being deleted. b6 b7C

A break was taken from approximately 3:20 PM until 3:30 PM.

#### Tom Green Statements

After the break, Gates' counsel, Green made the following statements:

Within the last few days, Gates contacted [redacted] in an effort to retrieve emails from DMP's server. Gates' counsel, Green, [redacted] were listening to his call with [redacted]. On the call, Gates asked [redacted] when the policy went into effect and [redacted] said sometime in 2014. [redacted] also said that emails are deleted off the server unless they are put into an archive folder. [redacted] confirmed that emails deleted from the server, which were not saved elsewhere, could not be retrieved. Gates did not ask [redacted] about any specific emails and did not address the issue of emails saved on laptops or phones. b6 b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4, On 02/01/2018, Page 20 of 23The FARA Unit Continued

Gates was asked if the purpose of providing [redacted] with the retention policy was to give the impression that there were only a minimal number of responsive documents. Gates stated that was the purpose. Gates only provided a minimal amount of documents to [redacted] and the retention policy answered the question as to why there were so few. The retention policy was misleading and used as an excuse to not provide more documents.

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Gates had other responsive documents in his possession and control which he did not provide. Gates specified that he only had a few emails, but he had more documents which he did not provide.

Gates knew Manafort was not providing any documents. Manafort said he could not find any responsive documents. Gates was surprised that Manafort did not provide any documents, but Manafort was not technologically advanced. Manafort said he had searched for documents, but could not find any. Gates did not know if this was true or not.

Prior to providing any documents to [redacted] Gates went through the responsive documents Gates had in his possession and control with Manafort. Manafort asked Gates not to provide some documents. Specifically, Manafort asked Gates not to provide the incorporation documents for the ECFM, or the [redacted]

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b7CDMP FARA Obligation

Gates believed if he was not the person directly lobbying, he did not have an obligation to file FARA. Gates now knows this is not the case. If Gates or Manafort were directly participating in the lobbying or public relations campaign in the US, DMP would need to file FARA. Gates stated he was only an employee of DMP and not responsible for DMP's FARA filings.

Gates' understanding of FARA came from conversations with an attorney many years ago. However, at the time of this conversation, DMP was only doing work in Ukraine and there was no need to register under FARA.

The reason DMP [redacted] to handle the lobbying campaign was because Manafort did not want to engage in lobbying in the US and therefore have to register under FARA.

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In 2006 or 2007, when the issue of FARA originally came up, Manafort told Gates he did not want to have to disclose contracts with PoR, or payments to DMP pursuant to those contracts. At that time, Manafort had meetings with the US Ambassador in Ukraine and there was a question as to



[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4, On 02/01/2018, Page 21 of 23

whether that triggered FARA. Ultimately, it was decided that it did not. Generally, Manafort did not want to register under FARA, but by 2012, Gates believed Manafort's feelings about FARA were not as strong as they were in 2006 and 2007.

Gates did not seek out any advice from counsel during the 2012-2014 time frame regarding his, or DMP's work with the ECFMU, [REDACTED] the Skadden Report, or Project Hapsburg. b7A

Gates was asked why DMP did not file FARA given Manafort's meetings with Rohrabacher. Gates was reminded he helped set up the meetings between Manafort and Rohrabacher and was therefore aware of the contact and the the ensuing need to register under FARA.

Gates stated that Manafort had a 25 year long relationship with Rohrabacher and therefore the meeting did not trigger a FARA obligation.

Gates then stated that the meeting with Rohrabacher was set [REDACTED] because of Rohrabacher's position as the Chairman of the Subcommittee of Europe and Eurasia. Rohrabacher was a target [REDACTED] b7A  
[REDACTED] Gates understood lobbying Rohrabacher would trigger FARA. The intended purpose of the meeting between Manafort and Rohrabacher was to talk about the "Engage Ukraine" strategy.

The use of Manafort in the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] would have triggered FARA had it been implemented. Gates was not aware of Manafort ever raising any objections to his participation in the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] because it would have trigger FARA. b7A

#### The Skadden Report

There were efforts to get Greg Craig and others at Skadden more involved in the roll out of the Skadden Report, but they resisted because Skadden did not want to file FARA.

Craig was supposed to use his contacts to help disseminate the Skadden Report. Manafort and Craig agreed that Craig would do a "Hill Tour" and be involved in the press outreach, but Craig backed out of this. Craig did one interview with a reporter at the New York Times and may have made 1-2 phone calls to Democrats in Congress, but Gates was not sure about the phone calls.

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4, On 02/01/2018, Page 22 of 23

Craig told Gates he did not want to be involved in any public outreach. Craig said his involvement in the PR campaign would make the Skadden Report seem like it was not an independent review. Craig recommended [REDACTED]

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Gates could not recall if Skadden's engagement letter specifically addressed the fact that they would not engage in any GR or PR. Gates did recall a conversation with Craig in which Craig said he did not want to do anything which would necessitate a FARA registration. Craig understood that the New York Times interview he did would trigger FARA. Craig had someone inside Skadden review this issue.

Craig never told Gates that FARA would only be triggered if Gates was personally involved in the contact. Gates did not recall having any conversations with Craig about Gates' personal understanding of FARA.

Gates did not learn that his prior understanding of FARA was inaccurate until April 2017 while dealing with the FARA Unit.

#### Think Tanks

Reaching out to think tanks, such as the IRI, Wilson Center and others, was an important part of the lobbying and public relations campaign. Many think tanks had experts on Ukrainian affairs. The goal was to establish relationships with these individuals so when the Ukrainian elections occurred, they could be called upon to give their opinion on whether the elections were free and fair. There were many issues getting the think tanks on board because they tended to view Yanukovich as pro-Russian and many believed Yanukovich's election was unfair.

#### The Association Agreement

Yanukovich did not sign the Association Agreement with Europe because the US and EU "dropped the ball". Gates blamed failed policies on the part of the US government and EU, specifically, Gates identified the US and EU's failure to provide sufficient financial support to Ukraine. Gates explained that Ukraine had a \$15 billion loan to repay and the US only offered to pay a small portion of that. The US needed to contribute more. Ukraine's economy was 45% dependent on Russia and could not survive a break with Russia without the economic support of the US and EU.

The US government was stuck on the issue of Tymoshenko. Senators McCain and Durbin, along with Ambassador Victoria Nuland did not believe Ukraine would live up to the reforms necessary. Gates believed this

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Rick Gates Proffer #4 , On 02/01/2018 , Page 23 of 23

influenced the US government's decision to only lend Ukraine a small portion of the money.

The US State Department under Hilary Clinton was also pro-Tymoshenko. [REDACTED] invited Clinton to speak at the Yalta Conference. Clinton was prepared to give a speech in favor of Tymoshenko until a large donation was paid to the Clinton Foundation and Clinton decided not to speak at the conference. [REDACTED]

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Gates explained that Yanukovych was supposed to go the Vilnius Summit to sign the Association Agreement, however, on Yanukovych's way back from a trip to China, he stopped in Russia. This stop over occurred two days before the Vilnius Summit. Russia offered Ukraine money, loans and gas agreements to try and prevent Yanukovych from signing the Association Agreement at the Vilnius Summit.


Gates was asked why the ECFMU did not come out against Yanukovych when he didn't sign the Association Agreement. Gates stated that the ECFMU wasn't going to criticize "itself".

Gates was asked if the ECFMU's mission was truly to move the Ukraine to the EU. Gates explained that PoR was split on this issue. Some, like Kluyiev and Akhmetov, were in favor of the Ukraine aligning with the west and joining the EU because it benefited their business interests. However, others were not. Gates noted that toward the end of his presidency, Yanukovych appointed a number of people from the Dontesk clan who were not in favor of aligning with the west.

#### Other

Gates used Manafort's credit card to purchase Manafort's New York Yankees season tickets. The season tickets were for Manafort and were purchased at Manafort's direction with Manafort's credit card. Gates knew the charge led to a delinquency on Manafort's credit card of a couple hundred thousand dollars.

Gates knew Manafort represented to a bank that the charge and the ensuing delinquency were a result of Manafort lending his card to Gates so Gates could purchase the tickets. Gates knew this was false. Gates signed a letter attesting to this false representation.



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/19/2017

JEFFREY DUANE GORDON, date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] was interviewed on September 7, 2017 at the FBI Washington Field Office, 601 4th St NW, Washington D.C. GORDON's cellular telephone number is [Redacted] [Redacted] GORDON was initially advised that providing false statements to federal officers could constitute a federal crime. After being advised of the identity of interviewing Agents [Redacted] [Redacted] GORDON provided the following information:

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GORDON informed the agents that he had just reviewed his transcript for his testimony before the Senate Intel Committee and reviewed it line by line to ensure it was correct.

At the beginning of the interview GORDON was asked if he wanted to update or discuss anything that was discussed in his previous interview. GORDON stated he did have some things he wanted to clarify [Redacted] [Redacted] In the previous interview he was asked if the campaign had ever discussed anything about the DNC email hacking and GORDON did not think they had but realized that in September 2016 he had been asked to write an article about Wikileaks which he forwarded on to [Redacted] [Redacted] to see if he wanted to be involved in the article. GORDON does not recall talking about Wikileaks during his time with the campaign.

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GORDON also wanted to let investigators know that when he received an article from DMITRI SIMES about Russia, GORDON told the campaign that the article understates threats to radical Islam and the Baltics.

Travels to Russia, Ukraine and Hungary

GORDON wanted to let investigators know that he had been to Russia twice, both visits occurring [Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 09/07/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/10/2017

by [Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Gordon on 09/07/2017 , On 09/07/2017 , Page 2 of 14

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] GORDON does not keep in touch with any Russians from these trips.

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Additionally, GORDON disclosed two visits to the Ukraine. In 2009, GORDON and [REDACTED] went through the Ukraine during a trip where they [REDACTED] In 2014, GORDON spent 3 days in the Ukraine performing research on a think tank project for [REDACTED] This trip was probably self-funded by GORDON with travel expense reimbursement from the think tank. GORDON wrote an article after the trip indicating that Ukraine should be armed but GORDON was not necessarily wedded to that idea. GORDON did not meet with any foreign officials while he was in the Ukraine. The biggest take away from his research was that corruption was a big issue in the Ukraine.

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GORDON told investigators he never met VICTOR ORBAN, Prime Minister of Hungary, or exchanged phone calls or other communications with him. GORDON knows that ORBAN was pushing a project for Hungarians in the Ukraine and expanding the EU to include the Ukraine after Brexit. GORDON did not [REDACTED] [REDACTED] because ORBAN fired [REDACTED] because she was unable to get ORBAN a meeting with TRUMP. [REDACTED] had asked KT McFARLAND to help set up a meeting between ORBAN and TRUMP. [REDACTED] asked GORDON for help too but GORDON explained that if McFARLAND couldn't arrange the meeting, GORDON couldn't arrange the meeting either. The CZECH president also fired his people for not being able to arrange a meeting with TRUMP around the same time.

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GORDON was asked about CARTER PAGE's trip to Budapest. GORDON explained that he was in Budapest in November and December 2016 and found out that PAGE had been there in September. GORDON does not think PAGE was there on behalf of the campaign as he was probably removed from the campaign by then. GORDON never went there as part of the campaign. The Hungarian Free Press tried to implicate GORDON by saying GORDON was in Budapest six times during the campaign. GORDON never traveled to Hungary during the campaign.

Simes, CNI and Foreign Policy Speech

GORDON thought he initially heard about the planning for TRUMP's foreign policy speech from JEFF SESSIONS in early March. GORDON provided SESSIONS with GORDON's vision statement on foreign policy. GORDON indicated the investigators should have a copy of this in his emails. GORDON stated that the U.S. House of Representatives has this vision statement as part of their investigation but the U.S. Senate does not.

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STEPHEN MILLER replaced SAM CLOVIS in January 2016 and was involved in drafting the speech. SESSIONS gave the vision statement GORDON drafted to MILLER. The vision statement said nothing about Russia. MICHAEL FLYNN, WALID PHARES and SEBASTIAN GORKA also attended the speech. ROSALIND HELDERMAN of the Washington Post has been asking a lot about the foreign policy speech.

RICK DEARBORN communicated with SESSIONS and JARED KUSHNER about the speech. DEARBORN and SIMES talked constantly about the event. DEARBORN and GORDON agreed the speech should be held at the National Press Club, a left wing place, but eventually the campaign decided against this location due to security matters. TRUMP wanted it at his golf club in Sterling, Virginia but most of the campaign did not think that was a good idea. It was probably KUSHNER and SIMES who decided on the Mayflower Hotel location. GORDON heard from DEARBORN the speech would be at the Mayflower. SIMES was involved in the planning early on when it was still scheduled to be at the Press Club.

SIMES was one of the organizers of the event. Ambassador KHALIZAD, former U.S. ambassador to Iraq and Afghanistan, was also involved in planning the speech. KHALIZAD introduced TRUMP at the event and was a representative of the Center for the National Interest (CNI). GORDON believes KHALIZAD is a fellow for CNI. GORDON met SESSIONS and SIMES in May or June 2016 after SESSIONS went to a CNI dinner SIMES was at. SIMES suggested that SESSIONS meet with KHALIZAD to benefit the campaign.

WALID PHARES assisted GORDON with planning the speech event. [redacted] and several of the surrogates attended the event for TRUMP. PHARES and GORDON developed the guest list and CNI had final approval on the guest list. GORDON does not know if CNI paid for the event but thinks they probably did since the campaign didn't pay for anything. GORDON suggested talking to MILLER and HOPE HICKS since they are the gatekeepers.

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Other than GORDON and DEARBORN, SIMES probably had contact with KUSHNER and MILLER. GORDON does not know if they maintained contact with SIMES after the event. PHARES and SIMES may have communicated with each other. GORDON recalls a German ambassador claiming credit for writing the foreign policy speech.

GORDON also mentioned that SIMES sent GORDON some emails from a woman named [redacted] Last Name Unknown (LNU), [redacted] [redacted] When asked why GORDON had been assigned to interact with SIMES, GORDON indicated it was probably because GORDON was the only person on the team with a good reputation who wasn't

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too high up and too busy to interact with him. GORDON quit talking to SIMES when he left the campaign.

GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS was not at the Mayflower foreign policy speech and GORDON remembers there was a reporter there that wanted to tear PAPADOPOULOS apart, likely because he was an easy target due to his lack of experience. The reporter was LYNN SWEET from a Chicago newspaper.

#### March 31, 2016 Meeting

GORDON told investigators the March 31, 2016 meeting with TRUMP and the foreign policy team was crystal clear in his mind. GORDON first found out about the meeting when DEARBORN informed him about it. GORDON was told TRUMP, SESSIONS and the National Security advisory team would be there. It was supposed to be one hour but ended up being about two hours. GORDON found out the day before when DEARBORN called him that it would be at the Trump Hotel in the Old Post Office location. CLOVIS contacted the initial 8 members of the advisory team. SESSIONS wanted to include the other attendees - [REDACTED] JAMES CARAFANO and [REDACTED]. At the meeting, they would each have 5 minutes to give a brief introduction.

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CLOVIS and MILLER were likely taking notes during the meeting and SESSIONS had an agenda or summary in front of him because GORDON remembers the summary about him including a misstatement and wondering who would have written that document. It indicated GORDON had worked with the MCCAIN campaign instead of the HERMAN CAIN campaign. SESSIONS gave an introduction and welcome to the group.

In going around the table for introductions, PHARES was the first to brief. PHARES began his brief saying that TRUMP's original five foreign policy team members have been viciously attacked since they were announced. PHARES said these attacks were from Iranian networks. After these initial remarks PHARES spoke about the threat from Islamic terrorism.

KEITH KELLOGG and [REDACTED] followed discussing military information. [REDACTED] had testified before SESSIONS in the Senate on multiple occasions gave a longer briefing on the nuclear threat and the nuclear triad, a topic that TRUMP was very interested in. [REDACTED] briefing was very long which is probably why the meeting ended up taking two hours instead of the scheduled one hour. During that portion TRUMP asked why we couldn't be the first to strike with nuclear weapons. This was put in the context of possibly using against ISIS. [REDACTED] spoke about Veterans Affairs and JAMES CARAFANO spoke about military readiness. SESSIONS spoke about improving relations

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with Russia due to the threat of Islamic terrorism and Russia's nuclear weapons.

Next to brief was GORDON. He held up an article he wrote about NATO to show the group. GORDON mentioned that NATO members were not paying their fair share and too much of their budget was focused on Russia when it should be focused on radical Islam and open borders. TRUMP asked how much of the U.S. budget was dedicated to NATO and [REDACTED] contradicted GORDON on this point. GORDON thought it had been about a trillion dollars a couple years earlier when he did the research for his article which was a year or two old at the time. [REDACTED] said it wasn't that much but didn't know how much it was, eventually guessing it to be \$900 million. During GORDON's briefing, TRUMP mentioned he did not want a World War III over the Ukraine. GORDON wanted to discuss water boarding as well but SESSIONS cut him off because they were running behind schedule.

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Next was GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS, who talked about the fact that he had Russian contacts through the embassy in London and could arrange a meeting between PUTIN and TRUMP. TRUMP seemed intrigued and fascinated by this and asked how that would work. [REDACTED] mentioned the Logan Act. Someone mentioned sanctions and how there are probably sanctions preventing a meeting with PUTIN and his associates. There was also discussion about how it could look bad for TRUMP to meet with a hostile foreign government. GORDON was asked if he could be confusing the mention of the Logan Act with an email sent by [REDACTED] on or about March 24, 2016 which mentioned concerns about the Logan Act over setting up a meeting with PUTIN. GORDON indicated that email may be where he remembers the Logan Act from but someone definitely mentioned sanctions in the March 31 meeting. The table went back and forth for a bit and even though TRUMP seemed to think it was a good idea, SESSIONS said it was a bad idea and "I prefer no one speaks of this again." GORDON recalls [REDACTED] and KELLOGG suggesting that the meeting was not a good idea. The discussion was probably three to four minutes long. GORDON described SESSIONS as an honorable guy and explained that if anyone at the meeting did not remember him shutting the idea down, they were lying.

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GORDON thinks there were probably about three people at the meeting who thought it was a bad idea. GORDON was confronted by investigators about how it seemed odd that SESSIONS would shut an idea down that TRUMP appeared to be supportive of. Investigators also suggested that GORDON's relationship with SESSIONS may create some bias to protect SESSIONS. GORDON agreed with these statements but said that is how it happened. SESSIONS said, "This is a really bad idea for all the reasons brought up right here. I prefer that no one ever speak of this again."

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GORDON was asked if it would seem reasonable for someone at the meeting to remember SESSIONS reacting differently. GORDON seemed to think that since this event was a year and a half ago and the meeting had gone way past when it should have by that point, people may have trouble recollecting the details. GORDON wanted to know if someone said something different about what happened at the meeting.

GORDON confirmed that he was probably the second source for a recent Daily Caller article that indicated two sources at the meeting told reporters that SESSIONS shot down PAPADOPOULOS' suggestion to set up a meeting between TRUMP and PUTIN. The reporter mentioned the first source to GORDON and asked if that was how it happened. GORDON indicated that was how it occurred at the meeting. GORDON was asked if he knew who the original source of the article was. He said he did not know but if he had to guess, it was probably [REDACTED] PHARES or maybe [REDACTED]

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PAPADOPOULOS continued to talk a little after SESSIONS shut down the conversation about a Russian meeting. Then [REDACTED] talked about military matters and [REDACTED] talked about how they should probably not talk to the public about nuclear issues because people take it the wrong way. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] talked about intelligence matters.

SESSIONS knew [REDACTED]

Several of them went to lunch across the street after the meeting but GORDON does not recall the name of the restaurant. GORDON, PAPADOPOULOS, PHARES, SESSIONS, [REDACTED] and KELLOGG were there. PAPADOPOULOS mentioned media interview opportunities at the lunch.

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#### Papadopoulos

GORDON met PAPADOPOULOS in 2013 or 2014 at a Greek/Israeli caucus where [REDACTED] introduced them to each other. PAPADOPOULOS gave GORDON his business card and GORDON added him to his distribution list for publications from his think tank. PAPADOPOULOS responded to a column post GORDON wrote disagreeing about a statement GORDON made. PAPADOPOULOS also commented at the time that he was working for BEN CARSON's campaign.

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GORDON was asked why PAPADOPOULOS continued to try and arrange meetings with Russia if he had been shot down by SESSIONS. GORDON thought PAPADOPOULOS was just being young and naïve and probably trying to impress people. GORDON didn't realize PAPADOPOULOS was continuing to try and arrange the meetings until he saw the recent Washington Post article about

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PAPADOPOULOS. [REDACTED] had shot down the idea as well with his email thread mentioning the Logan Act and suggesting the team not outrun their headlights.

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GORDON was asked again about a phone call scheduled between GORDON, PHARES and PAPADOPOULOS in May 2016. GORDON said the phone call did not happen and CLOVIS sent an email to PAPADOPOULOS and followed up with a phone call so there was no ambiguity. After the British press reported that PAPADOPOULOS wanted DAVID CAMERON to apologize to TRUMP, SESSIONS complained to DEARBORN who complained to GORDON who contacted CLOVIS to be the heavy and confront PAPADOPOULOS. PAPADOPOULOS was told he would be gone if he had one more slip up. After that, interview requests had to be submitted to GORDON. GORDON mentioned that the team was worried about firing PAPADOPOULOS for fear that PAPADOPOULOS would go to the press telling them the National Security team was a joke with no power or authority. GORDON recalls having to tell PAPADOPOULOS not to participate in interviews PAPADOPOULOS wanted to do.

GORDON only remembers PAPADOPOULOS attending two meetings - the one on March 31, 2016 and then one at the Capitol Hill Club in June or July 2016. [REDACTED] was part of the campaign briefly and like PAPADOPOULOS had been involved in the BEN CARSON campaign previously. GORDON does not recall any discussion of a meeting between TRUMP and PUTIN after the March 31, 2016 meeting.

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#### Campaign Details

The Alexandria office of the TRUMP campaign was set up in April 2016. GORDON would frequently schedule meetings for SESSIONS based on contact with SESSIONS' [REDACTED] or another woman named [REDACTED] LNU. The campaign frequently met at the JONES DAY LAW FIRM office because they could not meet for campaign activities in SESSIONS' office. SESSIONS had the mindset of a prosecutor and liked meeting in a law firm's office.

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The Alexandria office required badge access and very few people had that access. There were about 15 people with access including GORDON and PHARES. [REDACTED] kept trying to meet with them at the office and GORDON told him no but one day GORDON ran into [REDACTED] at the Starbucks by the office. [REDACTED] kept trying to [REDACTED] on the team as well. GORDON found out that [REDACTED] were both registered as foreign agents for [REDACTED]

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GORDON re-iterated the fact that TRUMP and HOPE HICKS had made false statements to the media about contacts with Russia. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] She made that initial statement about the team not having Russian contact and created a media mess.

JOHN MASHBURN handled lots of healthcare research since the campaign did not have a healthcare representative. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] He was also on the Presidential Transition Team. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and came in on Mondays. [REDACTED] and PHARES was the Foreign Policy Adviser.

GORDON does not recall anyone traveling overseas directly for the campaign. TRUMP went to Scotland for the opening of his new golf course there and happened to be there for the Brexit vote. PAGE went to Russia for his speech. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] PAPADOPOULOS went to Greece, Israel and Europe.

#### Phares

PHARES invited MICHAEL FLYNN to join the Foreign Policy team. FLYNN declined this offer. However, FLYNN had a personal relationship with TRUMP and then joined the campaign, even to the point of being considered for Vice President.

PHARES worked at the foreign policy office with GORDON for about two weeks. One of the main reasons PHARES left after such a short period of time was because DEARBORN said that he could no longer appear on television. Since PHARES made about [REDACTED] per appearance this was difficult for him especially since the foreign policy team was not paid by the Trump campaign. DEARBORN has a sarcastic personality and since PHARES is [REDACTED] [REDACTED] DEARBORN this frustrated him.

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PHARES developed a list of officials from 10 foreign embassies that had contacted him and [REDACTED] The first country was Italy and when PHARES brought this opportunity to the campaign, JARED KUSHNER shut it down. KUSHNER said that all contacts from other countries had to go through him. KUSHNER then asked the foreign policy team to develop three

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experts that could brief him regarding each of the ten countries. PHARES thought he was [REDACTED] and turned in his access pass and quit in the last week of April 2016.

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The ten countries that PHARES wanted to introduce to the Trump campaign were: Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Germany, France, Spain, Italy, South Korea, Lebanon, Australia, and Morocco. KUSHNER actually spoke to officials from Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Spain. There were no controversial countries such as Russia or China on the list that PHARES developed.

After leaving the campaign, PHARES was brought back into the campaign as a paid media surrogate. In this role, PHARES was paid [REDACTED] a month plus what he made from Fox news. After about three months, Fox found out about this dual role and told PHARES he could not work for both the Trump campaign and Fox news. As Fox news was a long term employment opportunity, PHARES quit the campaign after three months.

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GORDON thinks that PHARES should be the ambassador to Lebanon for what he did for the Trump campaign. PHARES received nothing despite all that he did for the campaign. In December 2016, KUSHNER told PHARES that he could no longer represent TRUMP or the presidential transition. PHARES has commiserated his frustrations about how he was treated with GORDON.

[REDACTED] is a business partner with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is a donor and possibly funded this business venture.

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[REDACTED] a 2014 Coptic Christian event at the National Press Club. PHARES, [REDACTED] and JIM CARAFANO spoke at this event. There were only 10 people at the event. GORDON thought it was too much work to set up and not worth the [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] paid GORDON and the speakers.

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[REDACTED] is a U.S. Citizen and is also involved with the Coptic Christians.

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TRUMP met with Egyptian President El-Sisi at the United Nations General Assembly in 2016. PHARES pushed this meeting on TRUMP. Coptic Christians were also involved with this meeting. Ways to counteract the Muslim Brotherhood was the focus of the meeting.

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Of the people who worked on the Trump campaign, GORDON is primarily still in contact with PHARES. PHARES asked GORDON for advice prior to his testimony at the Senate Select Committee for Intelligence. GORDON told PHARES that he did not need an attorney. GORDON is still in regular contact with PHARES.

#### Communications and Departure

GORDON was asked about any notes he had from the campaign and any devices he utilized for campaign business. GORDON explained he didn't really have any notes from the campaign. GORDON did a lot of phone calls and emails but not much in the way of handwritten notes. Most of the campaign documentation was done via email. GORDON did take notes on morning calls he had but those were probably thrown out.

GORDON utilized his personal phone and ipad for campaign business and when he tried to add his [REDACTED] email address to the phone, his phone started having issues which eventually broke GORDON's phone. GORDON joked that maybe it was tapped by the Russians. GORDON got rid of his tablet right after the campaign because it wore out. It was a Samsung tablet and GORDON did not utilize a personal laptop. GORDON did not have any campaign data on his home computer. GORDON did draft the two-page vision statement he initially provided to SESSIONS on his home computer but that has been provided by GORDON already. The campaign did not provide GORDON any phone, tablet or laptop. This is part of the reason we see someone else's name on the email utilized to send GORDON's summary of the GOP Platform events as discussed in the previous interview. GORDON probably used [REDACTED] laptop to draft that since the office did not have computers.

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When he left the campaign in August 2016, GORDON only had his building access badge to turn in. He turned that in to [REDACTED]. The office imploded after GORDON quit. The press questioned why everyone left the office.

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#### GOP Platform/Convention

JOHN MASHBURN led meetings regarding the GOP platform and the Republican National Convention (Convention). GORDON explained that the Platform committee had 6 different rooms of sub-committees. There were two Jones Day lawyers, a political advisor and a whip for each of the rooms. Every GOP presumptive nominee has a chance to shape the platform. GORDON was placed in the room that was focused on National Security matters.

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GORDON thought arming Ukraine would come up at the Platform meeting and he mentioned to [ ] it would be an issue. MASHBURN took inputs from a variety of campaign members including GORDON and [ ] for National Security issues. [ ] compiled the input which was collected. GORDON understood TRUMP's policy on arming Ukraine because of statements he made at the meeting on March 31, 2016 and public statements he made during the campaign. On March 31, 2016, TRUMP said he did not want World War III over Ukraine.

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[ ] and GORDON reviewed the platform's national security sections to determine amendments of interest on Sunday night when the amendments were made available. They identified DIANA DENMAN's Ukrainian amendment as being of interest and GORDON also identified an amendment regarding counter-terrorism which he modified to include Sunni Jihadist in related terrorist groups.

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[ ] DENMAN's Ukrainian amendment was the main one GORDON had an issue with. So he flagged it immediately. GORDON described DENMAN as an [ ] year-old Texas delegate who appears to have an unusually strong connection to Ukraine. Approximately 6 or 7 amendments were flagged for problems. GORDON recalls that one of the other amendments flagged was one related to support for the Ladies in White in Cuba.

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Since MATT MILLER, the Whip, was the only one who could walk around in the meeting, GORDON notified MATT MILLER about the amendment indicating TRUMP didn't want World War III over Ukraine. MATT MILLER then notified [ ] the co-chair. GORDON told [ ] it would be nice if DENMAN would withdraw her amendment or otherwise table it for later. GORDON saw [ ] go speak to DENMAN and observed her head shaking a negative response, which GORDON took to mean she would not withdraw her amendment. GORDON then called DEARBORN and MASHBURN who were in the building but in other rooms. GORDON talked to DEARBORN and MASHBURN on the phone and in person. MASHBURN was concerned about arming Ukraine.

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At some point MATT MILLER called DEARBORN which upset DEARBORN who told MATT MILLER not to call him. MATT MILLER had been getting on DEARBORN's nerves and DEARBORN showed up when MATT MILLER went to use the restroom. So DEARBORN was upset MATT MILLER called him.

DENMAN came over to GORDON's table and treated him like a school child asking him, "Who are you?" and "Who are you talking to?" since GORDON was on hold trying to speak with DEARBORN and MASHBURN at the time. GORDON

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explained that he was on hold with his policy colleagues. DENMAN asked him, "What do you have against the free people?" and "How do you know TRUMP doesn't want to arm Ukraine?" The amendment ended up getting tabled until the end of day. This conversation with DENMAN while GORDON was trying to call MASHBURN and DEARBORN was at approximately 8am. Eventually, the amendment was defeated. DEARBORN, MASHBURN and [REDACTED] were all in the room during the vote. GORDON and [REDACTED] talked about what language to use in the amendment but GORDON does not recall who came up with the language for "appropriate assistance" but [REDACTED] was the one who decided to use it. GORDON explained that not all GOP members want to arm Ukraine.

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DENMAN spoke with the Washington Post and convinced them to write about how the Trump campaign guts GOP platform on Ukraine. [REDACTED] emailed GORDON about the article.

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GORDON explained that the vote occurred at around 3pm and in the room there was a head table where Republican National Committee (RNC) representatives were sitting. In this case, [REDACTED] LNU were at the head table. GORDON had met [REDACTED] LNU at [REDACTED] LNU [REDACTED] One of PAUL RYAN's policy guys was at the table too but GORDON doesn't recall his name. DON MCGAHN was present. BARRASSO was not involved in the details and neither was PAUL MANAFORT.

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MANAFORT and REINCE PRIEBUS both received an afteraction report of the meetings from DEARBORN that night. GORDON met MANAFORT twice, once in April and then again in June, but GORDON never talked to MANAFORT about the platform. After the committee meetings, DEARBORN told GORDON "good job" and MANAFORT said it sounds like a "win" but GORDON did not actually see or talk to MANAFORT there.

GORDON didn't talk to TRUMP about the platform. GORDON remembers updating SESSIONS about the platform after the Convention but not during the committee meetings. GORDON did not recall talking to SESSIONS on July 11, 2016. GORDON talked to SESSIONS that week but not about the platform. They talked about surrogates. A black female surrogate was not getting enough air time and SESSIONS was concerned about backlash from that because of perceptions of racism. GORDON was shown emails he sent on July 11, 2016 in which he indicates that he is about to talk to SESSIONS and does talk to SESSIONS. GORDON stated that if he talked to SESSIONS it would have been about the surrogate issue. GORDON noted that the time on the emails even confirms that he talked to SESSIONS after the vote, not during the committee meeting. SESSIONS did not advise GORDON on how to approach the platform about arming Ukraine. GORDON does not recall

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if he talked to [REDACTED] during the committee meeting days. [Note: Copies of the emails shown to GORDON are attached to this document via 1A.]

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GORDON recalls that no one pushed the change to the platform amendment. Everyone just knew that's what TRUMP wanted from his statements during the campaign. GORDON was just doing his job.

On July 31, 2016, both MANAFORT and TRUMP discussed the platform change during separate interviews. MANAFORT indicated that the campaign had nothing to do with the platform change regarding Ukraine, which GORDON says is false. GORDON doesn't know if MANAFORT did not know about the change, forgot about it or was actually trying to cover up something. GORDON thinks MANAFORT probably lied because these details were below his level and he just defaulted to denying it even though he didn't know if that was correct or not.

In TRUMP's interview, TRUMP was asked about the platform change and stated that the change didn't come from him. GORDON stated that this was false because the modifications were made based on TRUMP's stance on Ukraine. While TRUMP didn't specifically ask anyone to change it, the platform was modified because of TRUMP's policy. GORDON says he was thrown under the bus with media because of TRUMP's statement.

SESSIONS, [REDACTED] PAGE, PHARES, [REDACTED] CARAFANO, McFARLAND and [REDACTED] were all in Cleveland for the Convention. PHARES was not involved in the committee meetings prior to the Convention.

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#### Miscellaneous

GORDON was asked if he talked to anyone about our previous interview. GORDON said he talked to Washington Post reporter ROSALIND HELDERMAN like he previously reported in between the meetings. HELDERMAN said she heard that they were looking into the platform and asked GORDON if he talked to the Special Counsel. GORDON told HELDERMAN that he wasn't going to tell her that.

GORDON also told his attorney and [REDACTED] about the interview. GORDON indicated he is still in touch with PHARES and [REDACTED] but did not talk to them about the interview.

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GORDON stated during the interview that TRUMP is a liar and an unreliable person who does not pay what is owed. GORDON was asked if

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
[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Gordon on 09/07/2017, On 09/07/2017, Page 14 of 14

TRUMP would collude with Russia. GORDON said TRUMP would probably meet with Russia but was not sure if TRUMP would collude with Russia. GORDON again stated that if TRUMP and PAPADOPOULOS had been alone together at the March 31, 2016 meeting, the PUTIN meeting probably would have happened.

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FBI(19cv1278)-2582



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/06/2017  
-b6 Per FBI & DOS  
b7C Per FBI & DOS

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] was interviewed at her place of employment, U.S. Department of State (DOS), 2201 C Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20520, [Redacted]

[Redacted] Also present during the interview was Special Agent [Redacted] Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Department of State. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

[Redacted] is currently the Conflicts Advisor in the Office of Caucasus Affairs and Regional Conflicts, DOS. In April 2016, she was serving in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Russia, and was the Control Officer for Representative DANA ROHRABACHER's bipartisan Congressional Delegation (CODEL). The CODEL also included Representative FRENCH HILL among others.

b6 Per FBI & DOS  
b7C Per FBI & DOS

On Saturday, April 2, 2016, the CODEL attended a meeting at the Federation Counsel with KONSTANTIN KOSACHEV, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. The Federation Counsel is the equivalent of the U.S. Senate. In addition to the CODEL, there was a large U.S. Embassy contingent present. After the meeting, [Redacted] was assembling the CODEL and Embassy personnel in the hallway and noticed that ROHRABACHER and staffer [Redacted] were not present. She asked the Federation Counsel minder where they were and was told they were meeting with someone. They were gone long enough that members of the CODEL began to ask when they were leaving.

b6 Per FBI & DOS  
b7C Per FBI & DOS

Later that day, HILL provided a document about the Magnitsky Act to [Redacted] and asked to speak with the FBI Legal Attache (LEGAT), [Redacted]. [Redacted] believes [Redacted] had given the document to HILL. [Redacted] set up a meeting with [Redacted] for Sunday, April 3, 2016, at a CODEL public event. [Redacted] was not willing to discuss the document in a nonsecure location. He wanted to discuss it in a "SCIF." [Redacted] wanted to be present at the meeting. However, [Redacted] would not discuss it with him as [Redacted] did not hold a clearance. [Redacted] told [Redacted] not to engage with Russians on this topic, and he should go back to Washington and research it. [Redacted] never met with HILL. A copy of the Magnitsky Act document HILL provided is attached.

Investigation on 08/31/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/31/2017

by [Redacted]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 08/31/2017, Page 2 of 3

b6 Per FBI & DOS  
b7C Per FBI & DOS

On the morning of April 3, 2016, [REDACTED] observed [REDACTED] in the lobby of the Ritz-Carlton eating breakfast with two individuals [REDACTED] did not recognize. Later that day just before a lunch event, [REDACTED] approached [REDACTED] and told her there were two Russian attorneys that wanted to attend lunch with the Ambassador [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that he could not spring something like this on her right before an event. [REDACTED] responded that the Russians did not have to sit at the Ambassador's table. [REDACTED] notified the Ambassador that the CODEL invited other individuals to lunch. The two Russians ultimately did not attend the lunch.

b6 Per FBI & DOS  
b7C Per FBI & DOS

After lunch, there was a press event. Two Russians showed up and [REDACTED] recognized them as the two individuals who had breakfast with [REDACTED]. One was a female that [REDACTED] now believes was NATALIYA VESELNITSKAYA. The two individuals spoke with HILL for a significant amount of time.

b6 Per FBI & DOS  
b7C Per FBI & DOS

When they arrived in country, the U.S. Embassy provided the CODEL with telephones to use. As they were heading to the airport to depart from Moscow, [REDACTED] collected all of these phones. [REDACTED] returned his phone and charger and dropped the attached document in the bag with the phones. The document identifies representatives of the Prosecutor General's office including VESELNITSKAYA and [REDACTED].

To document the events with the CODEL, [REDACTED] sent an email to her boss. A copy of which was shown to [REDACTED] and has been memorialized separately due to its classification.

b6 Per DOS

[REDACTED] believes the two individuals meeting with the CODEL had more to do with the Magnitsky Act than anything else. She also thought ROHRBACHER may have been involved with a film at the NEWSEUM related to the Magnitsky Act.

[REDACTED] indicated [REDACTED] was like any other Congressional staffer and was trying to please his boss.

b6 Per FBI & DOS  
b7C Per FBI & DOS

[REDACTED] noted that at that time Russian officials generally did not want to meet with U.S. officials because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. ROHRBACHER's meetings were also notable in that the CODEL met with the Russian officials on a Saturday.

b6 Per DOS

During the CODEL to Moscow, ROHRBACHER also had a meeting with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] ROHRBACHER and [REDACTED] were the only CODEL members to attend.

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[REDACTED] provided a copy of an article from THE ATLANTIC dated July 18, 2017, entitled Russian Anti-Sanctions Campaign Turned to California

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
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 08/31/2017, Page 3 of b6 Per DOS  
b7C Per DOS

Congressman. [Redacted] is mentioned by name in the article as having seen the document given to RORHBACHER concerning the Magnitsky Act. b6 Per DOS  
b7C Per DOS

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/08/2018

EDWARD H. LIEBERMAN, date of birth [Redacted] home address [Redacted] telephone [Redacted] email [Redacted]

[Redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, Washington, D.C. Also present were LIEBERMAN's attorneys, [Redacted] and [Redacted] Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, 601 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, telephone [Redacted] Assistant Special Counsel L. Rush Atkinson; Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] and Staff Operations Specialist [Redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, LIEBERMAN voluntarily provided the following information:

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LIEBERMAN was born and educated in [Redacted] He went to school in [Redacted] and then attended law school [Redacted] He attended the [Redacted]

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After [Redacted] LIEBERMAN spent [Redacted] years working in tax law for [Redacted] He then practiced tax law at a small boutique firm. As Russia began to open in 1988 and 1989, a partner in his firm who worked in London, [Redacted] asked for volunteers to learn the tax system of the USSR. Many big companies were interested in entering the market.

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LIEBERMAN came to manage the practice in Moscow, which eventually expanded to Saint Petersburg and Kazakhstan. He and a group of subordinate attorneys joined PEPPER HAMILTON in [Redacted] convinced him to join. Some in the firm were opposed to its planned expansion in Russia, and resigned.

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Work in Kazakhstan was difficult, and this convinced LIEBERMAN to leave PEPPER HAMILTON. He practiced on his own, and then joined COUDERT BROTHERS. He retired at age [Redacted] as a partner at that firm. Several days before September 11, 2001, LIEBERMAN co-founded the ALBRIGHT GROUP. He served as Of Counsel for about a year and a half. Once he realized that developing clients for the ALBRIGHT GROUP was similar to developing clients in the legal world, he left some time in 2003.

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Investigation on 12/13/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted]

Date drafted 12/14/2017

by [Redacted]

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[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Edward Lieberman, On 12/13/2017, Page 2 of 9

Since leaving the ALBRIGHT GROUP, LIEBERMAN has been making investments and practicing law on his own. Most of his projects involve Russia or central Asia. He does not speak or read Russian but knows a few phrases to prevent Russians from talking about him in front of him.

LIEBERMAN worked with AKEZHAN KAZHEGELDIN, the former prime minister of Kazakhstan. KAZHEGELDIN was prime minister from 1993 to 1997, and hoped to run again in 1999. KAZHEGELDIN left office in 1997 for an unsuccessful bid for President against NURSULTAN NAZARBAYEV. KAZHEGELDIN worked during the government's privatization, a policy which many Kazakhs opposed including NAZARBAYEV's [REDACTED]. KAZHEGELDIN fled to Switzerland after being exiled. He wanted LIEBERMAN to set up a US-based foundation to spread news of Kazakhstan as there was no free press there. He believed that such a foundation would allow news to bleed into the country.

