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Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
Executive Summary
•  The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program conducted no
operational testing of seaframes and mission package (MP)
capabilities in FY17.
•  The Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis
(COBRA) Block I in the mine countermeasures (MCM) MP
completed one of five phases of IOT&E in FY17.
•  DOT&E published an assessment of the results of operational
testing of the Independence-variant seaframe equipped
with the Increment 2 surface warfare (SUW) MP in
November 2016. The Navy did not conduct any additional
testing or perform any modifications to the seaframe and SUW
MP in 2017 that would affect the 2016 assessment.
•  In March 2016, the Navy completed a partial update of the
LCS Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) to support
future operational testing of the seaframes and MPs. Since
then, DOT&E and the Navy worked to extensively revise the
TEMP by incorporating developmental and integrated testing
as well as examining reductions in operational testing to
accommodate the Navy’s restricted program budget for LCS
testing. DOT&E expects to approve the LCS Program TEMP
Test and Evaluation Identification Number (TEIN) 1695
Revision B in 2QFY18.
•  DOT&E published the LCS 4 Total Ship Survivability Trial
(TSST) Report in September 2017. The report included
recommendations the Navy should consider implementing
on the Independence variant. DOT&E is awaiting the
Navy delivery of the LCS 5 and LCS 6 Shock Trial reports.
Shock trials on both variants occurred between June and
September 2016 off the northeastern coast of Florida. Based
on the analysis and testing performed by the Navy to date,
DOT&E’s assessment of the survivability of both LCS
variants is unchanged from previous annual reports.
System
Seaframes
•  The LCS is designed to operate in shallow waters that limit
the access of larger ships.
•  The Navy is procuring two LCS seaframe variants:
-- The Freedom variant (odd-numbered ships) is a
semi‑planing monohull design constructed of steel (hull)
and aluminum (deckhouse) with two steerable and two
fixed-boost waterjets driven by a combined diesel and
gas turbine main propulsion system.
-- The Independence variant (even-numbered ships) is an
aluminum trimaran with two steerable waterjets driven
by diesel engines and two steerable waterjets driven by
gas turbine engines.
•  Common design specifications include:
-- Sprint speed in excess of 40 knots, draft of less
than 20 feet, and an unrefueled range in excess of
3,500 nautical miles at 14 knots.

-- Accommodations for up to 98 personnel.
-- A common Mission Package Computing Environment
for use when an MP is embarked.
-- A Multi-Vehicle Communications System for
simultaneous communications with multiple unmanned
off-board vehicles.
-- Hangars sized to embark MH-60R/S helicopters and the
MQ-8 Fire Scout.
-- MK 110 57 mm gun.
•  Both variants include ballistic protection for magazines and
other vital spaces, such as, installed and portable damage
control, firefighting, and dewatering systems intended to
support recoverability
•  The designs have different core combat systems to
provide command and control, situational awareness, and
self‑defense against anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and
surface craft.
-- Freedom variant: COMBATSS-21, an Aegis-based
integrated combat weapons system with a TRS-3D
(AN/SPS-75) air and surface search radar (ASR); a
Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) system; a Terma Soft
Kill Weapon System; and a DORNA Electro‑Optical
Device (EOD) gunfire control system with an

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electro-optical/infrared sensor to target the MK 110
57 mm gun. Starting with LCS 17, Freedom-variant
ships will be fitted with a TRS-4D ASR and the MK 15
Mod 31 SeaRAM system as the air defense hard-kill
weapon system. The Navy is also developing plans to
retrofit earlier Freedom seaframes with SeaRAM in the
2020 to 2025 timeframe.
-- Independence variant: Integrated Combat Management
System derived from the TACTICOS system with a
Sea Giraffe (AN/SPS-77) ASR; one MK 15 Mod 31
SeaRAM system; the Automatic Launch of Expendables
(ALEX) system for decoy countermeasures; and the
SAFIRE electro-optical/infrared sensor to target the
57 mm gun.
Mission Packages
•  LCS is designed to host specific warfare area mission
modules (MMs) assembled and integrated into
interchangeable MPs. The Navy plans to install individual
MCM, SUW, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) MPs
semi-permanently on the seaframes, dedicating specific
ships to specific missions. Twenty-four of the planned
28 ships will be formed into 6 divisions with 3 divisions
on each coast; Independence variants on the west coast and
Freedom variants on the east coast. The Navy plans to use
the first four ships as test platforms.
•  The component MMs making up the MPs are:
MCM MP
-- Near Surface Detection MM: one Airborne Laser Mine
Detection System (ALMDS) unit for employment on the
MH-60S multi-mission helicopter.
-- Remote Minehunting (RMH) MM: two minehunting
sonar units and one MCM Unmanned Surface Vehicle
(USV) for minehunting capabilities. The Navy is
considering the AN/AQS-20C and AN/AQS-24C
minehunting sonar systems for use in the RMH MM.
The AN/AQS-24C is an upgrade to the airborne MCM
minehunting sonar that is in fleet use now. The Navy
expects to use a variant of the Unmanned Influence
Sweep System (UISS) surface craft in development as
the MCM USV.
-- Buried Minehunting MM: two battery-powered,
autonomous, Knifefish Unmanned Undersea Vehicles,
employing a low frequency, broadband, synthetic
aperture sonar to detect and classify volume and bottom
mines in shallow water.
-- Coastal Mine Reconnaissance MM: one COBRA
Block I, Block II, or Block III system for integration
with the MQ-8 Fire Scout. This capability is intended
for daytime unmanned aerial tactical reconnaissance to
detect and localize mine lines and obstacles in the beach
zone (Blocks I and II) and the surf zone (Block II). The
Navy expects the Block II system to add improved beach
zone detection capability against small mines and add
nighttime capability. Block III is intended to detect
buried mines in the beach zone and surf zone.

