



December 1, 2020

MR. JASON LEOPOLD
BUZZFEED NEWS
7TH FLOOR
1630 CONNECTICUT AVENUE NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20009

FOIPA Request No.: 1432673-000
Civil Action No.: 19-cv-01278
Subject: All 302's of individuals who were
questioned/interviewed by FBI Agents working for the
Office of Special Counsel Robert Mueller

Dear Mr. Leopold:

You were previously advised we were consulting with other government agencies concerning information located as a result of your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.

These consultations have been completed and the enclosed material is being released to you with the appropriate exemption noted next to the redacted information pursuant to Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 as noted below. Below you will find checked boxes under statute headings indicating the appropriate exemptions asserted to protect information which is exempt from disclosure. The checked exemption boxes used to withhold the information are further explained in the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions.

Section 552		Section 552a
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(1)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> (d)(5)
<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> (j)(2)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(3)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(1)
50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(D)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(2)
50 U.S.C § 3024(m)(1)		
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 6 (e)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(E)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(3)
10 U.S.C § 424	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(F)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(4)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(8)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(5)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(5)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(9)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(6)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(6)		<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(7)

61 pages were reviewed and 42 pages are being released.

- The appropriate redactions were made by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice/National Security Division (NSD), Department of Justice/Office of Information Policy (DOJ/OIP), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. "Part 1" of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. "Part 2" includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records about yourself or any third party individuals. "Part 3" includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

Although your request is in litigation, we are required by law to provide you the following information:

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under "Contact Us." The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request.

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP's website: <https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foipaquestions@fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.



See additional information which follows.

Sincerely,



Michael G. Seidel
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosures

Additional Information:

The enclosed documents represent the thirteenth release of information responsive to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. This material is being provided to you at no charge.

FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs.

Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the www.fbi.gov/foia website.
- (ii) **Intelligence Records.** To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist.

Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.
- (iii) **Requests for Records for Incarcerated Individuals.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any incarcerated individual pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

Part 3: General Information:

- (i) **Record Searches.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. A standard search normally consists of a search for main files in the Central Records System (CRS), an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does not include references, administrative records of previous FOIPA requests, or civil litigation files. For additional information about our record searches, visit www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/requesting-fbi-records.
- (ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative “FBI file.” An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks. Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at www.edo.cjis.gov. For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.
- (iv) **National Name Check Program (NNCP).** The mission of NNCP is to analyze and report information in response to name check requests received from federal agencies, for the purpose of protecting the United States from foreign and domestic threats to national security. Please be advised that this is a service provided to other federal agencies. Private Citizens cannot request a name check.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a


- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 FOI/PA
 DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
 Civil Action No.: 19-cv-1278 / 19-cv-1626
 FOIA: 1432673-000 / 1433273-000
 PDF Title:19-cv-1278 Release 13 Bates

Total Withheld Pages = 19

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19cv1278) 5427	b3; b6 per FBI and DHS; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5428	b3; b7A; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5552	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5553	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5554	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5555	b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5556	b3 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5557	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5681	b6 per FBI and NSD; b7A; b7C per FBI and NSD; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5682	b6 per FBI and NSD; b7A; b7C per FBI and NSD; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5759	b3 per DIA; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5760	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5761	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5762	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5763	b3; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5998	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5999	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 6000	b3; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 6001	b3; b5 per FBI and DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E

[Redacted]



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/25/2017

On August 10, 2017, Aaron Nevins was interviewed at the United States Attorney's Office, 500 East Broward Boulevard, Suite 700, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Counsel for Nevins, [Redacted] was present during the interview. Also present were Special Agents (SA) [Redacted] [Redacted] and DOJ National Security Division attorney [Redacted] Nevins was advised by both SA [Redacted] and NSD attorney [Redacted] he was not considered a subject. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and nature of the interview, Nevins voluntarily provided the following information:

b6 per FBI and NSD
b7C per FBI and NSD

Nevins [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Nevins [Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Redacted] Nevins [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted] Nevins [Redacted]
[Redacted]

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After this, Nevins [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Nevins [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Nevins [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b7C

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Investigation on 08/10/2017 at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/14/2017

by [Redacted]

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b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Aaron Nevins . On 08/10/2017 . Page 2 of 5

Nevins [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted] Hello Florida is a salacious gossip blog consisting of mostly state-wide, but some local, gossip. [Redacted]

[Redacted] Nevins [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Nevins considered the pseudonym Mark Miewurd the worst kept secret in Tallahassee, admitting locals knew who ran the site, and confirmed this was a play on words for the phrase mark my words.