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LIEBERMAN set up the EURASIAN INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RESEARCH (the INSTITUTE) and needed someone to run it. LIEBERMAN placed an advertisement in the *Washington Post* for a director of the institute. Two candidates applied for the position. One candidate was very qualified but overly academic. The other was RINAT AKHMETSHIN who had no experience [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] AKHMETSHIN was however "charming" and could hold his liquor with Russians and central Asians. LIEBERMAN hired AKHMETSHIN and has been [REDACTED]. AKHMETSHIN learned how to handle the media. He worked in public relations (PR) despite his lack of background in the topic. LIEBERMAN does not believe the INSTITUTE is still active. AKHMETSHIN was trying to sell PR projects. AKHMETSHIN worked with prosecutors from the government of Kyrgyzstan to find the assets of a former prime minister who fled. The Kyrgyzstan project was complicated because the United States had a military base in the country. Attorney [REDACTED] also worked on the case. [REDACTED] is another associate of AKHMETSHIN.

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AKHMETSHIN served for [REDACTED] years in the Soviet army as a conscript. While AKHMETSHIN claimed he worked in counterintelligence, he was simply a [REDACTED]. LIEBERMAN told AKHMETSHIN to stop exaggerating as it would come back to bite him. AKHMETSHIN told [REDACTED].

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AKHMETSHIN's father was in the KGB. His father died young and AKHMETSHIN [REDACTED].

Around [REDACTED] LIEBERMAN ended his involvement in the INSTITUTE following his departure from COUDERT BROTHERS. He could not be involved in the INSTITUTE while working for the ALBRIGHT GROUP.

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[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Edward Lieberman, On 12/13/2017, Page 3 of 9

AKHMETSHIN knew and worked for ANDREY VAVILOV, the former deputy finance minister of Russia. VAVILOV became wealthy by acquiring a Siberian oil company. VAVILOV had a legal dispute over a hotel he hoped to acquire in Moscow. AKHMETSHIN convinced VAVILOV that he could assist him in the fight. AKHMETSHIN handled VAVILOV's image in the US as VAVILOV hoped to start his own hedge fund. AKHMETSHIN got him very positive media coverage in the New York Times. LIEBERMAN explained how VAVILOV bought the most expensive apartment in New York City. He agreed to pay [REDACTED] for the apartment, including a [REDACTED] down payment. However, the Israeli developer could not deliver on the promised floor-to-ceiling windows on the apartment, so VAVILOV decided to sue. LIEBERMAN recommended VAVILOV accept a two bedroom apartment for his [REDACTED] down payment, but VAVILOV wanted to sue anyway. Ultimately, VAVILOV got a two bedroom apartment for [REDACTED] plus [REDACTED] in legal fees.

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LIEBERMAN was involved in the Prevezon case for about a year and a half as a tax lawyer. His job was to determine if the Russian case against BILL BROWDER was just or not. LIEBERMAN concluded that the Russian government's claim was sound. If BROWDER had paid his taxes in Russia, SERGEI MAGNITSKY would not have ended up in jail. LIEBERMAN worked with AKHMETSHIN, VESELNITSKAYA, and CYMROT on the case. LIEBERMAN did not know how AKHMETSHIN became involved in the Prevezon case.

VESELNITSKAYA had contact with FUSION GPS and GLENN SIMPSON during the Prevezon case. LIEBERMAN believes VESELNITSKAYA got her information about ZIFF BROTHERS from SIMPSON. LIEBERMAN did not see those connections while he was working on the Prevezon case.

Through his work on the Prevezon case, LIEBERMAN met DENIS KATSYV several times. He also met PYOTR KATSYV once in Moscow.

LIEBERMAN asserted that the primary goal of their lobbying regarding the Magnitsky Act was to restore Russian adoptions. Changing the name of the act was a means to that end. They simply hoped to change the name of the law, not the law itself.

LIEBERMAN did not recall the first time he met VESELNITSKAYA, but knew that it was in the United States. He indicated that the last contact he had with her was about a year ago, while she was in the US. He saw her on June 9, 2016, and that may have been the last time. She was the driving force behind the Human Rights Accountability Global Initiative Foundation (HRAGI). She indicated she could secure funding from DENIS KATSYV to cover the lobbying for the name change. They would need funding for public relations.

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Edward Lieberman , On 12/13/2017 , Page 4 of 9

LIEBERMAN never met the other donors to HRAGI. He indicated that there were three or four others, in addition to Katsyv. He indicated they donated about [REDACTED] LIEBERMAN reviewed HRAGI's Lobbying Report dated May 8, 2017 and was not familiar with the listed names: MIKHAIL PONOMAREV, ALBERT NASIBULIN, VLADIMIR LELYUKH, and BERRYLE TRADING INC. LIEBERMAN believes BAKER HOSTETLER completed the Lobbying Report.

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LIEBERMAN stated that they had a narrow window to change the name of the act, as a separate bill, the Global Magnitsky Act, was pending in Congress at the time. LIEBERMAN stated that VESELNITSKAYA's motivation to change the name of the act was to "expose Browder." DENIS KATSYV had the same motivation. Discrediting BROWDER would also benefit them in the Prevezon case.

HRAGI worked with CHRIS COOPER, [REDACTED] COZEN O'CONNOR PUBLIC STRATEGIES, and BAKER HOSTETLER.

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VESELNITSKAYA suggested [REDACTED] as the Director of HRAGI. Either VESELNITSKAYA or DENIS KATSYV knew [REDACTED] brother and that [REDACTED] was looking for work. [REDACTED] did not do much as the Director. LIEBERMAN never met [REDACTED] brother and does not know his name. HRAGI rented office space on the 5<sup>th</sup> floor in the same building as the offices of BAKER HOSTETLER in Washington, D.C. LIEBERMAN went to the office a few times to meet [REDACTED] Most of these meetings were for LIEBERMAN to receive payment from HRAGI.

VESELNITSKAYA was [REDACTED] She was a self-promoter who [REDACTED] Her whole motivation was to promote her own brand, [REDACTED] LIEBERMAN did not believe that she was affiliated with an intelligence service, and did not believe her to be [REDACTED] LIEBERMAN did not know how VESELNITSKAYA and DENIS KATSYV met. LIEBERMAN speculated that VESELNITSKAYA's position as [REDACTED]

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LIEBERMAN, AKHMETSHIN, VESELNITSKAYA, and [REDACTED] [Last Name Unknown (LNU)] attended a birthday party for DENIS KATSYV in Moscow. The Prosecutor General YURY CHAIKA and Deputy Prosecutor General of Russia also attended. [REDACTED] and the Deputy Prosecutor General knew each other. They collected all the cellphones from the attendees. LIEBERMAN sat across from CHAIKA at the birthday dinner. LIEBERMAN asked and got CHAIKA to agree to restore adoptions of Russian children by Americans if they could get the name of the Magnitsky Act changed. CHAIKA indicated that he "Spoke to the boss." CHAIKA did not speak English and LIEBERMAN did not speak Russian. All of their conversations were through translators. This was the first and only time LIEBERMAN met CHAIKA. LIEBERMAN heard no

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Edward Lieberman, On 12/13/2017, Page 5 of 9

mention of hacked emails during the dinner. He received a lacquer box while at the party.

VESELNITSKAYA did not appear to have an existing relationship with CHAIKA. She did not appear to have many connections in general. Whenever LIEBERMAN needed materials such as the underlying tax documents from Russia, VESELNITSKAYA could not or would not obtain them for LIEBERMAN.

Regarding the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower, LIEBERMAN indicated that he was in New York that day with [REDACTED]. He was invited to tour the METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART on behalf of BUFFALO STATE UNIVERSITY. LIEBERMAN's [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] of BUFFALO STATE UNIVERSITY, and LIEBERMAN established a scholarship [REDACTED]. The tour was for "donor maintenance" and to view a recently restored sculpture.

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AKHMETSHIN told LIEBERMAN that there was a great Russian play that day in New York that he was attending. AKHMETSHIN had already purchased tickets for himself, VESELNITSKAYA, and ANATOLI SAMOCHORNOV, her translator. LIEBERMAN believes VESELNITSKAYA was in New York City for court hearings about whether BAKER HOSTETLER should be disqualified as counsel for Prevezon. He also speculated that VESELNITSKAYA hoped to testify before Congress as a means to get her face in the public.

Following the tour of the METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, LIEBERMAN had dinner with [REDACTED] at a Greek restaurant near the theater. AKHMETSHIN joined them for a drink. LIEBERMAN, [REDACTED] and AKHMETSHIN met VESELNITSKAYA and SAMOCHORNOV at the theater. They never mentioned the meeting at the Trump Tower or JARED KUSHNER or DONALD TRUMP, JR.

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LIEBERMAN eventually learned about the Trump Tower meeting from AKHMETSHIN before it was made public. LIEBERMAN advised that AKHMETSHIN said it was a waste of time but they had no in depth discussion about it. AKHMETSHIN indicated that the "Trump kids" were at the meeting.

LIEBERMAN was shown numerous documents and he provided the following information:

Checks and deposit slips from January and March 2015: In reference to check #243 dated March 30, 2015, LIEBERMAN noted he had a client, [REDACTED] who wanted to take the Dupont Underground and transform it into a Disney-like ride. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In 2015, LIEBERMAN [REDACTED] LIEBERMAN and AKHMETSHIN go to the same gym, and [REDACTED] He considers AKHMETSHIN to be [REDACTED] AKHMETSHIN would serve as [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Edward Lieberman, On 12/13/2017, Page 6 of 9

LIEBERMAN's translator occasionally, and still calls LIEBERMAN "Mr. LIEBERMAN" even after knowing each other for [REDACTED] years.

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EL-000001: LIEBERMAN indicated he met [REDACTED] at the ALBRIGHT GROUP. [REDACTED] was charming. He retained [REDACTED] to work on the Dupont Underground project and to lobby. LIEBERMAN introduced [REDACTED] to AKHMETSHIN to help facilitate AKHMETSHIN's connections to Democrats. [REDACTED] "knows everyone in the DNC." He lobbied on behalf of HRAGI.

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EL-00006: [REDACTED] was a tax associate and brilliant Russian tax lawyer. She lives in [REDACTED] and worked on the Browder case.

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EL-000158: LIEBERMAN was unable to read Russian text in email.

EL-000178: HRAGI planned to show a film by ANDREW NEKRASOV at the Newseum. LIEBERMAN suggested [REDACTED] serve as the moderator and was trying to set up a pre-screening of the movie for [REDACTED] and some of their mutual friends.

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EL-000183: LIEBERMAN indicated the seized property is likely a reference to PREVEZON's real estate in New York City. LIEBERMAN noted he does not know [REDACTED]

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EL-000184: LIEBERMAN would usually get AKHMETSHIN to translate VESELNITSKAYA's email correspondence. Some would include a translation when he received them from her.

Email dated April 15, 2016: LIEBERMAN and AKHMETSHIN were arriving in Moscow on April 25, 2016 and AKHMETSHIN and VESELNITSKAYA would be leaving for Brussels for the screening of the Magnitsky film on April 26, 2016. LIEBERMAN could not travel to Brussels as he had a single entry visa for Russia and would not be able to return if he left. "G.P." in the email stands for the Prosecutor General. LIEBERMAN repeated that he only met CHAIKA at DENIS KATSYV's birthday party.

EL-000198: The emails are related to the Brussels screening of the Magnitsky film. The screening of the film was cancelled by the European Parliament minutes before it was scheduled to be shown. [REDACTED] placed a significant amount of pressure to cancel the screening of the film in Brussels. Parliament claimed the film violated the privacy rights of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in the film. [REDACTED] knew people in Kazakhstan and told LIEBERMAN to bid on projects there. [REDACTED] has a [REDACTED] He speaks Russian and has [REDACTED]

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EL-000215: This is an email to [REDACTED] same person as in EL-000086.

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Edward Lieberman, On 12/13/2017, Page 7 of 9

EL-000224 and EL-000243: LIEBERMAN claimed that the only thing [redacted] did well was holding the checkbook. LIEBERMAN wanted to meet to get a check from [redacted]. The successful meetings and key dinner in this email are references to the dinner with CHAIKA in Moscow. LIEBERMAN also met with [redacted] on this trip.

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Emails dated May 17, 2016, EL-000453, and EL-000462: [redacted] provided money to restore a synagogue in Eastern Europe. The synagogue was important to Satmar Jews. HRAGI went to visit the Satmar Rabbi [redacted] in Brooklyn to discuss the Magntisky Act. [redacted] knew [redacted] father. [redacted] noted that there were 400,000 Satmar voters in New York. [redacted] needed a face and a name for the cause. He encouraged HRAGI to try to identify Americans who had tried to adopt Russian children but were unable.

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EL-000438: HRAGI also reached out to adoption groups. LIEBERMAN described SAMORCHNOV as a "super translator." He was smart, but did not do much more than translate and [redacted] VESELNITSKAYA. AKHMETSHIN was less accommodating towards VESELNITSKAYA. SAMOCHORNOV was involved with the Department of State. He was working on a cultural musical, and requested LIEBERMAN assist him with funding. LIEBERMAN demurred. They last spoke a long time ago, possibly on June 9, 2016. SAMOCHORNOV was not a principle of HRAGI, and simply followed directions from others.

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EL-000439: [redacted] helped to facilitate the meeting with [redacted]. LIEBERMAN does not know how they were put in touch, but it may have been through SAMOCHORNOV.

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Email dated May 22, 2016: LIEBERMAN stated [redacted] could be Rabbi [redacted] but he would never call him that. Whenever SAMOCHORNOV communicated on behalf of HRAGI, he was being directed to do it by someone else such as VESELNITSKAYA. The KATSYVs placed a lot of faith in VESELNITSKAYA.

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EL-000467: LIEBERMAN attended the Newseum showing of the film and described the event as [redacted]. Several hundred people attended. He did not know who funded the screening. It could have been COOPER as he is that kind of a person, but LIEBERMAN was not sure. LIEBERMAN believes [redacted] had people at the event because people in the audience began to yell in the middle of the movie. It was tense and unpleasant. They needed security at the event.

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EL-000470 and EL-000471: These are emails about Congressional hearings. VESELNITSKAYA wanted to testify before Congress. LIEBERMAN commented that VESELNITSKAYA looks unhappy in the photograph because she was not allowed to testify.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Edward Lieberman, On 12/13/2017, Page 8 of 9

EL-000482: LIEBERMAN invited his neighbors to attend the screening of the Magnitsky Act film at the Newseum.

EL-000516: [REDACTED] from HERMITAGE notifying [REDACTED] about an Oslo, Norway, showing of a Magnitsky Act film. [REDACTED] sent it to AKHMETSHIN as they know each other.

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EL-000556: HRAGI worked with other organizations trying to restore Russian adoptions including the Friends of Russian Adoptions (FRUA). FRUA had contacts at the Russian Embassy. Neither HRAGI nor LIEBERMAN interacted with anyone from the Russian Embassy.

EL-000604: [REDACTED] had many connections but minimal involvement with HRAGI. His [REDACTED] was hired by the new administration, [REDACTED] LIEBERMAN met [REDACTED] a few times, but only knows him through AKHMETSHIN.

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Email dated June 29, 2016: LIEBERMAN advised payments from BAKER HOSTETLER were for PREVEZON related work. He also stated HRAGI banks with Bank of America and he set up the accounts for them.

EL-000621: LIEBERMAN indicated he did not know who was providing funding for HRAGI other than DENIS KATSYV.

EL-000625: LIEBERMAN indicated that his email contact "Justice Justice [REDACTED] is [REDACTED] She was arrested and exiled from Kazakhstan. She spent [REDACTED] years in exile in [REDACTED] but was trying to get back to Russia. AKHMETSHIN knows [REDACTED] via LIEBERMAN. She was unemployed following her exile from Kazakhstan and Russia.

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EL-000631: VESELNITSKAYA loved HILLARY CLINTON as she was a strong female and there were not many female politicians in Russia. LIEBERMAN sent VESELNITSKAYA a picture he had with CLINTON.

EL-000662: [REDACTED] was in the United States trying to find a job. She wanted to be involved in improving U.S.-Russia relations.

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EL-000735: SAM PATTEN met LIEBERMAN once or twice. He is AKHMETSHIN's [REDACTED] He worked on Ukrainian elections and was previously with the U.S. State Department.

EL-000737: [REDACTED] was the architect of the Magnitsky Act. He was promoted to join the staff of the Helsinki Commission. He worked on behalf of [REDACTED]


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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Edward Lieberman, On 12/13/2017, Page 9 of 9

EL-001038: LIEBERMAN received a letter from Congress for testimony and documents. His attorney sent a letter in response to Congress' request. They have not provided testimony or documents to Congress.

EL-000665: LIEBERMAN and AKHMETSHIN are in the process of filing a patent. Both realized that neither could be the face for the technology, so they contacted [redacted] to be the face of their product. [redacted] is a retired U.S. Marine Corps sniper.

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FBI INFO.  
CLASSIFIED BY: [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2043  
DATE: 10-20-2020

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~ (U)

Date of entry 11/08/2018

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Paul J. Manafort, date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents [redacted] FBI Intelligence Analyst [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres. Present representing Manafort were attorneys Kevin Downing and Thomas Zehnle and paralegal [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information:

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Manafort met Konstantin Kilimnik in the United States twice during 2016 - once in the Havana Room in New York and once at the Four Seasons in New York. The Four Seasons meeting occurred sometime before the Havana Room meeting but after Manafort became Trump's Campaign Chairperson. At the Four Seasons, they talked primarily about the Trump Campaign, events in Ukraine and the money owed by Ukrainian oligarchs to Manafort. [redacted]

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[redacted] Their meeting lasted about an hour and a half or two hours. Manafort, through Rick Gates, arranged and paid for Kilimnik's train ticket from New York to Washington, D.C. and back. Manafort did not pay for Kilimnik's airfare to the U.S.

At the time they met, Kilimnik was working for Serhiy Lyovochkin. During the meeting, Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the Trump Campaign. Manafort intended for Kilimnik to pass the information back to individuals in Ukraine and elsewhere. The Opposition Bloc members recognized that Manafort's position on the Campaign offered them a good opportunity. Kilimnik, however, did not ask for anything based on Manafort's position with the Campaign. Kilimnik updated Manafort on Ukraine. They mostly talked about how to get people in the occupied zone to participate in elections. These people are part of the Opposition Bloc's base. According to Kilimnik, Yuriy Boyko, the face of the Opposition Bloc in 2016, said he could get them to participate in the elections. Boyko was part of Lyovochkin's faction of the Opposition Bloc.

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Investigation on 10/11/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/12/2018

by [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~ (U)~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

Continuation of FD-302 of 10.11.2018

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While Kilimnik worked for Manafort, Kilimnik met two or three times a month with the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) Schultz and the Political Director, First Name Unknown (FNU) Last Name Unknown (LNU) at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv. Kilimnik briefed Manafort after Kilimnik's meetings. Kilimnik also dealt with the German, French and Italian Embassies in Kyiv. Kilimnik was especially close with the German Embassy. Kilimnik did not deal with the British Embassy because it was not as important for Ukraine's integration into the European Union. During his 2016 trip, Manafort believes that Kilimnik was meeting in Washington, D.C. with DCM Schultz. Manafort is not aware of any other trips that Kilimnik took to the U.S. in 2016.

[REDACTED] Someone told this to Manafort. [REDACTED] (S)

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[REDACTED] and may have told Manafort. Manafort told Kilimnik.

If Manafort had something urgent to discuss with Jared Kushner during the Transition, it would have been either appointments or personnel concerns about the Transition staff itself. Chris Christie ran the Transition until after the election. During the Campaign, an Executive Committee for the Transition was set up that included Manafort, Kushner, Christie and Rick Dearborn. Within the Transition itself were teams for each Department or Agency. Christie staffed the teams with Washington insiders that knew how to deal with these Departments and Agencies. Kushner and Christie were not close. Kushner engineered the Transition away from Christie and his people. Christie asked Manafort to try to repair his relationship with Kushner. Christie was also concerned that the next level of people, below top level, were not getting appointed fast enough. Manafort had four or five telephone calls with Kushner during the Transition. Manafort had no success in talking with Kushner about these issues.

Manafort reviewed NOSC00021598-599. Manafort does not recall what he wanted to discuss with Kushner that was "important and time sensitive." It would have been either appointments or personnel concerns. Manafort wanted to meet in person so he could get more time and attention from Kushner than would have occurred during a telephone call. Manafort wanted "total discretion" for the meeting because of the media scrutiny on him. Manafort was not concerned about anyone in the Transition learning about their meeting. It was the meeting itself, not the topics, that needed secrecy. Manafort never spoke with Kushner about Ukraine.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

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Manafort reviewed a 01/19/2017 e-mail chain between Manafort and [REDACTED] regarding "Names." In the first e-mail, Manafort wrote "fire drill time." Secretary of State had been one of the last cabinet positions filled. Manafort and [REDACTED] were concerned that Rex Tillerson would not bring on the right people. Steve Beguin was a key guy as far as [REDACTED] was concerned. Beguin brought the necessary knowledge but he was not part of Washington. Manafort anticipated recommending people for positions but he had not been asked. Manafort planned to aggressively fill the vacuum caused by the Transition's failure to select people. [REDACTED] really liked [REDACTED] a Russian/Eastern European think tank expert. Manafort has met [REDACTED] once or twice. [REDACTED] set up a meeting between [REDACTED] Manafort and [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] wanted to get Ukraine into Europe and were willing with deal with Yanukovych. David Kramer, on the other hand, is an ideologue who would not have dealt with Ukraine if Yanukovych was there. As to the people that [REDACTED] recommended in the e-mail, Manafort did not work with any of them in Ukraine. In addition to the people [REDACTED] recommended, Manafort pushed [REDACTED] for Head of Protocol. [REDACTED] did not get the position. Manafort knew [REDACTED] from the Bush and Reagan days. [REDACTED] worked for Manafort on the Trump convention. [REDACTED] had been involved in business activities in Ukraine, maybe for an energy company. [REDACTED] dealt with Ukraine during the Obama years. [REDACTED] wrote that [REDACTED] asks me every day when RA is going to get a visa to visit America." [REDACTED] [REDACTED] has a relationship with Rinat Akhmetov. [REDACTED] worked for Akhmetov. [REDACTED] worked for a major Russian company. Manafort thought that if Beguin became Deputy Secretary of State, they could try to [REDACTED] Manafort did not know why [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Akhmetov owned a metallurgy company in the U.S. Manafort never worked for or with Akhmetov's U.S. company.

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[REDACTED] came to the U.S. in early 2018 and met with Manafort. They met in Kevin Downing's law offices in Washington, D. C. First Name Unknown (FNU) Last Name Unknown (LNU) asked Manafort to represent [REDACTED] in Ukraine's 2019 presidential election. FNU LNU lives in the U.S. [REDACTED] connected Manafort with FNU LNU. After first hearing from FNU LNU, Manafort called Kilimnik. Kilimnik said [REDACTED] was not a first tier candidate and could not get enough support from the Opposition Bloc and their supporters. Manafort first said no to FNU LNU because [REDACTED] was not a real prospect. FNU LNU asked again and Manafort agreed to meet [REDACTED] did not speak English. They discussed money for Manafort and possible coalitions that would support [REDACTED] candidacy. Manafort agreed to audit [REDACTED] chances and give him an answer in June 2018, at which point they could both decide

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[Redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

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whether to go forward together. Manafort planned to start with a poll but did not actually conduct it because [Redacted] did not send the money. Manafort ended up assessing [Redacted] potential candidacy based on information Kilimnik collected by talking with people in Ukraine. In June 2018, Manafort told [Redacted] that he should not run. [Redacted] paid Manafort about [Redacted] from a business account. Manafort does not recall in which country the business account was located. The money probably came into Steam Mountain. Manafort performed about 25 to 30 hours of work.

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[Redacted] purchased a boost mobile phone at the beginning of 2018. Manafort wanted to talk securely with Kilimnik. Manafort may also have called Rick Gates on the phone. Manafort did not send any messages on the phone. Kilimnik was collecting materials from Borys Kolesnikov and [Redacted] for Manafort's defense. Kilimnik sent the materials to Manafort's hushmail account.

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Victor Boyarkin had been impressed with something Manafort did [Redacted]

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[Large Redacted Block]

Boyarkin worked for Deripaska. Manafort met Boyarkin only once. Manafort met Boyarkin in Deripaska's offices in Moscow sometime between 2006 and 2008. Manafort was there to meet with Deripaska. Manafort does not recall whether Boyarkin was in the meeting or introduced separately. Manafort and Boyarkin talked for about thirty minutes. Boyarkin does not speak or write English. Manafort used a translator whenever communicating with Boyarkin. Boyarkin was a bland guy, 5'10", overweight with gray hair. Boyarkin coordinated Deripaska's projects on which Manafort worked [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Boyarkin relayed messages from Deripaska but did not speak for him. [Redacted]

[Large Redacted Block]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

Continuation of FD-302 of 10.11.2018 , On 10/11/2018 , Page 5 of 10

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] Kilimnik, Akhmetov and Serhiy Lyovochkin told Manafort that Poroshenko and [Redacted] were business partners.

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Rick Davis hired [Redacted] to work in Ukraine on matters related to Deripaska. When Manafort took over the lead on the Deripaska account, [Redacted] began working for Manafort. [Redacted] ran the operation in Ukraine from about 2005 to 2010. Kilimnik worked as number two. [Redacted] left Ukraine right after Yanukovich became President. Manafort and [Redacted] talked about once a month after [Redacted] left. Manafort does not know any of [Redacted] clients after he left. In 2017, [Redacted] worked for Manafort in Kurdistan. Manafort was advising the Prime Minister on the referendum and other matters of U.S. and European policy. Manafort selected [Redacted] to work in Kurdistan because he was available and Manafort trusted him. [Redacted] worked for about two months during the September to December 2017 timeframe. Manafort was introduced to the Kurdish Prime Minister by Manafort's friends in Dubai. The Kurdish Prime Minister directly hired Manafort. Payment for Manafort's work in Kurdistan came into Steam Mountain. Manafort has not used offshore accounts since 2014. Gates said he shut down all of the offshore accounts. Manafort paid [Redacted] about [Redacted] Kurdistan paid [Redacted] expenses. Manafort did not pay [Redacted] in cash.

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Manafort did not encourage [Redacted] to talk with the press or media on behalf of Manafort. Manafort did not try to use [Redacted] to get around the court's gag order.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] introduced Manafort to the UAE's Head of Security, Talal. Talal recommended Manafort for work with a Crown Prince in Saudi Arabia and the

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

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Emir in Bahrain. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] Manafort never talked to any U.S. government official regarding his work for the UAE.

Manafort last spoke with [Redacted] in May 2018. Manafort communicated with [Redacted] through WhatsApp or possibly Signal. Manafort used whatever application that [Redacted] wanted to use. Manafort gave [Redacted] advice on what to tell Talal about Manafort's issues in the U.S. Manafort talked with [Redacted] about Manafort's case. Manafort did not ask [Redacted] for any assistance related to his charges, the trial or the media.

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Manafort met [Redacted] in the U.S. in 2017. Manafort believes that they met in New York, maybe at the Peninsula Hotel. There was no need to meet in person and nothing in particular that they did not want to discuss on the phone. They talked about work in Kurdistan and Iraq. [Redacted] was in New York on other business. Manafort does not know why [Redacted] was in the U.S.

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Manafort asked [Redacted] if he knew Christopher Steele. [Redacted] [Redacted] talked with [Redacted] relayed to Manafort from [Redacted] Manafort does not know [Redacted] source of information.

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All of the information in the Steele dossier about Manafort is untrue, including the trips to Russia.

[Redacted]

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During their meeting in the U.S., [Redacted] updated Manafort on their projects. Manafort never met [Redacted] in the U.S. Manafort did not ask [Redacted] or [Redacted] to do any work to check out the allegations in the Steele dossier. [Redacted] introduced Manafort to an international firm that could conduct due diligence regarding Manafort's various accounts in Cyprus. The firm did not do any work because Manafort did not pursue it.

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

Continuation of FD-302 of 10.11.2018, On 10/11/2018, Page 7 of 10

Manafort reviewed messages between Manafort and [Redacted] Manafort told [Redacted] about his case. Neither [Redacted] ever provided Manafort anything that he did not ask for. Manafort reviewed a message from [Redacted] on 07/20/2017 stating that:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Manafort does not believe that the first sentence is [Redacted]

[Redacted] Manafort does not recall getting

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] spoke in flowery language and [Redacted]

saying a lot about nothing. Manafort does not know what [Redacted] meant by

[Redacted] Manafort does not know who Oleg Erovinkin is. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Manafort met with his attorneys during a break.

Manafort and [Redacted] met in a hotel room in Washington, D.C. [Redacted]

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talked about Christopher Steele, Talal and Kurdistan. After their meeting, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

Continuation of FD-302 of 10.11.2018 , On 10/11/2018 , Page 8 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Manafort's only assignment to [Redacted] was to [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] Manafort talked with them about all elements of the investigation against him. They must have connected the dots and investigated further on their own initiative.

Manafort and [Redacted] talked about the newspaper reporting on the dossier and the cash ledger. [Redacted] knew that GPS Fusion had operations in Russia. They talked about how the June 9 meeting had no substance and thus may have been a setup. Manafort figured that the meeting was arranged to create questions about whether the Trump Campaign was working with the Russian government. The Russian government, or someone else, encouraged the Agaralovs to request the meeting with the plan that it would blow up into an allegation of collusion. Manafort's last question was who originated the setup plan. Manafort asked [Redacted] to see [Redacted] Manafort does not know why whoever set up the meeting did not make it public until after the election.

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At their meeting, [Redacted] and GPS Fusion's ability to work in Russia. [Redacted] said GPS Fusion had clients in Russia and GPS Fusion had worked for the Russian government. [Redacted] did not draw any conclusions regarding efforts to undermine the Trump Campaign. [Redacted] also talked about Kurdistan and [Redacted]

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Manafort never paid [Redacted] for any work. [Redacted] message about [Redacted] did not relate to any work that [Redacted] were doing for Manafort. Manafort did not relay any information regarding GPS Fusion from [Redacted] to anyone else.

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Manafort wrote "[p]ls block some time for me to review this and another project." "This" would have been [Redacted] and the other project may have been in Cyprus.

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

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[REDACTED] did not bring Manafort a hard copy of anything related to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] Someone had a court order to go into Manafort's Cyprus bank account information. The international firm recommended by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] got Manafort a copy of the court order. From the order, it did not look like the U.S. government was involved. Manafort thought it may have been the Associated Press or other media. Manafort did not pay the international firm. Manafort does not know if [REDACTED] paid the international firm.

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Manafort reviewed messages between Manafort and [REDACTED] on 07/20/2017. [REDACTED] wrote that "I know [REDACTED] has spoken to you about the intel we have to assist your side." The intel was the Cyprus project. Manafort then wrote "[n]ew VIP topic that I want to discuss." Manafort may have been talking about Afghanistan. Manafort reviewed messages between Manafort and [REDACTED] on 07/21/2017. In one message, Manafort asked [REDACTED] if he had access to "a very good international forensics accounting firm." This message was about the international firm that ended up conducting the Cyprus work for Manafort. Thus, the "VIP topic" was Cyprus. As to the earlier message, Manafort cannot recall what would have been the "intel we have to assist your side."

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[REDACTED]

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Manafort asked people, including [REDACTED] to donate to his Legal Defense Fund. In asking for donations, Manafort detailed the amount of his bills and where to send the money. Manafort also explained why he thought the government investigation was unfair.

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Manafort does not recall if [REDACTED] asked Manafort to talk with anyone in the U.S., including the Administration or the Hill, on behalf of their overseas clients. Given his circumstances, Manafort would have identified people and someone else would have contacted them.

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[REDACTED] works for Talal. [REDACTED] called [REDACTED] an action officer. [REDACTED] organized their trips. Manafort told [REDACTED] about his case. Manafort tried to raise money by proclaiming his innocence and criticizing the process.

Manafort wrote that "HOUSE Intel committee has the stuff exposing Dossier, FBI AND Illegal Fisa searches coming." Manafort based this

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

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statement on public reporting. Manafort did not seek, nor did he receive, any information from anyone on the House Intel committee or anyone else with access to confidential information.

When Manafort wrote that the

[Redacted]

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
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Manafort was stating his own conclusion for which he has no evidence.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/11/2018

GEORGE NADER, date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] was interviewed at 395 E. Street SW, Washington, D.C. NADER was represented by attorneys [Redacted] and [Redacted] from Holland and Hart LLP. Also present at the interview were Senior Assistant Special Counsels Zainab Ahmad, Brandon Van Grack, and Jeannie Rhee.

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At approximately 9:15 AM, NADER's attorneys and SCO attorneys discussed the attached proffer letter. [Redacted] made notations to the proffer letter. Ahmad indicated that these notations did not indicate the SCO agreed to these notations.

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[Redacted] raised concerns about the search warrant that was executed on January 17, 2018 and when NADER would get his phones back. Ahmad explained the difficulty in imaging NADER's iPhone 6 and iPhone 7.

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Ahmad explained to NADER that he was a subject, but not a target of the SCO and that his phones might have evidence of crimes committed by other people.

At approximately 9:34 AM, Ahmad made notations to the attached proffer letter. Ahmad explained the proffer letter to NADER and emphasized the importance of truthfulness. Ahmad told NADER that false statements to FBI agents would be violations of Title 18, U.S.C. Section 1001.

After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, NADER provided the following information:

NADER's Background

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] NADER introduced Vice President DICK CHENEY to AHMED CHALABI.

NADER continued an informal relationship with CHENEY through [Redacted]

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Investigation on 01/19/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

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File # [Redacted] Date drafted 01/23/2018

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by [Redacted]

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[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/19  
Continuation of FD-302 of /2018, On 01/19/2018, Page 2 of 15

NADER first met ERIK PRINCE in Iraq. PRINCE was running the security company Blackwater, and was a well-paid consultant for the U.S. occupation of Iraq. NADER advised PRINCE on the customs and business practices in Iraq. NADER was in the process of obtaining a business license for Blackwater to operate in Iraq when the Nisour Square shooting occurred.

NADER is currently a business consultant in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE). NADER has an unofficial advisory relationship with the leaders of UAE and Saudi Arabia, but is not an employee of the government of UAE or Saudi Arabia. This relationship is similar to how he worked for CHENEY. NADER specialized in bringing companies together for real estate deals or licenses.

During the 2016 Presidential Campaign, NADER advised the leaders of UAE and Saudi Arabia to be on good terms with both the HILLARY CLINTON and DONALD TRUMP campaigns. NADER found it easy to develop contacts inside the Clinton Campaign because he knew President BILL CLINTON. However, TRUMP was an enigma, and no one knew exactly what he stood for. Regardless of who won, they would need to be on good relations with the incoming administration.

NADER's greatest strength as an advisor is because he is a U.S. citizen who has respect and contacts with both sides in a difficult environment. (Note: [REDACTED] provided the attached Congressional Records at this time). For example, NADER has had contacts with both Israeli Prime Minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU and Ayatollah RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI.

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Meeting DONALD TRUMP JR.

NADER had attempted to develop connections to the senior level of the Trump Campaign through WALID PHARES. PHARES had tried to introduce NADER to JARED KUSHNER, but the meeting did not happen.

PRINCE brokered a meeting between TRUMP JR., [REDACTED] PRINCE, and NADER.

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Although PRINCE moved to Abu Dhabi, NADER had not talked to him in a long time. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] advised NADER that PRINCE was well connected to the Trump Campaign and TRUMP family. [REDACTED] is a traditional Republican, and like

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[REDACTED]  
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[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/19

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most traditional Republicans refused to join the Trump Campaign. However,

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[REDACTED] focus is on pro-Israel policies and the threat posed by Iran.

[REDACTED] is close to Israeli Ambassador RONALD DERMER.

[REDACTED] knew that PRINCE was working with [REDACTED] on a project. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Because NADER was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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NADER first met [REDACTED] at the Park Hyatt Hotel at 24<sup>th</sup> and M Street, Washington, DC. [REDACTED] told NADER that he had an independent way to connect with the Trump Campaign through [REDACTED] and an individual in New York. [REDACTED] also mentioned that PRINCE was well connected to the Trump campaign and Trump family and that PRINCE would be the fastest and best avenue to reach the TRUMP Campaign.

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[REDACTED] and PRINCE jointly set up a meeting with TRUMP JR. The meeting occurred at Trump Tower and lasted for 35 to 40 minutes. NADER initially recalled that this meeting happened in July 2016, but upon reviewing his text messages, he concluded it took place on August 1, 2016. PRINCE did most of the talking explaining to TRUMP JR what he was doing to help the campaign and about a fundraiser he was planning on holding at his house. NADER asked to be invited to the fundraiser.

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PRINCE introduced NADER to TRUMP JR and explained that NADER was an expert in the gulf region. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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TRUMP JR stated that the U.S.'s best allies in the region were Egypt, Israel, UAE and Saudi Arabia. TRUMP JR specifically emphasized Egypt. PRINCE told TRUMP JR that relations with UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel would all be better after TRUMP won the election that during the time of President BARRACK OBAMA.

[REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/19

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018, On 01/19/2018, Page 4 of 15

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After the meeting with TRUMP JR, NADER, PRINCE and [redacted] met for coffee. [redacted]

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PRINCE said NADER's connections with Middle East leadership could help with fundraising. PRINCE said that NADER should ask Gulf leaders for funds because a Trump Campaign victory would be good for them. NADER said that he would help with countering Iran, but not with asking about providing funds to support the campaign.

NADER's second and third meetings with TRUMP JR:

Approximately two to three weeks after their initial meeting, NADER met with TRUMP JR again. This meeting occurred in TRUMP JR's offices at Trump Tower and lasted for approximately 15 minutes. NADER had been staying at the Taj Pierre Hotel in New York when TRUMP JR told him to come to Trump Tower. Because NADER had heard about TRUMP JR traveling for the campaign, he wanted to invite him to meet MBZ and the then Deputy Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia MOHAMMAD BIN SALMAN (MBS) in Morocco. MBZ and MBS stay for several weeks at a compound in Morocco every summer. TRUMP JR said he would check with his team prior to going.

Approximately two to three days later, TRUMP JR and NADER met again.

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While this meeting was occurring, KUSHNER walked into TRUMP JR's office to ask about another meeting. TRUMP JR introduced KUSHNER to NADER and they shook hands.

All of these meetings occurred in TRUMP JR's personal office, not in the campaign offices at Trump Tower. At one of these meetings, TRUMP JR asked NADER about [redacted] specifically what he did, and why he had been at the initial meeting.

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[REDACTED]  
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[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/19

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NADER's fourth meeting with TRUMP JR:

In mid-September 2016, NADER was in New York for the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA). NADER informed TRUMP JR that he was in town. TRUMP JR asked NADER to stop by Trump Tower.

NADER told TRUMP JR that he was going to be heading to Washington, DC to meet with DERMER. TRUMP JR said he was trying to arrange a meeting between NETANYAHU and Candidate TRUMP. TRUMP JR told NADER words to the effect, [REDACTED] I know you're close with DERMER and can you make it happen? I know NETANYAHU is meeting with CLINTON. We need this meeting for our credibility."

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TRUMP JR started calling NADER hourly to check on the status of this meeting.

NADER checked with DERMER and was told that this meeting could not happen. NETANYAHU had met with Candidate MITT ROMNEY in 2012 and the meeting had caused problems. DERMER said he was traveling to Israel and coming back to the U.S. with NETANYAHU.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

This was the last substantive contact NADER had with TRUMP JR until after the 2016 election.

[REDACTED] and PRINCE follow up questions

[REDACTED]

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b7C

PRINCE was pushing for NADER to help PRINCE reconnect with MBZ.

Exhibit 21 (WhatsApp chats between [REDACTED] and NADER):

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Page 1 (June 8, 2016):

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/19

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NADER identified the reference to "St. P" as St. Petersburg, Russia.

NADER was in St. Petersburg for a business conference that is like the Davos conference, but in Russia. NADER attends this conference every year.

While in St. Petersburg, NADER met [Redacted] for a half hour at the bar.

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[Redacted]

NADER did not hear about any Trump Campaign staff travelling to Russia.

NADER initially stated he did not meet any Russian government officials during this trip.

NADER then said that Russian President VLADIMIR PUTIN was at a luncheon NADER attended during this trip. NADER met and shook hands with PUTIN. The Russian ministers of oil and industry were also present at this luncheon.

NADER met with KIRILL DMITRIEV, the head of Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF). NADER and DMITRIEV discussed regional politics. NADER and DMITRIEV did not discuss the Trump Campaign.

Pages 2 and 3 (June 15, 2016):

[Redacted]

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b7C

The photo of NADER and PUTIN was taken while at the St. Petersburg conference.

NADER identified the "big friend" as NETANYAHU. NADER said there was no particular reason he wanted [Redacted] to share with photo with NETANYAHU other than to show that NADER was well connected.

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Page 4 (June 15, 2016):

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

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[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/19

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[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Page 5 (June 28, 2016):

[Redacted] mention of "chief of staff" is a reference to DERMER's Chief of Staff.

b6  
b7C

Page 6 (July 2, 2016):

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Page 9 (July 16, 2016):

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

NADER did not discuss the Trump Campaign with [Redacted] on this trip. NADER thinks he had already met with [Redacted] PRINCE and TRUMP JR, but he might be remembering the days wrong.

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[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/19

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018, On 01/19/2018, Page 8 of 15

Page 10 (July 16, 2016):

"Our friend" refers to [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

"Proper introduction and management" refers to meeting the Trump Campaign team.

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

NADER personally preferred CLINTON as a candidate. NADER had good contacts within the Clinton Campaign. NADER was actually invited and present at the Clinton Campaign party on election night in 2016. NADER had been invited to the party [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

NADER's friends in the Middle East wanted TRUMP to win as they thought CLINTON would continue the policies of OBAMA. They thought that CLINTON's advisor HUMA ABEDIN was associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. They also associated CLINTON with the ouster of former Egyptian President HOSNI MUBARAK which occurred when CLINTON was Secretary of State.

