Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22502 Filed 08/06/20 Page 1 of 23

United States District Court
Eastern District of Michigan
United States of America,
Case No. 2:06-cr-20465
Plaintiff,
v.

Hon. Nancy G. Edmunds
United States District Judge

D-18 Leonard “Dad” Moore,
Defendant.
_________________________/
United States’ Combined Response and Brief Opposing
the Defendant’s Motion for Compassionate Release
Introduction
Following a nine-week jury trial, the defendant Leonard “Dad”
Moore was convicted of RICO conspiracy stemming from his
involvement with the Highwaymen Motorcycle Club. As this Court
aptly noted at his sentencing “…this was an organization which
wreaked havoc in southwest Detroit over a period of many, many years,
and there was testimony from many witnesses that this was Dad
Moore's organization. He was the godfather, want he said went.” (Se.
Tr. 2-16-2011, at pg. 12).

1

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22503 Filed 08/06/20 Page 2 of 23

Now the “godfather” seeks a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C §
3582(c)(1)(a), based on COVID-19. While Moore has exhausted his
administrative remedies, and suffers from health conditions that
qualify as heightened risk factors for COVID-19 by the CDC, his motion
should nonetheless be denied. Moore is a danger to the community, and
the § 3553(a) factors support the continued incarceration of this
defendant whose offenses centered around a violent and criminal
outlaw motorcycle gang.
Background
The Highwaymen Motorcycle Club (HMC) was a multi-state
criminal organization with its national headquarters located in Detroit,
Michigan. United States v. Nagi, 541 Fed.Appx. 556, 563, (6th Cir.
2013). There was ample evidence presented at trial which documented
the HMC-associated criminal activity. This criminal conduct included
acts of violence such as arson, assault, robbery, and conspiracy to
commit murder, as well as theft, drug trafficking, and weapons offenses.
Many of the group's violent acts were done to further the Club's
criminal enterprise and to protect the authority and reputation of the
HMC amongst rival gangs. Id. at 563-64.
2

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22504 Filed 08/06/20 Page 3 of 23

Leonard Moore was the “godfather” of the HMC, and he occupied
the top leadership position of the organization. (See e.g., Trial Tr. Vol.
13, Peters at 100-05; Vol. 18, Sanchez at 11-12). As the Sixth Circuit
recognized, the trial in this case was replete with evidence
demonstrating that the defendant was “likely the most powerful
member of the organization” and that “all significant club activities had
to go through him.” Id., 541 Fed.Appx. at 573-574. Because of this role
that the defendant possessed, he was intimately aware of, and involved
in the myriad of illegal activities this enterprise engaged in.
Illegal drug use and sales were common with HMC. Id. at 563.
Moore, as a leader of the gang, often received free drugs from other
members. Id. There was ample testimony presented at trial that Moore
was supplied with drugs by other members as a means to curry favor or
to allow drugs to be sold in the HMC clubhouse. In Fact, one witness
described giving Moore a complementary “Dad pack” of cocaine “just to
stay on his good side” (Trial Tr. Vol.17, N.Sanchez at pg.31). Not only
did Moore receive drugs, but as a member of HMC, he distributed them
as well. (Trial Tr. Vol. 7, Burton at pg. 174).

3

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22505 Filed 08/06/20 Page 4 of 23

After a lengthy trial, Moore was convicted of Count II of the
Superseding Indictment, Racketeering Conspiracy, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1962(d) and 1963(a). He was acquitted of all other charges.
Moore was initially sentenced to Life, but after a remand from the Sixth
Circuit, was re-sentenced to 20 years – the statutory maximum for his
conviction. He was 62 years old at the time of his sentence, and has
served just over ten years, or roughly 50%, of his sentence. Moore
refused to accept responsibility for his actions in statements to the
probation department and to the Court at sentencing. (PSR ¶¶ 52-3; Se.
Tr. 2-16-2011, at pg. 11)
Prior to his conviction in the instant case, Moore had been
convicted of two other felonies and an assault charge. In 1977, Moore
was sentenced to 40-60 months in Detroit Recorder’s Court for the
felony of Attempted Placement of an Explosive, Resulting in Damage.
(PSR ¶ 137). The offense involved the placement of an explosive device
at a motorcycle club. When the device detonated, the building was
destroyed, and an innocent by-stander was killed by the debris. (PSR ¶
139). Five months after his discharged from parole, Moore was
convicted of Assault and Battery. (PSR ¶ 141). In 1987, Moore was
4