Regarding Guccifer 2.0, Nevins first viewed his Twitter account. Guccifer 2.0's Twitter account linked to his WordPress site. Nevins read a post on Guccifer 2.0's blog inviting journalists to send him Direct Messages (DM) via Twitter - so Nevins did.

Nevins recalled the only communication between he and Guccifer 2.0 being Twitter DM. Nevins [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted] Nevins [Redacted]

[Redacted] Nevins'

[Redacted] Nevins [Redacted]

[Redacted] Nevins [Redacted]

[Redacted] Nevins [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Nevins [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Nevins [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Nevins thought Guccifer 2.0 and/or the DNC hack was probably the biggest story of the decade. [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

Nevins [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] Nevins [Redacted]

[Redacted]

In December 2016, Nevins spoke with the New York Times (NYT). They agreed to use his pen name. He gave the NYT [Redacted] his DMs with Guccifer 2.0 [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Aaron Nevins . On 08/10/2017 . Page 3 of 5

When the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) contacted Nevins, they did not agree to use his pen name. By this time, Nevins in part gave up and in part grew tired of filtering his communications; he figured the WSJ already had his name so why not [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

Nevins [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

Nevins [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

Nevins [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

Nevins [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

The last time Nevins [Redacted]

[Redacted]

and Nevins

[Redacted]

Nevins [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Nevins [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Nevins, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Nevins asked Guccifer 2.0 about Florida because Florida was Nevins coverage area. He thought being specific in his request, asking about one thing, Florida, helped him get a response. Nevins had no interest in any particular district.

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b7C

[Redacted] Nevins [Redacted]

Nevins did receive materials from Guccifer 2.0. [Redacted] it was reported he received 2.5 GB, [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

Nevins received the materials from Guccifer 2.0 on Dropbox.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Aaron Nevins . On 08/10/2017 . Page 4 of 5

Nevins [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

Nevins [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Nevins [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

Nevins [Redacted]

Nevins [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Nevins [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Nevins [Redacted] Nevins advised [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Nevins [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Nevins [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] Nevins' [Redacted]

[Redacted] Nevins' [Redacted] Nevins [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Nevins [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Nevins gave data from Guccifer 2.0 to some reporters. Once he realized there was a lot of information he started to farm it out to reporters across the state. [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Nevins [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Nevins [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

Nevins [Redacted] Nevins [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7E

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Aaron Nevins . On 08/10/2017 . Page 5 of 5

Nevins [Redacted]

b6
b7C

Nevins [Redacted]

b6
b7C

Nevins [Redacted]

Nevins [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

Nevins [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]


[Redacted] Nevins [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] Nevins [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/28/2018

Assistant Director of the FBI Counterintelligence Division E.W. PRIESTAP was interviewed at his office at FBI Headquarters. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, PRIESTAP provided the following information:

PRIESTAP provided to writer copies of five pages of handwritten notes he used to document conversations he participated in between 02/2017 and 07 /2017. PRIESTAP advised the notes document five conversations he had with EZRA COHEN-WATNICK, then-Senior Director for Intelligence at the National Security Council (NSC), and two conversations he had with [Redacted] the detailee of the FBI's Counterintelligence Division to the NSC's Intelligence Directorate.

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PRIESTAP retained his original notes. The copies of the five pages of handwritten notes provided by PRIESTAP will be maintained in the 1A section of the case file.


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Investigation on 08/23/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/23/2018

by [Redacted]

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b7C
b7E



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/20/2018

On September 13, 2017, [Redacted] was interviewed at the office of the Special Council located at 395 E Street SW, Washington DC by Special Counsel Prosecutors (SCP) Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres, SA [Redacted] SA [Redacted]. Also present for the interview were [Redacted] attorneys, [Redacted] and [Redacted].