UAE's Ambassador to the U.S. YOUSEF OTAIBA was also a supporter of CLINTON.

Pages 13 and 14 (July 19, 2016):

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Page 16 (July 22, 2016):

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/19

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] /2018, On 01/19/2018, Page 9 of 15

"Zero exposure" refers to NADER's concerns about connecting to the Trump Campaign through PRINCE. Previously, [REDACTED] had only mentioned [REDACTED] as being the connection to the campaign.

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NADER intended for this meeting to open a dialogue between the Trump Campaign and the leadership of Middle East countries.

Page 18 (July 22, 2016):

[REDACTED] mention of "something important to bring to the table" refers to the connection to the Middle East through NADER.

b6  
b7C

Discussions were occurring with American Jewish leaders such as [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to support the Trump Campaign.

Page 21 (July 23, 2016):

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Page 23 (July 23, 2016)

"RD" refers to DERMER.

Pages 19 and 20 (July 22, 2016):

"The Girl" refers to possibly meeting IVANKA TRUMP.

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Pages 25 to 27 (July 30, 2016):

NADER reviewed this exchange and indicated that he was referring to PRINCE. [REDACTED] had previously told NADER that PRINCE was going to be at the meeting with TRUMP JR.

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[REDACTED]

Pages 30 - 32 (July 30, 2016):

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[REDACTED]  
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/19

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018, On 01/19/2018, Page 10 of 15

NADER is informing [REDACTED] that MBZ and MBS are encouraging him to contact the Trump Campaign.

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"ERIC" is a reference to ERIC TRUMP. NADER has only met ERIC TRUMP at the inauguration. NADER asked to meet ERIC TRUMP several times.

[REDACTED] came up when NADER told [REDACTED] the Trump Campaign needed greater support from the Jewish community. NADER had been discussing with [REDACTED] how to garner additional support for the Trump Campaign within the American Jewish community. NADER never met [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Page 35 (August 4, 2016):

"HH" refers to MBS.

"HRH" refers to MBZ.

NADER told MBS and MBZ that the meeting with TRUMP JR was positive. TRUMP JR said that they would be allies with UAE and Saudi Arabia and not stab them in the back.

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Page 39 (August 7, 2016):

These messages refer to NADER asking [REDACTED] if TRUMP JR will be coming to Morocco to see MBS and MBZ.

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Pages 41 to 43 (August 7, 2016):

NADER had spoken with TRUMP JR about the potential meeting in Morocco and is relating their conversations with [REDACTED] TRUMP JR did not like to speak on the phone.

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[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/19

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018, On 01/19/2018, Page 11 of 15

Page 44 (August 7, 2016):

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7CPage 51 (August 13, 2016):

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7CPage 62 (August 25, 2016):

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

Seychelles Meeting

Erik PRINCE met with Kirill DMITRIEV in the Seychelles. NADER was present at the meetings, but stated that NADER helping to arrange the meeting was "too strong" of a wording. NADER stated that it was never meant for the Russians to be included in the Seychelles meeting. NADER subsequently further described the Seychelles meeting.

On December 14<sup>th</sup>, 2016, the day before the meeting between the UAE representatives and Jared KUSHNER, Steve BANNON and Michael FLYNN in New York, PRINCE came by and said he wanted to meet again with MBZ and therefore asked NADER to help set it up. NADER wanted to hear from and receive the approval from Donald TRUMP JR, KUSHNER, BANNON or one of the transition team principles to make sure PRINCE had their approval before he setup the meeting with MBZ. If they granted their approval, NADER would facilitate a meeting between PRINCE and MBZ. A meeting subsequently occurred where FLYNN, BANNON, TRUMP JR, PRINCE and NADER were present. During the meeting TUMP JR told NADER that from now on, he would no longer be a point of contact for these type of issues and NADER would therefore work with "these guys" in reference to FLYNN and BANNON. PRINCE was asking to setup a meeting with MBZ to discuss security/military issues and asked

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[REDACTED]  
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/19

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018, On 01/19/2018, Page 12 of 15

if it was ok "with you guys". FLYNN and BANNON told NADER that PRINCE was a great guy, work with him and anything he sets up we will support.

PRINCE wanted to meet with MBZ because he believed he never finished the job in Iraq and believed the incoming administration would support his efforts. PRINCE believed that any agreement made between him and MBZ would get the approval of the incoming administration. PRINCE believed he could get the incoming administration to back the agreement and said to leave the American side for him to handle. NADER asked MBZ when to setup the meeting, and MBZ said to do it in January 2017. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] and MBZ didn't want to go out of his way to facilitate the meeting.

PRINCE went to the Seychelles and met with MBZ. During the meeting it was apparent that PRINCE needed to be on the same level as the Russians, who were currently coordinating with MBZ and Egypt. PRINCE wanted to meet, coordinate, and cooperate with the Russians after he got to the Seychelles. The purpose would be to de-conflict with the Russians in advance. NADER didn't recall and didn't believe telling DMITRIEV that PRINCE was going to be in the Seychelles prior to their meeting. The discussion between MBZ and PRINCE went well, so NADER set up PRINCE with DMITRIEV. PRINCE wasn't saying he was coming on behalf of the Americans,

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[REDACTED] NADER reiterated that the PRINCE and DMITRIEV in the Seychelles meeting was not planned ahead of time, and that MBZ suggested it after his meeting with PRINCE.

Exhibit 25, page 15

When shown the text message of NADER sending to PRINCE links and articles of DMITRIEV's biography and information on January 3, 2017 NADER said that in regards to PRINCE talking with someone of the issue of Russia, and who he could meet, NADER thought DMITRIEV would be the person. NADER knew they would both be there, and it is possible that he told PRINCE that DMITRIEV would be there, but NADER did not pre-plan the meeting between PRINCE and DMITRIEV as such. NADER then stated that the meeting could have been pre-arranged. NADER was aware of the Washington Post article on the Seychelles meeting, did discuss it with DMITRIEV, and

[REDACTED] NADER stated that he mentioned DMITRIEV to PRINCE after meeting with MBZ and NADER contributed to setting up the PRINCE and DMITRIEV meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to talk business. Whatever needed to be done as a result of the meeting, PRINCE would coordinate with the "people back home" and it was PRINCE's responsibility on the American side to work it out accordingly. DMITRIEV would look on his side to find out what party to reach out too. NADER didn't

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[REDACTED]  
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[REDACTED]  
(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/19  
Continuation of FD-302 of /2018, On 01/19/2018, Page 13 of 15

t believe that PRINCE mentioned he was part of the incoming administration, and that PRINCE was interested in talking with DMITRIEV about going after their common enemies.

DMITRIEV was determined to be the most reliable and had an interest in meeting a representative of the Trump Campaign. DMITRIEV was attending a conference in New York City and NADER said to wait until after the new administration was in the White House, and he never mentioned it to the Americans.

Exhibit 22, page 40

When shown the text message dated January 3, 2017, NADER was not sure who it was referred to him meeting with. NADER did not meet with TRUMP JR, BANNON or anyone in the Trump Campaign in January 2017. NADER stated that he would have to refresh his memory and review the documents. NADER doesn't remember sending DMITRIEV's bio to anyone besides PRINCE.

Exhibit 22, page 43

When shown the text referring to a person designated by "Steve" for DMITRIEV to meet, NADER stated the person was PRINCE, and that "Steve" was BANNON. BANNON designated PRINCE to meet with DMITRIEV. PRINCE may have been the one that told NADER that BANNON was designating PRINCE to meet with DMITRIEV. PRINCE has a very close relationship to BANNON. MBZ was backing NADER, and PRINCE had the support of BANNON and FLYNN on how to fight terrorists. NADER stated it was not a backchannel between Americans and Russians, just for both to fight common enemies. For the PRINCE and DMITRIEV meeting, both knew beforehand that they were meeting in the Seychelles, and it is possible that BANNON sent PRINCE.

NADER felt it was not his business to introduce DMITRIEV to the incoming administration, or to be a conduit, and he only mentioned DMITRIEV to PRINCE. After the meeting in the Seychelles, NADER asked KUSHNER about PRINCE, and KUSHNER told NADER to have nothing to do with PRINCE. NADER stated that Secretary of Defense James MATTIS later re-affirmed KUSHNER's stance of not working with PRINCE.

In regards to BANNON, PRINCE let NADER to believe that whatever agreement they reached with MBZ and the Russians, PRINCE stated that "Steve is my pocket and [REDACTED]. PRINCE further said "I have Steve totally on board and in my pocket." PRINCE would know how to go about it to get backing from the American side. [REDACTED]  
NADER was clear that PRINCE told NADER that BANNON had sent PRINCE.

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/19

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NADER described the Seychelles meeting between PRINCE and DMITRIEV as such. [REDACTED] and he was encouraged to come into the Seychelles earlier than he planned. PRINCE had come to the Seychelles to meet with MBZ on a project involving Libya and Afghanistan. PRINCE stated that "this administration will owe you forever" and that the UAE would get protection in return. NADER remembers PRINCE going over maps with MBZ and saying the project might cost \$1-2 billion. DMITRIEV's name came out as a very important Russian, and PRINCE was very eager to work with the Russians in an effort to "clean up" Afghanistan. No political discussions were held between DMITRIEV and PRINCE. DMITRIEV was the Russian side who could put PRINCE in contact with the right person in Russia, and that DMITRIEV was the guy to work with on anything to do with Russia.

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NADER knew DMITRIEV for approximately 5-7 years [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DMITRIEV is reliable and efficient and [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] NADER emphasized to PRINCE that DMITRIEV is good in business and connected to the government in Russia. DMITRIEV could put PRINCE in touch with the right person or company. After the meeting with PRINCE, DMITRIEV had a meeting with MBZ and they did discuss the RDIF.

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The meeting between DMITRIEV and PRINCE took place in a bar by the sea, [REDACTED] The only ones present during the meeting were PRINCE, DMITRIEV and NADER. The meeting took approximately 25-30 minutes. PRINCE talked about how much the U.S. and Russia had in common, Russia was 20% Muslim, had problems with militant Islam in Chechnya. PRINCE stated that there was a unique opportunity and that the Americans had his back. PRINCE wanted to meet with his counterpart on the Russian side, who was determined be DMITRIEV. DMITRIEV stated that he was glad to meet, there were a lot of misunderstanding between the two countries but they had common goals. There was talk about Libya and Egypt. According to NADER there was no discussion of anything political. DMITRIEV stated he was a great admirer of the new administration, excited to work with them, in terms of the United States and Russia. It was apparent that PRINCE was very proud of being an American, but he did not mention BANNON or KUSHNER, PRINCE was most talking for himself. When the meeting ended, NADER said that before anything was done, they must first see what MBZ's decision would be. It was cordial between PRINCE and DMITRIEV as they left, they said it was nice to meet each other. No business cards were exchanged or any lines of communication established. They would work through the UAE and first wait for MBZ's decision first. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Just the plan that

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[REDACTED]  
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[REDACTED]  
(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/19  
Continuation of FD-302 of /2018, On 01/19/2018, Page 15 of 15

was discussed. U.S. sanctions against Russia didn't come up, as well as the RDIF. After the meeting, DMITIREV stated that he was uneasy with the conversation with PRINCE.

At approximately 2:12 PM SA [REDACTED] served the attached subpoena to NADER's attorneys who accepted service for him.


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At approximately 2:15 PM Senior Assistant Special Counsel Ahmad agreed to send photographs of NADER's text messages to his attorney.

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[Redacted]



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/11/2018

GEORGE NADER, date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] was interviewed at 395 E Street SW, Washington D.C., by writer and SA [Redacted] NADER was represented by attorneys [Redacted] and [Redacted] from Holland and Hart LLP. Also present at the interview were Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Zainab Ahmad, SASC Brandon Van Grack, and SASC Jeannie Rhee.

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AGENT NOTE: At approximately 9:55 AM, NADER's attorneys and SCO attorneys discussed the attached proffer letter. Ahmad explained the protections the proffer letter afforded NADER.

After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, NADER provided the following information:

Seychelles

KIRILL DMITRIEV had been visiting the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on a regular basis, and NADER initially met DMITRIEV on one of those visits approximately 6 years ago. The Saudi Arabian and Russian relationship was poor at the time and the UAE was concerned about the political relationship. NADER was running the Middle East Insight publication. NADER considered himself as a friend who was working quietly behind the scenes in an effort to distance Russia from Iran, shift their favor towards Saudi Arabia due to what they represent in the Islamic world. During the BARACK OBAMA Administration, Iran distrusted Saudi Arabia and the UAE because they considered them proxies of the Americans, and therefore there was lack of trust.

In approximately 2012-2013, NADER went on a visit to Russia with former Saudi Arabian Ambassador Prince BANDAR as an unofficial friend. Their goal was to build a trusted relationship with Russia, and Vladimir PUTIN designated DMITRIEV to be their contact person for that relationship. DMITRIEV speaks English, was educated in the United States, well off, and is extremely articulate and pleasant. DMITRIEV wanted to build a Sunni relationship, was not an anti-American, was pro-Israel, and "pro-Arab". DMITRIEV was head of the Russia Domestic Investment Fund (RDIF) at the time and clearly had the backing of PUTIN. During the 5-6 separate visits

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Investigation on 01/22/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)  
 File # [Redacted] Date drafted 01/23/2018  
 by [Redacted]

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[REDACTED]  
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/22/2018, On 01/22/2018, Page 2 of 19

they had, DMITRIEV was always the contact person. At the beginning, the relationship between Russia and Saudi Arabia was bad, and nothing really happened during the [REDACTED] visit, just talk. In 2015, the financial relationship got better as the ambassadors from both Russia and Saudi Arabia changed. DMITRIEV was in charge of the entire political and financial relationship. NADER was not involved in the details, just facilitating on a strategic sense.

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DMITRIEV's relationship with the UAE and MOHAMMED BIN ZAYED (MBZ) started with [REDACTED] and the Saudi Arabian's approximately 5-6 years ago. MBZ visits Russia on a yearly basis and PUTIN introduced MBZ to DMITRIEV. PUTIN wanted DMITRIEV to be in charge of Russia's relationships in the Gulf Region. DMITRIEV had been educated in the U.S. and spoke fluent English. DMITRIEV was both pro-Israel and pro-Arab; and he was not anti-American. When MOHAMMAD BIN SALMAN (MBS) took over the leadership of Saudi Arabia, the relationship with Saudi Arabia and Russia got better. The UAE and Saudi Arabian relationship had not really been close until MBZ and MBS developed their partnership.

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The UAE and the RDIF have had co-investments. One of which included the MUBADALA Investment Company which is owned by an Abu Dhabi fund. Other UAE funds include EMAR and ADIA. MUBADALA invested hundreds of millions of dollars in oil and real estate through the RDIF. The relationship with MUBADALA, and others, with the RDIF did not expand, but it did not pull out after pressure was put on Russia from the enactment of U.S. sanctions due to Russian activity in the Ukraine. The same with the Saudi Arabians. NADER was not involved in the meetings on the business aspects, both before and after the U.S. sanctions. The Gulf Countries overall did not want to do anything that would conflict with the U.S., and in fact had committed to the U.S. way before they began to improve the relationship with Russia. They were more concerned with staying away from the "bad guys" such as Iran. The money invested in the RDIF was not growing at a good rate due to the U.S. sanctions. The RDIF had a guarantee that the amount of money initially invested could grow, but would never go below the initial investment. The RDIF had kept a "good face" in light of the sanctions, but DMITRIEV and the Russians complained about the U.S. sanctions. The UAE had serious considerations in not investing "a penny more" in the RDIF due to the sanctions. The UAE had discussions about the possibility of lifting the sanctions and complained about them, but the UAE and Saudi Arabia would not do anything to jeopardize their relationship with the U.S. The UAE thought that if Donald TRUMP or Hillary CLINTON got elected, they hoped the next administration would look to move

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/22/2018, On 01/22/2018, Page 3 of 19

things forward in a positive way. The Middle East was impacted by the relations between the U.S. and Russia and therefore they wanted better relations.

The Saudi Arabians had invested in the RDIF and DMITRIEV received Saudi delegations in Russia. DMITRIEV prepared a visit for a Saudi delegation which came to Russia to discuss stabilizing and fixing oil rates, which succeeded and "everyone was happy".

Conversations between NADER and DMITRIEV involved discussion on Islamic extremists, Iran, and every issue the UAE cared about and DMITRIEV was supportive. DMITRIEV knew the bureaucracy in Russia, was keen on improving their relationships, and even changed the Russian view on Russia in regards to Yemen, in contrast to the situation with Syria. DMITRIEV was an interlocutor for PUTIN. NADER would report these conversations to MBZ.

DMITRIEV knew that NADER had good contacts within both presidential campaigns, and NADER told him as such. NADER's point of contact with the CLINTON Campaign was an individual named [REDACTED] DMITRIEV and the Russians preferred TRUMP, but NADER never heard of them speaking of efforts to help TRUMP win the presidential election. DMITRIEV persistently made efforts on how best to meet people of interest within the TRUMP Campaign. NADER told DMITRIEV that there was nothing he could do, and only came later in the context of ERIK PRINCE, in the fulfilling DMITRIEV's ongoing attempts and desire to have a contact within the TRUMP Campaign. DMITRIEV had met with Anthony SCARAMUCCI. DMITRIEV knew SCARAMUCCI before, and considered him a friend. SCARAMUCCI was a big businessman and supported TRUMP. DMITRIEV also knew Rick GERSON, who was close to JARED KUSHNER. Those were the only two Americans that DMITRIEV met with that NADER was aware of. NADER met GERSON in New York City through a contact, and met with GERSON multiple times later in the UAE. GERSON was interested in investments in the RDIF before the U.S. sanctions, but did not want to invest after the U.S. sanctions on Russia. GERSON was only in one meeting with KUSHNER, STEVE BANNON, MICHAEL FLYNN, Tony BLAIR, and MBZ. GERSON came into the meeting first and he helped arrange it. GERSON stayed throughout the meeting.

Russia was economically hurting due to the U.S. sanctions. The Russians, if they could work their way through to the U.S., and lift the sanctions, it would help their economy. During the meeting between PRINCE and DMITRIEV, the topic of U.S. sanctions relief did not come up during their conversation. DMITRIEV was not terribly excited about meeting with PRINCE. [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/22/2018, On 01/22/2018, Page 4 of 19

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DMITRIEV was not happy.

DMITRIEV was there because NADER thought he would be instrumental in finding the right person to deal with. NADER never heard directly from BANNON that he was sending PRINCE, but PRINCE said he was designated by BANNON. NADER believed that he fulfilled DMITRIEV's request to meet someone in the Transition Team when he arranged the meeting with PRINCE.

Exhibit 22 (WhatsApp chats between DMITRIEV and NADER), Pages 10-13 (November 4, 2016):

NADER was expressing his concern with DMITRIEV's health because whomever won the 2016 election would need to work to repair relations with Russia.

When DMITRIEV wrote "would be great to have a meeting with key people where you are when possible as we discussed before" refers to the necessity to have meetings with key people in the incoming administration after the election. If HILLARY CLINTON won, meetings would be set up with HUMA ABEDIN. If TRUMP won, meetings would be set up with TRUMP JR and JARED KUSHNER.

Exhibit 28 (Photos) Page 18:

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Exhibit 22 (WhatsApp chats between DMITRIEV and NADER), Page 14 (November 9, 2016):

NADER said it was possible that DMITRIEV's friend who just landed in the U.S. is ANTHONY SCARAMUCCI, but he was not certain.

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/22/2018, On 01/22/2018, Page 5 of 19

NADER recollected DMITRIEV had told him that DMITRIEV could not believe that the Russians whose names have been reported in the news met with TRUMP JR in Trump Tower in June 2016. DMITRIEV told NADER that these people were nobodies in Russia.

Exhibit 22 (WhatsApp chats between DMITRIEV and NADER), Page 15 (November 9, 2016):

DMITRIEV is asking NADER for to fly to New York after the election. NADER is telling DMITRIEV that he needs to check with TRUMP JR.

NADER initially did not know the "press secretary" that DMITRIEV is referring to. NADER then recalled that DMITRIEV is referring to Russian President VLADIMIR PUTIN's spokesman [REDACTED] PESKOV who was coming to New York for a chess championship. PESKOV did not ask NADER to be introduced to the TRUMP Transition Team.

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Exhibit 28 (Photos) Page 25:

This is a photo of NADER with TRUMP JR taken on November 16, 2016.

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Exhibit 22 (WhatsApp chats between DMITRIEV and NADER), Page 16 (November 9, 2016):

The reference to "key person" is to MBS [MOHAMMAD BIN SALMAN].

The reference to "big country" is Saudi Arabia.

Exhibit 22 (WhatsApp chats between DMITRIEV and NADER), Pages 19 to 22 (November 9-10, 2016):

These chats are discussing the upcoming chess tournament in New York. DMITRIEV is asking to be introduced to someone from the TRUMP Transition Team. NADER told DMITRIEV that he would check and develop contacts with the TRUMP Transition Team. However, NADER did not actually follow through

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with this. The TRUMP Transition Team was extremely busy as the election had just occurred. DMITRIEV was persistent in his desire to meet with the TRUMP Transition Team.

DMITRIEV's text stating, "my boss sends his warmest greetings and I will see him early again next week" is a message from PUTIN. NADER did not pass this message on to the TRUMP Transition Team.

NADER did not invite anyone to the chess event. NADER did not see SCARAMUCCI or other members of the TRUMP team at the chess event.

NADER did not see TRUMP JR in Trump Tower on this trip. However, he had been planning to see TRUMP JR, as TRUMP JR had told NADER he wanted to meet.

NADER and DMITRIEV met for lunch on November 10, 2016. DMITRIEV was ecstatic about the election of TRUMP and thought it would lead to great progress towards peace in the Middle East and defeating Iran. Although DMITRIEV is Russian, he was educated in the U.S. and is pro-American. DMITRIEV said he was meeting with a lot of investors and other people, but did not specify whom he was meeting with while in the U.S.

DMITRIEV thought that TRUMP would be better than CLINTON and would lift the U.S. sanctions placed on Russia. DMITRIEV did not mention specifically when he thought the sanctions might be lifted.

DMITRIEV continued to press for a meeting with the TRUMP Transition Team. DMITRIEV said that PUTIN would appreciate it and that a meeting would make history. DMITRIEV was anxious to make these connections. DMITRIEV said he was going to work other routes to set up a meeting with the TRUMP Transition Team. NADER thinks that RICK GERSON would be DMITRIEV's likely other route to the TRUMP Transition Team.

Exhibit 28 Photos, Page 21

The Chess Dinner that occurred on November 10, 2016, in New York City did not have anyone from the TRUMP Campaign present. GERSON did not attend either. PESKOV, the press secretary for PUTIN, was at the dinner. NADER briefly meet PESKOV and shook his hand. PESKOV's English was good, he did not request anything from NADER, and stated that he worked with DMITRIEV. When shown the photo which NADER is pictured with three other individuals, NADER stated that he did not know anyone else in the photo besides DMITRIEV, and that the other two individuals were Russians. NADER did not know of a company named Fosagro, nor was he introduced to anyone from that company. DMITRIEV at the time, was still actively looking for an

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introduction from NADER into the new administration. There were no talks of U.S. sanctions being lifted, and NADER only talked with DMITRIEV one on one. NADER was at the Chess Dinner for approximately 15-20 minutes, then he left. DMITRIEV left for the airport later, and departed the U.S. that same night.

NADER stayed in New York City for approximately 4-5 days. NADER saw TRUMP JR on November 15<sup>th</sup> or 16<sup>th</sup> at Trump Tower, in order to congratulate him, and did not remember any specifics from their conversation.

Exhibit 22 (WhatsApp chats between DMITRIEV and NADER), Page 37 (December 9, 2016):

NADER's reference to "working on something huge" is to a potential meeting between TRUMP and MBZ [MOHAMMED BIN ZAYED]. NADER was working with TRUMP JR to coordinate this meeting. However, KUSHNER stopped this meeting from actually happening. UAE Ambassador to the U.S, YOUSEF OTAIBA, and GERSON convinced KUSHNER that OBAMA was opposed to this meeting during the transition time. PRINCE did not know about this potential meeting between TRUMP and MBZ.

TRUMP JR told NADER that the meeting between TRUMP and MBZ was not going to happen. NADER was disappointed and confused for the reason behind this because TRUMP had met the Japanese Prime Minister and the Emir of Qatar during the transition.

OTAIBA also wanted the meeting between TRUMP and MBZ to occur after the Inauguration. OTAIBA said words to the effect, "SUSAN RICE said we shouldn't meet with the President Elect."

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OTAIBA told NADER that RICE was informed that MBZ had arrived in New York. NADER was in New York when MBZ arrived. MBZ booked NADER a room at the Four Seasons Hotel, but NADER did not move his baggage from the Pierre Hotel to this room.

GERSON, former U.K. Prime Minister TONY BLAIR, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], MBZ, and [REDACTED] were at the Four Seasons Hotel when

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NADER got there. Present from the TRUMP Transition Team were BANNON, KUSHNER, and MICHAEL FLYNN. GERSON was an unofficial representative from the TRUMP Transition Team. Representing UAE were OTAIBA, [REDACTED] MBZ, TAHNOUN, and [REDACTED] MBZ, [REDACTED] was also present.

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Because he was not specifically told to stay, NADER waited in an adjacent room. Other UAE staff members waited in this room. No other Americans were in the room with NADER. The meeting lasted for approximately two hours.

NADER understands that topics of fighting ISIS and Iran came up at the meeting. The meetings participants agreed that the incoming TRUMP Administration would be better than the OBAMA Administration on these topics. UAE and the incoming TRUMP Administration agreed to form a committee to go after common enemies. They exchanged each other's private phone numbers. NADER does not believe that Russia came up at this meeting. MBZ was very happy with the meeting and thought that the incoming TRUMP Administration shared the same common enemies as UAE.

At the conclusion of the meeting, NADER was invited in. MBZ introduced NADER to KUSHNER, FLYNN, and BANNON. MBZ said words to the effect "GEORGE is highly trusted, I've known him for many years, I trust him and he's like family to me." NADER mentioned to KUSHNER that they had briefly met in TRUMP JR's office, but KUSHNER did not remember meeting him.

MBZ left shortly after this. BLAIR returned and met with a [REDACTED]

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NADER flew back to UAE on MBZ's plane. NADER was instructed to keep in touch with the incoming TRUMP Administration and to specifically follow up with KUSHNER. GERSON was tasked to be NADER's connection to KUSHNER and the White House.

Exhibit 22, (WhatsApp chats between DMITRIEV and NADER), Page 40

The text referring to a meeting with some key people within the family and inner circle probably referred to GERSON and PRINCE. NADER might have discussed the meeting NADER had with MBZ, and possibly discussed PRINCE meeting with DMITRIEV. NADER had likely spoken of DMITRIEV to PRINCE and had discussed a meeting between the two. All along PRINCE thought in order to accomplish what they needed to do in the Middle East, tensions with Russia would have to be diffused. NADER thought PRINCE

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would be uniquely qualified to do this, but no one instructed PRINCE to do it. Whatever was decided upon, PRINCE could sell to the incoming administration. PRINCE was positive on having better relations with Russia.

Exhibit 30, (Text messages between NADER and TRUMP JR), Page 18

The text to PRINCE asking for any feedback from "Steve" on their meeting refers to BANNON. The meeting itself was a quick meeting including BANNON and FLYNN in the hallway where they discussed PRINCE working on a project in Afghanistan. NADER did not remember the exact details of the conversation, but BANNON was included.

NADER explained that he sent the photo of himself and PUTIN to PRINCE due to the fact that they could not take advantage of the rare and historic opportunity in the Middle East without PUTIN. PRINCE was in agreement with this idea. They believed they had to come in from a position of strength and stand with their allies, which included Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. In regards to the Middle East and PUTIN, the U. S. sanctions were not a subject. The Gulf Countries need the U.S. and those countries need to be backed by the U.S. The U.S., the Gulf Countries, and Russia would be a marriage of convenience in order to work against their common enemies.

Exhibit 22, (WhatsApp chats between DMITRIEV and NADER), Page 9

The meetings referred to by DMITRIEV in his January 12, 2017 text, were meetings he wished to have as a follow up from his meetings with PRINCE. DMITRIEV was not happy with his meeting with PRINCE and wished to have a follow up with someone higher up like BANNON. NADER never followed up on DMITRIEV's request for another meeting.

Exhibit 22, (WhatsApp chats between DMITRIEV and NADER), Page 24

When shown the text referencing a magnificent visit, NADER stated that this referred to his meeting with DMITRIEV. NADER stated that he left New York City in a very good mood, and did not arrange any future meetings. NADER came back in December 2016 in order to decide how to proceed with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, but he never talked about Russia during those meetings.

Exhibit 22, (WhatsApp chats between DMITRIEV and NADER), Pages 25-26

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When shown the text referencing "wonderful new[s] to share with you" NADER stated that this was in reference to DMITRIEV trying to work out relations with Saudi Arabia. NADER said the wonderful news was due to a recent breakthrough. DMITRIEV was designated to take a delegation from Saudi Arabia to Russia, and Saudi Arabia had just said yes. Saudi Arabia was taking it seriously and was prepared to improve relations between Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. The Saudi Arabians would not object to holding a meeting to discuss Syria and Yemen, and the Russians were becoming friendlier. The gentlemen referred to in the text was MBS.

Exhibit 22, (WhatsApp chats between DMITRIEV and NADER), Page 28

The text from DMITRIEV referring to a "good meeting", was referring to a meeting with MBS. The text from NADER saying "do not say another word" refers to an Arab expression, which means things are good and no need to say another word. They were currently working on Yemen and Syria, in regards to Russia.

There were no Saudi Arabian or UAE investments made with the RDIF through NADER. NADER assumed there were investments, but he was not aware of any. DMITRIEV desired to get Saudi Arabia to invest in the RDIF, but NADER was not aware of any specific investments in this period. DMITRIEV and Saudi Arabia did talk about oil.

Exhibit 22, (WhatsApp chats between DMITRIEV and NADER), Pages 30-31

During DMITRIEV's trip to the UAE, as referenced in the text, NADER was not present during the meeting between [REDACTED] and MBZ. The purpose of the meeting was to improve relations between Saudi Arabia and the Russians. The stunning surprise referenced was that MBZ was positive on helping MBS to make the relationship better in regards to cooperating on Yemen, Syria, etc. There was no talk about TRUMP being elected at any time. MBZ was keen on better relations between the U.S. and Russia. The UAE would be the middle man, as they were seen to be on the side of the Americans, and it would become easier to fight their common enemy. The U. S. sanctions against Russia was mentioned, as it would be good business for everyone if they were lifted. The UAE would not have the restraints that it has now and there would be more business investments in Russia. DMITRIEV was positive with Rex TILLERSON coming in as Secretary as State, as he was well known and respected in the region.

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During NADER's early December 2016 trip to New York City, there was a follow up meeting with TRUMP JR, but it was not prearranged. It was typically NADER being on standby, then receiving a call to come up right at that moment.

Exhibit 22, (WhatsApp chats between DMITRIEV and NADER), Page 35

The text from DMITRIEV asking to meet the relevant people was referring to DMITRIEV being persistent on meeting someone from the incoming administration. NADER has not talked to anyone in the incoming administration about DMITRIEV up to then. It is possible that he mentioned it to PRINCE, but he did not officially mention it to anyone else. PRINCE had been to the UAE multiple times in the past, but he did not meet with MBZ. NADER met with PRINCE in November or December 2016, before the UAE /MBZ meeting. [REDACTED]

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In December 2016 NADER was called into FLYNN or BANNON's office by PRINCE. FLYNN and BANNON "vouched" for PRINCE in order to facilitate PRINCE's request to meet with MBZ.

Exhibit 30, (WhatsApp chats between NADER and TRUMP JR) Page 18 (January 3, 2017):

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Agent Note: A break was taken.

Conference between NADER's attorneys and SCO:

NADER and his attorneys had a conference in a conference room. After the conference, NADER's attorneys returned and provided the following information emphasizing its sensitive nature.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/22/2018, On 01/22/2018, Page 12 of 19

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[Redacted]

The UAE is aware NADER has been questioned by the FBI.

NADER travelled to Mar a Lago for a TRUMP fundraiser over the past weekend.

[Redacted]

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NADER returned to the interview and provided the following information.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/22/2018, On 01/22/2018, Page 13 of 19

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/22/2018, On 01/22/2018, Page 14 of 19

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[Redacted]

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Exhibit 22, (WhatsApp chats between DMITRIEV and NADER), Pages 6-7

The text describing the friend from the first meeting who received an urgent message, was PRINCE. The urgent message is described as PRINCE having checked with friends and he wanted to relay to DMITRIEV that Libya is off the table. NADER did not know who PRINCE checked with, but it could have been with the incoming administration or it could have come from PRINCE's personal business team. NADER walked PRINCE back to meet with DMITRIEV. They meet at the same place as the first meeting, a bar area. The meeting lasted less than 10 minutes. At the second meeting between PRINCE and DMITRIEV, the only other person present was NADER. DMITRIEV relayed that Russia wanted more involvement in Libya, they were not yet inside Libya, and they would be more cooperative in other areas. PRINCE

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/22/2018, On 01/22/2018, Page 15 of 19

was worried that DMITRIEV did not get his message, and therefore relayed to DMITRIEV during their second meeting that the Americans would not accept any Russian involvement in Libya. DMITRIEV wanted to know what the meeting was all about and was disappointed. DMITRIEV was expecting more from his meetings with PRINCE, such as a strategic roadmap. DMITRIEV thought they needed to speak to someone with more authority. DMITRIEV stated that [REDACTED]

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PRINCE and DMITRIEV did not schedule any future meetings together, or between any other parties they were involved with, and said that NADER would know how to get a hold of them. No phone numbers or cards were exchanged.

During PRINCE and DMITRIEV's first meeting, they just talked about the Middle East and anti-terrorism efforts. PRINCE talked about the history between the U.S. and Russia. PRINCE talked about how positive the incoming president is to U.S./Russia relations, but they did not mention sanctions. PRINCE spoke with confidence, knew the Transition Team, and was confident he would get their backing. According to NADER, PRINCE was interested in making money in the Middle East.

That night, after the two PRINCE and DMITRIEV meetings, NADER had dinner with DMITRIEV. [REDACTED]

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NADER's introductions to the TRUMP Campaign:

[REDACTED] and WALID PHARES were NADER's initial contacts with the TRUMP Campaign. NADER knew PHARES from years back, but they had drifted apart. NADER saw a *Washington Post* article in which TRUMP said PHARES was one of his main foreign policy advisors. NADER asked [REDACTED] to reconnect them.

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PHARES is well known in the Middle East as he is on the television channel Al-Arabia often. The UAE was pleased that PHARES was picked to advise the TRUMP Campaign.

NADER met PHARES at the Ritz Carlton Hotel in Tyson's Corner, Virginia. They spoke in generalities of the importance of PHARES' position as an advisor to the campaign. PHARES told NADER that [REDACTED] had recommended him for the position to IVANKA TRUMP and KUSHNER.

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Otherwise, they spoke about the campaign's chances of winning and political issues. NADER found out that TRUMP and PHARES' viewpoints on Iran, Islamic extremism, and the Muslim Brotherhood were identical to the UAE's.

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After the meeting, NADER told the UAE leadership he had made contact with the TRUMP Campaign.

NADER arranged for PHARES to speak to [redacted] to verify his bona fides. [redacted] told PHARES that NADER has his total trust to connect with the TRUMP Campaign and find out TRUMP's positions. PHARES and [redacted] spoke on the phone for approximately 30 seconds.

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NADER put together his biography for a meeting with KUSHNER. NADER travelled to New York City with PHARES via train for this meeting. NADER paid for PHARES' first class train ticket. Five to 10 minutes prior to arriving at Penn Station, KUSHNER cancelled the meeting. PHARES was extremely upset that the meeting was cancelled. [redacted]

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[redacted] NADER then realized that PHARES did not have much influence with the campaign if he could not even get a meeting held.

NADER had planned to provide a readout of the meeting with KUSHNER to MBS, MBZ, and [redacted] NADER asked PHARES to reschedule the meeting, but PHARES never did.

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[redacted] told NADER that [redacted] would be another potential connection to the TRUMP Campaign. [redacted]

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UAE did not offer any support to the TRUMP Campaign through PHARES or anyone else.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/22/2018, On 01/22/2018, Page 17 of 19

PHARES asked to be invited to the UAE during the campaign. MBS and MBZ thought this was a bad idea and did not allow it. PHARES visited the Formula One race held in UAE after the election.

Exhibit 31 (WhatsApp chats between PHARES and NADER) Pages 4-6, (May 9, 2016):

PHARES stated, "I am at the computer" at 12:13 AM. PHARES was writing a memo to KUSHNER about the importance of meeting NADER and to find out why their meeting had been cancelled. PHARES read a draft of the memo to NADER. PHARES told NADER that the letter would be picked up and delivered to KUSHNER.

NADER sent PHARES a picture of himself and PUTIN to ensure KUSHNER knew he was important and had influence. NADER was not planning to discuss Russia with KUSHNER, but would have mentioned that he had met PUTIN.

Exhibit 50, PHARES' memo:

NADER was shown Exhibit 50 and indicated this was the memo that PHARES had drafted.

NADER was asked questions about various parts of the memo. PHARES' principle is TRUMP. PHARES thought that Al Jazeera was too negative towards TRUMP and was hoping that NADER would influence UAE and Saudi Arabian media to put forward more positive stories.

PHARES discussed with NADER the possibility of having a conference sponsored where journalists could meet to develop more positive images of the TRUMP Campaign. The UAE has \$200 billion invested in the U.S., and MBZ could talk to his U.S. friends to support the TRUMP Campaign. This idea was discussed in principle, but NADER said that he would need a green light from KUSHNER prior to doing this.

NADER said he could provide a list of the companies and banks in which the UAE has assets to investigators at a later time.

NADER is not aware of whom in the UAE media could execute PHARES' plan. Since PHARES could not deliver a meeting with KUSHNER, he moved on but stayed friendly and in touch with PHARES.

MBZ owns or exercises significant control over Al-Arabia. MBS has similar influence over Sky News. NADER spoke with MBZ and MBS about using media they control to provide better coverage of TRUMP. MBZ and MBS wanted TRUMP to win the election. MBZ and MBS both wanted TRUMP to receive more

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/22/2018, On 01/22/2018, Page 18 of 19

positive news coverage and if he won they did not want TRUMP to be antagonized from negative news coverage from their networks.

Although PHARES never put down a specific plan on paper, NADER briefed MBZ and MBS on this media plan. For the media plan or the potential influence of U.S. companies that UAE invests in, they would need direction from the TRUMP Campaign.

NADER said that he does not remember seeing Exhibit 50 and the document PHARES showed him in New York was only one page long, not a three page document.

Exhibit 31 (WhatsApp chats between PHARES and NADER) Pages 11-12, (May 9, 2016):

NADER telling PHARES, "we are on their side" reflects telling the TRUMP Campaign that UAE is not their enemy.

NADER did not ask PHARES to be introduced to anyone else in the TRUMP Campaign. PHARES later introduced NADER to SAM CLOVIS. PHARES said CLOVIS was a "big guy" in the campaign and could introduce NADER to KUSHNER.

When they met, CLOVIS did not impress NADER. CLOVIS was primarily focused on domestic policy and NADER was concerned with foreign policy. PHARES and CLOVIS wanted to travel to the UAE. They believed that this trip would allow them the influence to get KUSHNER to meet with NADER. NADER said he would not sponsor a visit to UAE until he had actually met KUSHNER.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of GEORGE NADER, 1/22/2018 , On 01/22/2018 , Page 19 of 19

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
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/22/2018

Erik Dean PRINCE, date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, Washington, D.C. Present representing Prince were [Redacted] and [Redacted] of Boies Schiller Flexner, LLP. The interviewing team were FBI Special Agents [Redacted] and [Redacted] FBI Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsels Jeannie Rhee, and Aaron Zelinsky. FBI Special Agent [Redacted] was present for a portion of the interview.

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Prior to the start of the interview, ASC Zelinsky verbally reviewed the terms of a letter setting forth the agreement upon which Prince made himself available for the interview. Prince stated that he understood the terms of the letter agreement. Prince and [Redacted] signed the letter. After being advised of the identities of the interview team and the nature of the interview, Prince provided the following information:

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PRINCE wanted to clarify information that he provided during his first interview with the Special Counsel's Office (SCO) on April 4, 2018. PRINCE previously stated he had met with Donald TRUMP JR twice prior to the election, and he remembered a 3<sup>rd</sup> meeting at the end of the Las Vegas debate. The 3<sup>rd</sup> meeting was at TRUMP HOTEL and nothing substantial was discussed. PRINCE also wanted to try to explain why his cell phones did not have SMS messages prior to a certain date. PRINCE has a [Redacted] [Redacted] which when he changed out with his regular cell phone SIM card, may have wiped the previous SMS messages prior to that date. Last, in trying to recall the events of January 4, 2017, PRINCE remembered having lunch at Cipriani's Restaurant, two blocks north of Trump Tower, in New York City [Redacted] The lunch occurred at 11:45 a.m., and it was the day he left for Texas.

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[Large Redacted Block]

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Investigation on 05/03/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/08/2018

by [Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Erik Prince on 5/3/2018, On 05/03/2018, Page 2 of 10

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PRINCE was informally advising the campaign, and he described it as him pushing, not them pulling. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] If a person was on the approved list, they could then go up. PRINCE did not have an access pass so he would call [REDACTED]. The only time PRINCE would call [REDACTED] would be for a meeting with BANNON. To meet BANNON, PRINCE would also try calling [REDACTED] or text BANNON. There was a bar/restaurant area in the lobby to the right, and up a nearby escalator was a Starbucks and sitting area.