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22506 Filed 08/06/20 Page 5 of 23

indicted for racketeering activities relating to the HMC. He pleaded
guilty to one count of Interstate Travel in Aid of Racketeering for
activity relating the drug trafficking for HMC. Moore was sentenced to
four years imprisonment. (PSR ¶¶ 143-146; EDMI Case Number 87-CR80761-02).
Moore began serving his current prison sentence on February 16,
2011 and is currently incarcerated at Loretto FCI. (As of August 4, 2020
in a population of just over 800 inmates, there were 19 inmates and six
staff members at that facility who are currently positive for COVID-19.)
Moore is 72 years old, and his projected release date is November 28,
2027. His most serious underlying medical conditions are Chronic
Pulmonary Disease (COPD), Type II diabetes, and heart disease. Moore
has moved for compassionate release, citing his medical conditions and
the Covid-19 pandemic. He has exhausted his administrative remedies
by asking for compassionate release from BOP. His request was denied.

5

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22507 Filed 08/06/20 Page 6 of 23

Argument
I.

The Bureau of Prisons has responded to Covid-19 by
protecting inmates and increasing home confinement.
A.

The Bureau of Prisons’ precautions have mitigated
the risk from Covid-19 within its facilities.

The Bureau of Prisons has reacted quickly to confront Covid-19’s
spread within its facilities. Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, (6th Cir.
2020). For over almost a decade, the Bureau of Prisons has maintained
a detailed protocol for responding to a pandemic. Consistent with that
protocol, the Bureau of Prisons began planning for Covid-19 in January
2020. Id.
On March 13, 2020, the Bureau of Prisons began modifying its
operations to implement its Covid-19 Action Plan and minimize the risk
of Covid-19 transmission into and inside its facilities. Id.; see BOP
Covid-19 Modified Operations Website. Since then, as the worldwide
crisis has evolved, the Bureau of Prisons has repeatedly revised its
plan. Id. To stop the spread of the disease, the Bureau of Prisons has
restricted inmate movement within and between facilities. Id. When
new inmates arrive, asymptomatic inmates are placed in quarantine for
a minimum of 14 days. Id. Symptomatic inmates are provided with
medical evaluation and treatment and are isolated from other inmates
6

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22508 Filed 08/06/20 Page 7 of 23

until testing negative for Covid-19 or being cleared by medical staff
under the CDC’s criteria. Id.
Within its facilities, the Bureau of Prisons has “modified
operations to maximize physical distancing, including staggering meal
and recreation times, instating grab-and-go meals, and establishing
quarantine and isolation procedures.” Id. Staff and inmates are issued
face masks to wear in public areas. See BOP FAQs: Correcting Myths
and Misinformation. Staff and contractors are screened for symptoms,
and contractors are only permitted to access a facility at all if
performing essential service. Wilson, 961 F.3d at 834. Social and legal
visits have been suspended to limit the number of people entering the
facility and interacting with inmates. Id. But to ensure that
relationships and communication are maintained throughout this
disruption, the Bureau of Prisons has increased inmates’ telephone
allowance to 500 minutes per month. Legal visits are permitted on a
case-by-case basis after the attorney has been screened for infection.
Like all other institutions, penal and otherwise, the Bureau of
Prisons has not been able to eliminate the risks from Covid-19
completely, despite its best efforts. But the Bureau of Prisons’ measures
7

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22509 Filed 08/06/20 Page 8 of 23

will help federal inmates remain protected from Covid-19 and ensure
that they receive any required medical care during these difficult times.
B.

