U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535 December 1, 2020 MR. JASON LEOPOLD BUZZFEED NEWS 7TH FLOOR 1630 CONNECTICUT AVENUE NW WASHINGTON, DC 20009 FOIPA Request No.: 1432673-000 Civil Action No.: 19-cv-01278 Subject: All 302’s of individuals who were questioned/interviewed by FBI Agents working for the Office of Special Counsel Robert Mueller Dear Mr. Leopold: You were previously advised we were consulting with other government agencies concerning information located as a result of your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. These consultations have been completed and the enclosed material is being released to you with the appropriate exemption noted next to the redacted information pursuant to Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 as noted below. Below you will find checked boxes under statute headings indicating the appropriate exemptions asserted to protect information which is exempt from disclosure. The checked exemption boxes used to withhold the information are further explained in the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions. Section 552 Section 552a (d)(5) (b)(1) (b)(7)(A) (b)(2) (b)(7)(B) (j)(2) (b)(7)(C) (k)(1) (b)(7)(D) (k)(2) (b)(7)(E) (k)(3) (b)(7)(F) (k)(4) (b)(4) (b)(8) (k)(5) (b)(5) (b)(9) (k)(6) (b)(3) 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1) 50 U.S.C § 3024(m)(1) Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 6 (e) 10 U.S.C § 424 (b)(6) (k)(7) 61 pages were reviewed and 42 pages are being released. The appropriate redactions were made by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice/National Security Division (NSD), Department of Justice/Office of Information Policy (DOJ/OIP), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. “Part 1” of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. “Part 2” includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records about yourself or any third party individuals. “Part 3” includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions. Although your request is in litigation, we are required by law to provide you the following information: For questions regarding our determinations, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under “Contact Us.” The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request. If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP’s website: https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified. You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI’s FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foipaquestions@fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state “Dispute Resolution Services.” Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified. See additional information which follows. Sincerely, Michael G. Seidel Section Chief Record/Information Dissemination Section Information Management Division Enclosures Additional Information: The enclosed documents represent the thirteenth release of information responsive to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. This material is being provided to you at no charge. FBI FOIPA Addendum As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs. Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests: (i) 5 U.S.C. § 552(c). Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the www.fbi.gov/foia website. (ii) Intelligence Records. To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist. Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals: (i) Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists. The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual’s name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist. (ii) Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records. The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist. (iii) Requests for Records for Incarcerated Individuals. The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any incarcerated individual pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist. Part 3: General Information: (i) Record Searches. The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. A standard search normally consists of a search for main files in the Central Records System (CRS), an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does not include references, administrative records of previous FOIPA requests, or civil litigation files. For additional information about our record searches, visit www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/requesting-fbi-records. (ii) FBI Records. Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity. (iii) Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets. The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative “FBI file.” An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-historysummary-checks. Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at www.edo.cjis.gov. For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590. (iv) National Name Check Program (NNCP). The mission of NNCP is to analyze and report information in response to name check requests received from federal agencies, for the purpose of protecting the United States from foreign and domestic threats to national security. Please be advised that this is a service provided to other federal agencies. Private Citizens cannot request a name check. EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552 (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order; (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld; (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential; (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ( A ) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ( B ) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ( C ) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, ( D ) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, ( E ) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or ( F ) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual; (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells. SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding; (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals; (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods; (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence; (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056; (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records; (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence; (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process; (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence. FBI/DOJ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOI/PA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET Civil Action No.: 19-cv-1278 / 19-cv-1626 FOIA: 1432673-000 / 1433273-000 PDF Title:19-cv-1278 Release 13 Bates Total Withheld Pages = 19 Bates Page Reference FBI(19cv1278) 5427 FBI(19cv1278) 5428 FBI(19cv1278) 5552 FBI(19cv1278) 5553 FBI(19cv1278) 5554 FBI(19cv1278) 5555 FBI(19cv1278) 5556 FBI(19cv1278) 5557 FBI(19cv1278) 5681 FBI(19cv1278) 5682 FBI(19cv1278) 5759 FBI(19cv1278) 5760 FBI(19cv1278) 5761 FBI(19cv1278) 5762 FBI(19cv1278) 5763 FBI(19cv1278) 5998 FBI(19cv1278) 5999 FBI(19cv1278) 6000 FBI(19cv1278) 6001 Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.) b3; b6 per FBI and DHS; b7A; b7C; b7E b3; b7A; b7E b6; b7A; b7C; b7E b6; b7A; b7C; b7E b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E b3; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E b3 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E b6 per FBI and NSD; b7A; b7C per FBI and NSD; b7E b6 per FBI and NSD; b7A; b7C per FBI and NSD; b7E b3 per DIA; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E b3; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E b3; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E b3; b5 per FBI and DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E (Rev. -l of 5- FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Date ofentn- 09f25f2017 On August l0, 201?, Aaron Nevins was interviewed at the United States Attorney?s Office, 500 East Broward Boulevard, Suite 700, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Counsel for Nevins, Iwas present during the interview. Also present were Special Agents and DOJ National Security Division attorne Nevins 136 per FBI and NSD b7C per FBI and NSD was advised by both NSD attorneyl lhe was not considered a subject. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and nature of the interview, Nevins voluntarily provided the following information: Nevins b5 b7: Nevins I be Nevins [Nevins] After this, Nevinsl b6 Nevins b6 . Nevins Ease- UBflUf20lT Fort Lauderdale, Florida, United States (In Person} File I mi This document contains neither nor conclusions ofthe FBI. [1 is the pnopetty of the FBI and is loaned to your agency: it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. Date drafted 08f14f201T b6 b6 FD-Tsnza (Rev. [15?03-10} bl": Interview of Aaron Nevins .On 08f10f201T .?mc 2 of 5 NevinsI I b6 IHello Florida is a salacious gossip blog consisting of ch mostly state?wide, but some local, gossip.I I INevins I Nevins considered the pseudonym Mark Miewurd the worst kept secret in Tallahassee, admitting locals knew who ran the site, and confirmed this was a play on words for the phrase mark my words. Regarding Guccifer 2.0, Nevins first viewed his Twitter account. Guccifer 2.0's Twitter account linked to his WordPress site. Nevins read a post on Guccifer 2.0?s blog inviting journalists to send him Direct Messages (DM) via Twitter so Nevins did. Nevins recalled the only communication between he and Guccifer 2.0 being Twitter DM. NevinsI be I INevinsI INevins' INevinsI I Nevins I INevinsI I I INevinsI I b6 INevinsI Nevins thought Guccifer 2.0 andfor the DNC hack was probably the :3 . biggest story of the decade.I NevinsI I be . I INevins In December 2016, Nevins spoke with the New York Times (NYT). They agreed to use his pen name. He gave the DMs with Guccifer 2.0 b6 b6 (Rm: b7E Interview of Aaron Nevins .On 08f10f201T .?mc 3 of 5 When the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) contacted Nevins, they did not agree . . . . . . b6 to use his pen name. By this time, Nevins in part gave up and in part grew b7: tired of filtering his communications; he figured the WSJ alreadv had his name so notl Nevinsl b6 Nevinsl b6 Nevins] b6 Nevinsl b6 b6 The last time Nevinsl land Nevins [Nevinsl I 'Nevinsl I I NevinsJ I Nevins asked Guccifer 2.0 about Florida because Florida was Nevins coverage area. He thought being specific in his request, asking about one thing, Florida, helped him get a response. Nevins had no interest in any particular district. b6 Nevins did receive materials from Guccifer 2.0. it was be . 