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PRINCE was shown an image of the business card of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] which was obtained from PRINCE's phone, and a photo of [REDACTED] PRINCE thought he met [REDACTED] one of the times he was on the floor at Trump Tower where the transition people were located and where BANNON's office was. PRINCE thought it was an approximately 15 second meeting and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PRINCE usually tries to take a picture of, or attempts to scan, business cards depending on the photo. PRINCE didn't know if [REDACTED] [REDACTED] met BANNON or not. PRINCE met him in the hallway outside a conference room. [REDACTED] had just been in that conference room with Michael FLYNN, Jared KUSHNER, or both of them. BANNON had been very busy that day and PRINCE had waited around to see him. PRINCE went around and talked to other people on the floor while he waited for BANNON and ended up being late [REDACTED]. If PRINCE saw BANNON that day it was only very briefly and would have been a 5 minute meeting. On either January 3 or January 4, PRINCE remembers talking to Judge Jeanine PIRRO, Kellyanne CONWAY, Secretary Wilbur ROSS, Steve MNUCHIN and [REDACTED] while he was waiting around for BANNON. It was possible he met with other

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Erik Prince on 5/3/2018 , On 05/03/2018 , Page 3 of 10

people as well. BANNON had blinds in his office that PRINCE believed were installed by January 2017. PRINCE was cleared to "get into the queue" with BANNON but he did not feel like he was getting guaranteed access. PRINCE does not recall, but it is possible that he met with BANNON on January 4 and discussed Kirill DMITRIEV.

When PRINCE met with BANNON on December 22, 2016 at Teterboro airport,

[REDACTED] PRINCE used [REDACTED] to fly up to Teterboro to deliver a document to BANNON. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] It was part of PRINCE's effort to change the foreign policy approach.

When George NADER sent him the text on DMITRIEV, PRINCE opened it within an hour of being on the transition team floor. It is possible he discussed it with BANNON, PRINCE didn't remember seeing BANNON then, but it is a possibility. PRINCE didn't believe that he passed DMITRIEV's information to anyone else, but he might have passed it to FLYNN, but not in a long substantial meeting. PRINCE believed he was perceived to be someone in the transition whose main contact was BANNON.

NADER was Mohammed Bin Zayed's (MBZ) man and was currently clashing with Yousef Al OTAIBA. PRINCE did have some type of conversation about DMITRIEV at the dinner with NADER. NADER became a conduit to MBZ for PRINCE. PRINCE was focused on getting in the good graces with MBZ and NADER's main interest was meeting someone in the transition team. NADER setup the meeting between PRINCE and MBZ. NADER viewed PRINCE as an access point and was using PRINCE as a messenger to the Trump Transition Team. PRINCE didn't remember affirming to NADER that he would pass information onto the Transition Team, but he thought it was a fair inference for NADER to think that he would pass the DMITRIEV information onto them. PRINCE wasn't NADER's sole access point to the Trump Transition Team. The DMITRIEV information was important to NADER and contact with MBZ was what was important to PRINCE. It was possible that PRINCE met with BANNON and possible that he spoke about DMITRIEV with BANNON. PRINCE also thought it was possible that he was just paying lip service to NADER and did not follow through. The only time PRINCE could remember being at Trump Tower after Christmas was 3 and 4 January 2017.

When PRINCE arrived in the Seychelles on January 11, 2017 he was greeted at the airport by a representative of the UAE. He was taken to his hotel room where he cleaned up. He had an initial meeting with NADER in his villa. Afterward he went to MBZ's villa and met with MBZ. PRINCE described the rest of the attendees as "all Arabs". The meeting took about an hour and a half. When the meeting concluded, he had dinner with NADER,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Erik Prince on 5/3/2018 , On 05/03/2018 , Page 4 of 10

and then PRINCE was reminded that there was a person MBZ's people thought he should meet. PRINCE thought the initial meeting with DMITRIEV was at a bar. PRINCE distinctly remembers it being a bar and remembers DMITRIEV's [REDACTED] After an approximately 30 minute meeting with DMITRIEV, PRINCE went back to his room. At that point, PRINCE saw the news about the Russian aircraft carrier Kuznetsov sailing into Tobruk, Libya, so he called NADER in order to meet with DMITRIEV again. They then met in NADER's villa. PRINCE told DMITRIEV that this was not the way to improve relations. PRINCE was not telling DMITRIEV this in an official capacity, but as his experience as a former Naval Officer. PRINCE told DMITRIEV this because DMITRIEV had links to the Russian Government. DMITRIEV said that sometimes the Russian military gets ahead of themselves.

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DMITRIEV believed, if anything, that PRINCE knew people in the transition, and was either officially or unofficially associated with the transition. PRINCE didn't remember BANNON specifically being raised during the conversation. PRINCE said that BANNON was effective if not conventional. PRINCE indicated he provided policy papers to BANNON. DMITRIEV was not surprised that PRINCE was linked to BANNON. DMITRIEV appeared to know that he would be meeting with PRINCE and knew something about PRINCE. PRINCE believed he was a diligent and audible campaigner for Donald TRUMP. DMITRIEV appeared to know that PRINCE was tangentially related to the Trump Campaign. It could have come up that PRINCE provided updates to BANNON and BANNON knew PRINCE was meeting a fund manager. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] PRINCE told DMITRIEV that he would let BANNON know that he had met with DMITRIEV. If there was an interest BANNON, or someone else in the transition, would take it from there. PRINCE was not interested in being the middle man. DMITRIEV was interested in improving relations between the U.S. and Russia. PRINCE thought he told NADER he would relay the DMITRIEV information back to BANNON. PRINCE would have conveyed to BANNON the DMITRIEV information regardless of whether NADER requested it or not. NADER wanted to be the "perpetual middleman" and PRINCE described the meeting with DMITRIEV as a date you didn't know you were being setup with. PRINCE described it as a fair assessment that NADER setup the meeting ahead of time. There were indications from DMITRIEV that he knew he was meeting with PRINCE. It appeared that DMITRIEV had read a little bit about PRINCE's background with Blackwater and the U.S. Navy SEALs. PRINCE thought it was probably both the UAE and NADER's idea to set PRINCE up with DMITRIEV. There was no indication given from PRINCE that BANNON sent PRINCE to the Seychelles. DMITRIEV was aware that PRINCE knew people connected to the administration.

There was no conversation between PRINCE and DMITRIEV of Russian interference during the 2016 presidential campaign. PRINCE described

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Erik Prince on 5/3/2018 , On 05/03/2018 , Page 5 of 10

himself as a student of intelligence and covert action. PRINCE believed that Russia's intent was to sow chaos and in that effort they succeeded. PRINCE didn't think the Russians affected the 2016 presidential election, but that they affected the first year after the election. DMITRIEV gave no indication that the Russians helped TRUMP or any gloating that they played any role in getting him elected. Right before the meeting with DMITRIEV, PRINCE asked NADER what DMITRIEV was looking for. NADER stated that he was looking for any way to communicate with the new administration.

DMITRIEV presents himself very well, is educated, and understood the U. S. system very well. [REDACTED]

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PRINCE subsequently met with BANNON at the "Breitbart Embassy". PRINCE talked through his Teterboro paper on the private option, briefed BANNON on his southern border trip, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] At the last minute, PRINCE said that he had met with DMITRIEV. He explained that DMITRIEV was looking at improving relations with the U.S., was the head of a Russian sovereign wealth fund, and the UAE wanted PRINCE to meet him. PRINCE probably held up a picture of DMITRIEV to show BANNON who he met. PRINCE didn't know if he had any contact information, such as a phone number, for DMITRIEV. It was possible PRINCE handed over to BANNON a business card, or wrote down an email address or a phone number for DMITRIEV. PRINCE subsequently said he presumed he conveyed how to get in contact with DMITRIEV, it could have been a card or number. PRINCE informed BANNON, and then it was up to him to follow up. BANNON told PRINCE to not follow up. BANNON wasn't interested and PRINCE could tell from his body language. PRINCE described it as on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being highly interested, BANNON was a 7 on his reaction. If it was a priority, PRINCE would have gotten a 1 from BANNON. The 7 in reaction PRINCE got from BANNON was not unusual, but it was more negative than PRINCE thought it would be. PRINCE didn't get a 10 either, meaning BANNON was "pissed off" about it. BANNON didn't verbalize why he lacked interest. PRINCE was not the conduit going forward.

PRINCE got a text response from BANNON when asking for feedback on PRINCE's proposed private option. PRINCE had done radio interviews with BANNON on certain topics and the first one he did was in 2013.

PRINCE was shown a screenshot from his phone which was captured from a video of TRUMP on CNN. The headline of the video was "Trump: I have no dealings with Russia in Business". If PRINCE had sent or received the video, WhatsApp automatically dumps it into the queue. PRINCE didn't know

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Erik Prince on 5/3/2018 , On 05/03/2018 , Page 6 of 10

why he would have been filming the show and doesn't know why he had the video.

[Redacted]

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PRINCE used the business card reader in his phone, but he never used it with DMITRIEV. PRINCE now remembered that DMITRIEV gave PRINCE a business card, or PRINCE wrote down his information. PRINCE remembered that he gave DMITRIEV's contact information to BANNON. PRINCE didn't remember what BANNON did with it.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Erik Prince on 5/3/2018 , On 05/03/2018 , Page 7 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Erik Prince on 5/3/2018 , On 05/03/2018 , Page 8 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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PRINCE stated he didn't know a [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Erik Prince on 5/3/2018 , On 05/03/2018 , Page 9 of 10

[Redacted]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Erik Prince on 5/3/2018 , On 05/03/2018 , Page 10 of 10

[REDACTED]

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
[REDACTED]

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PRINCE told a couple of [REDACTED] that the FBI had seized his phone. These [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PRINCE described them as "not dumb people" and they could see what was going on in the media. PRINCE told the immediate guys he was working with, but he did not tell anyone the questions that were asked. PRINCE described the phone seizure as not really an interview. BANNON and [REDACTED] did not know that PRINCE's phones were seized by the FBI.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/26/2018

(U) On 06/07/2018 Special Agent [Redacted] Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] FBI Contract Linguist [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel L. Rush Atkinson interviewed [Redacted] at the Special Counsel's Office in Washington, DC. [Redacted] Legal Counsel, was also present. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agent, the existence of potential legal ramifications for lying to the FBI, and executing a proffer agreement, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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Investigation on 06/07/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

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File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/15/2018

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by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/07/2018, Page 2 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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(U) In November 2013 [Redacted] traveled to Ukraine and something was happening in the streets in Ukraine. A revolution had started against YANUKOVYCH. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/07/2018, Page 3 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/07/2018, Page 4 of 10

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/07/2018, Page 5 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/07/2018, Page 6 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/07/2018, Page 7 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/07/2018, Page 8 of 10

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/07/2018, Page 9 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/07/2018, Page 10 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]


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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/31/2017

[Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] passport number [Redacted] was interviewed via [Redacted] from the [Redacted] serves as a [Redacted] at the [Redacted]. Present at FBIHQ for [Redacted] were FBI Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] FBI Intelligence Analyst (IA) [Redacted] Special Counsel Representative Aaron Zelinski, and FBIHQ General Counsel Representative [Redacted]. Present in [Redacted] were [Redacted] and [Redacted].

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[Redacted] was advised that the nature of the interview was to seek information about an individual who [Redacted] knew, named GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS (PAPADOPOULOS). After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted] immediately recalled meeting PAPADOPOULOS in [Redacted] subsequent to an open source news article that was published about PAPADOPOULOS being affiliated with the DONALD J. TRUMP (TRUMP) campaign. [Redacted] and his colleague, both reached out to PAPADOPOULOS given that he was locally based in London and a TRUMP adviser.

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[Redacted] recalled PAPADOPOULOS was interested in foreign policy matters which were a bit outside the box. [Redacted] provided an example of PAPADOPOULOS wanting to make good with Russia. [Redacted] was not aware of any specific details about potential business deals between TRUMP and Russia, but knew PAPADOPOULOS was interested in Russian relations with the TRUMP campaign.

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[Redacted] viewed PAPADOPOULOS as being a younger person in the political arena; was a bit naive at times, but very well connected. [Redacted] recalled PAPADOPOULOS portraying he had the ear of MICHAEL FLYNN (FLYNN) in the TRUMP campaign.

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Additionally, [Redacted] recalled PAPADOPOULOS had an interest in the Eastern Mediterranean area, specifically the Cyprus and Northern Cyprus

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Investigation on 08/29/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (, Other [Redacted])  
 File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/29/2017  
 by [Redacted]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 08/29/2017, Page 2 of 2


region. PAPADOPOULOS was also interested in that region as it pertained to the countries of Greece, Turkey, and possibly Egypt.

[REDACTED] has not been in touch with PAPADOPOULOS for several months. During one of their last conversations, PAPADOPOULOS told [REDACTED] that he is lying low for a while to let the Washington, DC chatter die down. [REDACTED] learned PAPADOPOULOS was not seeking a job with the administration, which both [REDACTED] and his colleague found to be odd. [REDACTED] overall assessment was that PAPADOPOULOS was a lot of bravado and talk.

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[REDACTED] recalled he and his colleague initially reached out to PAPADOPOULOS on LinkedIn, then communicated with him via Skype and LinkedIn.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/28/2018

Annie Donaldson was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC. Donaldson was accompanied by her attorneys [Redacted] and [Redacted]. Present for the interview were Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles, Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein, and Assistant Special Counsel Elizabeth Prelogar. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview, Donaldson provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Investigation on 04/02/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/15/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 04/02/2018 , Page 2 of 10

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 04/02/2018 , Page 3 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 04/02/2018 , Page 4 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

Donaldson did not know what the President asked McGahn to do specifically, but knew it related to the Russia investigation generally.

She went back to the office after McGahn's call. McGahn was there and said he had "had it" and was packing his stuff.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

Donaldson recalled the President wanted McGahn to [Redacted] but McGahn did not want to. McGahn told her the President called at least twice and asked "have you done it" in one of the calls.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

McGahn packed his office and got his resignation letter,

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 04/02/2018 , Page 5 of 10

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] She had already decide she would leave if McGahn left. [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] Donaldson and McGahn were fact witnesses, and the President should have those conversation with his own counsel, with whom he had a privilege. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 04/02/2018 , Page 6 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 04/02/2018 , Page 7 of 10

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 04/02/2018 , Page 8 of 10

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 04/02/2018 , Page 9 of 10

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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in

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 04/02/2018 , Page 10 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6 Per FBI & DOE-OIG  
b7C Per FBI & DOE-OIG  
b6 Per DOS  
b7C Per DOS

Date of entry 11/03/2017

On 10/19/2017, SA [Redacted] Department of State (DOS) SSA [Redacted] and Department of Energy SA [Redacted] interviewed [Redacted] with a telephone number of [Redacted] an email address of [Redacted] and an address of [Redacted] at DOS in Arlington, Virginia. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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Investigation on 10/19/2017 at Arlington, Virginia, United States (In Person)  
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/23/2017  
by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/19/2017, Page 2 of 5

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/19/2017, Page 3 of 5

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/19/2017, Page 4 of 5

[Redacted]

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DMP and POR

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/19/2017, Page 5 of 5

[Redacted]

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
[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/09/2018

[Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Jeannie S. Rhee and Andrew Weissmann. Present representing [Redacted] was [Redacted]. Prior to the start of the interview, ASC Weissmann reviewed the terms of a letter setting forth the agreement upon which [Redacted] made himself available for interview. [Redacted] and Weissmann signed the agreement. After being advised of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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In 2008, [Redacted] began working on the Democratic staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Joe Biden chaired the Committee. When Barack Obama selected Biden to run as his Vice-Presidential candidate, [Redacted] joined the campaign. When Obama took office in January 2009,

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] had no communication - in person, on the telephone or via e-mail - with Paul Manafort. [Redacted] likewise had no communication with Rick Gates.

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[Redacted] knows [Redacted] and [Redacted] from the Podesta Group. [Redacted] is friends with John Podesta and has sporadic contact with [Redacted] from their time working on Clinton's staff. [Redacted] regularly communicates with [Redacted] but does not recall ever communicating with [Redacted] about the Ukraine. [Redacted] does not know anyone that worked at Mercury, Clark & Weinstock during the period that [Redacted] worked for the Obama Administration.

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[Redacted] has known [Redacted] for a long time. [Redacted] talked about Ukraine during the long political drama starting with the election of Viktor Yanukovich and including Yanukovich's jailing of his political opponent in 2011. [Redacted] wanted the Obama Administration to not view Yanukovich negatively. [Redacted] was a

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Investigation on 07/26/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

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File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/26/2018

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of 07.26.2018 , On 07/26/2018 , Page 2 of 3

strong proponent of expanding NATO to Eastern Europe. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] An American law firm completed a report on the fairness of [Redacted] trial. The Ukraine government probably paid for the report. [Redacted] saw the report but cannot recall who gave it to him. [Redacted] does not recall any conversations about the report. When asked if [Redacted] knows [Redacted] [Redacted] responded yes and recalled that [Redacted] was involved with the report. Given [Redacted] prior position with the Administration, [Redacted] believes someone in the Administration would have talked with [Redacted] about the report.

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[Redacted] recalls that in the fall of 2013, Yanukovich pulled out of efforts to join the European Union. Protests began in the Ukraine. Biden took the lead on communicating with Yanukovich.

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[Redacted] did not know that Manafort had a role representing the Ukraine or any of Ukraine's political parties.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] does not recall Yanukovich visiting the U.S. Yanukovich probably came to the U.S. for the U.N. General Assembly, but [Redacted] does not recall any meetings with Obama or Biden.

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[Redacted] does not recall meeting with Romano Prodi. There were former European leaders that reached out to the Administration on behalf of Russia. Countries, like Italy, that had economic ties to Russia, opposed sanctions on the Ukraine. [Redacted] does not recall any visits or outreach from [Redacted] or [Redacted].

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[Redacted] contacted [Redacted] several times on behalf of [Redacted] [Redacted] may have met with [Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



[REDACTED]  
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~[REDACTED]  
(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of 07.26.2018 , On 07/26/2018 , Page 3 of 3

Anyone wanting to lobby on behalf of a faction in the Ukraine would contact the Assistant Secretary of European Affairs, Victoria Nuland, or her Deputy. At the White House, they would contact the Senior Directors for Europe and Russia. The Senior Director for Europe, including the Ukraine, was [REDACTED]. The Senior Director for Russia was [REDACTED].

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[REDACTED] has never heard of the European Centre for a Modern Ukraine.

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[REDACTED] does not recall any efforts by the Ukraine or its representatives to derail legislation like the Durbin Resolution or other legislation with sanctions against the Ukraine.

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If [REDACTED] attended or was scheduled to attend a meeting, whether in-person or on the telephone, then it would be on his official calendar. [REDACTED] does not know if unscheduled telephone calls were logged anywhere.

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
Most meetings with foreign officials or their Washington representatives would be at the White House or the Department of State. Staffers would sometimes follow-up after the meeting to reinforce a message with the opposition's staff or Washington representative.

Aspiring NATO members could be invited to attend NATO events. The Ukraine was always discussed as a possible NATO member.

[REDACTED] does not recall meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Khoroshkovskiy but that would have been an appropriate level meeting for him to take.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/01/2017

FBI INFO  
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2042  
DATE: 06-09-2020

(U) Matt Axelrod, date of birth [redacted] residing at [redacted] [redacted] work cell phone number [redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office. Participating in this interview were FBI Special Agents (SAs) [redacted] and attorneys Andrew D. Goldstein and Elizabeth Prelogar from the Special Counsel's Office. Also present for this interview was Axelrod's attorney [redacted] office telephone [redacted] cell phone [redacted] email address [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the purpose of the interview, SA [redacted] advised Axelrod that it is a violation of criminal law to lie to the FBI in the course of an investigation, and Axelrod said he understood. Axelrod provided the following information:

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Large redacted area]

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~~Reason: 1.4(b)  
Derived From: National Security Information SCG  
Declassify On: 20421231~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Investigation on 07/20/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

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File # [redacted] Date drafted 07/20/2017

by [redacted]

FBI(19cv1278)-3769

[Redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Matt Axelrod, On 07/20/2017, Page 2 of 8  
b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Matt Axelrod , On 07/20/2017 , Page 3 of 8

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Large Redacted Area]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

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[Redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Matt Axelrod, On 07/20/2017, Page 4 of 8  
b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Matt Axelrod , On 07/20/2017 , Page 5 of 8

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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(S)

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Matt Axelrod, On 07/20/2017, Page 6 of 8

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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FBI(19cv1278)-3774

[Redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Matt Axelrod, On 07/20/2017, Page 7 of 8

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S) X  
[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Matt Axelrod , On 07/20/2017 , Page 8 of 8

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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
[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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FBI INFO.  
CLASSIFIED BY: NSIC [Redacted] B11  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2043  
DATE: 06-16-2020

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/21/2018

(U) Annie Donaldson was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street SW, Washington, D.C. in the presence of her attorneys, [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Present for the interview were Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] [Redacted] SA [Redacted] Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles, and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein. Donaldson was advised it is a crime to lie to the FBI in the course of an investigation, which she acknowledged. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, Donaldson provided the following information:

[Redacted]

[Large Redacted Block]

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[Redacted Block]

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[Redacted Block]

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~~Reason: 1.4(b)  
Derived From: National Security Information SCG  
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM~~

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Investigation on 11/06/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/13/2017

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 2 of 30

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 3 of 30

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 4 of 30

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 5 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 6 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7E

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 7 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 8 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 9 of 30

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

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b7E

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 10 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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b3  
b7E

FBI(19cv1278)-3851

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 11 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U) "No Contact w/ Sessions" meant someone had said no one was to contact Sessions regarding the recusal.

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] "No comms" referred to a WHCO order to everyone not to contact Sessions [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 12 of 30

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 13 of 30

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

b1 :BI(19cv1278)-3854  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 14 of 30

SCR015\_000048:

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

SCR015\_000049:

(U) Donaldson thought the notation [Redacted] POTUS wants to call Dana | Is investigation | No | We know something on Flynn | GSA got contacted by FBI | There's something hot" meant [Redacted] the WHCO Trump wanted to call Boente about whether the White House or Trump was under investigation. [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson, On 11/06/2017, Page 15 of 30

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] Donaldson believed "4-5 Targets" followed by mentions of Flynn, Manafort, Stone, Carter Page, and "Greek Guy" was a [Redacted] However, Donaldson could not rule out that Burr told McGahn those individuals were the targets of the FBI.

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E



[Redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 16 of 30

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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b3  
b7E  
FBI(19cv1278)-3857

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 17 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

b1 =BI(19cv1278)-3858  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 18 of 30

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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b1 BI(19cv1278)-3859  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 19 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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b3  
b7E  
BI(19cv1278)-3860

[Redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 20 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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b1 =BI(19cv1278)-3861  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 21 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Donaldson added Trump was frustrated because Comey would never come to intelligence briefings at the White House, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

b1 BI(19cv1278)-3862  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 22 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

b1 BI(19cv1278)-3863  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 23 of 30

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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b1 BI(19cv1278)-3864  
b3  
b7E



[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 24 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 25 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

- "Resign vs Removal - POTUS/removal" - Dhillon suggested letting Comey resign vs be removed, and Trump was in favor of removal.

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

- "Is this the beginning of the end?" - Donaldson wondered if the Comey termination would be the end of the presidency. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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b1 BI(19cv1278)-3866  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

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b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 26 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

b1 FBI(19cv1278)-3867  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 27 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 28 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

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FBI(19cv1278)-3869

[Redacted]

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b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 29 of 30

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

b1 -BI(19cv1278)-3870  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

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b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Annie Donaldson , On 11/06/2017 , Page 30 of 30

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]


b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

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b3  
b7E FBI(19cv1278)-3871



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b6  
b7C  
b7E

FBI INFO.  
CLASSIFIED BY: NSI [redacted] B11  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2043  
DATE: 06-16-2020

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/22/2018

[Large redacted area]

b1  
b3  
b7E

John Eisenberg was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street SW, Washington, D.C. in the presence of his attorney, [redacted]. [redacted] Present for the interview were Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [redacted] Special Agent (SA) [redacted] [redacted] Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles, and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein. Eisenberg was advised it is a crime to lie to the FBI in the course of an investigation, which he acknowledged. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, Eisenberg provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

~~Reason: 1.4(b)  
Derived From: National Security Information SCG  
Declassify On: 20421231~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Investigation on 11/29/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)  
File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/06/2017  
by [redacted]



[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of John Eisenberg , On 11/29/2017 , Page 2 of 16

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of John Eisenberg, On 11/29/2017, Page 3 of 16

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(S)

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b7E

[Redacted]

(S)

X

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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(S)

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of John Eisenberg , On 11/29/2017 , Page 4 of 16

[Redacted]

(S)

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b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b7E

(S)

(S)

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of John Eisenberg , On 11/29/2017 , Page 5 of 16

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

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b3  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of John Eisenberg, On 11/29/2017, Page 6 of 16

(U) He remembered putting together a document at some point with the statutes which could be applicable to Flynn's behavior.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] It did not seem he had enough information to make a definitive recommendation for Trump.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

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b3  
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S) b1  
b3  
b7E

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b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of John Eisenberg, On 11/29/2017, Page 7 of 16

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

(S)

X —

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of John Eisenberg , On 11/29/2017 , Page 8 of 16

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of John Eisenberg, On 11/29/2017, Page 9 of 16

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(S) b1  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

b1  
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b6  
b7C  
b7E

They were not sure what Flynn had said to the FBI, so there was no clear way to identify or assess his [Title 18 USC] 1001 exposure. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] X

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted] Flynn said something like, "I talked to the FBI. They said they were done with the investigation. [Redacted] Eisenberg did not believe him when he said that. [Redacted]"

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)



[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of John Eisenberg , On 11/29/2017 , Page 10 of 16

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b1  
(S) b3  
b7E

(S)

X [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b1  
b3  
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of John Eisenberg, On 11/29/2017, Page 11 of 16

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of John Eisenberg , On 11/29/2017 , Page 12 of 16

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of John Eisenberg , On 11/29/2017 , Page 13 of 16

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of John Eisenberg, On 11/29/2017, Page 14 of 16

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of John Eisenberg , On 11/29/2017 , Page 15 of 16

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Trump wanted to make sure his cover letter said  
Comey told him three times he was not under investigation. Eisenberg  
thought it was the "driving animus of this whole thing."

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of John Eisenberg, On 11/29/2017, Page 16 of 16


b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/13/2018

On May 16, 2018, [Redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. Present for the interview were FBI Special Agent [Redacted], Special Counsel Prosecutor (SCP) Andrew Weissmann, SCP [Redacted] SDNY AUSA [Redacted] and SDNY AUSA [Redacted]. Also present were [Redacted] attorneys, [Redacted] [Redacted] and [Redacted]. After being advised of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

NOTE: SCP [Redacted] was only present for the start of the interview.

b6  
b7C

Prior to the interview commencing, SCP Weissmann advised [Redacted] that his participation in the interview was voluntary. [Redacted] was also advised that he needed to be truthful in his answers and lying to a Federal investigator could constitute at least one Federal crime. [Redacted] verbally acknowledged that he understood. Additionally, SCP Weissmann informed [Redacted] that the interview team had no interest in discussing [Redacted] career as [Redacted].

b6  
b7C

Background

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 05/16/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted]

Date drafted 05/18/2018

b6  
b7C  
b7E

by [Redacted]



[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/16  
/2018

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 05/16/2018, Page 2 of 11

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/16

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/16/2018 , Page 3 of 11

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/16

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/16/2018 , Page 4 of 11

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

FBC Dissolution

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/16  
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 05/16/2018, Page 5 of 11

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/16

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/16/2018 , Page 6 of 11

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/16  
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 05/16/2018, Page 7 of 11

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6

[Redacted]

b7C  
b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/16

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/16/2018 , Page 8 of 11

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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b7C

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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b7C

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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b7C

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6

[Redacted] b7C b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/16

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018 , On 05/16/2018 , Page 9 of 11

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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[Redacted]

b7A  
b7C  
b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/16  
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 05/16/2018, Page 10 of 11

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/16

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018 , On 05/16/2018 , Page 11 of 11

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C


[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/14/2018

On May 17, 2018, [Redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. Present for the interview were FBI Special Agent [Redacted], Special Counsel Prosecutor (SCP) Andrew Weissmann, SDNY AUSA [Redacted] and SDNY AUSA [Redacted]. Also present were [Redacted] attorneys, [Redacted] and [Redacted]. After being advised of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

Prior to the interview commencing, SCP Weissmann, [Redacted] counsel and [Redacted] initialed the Proffer agreement to acknowledge the continuance of the proffer.

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 05/17/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/04/2018

b6  
b7C  
b7E

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/17

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/17/2018 , Page 2 of 12

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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FBI(19cv1278)-4029

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/17

b6  
b7C  
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Continuation of FD-302 of /2018

, On 05/17/2018 , Page 3 of 12

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/17

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/17/2018 , Page 4 of 12

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4031

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
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(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/17

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/17/2018 , Page 5 of 12

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
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b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/17  
/2018

b6  
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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 05/17/2018, Page 6 of 12

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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b5 per DOJ/OIP b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4033



[Redacted]

b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
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(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/17

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/17/2018 , Page 7 of 12

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4034

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/17  
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 05/17/2018, Page 8 of 12

b3  
b6 b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
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b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/17

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018

, On 05/17/2018 , Page 9 of 12

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4036

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/17

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/17/2018 , Page 10 of 12

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/17

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018 , On 05/17/2018 , Page 11 of 12

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b3  
b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b3  
b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b3  
b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b3  
b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b3  
b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b3  
b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b3  
b6  
b7C

b3 b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/17

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/17/2018 , Page 12 of 12

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]


b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b7E



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/13/2018

On May 21, 2018, [Redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. Present for the interview were FBI Special Agent [Redacted] Special Counsel Prosecutor (SCP) Andrew Weissmann, and SDNY AUSA [Redacted]. Also present were [Redacted]'s attorneys, [Redacted] and [Redacted]. After being advised of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

Prior to the interview commencing, SCP Weissmann, [Redacted]'s counsel and [Redacted] initialed the Proffer agreement to acknowledge the continuance of the proffer. SCP Weissmann advised [Redacted] of his obligation to be truthful with investigators.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 05/21/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted]

Date drafted 06/04/2018

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/21

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/21/2018 , Page 2 of 13

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

FBC Starts Work with DMP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP



[Redacted]

b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/21

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018 , On 05/21/2018 , Page 3 of 13

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4042

[Redacted]

b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/21

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018 , On 05/21/2018 , Page 4 of 13

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/21

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018 , On 05/21/2018 , Page 5 of 13

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4044

[Redacted]

b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/21

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018

, On 05/21/2018 , Page 6 of 13

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/21

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/21/2018 , Page 7 of 13

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4046

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/21

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018 , On 05/21/2018 , Page 8 of 13

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7A

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/21

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018 , On 05/21/2018 , Page 9 of 13

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6

[Redacted] b7C  
b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/21

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/21/2018 , Page 10 of 13

b3

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6

b7C

b3

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6

b7C

b3

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6

b7C

b3

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6

b7A

b7C

b3

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6

b7A

b7C

b3

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6

b7C

b3

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6

b7C

b3

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6

b7C

b3

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6

b7C



[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/21

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/21/2018 , Page 11 of 13

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/21  
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 05/21/2018, Page 12 of 13

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/21

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/21/2018 , Page 13 of 13

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C


[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/23/2018

[Redacted] was interviewed telephonically by Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Weissmann and Jeannie Rhee as well as FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and Forensic Accountant [Redacted]. Also present for the call were [Redacted] s attorneys, [Redacted] and [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewers, [Redacted] provided the following information:

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 07/17/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted]

Date drafted 07/31/2018

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Telephonic Interview of [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 07/17/2018, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP


[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/31/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

[Redacted] previously identified, was interviewed at a Department of Justice office in Washington, D.C. by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] [Redacted] Senior Assistant Special Counsel Greg Andres and Assistant Special Counsel Brian Richardson. Present during the interview were [Redacted] defense counsel, [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

[Redacted] was told that his participation in the interview was voluntary, but that if he chose to answer questions, he needed to do so truthfully as lying to a federal agent was a crime. [Redacted] acknowledged that he understood.

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

Investigation on 08/30/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/30/2017

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 08/30/2017, Page 2 of 12

b5 per DOJ-OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 per DOJ-OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 per DOJ-OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 per DOJ-OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 per DOJ-OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 per DOJ-OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 per DOJ-OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 per DOJ-OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview, On 08/30/2017, Page 3 of 12

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b3  
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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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b7A  
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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 08/30/2017 , Page 4 of 12

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP

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b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP

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b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP

b3  
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 08/30/2017, Page 5 of 12

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 08/30/2017, Page 6 of 12

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 08/30/2017, Page 7 of 12

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview, On 08/30/2017, Page 8 of 12

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 08/30/2017, Page 9 of 12

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 08/30/2017, Page 10 of 12

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 08/30/2017, Page 11 of 12

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 08/30/2017, Page 12 of 12

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP

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
[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/18/2018

[Redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Andrew Weissmann. After being advised of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted] reviewed Section 5 inspection reports on four registrations: Black, Manafort and Stone, Inc. (#3415); Black, Manafort, Stone & Kelly Public Affairs Company (#3600) (BMSKPA); Paul J. Manafort (#3594); and Black, Manafort, Stone & Atwater, Inc. (#3710). [Redacted] recalls the inspections. At the time, in [Redacted] [Redacted] recognized her writing in some of the notes in the inspection reports.

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[Redacted] does not know why the inspection was initiated. [Redacted] along with other paralegals, attorneys and an accountant, from the Registration Unit went to offices in old town Alexandria. [Redacted] of BMSKPA and [Redacted] BMSKPA's attorney, pulled the firms' files. The inspection team spent about one week going through the files. The inspection team compared the firms' calendars, memos, contracts and billing records to the information in their supplemental filings. [Redacted] looked at the financials - comparing receipts and disbursements. The inspection team looked for non-disclosed activities and payments.

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[Redacted] did not deal with the legal issues in the inspection. [Redacted] a staff attorney that worked on the inspection, may be able to answer questions about the legal issues. [Redacted] cellular telephone number is [Redacted]

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The following other individuals were involved in the inspection:

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

b6 per NSD  
b7C per NSD

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Investigation on 07/17/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/17/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]  
07.17.2018

Continuation of FD-302 of


, On 07/17/2018 , Page 2 of 2

- [Redacted]

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b7C per NSD



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/31/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

[Redacted] of the FARA Registration Unit, 600 E St. NW, #1300, Washington, DC 20530 was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] [Redacted] Special Counsel Prosecutors Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres, and Associate Special Counsel Prosecutor Brian Richardson. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview [Redacted] provided the following information:

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Background

b6 per FBI/NSD  
b7C per FBI/NSD

[Redacted] began working in the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA) Unit of DOJ's National Security Division (NSD), Counterintelligence and Export Control Section (CES) in [Redacted] Initially, [Redacted] After completing law school at [Redacted] became a [Redacted]

[Redacted] in or around [Redacted] became [Redacted]

The FARA Unit

Currently, [Redacted] unit processes 400 FARA registrations per year. The number of registrations has gone down since the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) exception came into effect.

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The FARA Unit is an administrative enforcement body. Generally, the FARA Unit answers questions on how the statute works and when an entity needs to file FARA. The FARA Unit can conduct inspections of registrants' books and records to ensure compliance. The FARA Unit cannot conduct inspections of non-registrants. If information related to other clients which would be indicative of a need to file FARA is uncovered during an inspection, the FARA Unit can use this plain view information to request the registrant to file for that additional client.

Investigation on 09/12/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/12/2017

by [Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

(U)

Interview

, On

09/12/2017

, Page

2 of 12

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The FARA Unit can refer criminal matters to CES and the FBI. The FARA Unit does not have its own investigative body. [REDACTED] stated that she cannot recall an instance in which the FARA Unit has referred anything to CES or the FBI. The FARA Unit has received referrals from the FBI and United States Attorney's Office (USAO), but never referred anything to these entities.

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[REDACTED] thought it unlikely, but possible that an entity would be motivated to not file FARA in order to avoid inspections. Most of the registrants with whom [REDACTED] deals are repeat registrants and accustomed to filing FARA. That said, the LDA does not have a provision for inspection of books and records. Additionally, an LDA's filing fees are lower and in general, the reporting requirements for an LDA are less extensive and less intrusive into the activities provided by the registrant than FARA.

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[REDACTED] recalled an inspection of Black, Stone, Manafort and Kelly in [REDACTED]. The inspection was very in depth and took an entire week. [REDACTED] believed this inspection was related to the firm's work in Nicaragua, which was a very controversial issue at the time. [REDACTED] agreed to locate information regarding this inspection and provide it to the Special Counsel's Office.

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Sometimes, inspections are conducted on a random basis and sometimes they are conducted because an entity is late in filing their supplemental registration documents. Sometimes, a registrant is simply located nearby to another registrant on whom an inspection is being conducted. In these instances, the FARA Unit may do an inspection simply due to convenience of location.

The program specialists at the FARA Unit look through news articles to try and identify entities that may need to file under FARA. In these instances, the FARA Unit will send a Letter of Inquiry (LOI) to that entity, or invite the entity to have a meeting to discuss the matter. The FARA Unit does not typically get referrals from anyone on the Hill and does not have a hotline, or complaint line into which members of the public can refer FARA violations. The FARA Unit does not provide training or materials to potential registrants, but maintains publicly available information on their website.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview, On 09/12/2017, Page 3 of 12

Generally, registrants and potential registrants contact the FARA Unit to discuss whether or not they need to file based upon their circumstances. The FARA Unit provides opinion letters, or advisory opinions in response to questions posed by potential registrants. [Redacted] estimated that she only writes between 5-10 opinion letters per year.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] deals with many of the same attorneys who represent FARA registrants: [Redacted] are some of the attorneys with whom [Redacted] deals most often.

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[Redacted]

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FARA and LDA

[Redacted] referred to a FARA regulation which stated that the LDA exception cannot be applied if the principal beneficiary is a foreign government or political party. [Redacted]

b5 per NSD  
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[Redacted] explained that if the foreign principal is a foreign government or foreign political party then FARA is required. The purpose of the statute and the regulation was so that a "straw" entity could not be created to give the appearance of being unrelated to the actual foreign principal, which was a foreign government or foreign political party. [Redacted] reiterated that the statute alone is sufficient and the regulation is not really necessary.

The purpose of the regulation was for [Redacted] If a real non-governmental organization (NGO), which was completely independent from a foreign government or foreign political party, hired a lobbying firm, then an LDA would likely be okay. That said, the ECFMU was clearly not independent from the Ukrainian government or the Party of Regions (PoR) and therefore, it required a FARA filing.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview, On 09/12/2017, Page 4 of 12

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Hypothetically, had Manafort and/or Gates merely acted as political consultants for Ukraine and not directed and/or participated in any lobbying activities in the US, they may not have had an obligation to file FARA. [Redacted] stated that the physical location of Manafort and/or Gates was a factor to be considered. Hypothetically, if Manafort and/or Gates were located outside the US, but were just directing lobbying activities in the US, [Redacted] believed they may still have to file FARA. [Redacted] explained that if Manafort and/or Gates were located solely outside the US, but were directly lobbying activity, disseminating information and/or trying to influence US government officials, they would be required to file FARA.

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However, according to documentation reviewed by [Redacted] and the FARA Unit on this matter, it was clear that both Manafort and Gates did direct and /or participate in lobbying activities in the US. [Redacted] indicated that

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 09/12/2017, Page 5 of 12

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direction and control are key components to determining whether or not they needed to file FARA.

Documents

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] explained that typically, the FARA Unit is more collaborative with registrants and potential registrants. [Redacted] normal practice was to contact registrants and potential registrants and try to answer any questions they have. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] (U) [redacted] Interview, On 09/12/2017, Page 6 of 12

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[redacted] did not consider this LOI to be improper in any way, she just thought it was a more aggressive approach than she was used to and it signaled a change in how the FARA Unit approached these types of inquiries. Currently, this type of LOI language is the standard.

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[redacted] indicated that she felt the more aggressive approach had something to do with evolving practices within CES and the FARA Unit. [redacted] referred to the OIG Report which criticized the FARA Unit for not being aggressive enough. Even though that report did not come out until September 2016, her unit had seen a draft of the report. In addition, [redacted] believed the fact that this matter was in the news regularly and Manafort was a high profile individual played a role in why the LOI was more extensive.

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There was nothing done in this matter that deviated from the FARA Unit's normal course. The only difference was how in depth the inquiry was and how much oversight it garnered. [redacted] explained that normally the program specialist will identify a potential registrant and send the boiler plate LOI. In this case, the LOI underwent many revisions and was reviewed by [redacted] and likely others, before being sent.

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[redacted] explained that registrants and/or potential registrants have no obligation to answer an LOI or provide any documentation requested. Despite the fact that there was no obligation to comply with the request, [redacted] would have expected any response to be truthful and complete. For example, if PDG was going to provide documents in response, [redacted] would have expected all relevant documents would be included in that production, unless there was some sort of privilege issue.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 09/12/2017, Page 7 of 12

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview, On 09/12/2017, Page 8 of 12

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] recalled that [Redacted] represented to the FARA Unit that DMP, Manafort and Gates did not have any responsive documents due to a document retention policy. [Redacted] never followed up about this retention policy to determine whether or not it was actually followed, or whether or not there were responsive documents despite the retention policy.

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Had DMP, Manafort and/or Gates had any responsive documents, [Redacted] would have considered these relevant and expected these to be provided in response to the LOI. [Redacted] did not tell [Redacted] they had responsive documents, but were not providing them. [Redacted] represented to [Redacted] that DMP, Manafort and Gates did not have any responsive documents.

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In general, if an entity responds to an LOI [Redacted] assumes that they are responding with all responsive documents and information.

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[Redacted]

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b7C per FBI/NSD

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 09/12/2017, Page 9 of 12

[Redacted]

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The FARA Unit did not conduct any interviews prior to making their determination. The FARA Unit does not normally conduct interviews or refer matters to CES for a Grand Jury investigation.