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b7C

SCPs Weissmann and Andres explained to [Redacted] that this interview was voluntary, described the conditions of the proffer and, explained that lying to a federal agent was a crime. After this advisement, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C

[Redacted] Background

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

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Investigation on 09/13/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/15/2017

by [Redacted]

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b7E

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 09/13/2017 . Page 2 of 10

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 09/13/2017 . Page 3 of 10

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] received credit for bringing in the Ukraine project.

b6
b7C

First Meeting

The first meeting between RICK GATES and The Podesta Group occurred in 2012.

[Redacted]

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b7C

GATES proposed an opportunity to represent Ukraine. GATES worked with PAUL MANAFORT who had a contract with Party of Regions (POR) and by extension, VIKTOR YANUKOVICH. MANAFORT was a political consultant and needed lobbyist support. GATES informed those present at the meeting that Podesta Group would be working with POR.

The firm would be called upon to do both public relations and government relations (lobbying) for the client.

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

had understood that Podesta Group would be hired by POR. While some firms avoided international work because of the increased documentary requirements, this was not a problem for Podesta Group. The firm did extensive international work and would not have a problem filing FARA.

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~b6
b7C
b7EContinuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 09/13/2017 . Page 4 of 10

GATES told those present at the meeting that POR was pro-west but that the Tymoshenko issue was problematic. The firm would be expected to lobby that Tymoshenko had been properly imprisoned. [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Second Meeting

[REDACTED] did not know the specific date of this meeting but knew that it occurred before July 4, 2012 and that it was held in the firm's conference room.

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There were a lot of people in attendance at this meeting. [REDACTED] MANAFORT did not attend this meeting.

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The second meeting was a reprise of the first. GATES informed the attendants that the client would be an NGO in Brussels that was being set up. GATES explained they had looked into it and had decided that the NGO would be the client. GATES told the Podesta Group that their client would be the European Centre for a Modern Ukraine (ECFMU). This was the first time the Podesta Group had heard that an NGO would be set up.

[REDACTED] explained that anyone who did foreign work needed to file under FARA except under certain circumstances when the lobbyist can elect to file an LDA. Registering for FARA is complicated due to reporting requirements, registration requirements, contractual regulations, and because FARA filers are required to report every contact for both government relations and public relations work. Under LDA, the requirements are less stringent and public relations is exempt from any reporting. Furthermore, clients are often upset when their contact with the lobbying firm is reported to the US government.

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[REDACTED] was aware that FARA violations were criminal.

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Because of the compensation structure of the firm, the originator of the client always wanted to close the client. [REDACTED]

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For most clients, the normal course of business would have been to have a proposal writer sit in on a meeting and take detailed notes so that they could later draft a detailed proposal to send the client. [REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 09/13/2017 . Page 5 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] understood 90% of the tasking to be related to diffusing the Tymoshenko situation.

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Following the second meeting, Podesta Group accepted the client. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] understood the second meeting as a continuation of the first. The nature of work Podesta Group was being asked to perform had not changed.

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[Redacted] and ECFMU Work

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At some point [Redacted] expressed concern that the project seemed to be sovereign representation. Among his concerns, [Redacted] cited that there was no website for ECFMU. [Redacted] questioned where the organization got their money.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~b6
b7C
b7EContinuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED] . On 09/13/2017 . Page 6 of 10b6
b7CPodesta Group's Work with ECFMU

Podesta Group was taking orders from GATES. The policies Gates was advocating would ultimately benefit the government of Ukraine. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] understood GATES worked for POR. [REDACTED] had never heard that GATES was from ECFMU. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] understood that FARA was a matter of who was giving direction and controlling the actions of the lobbyists. The instructions to Podesta Group came from GATES [REDACTED]

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Once Podesta Group decided to do an LDA, there was no more discussion of the decision.

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SA [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] the purpose of ECFMU to which [REDACTED] glibly responded [REDACTED] ECFMU was supportive of Ukrainian integration with the West. A political obstacle to Ukraine's integration with the West was the Tymoshenko case.

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[REDACTED] was not aware of any position the ECFMU took that was divergent to the Yanukovich regime. If ECFMU was philosophically aligned with their stated mission, they would have objected to Yanukovich's choice not to sign the EU association agreement.

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[REDACTED] did not know where the money came from to pay for Podesta Group's work.

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Typically a country's embassy organized government delegations but ECFMU seemed to be directing the visits. No non-sovereign client would ask to set up a delegation visit.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 09/13/2017 . Page 7 of 10

[Redacted] believed ECFMU had commissioned a report from Skadden on the jailing of Tymoshenko. From the client's point of view, Skadden had not fulfilled their request because Skadden's conclusion was not forceful enough. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] had no conversations with Mercury about the client.

