In The Matter Of: United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation Min-U-Script(R) with Word Index UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 1 1 VOLUME XXV 2 IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY 3 4 UNITED STATES 5 VS. 6 MANNING, Bradley E., Pfc. 7 U.S. Army, xxx-xx-9504 8 Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 9 U.S. Army Garrison, 10 Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, 11 Fort Myer, VA 12 COURT-MARTIAL _______________________________________/ 22211 13 14 15 The Hearing in the above-titled matter was 16 continued on Wednesday, July 31, 2013, at 1:25 p.m., at 17 Fort Meade, Maryland, before the Honorable Colonel 18 Denise Lind, Judge. 19 20 21 Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 2 1 DISCLAIMER 2 This transcript was made by a court 3 reporter who is not the official Government reporter, 4 was not permitted to be in the actual courtroom where 5 the proceedings took place, but in a media room 6 listening to and watching live audio/video feed, not 7 permitted to make an audio backup recording for editing 8 purposes, and not having the ability to control the 9 proceedings in order to produce an accurate verbatim 10 transcript. 11 12 This unedited, uncertified draft transcript 13 may contain court reporting outlines that are not 14 translated, notes made by the reporter for editing 15 purposes, misspelled terms and names, word combinations 16 that do not make sense, and missing testimony or 17 colloquy due to being inaudible by the reporter. 18 19 20 21 Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 3 1 APPEARANCES: 2 3 ON BEHALF OF GOVERNMENT: 4 MAJOR ASHDEN FEIN 5 CAPTAIN JOSEPH MORROW 6 CAPTAIN ANGEL OVERGAARD 7 CAPTAIN HUNTER WHYTE 8 CAPTAIN ALEXANDER van ELLEN 9 10 ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED: 11 DAVID COOMBS 12 CAPTAIN JOSHUA TOOMAN 13 MAJOR THOMAS HURLEY 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 4 1 INDEX 2 July 31, 2013 3 4 Witness: ROBERT CARR 5 Examination by: 6 Mr. Fein 7 Mr. Hurley Page 5, 109 69, 111, 116 8 9 Witness: JOHN KIRCHHOFER 10 Examination by: Page 11 Mr. Fein 121, 164 12 Mr. Hurley 146, 190 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 5 1 PROCEEDINGS, 2 BY MR. FEIN: 3 Q And, sir, what did this memorandum -- what 4 type of authorities did it, I guess, give you and the 5 IRTF? 6 A Well, it certainly gave me -- I think it 7 gave me the authority to, one, be the single element 8 within the Department of Defense that was charged with 9 the responsibility of reviewing these documents. 10 It gave me the authority to coordinate 11 broadly across the Department of Defense as I worked 12 with these documents. 13 It gave me the authority to work an Intel 14 mission to understand and provide warning to the 15 Secretary of Defense and I think in there it gave me 16 the authority or the requirement that I would retain or 17 maintain close coordination with the Office of National 18 Intelligence and, in particular, the counter 19 intelligence executive that had some responsibilities 20 for this effort at the national level. 21 Q Sir, did your original tasking and Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 6 1 authorities have any either prohibitions of limitations 2 with your involvement with law enforcement? 3 A 4 limitations. 5 remember whether it was in the document itself, but at 6 least a recognition that our actions would be well 7 coordinated with any law enforcement settlements to 8 ensure that we didn't do anything detrimental to the 9 case. 10 11 Q What I do recall was that -- and I don't And, sir, you mentioned a moment ago one of the tasks was mitigation strategies. 12 13 I don't recall any prohibitions or Generally, what do you mean by that? A To try to -- perhaps mitigation strategies 14 might not be the best word there. 15 word is identify where risk might have resulted. 16 came about as a result of this release of documents and 17 to identify that risk and to inform those folks that 18 may be victims of that risk and to get that word and 19 understanding to them as quick as possible. 20 21 Q Perhaps a better Risk Sir, was the IRTF mission focused on a U.S. government wide assessment or was it DOD centric? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 7 1 A The mission was DOD centric and -- but as 2 this was such an -- as this was such an unusual and a 3 new situation and the magnitude of it was such that we 4 quickly became a center of gravity in terms of 5 expertise of understanding this. 6 broadened that envelope by bringing in Department of 7 State type people, other agencies of the national 8 government. 9 connect with us in an effort to save resources. 10 11 Q 14 Rather than duplicate the effort, begin to Sir, so you used the term -- two terms, unusual and new. 12 13 So we brought in and What do you mean by that, this was an unusual and new situation? A Well, no one had ever seen, witness or had 15 to deal with a release of this number of documents, 16 this number of classified documents, this type of 17 reporting from the battlefield as the war was going on. 18 19 20 21 Q And, sir, speaking of the information, what type of information was the IRTF tasked to review? A The IRTF was initially tasked to review the Afghan files or the CIDNE Afghanistan database that was Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 8 1 leased -- I don't recall the exact number -- 2 70,000-plus files and then we were required to review 3 any other information that we thought had been released 4 from government control into WikiLeaks or anywhere 5 else. 6 Q Sir, how long did the IRTF operate for, 7 approximately? 8 A 9 months. 10 Q I believe we operated for about ten-plus Now, sir, just specifically looking at the 11 IRTF macro level operations, as head of the IRTF, what 12 action or correspondence did you have with senior DOD 13 and U.S. government leadership? 14 15 A So as a matter of routine, I would say there were three things that came to be. 16 First of all, I participated in a daily VTC 17 between the IRTF, the director of national intelligence 18 and the counter-intelligence executive and then we were 19 joined by a series of reps from various agencies across 20 the Intel community and other departments that might 21 have been impacted by this release. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 9 1 The second one was the task force and I 2 released a report to the director of DIA who submitted 3 that report to the Secretary of Defense each and every 4 week and then for at least probably the first 45 days 5 there was a daily or every other day meeting of senior 6 officials just outside of the Secretary of Defense's 7 office down a level where we shared knowledge and tried 8 to understand the issue and went forward. 9 Q Again, sir, on a -- generally speaking with 10 these daily VTCs and these weekly reports up to the 11 Secretary of Defense, what type of information -- what 12 is the gist of that, of either VTC briefs or the 13 reports? 14 A So it was a combination of things. 15 Initially, it was just trying to get the status of the 16 IRTF and understanding the effort that we were 17 undertaking, whether we had all of our resources, how 18 we were going to be configured, out we were going to 19 communicate with people, how we were going to operate 20 in this kind of undefined world that we were creating 21 here. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 10 1 The second part of it was to understand how 2 we were making progress for getting through these 3 documents or understand these documents and have a 4 common understanding of how we were going to push that 5 impact or that risk out to people that needed it. 6 then last, but not least, you know, an attempt to 7 capture the activities that were ongoing in various 8 elements of the government, the questions that we 9 needed answered so we knew what we were working on and, 10 you know, what was the effort ahead, what was the next 11 step so people had a common understanding as we worked 12 through this. 13 Q 14 15 16 And Sir, you used the term "undefined world." What do you mean by that when you described the IRTF? A So, you know, these were our documents. 17 This is not new information to the U.S. government, 18 these are our documents. 19 we've had in our possession, securely in our possession 20 for a long period of time and now all of the sudden 21 this massive amount of data was available to the These are documents that Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 11 1 public, to the adversary, to everyone and we needed to 2 begin to come to grips and understand what those 3 impacts were. 4 That's not something that you do in that 5 volume where you necessarily do. 6 out there, there's something you train, there wasn't a 7 playbook we could go to. 8 move forward kind of on the fly in real-time. 9 Q There's not a course We had to figure this out and Sir, in your 31 years of experience, has a 10 task force like this ever needed to be set up for 11 similar reasons? 12 A Not to my knowledge. 13 Q Sir, what factors drove the priorities of 14 the review effort during the initial days of the IRTF 15 establishment? 16 A So one of the biggest factors was 17 protecting the troops forward and, you know, I think 18 that was probably the very most important one right off 19 the bat. 20 21 We had to understand this data and begin to inform the folks on the battlefield as to what the Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 12 1 potential implications were for them and then give them 2 some reassurance that they didn't have to sit on the 3 top in the middle of a hill in Afghanistan and go 4 through 77,000 documents to find their vulnerabilities. 5 That was our job. 6 from them and that task force was going to work with 7 CentCom to push that data out. 8 foremost. 9 We were going to lift that function That was first and I think the second one was we needed to 10 start making sure that our sources were not vulnerable 11 because we were going to have people that were going to 12 go out and meet with these sources and that kind of 13 stuff, but we needed to make sure that we were doing 14 the right thing. 15 Q Sir, what do you mean by sources? 16 A In the case that I just mentioned, what I 17 mean is folks that go out and talk to people who were 18 providing human information at the request of the U.S. 19 government or the task in the U.S. government back into 20 the system. 21 conversation with a civilian. That's different than just a casual This is sources and Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 13 1 there are some obligations, we have to protect them. 2 And then, as you walk your way down the 3 list of priorities, you get to -- you know, is there 4 anything in here that could hurt the coalition because 5 we had to look out for -- I'm not sure there's another 6 country or department that could get through this 7 amount of data this fast and make sense of it and 8 understand the implications. 9 So we had to know whether our British 10 allies or whether our French friends or whoever else 11 was on the battlefield with us hadn't been put at some 12 risk as a result of our -- of activities. 13 Q So when you just said that no other country 14 would have the ability or department to go through this 15 data this fast, could you please explain to the court? 16 Just put the perspective. 17 18 19 What do you mean this amount of data this fast? A 77,000 documents is a lot and you've got to 20 get it in. You've got to verify that it's actually 21 your data. You've got to make sure that it's the data Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 14 1 that actually was yours and hasn't been manipulated in 2 some way. 3 had to securely have confidence that we knew the data 4 that was out on the Internet and then we had to begin 5 to put technical processes in place so that it wasn't 6 an eyeball line-by-line to figure this thing out. 7 And so we had to get the data together. We We began to use technical capabilities and 8 I am sure that there are certainly private companies, 9 private industries, there are other folks that could do 10 that. 11 that I was talking to as I was going through this, 12 nobody had the wherewithal or the resources to put this 13 together this fast and get to the answers that we 14 needed to get to. 15 But, as a general rule, there was all the allies Q Sir, was that one within the first month or 17 A Oh, absolutely. 18 Q And, sir, how did you determine what 16 so? This was within days. 19 information had been compromised or potentially 20 compromised and needed to be reviewed? 21 A Well, obviously, we started with the data Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 15 1 that we found on the web. 2 the Afghan CIDNE database was out there. 3 that was the start point and that was the priority of 4 the effort. 5 I mean, the Afghan national, So we knew You know, as quick as we got processes 6 going on that, then I begin to shed, you know, five or 7 ten percent of the effort to take on that task that 8 talked about what else is out there, what's missing. 9 The first pointer literally became 10 commentary. 11 something, one of these magazines where there was 12 excerpts in this magazine that talked about chat logs 13 between the Private Manning and individuals within, you 14 know, the community that read wire.com. 15 I think it was wire.com magazine or So we used the data out of those chat logs 16 to begin to take a look at the internal structure and 17 figure out whether that was even possible and, once we 18 realized that it was possible, then we begin to 19 dialogue with the prosecutors to take the next steps 20 forward, to see where we needed to go. 21 THE COURT: Let me interrupt you for just a Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 16 1 second. You said if that was possible. 2 If what was possible? 3 THE WITNESS: So, you know, depending on -- 4 so I think what was said in the wire.com notes, the 5 magazine, took credit for -- I think he used the term 6 Gitmo files and then he talked about files from the 7 CIDNE database in Iraq and talk about that kind of 8 stuff. 9 So what I wanted to do at first was to 10 figure out whether it was even possible for him to have 11 that access from the location he was. 12 validated that that was possible, then we went with 13 getting synced up with the legal system. 14 BY MR. FEIN: 15 Q 16 it now twice. 17 prosecutor, you synced up with the legal system once 18 you identified what's possible. 19 20 21 Once we And, sir, what do you mean by -- you said First, you said you got with the Why and to what extent did you do that? A For a couple of reasons. First of all, the one that hit us in the face was the Iraq logs which, Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 17 1 the magnitude of the Iraq logs, was something on the 2 order of 400,000-plus and the fact of this significant 3 force structure that was in Iraq at the time gave us 4 great concern. 5 require a significant increase in resources and time 6 and we needed to get on it quickly. 7 So to go through that was going to So just to kind of make sure that we were 8 heading in the right direction, we linked with the 9 federal prosecutors to get their understanding and to 10 get some verification that, in fact, this was probably 11 gone. 12 13 Q And just to clarify, sir, because we all say federal prosecutors. You also met with me? 14 A Exactly, right. 