The Bureau of Prisons is increasing the number of
inmates who are granted home confinement.

The Bureau of Prisons has also responded to Covid-19 by
increasing the placement of federal prisoners in home confinement.
Recent legislation now temporarily permits the Bureau of Prisons to
“lengthen the maximum amount of time for which [it] is authorized to
place a prisoner in home confinement” during the Covid-19 pandemic.
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act)
§ 12003(b)(2), Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281, 516 (Mar. 27, 2020).
The Attorney General has also issued two directives, ordering the
Bureau of Prisons to use the “various statutory authorities to grant
home confinement for inmates seeking transfer in connection with the
ongoing Covid-19 pandemic.” (03-26-2020 Directive to BOP, at 1; accord
04-03-2020 Directive to BOP, at 1). The directives require the Bureau of
Prisons to identify the inmates most at risk from Covid-19 and “to
consider the totality of circumstances for each individual inmate” in

8

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22510 Filed 08/06/20 Page 9 of 23

deciding whether home confinement is appropriate. (03-26-2020
Directive to BOP, at 1).
The Bureau of Prisons’ efforts on this point are not hypothetical.
Over 7280 federal inmates have been granted home confinement since
the Covid-19 pandemic began, and that number continues to grow. BOP
Coronavirus FAQs. As the Sixth Circuit recently stressed, these efforts
show that “[t]he system is working as it should”: “A policy problem
appeared, and policy solutions emerged.” United States v. Alam, 960
F.3d 831,836, (6th Cir. 2020).
This policy solution is also tailored to the realities of the Covid-19
pandemic. As the Attorney General’s directives have explained, the
Bureau of Prisons is basing its home-confinement decisions on several
factors:
1.) Each inmate’s age and vulnerability to Covid-19;
2.) Whether home confinement would increase or decrease
the inmate’s risk of contracting Covid-19; and
3.) Whether the inmate’s release into home confinement
would risk public safety.
(03-26-2020 Directive to BOP; 04-03-2020 Directive to BOP). These
criteria account for justifiable concerns about whether inmates “might
have no safe place to go upon release and [might] return to their
9

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22511 Filed 08/06/20 Page 10 of 23

criminal activities,” as well as “legitimate concerns about public safety.”
Wilson, 961 F.3d, at 845.
The Bureau of Prisons, after all, cannot open its facilities’ gates
indiscriminately and unleash tens of thousands of convicted criminals,
en masse. See id. It must focus on the inmates who have the highest
risk factors for Covid-19 and are least likely to engage in new criminal
activity. This is true not just to protect the public generally, but to avoid
the risk that a released defendant will bring Covid-19 back into the jail
or prison system if he violates his terms of release or is caught
committing a new crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(5); 34 U.S.C.
§ 60541(g)(2).
The Bureau of Prisons must also balance another important
consideration: how likely is an inmate to abide by the CDC’s socialdistancing protocols or other Covid-19-based restrictions on release?
Many inmates—particularly those who have been convicted of serious
offenses or have a lengthy criminal record—been already proven
unwilling to abide by society’s most basic norms. It is thus important to
evaluate “how . . . released inmates would look after themselves,”
Wilson, 961 F.3d, at 845, including whether a particular inmate would
10

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22512 Filed 08/06/20 Page 11 of 23

adhere to release conditions and social-distancing protocols during the
pandemic. If a prisoner would be unlikely to take release conditions
or Covid-19 precautions seriously, for instance, he would also be far
more likely than the general public to contract and spread Covid-19
if released.
Finally, the Bureau of Prisons’ home-confinement initiative allows
it to marshal and prioritize its limited resources for the inmates and
circumstances that are most urgent. For any inmate who is a candidate
for home confinement, the Bureau of Prisons must first ensure that his
proposed home-confinement location is suitable for release, does not
place him at an even greater risk of contracting Covid-19, and does not
place members of the public at risk from him. It must assess
components of the release plan, including whether the inmate will have
access to health care and other resources. It must consider myriad other
factors, including the limited availability of transportation right now
and the probation department’s reduced ability to supervise inmates
who have been released. All of those decisions require channeling
resources to the inmates who are the best candidates for release.