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-- Airborne Mine Neutralization MM: two Airborne Mine
Neutralization Systems (AMNS) units for employment
on the MH-60S multi-mission helicopter.
-- Near Surface Neutralization MM (projected for FY23):
the Barracuda Mine Neutralization System (MNS)
should begin developmental testing in FY22, and if
successful, augment AMNS in other portions of the
water column. The Navy plans to deploy Barracuda
from LCS using the MCM USV.
-- Unmanned Minesweeping MM: one UISS composed of
one MCM USV and sweep gear to detonate acoustic-,
magnetic-, and combined acoustic/magnetic-initiated
volume and bottom mines.
-- Aviation MM: consists of one MH-60S multi-mission
helicopter with the AMCM mission kit and one MQ-8B
or MQ-8C Fire Scout.
SUW MP
-- Increments 1 and 2 included:
▪▪ Gun MM: two MK 46 30 mm guns
▪▪ Aviation Module: embarked MH-60S Armed
Helicopter Weapon System
▪▪ Maritime Security Module: two 11-meter rigid-hull
inflatable boats (RHIBs) with launch and recovery
equipment
-- Increment 3 will add:
▪▪ Surface-to-Surface Missile Module, employing
the AGM-114L-8A Longbow HELLFIRE missile
modified for the maritime environment
▪▪ One MQ-8 Fire Scout to augment the Aviation Module
ASW MP
-- Torpedo Defense and Countermeasures Module:
lightweight towed torpedo countermeasure
-- ASW Escort Module: Multi-Function Towed Array
(MFTA) and variable depth sonar (VDS) with
AN/SQQ-89A(V)15 Surface Ship Undersea Warfare
Combat System. MFTA and VDS are intended to
provide submarine search, detection, localization,
and track capability. MFTA is also intended to detect
incoming torpedoes and be a catalyst for LCS torpedo
evasion.
-- Aviation Module: embarked MH-60R and an MQ-8 Fire
Scout. MH-60R provides organic submarine prosecution
capability using MK 54 torpedoes.
Mission
•  The Maritime Component Commander will employ LCS to
conduct MCM, ASW, or SUW tasks depending on the MP
installed in the seaframe. Because of capabilities inherent to
the seaframe, commanders can employ LCS in a maritime
presence role in any configuration. With the Maritime Security
Module, installed as part of the SUW MP, the ship can conduct
Maritime Security Operations including Visit, Board, Search,
and Seizure of ships suspected of transporting contraband.
•  The Navy can employ LCS alone or in company with
other ships. The Navy Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

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anticipates LCS will prepare the environment for joint force
assured access to critical littoral regions by conducting
MCM, ASW, and SUW operations, possibly under an air
defense umbrella. However, the latest CONOPS observes,
“The most effective near-term operational roles for LCS to
support the maritime strategy are theater security cooperation
and maritime security operations supporting deterrence and
maritime security.”
Major Contractors
•  Freedom variant
-  Prime: Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors –
Washington, District of Columbia
-  Shipbuilder: Marinette Marine – Marinette, Wisconsin