15 Q Now, with that, sir, were you getting 16 directions, sir, from the law enforcement or 17 prosecutors or just getting information from them? 18 A I didn't get any direction in terms of 19 things to do. 20 that I'm not doing anything that would preclude 21 prosecution. What I did often ask is to make sure And so I kept -- you know, I had legal Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 18 1 advisors on my team that I wasn't getting direction 2 from. 3 Q And, sir, what was the general 4 classification of the information that IRTF started to 5 review? 6 A 7 8 9 10 11 The classification was U.S. secret and below information. Q At any point, sir, were you concerned that even more highly classified information was being compromised at WikiLeaks? A Yeah, I was very concerned and because, as 12 we learned, as time went on, what was in these logs, 13 this article in wire.com that contained the chat logs, 14 it talked about the Gitmo detainee files, it talked 15 about the Afghan files, it talked about the Iraq files. 16 I think it talked about the department of, say, cables 17 and it also talked about information off a system known 18 as Jaywiks (phonetic). 19 previously talked about. 20 21 MR. HURLEY: So none of the data we Objection as to the relevancy of this information. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 19 1 THE COURT: What is the relevance of this 2 information if it's not disclosed? 3 MR. FEIN: Ma'am, the relevance is simply 4 to have General Carr explain what the left and right 5 remnants of what IRTF did or didn't do. 6 last question, actually, just to say they didn't look 7 at that. 8 THE COURT: All right. 10 MR. FEIN: Yes, ma'am. 11 MR. HURLEY: This was the 9 So let's move on then. We're not, of course, plan on 12 making these continuing objections, but I think you 13 understand -- 14 15 THE COURT: Put it in your filing. MR. FEIN: Go Sir, one moment, please. ahead. 16 17 BY MR. FEIN: 18 Q Sir, now, I'd like to talk about -- you've 19 already referenced a few of them, the different data 20 sets that were reviewed. 21 Specifically, what large data sets did the Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 20 1 IRTF Erie view. 2 A 3 Afghanistan. 4 reviewed the Gitmo files. 5 It reviewed the CIDNE database of It reviewed the CIDNE Iraq files. It I think there was a couple of assorted 6 pieces of papers and videos and things that came out 7 and then there was the State Department cables. 8 not review the entirety of the State Department cables. 9 We did go through the State Department cables and look 10 for indications of where information within there might 11 have an impact on U.S. forces or on the Department of 12 Defense. 13 thorough review of the State Department cables as we 14 did with the Department of Defense information. 15 We did Q But I did not do, you know, a line-by-line Sir, just to clarify one issue. When you 16 say the CIDNE Iraq and CIDNE Afghanistan, do you mean 17 the SigActs from the CIDNE Iraq and Afghanistan 18 databases? 19 20 21 A Exactly, all of those reports that were contained within that database. Q Sir, can you generally characterize what Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 21 1 types of other -- when you said there was a few other 2 documents and videos, how would you characterize those 3 as the types of information other than video? 4 A I'm not sure. You know, there -- it was 5 data that was available on the SIPRNET. 6 classified information up on the SIPRNET. 7 accessed and pulled down and pushed out. 8 9 10 Q It was It had been Sir, prior to your work meeting the IRTF, were you familiar with the CIDNE database and the SigActs? 11 A I was. 12 Q And how so, sir? 13 A We certainly -- we used it in Afghanistan 14 when I was the J2 in Afghanistan and the CIDNE database 15 was a significant topic of discussion in Afghanistan as 16 we worked with our NATO partners to merge our 17 information databases together. 18 So we were constantly working with the NATO 19 team so that the U.S. and the NATO could get on a 20 common database of information in Afghanistan. 21 Q And, sir, from your experience with CIDNE, Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 22 1 did CIDNE contain information that was used by Intel 2 analysts? 3 A It did. It contained information that was 4 used by the operators, by the logisticians as well as 5 by Intel analysts. 6 and an understanding of ongoing reporting on the 7 battlefield. 8 Q 9 It gave you situational awareness And, sir, are you generally familiar with the SigActs that PFC Manning has been found guilty of 10 compromising? 11 A 12 SigActs that are inside this database, yes. 13 14 15 I'm generally familiar with the type of Q Is that from your time as the leading IRTF, A It's the time of leading IRTF as well as sir? 16 participating in reading SigActs on a daily basis in 17 Afghanistan. 18 Q 19 20 21 In general, sir, what type of information was included in the CIDNE SigActs? A It's largely battlefield reporting. It's events that go on in the battlefield that are captured Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 23 1 for command and control purposes for historical records 2 for understanding so that you can build a knowledge 3 database that allows your mission to go forward. 4 Q Sir, did any of the information -- the 5 CIDNE SigActs reveal and aspects of TTPs and how we 6 respond to certain combat situations? 7 A Well, it certainly did. In accumulation, 8 you can certainly begin to appreciate how we might 9 respond when we work medevac operations. You can 10 certainly appreciate incidences and how we respond for 11 things like IED or mortar shells or that kind of stuff. 12 Convoy operations, that kind of stuff. 13 14 15 Q Sir, was there was information about insurgent activity? A There was operational reporting on 16 insurgent activity, absolutely. What you would get is 17 inside the database you have things like patrol 18 reports. 19 they would write a report that might include 20 conversations with local nationals who might tell you 21 their view of insurgent activity in the area and how If a patrol went out and when they came back Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 24 1 they judge it. 2 So, yes, you could capture an understanding 3 and get more information about insurgent activity as a 4 result of looking at that database. 5 Q And, sir, that example you gave, would 6 those reports sometimes include those local nationalist 7 names? 8 A In many cases they were. I don't know 9 exactly, but I think the Afghanistan database alone had 10 us concerned with as many as 900-plus Afghan names that 11 were in there. 12 Q 13 And, sir, did it just include their names or other identifying information? 14 A 15 information. 16 what their position and/or function might be in a 17 particular village. 18 identification of the individual that lives in the 19 third compound down. 20 21 In most cases it had other identifying Certainly in some cases it might include In some cases it might be What you're trying to do is you're trying to build some understanding to pass on to the next Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 25 1 team. So you're building your knowledge. 2 building your information and understanding. 3 You're So if I'm meeting with the shopkeeper at 4 the third store, I want to know I met with him the next 5 time I go out there or the next team that goes out. 6 there is some identifying information. 7 Q So And, sir, was there information in the 8 CIDNE SigActs about individuals, U.S. persons, in those 9 reports? 