11

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22513 Filed 08/06/20 Page 12 of 23

Those types of system-wide resource-allocation decisions are
difficult even in normal circumstances. That is why Congress tasked the
Bureau of Prisons to make them and has not subjected the decisions to
judicial review. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (“Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, a designation of a place of imprisonment under this
subsection is not reviewable by any court.”); United States v. Patino,
No. 18- 20451, 2020 WL 1676766, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 6, 2020) (“[A]s
a general rule, the Court lacks authority to direct the operations of the
Bureau of Prisons.”). It is especially true now, given the Bureau of
Prisons’ substantial and ongoing efforts to address the Covid-19
pandemic.
II.

The Court should deny Moore’s motion for compassionate
release.
Moore’s motion for a reduced sentence should be denied. A district

court has “no inherent authority . . . to modify an otherwise valid
sentence.” United States v. Washington, 584 F.3d 693, 700 (6th Cir.
2009). Rather, a district court’s authority to modify a defendant’s
sentence is “narrowly circumscribed.” United States v. Houston, 529
F.3d 743, 753 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008). Absent a specific statutory exception,

12

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22514 Filed 08/06/20 Page 13 of 23

a district court “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has
been imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Those statutory exceptions are
narrow. United States v. Ross, 245 F.3d 577, 586 (6th Cir. 2001).
Compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) is equally
narrow.
Even if a defendant is eligible for compassionate release, a district
court may not grant the motion unless the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
support release. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); USSG § 1B1.13. As at
sentencing, those factors require the district court to consider the
defendant’s history and characteristics, the seriousness of the offense,
the need to promote respect for the law and provide just punishment
for the offense, general and specific deterrence, and the protection of the
public. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
A.

Moore is not eligible for compassionate release under
the mandatory criteria in USSG § 1B1.13.

Even though Moore has exhausted his administrative remedies,
compassionate release would be improper. Compassionate release
must be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Congress tasked the

13

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22515 Filed 08/06/20 Page 14 of 23

Sentencing Commission with “describ[ing] what should be considered
extraordinary and compelling reasons for [a] sentence reduction” under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A), as well developing “the criteria to be applied and a list
of specific examples” for when release is permitted. 28 U.S.C. § 994(t).
Because the Sentencing Commission has fulfilled Congress’s
directive in USSG § 1B1.13, that policy statement is mandatory. Section
3582(c)(1)(A)’s reliance on the Sentencing Commission’s policy
statements mirrors the language governing sentence reductions under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for retroactive guideline amendments. Compare
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) with § 3582(c)(2). When Congress uses the same
language in the same statute, it must be interpreted in the same way.
Marshall, 954 F.3d at 830. In both contexts, then, the Sentencing
Commission’s restraints “on a district court’s sentence-reduction
authority [are] absolute.” United States v. Jackson, 751 F.3d 707, 711
(6th Cir. 2014); accord Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 830 (2010).
The First Step Act did not change that. It amended only who could
move for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A). It did not amend
the substantive requirements for release. United States v. Saldana, No.
19-7057, 2020 WL 1486892, at *2–*3 (10th Cir. Mar. 26, 2020); United
14

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22516 Filed 08/06/20 Page 15 of 23