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[Redacted]

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b7C

Everyone at Podesta had reservations with trying to sell the Tymoshenko issue. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C

ECFMU appeared to be a "contrivance" to avoid being subject to FARA. The nature of work was the kind of work a sovereign government would ask for. It was unusual for an NGO to request that kind of work. ECFMU "looked reverse-engineered" with ECFMU being created for this purpose.

[Redacted] surmised that either ECFMU was a brand new entity or it was being created. [Redacted] believed that he had probably looked ECFMU up on Google and found that there was no website. Most bona fide think-tanks would set up a website.

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[Redacted]

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Podesta Group's business was growing and [Redacted] asked [Redacted] for recommendations. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 09/13/2017 . Page 8 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] had no recollection of discussing the legitimacy of ECFMU with [Redacted]

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Regarding the letter from Dick Durbin, [Redacted] said that there was an effort to find one senator to object to the letter. [Redacted] became engaged with this effort. Senator Manchin was selected as the target for this objection. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] had no recollection of interests in West Virginia.

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[Redacted]

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Exhibit 1

[Redacted] was shown a meeting invite for 2/22/2012 with the subject, "Rick Gates meeting re- [sic] representing the Government of Ukraine in DC".

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[Redacted]

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Exhibit 2

[Redacted] was shown a meeting invite for 4/2/2012 with the subject, "Ukraine meeting with Rick Gates".

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[Redacted] believe this was for the second meeting. [Redacted] understood the clients listed on Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 to be the same.

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Exhibit 3

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 09/13/2017 . Page 9 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Exhibit 5

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Exhibit 11

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] . On 09/13/2017 . Page 10 of 10

[Redacted]

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Exhibit 13

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Document 17

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Document 18

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] . On 10/10/2017 . Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

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
(U)

~~(S//NF)~~ Following the exchange with DALY, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/23/2018

On Wednesday, February 27, 2018, [Redacted] was interviewed by Andrew A. Weissmann, Senior Assistant Special Counsel, and [Redacted] Department of Justice Senior Financial Investigator. Representing [Redacted] were [Redacted] attorneys [Redacted] and [Redacted]. After being advised the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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Prior to the interview commencing, Senior Assistant Special Counsel Attorney Weissmann advised [Redacted] that his participation in the interview was voluntary and he could consult with his attorneys anytime he wished. [Redacted] was also advised he needed to be truthful in his answers and that lying to the Office of the Special Counsel could constitute a Federal crime. [Redacted] verbally acknowledged that he understood.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Investigation on 02/28/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 03/06/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~)

[Redacted]

. On 02/28/2018

. Page 2 of 11

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] . On 02/28/2018 . Page 3 of 11

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] . On 02/28/2018 . Page 4 of 11

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] . On 02/28/2018 . Page 5 of 11

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] . On 02/28/2018 . Page 6 of 11

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] . On 02/28/2018 . Page 7 of 11

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] . On 02/28/2018 . Page 8 of 11

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] . On 02/28/2018 . Page 9 of 11

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] . On 02/28/2018 . Page 10 of 11

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
Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] . On 02/28/2018 . Page 11 of 11

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[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/05/2018

On 2/27/2018, Special Counsel Prosecutors (SCP) Andrew Weissmann and Brian Richardson spoke on the phone to [Redacted] SA [Redacted] entered the discussion in-progress and was subsequently replaced by SSA [Redacted]. The below record reflects portions of the conversation for which one or both of the agents were present:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Investigation on 02/27/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted]

Date drafted 03/02/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Conversation with [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of 2/27/2018

. On 02/27/2018 . Page 2 of 3

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Conversation with [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of 2/27/2018 . On 02/27/2018 . Page 3 of 3
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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]


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[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/20/2018

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] email address [Redacted]
[Redacted] office phone [Redacted] mobile phone [Redacted]
[Redacted] was interviewed at his workplace, [Redacted]
[Redacted] Washington, DC, 20006.