10 A Absolutely. So in many of those reports, 11 you know, indicate activities and the activities that 12 U.S. forces were taken as they came back and reported 13 it. 14 had stories and some, you know, tough reading 15 associated with the physical injuries that service 16 members were having and in some cases it was the story 17 about how an individual might have lost a limb or how 18 they may have died. 19 But they also included medevac reports that often Q Sir, based on your experience as the ISAF 20 (phonetic) J2, did you believe that information could 21 be used by our adversaries? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 26 1 A I did. 2 Q And why -- do you today, sir, or did you? 3 A I did. 4 MR. HURLEY: Objection. It's cumulative to 5 what we received during the merits portion of the 6 trial. 7 we would say it's cumulative for that purpose, ma'am. Do you believe it could, yet how could it and 8 9 THE COURT: Is your question could or is your question did? 10 MR. FEIN: Well, eventually it will be 11 "did", but it's leading up to did it. 12 foundation to get to that ultimate question. 13 THE COURT: 14 Q Go ahead. BY MR. FEIN: 15 Overruled. I'm laying the Sir, based off of your experiences of the 16 ISAF J2, did you believe that information could be used 17 by our adversaries? 18 A Absolutely. 19 Q And why do you believe it could have been A In particular to the Afghan files, one of 20 21 used? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 27 1 our primary mission is to protect the population over 2 there and we had to get close to the population. 3 had to understand the population and we had to protect 4 them. 5 We If the adversary had more clarity as to 6 which people in the village were collaborating with the 7 U.S. forces, then there is a chance that those folks 8 could be at greater risk. 9 10 11 Q Sir, are you familiar the Net-Centric diplomacy database? A I am. I believe that sometimes we refer to 12 that as the Department of State cables that we 13 reviewed. 14 Q And how are you familiar with that, sir? 15 A Two ways. One as a J2 and my analyst, you 16 know, routinely accessed that data to gain more 17 understanding, more situational, to understand 18 pol-military activities that were ongoing in a 19 particular country or environment. 20 21 And then number 2, as part of the IRTF, once I realized that that was gone I had to, you know, Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 28 1 begin to learn more about that particular database. 2 Q 3 Sir, you used the term pol-mil. What do you mean by pol-mil? 4 A Political military relationships. So it 5 was -- you know, as a military command in Iraq, you've 6 got to work your relations with the Afghan political 7 leadership in coordination with the Department of 8 State. 9 Q Sir, in terms of the information within the 10 Department of State cables and specifically DOD 11 information, what type of DOD information was contained 12 within those cables? 13 A I don't know that I specifically recall all 14 the DOD type stuff in there. 15 Department of State cables that talked about their 16 negotiation of deployment, military training teams of 17 the various countries throughout the world and how that 18 negotiation was going, status of forces and all of that 19 kind of stuff, and how they would be protected in that. 20 21 Certainly there was There were numerous cables in there that talked about the interaction between the defense Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 29 1 attaches and the host nation ministry of defense and 2 they were very blunt and sometimes critical of how that 3 particular host nation responded. 4 So that created fractures between our 5 ability to get in there and communicate. 6 there was data in there that -- you know, to get to 7 places like Iraq and Afghanistan, you have got to rely 8 on a lot of allies, you've got to rely on a lot of 9 countries to work your supply lines and ensure you can 10 take care of your forces and all of those supply lines, 11 all of those efforts required negotiation between the 12 U.S. government and the host government. 13 ultimately, it affects our ability as DOD to do our 14 mission. 15 And I believe Then, So I think there was some instances in 16 there where some of those more difficult discussions 17 might have been played out in public as result of these 18 cables. 19 Q Sir, when you say as a result of these 20 cables, are those the cables that -- the compromised 21 cables by PFC Manning? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 30 1 A Yeah, certainly they were all compromised 2 at the time they left the security of the U.S. 3 government. 4 actually been fully released into the open, but 5 obviously some of them have. 6 Q 7 8 9 I don't know how many of those cables have Yes, sir. Why was the Department of State reporting a concern to the Department of Defense? A The Department of State was reporting a 10 concern to the Department of Defense because the 11 Department of State took a step a number of years ago 12 to share with the Department of Defense those cables 13 that they thought would be of benefit to military 14 leaders. 15 So over a period of time, they moved cables 16 from their internal State Department system and they 17 provided them through a portal on the SIPRNET to be 18 accessible to the Department of Defense. 19 interagency coordination, great opportunity for 20 military folks to be more wired into what was going on. 21 It allowed our Intel and our operators to have much Great Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 31 1 more enhanced situational awareness of what's going on. 2 The fact that we didn't secure -- you know, 3 that there was a crime that took place and if those 4 documents got out, the State Department felt that we 5 had let them down. 6 7 MR. HURLEY: Ma'am, can we take a break and have a [Inaudible.] during that break? 8 THE COURT: 9 MR. HURLEY: 10 THE COURT: 11 MR. FEIN: 12 THE COURT: 13 sir. 14 How long would you like? Ten minutes would be fine. Any objection? No, ma'am. Once again, same rules apply, We are going to take a brief recess until ten minutes after 2:00. 15 THE CLERK: 16 (There was a recess taken at 1:57 and the 17 All rise. trial resumed at 2:11.) 18 THE CLERK: All rise. 19 THE COURT: Please be seated. The court is 20 called to order. Let the record reflect all parties 21 present in the court at the last recess our again Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 32 1 present in court. 2 Proceed. 3 BY MR. FEIN: 4 Q 5 The witness is on the witness stand. Sir, before I proceed, I just want to get some points clarified from you. 6 When you talked about or when you testified 7 earlier about the IRTF in the original mission, was the 8 IRTF focused on the original data from the databases 9 when you talked about looking at the Lamo chats and 10 pulling that information or was the focus on the 11 information that was sitting on the WikiLeaks website? 12 A The first function and the first priority 13 was to deal with the information that was sitting on 14 the WikiLeaks website. 15 Secretary of Defense that was for us to then provide 16 him warning and review all other documents that are 17 expected to be in the hands of WikiLeaks as a result of 18 this activity. 19 Q But there was a task by the Sir, in the early fall of 2010 when the 20 department -- when the IRTF was reviewing the State 21 Department cables, how did you determine that Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 33 1 population of documents to review? 