[Redacted]

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5. [Redacted] was shown a letter dated November 23, 2016 from [Redacted] [Redacted] had conversations with [Redacted] outside of written communication, but they were not substantive in nature. These conversations were about scheduling and logistical or administrative matters.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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6. [Redacted] was shown a letter from her to [Redacted] dated March 31, 2017. The purpose of this letter was to notify [Redacted] that the FARA Unit had determined DMP, Manafort and Gates needed to file FARA.

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[Redacted] stated that this type of letter was usual after the FARA Unit had made a determination on a matter. The difference between this letter and other letters like it was that there were specific references made to documents which supported the determination. [Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 09/12/2017, Page 10 of 12

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per NSD  
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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] explained that in her letter to [Redacted] she listed the foreign principal as the ECFMU, the government of Ukraine and/or the PoR because it did not really matter which one it was. [Redacted] considered all three to be foreign principals under FARA. [Redacted] had enough information to know that any of the three constituted a foreign principal under FARA, and she did not want to pick only one.

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[Redacted] had expressed to [Redacted] that she was uncertain as to the who the foreign principal would be. This was one of the reasons [Redacted] used "and /or" in her letter. [Redacted] may have asked [Redacted] who the principal should be. Had [Redacted] asked [Redacted] would not have given her an answer. [Redacted] felt that it was the registrant's burden to know who the client was.

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[Redacted] knew DMP worked for the government of Ukraine and PoR per their contract. [Redacted] told [Redacted] that DMP did not have a contract with the ECFMU.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 09/12/2017, Page 11 of 12

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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In or around [Redacted] believed she was asked by [Redacted] to review a draft FARA filing for DMP. [Redacted] did not think this was a good idea because it would have been perceived as the FARA Unit's blessing on the document. [Redacted] did not believe that her review of a filing indicated she approved of it, but she thought it would be perceived that way. The FARA Unit did not end up reviewing the DMP filing.

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On rare occasions in the past [Redacted] has reviewed registrants' filings [Redacted] explained that this was with entities or individuals who were new to FARA and had little to no knowledge about what they were doing.

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[Redacted]

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[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview, On 09/12/2017, Page 12 of 12

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[REDACTED] stated that it is public knowledge that there have been no prosecutions under FARA after a filing has been submitted. The attorneys representing these parties would likely have been aware of that fact.

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With respect to the FARA registration documents. The FARA Unit paid close attention to item 11 regarding activities, item 12 related to political activities, item 14 regarding funding and item 15 related to receipts and disbursements.

[REDACTED] did not believe she personally reviewed DMP, Manafort and/or Gates' FARA filings. [REDACTED] believed her program specialist reviewed it and then the Special Counsel's Office was involved so [REDACTED] did not get involved in the matter further.


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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] recalled dealing with Skadden and Greg Craig regarding their commissioning to write the Skadden Report on Tymoshenko. The question was whether or not Skadden needed to file under FARA for this matter. After looking into the details, [REDACTED] believed they did not need to file under FARA because they were not disseminating the information to anyone other than the client. [REDACTED] believed she initiated contact with Skadden on this matter when a news report came to her attention.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/06/2018

[Redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel, Washington, D.C. Present for the interview were FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Counsel Attorneys Andrew Weissmann and Brian Richardson. Also present were [Redacted] attorneys [Redacted] and [Redacted] with the law firm [Redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted] was advised his participation in the interview was voluntary. [Redacted] was also advised he needed to be truthful in his answers and lying to a Federal agent could constitute a Federal crime. [Redacted] acknowledged his rights and obligations.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

Investigation on 01/18/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)  
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 01/24/2018  
by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E



[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/18/2018, Page 2 of 19

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/18/2018, Page 3 of 19

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/18/2018, Page 4 of 19

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/18/2018, Page 5 of 19

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/18/2018, Page 6 of 19

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/18/2018, Page 7 of 19

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/18/2018, Page 8 of 19

b5 per DOJ-OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/18/2018, Page 9 of 19

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C



[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/18/2018, Page 10 of 19

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/18/2018, Page 11 of 19

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/18/2018, Page 12 of 19

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/18/2018, Page 13 of 19

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/18/2018, Page 14 of 19

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/18/2018, Page 15 of 19

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/18/2018, Page 16 of 19

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/18/2018, Page 17 of 19

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]



[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/18/2018, Page 18 of 19

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/18/2018, Page 19 of 19

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C


[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/25/2018

On Friday, June 22, 2018, [Redacted] was interviewed at the Eastern District of Virginia United States Attorney's Office, by Department of Justice Senior Financial Investigator [Redacted] FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

[Large Redacted Block]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C


UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 06/22/2018 at Alexandria, Virginia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/22/2018

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E



~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/27/2017

FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [Redacted], identifying information having previously been provided, was interviewed via Lync. Having provided him the identities of the interviewing agents and the reason for the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]

b7E

Former Director James Comey had a [Redacted] telephone in his residential SCIF, [Redacted], ever since the buildout of the SCIF. It was removed by [Redacted] on May 12, 2017. This [Redacted] phone is currently stored at [Redacted] office. However, the phone was recently reconfigured for use by the Special Counsel, which means there is no call history or any other information stored on it.

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

The phone has not yet been delivered to the Special Counsel. There was also a CMS telephone in Comey's office at FBIHQ, but [Redacted] does not know the number. [Redacted] recommended interviewing agents obtain the number from FBI executive management.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]

b7E

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

Investigation on 07/24/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (, Other (Lync))

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/25/2017

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Telephonic Interview of SSA

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 07/24/2017, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted] recalled that on January 6, 2017, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b7E

Comey had both a [Redacted] in his residential SCIF. [Redacted] that was in Comey's SCIF, but

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]


b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted] that were assigned to the DPD while Comey was Director. [Redacted] will inquire about this information from the COMSEC manager when he returns on Wednesday, July 26, 2017.

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b7E



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/08/2018

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] telephone number [Redacted]  
[Redacted] e-mail address [Redacted] was interviewed at the  
[Redacted] New York, NY  
10001. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents  
and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following  
information:

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 06/03/2018 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/04/2018

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 06.03.2018 , On 06/03/2018 , Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]


b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/16/2018

[Redacted] DOB: [Redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street, SW, Washington, D.C. Also present during the interview were [Redacted] attorney [Redacted] Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky, FBI Special Agents [Redacted] and [Redacted] and FBI Intelligence Analyst [Redacted]. The interview began at approximately 9:30 a.m. and concluded at approximately 5:30 p.m. Water was provided to [Redacted] and his attorney. Multiple breaks were taken throughout the morning and afternoon including a lunch break. Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky reviewed with [Redacted] and his attorney, [Redacted] after [Redacted] informed the Special Counsel's Office (SCO) that [Redacted] wished to provide information to the government.

b6  
b7C  
b7D

During the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information. [Redacted]

[Redacted] spoke to [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] provide incriminating information about [Redacted] stated that [Redacted] provided the waiver from [Redacted]

b3 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted] told most of these people

[Redacted]

After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 05/18/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/19/2018

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E



[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] On 05/18/2018, Page 2 of 12

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/18/2018, Page 3 of 12

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

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b7C  
b7D

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/18/2018, Page 4 of 12

[Redacted]

b6  
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b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

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b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/18/2018, Page 5 of 12

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/18/2018, Page 6 of 12

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/18/2018, Page 7 of 12

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b7A  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

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b7A  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C  
b7D

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

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b7D  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/18/2018, Page 8 of 12

[Redacted]

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b7D

[Redacted]

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b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

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b7A  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/18/2018, Page 9 of 12

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/18/2018, Page 10 of 12

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7D

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] On 05/18/2018 , Page 11 of 12

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7D

MISCELLANEOUS

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/18/2018, Page 12 of 12


[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/06/2018

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] was interviewed at the E. Barrett Prettyman United States Courthouse, 333 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20001. Also present were [Redacted] representing [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]


b6  
b7C  
b7D

Investigation on 06/01/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/05/2018

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/20/2018

On 12/20/2017, SA [Redacted] and US Department of State (DOS) SSA [Redacted] interviewed [Redacted] DOB [Redacted] at his place of work. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] Administration

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b6 per DOS

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 12/20/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/21/2017

b6  
b7C  
b7E

by [Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 12/20/2017, Page 2 of 10

[Redacted] met [Redacted] after he started his tour in Ukraine. [Redacted] met [Redacted]

b6 per DOS

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted] did not know how [Redacted] had met [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b6 per DOS  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b6 per DOS

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of

[Redacted]

, On 12/20/2017 , Page 3 of 10

b6 per DOS

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

In his new role,

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of

[Redacted]

, On 12/20/2017 , Page 4 of 10

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b6 per DOS

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b6 per DOS

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b6 per DOS

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4345

b6 per DOS



[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of

[Redacted]

, On

12/20/2017

, Page

5 of 10

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

PAUL MANAFORT

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] did not recall the date of the meeting with MANAFORT but did recall that it was in the [Redacted] MANAFORT to TEFFT's office, but he was not sure if was in the meeting. If [Redacted] was not in the meeting, TEFFT would have recounted the meeting to him afterward.

b6 per DOS  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

The imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko was the main topic of discussion between MANAFORT and TEFFT (NFI). MANAFORT told TEFFT that he was trying to urge YANUKOVITCH to take a more proactive direction toward the EU and the West (NFI).

Throughout [Redacted] time in Ukraine, MANAFORT would sporadically meet with the Ambassador.

b6 per DOS  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] recalled that the [Redacted]

b6 per DOS

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted] did not know RICK GATES.

b6  
b7C

Emails

b6 per DOS

[Redacted] was shown a number of email exchanges between himself and [Redacted] and provided the information below:

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of

[Redacted]

, On

12/20/2017

, Page

6 of 10

Exhibit 28:

b6 per DOS

[Redacted] was shown an email with the subject line, "FT (print): Trump's 'dark prince' honed skills in Ukraine."

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

After news about MANAFORT came out, [Redacted] was a little concerned about

b6 per DOS

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

Exhibit 29

[Redacted] was shown an email exchange with the subject line, "our dinner yesterday."

b6 per DOS

[Redacted] explained that this was a reference [Redacted] dinner with

b6 per DOS

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted] reference to "North" was a reference to Russia.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b6 per DOS

At the time of this email, [Redacted]

b6 per DOS

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

After receiving this email, [Redacted] would have likely communicated the

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6 per DOS

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 12/20/2017, Page 7 of 10

Exhibit 31

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS

b6  
b7A  
b7C

Exhibit 2

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 6

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS

b6  
b7A  
b7C

Exhibit 18

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS

b6  
b7A  
b7C

Exhibit 24

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 12/20/2017, Page 8 of 10

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS  
b7E per DOS

b6  
b7A  
b7C

Exhibit 25

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 12/20/2017, Page 9 of 10

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

Exhibit 26

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS  
b6  
b7C

Exhibit 1

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

Exhibit 3

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

Conclusion

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of

[Redacted]


, On 12/20/2017 , Page 10 of 10

b6 per DOS

At the conclusion of the interview, [Redacted] was advised that lying to the interviewing agents was a federal crime. [Redacted] acknowledged that he understood and that the information he had provided was accurate to the best of his knowledge.

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/14/2017

[redacted] (previously reported address at [redacted] and phone number [redacted] was interviewed at telephonically . After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent [redacted] and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted] in the near future. [redacted] did express that a meeting in [redacted] would be easier, but [redacted] would meet in [redacted] is not planning to leave the country in the near future.

b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[redacted]


b3  
b6  
b7C

Investigation on 12/06/2017 at [redacted] United States (Phone)  
File # [redacted]-SM-2230634 Date drafted 12/12/2017  
by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b7E



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/01/2017

THOMAS KENDRIS, United States (U.S.) Country President of NOVARTIS CORPORATION (NOVARTIS), was interviewed by Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] [Redacted] Forensic Accountant [Redacted] Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein, and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Jeannie Rhee at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC 20546. KENDRIS was accompanied by NOVARTIS outside counsel [Redacted] from Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing officials and the nature of the interview, KENDRIS provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

KENDRIS has been with NOVARTIS since [Redacted] KENDRIS has served in various positions at NOVARTIS, [Redacted] [Redacted] KENDRIS became the U.S. Country President of NOVARTIS.

b6  
b7C

DAN CASSERLY was NOVARTIS' head of Government Affairs. [Redacted] [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

The first time KENDRIS heard the name MICHAEL COHEN was when FELIX EHRAT sent KENDRIS an email regarding a meeting invitation with COHEN. After KENDRIS received the aforementioned email from EHRAT, KENDRIS and EHRAT had a phone call. During the call, KENDRIS believed EHRAT told him that COHEN was DONALD TRUMP's personal attorney, which was news to KENDRIS. KENDRIS thought TRUMP's personal attorney was MARC KASOWITZ.

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

During the aforementioned call with EHRAT, EHRAT told KENDRIS that JOE JIMENEZ had contacted him (EHRAT) about COHEN. JIMENEZ said he had retained COHEN and wanted to enter into an agreement with COHEN. EHRAT provided KENDRIS with a copy of the agreement. KENDRIS recalled a scope of services attachment to the agreement which said COHEN would be assisting

Investigation on 11/09/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/20/2017

b6  
b7C  
b7E

by SA [Redacted]



Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Thomas Kendris, On 11/09/2017, Page 2 of 7

NOVARTIS with healthcare legislation. EHRAT told KENDRIS that COHEN would help JIMENEZ set up meetings with individuals in the TRUMP administration. JIMENEZ was introduced to COHEN through a third party.

NOVARTIS had a history working with a public relations firm called TENEQ. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Prior to COHEN's involvement with NOVARTIS, KENDRIS and CASSERLY spoke about the fact that they did not know who in the TRUMP administration would be responsible for issues relevant to NOVARTIS. CASSERLY had the ability to set up meetings between JIMENEZ and [REDACTED] but there was a general lack of understanding as to who was responsible for healthcare policy issues in the TRUMP administration. CASSERLY put together a list of people he thought would be responsible, but KENDRIS had not previously heard many of the names.

b6  
b7C

Value-based pricing and outcome-based contracts were issues JIMENEZ was interested in, so JIMENEZ wanted to talk with someone in the TRUMP administration about the issues. Value-based pricing and outcome-based contracts were ways to address the rising prices of prescription drugs. NOVARTIS wanted the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to clarify whether or not pharmaceutical companies could have outcome-based contracts with its customers.

KENDRIS noted that NOVARTIS and the U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) recently agreed on outcomes-based pricing for an approved FDA leukemia drug. Under the agreement, a government patient would not receive a bill until 30 days after receiving treatment. If the patient did not go into remission, then the patient would not receive a bill.

Another policy issue NOVARTIS was interested in speaking with the TRUMP administration about was indication-based pricing. Indication-based pricing was something that had never been done before. NOVARTIS and CMS recently agreed to collaborate on indication-based pricing with respect to certain drugs. If NOVARTIS had been unable to come to an agreement with CMS, NOVARTIS could have spoken to COHEN about the issue.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] When

KENDRIS received the aforementioned email from EHRAT, KENDRIS agreed to meet with COHEN. COHEN supposedly helped TRUMP decide who would fill which posts within the administration. NOVARTIS wanted insight from these

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Thomas Kendris, On 11/09/2017, Page 3 of 7

individuals. KENDRIS may have suggested to EHRAT that CASSERLY attend the meeting with COHEN as well. However, KENDRIS came to find out that CASSERLY had already spoken with JIMENEZ about COHEN, so CASSERLY was already aware of a meeting being arranged.

The issues concerning KENDRIS and CASSERLY were tax reform, health care reform, and value-based pricing.

KENDRIS was shown a set of his handwritten notes Bates stamped NVS\_00000429 through NVS\_00000430. Prior to meeting with COHEN, KENDRIS had a one-on-one meeting with CASSERLY. The meeting with CASSERLY occurred right before the meeting COHEN and was used to prepare for the meeting with COHEN. KENDRIS' notes about "SDNY" and "Boston" were regarding cases NOVARTIS was litigating that they believed EHRAT possibly wanted to discuss with COHEN.

JIMENEZ was the main individual at NOVARTIS responsible for meeting with people in Washington, DC regarding policy issues. JIMENEZ was on the Board of a Pharmaceutical Trade Association (PHRMA). After TRUMP won the Presidential election, JIMENEZ was very focused on identifying individuals in the TRUMP administration in order to determine their support of issues important to NOVARTIS and setting up meetings with the individuals.

JIMENEZ typically hired consultants through CASSERLY, but JIMENEZ was focused on setting up meetings with the TRUMP administration.

[REDACTED] in the lead up to the meeting with COHEN on March 1, 2017. However, KENDRIS recalled having

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

As soon as EHRAT told KENDRIS about the meeting with COHEN, KENDRIS wanted to get CASSERLY involved. CASSERLY knew everyone in DC.

Regarding the March 1, 2017 meeting with COHEN, KENDRIS wanted the meeting to be in NOVARTIS' New York office. KENDRIS noticed that in COHEN's consulting contract with NOVARTIS, the address listed for COHEN appeared to be COHEN's personal residence.

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Thomas Kendris , On 11/09/2017 , Page 4 of 7

During the March 1, 2017 meeting with COHEN, COHEN indicated that he was no longer working for TRUMP. COHEN represented that he was independent, separate from TRUMP and the TRUMP administration.

b6  
b7C

EHRAT and CASSERLY were also present for the March 1, 2017 meeting with COHEN. The meeting lasted approximately 90 minutes. KENDRIS arrived at NOVARTIS' New York office early to meet with CASSERLY.

Referring to KENDRIS' handwritten notes Bates stamped NVS\_00000430, these were topics KENDRIS and CASSERLY believed EHRAT would be interested in discussing with COHEN.

b6  
b7C

KENDRIS' handwritten note in the lower left corner of the page, "monitor? avoid that?" was in reference to potential settlements NOVARTIS was currently negotiating.

KENDRIS was shown a page of his handwritten notes Bates stamped NVS\_00000431. These notes were also from the one-on-one meeting KENDRIS had with CASSERLY before the meeting with COHEN. The items on this page contained a list of things KENDRIS and CASSERLY thought COHEN could potentially be helpful on. KENDRIS believed the note at the top of the page, "14B," should have stated "340B." If KENDRIS wrote "14B," then KENDRIS did not know what the note referred to. If KENDRIS intended to write "340B," then the note was referring to a drug pricing program dealing with a reimbursement issue for indigenous patients. "Border adjustability tax" was an issue important to NOVARTIS because such a tax was damaging for companies located outside the U.S., such as NOVARTIS. "Copay/OIG" was an issue discussed at PHRMA. Prior to meeting with COHEN,

b6  
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EHRAT started the March 1, 2017 meeting with COHEN with a long introduction about NOVARTIS and then touched on some of the issues of interest to NOVARTIS. At one point in the meeting, COHEN said he knew

CASSERLY was interested in partnering up with the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) regarding outcome-based pricing. KENDRIS, CASSERLY, and EHRAT tried discussing the substance of outcome-based pricing with COHEN.

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COHEN suggested NOVARTIS set up a reduced pricing program with the VA and marketing it as "in honor of those that have served."

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Thomas Kendris , On 11/09/2017 , Page 5 of 7

During the March 1, 2017 meeting, COHEN said he also knew GARY COHN.

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b7C

During the meeting with COHEN, KENDRIS remembered thinking that COHEN knew everyone in the TRUMP administration, some better than others. As a result,

COHEN knew all the players and could make introductions for NOVARTIS.

b6  
b7C

In July 2017, JIMENEZ was in DC for PHRMA planning meetings. The night before the PHRMA planning meetings, there was discussion

The discussion was about

b5 per OMB

On the morning of the first day of the PHRMA planning meetings, JIMENEZ and CASSERLY met with someone from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to discuss amongst other things. It was through discussions with OMB that led to the agreement between NOVARTIS and CMS on outcomes-based pricing.

It was meetings like the one described with OMB that KENDRIS envisioned COHEN helping arrange.

KENDRIS was shown a set of his handwritten notes Bates stamped NVS\_00000432 through NVS\_00000436. These notes were taken by KENDRIS during the March 1, 2017 meeting with COHEN. Referring to NVS\_00000433, KENDRIS explained Pharmacy Benefit Management (PBMS) to COHEN and how they acted as the middleman between the pharmaceutical companies and healthcare providers.

b6  
b7C

Referring to NVS\_00000434, CASSERLY provided COHEN with a list of individuals in the administration CASSERLY had put together as potential individuals COHEN could introduce JIMENEZ to. The list of names KENDRIS wrote down were the individuals from CASSERLY's list that COHEN said he knew. KENDRIS put a star by the names of the individuals COHEN said he knew best. At one point during this exercise, COHEN said something to the effect of, "why do you want me to introduce you to these people? I can bring your ideas directly to the President." COHEN's opinion of the individuals he knew from CASSERLY's list was regarding how close the person was to TRUMP.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Thomas Kendris , On 11/09/2017 , Page 6 of 7

Referring to NVS 00000434, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

At one point during the March 1, 2017 meeting with COHEN, COHEN talked about someone who was not on CASSERLY's list. KENDRIS could not remember the individual's name, but COHEN called him/her during the meeting. COHEN then put the individual on speakerphone, but did not tell the individual that he/she was on speakerphone. After the call concluded, COHEN said something to the effect of, "see, I can get anyone on the phone."

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

COHEN's approach as a consultant was significantly different, particularly from how NOVARTIS dealt with TENEO. Referring to NVS\_00000432, KENDRIS wrote, "expecting us to deliver stuff to make Trump look good." During the March 1, 2017 meeting, COHEN told KENDRIS, CASSERLY, and EHRAT that NOVARTIS should build a manufacturing plant in Indiana. Doing so, explained COHEN, would create jobs and would make TRUMP look good.

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

At the end of the March 1, 2017 meeting, COHEN said he did not want to deal with anyone else at NOVARTIS besides KENDRIS, CASSERLY, EHRAT, and JIMENEZ.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] the March 1, 2017 meeting. However, it ended up making no sense, so nothing came of it.

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] but as previously noted, it was determined that COHEN could not be helpful, so nothing came of it.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Thomas Kendris , On 11/09/2017 , Page 7 of 7

By March 9, 2017, it was KENDRIS' view that COHEN [Redacted] However, JIMENEZ was hoping COHEN could set up meetings with people in the TRUMP administration. After July 2017, it was KENDRIS' understanding that NOVARTIS stopped trying to use COHEN as a consultant. [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

When CASSERLY provided COHEN with the list of individuals in the administration CASSERLY had put together, [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] During that exercise, COHEN represented that he could call TRUMP at any moment. [Redacted]


[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

KENDRIS did not have any other discussions with COHEN after the March 1, 2017 meeting.

ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE: All emails and documents shown to KENDRIS are included in the attached 1A envelope.



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/16/2018

(U) On 05/03/2018 Special Agents [Redacted] and [Redacted] interviewed [Redacted] at [Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

(U) In preparation for the interview, [Redacted] spoke to his former assistant, who told [Redacted] that according to her records, [Redacted] attended the May 23, 2016 Distinguished Awards Dinner for the CENTER FOR THE NATIONAL INTEREST (CNI). [Redacted] cannot remember it though.

(U) [Redacted] often keeps the programs from events and dinners like this. He found programs for the two previous years but not 2016.

(U) [Redacted] assistant told him it was at the Four Seasons Hotel.

b6  
b7C

(U) [Redacted] had attended other CNI events. [Redacted] thought CNI events may have had VIP receptions and he assumed would have been invited to the reception at this dinner.

(U) [Redacted] said he should have remembered the event because of Senator Pat Roberts and Senator Tim Kaine, but he could not. [Redacted] had no recollection of AMBASSADOR SERGEI KISLYAK at this event. [Redacted] did not remember if then-SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS was at the event.

b6  
b7C

(U) [Redacted] was shown a document with a diagram of the head table arrangement depicting where he was supposed to have sat. [Redacted] did not know why he could not remember the event because he had [Redacted] and [Redacted] who were both depicted on the table diagram. [Redacted] recalled he met the Italian Ambassador at some point, but could not recall if it was at the CNI dinner.

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(U) [Redacted] was shown a document with the second head table arrangement diagram. [Redacted] knew AMBASSADOR RICK BURT and DOV ZAKHEIM, who were depicted on the document. [Redacted] had met DIMITRY SIMES, adding that the dinner was an event for SIMES' NGO. [Redacted] knew KISLYAK, but only dealt with him in [Redacted] official capacity at the State Department.

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 05/03/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/03/2018

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 05/03/2018, Page 2 of 2

(U) [REDACTED] recalled speaking to BURT and ZAKHEIM, and it may have been at the CNI event. Seeing the head table arrangements helped [REDACTED] determine that he must have attended.

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b7C

(U) [REDACTED] does not know SESSIONS; he has met KAIN; and is friends with [REDACTED]. The other people on the diagrams are distant professional colleagues.

b6  
b7C

(U) At events like this, some of the people who are required to attend may arrive at the last minute of the VIP reception. [REDACTED] said he did not like these events because he is not gregarious, and may have spoken only to people he knew at the VIP reception.

b6  
b7C


(U) Had [REDACTED] seen KISLYAK, [REDACTED] was reasonably certain he would have not approached KISLYAK. In his capacity at the State Department [REDACTED] only dealt with KISLYAK on tough issues, such as when Russian diplomats had done something wrong.

b6  
b7C

(U) If [REDACTED] remembered any additional pertinent information he would contact the interviewing SAs.



[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/23/2018

On May 17, 2018, [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] cellular telephone number [Redacted] work telephone number [Redacted] 1000, was interviewed at the United States Attorney's Office located at 2100 Jamieson Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22314 [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] Also present were [Redacted] of Land, Carroll & Blair, PC, Assistant United States Attorney [Redacted] and FBI Forensic Accountant [Redacted] [Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewers, [Redacted] provided the following information:

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 05/17/2018 at Alexandria, Virginia, United States (In Person)

b6  
b7C  
b7E

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/17/2018

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] Interview, On 05/17/2018, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]


b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5 per DOJ/OIP



b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI INFO  
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2043  
DATE: 06-18-2020

Date of entry 01/22/2018

Donald McGahn, White House Counsel, was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street NE, Washington, D.C. McGahn was accompanied by his attorneys, [redacted]

[redacted] Present for the interview were Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [redacted] Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles, and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, McGahn provided the following information:

[Large redacted block]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Large redacted block]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~Reason: 1.4(b)  
Derived From: National Security Information SCG  
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Investigation on 12/12/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/17/2017

by [redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn, On 12/12/2017, Page 2 of 18

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] McGahn [redacted] thought at least Priebus, [then-Chief Strategist Stephen] Bannon [redacted] were there. [redacted]

(U) Trump's first line to McGahn was "I don't have a lawyer" [redacted]

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] McGahn told Trump the ethics people had weighed in on the decision. Trump talked about attorney Roy Cohn and how he wished Cohn was his attorney. [redacted]

[redacted] McGahn thought the Cohn comment was directed at him and he thought Trump meant Cohn would fight for Trump whereas McGahn was not.

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn, On 12/12/2017, Page 3 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Trump said something like "You're telling me that Bobby and Jack didn't talk about investigations? Or Obama didn't tell Eric Holder who to investigate?" [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U) Sessions and McGahn took a day trip down to Mar-a-Lago the weekend after the recusal to discuss [Redacted] with Trump. [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn , On 12/12/2017 , Page 4 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn, On 12/12/2017, Page 5 of 18

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn, On 12/12/2017, Page 6 of 18

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

(S)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

X [redacted]

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(S)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

X [redacted]

(S)

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b3  
b7E

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

(S)

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b3  
b7E

(S)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

X [redacted]

[redacted]

(S)

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b7E

[redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)



[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn , On 12/12/2017 , Page 7 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Boente told McGahn he did not think it was sustainable for Comey to stay on as FBI Director. McGahn relayed that to Trump, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] Trump thought Comey was acting like "his own branch of government." [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(S)

[Redacted]

b1 per DOS

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn, On 12/12/2017, Page 8 of 18

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

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[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn , On 12/12/2017 , Page 9 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] Boente said [Redacted] and Comey told him there was nothing obstructive about the calls, but they made Comey uncomfortable. McGahn told Boente that Trump said Comey told him he could make a statement if DOJ cleared it and approved. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn, On 12/12/2017, Page 10 of 18

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

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[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn, On 12/12/2017, Page 11 of 18

[Redacted]

Tru b5 per DOJ/OIP

said

[Redacted]

it would be the last straw,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

(S)

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[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn , On 12/12/2017 , Page 12 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn , On 12/12/2017 , Page 13 of 18

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] McGahn recalled he and Dhillon talked to Trump about letting Comey resign rather than firing him, but Trump was adamant he be fired. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn , On 12/12/2017 , Page 14 of 18

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn, On 12/12/2017, Page 15 of 18

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Dhillon

made one last pitch to get Trump to allow Comey to resign, but Trump said no.

b5 per DOJ/OIP

McGahn thought Trump wanted the line in there

so they would not think he fired Comey because he was under investigation.

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn , On 12/12/2017 , Page 16 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn , On 12/12/2017 , Page 17 of 18

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] At some point, however, Trump said he never said what Comey said he had. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn , On 12/12/2017 , Page 18 of 18

b5 per DOJ/OIP


[Redacted] Trump told McGahn when he said it was good that Comey was fired because the pressure was off, he meant it was clear he was not under investigation, so he could get more work done. [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/29/2018

Donald F. McGahn, White House Counsel, was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street NE, Washington, D.C. McGahn was accompanied by his attorneys, [Redacted] Present for the interview were Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] SA [Redacted] Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles, Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein, Counselor to the Special Counsel Michael Dreeben, Assistant Special Counsel Elizabeth Prelogar, and Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] McGahn was advised it is crime to lie to the FBI in the course of an investigation, which he acknowledged. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, McGahn provided the following information:

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In mid-June 2016, on or around June 17, 2016, McGahn received telephone calls from President Trump. [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

He remembered it was Father's Day weekend [Redacted] and Trump was supposed to be at Camp David that weekend. [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] Trump told McGahn to call [Deputy Attorney General] Rod Rosenstein and tell Rosenstein that [Special Counsel] Robert Mueller had conflicts and could not be the Special Counsel.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] McGahn had told Trump he (McGahn) was not the person to make that call. It should be Trump's personal lawyer, [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] McGahn probably said he would think about it or "I'll see what I can do about it." He said that usually meant he would do nothing.

McGahn was perturbed by the call. [Redacted] he thought the reasons provided by Trump were silly. [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

Investigation on 03/08/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 03/24/2018

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn , On 03/08/2018 , Page 2 of 7

McGahn was concerned about having a role in asking Rosenstein to get rid of the Special Counsel. He added he had grown up in the Reagan era and wanted to be more like Judge Bob Bork, not [Redacted] The request from Trump was an inflection point and McGahn wanted to hit the brakes. b6 b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

McGahn believed Trump called him again, maybe a couple of hours after the first call, [Redacted]

[Redacted] He said something like, "Call Rod. Call me back when you do it." Trump wanted McGahn to call Rosenstein and tell him Mueller had conflicts and could not be the Special Counsel. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Eventually, McGahn thought said he would see if he could get Rosenstein on the phone. McGahn left Trump with the impression he would do something, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

McGahn reached his breaking point. [Redacted] and wanted to get off the phone.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] He did not know what to say when Trump called the next time. He felt stuck and trapped. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

He thought he went to the office later on Saturday and packed his things. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Priebus said, "No, you can't do that" [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

He also told [then Chief Strategist] Stephen Bannon the same thing, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] He told McGahn he could not quit. [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn , On 03/08/2018 , Page 3 of 7

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

McGahn probably told Annie Donaldson, his Chief of Staff [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

McGahn did not speak directly to Trump about leaving. He did not discuss the request with Trump the Monday after the calls. Trump did not bring it up with McGahn.

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Agent note] [Redacted] McGahn's attorney, said that the day after the NYT article came out, John Dowd called [Redacted] to relay that Trump wanted McGahn to put out a statement to correct the NYT article.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] as in McGahn had not been asked to fire the Special Counsel and had not tried to quit. [Redacted] said no to the request but said he would speak to his client. Dowd and [Redacted] spoke a second time and [Redacted] reiterated McGahn would not make a statement and that the NYT story was accurate based on McGahn's

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn, On 03/08/2018, Page 4 of 7

understanding that Trump wanted Mueller fired. The story was inaccurate in some other ways, but McGahn would not make a statement.]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

A while after the article came out, [then Staff Secretary] Rob Porter came to McGahn's office and said he and Trump had spoken about the article [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] Trump told Porter to tell McGahn that McGahn needed to write a letter to correct the NYT story. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

McGahn told Porter he was not going to write the letter. [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] McGahn scheduled time with Trump through Kelly to clear the air on the article. He thought it was after the conversation with Porter.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] McGahn told Kelly [Redacted] he was not inclined to fix it. [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

Trump: Don, this NYT story, [Redacted] I never said to fire Mueller. I never said 'fire.' This story doesn't look good. You need to correct this. You're the White House Counsel.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

McGahn: [Redacted] I'll grant you I didn't come to you directly, [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Trump: [Redacted] Did I say the word 'fire'?

McGahn: What you said is 'Call Rod, tell Rod that Mueller has conflicts and can't be the Special Counsel.'



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn, On 03/08/2018, Page 5 of 7

Trump: I never said that.

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Trump: Why did you tell Mueller that?

McGahn: Because I have to. There is no privilege with me.

Trump: So, you won't do a correction?

McGahn: No.

Trump: What about these notes? Why do you take notes? Lawyers don't take notes. I never had a lawyer who took notes.

McGahn: Because I'm a real lawyer. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Trump: I've had a lot of great lawyers, like Roy Cohn. He did not take notes.

McGahn: The notes say what happened. Notes aren't bad. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Trump: I wanted you to raise the conflict issue with Rod and then Rod could decide what to do.

McGahn: [Redacted] I heard 'Call Rod. There are conflicts. Mueller has to go.'

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

McGahn thought Trump was testing his mettle to see how committed McGahn was to what happened. Kelly spoke to Trump after that conversation and said McGahn did not back down and would not budge. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Agent note: [Redacted] stated that the morning of McGahn's meeting with Trump in the Oval Office, he and Dowd spoke. Dowd told [Redacted] to tell McGahn the conversation was coming and not to resign no matter what happened that day. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] and no matter what happened, McGahn could not resign. Dowd said [Redacted] Following McGahn and Trump's conversation, Dowd followed up with [Redacted] and relayed that Trump was "fine" with McGahn.]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn , On 03/08/2018 , Page 6 of 7

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] [then FBI Director James] Comey's testimony [Redacted]

[Redacted] on May 3, 2017 [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] Trump asked how

Comey did and McGahn told him [Redacted] that Comey did not say Trump was not under investigation. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Don McGahn, On 03/08/2018, Page 7 of 7

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP


[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP  
  
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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP  
  
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FBI INFO  
CLASSIFIED BY: [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2042  
DATE: 06-22-2020

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/05/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Michael Pompeo, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was interviewed in his office at CIA Headquarters, Langley, Virginia. Pompeo was accompanied by his personal attorney, [redacted]

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[redacted]  
[redacted] Participating in the interview were FBI SA [redacted] & SSA [redacted] and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Zainab Ahmad & Brandon Van Grack. After introductions, Pompeo was reminded of his prior admonishment regarding 18 USC § 1001 and the potential consequences for making false statements during a federal investigation. Pompeo acknowledged understanding and said his attorney told him the same thing every time they spoke. He then provided the following information:

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

Investigation on 09/26/2017 at Langley, Virginia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/27/2017  
by [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~(U)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~ (U)

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Michael Pompeo second interview , On 09/26/2017 , Page 2 of 6

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

~~SECRET~~ (U)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~ (U)

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Michael Pompeo second interview , On 09/26/2017 , Page 3 of 6

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b3

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b3

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

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~~SECRET~~ (U)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~ (U)

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Michael Pompeo second interview , On 09/26/2017 , Page 4 of 6

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

~~SECRET~~ (U)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Michael Pompeo second interview, On 09/26/2017, Page 5 of 6

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

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X [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~ (U)

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Michael Pompeo second interview , On 09/26/2017 , Page 6 of 6

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]


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[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/21/2017

[Redacted] represented by his attorney [Redacted] was provided admonishments by Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Weissmann instructing him to be truthful [Redacted]

b3 Per DOJ-OIP  
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[Redacted]

Also present were Senior Assistant Special Counsel Jeannie Rhee, Assistant Special Counsel L. Rush Atkinson, Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky, and the writer.

[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ-OIP


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Investigation on 07/21/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (, Other (Admonishments given to [Redacted])  
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/21/2017  
by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/19/2017

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] was interviewed over the telephone on 07/13/2017 at approximately 2:18pm by Special Agent [Redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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(U) [Redacted] called to inform writer that he had not obtained counsel in any form. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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
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Investigation on 07/13/2017 at New York, New York, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/13/2017

by [Redacted]

b6  
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/25/2018

FEDERAL GRAND JURY INFORMATION

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(U) On 06/11/2018 Special Agents (SAs) [Redacted] and [Redacted] interviewed [Redacted] [PROTECT IDENTITY] at her residence at [Redacted] [Redacted] was also present at the interview. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing SAs and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted]

Investigation on 06/11/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)  
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/15/2018  
by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/11/2018, Page 2 of 6

(U) [Redacted] b6  
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b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted] b6  
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b7D  
b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted] b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted] b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted] b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted] b6  
b7C  
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b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted] b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted] b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b5 Per DOJ-OIP

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [redacted], On 06/11/2018, Page 3 of 6

(U) [redacted] b6  
[redacted] b7C  
[redacted] b7D  
[redacted] b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [redacted] b6  
[redacted] b7C  
[redacted] b7D  
[redacted] b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [redacted] b6  
[redacted] b7A  
[redacted] b7C  
[redacted] b7D  
[redacted] b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [redacted] b6  
[redacted] b7C  
[redacted] b7D  
[redacted] b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [redacted] b6  
[redacted] b7C  
[redacted] b7D  
[redacted] b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [redacted] b6  
[redacted] b7A  
[redacted] b7C  
[redacted] b7D  
[redacted] b5 Per DOJ-OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/11/2018, Page 4 of 6

(U) [Redacted] b6  
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b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted] b6  
[Redacted] b7C  
b7D  
b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted] b6  
[Redacted] b7C  
b7D  
b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted] b6  
[Redacted] b7C  
b7D  
b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted] b6  
[Redacted] b7C  
b7D  
b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted] b6  
[Redacted] b7C  
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b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted] b6  
[Redacted] b7C  
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b7F  
b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted] b6  
[Redacted] b7C  
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b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted] b6  
[Redacted] b7C  
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b5 Per DOJ-OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/11/2018, Page 5 of 6

[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted]

(U) [Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted]

(U) [Redacted]

(U) [After the interview, the SAs scheduled with [Redacted]

[Redacted]



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/11/2018, Page 6 of 6

(U) PHONE CALL

(U) [On 6/11/2018 At about 8:19 pm, [Redacted] and [Redacted] called SA [Redacted] No new substantive information was discussed.]

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b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U)

[Redacted]

(U) [On 06/12/2018 at about 6:00 pm, SA [Redacted] and [Redacted] met [Redacted] and [Redacted] at [Redacted] residence.]

(U)

[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U)

[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ-OIP

(U)

[Redacted]

b6  
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b5 Per DOJ-OIP


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[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ-OIP



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/25/2018

(U) On 06/26/2018 Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] SA [Redacted] [Redacted] Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky interviewed [Redacted] at the Special Counsel's Office, Washington, DC. [Redacted] [Redacted] was present for the interview. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing officials and after reviewing the proffer agreement in the presence of her attorney, [Redacted] executed the proffer agreement, whereupon she provided the following information:

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(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
b7C  
b7D

Investigation on 06/26/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/26/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/26/2018, Page 2 of 10

(U) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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b7D

(U) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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b7D

(U) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

(U) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/26/2018, Page 3 of 10

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
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(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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b7D

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
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(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
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b7D

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/26/2018, Page 4 of 10

(U) [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U) [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U) [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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b7D

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/26/2018, Page 5 of 10

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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b7C  
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(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/26/2018, Page 6 of 10

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U) [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U) [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/26/2018, Page 7 of 10

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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b7C  
b7D

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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b5 per DOJ-OIP

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/26/2018, Page 8 of 10

(U) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP

(U) [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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[Redacted]

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b7C  
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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/26/2018, Page 9 of 10

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP

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(U)

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[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP

b6

b7C

b7D

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP

b6

b7C

b7D

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP

b6

b7C

b7D

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP

b6

b7C

b7D

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP

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(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/26/2018, Page 10 of 10

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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b5 per DOJ-OIP

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
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(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ-OIP  
b6  
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b5 per DOJ-OIP

(U)

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U)


[Redacted]

b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [Redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2042  
DATE: 10-14-2020

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

Date of entry 10/24/2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] was interviewed at [Redacted]  
[Redacted] Washington, D.C. After being advised of the identities  
of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided  
the following information:

b6  
b7C  
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(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b6  
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(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7F

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
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b7F

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b6  
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(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b6  
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~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

Investigation on 10/12/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/13/2017

by [Redacted]

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b7C  
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~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E  
b7F

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 10/12/2017 , Page 2 of 2

~~(S//FOUO)~~

[Redacted]

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b7C  
b7D  
b7F

[Redacted]

(U//FOUO)


[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

~~SECRET~~



CLASSIFIED BY: NSICC [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2092  
DATE: 06-25-2020

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6  
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Date of entry 11/09/2017

On Monday, 18 September 2017 and Tuesday, 19 September 2017, CHRISTOPHER STEELE, ORBIS Business Intelligence, was interviewed at The [redacted] [redacted] by FBI SSA [redacted] and FBI SIA [redacted]

b6  
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The following information was provided by STEELE over the course of the two-day interview. On 18 September 2017, in the initial part of the interview, STEELE was accompanied by his fellow ORBIS executive, [redacted] After about 45-60 minutes on 18 September 2017, [redacted] departed, and STEELE remained with SSA [redacted] and SIA [redacted] for the duration of 18 September 2017 and for the entirety of the interview on 19 September 2017.