7 reported he received 2.5 I Nevins received the materials from Guccifer 2.0 on Dropbox. b6 190-3022: (Rev. ?S-liR-l?} b7: Interview of Aaron Nevins .On 08f10f201T .?mc 4 of 5 Nevins b6 Nevinsl b5 Nevins b6 Nevins Nevins] I be I I b7: Nevins I Nevinsl lNevins advised b5 lNevinsl Nevins b6 Nevins? b7: Nevins Nevins gave data from Guooifer 2.0 to some reporters. Once he realized there was a lot of information he started to farm it out to reporters b6 across the state. I [Nevinsl Nevins b5 Nevins INevins b5 I b6 R-i?imln b7: at m. - b7E ContinuationoFFD-B?lor Interview of Aaron Nevins .011 08f10f2017? .1?21gc 5 of 5 Nevins b6 Nevinsl I b6 Nevins Nevinsl b6 Nevins b6 I [Nevins] b6 I Nevins] 1 Of 1 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Date ofentt'y 08f28f2018 Assistant Director of the FBI Counterintelligence Division E.W. PRIESTAP was interviewed at his office at FBI Headquarters. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, PRIESTAP provided the following information: PRIESTAP provided to writer copies of five pages of handwritten notes he used to document conversations he participated in between O2f20lT and ?2017. PRIESTAP advised the notes document five conversations he had with EZRA COHEN-WATNICK, then-Senior Director for Intelligence at the National Security Council (NBC), and two conversations he had withl :3 . . . . the detailee of the Counterintelligence Division to the Intelligence Directorate. PRIESTAP retained his original notes. The copies of the five pages of handwritten notes provided by PRIESTAP will be maintained in the 1A section of the case file. 03f23f2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person08f23f2018 it Date donned h?C by I b7E This doeomeut contains neither reeonnuendatious nor conclusions oflhe FBI. [1 is the ptopeny of the FBI and is loaned to your agency: it and its eontents are not to be distributed outside your agency. FBK 19W1 roan). tum: S-R-IU) - of - FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Date ofentt'y le20f2 8 On September l3, 201?, was interviewed at the office of the Special Council located at 395 Street SW, Washington DC by Special Counsel Prosecutors (SCP Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres, SAI Also resent for the interview were atmi land SCPs Weissmann and Andres explained this interview was be voluntary, described the conditions of the proffer and, explained that lying to a federal agent was a crime. After this advisement, provided the following information: Background b6 b6 b6 tm-cstigutionon 091?13i?2017 at washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person} . b6 Fileii I Date dra?ed 09fi5f2017? 1337!: mi This doeunteut contains neither reeonnuendutious nor conclusions oflhe FBI. [1 is the pl?OpCi?l}' of the FBI and is loaned to your agency: it and its eontents are not to be distributed outside your agency. FBK 19W1 (Rev. b6 . Page Conlinuztlionc-FFD-R?lof (Him Interview of .On 09f13f2017? 2of10 b6 1:16 1370 b6 136 EN: b6 b6 1:16 Hi?: b6 1:16 (Rm: ME Continuationc-FFD-B?lof Interview of .011 09f13f2017? .1?21gc 3 of 10 b6 1:16 b6 1:6 b7C received credit for bringing in the Ukraine project. be First MEeting The first meeting between RICK GATES and The Podesta Group occurred in 2012. b6 b7: GATES proposed an opportunity to represent Ukraine. GATES worked with PAUL MANAFORT who had a contract with Party of Regions (FOR) and by extension, UIKTOR YANUKOVICH. MANAFORT was a political consultant and needed lobbyist support. GATES informed those present at the meeting that Podesta Group would be working with FOR. The firm would be called upon to do both public relations and government relations (lobbying) for the client. EEC had understood that Podesta Group would be hired by FOR. While some firms b6 . . . . avo1ded international work because of the increased documentary requirements; this was not a problem for Podesta Group. The firm did extensive international work and would not have a problem filing EARA. b6 FD-Tmza (Rev. 05-03-10} 136 ME Continuationc-FFD-B?lof (Him Interview of .011 09f13f2017? .1?21gc 4 of 10 GATES told those present at the meeting that FOR was pro?west but that the Tymoshenko issue was problematic. The firm would be expected to lobby that Tymoshenko had been properly imprisoned. b6 h?C Second Meeting hG did not know the specific date of this meeting but knew that it occurred before July 4, 2Ul2 and that it was held in the firm?s conference room. There were a lot of people in attendance at this meeting. be I MANAFORT did not hm attend this meeting. The second meeting was a reprise of the first. GATES informed the attendants that the client would be an NGO in Brussels that was being set up. GATES explained they had looked into it and had decided that the NGO would be the client. GATES told the Podesta Group that their client would be the European Centre for a Modern