2 A We had a -- we got a mirror image of that 3 data that we thought was in the database as of a 4 certain particular date. 5 exactly what was going to come out on the website or 6 anything -- if it had come out, we certainly had an 7 opportunity to see it. 8 9 10 But what we were looking at was a mirror image of those records as they existed at the time that they were likely taken from the secure environment. 11 Q 12 13 So we didn't know, you know, Thank you, sir. Sir, are you familiar with the -- you mentioned earlier the JTF Gitmo documents. 14 How are you familiar with those documents? 15 A Through the IRTF process, we certainly had 16 to review those documents and then I have some 17 familiarity with those documents as a result of my job 18 on the -- when I was the assistant J2 on the joint 19 staff, I had a role in the detainee processes of the 20 joint staff and we used to look at those as we reviewed 21 cases. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 34 1 2 Q Sir, was the compromise of this information a concern to the Department of Defense? 3 A It was. 4 Q Why, sir, in your role as overseeing IRTF 5 was that a concern? 6 A It was a concern in a number of ways. The 7 first one is that -- I mean, these are pretty dangerous 8 people who have a number of dangerous friends and 9 allies they were working with that are sworn to do us 10 harm. 11 Up until the release of those files, the 12 adversary had no idea what knowledge we had obtained 13 from them. 14 we were able to put together or not put together. 15 So they had no idea how much of that puzzle The second thing of significant concern was I 16 think in those particular documents might have been 17 some of the first time that the broader public gained 18 some understanding as to how some of these folks were 19 detained and captured. 20 21 Q Now, sir, I assume that was what the potential threat was when the IRTF was looking at it in Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 35 1 regards to if it was published or not or released or 2 not, correct? 3 A That's exactly right. I mean, I couldn't 4 wait to the release to figure out and tell someone of 5 the potential risk. 6 folks could figure out if there were any mitigation 7 charts. 8 these folks were detained, how some of these folks were 9 captured and in many cases it was a result of I had to get ahead of that so that In those documents we talked about how some of 10 cooperative efforts between two governments and 11 sometimes those activities were not publicly known and 12 foreign governments were very concerned, should that 13 data get out, it had the potential for bringing down a 14 particular ruling coalition somewhere. 15 Q Now, sir, I'd like to focus your testimony 16 at this point about the initial concerns about all the 17 leaks now that -- 18 19 20 21 A If I could go back, just one more thing on the detainee piece because I think this is important. At the time, we were trying to move people out of Gitmo. We were trying to repatriate them to Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 36 1 either their own country or second countries. 2 involved negotiations between our Department of State 3 and foreign governments and so, you know, everything 4 that was contained in those DABs were not part of that 5 negotiation process. 6 So that So there was a delta between what we were 7 saying and now what potentially had the possibility of 8 coming out into the public light. 9 been a delta between what the foreign government was 10 saying and what they had told their people and that 11 could, in fact, cause conflict between two nations and 12 stop our efforts to move forward on the Guantanamo. 13 Q There might have Sir, across all the data sets, 14 approximately how much information in total did IRTF 15 review? 16 A You know, I think in the cumulative we were 17 talking about something in the magnitude of 800,000 18 documents. 19 the Iraq database. 20 every document out of the Afghan database and we 21 reviewed every document out of the Gitmo files. We reviewed every single document out of So 490-some thousand. We reviewed Again, Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 37 1 on the NCDs, we only did snapshots and things that we 2 thought had implications directly to the Department of 3 Defense. 4 Q Sir, did the size of the compromised 5 information cause any specific concerns for the U.S. 6 government and our foreign partners? 7 A Absolutely. You know, from a foreign 8 partner standpoint, as I said on the Gitmo files, you 9 know, when they talked to the United States and there's 10 classified information, they expect us to have an 11 obligation to protect it and we're protecting it for 12 ourselves and for them. 13 When this data got out, there was a number 14 of foreign partners that were routinely engaged with me 15 who became greatly concerned whether we were still a 16 trusted partner and whether we could still engage in 17 Intel operations with them and they wanted to know what 18 the extent of this is. 19 we stop cooperation and how bad is this going to be? 20 21 Q How far was this going? Should And, sir, why was it a concern if other nations doubted our ability to guard our classified Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 38 1 information? 2 A It's absolutely critical. It was critical 3 for us to have trust in reliance in the war zone with 4 our partners. 5 special operations forces around the world that had 6 partners. 7 alone. 8 ability for nations to work together for common good. 9 It was absolutely critical in our In so many operations we don't do this We have partners and we reply on trust and the Q Sir, did the IRTF have any -- and you, 10 specifically, have any specific concerns about how the 11 compromised data might impact the Iraq and Afghanistan 12 wars at the time? 13 A I did. Very much so. The biggest one was 14 to protect our sources and to protect our troops that 15 were on the ground out working those particular 16 sources. 17 The other thing was to -- concern that we 18 keep the momentum going and we needed to continue to 19 dialogue on the battlefield. 20 the battlefield. 21 local population. We needed to go out on We needed to build relations with the We needed them to keep talking to Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 39 1 us. We needed to understand what with going on. 2 This is a difficult environment to 3 understand. You need that information to continue to 4 come on. 5 concerned, in some cases, that, you know, folks might 6 choose not to talk to us anymore because of information 7 that would come out on here could be detrimental to 8 their livelihood or their ability to function in that 9 environment. 10 Q You need that dialogue and we were very So earlier you testified in general about 11 the steps and priorities that IRTF had and you just 12 talked about sources. 13 14 Sir, what was the duty to notify? A So if the United States intelligence 15 community has created an arrangement with an individual 16 and that arrangement is operating on behalf of the U.S. 17 Intel community, to gather knowledge and report back to 18 us, that becomes a human source. 19 regulatory or a legal obligation to protect that 20 particular source. 21 I think we have a When this data all came out and the Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 40 1 hundreds of names that were in there, they were not 2 necessarily -- not all of these names were legitimate 3 intelligence sources that were committed to operating 4 on our behalf. 5 villagers that were cooperating with patrols and 6 soldiers as they went through as they talked from the 7 police chief to the captain so that they would begin to 8 work together in a security operation. 