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C  
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~~Reason: 1.4(c)  
Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 20421231~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

Investigation on 09/18/2017 at [redacted] (In Person)  
File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/09/2017  
by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 2 of 26

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C  
b7D  
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~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele

On 09/18/2017 Page 3 of 26

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(S)

b1  
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b7D  
b7E

[Redacted]

(S)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b7D  
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(S)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Interview of Christopher

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele

On 09/18/2017 Page 4 of 26

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7E

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 5 of 26

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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- b7E

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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- b7E

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(S)

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- b7E

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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- b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 6 of 26

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7E

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ /OC/NF Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 7 of 26

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 8 of 26

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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(S)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b7E

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
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(S)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b7D  
b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ /OC/NF Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele

On 09/18/2017 Page 9 of 26

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b7D  
b7E

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b7C  
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b7E

(S)

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(S)

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~(S)~~ Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele

, On 09/18/2017 , Page 10 of 26

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(S)

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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- b7E

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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- b3
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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(S)

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- b7C
- b7D
- b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 11 of 26

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(S)

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- b7D
- b7E

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(S)

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- b6
- b7C
- b7D
- b7E

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~



[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ Interview of Christopher

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele

On 09/18/2017 Page 12 of 26

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b1  
(S) b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7D

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(S) b1  
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b7E

(S)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b7C  
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~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele

, On 09/18/2017 , Page 13 of 26

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b1  
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b7E

(S)

(S)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b7D  
b7E

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 14 of 26

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b3  
b6  
(S) b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(S)  
  
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b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele

On 09/18/2017 Page 15 of 26

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Large Redacted Area]

(S)

b1  
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
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~~(U)~~ ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 16 of 26

b5 per DOJ/OIP



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[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele

, On 09/18/2017 , Page 17 of 26

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(S)

b1  
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b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

[Large Redacted Area]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele

On 09/18/2017 Page 18 of 26

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Large Redacted Area]

(S)

b1  
b3  
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b7C  
b7D  
b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele

, On 09/18/2017 , Page 19 of 26

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Large Redacted Area]

(S)

b1  
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b7C  
b7D  
b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~



[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele

, On 09/18/2017 , Page 20 of 26

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Large Redacted Area]

(S)

b1  
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b7C  
b7D  
b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele

, On 09/18/2017 , Page 21 of 26

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Large Redacted Area]

(S)

b1  
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b7C  
b7D  
b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele

On 09/18/2017 Page 22 of 26

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Large Redacted Area]

(S)  
b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~(U)~~ ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Interview of Christopher

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele

, On 09/18/2017 , Page 23 of 26

[Redacted]

(S) b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7D  
b7E

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b7D  
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~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 24 of 26

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b7D  
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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(S)

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele

, On 09/18/2017 , Page 25 of 26

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7E

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele

, On 09/18/2017 , Page 26 of 26

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]


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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/18/2018

On Thursday, July 5, 2018, [Redacted] appeared at the Office of the Special Counsel in preparation for possible testimony at the trial of Paul Manafort (Manafort) in July 2018. Also present were Senior Assistant Special Counsel Greg D. Andres, Assistant United States Attorney [Redacted] FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and Senior Financial Investigator [Redacted]. Also present was [Redacted] attorney, [Redacted], cellular telephone number [Redacted]. The following information was furnished:

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Paul Manafort:

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] was questioned if Manafort asked him about his previous contact with the FBI and the Office of the Special Counsel. In or around [Redacted] Manafort asked [Redacted] if he spoke with the FBI. [Redacted] told Manafort [Redacted]

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Manafort later asked [Redacted] [Redacted] subsequently relayed this information to his attorney [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Rick Gates:

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 07/13/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/14/2018

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by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] July 13, 2018 , On 07/13/2018 , Page 2 of 2

[Redacted] viewed Rick Gates as Manafort's #2  
guy. Gates, who reported directly to Manafort, [Redacted]  
[Redacted] and often traveled to Ukraine.

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[Redacted] Manafort never had anything to say against Gates and [Redacted]  
[Redacted] described them as two peas in a pod.

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[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

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Miscellaneous:


[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/25/2017

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[Redacted] cellular [Redacted] was interviewed by FBI Supervisory Special Agent [Redacted] Special Agent [Redacted] at the FBI's [Redacted]. Also present during the interview via video conference were FBI Forensic Accountant [Redacted] DOJ Contract Investigator [Redacted] Special Counsel prosecutor Kyle Freeny, and IRS Special Agent [Redacted].

b6 Per IRS  
b7C Per IRS

[Redacted] was advised by the interviewing agents that his participation in the interview was voluntary. [Redacted] was also advised that lying to a federal agent could constitute a federal crime.

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[Redacted]

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Paul Manafort became a client [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Investigation on 09/07/2017 at [Redacted] California, United States (In Person)

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File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/15/2017

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) \_\_\_\_\_, On 09/07/2017, Page 2 of 7

[Redacted]

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Rick Gates, Manafort's employee/assistant, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Agents showed [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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DMP International LLC: This was the company that Manafort utilized for a majority of his business and the main entity which conducted financial business transactions. [Redacted] could not remember if Manafort had any partners in this business.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) \_\_\_\_\_, On 09/07/2017, Page 3 of 7

Davis Manafort Partners Inc.: This was Manafort's old company and his partner was [Redacted] thought this was a law firm. Manafort told [Redacted] that Davis Manafort Partners International LLC was his lobbying firm and Davis Manafort Inc. was his law firm. [Redacted] advised that Manafort was a lawyer.

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[Redacted]

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John Hannah: This was an entity created by Manafort to purchase real estate; specifically, a condominium in Manhattan, NY.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] advised [Redacted] understood from Manafort that his income came from work he conducted as a lobbyist in the Ukraine. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) \_\_\_\_\_, On 09/07/2017, Page 4 of 7

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Davis MANAFORT Partners [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) \_\_\_\_\_, On 09/07/2017, Page 5 of 7

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] believed that all of Manafort's employees resided in the U.S. [Redacted] recalled that Gates, Konstantine Kilimnik and [Redacted] were on Manafort's payroll.

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[Redacted]

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Foreign Wire Transfers

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted], On 09/07/2017, Page 6 of 7

[Redacted]

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Foreign Bank Accounts and Foreign Wire Transfers

[Redacted] was not aware of any foreign bank accounts owned, controlled, or directed by Manafort or Manafort entities. Moreover, [Redacted] was not aware of any direct payments to vendors for Manafort personal expenses from Manafort or Manafort entity foreign accounts. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

However, [Redacted] was never told that these foreign bank transfers were from Manafort and/or Gate's controlled foreign accounts.

[Redacted] was not aware of Gates making any of any direct payments to vendors for Manafort personal expenses from Manafort or Manafort controlled foreign accounts. [Redacted] does not recall seeing the following vendor names associated with Manafort accounts: SP&C Home Improvements; Big Picture Solutions; J&J Oriental; Alan Couture (although sounded familiar to [Redacted]; Aegis Holdings; and House of Bijan.

Manafort told [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Regarding payments for season tickets to sports teams such as the Yankees, Capitals, Wizards, and Redskins, Manafort paid for them with his DMP credit card. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Real Estate Purchases

[Redacted] recalled that Manafort bought one or two properties for his [Redacted] Manafort paid cash for these properties and the cash [Redacted]

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[Redacted] was shown an email related to the MC SOHO property. [Redacted] did not recall who [Redacted] was and stated that [Redacted] was the [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]


[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) \_\_\_\_\_, On 09/07/2017, Page 7 of 7

[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/01/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

[Redacted] previously identified, was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres. Present during the interview were [Redacted] counsel, [Redacted] and [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted] wanted to clarify something from her previous interview

[Redacted]

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After her previous interview, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Investigation on 09/22/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/25/2017

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up \_\_\_\_\_, On 09/22/2017, Page 2 of 9

[Redacted]

[Redacted] stated that

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this document was another example of how the "Centre was an afterthought".

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up , On 09/22/2017 , Page 3 of 9

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] did not recall discussing the ECFMU with [Redacted] only the government of Ukraine.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] understanding of FARA was lobbying a United States government official on behalf of a foreign government official. [Redacted]

[Redacted] PDG was tasked by Gates to arrange a number of meetings between visiting Ukrainian government officials and United States government officials. At the time, there was a lot of talk among the PDG team about the need to FARA because of these meetings.

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[Redacted] recalled receiving an introduction to FARA and LDA filings at PDG. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up , On 09/22/2017 , Page 4 of 9

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Ultimately, [Redacted] created a methodical process for PDG on FARA.

[Redacted] knew Rick Gates worked for Paul Manafort. Gates bragged about he and Manafort and their work in Ukraine. Gates bragged that he and Manafort met with the "highest levels" of government in Ukraine. Gates told [Redacted] and others that Manafort met with the President of Ukraine. Gates often referred to needing to report back to Kiev on activities done by PDG. Gates and Manafort never tried to conceal the fact that they worked for the Ukrainian government. In fact, they bragged about it.

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[Redacted] recalled Manafort was running the meeting with [Redacted] and [Redacted] Manafort was clearly in charge and Gates was off to the side. Manafort portrayed himself as the Ukrainian government's "connection". [Redacted] couldn't recall specifically what Manafort said about his relationship to the Ukrainian government. [Redacted] was "pretty sure" Manafort talked about his work for the Ukrainian President in the meeting. [Redacted] could not recall if Manafort gave PDG any specific instructions or directions for their lobbying effort in this meeting, but the purpose of the meeting was to talk about strategy and next steps for PDG's representation of Ukraine.

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Rick Gates did not work for the ECFMU, but he seemed to be in charge of it. Gates did not report to [Redacted] Gates was not an employee of ECFMU, but he did exert leadership over the ECFMU. Gates used the ECFMU as a tool. Gates created the ECFMU and dictated what they did, when they did it and how they did it. [Redacted] believed this because Gates had control over the ECFMU's messaging, website content, Facebook page and meetings. If something needed to be changed, Gates would arrange that.

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Over time, [Redacted] the ECFMU and had some input in PDG's lobbying and public relations activities. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up , On 09/22/2017 , Page 5 of 9

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] was not introduced to PDG until sometime after the ECFMU had already been created. [Redacted] did not know how [Redacted] was selected to be involved with the ECFMU. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] did not recall having any interaction with [Redacted] and believed him to be a figure head.

[Redacted] recalled a conversation among PDG and MCW teams about the ECFMU needing someone independent from the Ukrainian government and Party of Regions (PoR) as their director. This conversation came up during a strategy meeting when the ECFMU was being created.

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[Redacted] and she did not have input for PDG and MCW at first. [Redacted] recalled [Redacted] had a general understanding of what was going on, but not at a detailed level. At some point later, [Redacted] began to have some input and direction over certain tasks.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Gates was smarter than average when it came to D.C. politics, but he was not an expert. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up , On 09/22/2017 , Page 6 of 9

[Redacted]

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Gates did not seem to understand the intimate details of how various processes worked. Gates did have a good grasp on who the "players" were on "the Hill" and he had a good understanding about who needed to be lobbied and on what issues. Gates did not seem to have relationships with anyone in Congress. Gates appeared to be quite connected in Europe, but not in the United States.

Gates often directed PDG as it related to visiting Ukrainian government officials. At some point, [Redacted] began giving PDG direction on these pending visits as well. [Redacted] direction was primarily related to logistics. [Redacted] seemed to recall the visits arranged by [Redacted] were for more low level officials.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] believed the ECFMU solved two problems. The first, it made PDG and MCW's lobbying message more credible as it was not coming directly from the Ukrainian government, but from a seemingly independent third party. This made it easier for PDG and MCW to carry out the strategy developed for this client. The second, it solved the FARA issue which made many people at PDG uncomfortable. [Redacted] did not know if the ECFMU was created to solve the FARA issue, or if that was an after thought. [Redacted] was aware of conversations going on about FARA and LDA at the time the ECFMU was being created, but she was not a party to those

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up , On 09/22/2017 , Page 7 of 9

conversations. [Redacted] assumed [Redacted] Gates and [Redacted] were having these conversations.

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To [Redacted] and [Redacted] it was clear from the very beginning that this client required a FARA registration. [Redacted] and [Redacted] did not understand the debate of FARA versus LDA. [Redacted] did not know what the opposing argument in favor of LDA was. [Redacted] heard something about the effect a FARA registration may have had on [Redacted] and [Redacted]

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Prior to seeing the Skadden Letter, [Redacted] thought PDG would register under FARA because the ECFMU was controlled and directed by the PoR and/or the Ukrainian government. Even with the ECFMU as a vehicle for PDG's lobbying, [Redacted] still believed this required a FARA registration. At some point, [Redacted] was told the Skadden Letter existed [Redacted] [Redacted] recalled discussing the Skadden Letter with [Redacted]

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[Redacted] was asked if she thought the Skadden Letter accurately reflected the facts with regards to PDG's representation of the ECFMU. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Gates directed and controlled the lobbying efforts for the benefit of the Ukrainian government. Gates also reported back to the Ukrainian government on PDG's lobbying efforts. [Redacted] had a general understanding of the fact that the Ukrainian government was directing Gates, but she did not know specifically who within the Ukrainian government. The ECFMU was ultimately created and directed by the Ukrainian government. The ECFMU was not independent from the Ukrainian government. Efforts were made to try to make the ECFMU appear independent, but they were not.

Initially, Gates represented to PDG that the Ukrainian government was in favor of better relations with Europe and the West, [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up \_\_\_\_\_, On 09/22/2017, Page 8 of 9

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] was asked if PDG directed employees to respond in a certain way after the August 2016 AP article about Gates, Manafort, PDG, MCW, Ukraine and the ECFMU. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] was not sure if this information was maintained or produced by PDG.

[Redacted] did not travel for this matter and her only expenses would have been taxi receipts. [Redacted] likely did not note where she went or with whom she met on her receipts. If [Redacted] expensed meals, she would have noted that she paid for herself only on the receipt [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up , On 09/22/2017 , Page 9 of 9

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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A couple weeks prior to this interview, [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] did not specifically talk about the FARA issue or Ukraine, but [Redacted] believed that's what he meant. [Redacted]

[Redacted]


PDG has lost a number of clients as a result of the bad press from this matter. The loss of clients further resulted in PDG having to lay off a number of employees. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Everyday there are conversations at PDG about how the negative media attention from this matter is affecting the firm. The conversations are not substantive in nature. Some people talk about having to get attorneys or having to be interviewed. [Redacted] told [Redacted] he had to meet with the government. [Redacted] and [Redacted] mentioned to [Redacted] that they had to meet up with their attorneys.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/05/2017

On 11/15/2017, SA [Redacted] IA [Redacted] and Department of State (DOS) SSA [Redacted] interviewed [Redacted] with a telephone number of [Redacted] an email address of [Redacted] [Redacted] and an address of [Redacted] at DOS in Arlington, Virginia. [Redacted] knew SA [Redacted] and SSA [Redacted] from a previous interview. After being introduced to IA [Redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C Per FBI & DOS

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 11/15/2017 at Arlington, Virginia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/16/2017

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/15/2017, Page 2 of 6

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/15/2017, Page 3 of 6

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/15/2017, Page 4 of 6

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/15/2017, Page 5 of 6

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/15/2017, Page 6 of 6


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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/13/2017

On 12/6/2017, SA [Redacted] and Department of State (DOS) [Redacted] interviewed [Redacted] with a telephone number of [Redacted] an email address of [Redacted] and an address of [Redacted] at DOS in Arlington, Virginia. [Redacted] knew SA [Redacted] and SSA [Redacted] from a previous interview and provided the following information:

b3  
b6 Per FBI and DOS  
b7C Per FBI and DOS

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 12/06/2017 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)  
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/07/2017  
by [Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E



[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 12/06/2017, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]


b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/10/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

[Redacted] born [Redacted] residing at [Redacted] [Redacted] Virginia, personal mobile telephone [Redacted] was interviewed at her place of employment, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), located at Liberty Crossing II, McLean, Virginia. Present for this interview was the ODNI's Principal Deputy General Counsel Bradley A. Brooker, office telephone [Redacted] Also participating in this interview were Associate Special Counsel James L. Quarles and FBI Special Agents [Redacted] After providing them the identities of the interviewing agents and the reason for the interview, [Redacted] was admonished regarding 18 USC § 1001 and the potential consequences for making false statements during a federal investigation. Having indicated her understanding of this admonishment, [Redacted] thereafter provided the following information:

b3 per ODNI  
b6 per FBI/ODNI  
b7C

[Redacted] Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats. [Redacted] Coats was confirmed on March 15, 2017. [Redacted] estimated that Coats tells [Redacted]

b3 per ODNI  
b6 per FBI/ODNI  
b7C

[Redacted] did not specifically remember a meeting that occurred on March 22, 2017, but [Redacted] The March 22 briefing would have been either the first or one of the first briefs Coats would have had with Trump. [Redacted]

b3 per ODNI  
b6 per FBI/ODNI  
b7C

After Coats left the White House he generally returned to the EEOB, but [Redacted] did not specifically remember the March 22 briefing, nor does she

b3 per ODNI  
b6 per FBI/ODNI  
b7C

Investigation on 06/14/2017 at McLean, Virginia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/15/2017

by [Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b3 per FBI/ODNI  
b6 per FBI/ODNI  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] interview, On 06/14/2017, Page 2 of 2

remember whether they returned with John Culver and Ted Gistaro.

Generally, especially in the first few weeks, [Redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

On a number of occasions, Trump asked Coats to stay behind, but no single instance stands out to her.

Generally, there were a few occasions when Coats told her [Redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] recalled news reporting that cited the date of March 22, 2017 but did not independently remember that date. [Redacted]

b5 PER DOJ/OIP  
b3 per ODNI  
b6 per FBI/ODNI  
b7C

[Redacted] so it was difficult for one such occasion to stand out among the others.

b3 per ODNI  
b6 per FBI/ODNI  
b7C

[Redacted] did not take notes or record her conversations with Coats.


[Redacted]

b3 per ODNI  
b6 per FBI/ODNI  
b7C  
b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Administrative

Acting General Counsel Brooker stated he would identify any classified information discussed during this interview. Brooker made no such statement during this interview.

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/05/2017

FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On May 31, 2017, [Redacted] of the law firm [Redacted] cellular telephone number [Redacted] was interviewed telephonically. Also present during the interview was SSA [Redacted] [Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] has been in contact with Andrew Weissmann, wherein [Redacted] advised Weissmann a subpoena would be required in order to obtain [Redacted] [Redacted] from [Redacted] The writer advised [Redacted] he would obtain the subpoena, and contact [Redacted] when the subpoena was ready.


b3  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on	<u>05/31/2017</u>	at	[Redacted]	United States (Phone)	[Redacted]
File #	[Redacted]	Date drafted	<u>06/01/2017</u>		
by	[Redacted]				

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/10/2017

Scott W. Bray, born [Redacted] residing at [Redacted] [Redacted] office telephone [Redacted] personal mobile telephone [Redacted], was interviewed at his place of employment, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), located at Liberty Crossing II, McLean, Virginia. Present for this interview was the ODNI's Principal Deputy (and Acting) General Counsel (Acting General Counsel) Bradley A. Brooker, office telephone [Redacted]. Also participating in this interview were Associate Special Counsel James L. Quarles and FBI Special Agents [Redacted]. After providing them the identities of the interviewing agents and the reason for the interview, Bray was admonished regarding 18 USC § 1001 and the potential consequences for making false statements during a federal investigation. Having indicated his understanding of this admonishment, Bray thereafter provided the following information:

b3 per ODNI  
b6 per ODNI

b6  
b7C

Bray is the National Intelligence Manager for East Asia, which is an Assistant Secretary level position. Bray is responsible for the collection and analysis of intelligence related to East Asia, and he spends much of his time managing the intelligence community's efforts on East Asia and supporting the White House's needs. He has been employed by the ODNI for five years.

Bray's first meeting with President Elect Donald J. Trump was in January 2017 [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] Bray has briefed Trump around four or five times, and has attended multiple other meetings with Trump, whether in the White House Situation Room or elsewhere.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] but Trump never mentioned the Russia investigation in front of Bray.

Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats gives an intelligence briefing to Trump almost every day. [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 06/14/2017 at McLean, Virginia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/14/2017

by [Redacted]

b3  
b7E

[REDACTED]  
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]  
Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Scott W. Bray , On 06/14/2017 , Page 2 of 4

On the morning of March 22, 2017, John Culver, Coats, and Trump met together [REDACTED] Later that afternoon, Culver telephoned Bray to tell him about the briefing, including what questions Trump asked. [REDACTED]

b5 PER DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]  
Bray provided interviewing agents a copy of notes he took contemporaneously during this telephone call from Culver, and directed interviewing agents to the final paragraph of his notes. Bray did not do anything after this telephone call, assuming the "boss has this and knows what to do."

A week later, on March 29, 2017, Bray discussed this matter with Coats, then after that conversation, Bray spoke with Culver about what Culver should do with the information. Bray is certain of the date because Bray usually takes good notes, but his notes for March 29 were "noticeably blank." It was a very busy day, as he had spent two days in a row briefing Trump. There was "lots going on," so he never had time to complete his notes, which was very unusual.

During their conversation, Culver asked Bray with whom he should discuss his observations, and Bray suggested Brooker. Bray did not talk to Coats until a week after the event occurred, but Culver saw Coats's reaction immediately after Coats's exchange with Trump, and Culver thought Coats seemed "shocked" by what Trump asked.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

When thinking about this issue later, Bray went looking for his notes, found them blank for March 29, and recalled [REDACTED]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Trump is very focused during some briefs, such as [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and on other occasions, such as [REDACTED] Trump "seems to have other things on his mind." For example, [REDACTED]

After Bray's [REDACTED] brief with Trump, [REDACTED] leaving Bray, Coats, and Ted Gistaro to return to the Eisenhower Executive Office Building (EEOB). Gistaro sat at a desk outside the DNI's office at the EEOB, and Bray followed Coats into Coats's office and they discussed the briefing with Trump. Bray commented to Coats how challenging their briefings were with Trump, and Coats commented that [REDACTED]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b3

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4676

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Scott W. Bray, On 06/14/2017, Page 3 of 4

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

Coats told Bray there was "only one answer to that question" and Bray agreed, explaining to interviewing agents the only answer is to let the investigation be completed. That was the only conversation Coats and Bray had on the subject.

Presidential briefings used to be very different; President Obama normally listened to the briefing then asked questions at the end. Trump asked questions from the very beginning of a briefing, and sometimes brought up "completely different subjects."

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 PER DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4677

[REDACTED]  
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~[REDACTED]  
Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Scott W. Bray, On 06/14/2017, Page 4 of 4  
b5 Per DOJ/OIP[REDACTED]  
b3

Bray's last visit to the White House was possibly April 2017, and was likely a visit to either the Oval Office or the White House Situation Room. Bray assumed it was in April because he was "pretty confident" he had no meetings with Trump in May. Bray did not recall Russia being discussed in that last meeting.

Bray specifically stated he had never been present when Trump commented on the Russia investigation.


#### Administrative Note

Acting General Counsel Brooker stated he would identify any classified information discussed during this interview. Brooker made no such statement during this interview.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4678





UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/13/2017

[Redacted]

b7E

On October 13, 2017, [Redacted] with a social security number of [Redacted] [Redacted] and an address of [Redacted] [Redacted] was interviewed at the office of the Special Council located at 395 E Street SW, Washington DC. Also present during the interview was Special Counsel Prosecutors (SCP) Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres, SA [Redacted] [Redacted] and [Redacted] attorneys, [Redacted] and [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

SCP Weissmann informed [Redacted] that the terms of the proffer agreement from [Redacted] were still valid. SCP Weissmann and [Redacted] initialed the agreement to indicate this.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] provided the following information:

[Redacted] learned about the client in or around [Redacted] Until this time, [Redacted] job had been very straightforward.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] showed up at a meeting as it was breaking up and recalled seeing [Redacted] recognized [Redacted] because he [Redacted] [Redacted] had no recollection of RICK GATES or his associates attending the meeting.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] explained that people knew that European Centre for a Modern Ukraine (ECFMU) was aligned with VIKTOR YANUKOVITCH and that this put a bad taste in everyone's mouth. With relation to the decision to make FARA filing, [Redacted] explained that they did not want to have discrepancies between the filings of Podesta Group and Mercury. Once Podesta Group lost the FARA battle, Podesta Group decided to shrug it off and file LDA.

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 1

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 10/10/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/13/2017

b6  
b7C  
b7E

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/10/2017, Page 2 of 14

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 2

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 4

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/10/2017, Page 3 of 14

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 5

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 6

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 7

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/10/2017, Page 4 of 14

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit A

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit B

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 10

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/10/2017, Page 5 of 14

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 12

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 13

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 14

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/10/2017, Page 6 of 14

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 15

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 16

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 19

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 20

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/10/2017, Page 7 of 14

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 21

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 23

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

Exhibit 24

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/10/2017, Page 8 of 14

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 26

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 27

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 135

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 136



[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/10/2017, Page 9 of 14

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 137

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 28

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 29

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/10/2017, Page 10 of 14

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 30

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 31

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 32

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/10/2017, Page 11 of 14

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 34

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 33

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 38

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 39

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/10/2017, Page 12 of 14

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 41

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 43

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 45 & 51

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/10/2017, Page 13 of 14

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 50

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 46

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 47

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 54

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/10/2017, Page 14 of 14

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Exhibit 58

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]


b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]



~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/08/2017

[Redacted] born [Redacted] was contacted on 8/31/2017 on his mobile telephone at [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] subsequently offered to arrange for the "pick up" of the undersigned at [Redacted]

b6  
b7C


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Investigation on 08/31/2017 at [Redacted] (Phone)

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File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/08/2017

by [Redacted]



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/05/2018

[Redacted] previously interviewed, was interviewed at his attorney's office located at [Redacted] Washington, D. C. [Redacted] was represented by [Redacted]. Also present during the interview was Senior Assistant Special Counsel Zainab Ahmad. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] understood that PSY Group would [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Investigation on 03/01/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

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File # [Redacted] Date drafted 03/01/2018

by [Redacted]



[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview 3/1/2018 , On 03/01/2018 , Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]


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Agent Note: The documents shown to [Redacted] will be maintained in a 1A.

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[Redacted]



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/26/2018

On or around 9/6/2018, SA [Redacted] Forensic Accountant [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor (SCP) Andrew Weissmann interviewed [Redacted] at the Offices of the Special Counsel. Also present for the interview were [Redacted] counsel, [Redacted]. [Redacted] was advised of the need to be truthful. [Redacted] provided the following information:

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Inception of FBC's work for Ukraine

[Redacted] PAUL MANAFORT [Redacted] MANAFORT described [Redacted] a political image campaign that would spread positive media about Ukraine and the Association Agreement across Europe. [Redacted] MANAFORT's vision grew to include US work as well.

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[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted] This understanding changed over time.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Investigation on 09/06/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/10/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] on 9

Continuation of FD-302 of /6/2018 , On 09/06/2018 , Page 2 of 7

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Mercury and Podesta

[Redacted] learned of Mercury and Podesta doing work for Ukraine in Spring of 2012. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Svoboda

[Redacted] did not recall pushing articles that Hillary Clinton was anti-semetic.

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Skadden Report

The original scope for the Skadden Report was Europe, but this changed.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] understood that the New York Times (NYT) would be getting an exclusive on the Skadden Report. GREG CRAIG, a senior official at Skadden, would be briefing NYT.

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The benefits of giving NYT an exclusive would include maximizing the report's impact and setting the narrative of subsequent news stories that would parrot the sentiment of the original article.

Miscellaneous

FBC would submit blank invoices for payment. FBC received payment on these invoices.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] on 9

Continuation of FD-302 of /6/2018, On 09/06/2018, Page 3 of 7

FBC worked until February 2014.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] on 9

Continuation of FD-302 of /6/2018, On 09/06/2018, Page 4 of 7

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] on 9

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /6/2018, On 09/06/2018, Page 5 of 7

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] on 9

Continuation of FD-302 of /6/2018, On 09/06/2018, Page 6 of 7

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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
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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] on 9/6/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 09/06/2018, Page 7 of 7





FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/16/2018

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, Washington, DC. Agents advised [Redacted] that it was a crime to lie to the FBI. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Investigation on 06/07/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/08/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 06.07.2018 , On 06/07/2018 , Page 2 of 4

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 06.07.2018 , On 06/07/2018 , Page 3 of 4

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 06.07.2018 , On 06/07/2018 , Page 4 of 4

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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
[Redacted]

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[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/20/2017

[Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] office telephone [Redacted]  
[Redacted] email [Redacted] was interviewed at her place of  
employment, U.S. Department of State, Harry S. Truman building by Special  
Agent (SA) [Redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation, and SA [Redacted]  
[Redacted] DOS, Diplomatic Security. Attached is the Memorandum of  
Interview prepared by SA [Redacted]


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Investigation on 08/31/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)  
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/03/2017  
by [Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/08/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

[Redacted] previously identified, was interviewed by FBI Special Agents [Redacted] and [Redacted] at an FBI office in Washington, D. C. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C

Roles

[Redacted]

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Investigation on 08/10/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/10/2017

by [Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Follow Up Interview, On 08/10/2017, Page 2 of 7

[redacted] was more involved with ECFMU than [redacted] came from Mercury and was not a former Clark & Weinstock employee. For this reason, [redacted] did not know [redacted] well. [redacted] did not know what [redacted] thoughts on ECFMU were because they never talked about the topic.

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[redacted] with Rick Gates and Paul Manafort regarding ECFMU. [redacted]

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[redacted] of Mercury. [redacted] the ECFMU account. [redacted] believed [redacted] participated in conversations with Gates and Manafort regarding ECFMU as well. [redacted]

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[redacted] statement in his previous interview regarding [redacted] being excited about the ECFMU and the prospect of future business with Russian Oligarchs was based upon [redacted] general sense of who [redacted] was. [redacted] never said this directly to [redacted] could not be more specific about why he thought [redacted] was excited to do business with Russian Oligarchs.

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#### Meetings/Calls

[redacted] was aware of regular and/or periodic meetings with [redacted] Manafort, Gates and possibly [redacted] would mention these meetings to [redacted] did not know the substance of the meetings. The meetings did not take place in Mercury's office as far as [redacted] knew. [redacted] did not know where else these meetings may have taken place. [redacted] was asked if the meetings may have taken place [redacted] stated he did not know.

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[redacted] consisted of [redacted] and sometimes Rick Gates providing updates on the state of Ukraine. [redacted]

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[redacted] to talk about policy and what was going on in Ukraine and they were not a time in which Mercury and/or Podesta were given directions or instructions on what to do.

#### Payment

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up Interview , On 08/10/2017 , Page 3 of 7

ECFMU paid Mercury \$65,000 per month. [Redacted] described this as a lot of money for the work Mercury did for ECFMU. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

In general, foreign clients paid a premium for lobbying services in the United States. [Redacted] believed any foreign client, whether foreign government, or other foreign entity/person would be subject to paying a premium for lobbying services. The reason foreign clients paid more was because reputation issues were usually a factor, depending on the country of origin. In addition, there were added complications and burdens due to having to file Foreign Agent Registration Act ("FARA") for foreign clients.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] did not know [Redacted] [Redacted] belonged to Gates, Manafort, or DMP International.

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FARA vs LDA

[Redacted] could not think of an instance in which Clark & Weinstock, or Mercury had a foreign client, but didn't file FARA, except for with the ECFMU. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] said Rick Gates and Paul Manafort went to great lengths to avoid filing FARA. It seemed obvious to [Redacted] that FARA should have been filed.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] had just finished their meeting in which they decided to file Lobbying Disclosure Act ("LDA") instead of FARA. [Redacted] could not recall for sure if Manafort was in the meeting at Mercury's office this day.



[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up Interview , On 08/10/2017 , Page 4 of 7

[Redacted] why Gates and Manafort were trying to avoid filing FARA, but he could not recall [Redacted] did have conversations [Redacted] regarding whether or not Mercury's work for ECFMU was actually for the Ukrainian government or the ECFMU. These conversations were prompted by emails and/or instructions from Gates for Mercury to do things that seemed to be for the Ukrainian government.

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[Redacted] said it was abnormal for [Redacted] to not file FARA in this instance. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] thought ECFMU was a great client for him.

[Redacted] did not specifically recall [Redacted] preparing a FARA prior to the meeting described above in which it was decided that Mercury would file LDA instead. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] It would have been logical for [Redacted] to begin a FARA filing in the case of the ECFMU.

[Redacted] was not sure who told [Redacted] to scrap the FARA filing and do an LDA instead. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Although [Redacted] questioned the decision to file LDA versus FARA, he did not believe he re-visited this issue each quarter when the LDA update was filed. [Redacted] felt like the decision had been made already. [Redacted] understood that Mercury could have changed the LDA to a FARA at any point, but they chose not to.

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Media

[Redacted] was not aware of any news articles published as a result of Mercury's lobbying on behalf of ECFMU. [Redacted] [Redacted] thought [Redacted] may have more information about this.

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[Redacted] was not aware of any legislation proposed or passed as a result of Mercury's lobbying on behalf of ECFMU.

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[redacted]  
[redacted]  
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Follow Up Interview, On 08/10/2017, Page 5 of 7

[redacted] read an article from 2016 in which Podesta Group employees are quoted as sources. [redacted]  
[redacted]

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[redacted] did not know who the Podesta Group sources were. [redacted] did not recall anyone from Podesta Group being significantly uncomfortable with the ECFMU account.

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[redacted] was asked about statements in the article in which Podesta Group employees clearly knew ECFMU board members were also members of Ukrainian parliament. [redacted] stated he knew ECFMU was related to the Party of Regions ("POR"), but he did not know that ECFMU board members were also members of Yanukovych's Parliament.

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[redacted] was asked about a portion of the article which indicated Gates told Podesta employees the purpose of ECFMU was to obscure the fact that the money was coming from POR through Gates and Manafort. [redacted]  
[redacted]

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[redacted]

b6  
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[redacted] did not have any subsequent conversations with [redacted] about this topic.

It did not surprise [redacted] to learn that Podesta Group had consulted with [redacted] on the issue of whether to file FARA or LDA. [redacted] did not know if Podesta Group usually consulted with [redacted] for these matters.

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#### Think Tanks

[redacted] early on in Mercury's relationship with ECFMU. [redacted]  
[redacted] During this meeting, [redacted] brought up ECFMU. [redacted] could not recall if [redacted] was familiar with ECFMU or not.

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[redacted] did not believe he brought up Gates or Manafort in this meeting. [redacted] did not recall if he brought up [redacted] or [redacted] in this meeting. [redacted] did not think he brought up [redacted] during the meeting.

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[redacted] explained to [redacted] the history of the POR and Yanukovych's government as well as, the imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko. [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Follow Up Interview, On 08/10/2017, Page 6 of 7

told [redacted] all Ukrainian politicians were corrupt, just different degrees of corrupt.

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[redacted] could not recall her name. This meeting was toward the early or middle part of Mercury's relationship with ECFMU.

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This person chastised [redacted] for working with the "pro-Russian" ECFMU. At the time, [redacted] did not understand why she said that as he thought ECFMU was pro-European. [redacted] did not get into a deeper conversation with this person about this topic. [redacted] wrote the comments off to the fact that this person was known to be "anti-Russian". [redacted] recalled wondering what her basis for this statement was as she was not familiar with ECFMU.

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#### Emails

1. [redacted] was shown an email from Gates dated [redacted]

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2. [redacted] was shown an email from [redacted] which referenced a visit to the United States by [redacted]

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[redacted] was directed to the section of the email in which [redacted] is writing about meetings with the US Department of State. [redacted] did not believe he, or Mercury were involved in setting up meetings for [redacted] at the US Department of State. Typically, Podesta Group handled anything related to the Department of State.

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It would be abnormal for Mercury to set up meetings for a Ukrainian politician's visit unless the Ukrainian government was Mercury's client. [redacted] believed this would have been organized by the Ukrainian Embassy.

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3. [redacted] was shown an email from Gates dated [redacted] regarding riots in Ukraine following Yanukovich's decision to abandon Ukraine's efforts at membership with the European Union.

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[redacted] recalled being surprised by the change in policy by Yanukovich. [redacted] did not recall if, or how this affected Mercury's work for ECFMU. [redacted] knew Gates and Manafort worked with Yanukovich on his campaign and afterwards. [redacted] knew Gates had directed Mercury on some matters which seemed to be for the benefit of Yanukovich. [redacted] had

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Follow Up Interview, On 08/10/2017, Page 7 of 7

previously questioned Mercury's work for ECFMU as really being for Yanukovych. All of that said, [REDACTED] did not recall how he interpreted this email from Gates as it related to Mercury's work for ECFMU.

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This was toward the end of Mercury's work for ECFMU and [REDACTED] may have ignored the email altogether.

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4. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] had no recollection of this email or the document to which it refers.

5. [REDACTED] was shown an email from [REDACTED] regarding violence and rioting in Ukraine. [REDACTED] had no recollection of this email. [REDACTED] read the email and thought [REDACTED] was asking Podesta Group to lobby the US State Department to condemn the use of violence by rioters.

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6. [REDACTED] was shown an email from Gates dated [REDACTED] which referenced a blog about the state of post-Yanukovych Ukraine.

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[REDACTED] had no recollection of this specific email. [REDACTED] likely did not regard the email at the time he received it because Gates was the type of person to get worked up about everything. After reading the email, [REDACTED] stated he would not have responded to the email as it did not relate to his work as a lobbyist.

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7. [REDACTED] was shown an email from Gates dated [REDACTED] which referenced an entity called [REDACTED] had no recollection of this email and did not know [REDACTED]

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
In general, [REDACTED] did not recall a shift in Gates' tasking of Mercury after the ousting of Yanukovych.

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Copies of the emails shown to [REDACTED] were placed in a 1A envelope and attached to this FD 302.

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[Redacted]



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/30/2018

[Redacted] [PROTECT IDENTITY] [Redacted] email address [Redacted] was interviewed at the FBI Washington Field Office, 601 4th St NW, Washington, D.C., 20535. The interview was coordinated with the assistance of [Redacted]. Present for the interview were Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Agent [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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Upon the direction and authority of [Redacted] Office of the Special Counsel [Redacted] was advised the interview [Redacted] [Redacted] was advised the interview was an investigative step for the interviewing Agents and thereby would be documented accordingly.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 04/02/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)  
 File # [Redacted] SM-2589105 Date drafted 04/23/2018  
 by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted] SM-2589105

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]  
[PROTECT IDENTITY]

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 04/02/2018, Page 2 of 3

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] SM-2589105

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]  
[PROTECT IDENTITY]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 04/02/2018, Page 3 of 3

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]


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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/07/2017

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] with a social security number of [Redacted] was interviewed over the telephone. Present for the call were SA [Redacted] Special Counsel Prosecutors (SCP) Kyle Freeny and Andrew Weissmann, and [Redacted] defense counsel [Redacted]

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SCP Weissmann and [Redacted] confirmed for [Redacted] that [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~


Investigation on 10/20/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/20/2017

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E





UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/08/2018

On Thursday, May 17, 2018, [Redacted] was interviewed at the Federal Public Defender's Office in [Redacted] in preparation for possible testimony at the trial of Paul Manafort in July 2018. Also present were Senior Assistant Special Counsel Greg D. Andres and [Redacted] (Attorney) and [Redacted] (Chief Investigator) of the Federal Public Defender's Office - [Redacted] furnished the following information:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b7C  
b7D

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 05/17/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)  
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/25/2018  
by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

[Redacted]

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b7C  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] - May 17, 2018 , On 05/17/2018 , Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

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b7C  
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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D


[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/10/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

b6 Per FBI & ODNI  
b7C  
b3 Per ODNI

[Redacted] born [Redacted] residing at [Redacted] mobile telephone [Redacted] office telephone [Redacted] e-mail [Redacted] was interviewed at his place of employment, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), located at Liberty Crossing II, McLean, Virginia. Present for this interview was the ODNI's Principal Deputy (and Acting) General Counsel Bradley A. Brooker, office telephone [Redacted] Also participating in this interview were Associate Special Counsel James L. Quarles and FBI Special Agents [Redacted] [Redacted] After providing them the identities of the interviewing agents and the reason for the interview, [Redacted] was admonished regarding 18 USC § 1001 and the potential consequences for making false statements during a federal investigation. Having indicated his understanding of this admonishment, [Redacted] thereafter provided the following information:

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] During Coats's early weeks as DNI, when he attended intelligence briefings at the Oval Office, on several occasions Coats told [Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] recalled the March 22, 2017 Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) in the Oval Office, but remembered the exact date only by reading a news article in the Washington Post. [Redacted] did not recall a specific conversation that day involving Russia, and did not recall any occasion when Coats said he felt he was being asked to do something specific related to Russia.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] remembered the story about Trump making telephone calls to Coats and National Security Agency Chief Mike Rogers, and remembered it because

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 06/14/2017 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)  
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/15/2017  
by [Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED], On 06/14/2017, Page 2 of 3

it was the night of the Final Four and Coats commented he missed the conclusion of one of the basketball games. That Monday, Coats told [REDACTED] about the call and described how [REDACTED]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] estimated there were three or four Oval Office briefings where afterwards, Coats may have mentioned [REDACTED]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] On several occasions, Coats commented about how different things were under the current administration compared to prior administrations.

b6 Per FBI & ODNI  
b7C

Usually [REDACTED] accompanies Coats to the Oval Office briefings, then [REDACTED]

b3 Per ODNI

[REDACTED] until Coats leaves the Oval Office briefing. Either [REDACTED] usually accompanies Coats. They do work during the car ride, generally arrive at the EEOB around thirty minutes before the briefing, conduct a fifteen minute prep session with Ted Gistaro and perhaps CIA Director Michael Pompeo. They will strategize, then Gistaro, Pompeo, and Coats go to the Oval Office and the others remain at the EEOB.

b6 Per FBI & ODNI  
b7C  
b3 Per ODNI

[REDACTED] consulted his notes and determined on March 22, 2017, Coats went straight from the Oval Office to a speech at the Department of State.