Ukraine This was the first time the Podesta Group had heard that an NGO would be set up. that anyone who did foreign work needed to file under hG FARA except under certain circumstances when the lobbyist can elect to file an LDA. Registering for FARA is complicated due to reporting requirements, registration requirements, contractual regulations, and because PARA filers are required to report every contact for both government relations and public relations work. Under LDA, the requirements are less stringent and public relations is exempt from any reporting. Furthermore, clients are often upset when their contact with the lobbying firm is reported to the US government. was aware that FARA violations were criminal. Egc Because of the compensation structure of the firm, the originator of the client always wanted to close the client. b6 b7: For most clients, the normal course of business would have been to have a proposal writer sit in on a meeting and take detailed notes so that they could later draft a detailed proposal to send the client. E: {Re-.2 b6 Continuationc-FFD-B?lof Interview of .011 09f13f2017? .1?21gc 5 of 10 hG 90* of the tasking to be related to diffusing the he Tymoshenko situation. Following the second meeting, Podesta Group accepted the client. b6 I b?C the second meeting as a continuation of the be first. The nature of work Podesta Group was being asked to perform had b7: not changed. and ECFMU Work ha At some concern that the project seemed to be sovereign representation. Among his that there was no website for where the organization got their money (Rev. mg Continuationc-FFD-B?lof (UfJ?Fe-H-e-y?Interview of .011 09f13f2017? .1?21gc 6 of 10 h? Podssta Group's Work with ECFMU Podesta Group was taking orders from GATES. The policies Gates was advocating would ultimately benefit the government of Ukraine. b5 GATES worked for FOR. I lhad never heard that b6 GATES was from ECFMU. hm understood that FARR was a matter of who was giving direction h? and controlling the actions of the lobbyists. The instructions to Podesta Group came from GATESI Once Podesta Group decided to do an LDA, there was no more discussion of the decision. b6 b7C I the purpose of ECFMU to whichl lglibly b5 respondedl I ECFMU was supportive ch of Ukrainian integration with the West. A political obstacle to Ukraine?s integration with the West was the Tymoshenko case. was not aware of any position the ECFMU took that was divergent ?gc to the Yanukovich regime. If ECFMU was philosophically aligned with with their stated mission, they would have objected to Yanukovich's choice not to sign the EU association agreement. not know where the money came from to pay for Podesta E: Group?s work. Typically a country?s embassy organized government delegations but ECFMU seemed to be directing the visits. No non-sovereign client would ask to set up a delegation visit. b6 1* Cominuztlionc-FFD-S?lof (U?f?tlEll Interview Of .011 09/13f2017' Jung; 7 Of 10 ECFMU had commissioned a report from Skadden on the jailing of Tymoshenko. From the client?s point of view, Skadden had not EEC fulfilled their request because Skadden?s conclusion was not forceful enough. b6 had no conversations with Mercury about the client. b6 h?C Everyone at Podesta had reservations with trying to sell the Tymoshenko b6 issue. b6 b6 b6 ECFMU appeared to be a "contrivance" to avoid being subject to PARA. The nature of work was the kind of work a sovereign government would ask for. It was unusual for an N60 to request that kind of work. ECFMU "looked reverse-engineered" with ECFMU being created for this purpose. that either ECFMU was a brand new entity or it was b6 being created. that he had probably looked ECFMU up on Google and found that there was no website. Most bona fide think-tanks would set up a website. b6 Podesta Group?s business was growing and asked for recommendations.l b6 (Rev. b6 Interview of .On 09f13f201T Ihad no recollection of discussing the legitimacy of ECFMU with ES Regarding the letter from Dick Durbin, Isaid that there was an be effort to find one senator to object to the letterJ lbecame engaged ch with this effort. Senator Manchin was selected as the target for this objection. no recollection of interests in West Virginia. b5 b6 Exhibit 1 . . . b6 was shown a meeting inVite for 2122f2012 with the subject, "Rick b7: Gates meeting re- [sic] representing the Government of Ukraine in b6 Exhibit shown a meeting anlte for 4f2/2012 with the subject, b7C "Ukraine meeting with Rick Gates". this was for the second b6 the clients listed on Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 to be the same. b7C Exhibit 3 b6 i (Rm: na-nH-m} UNCLASSI Conlinuztlionc-FFD-B?lof Interview Exhibit 5 136 hi?: b6 Exhibi 11 b6 1:16 b6 b6 (Rev. 136 b7E Cominuztlionc-FFD-S?lof Interview Of .011 Jung; 10 Of 10 b6 b7C Exhibit Document 17 b6 b6 Document 18 h? h?C b6 t?o-stn tum: 5-8-1t3) 1 Of 2 ALL.- FBI INEDRMATIDN CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIEIED cars oa-os?soso B?I:Ittsr Date ofenti'gr 10f16f2017 I 10 October 2017, Special AgentsI IandI Iinterviewed Idate of Isoc1al security number at the Eisenhower Executive Office Building 1650 Avenue NW, Washington, D. C. After hein