9 legal or regulatory obligation, but I think as the They were relationships of local I didn't have a 10 secretary and others defined it, we had a moral 11 obligation. 12 So we created the concept of, instead of a 13 duty to warn, it was a duty to notify. 14 through the process to evaluate each and every name as 15 to whether their name being released within this 16 context of data put them at a greater risk. 17 tried to characterize it and we pushed that forward and 18 we allowed local commanders to make that decision as to 19 whether they wanted or needed to put a soldier in 20 harm's way to go notify this particular individual. 21 Q So we went And we Sir, how did the task force identify these Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 41 1 2 individuals that ultimately we had a duty to notify? A First and foremost was just, you know, 3 identify by name which is a very difficult task given 4 the name constructs that we were dealing with and 5 over -- you know, one particular name might happen to 6 be in the databases multiple times and so we tried to 7 match them up, narrow them down as best we can, 8 identify a name, attach him to another -- a number of 9 reports, work with CentCom, work with the analyst and 10 try to put a picture together as to whether this 11 individual, as a result of the things he's saying, 12 might be at an additional risk than before the data 13 came out and that we used that to make a risk 14 assessment and we pushed that down in cooperation with 15 CentCom to the ground forces. 16 17 18 Q Sir, why was this information then given to CentCom? A CentCom being the higher command for the 19 Afghan and the Iraq war. Rather than come directly 20 from the national or DOD level, we worked through 21 CentCom. We needed their team work, we needed their Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 42 1 cooperation, we needed their expertise and we needed a 2 process flow. 3 Q 4 Sir, are you aware of whether anyone was actually harmed as a result of these compromises? 5 MR. HURLEY: 6 THE COURT: 7 A Objection. Overruled. As a result of the Afghan logs, I only know 8 of one individual that was killed. 9 an Afghan national. The individual was The Afghan national had a 10 relationship with the United States government and the 11 Taliban came out publicly and said that they killed him 12 as a result of him being associated with the 13 information in these logs. 14 MR. HURLEY: Ma'am, we may object again as 15 to relevance. 16 about how this person wasn't listed in the WikiLeaks 17 disclosures. 18 among those names, among the hundreds of names he 19 talked about. 20 21 General Carr is going to going to talk This individual's name wasn't listed THE COURT: Is this, what you're testifying to, tied to the information in the disclosures in any Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 43 1 way? 2 THE WITNESS: The Taliban killed him and 3 tied him to the disclosures. 4 for this individual's name in all of the disclosures. 5 The name was not there. 6 behalf of the Taliban threatening all of the others out 7 there. 8 was not in the disclosures. It was a terrorist act on But the name of the individual that was killed 9 10 We went back and searched THE COURT: Objection. MR. FEIN: Sustained. Move Yes, ma'am. on. 11 12 BY MR. FEIN: 13 Q Sir, with the names being in these reports, 14 how does having individuals' names in our report impact 15 our operations with local nationals? 16 A Well, their interaction with our soldiers 17 is critical. You can go into a village and we work 18 with a local government. 19 need the mayor, we need the civil leaders within that 20 town to work with us and cooperate and talk to us and 21 help us build a civil society. We need the police chief, we Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 44 1 So the concern was if their names came out 2 and they thought that their conversations with the 3 United States was no longer, you know, comfortable or 4 protected, then they would back off from those 5 conversations and less interactions which would slow 6 our momentum and, in fact, our overall mission success. 7 We saw signs of that and we signs where 8 there was no impact. 9 that quit talking to us as a result of their releases. 10 11 12 Q There are some people out there Sir, did you determine there's a requirement to notify our foreign partners? A I did on a couple of levels. One, I was 13 directed by more senior government officials to ensure 14 that I provided sufficient transparency to key allies 15 and I routinely met with representatives of their 16 government once a week to ensure that there was enough 17 transparency and they weren't surprised by the 18 potentially harmful statements in the public that got 19 out as a result of this. 20 21 The second one was that, as we talked earlier, in Afghanistan we were trying to get the NATO Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 45 1 team and the U.S. team to get their information in a 2 common database. 3 determined to be in this release was a number of 4 documents that was not originated by the United States 5 community. 6 documents and so, even though those documents hadn't 7 come out, I took the step with approval of my 8 leadership to transmit knowledge of that information to 9 each country. Part of the data that was later These were actually NATO originated 10 THE COURT: 11 MR. HURLEY: Yes? Objection, relevance. Is this 12 what -- is this information that's charged and PFC 13 Manning was found guilty of based? 14 description, it's not. 15 relevancy of it. 16 17 On the witness's THE COURT: So we're objecting as to the Is this the information that was included in the CIDNE I and A database? 18 THE WITNESS: 19 THE COURT: 20 Q Overruled. BY MR. FEIN: 21 Yes. Sir, what specific steps did the IRTF take Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 46 1 2 to address these concerns? A Again, we met with our foreign partners on 3 a routine basis and in the case of the Afghan files 4 that NATO originated, we consolidated those and pushed 5 them back to them as quickly as possible notifying them 6 that this data was no longer under the control of the 7 U.S. government and had been compromised so that they 8 could do their own review and come to their own 9 conclusions at what risk their people may be in. 10 Q Sir, why did you decide that the IRTF 11 needed to send these letters, this information to 12 foreign partners? 13 A Because the ability to sustain the trust of 14 our NATO allies in Afghanistan and the need to continue 15 to move forward in building the information sharing 16 environment there, we could not afford for us to hang 17 on to this knowing that it was out there without giving 18 them a chance to protect their soldiers just like we 19 were going to do trying to do everything we could to 20 protect our own soldiers. 21 Q Sir, do you recall when -- I guess in Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 47 1 2 3 4 context to the IRTF stating that this occurred? A Probably within the first 30 days we came to that conclusion that that data had been compromised. Q Now, in reference to what you testified 5 earlier about personal information of U.S. soldiers, 6 you mentioned that the city reports also contain PII. 7 8 Did the IRTF conduct any type of process to identify this information? 9 A We did. 10 Q And the actual data? 11 A Yes, we did. We went through all the data 12 to identify where PII had been released into the open 13 and we notified that service member's service, whether 14 it was Army, Navy, Air Force, marine, we pushed it to 15 back to the service so they could take the appropriate 16 and necessary actions to protect the individuals. 