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Present for the interview were SIA [Redacted] and the writer. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] provided an envelope containing three documents described as follows. The full contents of the envelope will be included with this communication in the form of a digital 1A:

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• [Redacted]

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• [Redacted]

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• [Redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 04/19/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

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File # [Redacted] Date drafted 04/20/2018

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] #2 . On 04/19/2018 . Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~)


[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] provided a business card (enclosed) and indicated he would be amenable for re-contact.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



b6
b7C
b7E

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2042
DATE: 11-19-2020

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Date of entry 10/18/2017

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ On 10 October 2017, Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] interviewed [redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] social security number (SSN) [redacted] 3155, at the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, 1650 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, D. C. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] was an F.B.I. detailee to the White House National Security Council (NSC), where he served as [redacted] On or about 10 May 2017 [redacted]

b1
b3
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[redacted] According to the MemCon President TRUMP [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP [redacted] The version of the MemCon that [redacted] received was partially redacted, but included enough information for [redacted] to conclude that [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

(S)

~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] first went to his boss, [redacted] and then consulted with [redacted]

Writer's Note: [redacted] was the NSC's [redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

(S) [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C

[redacted] then went to raise the matter with TOM BOSSERT, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (a/k/a the Homeland Security Advisor). However, BOSSERT was not in his office, so [redacted] instead went to the Acting Homeland Security Advisor, JOHN DALY. At some point before reaching DALY's office, [redacted] encountered BOSSERT's Senior Policy Advisor, [redacted]

~~Reason: 1.4 (c)
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20421231~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 10/10/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

b6
b7C
b7E

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/12/2017

by [redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] . On 10/10/2017 . Page 4 of 4

[Redacted]
[Redacted] BOSSERT claimed that he did not know of [Redacted] and stated that he would not have signed-off on it had he been aware. When [Redacted] reminded BOSSERT that he had approved [Redacted] BOSSERT denied it. [Redacted] boss later confirmed to [Redacted] that BOSSERT and DALY had in fact signed-off on [Redacted]
[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [Redacted] last day with the NSC was [Redacted] Before departing, [Redacted] placed hard copies of the e-mails and the partially-redacted MemCon in a locked safe on the fourth floor of the Eisenhower Executive Office Building. [Redacted] noted that a number of the individuals who saw the MemCon were no longer working with the NSC, including [Redacted] [Redacted] and [Redacted] did not know whether they had been fired or their tours had simply ended, though he got the distinct impression that at least [Redacted]
[Redacted]

b6
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1) per ODNI
(b)(3) per ODNI
and FBI
(b)(6)

(TS)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

(U) On March 6, 2018, Edward "Ted" Gistaro was interviewed at his place of employment, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), located at Liberty Crossing II, McLean, Virginia. Present for the interview was ODNI Acting General Counsel Bradley Brooker. Participating in the interview were FBI Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles, and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein.

(b)(7)(C)
(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(5) per DOJ/
OIP

(b)(3) per ODNI
(b)(6) per ODNI
and FBI

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(5) per DOJ/
OIP

(b)(1) per ODNI
(b)(3) per ODNI
and FBI

(b)(6) per ODNI
and FBI

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(b)(1) per ODNI
(b)(3) per ODNI
and FBI

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(5) per DOJ/
OIP

(b)(5) per DOJ/
OIP

(b)(5) per DOJ/
OIP

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)
(b)(5) per
DOJ/OIP

(b)(5) per
DOJ/OIP

(b)(5) per
DOJ/OIP

(b)(1) per ODNI
(b)(3) per ODNI and FBI
(b)(7)(E)

(TS)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

(TS)

~~TOP SECRET~~




(b)(1) per ODNI
(b)(3) per ODNI and FBI
(b)(7)(E)



(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP


(TS)



(b)(1) per ODNI
(b)(3) per ODNI
(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP




(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP



(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP


(U)



(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP



(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP




(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP



(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(U)



(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(U)



(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(TS)

~~TOP SECRET~~



(b)(1) per ODNI
(b)(3) per ODNI and FBI
(b)(7)(E)

(TS) ~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(1) per ODNI
(b)(3) per ODNI and FBI
(b)(7)(E)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)
(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(U)

[Redacted]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(U)

[Redacted]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(U)

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(b)(3)
(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(TS) ~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(1) per ODNI
(b)(3) per ODNI and FBI
(b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(S)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

(U)

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(7)(E)
(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(7)(E)
(b)(5) per DOJ/OIP