[REDACTED] could not recall any details from that day, and thus assumed he did not accompany Coats to that briefing. [REDACTED] surmised that either [REDACTED] or nobody accompanied Coats that day.

[REDACTED] was surprised to learn of Jim Comey's termination. The only time the issue came up was after Coats's nomination but before his confirmation. Coats had dinner at the White House in a "big group" and the next day Coats told [REDACTED] Trump asked everyone at dinner what he should do with Comey. That was the only time [REDACTED] recalled Comey being discussed.

b6  
b7C

Coats knew and respected Comey based on Coats' time on the Senate Intelligence Committee. Comey visited Coats within twenty four hours of Coats' swearing in to brief him on the Russia investigation.

Coats does not always remember details, and [REDACTED] practice is to give him a one minute overview of the topics likely to be discussed during his meetings. Coats does remember when people "slight him" and explained people consider Coats to be a boy scout and he knows when people do the right thing but he also remembers when people do not do the right thing.

b6  
b7C

Administrative

FBI(19cv1278)-5110


[Redacted]

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b7C  
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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted], On 06/14/2017, Page 3 of 3

Acting General Counsel Brooker stated he would identify any classified information discussed during this interview. Brooker made no such statement during this interview.



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/03/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

David Laufman, Chief of the Department of Justice Counterintelligence and Export Control Section (CES), was interviewed by FBI Supervisory Special Agent [Redacted] Special Agent [Redacted] Special Counsel Prosecutors Andrew Weissmann, Greg Andres and Brian Richardson. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, Laufman provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Investigation on 09/12/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/15/2017

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) David Laufman Interview, On 09/12/2017, Page 2 of 8

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) David Laufman Interview, On 09/12/2017, Page 3 of 8

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6 per FBI and NSD  
b7C per FBI and NSD

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) David Laufman Interview, On 09/12/2017, Page 4 of 8

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) David Laufman Interview, On 09/12/2017, Page 5 of 8

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) David Laufman Interview, On 09/12/2017, Page 6 of 8

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) David Laufman Interview, On 09/12/2017, Page 7 of 8

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) David Laufman Interview, On 09/12/2017, Page 8 of 8

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C


[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/13/2018

b6 Per FBI & FinCEN  
b7C Per FBI & FinCEN

On Thursday, July 12, [Redacted] appeared at the Special Counsel's office in Washington, DC in preparation for possible testimony at the trial of Paul Manafort, Jr. Also present was Assistant United States Attorney [Redacted] furnished the following information:

b6 Per FBI & FinCEN  
b7C Per FBI & FinCEN

[Redacted] has testified in federal court in the Southern District of New York, Eastern District of New York, Boston, and before grand juries. [Redacted] has a bachelors in accounting. She is a Certified Fraud Examiner and a Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist. [Redacted] has worked as a Senior Special Agent at the Department of Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) [Redacted]

FinCEN's mission is to protect the financial system of the United States. The Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) is a form required to be filed when a U.S. person has an interest in foreign accounts. The purpose of the form is to provide information about people, entities and transactions that otherwise would be anonymous since foreign financial institutions are not subject to the same rules as U.S. financial institutions. The information in the FBARs is used to enforce laws. FBARs create a paper trail for transactions that would otherwise be anonymous. The FBAR became law in 1972. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was responsible for FBAR regulations and guidance until 1990 when FinCEN was formed.

Financial interest includes being the owner of record, having legal title, or having other authority, including if someone is acting on your behalf . A U.S. person must file an FBAR if they are not the signer on the account but if they control the disposition of the funds, assets or property in the account through direct communication or through agents and nominees. If the person has other authority - they can direct movement of funds - an FBAR is required.

FBARs are filed for the period of a calendar year. The current deadline for FBAR filings is April 15 of the following calendar year. Generally, for calendar years 2011 through 2014, the filing deadline was June 30 of the following calendar year. The deadline might have been slightly different due to the day June 30 fell each year.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 07/12/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/12/2018

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

b6 Per FBI & FinCEN  
b7C Per FBI & FinCEN  
b7EUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 07/12/2018 , Page 2 of 2

FBARS are filed electronically. Electronic filing became available in 2012 for the 2011 calendar year filing. Prior to 2011, FBARS were paper filings. FinCEN maintains their records in an electronic database.

b6 Per FBI & FinCEN  
b7C Per FBI & FinCEN

[REDACTED] was asked to search the FinCEN database for FBARS received from January 1, 2001 through May 2018 for the following individuals and entities: Paul Manafort, [REDACTED] DMP International LLC, Richard Gates, Davis Manafort Partners Inc, Davis Manafort Inc, Lil Red, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] John Hannah LLC, Jesand Investments, Smythson LLC, Global Sites LLC, LOAV Ltd, and Paul J. Manafort Jr. P.C. for FBARS filed from January 1, 2001 through May 2018.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]


b3 Per FinCEN

FBARS are required to be filed when the aggregate maximum value in foreign bank accounts at any time over the calendar year exceeds \$10,000.

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FBI(19cv1278)-5180

[Redacted]



b7E

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/31/2017

On 10/23/2017, attorney Abbe LOWELL, was contacted telephonically by Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein, Assistant Special Counsel Zainab Ahmad, Assistant Special Counsel Brandon Van Grack, ASAC [Redacted] [Redacted], and SA [Redacted]. LOWELL was accompanied by [Redacted] from his offices at Norton, Rose, Fulbright. LOWELL provided the following information on behalf of his client, Jared KUSHNER.

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 10/23/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)  
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/30/2017  
by [Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
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[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b7E

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Attorney Proffer of Abbe Lowell  
on Behalf of Jared Kushner

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/23/2017, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]


b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/15/2018

b6 per FBI & NCUA  
b7C per FBI & NCUA

[Redacted] Division of Special Actions, National Credit Union Association (NCUA) was interviewed by Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] Forensic Accountant [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel Rush Atkinson at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC 20546.

[Redacted] was accompanied by NCUA's internal counsel [Redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing officials and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

The NCUA provides oversight of federally regulated credit unions. The NCUA is the credit union counterpart to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).

[Redacted] currently based in [Redacted] New York, has worked for the NCUA for [Redacted] years. As [Redacted] NCUA's Division of Special Actions, [Redacted] had oversight of problem cases. NCUA's Regional Director, based in Albany, assigned problem cases to [Redacted] division. [Redacted] group was assigned [Redacted] cases in the region. A problem case was a credit union in danger of insolvency or with managerial, regulatory, or economic problems. Currently, [Redacted] six problem case officers. [Redacted] team was responsible for working directly with the problem credit unions. Some of [Redacted] duties were delegated to him by the NCUA Regional Director. Currently, [Redacted] group had [Redacted] problem cases and two of those cases were credit unions in conservatorship. MELROSE CREDIT UNION (MELROSE) was one of those credit unions in conservatorship. [Redacted] group's territory was all credit unions in New York, but the region included all of New England, Michigan and Wisconsin.

b6 per FBI & NCUA  
b7C per FBI & NCUA  
b8 per NCUA

New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) had regulatory authority over MELROSE because it issued credit union state charters. NCUA is the insurer of credit union funds. Credit unions paid an operating fee into NCUA's insurance fund. NCUA was a regulator and participated with DFS in regulatory oversight of MELROSE. If a state did not have a law or regulation on a topic, the NCUA's regulation would be the default regulation.

MELROSE was a taxi medallion credit union that started to experience financial difficulty in 2015 because of the struggle of the taxi

Investigation on 12/14/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/18/2017

by [Redacted]

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b7E

[Redacted]

b6 per FBI & NCUA  
b7C per FBI & NCUA  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of \_\_\_\_\_, On 12/14/2017, Page 2 of 5

industry. MELROSE financed medallions in Chicago, Philadelphia, and New York, all of which were struggling markets for taxis. MELROSE's net worth deteriorated, and the credit union suffered losses.

In July 2015, NCUA tried to get MELROSE to implement safe and sound lending practices. MELROSE's board and management did not follow through to turn things around according to regulator recommendations.

In February 2017, DFS made the decision to place MELROSE into conservatorship. NCUA established MELROSE's loan policy and worked to refinance loans. NCUA's primary goal was to minimize losses to the NCUA insurance fund. NCUA's secondary goal was to maintain service for MELROSE members.

[Redacted]

b8 per NCUA

[Redacted]

b6 per FBI & NCUA  
b7C per FBI & NCUA  
b8 per NCUA

MELROSE's Chief Executive Officer hired a Chief Credit Officer, a Chief Lending Officer, and a Chief Operating Officer. Those officers were the ones to interact directly with borrowers. NCUA served as the back office and had high level oversight over MELROSE.

[Redacted]

b6 per FBI & NCUA  
b7C per FBI & NCUA  
b8 per NCUA

[Redacted]

b6 per FBI & NCUA  
b7C per FBI & NCUA  
b8 per NCUA

[Redacted]

b6 per NCUA  
b7C per NCUA  
b8 per NCUA

[Redacted]

b6 per FBI & NCUA  
b7C per FBI & NCUA  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 12/14/2017, Page 3 of 5

[Redacted]

b6 per FBI & NCUA  
b7C per FBI & NCUA  
b8 per NCUA

[Redacted]

b6 per FBI & NCUA  
b7C per FBI & NCUA  
b8 per NCUA

[Redacted]

b6 per FBI & NCUA  
b7C per FBI & NCUA  
b8 per NCUA

When substituting borrowers for an outstanding loan, the NCUA and MELROSE needed to see income taxes to prove business income and expenses in order to analyze whether the new party had the ability to repay the loan.

[Redacted]

b6 per NCUA  
b7C per NCUA  
b8 per NCUA

[Redacted]

b6 per FBI & NCUA  
b7C per FBI & NCUA  
b8 per NCUA

NCUA did not approve loans. NCUA provided commentary if something should be done differently. NCUA could object or not object to a proposed loan.

[Redacted]

b8 per NCUA

[Redacted]

b6 per FBI & NCUA  
b7C per FBI & NCUA  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of \_\_\_\_\_, On 12/14/2017, Page 4 of 5

[Redacted]

b6 per FBI & NCUA  
b7C per FBI & NCUA  
b8 per NCUA

[Redacted]

b6 per FBI & NCUA  
b7C per FBI & NCUA  
b8 per NCUA

[Redacted]

b6 per NCUA  
b7C per NCUA  
b8 per NCUA

[Redacted]

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b7C per FBI & NCUA  
b8 per NCUA

[Redacted]

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b7C per FBI & NCUA  
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[Redacted]

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b7C per FBI & NCUA  
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[Redacted]

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b7C per NCUA  
b8 per NCUA

[Redacted]

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b7C per FBI & NCUA  
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[Redacted]

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b7C per FBI & NCUA  
b8 per NCUA

[Redacted]

b6 per FBI & NCUA  
b7C per FBI & NCUA  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of \_\_\_\_\_, On 12/14/2017, Page 5 of 5

[Redacted]

b6 per FBI & NCUA  
b7C per FBI & NCUA  
b8 per NCUA

[Redacted]


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b7C per FBI & NCUA  
b8 per NCUA

[Redacted]

b6 per FBI & NCUA  
b7C per FBI & NCUA  
b8 per NCUA

ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE: All emails and documents shown to [Redacted] are included in the attached 1A envelope.

b6 per FBI & NCUA  
b7C per FBI & NCUA



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/30/2018

Paul J. Manafort, date of birth [Redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents [Redacted]; Assistant United States Attorney [Redacted]; and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Andrew Weissmann, Greg Andres and Zainab Ahmad. Present representing Manafort were attorneys Richard Westling, Thomas Zehnle and Kevin Downing and paralegal [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 09/25/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/25/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

Continuation of FD-302 of 09.25.2018

, On 09/25/2018 , Page 2 of 7

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

Continuation of FD-302 of 09.25.2018

, On 09/25/2018

, Page 3 of 7

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

Continuation of FD-302 of 09.25.2018

, On 09/25/2018 , Page 4 of 7

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

Continuation of FD-302 of 09.25.2018, On 09/25/2018, Page 5 of 7

[Redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

Continuation of FD-302 of 09.25.2018, On 09/25/2018, Page 6 of 7

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

Continuation of FD-302 of 09.25.2018, On 09/25/2018, Page 7 of 7

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]


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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/25/2018

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Paul J. Manafort, date of birth [Redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents [Redacted] and [Redacted]; Assistant United States Attorneys [Redacted] DOJ Attorney [Redacted]; and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres. Present representing Manafort were attorneys Richard Westling, Kevin Downing and Thomas Zehnle and paralegal [Redacted] [Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Manafort provided the following information:

Manafort opposed the arrest of Yulia Tymoshenko. Regardless of her guilt, the arrest restricted Ukraine's ability to join the European Union (EU). Manafort himself developed the idea for an audit and report on her trial. Manafort wanted a reputable firm to perform the audit. Manafort got Viktor Yanukovich to approve the creation of the report. After the audit, Manafort planned for the firm to work with the Ministry of Justice to correct any problems found during the audit.

The purpose of the report was to defend the trial process and result to stakeholders, particularly in Europe but also in the United States. Ukraine was considering filing an application to join the EU which required Ukraine to meet certain European standards. U.S. opinion could have influenced European decisionmakers. Manafort planned to target European embassies in Kyiv with the report.

After conversations with [Redacted] Manafort decided to use Greg Craig to supervise the report. Craig worked for a well-known firm, had political sensibilities and had legal ability. Craig also had connections to the Clinton and Obama Administrations. Manafort reached out to Craig through [Redacted] Manafort met Craig in Craig's office in Washington, D. C. [Redacted] had already explained the project to Craig. Manafort told Craig that Manafort's goal was getting Ukraine into the EU. Tymoshenko's imprisonment was a setback to that goal. Manafort said he wanted an audit of the trial and justice process.

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Investigation on 09/26/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/02/2018

by [Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul ManafortContinuation of FD-302 of 09.26.2018, On 09/26/2018, Page 2 of 9

Manafort planned for the report to be submitted to European embassies in Kyiv. There would be presentations on the high points of the report to stakeholders in Berlin, Paris, Brussels and the United States. The presentations would also highlight other reforms and advances being made in the Ukraine. Manafort told Craig that the report would be published, disseminated and explained but Manafort cannot recall whether he gave Craig any details on these steps. Craig was intrigued but wanted to think about it. Manafort does not recall whether the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) came up during this initial meeting. Manafort does not recall discussing billing costs or payments at this first meeting. In the meeting, or at least prior to the agreement, Manafort told Craig that Craig needed to communicate the report's findings. Because of his background and experience, Craig was a credible spokesperson. Craig resisted but Manafort felt he could overcome the resistance and establish a role for Craig.

Manafort made clear to Craig that the client was the Ukrainian government. With the government as the client, Craig would have access to its officials. Craig made the point that he needed independence. Manafort told Yanukovich that the report could not be a whitewash, its credibility depended on it being fair and independent. In other words, it would be a Western-like report not a Russian-like report.

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A formal contract between the Ukrainian government and Skadden was needed for Skadden to have access to government officials for the interviews. The Ministry of Justice and Ukrainian government could not pay Skadden's rate without issuing a formal tender which would have opened the process up to competition. Manafort had picked the person and firm he wanted and did not want the contract going to the lowest bidder. Also,

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

Continuation of FD-302 of 09.26.2018, On 09/26/2018, Page 3 of 9

the tender process would have taken longer than Manafort wanted. Lyovochkin or Yanukovych got [Redacted] to pay for the report. The amount of the formal contract between Skadden and the Ministry of Justice was set at the ceiling for a non-competitive procurement. Manafort wanted a non-public process for additional reasons. First, if opponents knew about the report before it was complete, they would criticize it as a whitewash without giving it a fair read. Second, the government would need to disclose the price of the report which would be unpopular and undermine its credibility.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

Continuation of FD-302 of 09.26.2018

, On 09/26/2018 , Page 4 of 9

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Manafort reviewed SAU 000399-402. Manafort forwarded the Kuzmin interview to Craig to alert him to a problem that he would have to deal with. Deputy Kuzmin was very political and hated Tymoshenko. Manafort sent comments to Craig throughout the process to push a finding of a fair trial in the report but that was not the purpose here. Manafort was not sending this interview in order to get negative information about Tymoshenko in front of Craig to bias him against her. Regarding the payment, [Redacted] ended up paying the other \$500,000. Manafort expected this result but wrote that "some is coming a different way" in order to buy time. All the money paid for the Skadden Report came from [Redacted]

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Phase Two of the project - training prosecutors and judges on the reformed laws and regulations - intrigued Craig. Manafort does not know why Phase Two did not go forward, perhaps it was because the government did not like the report or because Craig was worn out with the Ukraine work. Manafort did not believe, and he did not discuss with Craig, that the government needed to be satisfied with the report in order for Phase Two to go forward.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

Continuation of FD-302 of 09.26.2018, On 09/26/2018, Page 5 of 9

Manafort reviewed a 04/10/2012 Retainer Memorandum to the Ministry of Justice from Gregory B. Craig. The letter came from Skadden. Craig dictated its terms. The FARA language did not bother Manafort because he believed Craig's promotion work could still focus in Kyiv. Manafort was not happy about the limitation but the report would still have Craig's name on it which could be used by Manafort's lobbyists in D.C. The Skadden Report was part of a larger campaign to influence Western views of the Ukraine and its reforms. Skadden's filing under FARA would have required them to disclose the amount of money it was being paid and the source of the funds.

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Jonathan Hawker of FTI developed the plan to rollout the Skadden Report. Manafort and Rick Gates reviewed and had input into the rollout plan. The plan was ambitious and a lot of it did not get executed. They ended up having no one to speak about the report because Craig and Pshonka would not.

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

Continuation of FD-302 of 09.26.2018 , On 09/26/2018 , Page 6 of 9

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Manafort reviewed a document titled "Master Control Grid." Craig did not sign off on his role identified in this document. Craig had made clear to Manafort that Craig would not make political contacts. Manafort is not aware of Craig contacting any politicians.

Manafort met with Hawker, Gates and perhaps Alex Van Der Zwaan in Manafort's New York apartment to discuss the rollout plan. The next day, Manafort, Gates, Van Der Zwaan, Hawker, Craig and maybe Kilimnik met for brunch at the Harvard Club. They ate in the main dining room, it was not the right environment for an organized meeting. Manafort talked one-on-one with Craig in the buffet line. Manafort pressed Craig to be part of the rollout. Craig resisted. Craig agreed to entertain doing a New York Times interview with David Sanger. Their conversation continued at the table. After the lunch, Manafort was not happy, he had a rollout plan but no face. The New York Times / Sanger piece replaced the Bloomberg placeholder in the plan. Manafort does not know why later versions of the rollout plan do not list the New York Times or Sanger.

It was not cemented that Craig would talk with Sanger until right before the report's release. Gates told Manafort that Craig agreed to deliver the report to Sanger. Manafort believes that Van Der Zwaan told Gates this. Gates told Manafort that Craig physically dropped off the report with Sanger because they were neighbors. Gates said Craig had talked to Sanger when he dropped off the report.

Manafort reviewed FTI-027120-124. Manafort knew Craig's talking points for reporters if they called. Yanukovych wanted a finding of no political motivation for the prosecution, not just a finding that there was no evidence of political motivation. Craig and Manafort went back and forth on this point.

Manafort reviewed FTI-026144-146, a document titled "Key Points About the Skadden Report." The document was to be given to people that spoke out on behalf of the Report. The points track the conversations between Manafort and Craig on what Manafort wanted stressed and what Craig was willing to say. The points are consistent with Craig's points in the New

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[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

Continuation of FD-302 of 09.26.2018, On 09/26/2018, Page 7 of 9

York Times article. Craig never said that the New York Times article would be favorable. Manafort assumed it would be favorable because Craig and Sanger were friends.

Manafort used Van Der Zwaan as a backchannel to communicate with Craig. Craig trusted Van Der Zwaan. Manafort asked Gates to get Van Der Zwaan to convince Craig to give the Report to the New York Times. Manafort planned to be the final hammer to convince Craig if necessary. Manafort did not need to talk with Craig after the Harvard Club because Gates told Manafort that Craig agreed to do it.

Craig used FARA to push back at the Harvard Club. Craig said he would not meet with government officials or the media. Manafort focused on the New York Times as a way to get his foot in the door with Craig. Craig said he would explain the findings to Sanger.

Manafort reviewed DOJSCO-400587848-849. Manafort created the document. Under 2.a., Manafort was responsible for convincing Craig to do more with the media.

In October 2012, the Ukrainian language version of the Report was being created. During this time, Manafort and Craig had several conversations about the Report's key findings. Manafort was trying to find an agreement between what the Ukrainian government wanted and what Craig would say. Craig explained his decision to find no selective prosecution, as opposed to using the term political prosecution. Craig explained that selective prosecution included a finding that there was no evidence of political motivation.

Manafort reviewed SAU 143424. [REDACTED] is listed as the [REDACTED] contact because he was the [REDACTED]. No one had a relationship with him.

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[REDACTED]

Manafort briefed Yanukovych several times on the potential media positives and negatives from the Report. The New York Times article was consistent with what Manafort told Yanukovych to expect.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

Continuation of FD-302 of 09.26.2018

, On 09/26/2018

, Page 8 of 9

Van Der Zwaan briefed [Redacted] on the key points of the Report.

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[Redacted]

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Manafort reviewed ES 00012-015. Manafort is not aware of Craig communicating with John Kerry about the Report. Manafort does not recall ever discussing Kerry with Craig. At this time, Mercury's and Podesta's principal activity was lobbying against the Senate Resolution.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Paul Manafort

Continuation of FD-302 of 09.26.2018, On 09/26/2018, Page 9 of 9

[Redacted]

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
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Manafort reviewed FTI-025220-223. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs distributed the Skadden Report, Manafort does not know why the plan said Skadden would send it. Manafort expected the Skadden Report to be distributed to these individuals through their embassies in Kyiv.

[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/19/2018

On May 10th 2018 11:00 AM, at the office of Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee's legal counsel, Perkins Coie, 700 Thirteenth Street Northwest, Suite 600, Washington, District of Columbia 20005, [redacted] [redacted] at Hillary for America, Date of Birth (DOB) [redacted] Social Security Number [redacted] was interviewed by employees of the Special Counsel's Office. In attendance were Perkins Coie Attorney [redacted] Perkins Coie Attorney [redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent [redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation Management and Program Analyst [redacted] Special Counsel Attorney Jessica Romero, Special Counsel Attorney Lawrence Rush Atkinson V, and Special Counsel Attorney Heather Alpino. After being advised of the identity of the interview agents, and purpose of the interview, [redacted] stated the following:

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[redacted] had several email accounts [redacted]

[redacted]

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Investigation on 05/10/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)  
 File # [redacted] SM-2589105 Date drafted 05/10/2018  
 by [redacted]

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[redacted] SM-2589105

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [redacted], On 05/10/2018, Page 2 of 4

[redacted]

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Password change policy for HFA accounts were automated and forced to change his password on a regular basis.

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[redacted]

[AGENT NOTE: [redacted] was shown a series of printed emails and asked to verify their authenticity]

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[redacted] an FBI Special Agent reached out to [redacted] via phone to arrange an in-person meeting.

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[redacted] could not make it back to Washington, DC to meet the agent in the FBI field office. FBI made arrangements for two local agents in [redacted]

[redacted] believed the name of one of the FBI Agents in [redacted] to be Special Agent [redacted] At this meeting, [redacted] signed forms consenting to imaging of his phone and laptop. [redacted] provided the FBI with the password to his personal email account so that the FBI could monitor his account for malicious activity. After this meeting, [redacted] was handed off to an Agent out of DC whose names [redacted] did not recall. The



FBI called back once to ask for the two factor verification code sent to his phone so that they could access the account. The FBI followed up with emails once or twice.

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[redacted]

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After his emails and documents were leaked [redacted]

[redacted]

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[Redacted] SM-2589105 [Redacted]


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[Redacted] SM-2589105

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/10/2018, Page 4 of 4

[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/30/2018

On May 30th 2018 10:00 AM, at the Office of Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee's legal counsel, Perkins Coie, 700 Thirteenth Street Northwest, Suite 600, Washington, District of Columbia 20005, [redacted]

[redacted] at Hillary For America, Date of Birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed by

employees of the Special Counsel's Office. In attendance were Perkins Coie Attorney [redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent [redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation Management and Program Analyst [redacted] and Special Counsel Attorney Jessica Romero.

After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents, and purpose of the interview, [redacted] stated the following:

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[Large redacted block]

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Investigation on 05/30/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] SM-2589105 Date drafted 05/30/2018

by [redacted]

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[Redacted] SM-2589105

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/30/2018, Page 2 of 2

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[Redacted]


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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/04/2018

FEDERAL GRAND JURY INFORMATION

This document contains information pertaining to a federal grand jury proceeding. The information may not be disseminated within or outside the FBI, except as provided for under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3), wherein disclosure may be made to: (1) an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney's official duties; or (2) any government personnel that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney's official duties.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] was interviewed on 5/27/2018 at his residence by FBI Special Agents [Redacted]. After being advised the identity of the agents, [Redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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Investigation on	<u>05/17/2018</u>	at	[Redacted]	United States (In Person)
File #	[Redacted]	Date drafted	<u>05/19/2018</u>	
by	[Redacted]			

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/17/2018, Page 2 of 3

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/17/2018, Page 3 of 3

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
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/04/2018

[Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] home address [Redacted]  
 [Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] email address [Redacted]  
 [Redacted] was interviewed at [Redacted]  
 [Redacted] After being advised of the  
 identify of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted]  
 provided the following information:

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[Redacted] did not know the extent of the  
relationship between Credico and Stone.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Investigation on 10/26/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)  
 File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/29/2018  
 by [Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/26/2018, Page 2 of 3

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/26/2018, Page 3 of 3

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
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[Redacted] was willing to voluntarily testify to the grand jury and agreed to accept service of a subpoena at his email address [Redacted]

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**Administrative:** The original interview notes will be maintained in the 1A section of the case file. SA [Redacted] exchanged several text messages with [Redacted] prior and subsequent to this interview. Screenshots of those communications are enclosed for the file as a digital 1A attachment to this FD-302.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
ON 07-27-2020

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/04/2016

(U//FOUO) [redacted] DOB [redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed at a private residence at [redacted]  
[redacted] by the writer, Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and  
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [redacted]. After being advised of  
the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, he  
provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ The writer advised [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ The writer asked [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~Reason: 1.4(b)  
Derived From: National Security  
Information SCG  
Declassify On: 20411231~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 09/26/2016 at [redacted] United States (In Person)  
File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/26/2016  
by [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/26/2016, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ The writer advised [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

[Redacted]


b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ The writer concluded the interview by asking [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/30/2017

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]  
[redacted] National Intelligence Council (NIC), Office  
of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), [redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed **b3 per ODNI**  
at her office [redacted] **b6 per ODNI and FBI**  
[redacted] Present for this interview **b7C**  
a [redacted] work associate of [redacted] **b7E** was

[redacted] Having provided her with the identities of the interviewing agents and the reason for the interview, specifically, to determine whether there were unaccounted for handwritten notes from the January 6, 2017, meeting between then FBI Director James Comey and then President Elect Donald Trump, [redacted] provided the following information:

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ In early December 2016, James R. Clapper, the Director of ODNI at the time, tasked [redacted] with producing a briefing document for then President Obama. Meetings were held to determine which agencies should be responsible for authoring the product. It was determined that the FBI, NSA, and CIA would be the lead drafting agencies.

b6  
b7C

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Three versions of the briefing document were produced:

- Compartmented
- Top Secret (TS)/Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)
- Declassified

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ The audience for the compartmented version was the FBI, NSA, CIA, and Congress, and consisted of approximately 200 to 250 individuals. The TS /SCI version was for the four directors to use to brief Congress. The declassified version was made public via the ODNI website.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ There were six copies of the compartmented briefing document that went outside of the Intelligence Community. In addition, copies of the

~~Reason: 1.4(b)  
Derived From: National  
Security Information SCG  
Declassify On: 20421231~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 06/28/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)  
File # [redacted] Date drafted 06/29/2017  
by [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/28/2017, Page 2 of 3

compartmented version were made available to the Deputy Attorney General (DAG) and Attorney General (AG) at the Department of Justice.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ On Wednesday, January 4, 2017, Comey, Clapper, Brennan, and Rogers briefed then President Obama using the compartmented version of the briefing document.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Shortly after the presidential inauguration, ODNI realized that one of the six abovementioned copies of the briefing document was left in [Redacted]. This copy was used by ODNI staffer Ted Gistaro to brief President Elect Trump during the transition on January 6, 2017, in New York City. The four directors were also present at this briefing.

b7E

~~(S//NF)~~ After the New York briefing, unbeknownst to [Redacted] Clapper authorized a copy of the compartmented version to be left behind for reference by the president elect or senior members of his team if necessary. The copy left in the [Redacted] was not the copy used by Comey and there was no indication he had anything to do with it. It may have been left at the [Redacted] for convenience, because it was closer to Trump Tower [Redacted] but [Redacted] did not know for sure. (S)

b1  
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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ When [Redacted] recently learned of the copy left with the FBI in [Redacted] she [Redacted] worked with Gistaro [Redacted] and Bill Evanina, Chief of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), to locate the copy. [Redacted] was concerned about the classification of the copy [Redacted] so she requested that it immediately be returned to her. [Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//FOUO) [Redacted] did not know when the [Redacted] of the document arrived at her office. It is now secured in her safe at her office with the other copies.

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Administrative

~~(S//NF)~~ SA [Redacted] reviewed the six copies of the compartmented document from [Redacted] safe because she was unsure which copy had come from the [Redacted]. Two of the six copies had what appeared to be routine writing and/or highlighting. [Redacted] knew who one of the copies belonged to, and it was not Comey. The other notes appeared to have been written by a [Redacted] SA [Redacted] (S) [Redacted] also reviewed the copies provided to and returned by the AG and DAG. There was no writing on these copies.

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~


[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/28/2017, Page 3 of 3

(U//FOUO) On June 29, 2017, [Redacted] telephoned SA [Redacted] to advise that, according to her records, [Redacted] briefing documents was received by [Redacted] at her office on March 7, 2017.

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



FBI INFO  
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [Redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2042  
DATE: 07-30-2020

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/18/2017

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) JOSEPH KEITH KELLOGG, date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] was interviewed at The Special Counsel's Office by the writer and Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] and Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [Redacted]. [Redacted] Also present were Senior Assistant Special Counsels Zainab Ahmad and Brandon Van Grack. KELLOGG was advised that this was a voluntary interview and he could request breaks at any time. The interview began at 1:30 PM and ended at approximately 4:40 PM. One ten minute break was taken at KELLOGG's request. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, KELLOGG provided the following information:

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~Reason: 1.4(c)  
Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 20421231~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

Investigation on 09/28/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/29/2017

by [Redacted]



[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of KEITH KELLOGG , On 09/28/2017 , Page 2 of 14

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U) ~~S//NF~~ [Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of KEITH KELLOGG , On 09/28/2017 , Page 3 of 14

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of KEITH KELLOGG , On 09/28/2017 , Page 4 of 14

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of KEITH KELLOGG , On 09/28/2017 , Page 5 of 14

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of KEITH KELLOGG , On 09/28/2017 , Page 6 of 14

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of KEITH KELLOGG , On 09/28/2017 , Page 7 of 14

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

Reince Preibus:

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of KEITH KELLOGG , On 09/28/2017 , Page 8 of 14

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b7A

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ b7A

[Redacted]

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of KEITH KELLOGG , On 09/28/2017 , Page 9 of 14

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of KEITH KELLOGG , On 09/28/2017 , Page 10 of 14

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of KEITH KELLOGG , On 09/28/2017 , Page 11 of 14

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

X

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of KEITH KELLOGG , On 09/28/2017 , Page 12 of 14

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of KEITH KELLOGG , On 09/28/2017 , Page 13 of 14

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of KEITH KELLOGG , On 09/28/2017 , Page 14 of 14

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b7A

[Redacted]

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

Special Agent [redacted] b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
ON 07-30-2020

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/02/2018

(U) On 05/01/2018 Special Agent [redacted] telephonically interviewed [redacted] at [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

(U) [redacted] is in North Carolina until Wednesday and has an event all day Friday. [redacted] lives at [redacted] and will be available to meet on Thursday 5/03/2018 at 1pm.

b6  
b7C

(U) [redacted] does not remember attending the May 23, 2016 Awards Dinner for the Center of the National Interest honoring Senator Pat Roberts and Senator Tim Kaine. [redacted] knows Senator Roberts well and thought he would remember Senator Kaine because he is very funny. [redacted] goes to a lot of events like this and would look through his calendar when he returned to Washington to confirm.

b6  
b7C

(U) When asked about Ambassador SERGEY KISLYAK, [redacted] said he knew KISLYAK [redacted]

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b7C

(U) With the information provided [redacted] was 97% sure he did not attend the dinner, but would check his calendar for confirmation.

b6  
b7C

~~Reason: 1.4(c)  
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20120629  
Declassify On: 20431231~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~


Investigation on 05/01/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/01/2018

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/05/2018

On 12/5/2017, SA [Redacted] and Department of State (DOS) SSA [Redacted] interviewed [Redacted] at the [Redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] never met PAUL MANAFORT [Redacted] was unaware of anyone else [Redacted] meeting with MANAFORT.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 12/05/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/13/2017

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 12/05/2017, Page 2 of 4

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 12/05/2017, Page 3 of 4

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

KILIMNIK was a Russian citizen and traveled occassionally to Russia. Based on his place of birth and the amount of time that he had lived in Ukraine, KILIMNIK was eligible to become a Ukrainian citizen. At some point in time, KILIMNIK's family was in the process of becoming Ukrainian citizens.

KILIMNIK was intelligent. MANAFORT had confidence in him.

KILIMNIK had training as a Western political operative through IRI, similar to one might consider a campaign manager. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] MANAFORT had a consultancy contract with OB. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] MANAFORT was no longer doing

work for OB.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 12/05/2017, Page 4 of 4

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C


SA [Redacted] asked [Redacted] if he recognized the name WILLIAM SAMUEL PATTEN. [Redacted] believed that this was likely US political consultant whom he knew as SAM LNU. SAM was advising the same individuals that KILIMNIK was advising. [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] may have recognized SAM from press articles. [Redacted] would have more information about SAM.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/23/2018

On 12/5/2017, SA [Redacted] and Department of State (DOS) SSA [Redacted] interviewed [Redacted] at DOS. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

KILIMNIK Background Information

KONSTANTIN KILIMNIK [Redacted]  
[Redacted] KILIMNIK would travel occasionally to Moscow.

b6  
b7C

KILIMNIK never mentioned meetings with Russians.

News reports about KILIMNIK had enabled [Redacted] to piece together parts of KILIMNIK's past, including his uncommon talents in the English language.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 08/01/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/02/2018

by [Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] on 8/1

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 08/01/2018 , Page 2 of 4

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

KILIMNIK's May 2016 Meeting with PAUL MANAFORT

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] on 8/1

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 08/01/2018, Page 3 of 4

In May 2016, KILIMNIK

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

Following KILIMNIK's travel, KILIMNIK

[Redacted]

KILIMNIK

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

While in the US, KILIMNIK

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

EX 1

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

EX 2

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] on 8/1

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 08/01/2018, Page 4 of 4

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C


[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/07/2018

[Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] was interviewed at the FBI Field Office at 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, CA. The interviewers were FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Jeannie Rhee. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 08/14/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)  
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/16/2018  
by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]  
08.14.2018

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 08/14/2018, Page 2 of 7

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] 08.14.2018 , On 08/14/2018 , Page 3 of 7

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] 08.14.2018 , On 08/14/2018 , Page 4 of 7

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] 08.14.2018 , On 08/14/2018 , Page 5 of 7

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] 08.14.2018 , On 08/14/2018 , Page 6 of 7

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
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b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~)

Interview of [Redacted]  
08.14.2018

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 08/14/2018, Page 7 of 7


[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/29/2017

[Redacted] (PROTECT IDENTITY) was contacted on his mobile telephone, [Redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7D

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 07/18/2017 at [Redacted] United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/18/2017

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]  
(PROTECT IDENTITY)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 07/18/2017, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D


[Redacted]

b6  
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b7D

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b7A  
b7E



FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Date of entry 07/24/2018

b6  
b7C

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-22-2020 BY [Redacted] NSICG

[Redacted] was interviewed in an FBI  
vehicle parked on [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

His cell phone number is [Redacted]

[Redacted] came to the attention of the Special Counsel's Office through Senior  
Congressional Affairs Liaison (SCAL), [Redacted] SCAL [Redacted]  
provided [Redacted] with contact information for Special Agent (SA) [Redacted]

[Redacted] SA [Redacted] was subsequently contacted by [Redacted] and exchanged several  
phone calls and text messages with him in order to arrange this interview.  
After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the  
nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

[Redacted]

b3 per NSA  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b1 per NSA  
b3 per NSA

(C)  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

Investigation on 05/16/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/17/2018

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/16/2018, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
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[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C


[Redacted]

b6  
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Subsequent to this interview, SA [Redacted] exchanged several follow-up text messages with [Redacted]. A copy of those text messages have been enclosed for the file as a digital 1A attachment to this FD-302. Also enclosed is a photograph of [Redacted] which SA [Redacted] obtained from the Internet.

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b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/12/2018

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] home address [Redacted] was interviewed on Wednesday, December 13, 2017, at the Special Counsel's Office (SCO). Present during the interview were [Redacted] Attorneys [Redacted] FBI Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] [Redacted] SSA [Redacted] Senior Assistant Special Counsel Attorney Zainab AHMAD, and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Attorney Brandon VANGRACK.

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

Investigation on 12/13/2017 at District of Columbia, Washington, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/14/2017

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Proffer #2 of [Redacted], On 12/13/2017, Page 2 of 10

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Proffer #2 of [Redacted], On 12/13/2017, Page 3 of 10

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Proffer #2 of [Redacted], On 12/13/2017, Page 4 of 10

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Large Redacted Area]

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b7A  
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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted Area]

b6  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Proffer #2 of [Redacted], On 12/13/2017, Page 5 of 10

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Proffer #2 of [Redacted], On 12/13/2017, Page 6 of 10

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Proffer #2 of [Redacted], On 12/13/2017, Page 7 of 10

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Large Redacted Area]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Proffer #2 of [Redacted], On 12/13/2017, Page 8 of 10

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Proffer #2 of [Redacted], On 12/13/2017, Page 9 of 10

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Proffer #2 of [Redacted], On 12/13/2017, Page 10 of 10

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]


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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



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b7C  
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FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [Redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2043  
DATE: 09-08-2020

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Date of entry 03/06/2018

(U) [Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] home address [Redacted]  
[Redacted] was interviewed at 395 E. Street SW,  
Washington, DC. Present during the interview were Special Agent (SA)  
[Redacted] SA [Redacted] SSA [Redacted] Senior  
Assistant Special Counsel Zainab Ahmad, and Senior Assistant Special  
Counsel Brandon Van Grack. [Redacted] was represented by his attorney, [Redacted]  
[Redacted] and [Redacted]. The interview was conducted under a signed  
proffer agreement. After being advised of the identities of the  
interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the  
follow information:

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Large redacted block containing multiple lines of obscured text]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Large redacted block containing multiple lines of obscured text]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

~~Reason: 1.4 (b)  
Derived From: National  
Security Information SCG  
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Investigation on 12/04/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/07/2017

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Interview of [Redacted], On 12/04/2017, Page 2 of 13

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S) [Redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Interview of [Redacted], On 12/04/2017, Page 3 of 13

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

X

[Redacted]

b1  
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b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Interview of [Redacted], On 12/04/2017, Page 4 of 13  
b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Interview of [Redacted], On 12/04/2017, Page 5 of 13

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

X

[Redacted]

b1  
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b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

X

[Redacted]

b1  
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b7A  
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b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

X

[Redacted]

b1  
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b7A  
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b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

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b7E



[Redacted]

b1  
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b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Interview of [Redacted], On 12/04/2017, Page 6 of 13  
b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7A  
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

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b7E

[Redacted]

b1  
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b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Interview of [Redacted], On 12/04/2017, Page 7 of 13  
b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Interview of [Redacted], On 12/04/2017, Page 8 of 13

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP  
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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP  
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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP  
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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP  
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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP  
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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP  
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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP  
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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP  
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b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7A  
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

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b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

b1  
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b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Interview of [Redacted], On 12/04/2017, Page 9 of 13

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S) ~~X~~ [Redacted]

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b7A  
b7C  
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S) ~~X~~ [Redacted]

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b7A  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted] (S)

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b7E

[Redacted]

b1  
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b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Interview of [Redacted], On 12/04/2017, Page 10 of 13

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(S)

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b7A  
b7C  
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

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b7E

[Redacted]

b1  
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b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Interview of [Redacted], On 12/04/2017, Page 11 of 13

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

b1  
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b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Interview of [Redacted], On 12/04/2017, Page 12 of 13

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7A  
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Interview of [Redacted], On 12/04/2017, Page 13 of 13

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]


b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E





FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/14/2017

[Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] home address [Redacted] [Redacted] was interviewed at his residence by Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] and SA [Redacted] was advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview. [Redacted] was also advised that the interviewing agents appreciated his honesty and transparency during the course of the interview. [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 09/12/2017 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)  
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/12/2017  
by SA [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/12/2017, Page 2 of 8

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/12/2017, Page 3 of 8

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/12/2017, Page 4 of 8

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/12/2017, Page 5 of 8

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/12/2017, Page 6 of 8

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/12/2017, Page 7 of 8

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/12/2017, Page 8 of 8

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C


[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] indicated he was willing to meet with the interviewing agents again, either at his house, his place of work, an FBI office, or over lunch.

b6  
b7C





FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/20/2017

[Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] home address [Redacted]  
[Redacted] work address [Redacted]  
[Redacted] was interviewed at his place of work by Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] and SA [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 09/18/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/19/2017

by SA [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]


(U)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 09/18/2017, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/04/2017

[Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] home address [Redacted]  
[Redacted] work address [Redacted]  
[Redacted] was interviewed at his place of work by Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] and SA [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 09/21/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/25/2017

by SA [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of

[Redacted]

, On

09/21/2017

, Page

2 of 2

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]


b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

**ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE:** [Redacted] provided the interviewing agents with a list of contacts, which is included in the attached 1A envelope.

b6  
b7C



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/06/2019

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) DATE, was interviewed in Washington DC. Also present were government attorneys Andrew Goldstein, Jeannie Rhee, and Matthew Podolsky, and [Redacted] attorney [Redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] first came to know ROGER STONE [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] was familiar with STONE's work on BOB DOLE's presidential campaign. STONE "changed his persona" after the 1996 campaign.