17 18 19 Q And why, sir? Why transfer it to over to the services like the Army G1? A It did go to the Army G1 in particular 20 because it was a service function and not something the 21 IRTF was doing. We were identifying the risk and Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 48 1 moving it to people that could take the appropriate 2 actions to mitigate any damage. 3 Q Sir, why did you feel that it was important 4 to find this type of information particularly the 5 historical information about our soldiers that were 6 killed or injured? 7 A Well, in a case of PII, I think we had some 8 legal obligation when PII data is released out into the 9 open as a result of government activities. 10 In the case of medical data, the concern 11 was two-fold. 12 warning to families who may have to relive events that 13 were very uncomfortable and significant emotional 14 events as a result of their loved ones either losing an 15 arm or a leg. 16 First of all, we needed to provide So we tried to identify that as quickly as 17 we could, get it back into the particular service and 18 allow them to continue to help that family work through 19 this and to give them some warning before they open up 20 their Internet computer and have to relive a very 21 unfortunate event. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 49 1 The second thing is that, if you recall 2 this particular database was largely based on first 3 reports. 4 report off the battlefield and every single death on a 5 battlefield gets investigated and a body of knowledge 6 comes together so that you inform that family as to 7 what really happened to their loved out there on the 8 battlefield. 9 It's spot reports SigActs. It's that first That first report is not always the most 10 accurate. 11 services a quick opportunity as they could to get that 12 data to the family and bring them in and warn them that 13 they don't be misled by what's going to hit the 14 Internet when the next release comes out. 15 our attempt, just to try to save the emotional impact 16 from soldiers who had already lost family members or 17 lives. 18 Q So we wanted to make sure that we gave the Sir, in reference to attache operations? 19 MR. HURLEY: 20 THE COURT: 21 Q So that was Again, objection. Got it. Sir, in reference to the attache Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 50 1 operations, you testified earlier in your capacity as 2 the DCHT director that you oversaw attaches. 3 4 5 What are the general responsibilities of defense attaches? A A defense attache either represents a 6 service or represents a Department of Defense as a 7 representative to a foreign government. 8 they are the interlocutor with a ministry of defense or 9 a foreign military, army, navy, air force or marine. 10 They coordinate activities. In particular, They 11 coordinate visits. 12 work security assistance. 13 that help us grow together as coalition partners and 14 militaries. 15 of liaison with the local ministry of defense or 16 service. 17 Q They coordinate cooperation. They They build relationships So their job involves an incredible amount Sir, how do -- if at all, do defense 18 attaches collect information important to the 19 Department of Defense? 20 21 A Well, in that conversation they learn things no different than a soldier out on the Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 51 1 battlefield who's been talking to the local police 2 chief. He captures things. 3 So defense attaches do, in fact, capture 4 information and they let us have an understanding of 5 how a particular ministry of defense feels. 6 what's their position on a particular issue? 7 want to buy this new weapon system? 8 buy -- so all of that comes back in reports and 9 dialogues and that adds to the body of information that 10 11 I mean, Do they Do they want to we contain. Q Sir, in your role as director of DCHC, were 12 you familiar with the impact that the disclosures had 13 on defense attache operations? 14 A I was. Very much so. 15 Q And how are you familiar, sir? 16 A I'm familiar because there were a number of 17 attaches in a number of different countries whose 18 relationship and ability to interact with that country 19 was either stopped, it was minimized, it degraded or it 20 was -- you know, their ability to do their job -- 21 MR. HURLEY: I'm sorry, we would reiterate Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 52 1 our objection, our hearsay objection and this 2 information, we don't believe, is otherwise admissible. 3 In the position of defense, this is inadmissible 4 hearsay. 5 do the probative value -- essentially, the 403 analysis 6 that's required under 703 to determine if the 7 sentencing authority should hear this information, Your 8 Honor. 9 10 So under 703 we would request that the court THE COURT: Major Fein, is the information hearsay? 11 MR. FEIN: Ma'am, may we have a moment? 12 THE COURT: 13 MR. FEIN: Yes. (Pause.) Ma'am, the United States 14 contends, first, it is hearsay but it is the same 15 subject matter that was relied on by other experts in 16 this field, General Carr. 17 THE COURT: That's not my issue. Hearsay, 18 then, under RCA703. 19 probative value in helping me evaluate the opinion? 20 21 MR. FEIN: Does the government -- what is the Ma'am, the probative value here is that General Carr was the head of the entire attache Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 53 1 system as the director of DCHC. 2 opinion on whether that system was impacted. 3 THE COURT: He's offering his No, he's not. He's giving 4 factual information that's hearsay right here. 5 haven't elicited an opinion. 6 MR. FEIN: You Yes, ma'am, but I'm building up 7 to that, actually. 8 of that opinion on how he knew this information, how he 9 could give an opinion on it to fact. 10 This is the foundational elements THE COURT: Why don't we do this? I'm 11 going to sustain the defense objection. 12 to the opinion and if it comes up on cross-examination, 13 you can start doing this on redirect and this is true 14 for all of the factual matters. 15 MR. FEIN: 16 Q Yes, ma'am. BY MR. FEIN: 17 Let's just get Do you have an opinion about whether the 18 attaches you were responsible for were affected by the 19 WikiLeaks releases? 20 A Yes. 21 Q How confident, sir, are you on that Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 54 1 opinion? 2 3 A I am extremely confident because it was the data that was reported up through the system. 4 Q And, sir, what is your opinion about how 5 the attaches across-the-board that you were responsible 6 for were affected by the WikiLeaks releases? 7 A I think there were a number of them 8 affected, that they were affected in many very 9 different ways. Some of them were absolutely sealed 10 off for a period of time until that confidence could be 11 rebuilt. 12 know, a degradation of access and ability to do their 13 job. 14 imagine the number of countries in the world but not 15 every country was mentioned in the WikiLeaks. 16 one took it individually because they were affronted by 17 the data that was now public about them and their 18 relationship with the United States. 19 20 21 Others had only smaller impacts and, you But it went across a broad swath. Q Yes, sir. As you can But each And why, sir, then -- well, is that a concern of yours, sir, with that impact? A It certainly is a concern of mine because I Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 55 1 need to maintain those relationships for a whole number 2 of reasons. 3 in various countries that we needed to maintain contact 4 with and we needed to know that we had the full support 5 of that host nation. 