Activity
LCS Program
•  The Navy plans to field warfighting capability in multiple
increments of each MP have changed. The Navy now
intends to field a single increment of the ASW MP and
complete the SUW MP with the introduction of the
Surface‑to-Surface Missile Module in Increment 3. Plans
for the MCM MP are uncertain following the Navy’s
cancellation of the Remote Minehunting System and
the development of several other minehunting and mine
neutralization systems.
•  The Navy expects to complete operational testing of both
LCS seaframe variants with the SUW Increment 3 MP in
FY18 and with the ASW MPs in FY20.
•  DOT&E approved an update to the LCS TEMP in
March 2016. Since that time, the Navy and DOT&E
worked on updates to the TEMP, including operational
and integrated testing plans, changes to reflect the Navy’s
evolving plans to acquire and field the MCM MP, air
defense testing of seaframes, and plans to test a seaframe
over-the-horizon SUW missile capability. DOT&E expects
to approve LCS Program TEMP Revision B in 2QFY18.
•  In November 2016, DOT&E published a classified Early
Fielding Report on the Independence-variant seaframe
equipped with the Increment 2 SUW MP.
•  In September 2017, DOT&E published the LCS 4 TSST
Report. Shock trials on LCS 5 and LCS 6 occurred between
June and September 2016 off the northeastern coast of
Florida. DOT&E is awaiting Navy delivery of the LCS 5
and LCS 6 shock trial reports.
Seaframe
•  The Navy has not conducted any air warfare test
events against ASCM surrogates planned as part of the
Enterprise Air Warfare Ship Self-Defense TEMP or the
LCS TEMP. The Navy’s Program Executive Office for
Integrated Warfare Systems has halted all work to develop
a Probability of Raid Annihilation (PRA) Modeling and
Simulation (M&S) suite of the ships’ combat systems for
FY18. Delaying these efforts postpones evaluation of LCS
air warfare capabilities.

•  Independence variant
-  Prime for LCS 2 and LCS 4: General Dynamics Marine
Systems Bath Iron Works – Bath, Maine
-  Prime for LCS 6 and subsequent even-numbered ships:
Austal USA – Mobile, Alabama
-  Shipbuilder: Austal USA – Mobile, Alabama
• MPs
-  MP Integration contract awarded to Northrop Grumman –
Los Angeles, California
-  VDS: Raytheon Company – Waltham, Massachusetts

•  The Navy revised the LCS Capability Development
Document in April 2017, moving the requirement for
an Over-the-Horizon Weapon System (OTH-WS) from
the SUW MP to the seaframe. The Navy is selecting a
vendor for the OTH-WS, an ASCM for all LCS seaframes
regardless of the installed MP. Source selection is expected
in mid-FY18, with Initial Operational Capability scheduled
for FY20.
•  In August 2017, the USS Coronado (Independence variant)
fired a Harpoon missile that hit a surface target beyond
visual range. An MQ-8B Fire Scout and an MH-60S
helicopter provided targeting for this live fire event.
•  DOT&E reviewed the Navy draft Detail Design
Survivability Assessment Report (DDSAR) for the Freedom
variant. The Navy plans to release the final document in
late CY17.
MCM MP
•  The Navy continues to plan for the LCS MCM MP
IOT&E scheduled in FY20. The Navy’s CONOPS and
tactics, techniques, and procedures for employment of
the LCS MCM MP capability in the intended operational
environments are unknown.
•  In May 2017, the Navy completed the first of five planned
phases of IOT&E for COBRA Block I. The testing focused
on the operational effectiveness of the system to detect and
classify mine lines, minefields, and obstacles on the beach.
Fleet sailors operated the system from a shore base during
this phase of IOT&E. The remaining LCS-based phases
of IOT&E could not be completed in FY17 because of
higher priority operational commitments for in-service LCS
seaframes. The Navy conducted the testing in accordance
with a DOT&E-approved test plan.
•  In November 2017, the Navy completed AMNS medium
current developmental testing.
•  The Navy continued development of the UISS TEMP in
FY17 and intends to submit it for DOT&E approval in
FY18. The Navy continued development of the UISS,
expects to complete contractor testing in 1QFY18. The