[Redacted] believed STONE was very rational and he was different from the type of person he projected on television.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] During this time, [Redacted] and STONE became friends.

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

STONE knew MANAFORT was moving money around "like crazy."

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 11/14/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

b6

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/16/2018

b7A

b7C

by [Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] 11/14/18 Interview , On 11/14/2018 , Page 2 of 10

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

In or about 2010, CARL PALADINO decided to run for governor of New York and challenge RICK LAZIO in the Republican primary. [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

STONE may have served as an unofficial advisor

on the campaign.

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

In or about 2010, STONE may have also worked on political campaigns in Jamaica and Kenya.

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

In the months before the 2016 US presidential debates, STONE stated he was going to bring CLINTON's "victims" to attend the debates. [Redacted] did not believe STONE would actually follow through. [Redacted] was surprised when STONE actually did so.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

SPECIAL COUNSEL'S OFFICE INVESTIGATION

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FBI(19cv1278)-5622

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] 11/14/18 Interview, On 11/14/2018, Page 3 of 10

STONE viewed the Special Counsel's Office (SCO) investigation as entirely a political fight rather than a legal one. STONE believed JAMES COMEY "fucked up so bad" there would be an SCO investigation no matter who won the presidential election.

STONE felt SCO was trying to pressure him to "come in" to make him make statements against other people.

After the SCO was initiated, [REDACTED] continued to talk with STONE. STONE told [REDACTED] STONE did not say whether he conveyed a message to TRUMP or warned others about the SCO.

b6  
b7C

STONE and [REDACTED] discussed the Congressional committees. STONE stated the committees were interested in having STONE testify.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] did not think he had any discussions with STONE about [REDACTED] around the time of the Congressional hearings. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

#### CONTACT WITH THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT

[REDACTED] did not believe STONE knew the Russians, that is, the Russian government. [REDACTED] believed PAUL MANAFORT was associated with the Russian government. [REDACTED] reasoned STONE worked for pro-Western Ukrainian politicians in the early 2000s whereas MANAFORT worked with pro-Russian politicians during that time.

b6  
b7C

STONE believed the Russians would try to cause chaos in the US political system in any way possible. He also believed Russia would try to exploit any situation to sow more chaos.

#### 2016 CAMPAIGN

[REDACTED] believed STONE was in contact with TRUMP during the presidential campaign. He also believed STONE was in contact with MANAFORT.

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5623

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] 11/14/18 Interview, On 11/14/2018, Page 4 of 10

During the campaign, STONE was pushing [Redacted]  
[Redacted] STONE thought TRUMP's campaign was a "shit show" and relished working on his own outside the formal campaign.

b6  
b7C

STONE called [Redacted] on multiple occasions to tell [Redacted] about anti-CLINTON stories.

b6  
b7C

STONE was under the impression someone who worked on the HILLARY CLINTON campaign ended up working in the Special Counsel's Office.

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] 11/14/18 Interview , On 11/14/2018 , Page 5 of 10

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

STONE COMMUNICATIONS WITH DONALD TRUMP

STONE spoke with TRUMP all the time after STONE was fired from the TRUMP presidential campaign. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] stated STONE did not discuss having phone calls with TRUMP around the time the PODESTA e-mail leaks occurred.

b6  
b7C

COMMUNICATIONS WITH STONE

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] 11/14/18 Interview , On 11/14/2018 , Page 6 of 10

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] STONE stated MUELLER's investigation was a political hit job [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] 11/14/18 Interview , On 11/14/2018 , Page 7 of 10

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] believed STONE's ideas to use the NATIONAL ENQUIRER as a tool against MUELLER were STONE's ideas, not TRUMP's.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] 11/14/18 Interview , On 11/14/2018 , Page 8 of 10

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] 11/14/18 Interview , On 11/14/2018 , Page 9 of 10

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

MISCELLANEOUS

[Redacted] knows [Redacted] was in Washington, DC on November 14, 2018. [Redacted] suspects [Redacted] knows why [Redacted] is in DC. [Redacted] also knew [Redacted] was in DC on this date [Redacted] [Redacted] STONE is unaware of [Redacted] meeting with SCO in DC.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] STONE never liked COHEN. [Redacted] viewed COHEN as a disaster. STONE never indicated he was aware of COHEN's attempts to bury stories such as the one regarding STORMY DANIELS. [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

STONE had no discussion with [Redacted] about [Redacted] [Redacted] Nor have they discussed STONE being in a joint defense agreement with anyone.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] was unaware of any other personal matters STONE may have been concerned about.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] thought that if the government had knowledge of criminal activity STONE was involved in, the government could bring STONE in for an interview and get him to talk about someone "higher ranking." [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] 11/14/18 Interview, On 11/14/2018, Page 10 of 10

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C


[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/17/2019

[Redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC. [Redacted] was accompanied by her attorneys [Redacted] of [Redacted]. Present for the interview were Special Agent [Redacted] Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] Senior Assistant Special Counsel Jeannie Rhee, Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, and Security Officer [Redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

Prior to the start of the interview, ASC Zelinsky verbally reviewed the terms of a letter setting forth the agreement upon which [Redacted] made herself available for the interview. [Redacted] stated that she understood the terms of the letter agreement. [Redacted] signed the letter. After being advised of the identities of the interview team and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 11/01/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/27/2018

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of \_\_\_\_\_, On 11/01/2018, Page 2 of 5

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C



[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/01/2018, Page 3 of 5

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] was shown a text message dated [Redacted] Bates stamped

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted] was shown a text message dated [Redacted] Bates stamped

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/01/2018, Page 4 of 5

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

The two text messages in early [Redacted] Bates stamped [Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted] was shown a text message dated [Redacted] Bates stamped

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/01/2018, Page 5 of 5

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted] The previously mentioned texts, Bates stamped [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] was in talking to the Special Counsel's Office (SCO). [Redacted]

b6  
b7C


[Redacted] did not discuss her previous interview with the SCO with [Redacted] or anyone else.

**Administrative:**

The agent notes and documents shown to [Redacted] will be maintained in the 1A section of the case file. The physical version of the Attorney Proffer Letter will be maintained with the FD-302 of the 11/15/2018 interview of [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/18/2018

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] Social Security Account Number (SSAN) [Redacted] Address [Redacted] telephone number of [Redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, Washington, D.C. Present representing [Redacted] were [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] The interviewing team consisted of FBI Special Agent [Redacted] FBI Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky.

Prior to the start of the interview, ASC Zelinsky verbally reviewed the terms of a letter setting forth the agreement upon which [Redacted] made herself available for the interview. [Redacted] stated that she understood the terms of the letter agreement. [Redacted] signed the letter. After being advised of the identities of the interview team and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] reviewed a document Bates stamped [Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

Investigation on 08/14/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/31/2018

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted] on 08/14  
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 08/14/2018, Page 2 of 6

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] reviewed a document Bates stamped [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted] on 08/14  
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 08/14/2018, Page 3 of 6

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] reviewed a document Bates stamped [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] reviewed a document Bates stamped [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] reviewed a document Bates stamped [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] reviewed a document Bates stamped [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] reviewed a document Bates stamped [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] reviewed a document Bates stamped [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted] on 08/14  
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 08/14/2018, Page 4 of 6

[Redacted]

reviewed a document Bates stamped

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

reviewed a document Bates stamped

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

reviewed documents Bates stamped

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

On text message Bates stamped

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

reviewed a document Bates stamped

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted] on 08/14  
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 08/14/2018, Page 5 of 6

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] reviewed a document Bates stamped [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] reviewed a document Bates stamped [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] reviewed a document Bates stamped [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] knew that she was coming in to talk to the  
Special Counsel's Office.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted] on 08/14  
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 08/14/2018, Page 6 of 6

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b3 per DOJ-OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b3 per DOJ-OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C


[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/18/2018

On 2/21/2018, SA [Redacted] IA [Redacted] Special Counsel Prosecutor (SCP) Greg Andres and SCP Brian Richardson interviewed [Redacted] at the Special Counsel's Office. [Redacted] was advised that the interview was voluntary, and that it was a criminal offense to lie to federal investigators. Additionally, [Redacted] was advised that the interview would be treated as unclassified unless he indicated that any information was at a higher classification. After being advised of the foregoing, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 02/21/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted]

Date drafted 02/23/2018

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 02/21/2018, Page 2 of 5

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 02/21/2018, Page 3 of 5

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [redacted], On 02/21/2018, Page 4 of 5

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[redacted]

b6 b5 per DOJ/OIP

b7A  
b7C

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7A  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 02/21/2018, Page 5 of 5

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7A  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP


b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/22/2017

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] was interviewed by Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] Forensic Accountant [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC 20546. [Redacted] was accompanied by [Redacted] [Redacted] from [Redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing officials and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 11/08/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/15/2017

by SA [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/08/2017, Page 2 of 12

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/08/2017, Page 3 of 12

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/08/2017, Page 4 of 12

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/08/2017, Page 5 of 12

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/08/2017, Page 6 of 12

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/08/2017, Page 7 of 12

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/08/2017, Page 8 of 12

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/08/2017, Page 9 of 12

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/08/2017, Page 10 of 12

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/08/2017, Page 11 of 12

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/08/2017, Page 12 of 12

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP


[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/30/2018

[Redacted] previously identified, [Redacted] was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] FDIC OIG Special Agent [Redacted] Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres and Assistant United States Attorney [Redacted] Present during the interview were counsel for [Redacted] and [Redacted]

b6  
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b6 per FDIC-OIG  
b7C per FDIC-OIG

[Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C

[Redacted] was advised that the interview was voluntary and if he chose to answer questions, he was required to answer them truthfully. A proffer agreement was provided to [Redacted] which he acknowledged understanding and which he and his attorney signed.

b6  
b7C

Background

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Loan Process at TFSB

[Redacted]

[Redacted] A portfolio loan is a loan that does not meet the Freddie Mac /Fannie Mae guidelines and is serviced in house by TFSB. Portfolio loans are underwritten by TFSB. A conventional loan is a loan that conforms to Freddie Mac/Fannie Mae guidelines and is originated by TFSB, but generally sold on the secondary market. With conventional loans, TFSB typically knows they are going to sell the loan before the loan funds. In these

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Investigation on 11/28/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

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File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/29/2017

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 11/28/2017 , Page 2 of 19

cases, the loan may be underwritten by TFSB, or by the investor buying the loan, or both. In general, portfolio loans have less strict underwriting guidelines. Approximately 90% of loans originated by TFSB are sold on the secondary market.

Portfolio loans generally adhere to shorter loan terms between 12-24 months, a higher interest rate of 7.25% interest rate, and higher closing costs of 2-3 points. Generally, borrowers seeking portfolio loans need bridge financing for construction. [Redacted] was asked to answer questions during this interview for portfolio loans and not for Freddie Mac/Fannie Mae loans.

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Some loans come [Redacted] through a third party broker who acts as a liaison between the borrower and TFSB. Documents and information necessary for the loan either come directly from the borrower [Redacted] or through the third party broker. Initially, [Redacted] requires two years tax returns, two months bank statements, a Personal Financial Statement (PFS), a schedule of real estate (REO) and a credit report. The purpose of requesting these documents is to understand the borrower's financial profile: income, liquidity, assets, credit and additional collateral. [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

TFSB requires tax returns, PFS and profit and loss statements (P&Ls) if tax returns have not yet been filed to determine a borrower's income. Similarly, TFSB requires bank statements and REO schedules to determine a borrower's assets. TFSB looks at the borrower's credit report to not only see the credit score, but see if the borrower has any judgments, bankruptcies or other issues. TFSB places emphasis on the value of the collateral and the use of cross-collateralization to secure the loan. As such, properties owned by the borrower and the equity available in those properties is important to TFSB.

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] The Credit Committee approves all loans and can only do so with a unanimous decision. The Credit Committee approves loans subject to underwriting. The Credit Committee can also deny, or

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview, On 11/28/2017, Page 3 of 19

restructure a loan. [redacted]

b6  
b7C

Once a loan was verbally approved by the Credit Committee, a term sheet was issued to the borrower listing the terms of the loan. The approval and terms were subject to conditions being met. [redacted] was not sure who set the conditions. Conditions were requirements of the loan and were subject to change.

b6  
b7C

#### LTV and DTI

Underwriting guidelines for portfolio loans differ depending on the specifics of the loan. [redacted] was not aware of any guidelines or thresholds that are adhered to. [redacted] explained that the "sweet spot" for loan-to-value (LTV) is 60-75%. If the LTV is higher than 75%, the borrower will usually be required to offer another asset as cross-collateral. [redacted] believed TFSB placed more emphasis on LTV than on debt-to-income (DTI). That said, TFSB had denied loans because the borrower's DTI was too high.

b6  
b7C

DTI is the ratio of the borrower's income versus the borrower's debts. TFSB factors in any and all debt obligations for which the borrower is personally responsible. If debt belongs to a business or corporation and the borrower is not a guarantor or personally responsible for that debt's repayment, it is not included in their debt. TFSB is relying on the borrower to disclose whether or not they are personally responsible for some debt that does not appear on their credit report.

Borrower's disclose debt obligations on their PFS. The PFS clearly states that the borrower is required to disclose all debt obligations. [redacted]

b6  
b7C

#### REO

TFSB requires borrowers to provide an REO schedule including all properties in which they have an ownership interest. Mainly, TFSB is looking for other assets the borrower has that may be used as cross-collateral. TFSB is also looking at the debt the borrower carries on other properties. Only properties with equity can be used as cross-collateral. In addition, debt obligations for other properties is factored into the borrower's DTI.

#### Credit

[Redacted]

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b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 11/28/2017 , Page 4 of 19

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Use of Proceeds

Any time a loan resulted in cash out proceeds in excess of \$500,000, commercial lenders are required to as for an explanation as to the use of proceeds. TFSB also required such an explanation on their portfolio loans. [Redacted] was not sure why an explanation was needed or if there were any prohibited uses of the funds.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] and is not sure how important various factors are to the underwriting decision.

b6  
b7C

TFSB Roles

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

TFSB's loan origination database was called Encompass. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] All loan

documents and information are uploaded into Encompass's loan file.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Paul Manafort

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Manafort was a high profile borrower who was looking for construction and

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 11/28/2017 , Page 5 of 19

other types of financing for real estate development transactions.

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] learned Manafort was a political consultant [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 11/28/2017, Page 6 of 19

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C



[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 11/28/2017, Page 7 of 19

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] did not hear the details of what Manafort said about his work for Trump.

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

It wasn't until [Redacted] that [Redacted] Manafort, [Redacted] had another meeting. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

and a construction project on Union St. in Brooklyn.

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview, On 11/28/2017, Page 8 of 19

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 11/28/2017 , Page 9 of 19

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] Handwritten Notes

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] was shown a copy of his handwritten notes relevant to the Manafort transactions. [Redacted] stated he recognized these as his notes and he had reviewed them recently to refresh his memory.

[Redacted] was directed to an entry on [Redacted] further identified by bates number TFSB0055636 which read [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] was directed to an entry on [Redacted] further identified by the bates number TFSB0055637 which read, [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] was directed to an entry on [Redacted] further identified by bates number TFSB0055639 which read, [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 11/28/2017 , Page 10 of 19

[Redacted] was shown an email between [Redacted] and [Redacted] dated [Redacted] with the subject line: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Manafort Income Issues

[Redacted] recalled TFSB questioning whether Manafort's income was sufficient for a \$9.5 million refinance. [Redacted] was asked to obtain Manafort's updated 2016 P&L [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] was asked to obtain additional documentation to support Manafort's income. [Redacted] could not say how important the 2016 P&L was on TFSB's decision.

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] recalled an issue regarding Manafort's 2015 income as well. The P&L provided for 2015 did not match the draft tax returns for that year. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] to [Redacted] and [Redacted] dated [Redacted] and the subject line, [Redacted]

[Redacted] was directed to the portion of the email which read, [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted] was also shown an email from [Redacted] to Manafort dated [Redacted] with the subject line [Redacted] was directed to the portion of the email which read, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 11/28/2017, Page 11 of 19

[Redacted]

[Redacted] was told Manafort needed to document his income for 2015 because his tax returns were on extension. [Redacted] was also told to ask Manafort for updated P&Ls to document Manafort's income for 2016. [Redacted] knew that Manafort's income was a material factor in the underwriting process. [Redacted] knew that Manafort's loan would not have closed had Manafort not shown sufficient income. [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 11/28/2017, Page 12 of 19

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] was shown an email from Manafort to [Redacted] dated [Redacted] with the subject line, [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] who uploaded it to Manafort's loan file in Encompass.

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Borrowers are expected to provide accurate information to the bank. The bank requires borrowers to sign various forms attesting to the fact that the information they provided was indeed accurate. [Redacted] did not know if

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 11/28/2017, Page 13 of 19

the borrower was told that material misrepresentations to the bank were a crime.

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

174 Jobs Lane Lien

[Redacted] was shown an email dated [Redacted] between [Redacted] and Manafort and copying [Redacted] with the subject line [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] was directed to the portion of Manafort's email which read, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Union St. Loan

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 11/28/2017 , Page 14 of 19

Manafort's Union St. loan was different from the Bridgehampton loan because it was a construction loan, it was for a shorter term and the primary source of repayment was the sale of the property upon completion. As such, less emphasis is placed on the borrower's income and more emphasis is placed on the collateral value.

[Redacted] was asked if more emphasis was placed on collateral value, why a \$6.5 million loan was approved for a property that was valued at [Redacted] upon completion. [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

During the process of the Union St. loan, [Redacted] had to get multiple construction budgets because the contractor changed.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] was not sure why TFSB needed the construction budgets. [Redacted] understood that the construction loan needs to be sufficient to finish the construction so the property can be sold and the loan can be repaid. The cost to complete the property is relevant to the bank because it determines the amount of the construction loan. [Redacted] did not recall any conversations about this issue.

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 11/28/2017 , Page 15 of 19

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

2016 P&L

[Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] to [Redacted] and [Redacted] dated [Redacted] with the subject line, [Redacted] Attached to the email was [Redacted] prepared 2016 P&L for DMP [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] stated that this document was requested to support Manafort's income for the Union St. loan. [Redacted] did not have an independent recollection of seeing this document at the time. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Manafort is Influential

[Redacted] was shown portions of his handwritten notes related to an entry on [Redacted] and further identified by the bates numbers TFSB0055645-646. [Redacted] was directed to the portion of his notes which read, [Redacted] we are doing \$6.5 Mil [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] they were going to do the Union St. loan.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 11/28/2017, Page 16 of 19

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 11/28/2017, Page 17 of 19

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Post Negative New Stories

After negative news stories emerged related to Manafort's loans with TFSA, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

When Manafort's loan was restructured to a \$9.5 million loan and [Redacted] knew a second loan was coming afterwards, [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 11/28/2017 , Page 18 of 19

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] was shown a portion of his handwritten notes related to an entry on [Redacted] and further identified by the bates number TFSB0055641 which read, [Redacted] [Redacted] stated he could not recall what information [Redacted] was referring to.

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Other

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 11/28/2017 , Page 19 of 19

[Redacted] was shown an email dated [Redacted] from [Redacted] to [Redacted] and [Redacted] with the subject line, [Redacted] Attached to this email was [Redacted] for the Bridgehampton loan. [Redacted] stated he did not write this [Redacted]

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b7C

TFSB needed an explanation of Manafort's use of proceeds for their file. [Redacted] believed the statement in the letter was accurate.

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]


b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/02/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

[Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Andrew Weissmann. Present for [Redacted] were [Redacted] and [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C

[Redacted] was told that the interview was voluntary. [Redacted] was also told that if she chose to answer questions during the interview, she needed to be honest in her answer and that making false statements to the FBI and/or DOJ could constitute a federal crime.

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Background

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 10/03/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/06/2017

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 10/03/2017 , Page 2 of 13

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Generally, Citizens Bank requires borrowers to provide proof of income and assets such as, pay stubs, 2 months bank statements, mortgage statements and a list of other properties owned. Borrowers also answer a series of questions about their income, assets and liabilities on a questionnaire at the beginning of the loan process. Once this general information is reviewed, follow up questions are usually asked such as, explanation of large deposits or inquiries on credit report.

Citizens Bank offers a number of different loan programs such as, portfolio loans, jumbo loans and conventional loans; fixed rate, ARM, and interest only loans; and initial purchase loans, refinances, and construction to permanent loans. The riskier the loan program, the stricter the guidelines are. For example, interest only loans have stricter guidelines than fixed rate loans.

[Redacted]

b6  
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For initial purchase loans, the loan amount is typically based on the value of the property and/or contract purchase price, whichever is lower. For construction to permanent loans, the loan amount is typically based on the future and/or completed value of the property. Sometimes, these loans involve construction holdback accounts. For refinance loans, the loan amount is based on the value of the property. There are different types of refinances loans: refinance for the purpose of restructuring an existing mortgage and/or consolidating debt and refinance for cash out purposes.

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview, On 10/03/2017, Page 3 of 13

Loan to value ratio (LTV) is the amount of loan versus the value of the property. Citizens Bank has maximum thresholds for LTV depending on the loan type, loan amount, and occupancy. Generally, the higher the amount of loan, the lower the LTV threshold. Any loans over \$3 million are required to go to an exception underwriter who determines LTV. Riskier loans generally have lower LTV thresholds. Primary residence loans have the highest LTV and investment properties have the lowest LTV thresholds. [redacted] was not sure exactly why this was, but she speculated it was because people are more likely to repay loans on their primary residence.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] understood primary residence to be a property the borrower lives in more than 6 months per year. Second residence is a property the borrower lives in less than 6 months per year and does not generate income off of. Investment or income property is a property the borrower does not live in and is often income generating. The occupancy type for a loan is provided by the borrower in documentation they submit to the bank.

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b7C

Debt to income ration (DTI) is the amount of money the borrower makes versus the amount of money the borrower owes. Citizens Bank's maximum threshold is 45% DTI. [redacted] believed an exception could be made for higher DTI. DTI thresholds are determined based upon the loan type and occupancy. For example, for loans over \$3 million, the maximum DTI is 30%. Again, [redacted] believed there could be exceptions for this.

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DTI was important to the bank because ensured the borrower could pay back the loan. The borrower provided information to the bank such as, tax returns, W2s, pay stubs, retirement accounts etc. to support income. The borrower provided some information on their debt to the bank in the loan application and list of other properties owned. The bank also learned about debt from the borrower's credit report and withdrawals from bank statements.

The bank would not know about any pending liabilities unless the borrower disclosed them. The borrower was required to disclose any pending debt to Citizens Bank. When the credit report is run, the borrower is asked about any recent credit inquiries and whether they resulted in new debt. Citizens Bank relies on the borrower to provide this information.

The exception underwriters would look at all loan origination documents and relevant factors to determine whether or not to grant an exception to LTV or DTI.



[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 10/03/2017 , Page 4 of 13

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] If the borrower does not like an appraisal, they can rebut the value by providing rebuttal comparables and/or other information. This rebuttal is given to Citizens Bank's internal appraisal team for review and if deemed to have merit, it is sent to the original appraiser for consideration. This is not common, but it happens. In the rebuttals [Redacted] has seen, the value is rarely changed more than \$100,000.

Citizens Bank does not lend to foreign nationals at all. Borrowers can have foreign assets and foreign income, but it must be claimed on their US tax returns to be considered as income for the purpose of the loan.

For refinance transactions, underwriting requires the borrower to write a cash out letter explaining the use of proceeds. [Redacted] did not know why this was required.

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29 Howard St.

When [Redacted] began working at Citizens Bank, Paul Manafort was already a client [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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The Howard St. loan was a cash out refinance for Manafort's second home. [Redacted] Manafort worked for the Donald Trump Campaign. Manafort was self-employed and he owned several businesses. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Manafort's main source of income was company called DMP. [Redacted] recalled seeing Profit and Loss statements (P&L) for DMP.

P&Ls are used by Citizen's Bank to show income for self employed borrowers. P&Ls can be done on an accrual basis or based upon expected

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 10/03/2017, Page 5 of 13

income to date. P&Ls can be created by the borrowers themselves. They do not have to be audited by a CPA. The borrower must sign off on the P&Ls to certify accuracy.

Citizens Bank relied on the borrower to provide accurate information regarding their income. P&Ls for previous years would tie to tax return information. However, for the current year, a tax return would not be available and a P&L could be provided instead. If a P&L was created based upon expected income, it needed to make sense when compared to previous years' income. Citizens Bank would look at previous years' income when assessing a P&L. [redacted] explained that many businesses make the bulk of their revenue at the end of the year. If a borrower was applying for a loan prior to that revenue generating time, their year-to-date P&L may not show much income, but their P&L based upon expected income would. Citizens Bank would look back at the last couple of years to see what the full yearly income was and compare it to the P&L provided. Ultimately, Citizens Bank was trusting the borrower to provide accurate information.

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Manafort applied for a jumbo loan on Howard St. but [redacted] could not recall the exact amount. [redacted] believed there were two loans that comprised the total amount. The loans were ARMs. As a general rule, Citizens Bank does not do ARM loans for investment properties. [redacted] was not sure why this was.

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Citizens Bank did not do much due diligence on properties to determine if they were indeed primary or second residences. Citizens Bank did look at tax returns to see if there was any rental income or depreciation which would indicate the property was a rental.

If Citizens Bank knew a property was a rental, they would require a copy of the lease and it would affect the loan terms. Citizens Bank did not lend on any properties used for Airbnb. This was because Airbnb rentals were too risky for Citizens Bank and they did not provide consistent income. Citizens Bank relied on the client to tell them if the property was a rental.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/03/2017, Page 6 of 13

Gates was helping Manafort by providing documentation. [Redacted] believed Gates was an accountant who worked for Manafort. Ultimately, Manafort had to sign off on all documentation and information.

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[Redacted]

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377 Union St.

Manafort also applied for a construction to permanent loan with Citizens Bank for a brownstone in Brooklyn at 377 Union St. This was a complete renovation project. [Redacted] was told that the loan was an initial construction loan to renovate the property.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/03/2017, Page 7 of 13

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Funds for a construction loan could only be used for construction. The construction loan amount is determined based upon the cost of construction. The funds cannot be used for any other purpose. The funds are held in an escrow account and only released upon inspection of work completed. [Redacted] believed this process was clearly explained to applicants, but she was not the person who explained this.

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The loan process took a very long time because it was difficult to get documentation from Manafort. [Redacted]

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Ultimately, this loan did not close because the appraisal value came in too low to pay off the existing liens and leave money for construction. In addition, Manafort had a "fall from grace" and the bank decided they did not want to lend to him.

[Redacted] could not recall if Manafort rebutted the appraisal for 377 Union St. as he did for 29 Howard St.

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[Redacted] recalled issues with Manafort's income as it pertained to this loan and the 29 Howard St. loan. When [Redacted] first looked at Manafort's new P&Ls they seemed fine, but the underwriter for 377 Union St. said the P&Ls did not support Manafort's income for the 377 Union St. loan or for the 29 Howard St. loan. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/03/2017, Page 8 of 13

[Redacted]

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Document 1

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/03/2017, Page 9 of 13

[Redacted]

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Document 2

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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The issue of ordinary income versus distribution income was something the underwriters looked at to determine income for self employed borrowers. Fannie Mae had guidelines for determining income. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/03/2017, Page 10 of 13

[Redacted] did not know who was living in 29 Howard St. Manafort obtained the 29 Howard St. loan as a second home.

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Document 3

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] stated this would increase Manafort's income and decrease his debt, thereby improving his DTI. [Redacted] did not have any other details about this loan.

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Document 4

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Document 5

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/03/2017, Page 11 of 13

[Redacted]

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Document 6

[Redacted] was shown an email dated [Redacted] with the subject line, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] the construction loan underwriter for 377 Union St. found discrepancies between the P&Ls and the income used to qualify for the loan. [Redacted]

[Redacted] The new underwriter had "pended the file", meaning the loan could not go forward because Manafort's income was not sufficiently supported by the P&L.

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Interview

, On 10/03/2017

, Page 12 of 13

Continuation of FD-302 of

Document 7

[Redacted]

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Document 8

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/03/2017, Page 13 of 13

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[Redacted]


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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/13/2018

On or around 7/3/2018, SA [Redacted] Forensic Accountant [Redacted] and Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) [Redacted] interviewed [Redacted] was represented by [Redacted] and [Redacted]

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Prior to the start of the interview, AUSA [Redacted] advised [Redacted] of her obligation to be truthful with investigators. After being advised of the above and the identities of the interviewing team, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Investigation on 07/03/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted]

Date drafted 07/10/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 7/3

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 07/03/2018, Page 2 of 7

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 7/3

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 07/03/2018, Page 3 of 7

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 7/3

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 07/03/2018, Page 4 of 7

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 7/3

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 07/03/2018, Page 5 of 7

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 7/3

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 07/03/2018 , Page 6 of 7

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[Redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 7/3

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 07/03/2018, Page 7 of 7

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
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/13/2018

On May 31, 2018, [Redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. Present for the interview were FBI Special Agent [Redacted] FBI Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] Special Counsel Prosecutor (SCP) Andrew Weissmann, SCP [Redacted] and SDNY AUSA [Redacted]. Also present were [Redacted] attorneys, [Redacted] and [Redacted]. After being advised of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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Prior to the interview commencing, SCP Weissmann explained the terms of the proffer agreement to [Redacted] SCP Weissmann, [Redacted] counsel and [Redacted] signed the proffer agreement. SCP Weissmann informed [Redacted] that the interview was voluntary and that lying to Federal investigators could constitute criminal activity.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Investigation on 05/31/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/04/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/31

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/31/2018 , Page 2 of 11

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/31

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/31/2018 , Page 3 of 11

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/31

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/31/2018 , Page 4 of 11

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[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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b7C

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b7C

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[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/31

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 05/31/2018, Page 5 of 11

[Redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/31

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/31/2018 , Page 6 of 11

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
[Redacted] b6  
[Redacted] b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
[Redacted] b6  
[Redacted] b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP b6  
[Redacted] b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP b6  
[Redacted] b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
[Redacted] b6  
[Redacted] b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP b6  
[Redacted] b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP b6  
[Redacted] b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP b6  
[Redacted] b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
[Redacted] b6  
[Redacted] b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
[Redacted] b6  
[Redacted] b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/31

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 05/31/2018, Page 7 of 11

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/31

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/31/2018 , Page 8 of 11

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/31

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/31/2018 , Page 9 of 11

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/31

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/31/2018 , Page 10 of 11

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/31

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 05/31/2018, Page 11 of 11

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]


b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/22/2018

[Redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents [Redacted] and [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Andrew Weissmann. Present representing [Redacted] was [Redacted]. Prior to the start of the interview, ASC Weissmann reviewed the terms of a letter setting forth the agreement upon which [Redacted] made himself available for interview. [Redacted] had signed the agreement on 05/31/2018. ASC Weissmann, [Redacted] initialed the agreement. After being advised of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 07/06/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/06/2018

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of 07.06.2018

, On 07/06/2018 , Page 2 of 5

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of 07.06.2018, On 07/06/2018, Page 3 of 5

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of 07.06.2018, On 07/06/2018, Page 4 of 5

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of 07.06.2018, On 07/06/2018, Page 5 of 5

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP


b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



b3  
b7E

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/18/2018

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] and address at [Redacted] was interviewed telephonically via cellular telephone number [Redacted] [Redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] mistakenly recognized [Redacted] as someone she met before. [Redacted] approached [Redacted] as a familiar person and [Redacted] believed to know [Redacted] as [Redacted] [Redacted] During the initial introductions in an attempt to recognize each other, [Redacted] asked [Redacted] a question, "Did I meet you with Michael?" [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] believed [Redacted] referenced Michael as to the person Michael Flynn or Michael Cohen.

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Investigation on 05/16/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)  
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/17/2018  
by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/16/2018, Page 2 of 2


[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/24/2018

On 05/22/2018, at approximately 5:10pm, [Redacted] [Telephone Number [Redacted]] contacted SA [Redacted] at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) [Redacted]. The purpose of the telephone call was to relay additional information that was missed during his 05/18/2018 interview with the FBI. During the telephone conversation, the following information was obtained:

b6  
b7C

Roger Stone (STONE) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on	05/22/2018	at	[Redacted]	United States (Phone)
File #	[Redacted]			Date drafted
by	[Redacted]			05/23/2018

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~


[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Telephone Conversation With

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 05/22/2018, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/19/2018

(U) On or about 3/19/2018, ASAC [Redacted] received a phone call from [Redacted] [Redacted] is assigned to [Redacted] She was recently contacted by [Redacted] telephone [Redacted] a [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

According to [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

On 3/29/2018, SA [Redacted] contacted [Redacted] via telephone. [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U) After leaving [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

b6  
b7C


UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 03/29/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 03/29/2018

by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/27/2017

[Redacted] was interviewed by Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] Forensic Accountant [Redacted] Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein, and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Jeannie Rhee at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC 20546. [Redacted] was accompanied by [Redacted] from [Redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing officials and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 11/09/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/16/2017

by SA [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/09/2017, Page 2 of 13

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C



[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/09/2017, Page 3 of 13

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/09/2017, Page 4 of 13

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/09/2017, Page 5 of 13

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/09/2017, Page 6 of 13

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/09/2017, Page 7 of 13

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/09/2017, Page 8 of 13

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/09/2017, Page 9 of 13

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/09/2017, Page 10 of 13

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/09/2017, Page 11 of 13

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/09/2017, Page 12 of 13

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/09/2017, Page 13 of 13

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]


b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/28/2017

On 09/25/2017, the FBI obtained two search warrants, issued in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, to seize the baggage and person of [Redacted]

b6 per CBP and FBI  
b7C per CBP and FBI  
b7E per CBP and FBI

[Redacted] The purpose of the search [Redacted]

Special Agents [Redacted] executed the search on 09/25/2017 at approximately 6:30pm with the assistance of U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). CBP identified and escorted [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6 per CBP and FBI  
b7C per CBP and FBI  
b7E per FBI

[Redacted] interviewed [Redacted] concurrent with the search of his baggage. The interview is documented under a separate communication. [Redacted] declined to sign the FD-597 Receipt for Property acknowledging the seizure of these items. The FD-597 is attached to this communication via 1A.

b6 per CBP and FBI  
b7C per CBP and FBI


[Redacted]

b6 per CBP and FBI  
b7C per CBP and FBI  
b7E per FBI

Investigation on 09/25/2017 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)  
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/28/2017  
by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/05/2017

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted]  
[Redacted] passport number [Redacted] was interviewed at [Redacted]  
[Redacted] Present  
during the interview were FBI Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] FBI SA  
[Redacted] and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Officer [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b6 per CBP and FBI  
b7C per CBP and FBI

The interview began at approximately 6:25 PM and concluded at approximately 8:04 PM. [Redacted]

[Redacted]


b7E per CBP and FBI

CBP Officers [Redacted] provided the interviewing Agents with copies of [Redacted] passport as well as customs paperwork filled out by [Redacted] upon his entry into the United States. Copies of those documents are enclosed for the file as digital 1A attachments to this FD-302. The original documents will be maintained in a physical 1A envelope.

b6 per CBP and FBI  
b7C per CBP and FBI

Investigation on 09/25/2017 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)  
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/25/2017  
by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/03/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

[Redacted] previously identified, was interviewed by FBI Supervisory Special Agent [Redacted] Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Kyle Freeny at the FBI's [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted] Also present during the interview were FBI Forensic Accountant [Redacted] DOJ Contract Investigator [Redacted] IRS Special Agent [Redacted] and [Redacted] counsel [Redacted]

b6 Per IRS  
b7C Per IRS

[Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

[Redacted] was advised by the interviewing agents that her participation in the interview was voluntary. [Redacted] was also advised that she needed to be truthful in her answers and lying to a federal agent could constitute a federal crime.

b6  
b7C

Background

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Paul Manafort

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 09/07/2017 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)  
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/08/2017  
by [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up Interview , On 09/07/2017 , Page 2 of 18

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Davis Manafort Partners was Manafort's business account [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up Interview , On 09/07/2017 , Page 3 of 18

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] MC Brooklyn Holdings was an entity which owned a property in Brooklyn; MC Soho Holdings was an entity which owned a property on Howard St. in New York [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C



[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up Interview , On 09/07/2017 , Page 4 of 18

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up Interview , On 09/07/2017 , Page 5 of 18

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] had heard of the name [Redacted] as it related to Manafort, but she could not recall why.

b6  
b7C

Foreign Wires

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up Interview , On 09/07/2017 , Page 6 of 18

1. Yiakora Ventures, Global Highway Limited, Leviathan Advisors, Global Highway, Global Endeavor, Peranova Holdings, LOAV Ltd. and Telmar Investments

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

2. Lucicle Consultants, Black Sea View, Black Sea Cable, Evo Holdings, Bletilla Ventures, Actinet Trading, Marziolla, Olivenia, Cavenari, Segreyon, PEM, Inter Jua, Vega Holdings and System Capital Management

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C

Properties

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up Interview , On 09/07/2017 , Page 7 of 18

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

The property on Howard St. is a rental. [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

In 2016, Manafort obtained a refinance on the Howard St. property through Citizens Bank. [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up Interview , On 09/07/2017 , Page 8 of 18

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up Interview , On 09/07/2017 , Page 9 of 18

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up Interview , On 09/07/2017 , Page 10 of 18

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Emails

1. [Redacted] was shown an email dated [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] On this particular email, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up Interview , On 09/07/2017 , Page 11 of 18

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

2. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] with the subject line

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

3. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

4. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] with the subject line

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

5. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] with the subject line [Redacted] recalled this email. At some point [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

6. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] regarding [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]



[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up Interview , On 09/07/2017 , Page 12 of 18

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

7. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] regarding [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

8. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] with the subject [Redacted] recalled this was a document sent by [Redacted] The attached document contains [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up Interview , On 09/07/2017 , Page 13 of 18

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

9. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

10. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] from

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

11. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] with the subject line [Redacted] recalled this email. [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

12. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] between her and [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up Interview , On 09/07/2017 , Page 14 of 18

13. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] understood the difference between a refinance and a construction loan. A construction loan could only be used for construction work on the property. A refinance could be used for virtually anything.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

14. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] [Redacted] recalled this email.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up Interview , On 09/07/2017 , Page 15 of 18

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

15. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] with the subject line

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

16. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] with the subject line

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

17. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] with the subject line

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] recalled this email. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

18. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

19. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] with the subject line [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up Interview , On 09/07/2017 , Page 16 of 18

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

20. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] with the subject line [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

21. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

22. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

23. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] with the subject line [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

24. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up Interview , On 09/07/2017 , Page 17 of 18

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

25. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] regarding a [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] Based upon this email, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

26. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] referencing [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

27. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

28. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] regarding [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

29. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted] regarding a

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

30. [Redacted] was shown an email from [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted], On 09/07/2017, Page 18 of 18

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Other

[Redacted]


b6  
b7C

[Redacted] was aware that in 2016, Manafort and Gates worked on Trump's Presidential Campaign. [Redacted] knew Manafort was Trump's Campaign Manager. [Redacted] learned from the news that Manafort left the campaign.

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/20/2018

b6  
b7C

[Redacted] aka [Redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel, Washington, D.C. Present for the interview were FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Counsel Attorney Andrew Weissmann. Also present were [Redacted] attorneys [Redacted] and [Redacted] with the law firm [Redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

Investigation on 01/08/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

b6  
b7C  
b7E

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 01/16/2018

by [Redacted]



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/08/2018, Page 2 of 12

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/08/2018, Page 3 of 12

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/08/2018, Page 4 of 12

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/08/2018, Page 5 of 12

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/08/2018, Page 6 of 12

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of \_\_\_\_\_, On 01/08/2018, Page 7 of 12

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/08/2018, Page 8 of 12

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/08/2018, Page 9 of 12

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/08/2018, Page 10 of 12

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
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[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
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[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/08/2018, Page 11 of 12

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/08/2018, Page 12 of 12

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6  
b7C


[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b3  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/05/2018

FEDERAL GRAND JURY INFORMATION

This document contains information pertaining to a federal grand jury proceeding. The information may not be disseminated within or outside the FBI, except as provided for under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3), wherein disclosure may be made to: (1) an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney's official duties; or (2) any government personnel that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney's official duties.

[Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] arrived at [Redacted] on February 4, 2018. SSA [Redacted] and SA [Redacted] approached [Redacted] and identified themselves. [Redacted] walked with the agents to the [Redacted] was informed he was not in custody and this was a voluntary interview. [Redacted] said he would like to speak to an attorney prior to answering any questions.

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

OTHER Sealed per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] asked to speak with his attorney. [Redacted] used SA [Redacted] phone to call [Redacted] referred the matter to [Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 02/04/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)  
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 02/04/2018  
by [Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E  
OTHER Sealed per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(U) Interview, [Redacted] and  
[Redacted] of [Redacted] on February

Continuation of FD-302 of 4, 2018, On 02/04/2018, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
OTHER Sealed per DOJ/OIP

The interviewing agents informed [Redacted] that they would attempt to [Redacted]  
[Redacted] and return them to him as soon as possible. [Redacted]  
was provided with SA [Redacted] business card.

b3  
b6  
b7C  
OTHER Sealed per DOJ/OIP