States v. Mollica, No. 2:14-CR-329, 2020 WL 1914956, at *4 (N.D. Ala.
Apr. 20, 2020). Section 1B1.13 remains binding.
Section 1B1.13 cabins compassionate release to a narrow group of
non-dangerous defendants who are most in need. That policy statement
limits “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to four categories: (1) the
inmate’s medical condition; (2) the inmate’s age; (3) the inmate’s family
circumstances; and (4) other reasons “[a]s determined by the Director of
the Bureau of Prisons,” which the Bureau of Prisons has set forth in
Program Statement 5050.50. USSG § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1.
The Covid-19 pandemic does not, by itself, qualify as the type of
inmate-specific condition permitting compassionate release. The Bureau
of Prisons has worked diligently to implement precautionary measures
reducing the risk from Covid-19 to Moore and other inmates. See Wilson
v. Williams,961 F.3d 829, (6th Cir. 2020). Thus, “the mere existence of
Covid-19 in society and the possibility that it may spread to a particular
prison alone cannot independently justify compassionate release,
especially considering BOP’s statutory role, and its extensive and
professional efforts to curtail the virus’s spread.” Raia, 954 F.3d at 597.

15

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22517 Filed 08/06/20 Page 16 of 23

Moore’s medical records, however, confirm that he has medical
conditions, which the CDC has identified as risk factors for Covid-19.
Given the heightened risk that Covid-19 poses to someone with those
conditions, Moore has satisfied the first eligibility threshold for
compassionate release during the pandemic. See USSG § 1B1.13(1)(A)
& cmt. n.1(A).
But Moore remains ineligible for compassionate release because
he is a significant danger to the community, despite his age and medical
conditions. Section 1B1.13(2) only permits release if a “defendant is not
a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as
provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).” It thus prohibits the release of violent
offenders, including most drug dealers. See United States v. Stone, 608
F.3d 939, 947–48 & n.6 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Knight, No.
15-20283, 2020 WL 3055987, at *3 (E.D. Mich. June 9, 2020). It also
bars the release of many other defendants. An evaluation of
dangerousness under § 3142(g) requires a comprehensive view of
community safety—“a broader construction than the mere danger of
physical violence.” United States v. Cook, 880 F.2d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir.
1989) (per curiam).
16

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22518 Filed 08/06/20 Page 17 of 23

Adhering to § 1B1.13(2) is especially important given the current
strain on society’s first responders and the rise in certain types of crime
during the Covid-19 pandemic. Police departments in many cities have
been stretched to their limits as officers have either contracted Covid-19
or been placed in quarantine. Some cities, including Detroit, have seen
spikes in shootings and murders. Child sex predators have taken
advantage of bored school-aged kids spending more time online. Covid19-based fraud schemes have proliferated. There are real risks to public
safety right now, and those risks will only increase if our community is
faced with a sudden influx of convicted defendants.
Because Moore’s release would endanger the community,
§ 1B1.13(2) prohibits reducing his sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A). Moore
is a uniquely dangerous individual. He was convicted in state court for
placing an explosive device, resulting in property damage. Not only did
this conduct result in the destruction of a building, but also the death of
an innocent bystander. Moore went to prison for the offense, and
months after being discharged from parole, he was convicted of an
assault charge.

17

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22519 Filed 08/06/20 Page 18 of 23

Moore has twice been convicted and sent to federal prison for
racketeering crimes relating to his involvement with the HMC. His
racketeering conviction and incarceration in the 1980s did nothing to
deter his criminal behavior. In fact, quite the opposite. Upon his
release from prison, Moore stepped up his involvement with HMC, and
became its godfather, directing and controlling the organizations
criminal conduct.
As the leader of a violent, criminal motorcycle gang, he was the
director of their criminal activities. These crimes included assault,
arson, obstruction of justice, witness intimidation, and conspiracy to
commit murder; in addition to drug trafficking. Moore’s dangerousness
relates to his ability to direct others to carry-out crimes. At the time of
his sentencing, Moore was 62 and had many of the same ailments that
he suffers from today (PSR ¶¶ 157-159). Yet, neither his age nor his
physical condition deterred him them, and it will not deter him now.
As the Sixth Circuit observed “while Moore might not have been on the
street committing illegal acts himself, he was aware of and directing
HMC members' activities…” Nagi 541 Fed.Appx. at 574. Moore would

18

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22520 Filed 08/06/20 Page 19 of 23

not have to be “on the street” to be a danger to the community. Simply
being in the community is enough.
B.

The factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) strongly weigh
against compassionate release.

Even when an inmate has shown “extraordinary and compelling
reasons”, he is still not entitled to compassionate release. Before
ordering relief, the Court must consider the factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) and determine that release is appropriate. See United
States v. Knight, No. 15-20283, 2020 WL 3055987, at *3 (E.D. Mich.
June 9, 2020) (“The § 3553(a) factors . . . weigh against his request for
compassionate release.”); United States v. Austin, No. 15-20609, 2020
WL 2507622, at *3–*5 (E.D. Mich. May 15, 2020) (holding that the
“[d]efendant’s circumstances do not warrant compassionate release . . .
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)”); United States v. Murphy, No. 15-20411,
2020 WL 2507619, at *6 (E.D. Mich. May 15, 2020) (denying
compassionate release because “the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing
factors do not favor release”); see also United States v. Kincaid, 802 F.
App’x 187, 188–89 (6th Cir. 2020) (upholding a district court’s denial of
compassionate release based on the § 3553(a) factors). So even if the

19

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22521 Filed 08/06/20 Page 20 of 23

Court were to find Moore eligible for compassionate release, the
§ 3553(a) factors should still disqualify him.
Moore was convicted of a very serious offense of racketeering for
running a violent motorcycle gang. He was sentenced to serve a 20
years term of incarceration. He has only served slightly more than half
of his sentence. Moore’s case is similar to United States v. Hamman,
3:16-cr-185-SI, 2020 WL 3047371(USDC Oregon, June 8, 2020)(denying
a request for compassionate release to Hamman who suffers from
severe heart disease and who had been hospitalized recently, because
he had only served half of his sentence for a violent crime, and
COVID-19 was under control at his facility).
When the defendant was originally sentenced, this Court engaged
in a thorough analysis of the § 3553(a) factors, including Moore’s history
and characteristics, seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for the
law, and providing just punishment. The Court found that HMC, while
under Defendant’s direction, had “wreaked havoc in southwest Detroit
over a period of many, many years,” (Se. Tr. 2-16-2011, at pg. 12), and
that Moore was the leader of the criminal motorcycle gang, “He was the
one who ordered discipline, he was the one who maintained it, he was
20

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22522 Filed 08/06/20 Page 21 of 23

the one who laid the groundwork for what the club was and what they
did. He was their leader.” Id.
After applying the § 3553(a) factors, Moore was ultimately
sentenced to the statutory maximum of 20 years. This Court, in
sentencing Moore, recognized that his incarceration would likely have
a direct positive impact on the safety of the community: “Southwest
Detroit has been an extremely difficult place to live for a very long time,
and hopefully with these cases, that will be ended, and the people in
that neighborhood can live in calm and in peace.” (Se. Tr. 2-16-2011, at
pg. 13). His release from prison would be an imminent threat to the
calm and peace of those same neighborhoods. Those factors apply with
the same weight today, unaffected by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the
defendant’s motion for compassionate release should be denied.

21

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22523 Filed 08/06/20 Page 22 of 23

Conclusion
Moore’s motion should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,
MATTHEW SCHNEIDER
United States Attorney
s/ Robert A. Moran
Robert A. Moran
Assistant United States Attorney
211 W. Fort Street, Suite 2001
Detroit, MI 48226
Robert.Moran@usdoj.gov
(313) 226-9553
P46346
Dated: August 6, 2020

22

 Case 2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM ECF No. 3025, PageID.22524 Filed 08/06/20 Page 23 of 23

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on August 6, 2020, I electronically filed the
foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system,
which will provide electronic copies to counsel of record:
Robert E. Higbee
robhigbee@gmail.com

s/ Robert A. Moran
Assistant United States Attorney
211 W. Fort Street, Suite 2001
Detroit, MI 48226
Robert.Moran@usdoj.gov
(313) 226-9553

23