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Navy intends to conduct UISS developmental testing
during the rest of FY18, concluding with an operational
assessment (OA) on LCS 2 in 1QFY19.
•  The MCM USV, the intended UISS tow vehicle, began
builder’s trials in 1QFY18. The Navy plans to conduct LCS
launch and recovery testing and sweep testing from LCS 2
in southern California in late 3QFY18.
•  The Navy continued development of the mine-like Navy
Instrumented Threat Target (NAVITTAR), a key test
resource for future developmental and operational testing of
UISS and a potential training asset for the fleet.
•  Until the MCM USV becomes available for testing, the
Navy intends to conduct AN/AQS-20C developmental
testing using manned surface platforms in FY18. The Navy
is still developing a test strategy and TEMP to document
required RMH MM testing.
•  The Knifefish completed contractor testing and began
Factory Acceptance Testing in September 2017. Sea
acceptance testing is expected to begin in 1QFY18. The
Navy intends to conduct developmental testing in early
2QFY18, followed by an OA in mid-2QFY18. However,
the DOT&E OA report will likely not be available to inform
the Navy Milestone C decision, scheduled for late 2QFY18.
SUW MP
•  The Navy conducted preliminary developmental tests of
the Longbow HELLFIRE missile to include missile firings
from a barge at moving targets and a structural test firing
aboard a Freedom-variant LCS.
ASW MP
•  The Navy conducted no at-sea testing of the ASW MP in
FY17.
•  In March 2017, the Navy awarded a contract to develop
the VDS. The vendor’s proposal uses a single towline to
deploy both VDS and MFTA. The vendor intends to deliver
a test article in late 2018.
•  In September 2015, the Navy completed a formal study
that identified capability gaps in currently available torpedo
surrogates and presented an analysis of alternatives for
specific investments to improve threat emulation capability.
The Navy has since taken the following actions to address
the identified capability gaps:
-- The Navy received approximately $1.4 Million through
an FY16 Resource Enhancement Project (REP) proposal
to develop a threat-representative, high-speed quiet
propulsion system.
-- The Navy received approximately $6.2 Million
through an FY17 REP proposal to develop a General
Threat Torpedo (GTT). The GTT expands upon the
high‑speed quiet propulsion system by developing threat
representative tactics and countermeasure logic.
Assessment
Seaframes
•  DOT&E provided early fielding reports of the Freedom
variant in December 2015 and the Independence variant in
November 2016. The Navy did not conduct any additional

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testing or perform any modifications to either LCS seaframe
variant in 2017 that would affect these assessments.
•  The Navy commissioned LCS Freedom in 2008, and LCS
Independence in 2010. Both LCS seaframes have limited
anti-ship missile self-defense capability. The Navy has not
fully tested these combat systems and the Navy does not
plan to conduct further air warfare operational testing of
Freedom seaframes 1 through 15 in their current combat
system configuration. The Navy has accepted the risk
of continued operation with a combat system that is not
operationally tested. DOT&E cannot fully assess the
operational effectiveness and suitability of the combat
system aboard each variant without further testing.
•  The Navy halted all work to develop a PRA M&S suite of
LCS combat systems in FY15 because some combat system
element models (e.g., radars) were not available. The lack
of combat system element models persists. The Navy
has not funded the development of the LCS PRA combat
system M&S suite in FY18.
•  The Navy delivered draft versions of the Freedom- and
Independence-variant Detail Design Integrated
Survivability Assessment Reports, which include a
summary of TSST data, assessment of ship vulnerabilities
to air and underwater threats, and assessment of their
compliance with survivability requirements.
•  Survivability testing and preliminary analyses on both
LCS variants continue to demonstrate that neither LCS
variant is survivable in high intensity combat. Although the
ships incorporate capabilities to reduce their susceptibility
to attack, testing of analogous capabilities in other ship
classes demonstrated that such capabilities have limited
effectiveness in high intensity combat. As designed, the
LCS lacks redundancy and the vertical and longitudinal
separation of vital equipment found in other combatants.
These features are required to reduce the likelihood
that a single hit will result in loss of propulsion, combat
capability, and the ability to control damage and restore
system operation.
•  The final survivability assessment of the LCS variants is
ongoing and is largely dependent on Navy delivery and
quality of shock trial reports, completion of FY16 surrogate
test reports, and the final survivability analysis runs.
•  Based on the testing and analysis performed by the Navy
to date, the DOT&E assessment of the survivability of both
LCS variants is unchanged.
MCM MP
•  The first phase of COBRA Block I IOT&E provided data to
evaluate the effectiveness of the system to detect, classify,
and localize mine lines, minefields, and obstacles on pure
sand and on sand with beach vegetation. The COBRA
Block I system performed reliably with few operational
mission failures. However, both MQ-8B Fire Scout test
platforms were not operationally available for several days
during this IOT&E period. MQ-8B troubleshooting and
repairs required significant maintenance support.

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•  The UISS must be survivable in the intended operating
environment to repeatedly sweep and detonate mines. The
Navy plans to test UISS mission survivability, prior to
full‑rate production, using underwater explosive testing of
the operational system are uncertain. Without this testing,
the Navy risks acquiring a minesweeping system with
limited survivability against the threats it is intended to
counter.
•  The Navy is deciding whether the RMH MM, a core
capability for the LCS MCM MP, will integrate the
AN/AQS-20C or AN/AQS-24C minehunting sonar system
with the MCM USV tow craft. The MCM USV is still
under development, and must be further modified to serve
as the tow craft in the RMH MM.
•  Navy plans to develop, integrate, and test the RMH MM
in the LCS MCM MP are not mature. A productionrepresentative RMH MM is not expected to be available
for test until the MP IOT&E and the Navy intends to
operationally test RMH MM capability for the first time
during the LCS MCM MP IOT&E scheduled in FY20.
This testing strategy adds risk to successful completion of
the LCS MCM MP IOT&E and delivery of its intended
capability to the fleet.
•  Despite having plans and funding to develop, integrate,
and test multiple MM programs of record in the MCM
MP, the Navy does not have approved CONOPS or tactics,
techniques, and procedures to employ the family of
MCM MP systems and capabilities to complete a combat
mission. This information is essential for successful MP
development, testing, and fleet employment.
•  The slow pace of development, production, and validation
of NAVITTAR, a mine like test resource, raises doubts
as to whether accredited moored and bottom mine targets
will be available in sufficient quantities to support planned
operational testing of UISS in FY18.
SUW MP
•  In December 2015, DOT&E issued a classified assessment
of the Freedom variant with the Increment 2 SUW MP. The
ship’s mixed performance in live fire testing resulted in
DOT&E deferring a determination of its effectiveness until
the completion of Increment 3 SUW testing, scheduled for
FY18. The Navy did not conduct any additional testing or
perform any modifications to the seaframe and SUW MP in
2017 that would affect the 2015 assessment.
•  In November 2016, DOT&E issued a classified assessment
of the Independence variant with the Increment 2 SUW MP.
The Navy did not conduct any additional testing or perform
any modifications to the seaframe and SUW MP in 2017
that would affect the 2016 assessment.
ASW MP
•  The observed operational availability of MFTAs in the fleet
will reduce the percentage of time that LCS with the ASW
MP is able to support the ASW mission. The MFTA is
required for the LCS to conduct the ASW mission. Repair
of a MFTA requires LCS to return to port to replace the
MFTA with a spare. An effective ASW mission capability
will depend on a logistics plan that includes pre-placement

of MFTA spares in strategic locations and a tow design that
supports replacement of the MFTA on the single VDS and
MFTA towline.
•  Current test surrogates have significant limitations
representing threat torpedoes. Operational assessments
of each LCS variant with the ASW MP using these test
assets will not fully characterize the capability provided
by an LCS to defeat incoming threat torpedoes. The Navy
proposed development of a GTT addresses many shortfalls,
but the capability to support realistic operational testing
depends on future Navy decisions to procure a sufficient
quantity of GTTs.
Recommendations
•  Status of Previous Recommendations. The Navy has
partially addressed one recommendation from the DOT&E
FY16 Annual Report relating to MCM MP. DOT&E is not
aware of any other actions taken by the Navy to address the
recommendations relating to LCS seaframes, cybersecurity,
and the MCM, SUW, and ASW MPs.
•  FY17 Recommendations. The Navy should address the
remaining FY16 recommendations and the following FY17
recommendations:
MCM MP
1.  Complete the remaining COBRA Block I IOT&E phases
that include LCS-based testing at sea and cybersecurity
testing on LCS.
2.  Fund and integrate the COBRA Block I system on a more
robust and reliable platform to mitigate risks caused by poor
MQ-8B Fire Scout operational reliability and availability
observed during testing.
3.  Complete the MCM MP CONOPS and the tactics,
techniques, and procedures for employing the MCM MMs
in expected combat environments.
4.  Characterize RMH MM capabilities using the MCM USV
and minehunting sonar in operational testing prior to
conduct of the LCS MCM MP IOT&E.
5.  Accelerate completion of development, production, and
validation to support accreditation of NAVITTAR for use in
planned UISS testing in FY18.
6.  Fund and execute full system shock testing for the
UISS prior to full-rate production to ensure the
production‑representative system is survivable in a combat
environment.
ASW MP
7.  Develop a logistics plan that includes pre-placement of
MFTA spares in strategic location and ensure that the
combined tow for the vertical depth sonar and MFTA
supports replacement of the MFTA.
LFT&E
8.  Address recommendations listed in the Navy and DOT&E
LCS 4 TSST reports.
Future Operational Testing
9.  Complete the air warfare testing of both seaframes,
including development and execution of the LCS PRA
testbed.

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