6 Pakistan. 7 In some cases, we had troops on the ground A classic example would be Q We needed -Sorry, thank you. Just based off the 8 court's previous ruling for the defense, we'll just 9 move on from here. 10 Sir, now, I'd like you to focus your 11 attention on information sharing. 12 information sharing so important to the intelligence 13 defense DOD intelligence community? 14 A Sir, why is Well, it's critical in the sense that if 15 we're talking about Intel sharing, then it's critical 16 that a senior Intel officer at whatever level is 17 providing his commander the best assessment and the 18 best information available based on an all source 19 conclusion. 20 21 You don't want to know that you're only getting 70 percent of the pie as you go in and tell the Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 56 1 story. You could be absent critical factors that might 2 change your conclusions and, ultimately, could affect 3 the decisions that a commander would make. 4 So having confidence that the necessary 5 information is being shared up and down the chain 6 appropriately as well as laterally across the various 7 agencies and funneling into that J2 is critical to 8 success. 9 Q Sir, how is the intelligence -- how has 10 intelligence shared within the U.S. government changed 11 post 9-11, sir? 12 A Well, up until the WikiLeaks releases. I mean, post 9-11, the system began to move 13 in amazing ways to ensure that information got to the 14 people that could need it to help both defend the 15 United States as well as in those areas where we had 16 troops in harm's way. 17 So across the board you begin to see more 18 and more instances of pipes and information flows being 19 opened so that people could have the confidence that 20 they had the best information that our nation could 21 provide into the right hands and as we got deeper and Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 57 1 we became -- you know, as you go through something like 2 a war, you get better and you do things better and 3 better. 4 of ways that were very positive. 5 So that continued to move forward in a number Q Sir, did you experience or observe any 6 impact information sharing with the United States 7 government after Private First Class Manning's 8 compromising? 9 A I did. 10 MR. HURLEY: Objection. If the witness is 11 going to talk about and I'm sure from the pretrial 12 interview he is, a choice of the federal government to 13 do one thing or another, we would submit that the 14 decision of the U.S. government policy makers is not 15 directed related to PFC Manning -- 16 MS. OVERGAARD: I got that down. You can put that in your 17 filing. It's the objection we talked 18 about before. 19 doesn't fall within RCA1004 I will disregard it. 20 BY MR. FEIN: 21 Q I'll hear the evidence and if I find it Sir, in your experience, did you experience Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 58 1 or observe after Private First Class Manning's 2 disclosures, an impact to the information sharing 3 within the United States government? 4 A I don't have a -- the answer to the 5 question is absolutely yes. What you have is you have 6 a reluctance. 7 provide that information down to the lowest levels 8 because they no longer trust the folks that are working 9 that information from protecting it and, therefore, You have people making a reluctance to 10 protecting their ability to continue to get that 11 information. 12 Q And, sir, why is trust so important in this 13 process of information sharing within the U.S. 14 government? 15 A Trust is absolutely critical. In some 16 cases, there's millions of dollars of investment that 17 go in to get a particular capability and we need to 18 ensure that we take the appropriate actions to protect 19 that so that that capability will be sustained and 20 provide goodness and value over a long period of time. 21 The other aspect, there's the trust and Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 59 1 confidence that our own folks that are going into 2 harm's way have not been betrayed as a result of 3 release of information that now provides an adversary 4 advantage and then in the human world, again, as we 5 mentioned earlier, you have a responsibility to protect 6 your source and if all of the sudden, if the 7 information that they're providing then gets released 8 into the open and the adversary can figure out -- the 9 counter-intelligence agencies of other foreign 10 countries can all of the sudden figure out who these 11 sources are. 12 continue to do that will not be there and in some 13 cases, in some countries their life will be in harm. 14 Q It's a nasty world and their ability to Sir, how much of your military career have 15 you been involved with access to classified 16 information? 17 A My entire career. 18 Q During your career, sir, did you also 19 supervise personnel who had access to classified 20 information? 21 A In nearly every assignment. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 60 1 Q Did that include junior enlisted personnel? 2 A Absolutely. 3 Q Sir, in your experience, were junior 4 enlisted personnel and even junior officers, senior 5 officers, senior enlisted generally committed to 6 protecting classified information that they have access 7 to? 8 A Absolutely. 9 Q And why did you not question that 10 commitment, sir? 11 12 MR. HURLEY: Objection. Relevance to this question. 13 THE COURT: 14 Q Go ahead. BY MR. FEIN: 15 Overruled on that. The question is: Why didn't you question 16 that commitment, sir, of everyone who worked for you or 17 you worked with on protecting classified information? 18 A Loyalty, performance, the need to have the 19 information to do their job, continued demonstration of 20 capabilities and basically commander's confidence in 21 them. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 61 1 There are cases where we had to remove 2 individuals from access to classified information and 3 you look for various factors that might make them more 4 of a risk. 5 that confidence, that they need that information to do 6 the job and they reward you with an absolutely great 7 job. 8 Q But, overwhelmingly, soldiers provide you And why is that necessary, sir? 9 THE COURT: 10 objection, but I've got the point. 11 MR. FEIN: 12 Q Yes, ma'am. BY MR. FEIN: 13 I know I didn't sustain the Sir, in your experience, were there any 14 physical security measures designed to ensure proper 15 handling of classified information? 16 17 18 A Absolutely. There's a number of various measures that were critical. Q Can you please briefly describe the types 19 of physical measures that you've experienced to protect 20 classified information? 21 A In some cases, depending on the environment Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 62 1 you're in, you may be required to physically be present 2 with the material and the two-man rule. 3 You might have a case where it has to be 4 locked up into safes of various definition. 5 got, you know, the construct of a particular facility 6 needs to be accredited in a way that classified 7 information would be there. 8 9 You've You often have guard forces that surround a facility that has classifieds information and, of 10 course, they have a set of rules that are put in place 11 to provide both a deterrence and confidence that 12 classified information is sustained within the facility 13 that it's supposed to be. 14 Q Sir, with all of these different types of 15 security measures, is there any measure that could have 16 prevented someone from compromising classified 17 information? 18 A 19 I don't know that any of them are necessarily foolproof. 20 Q And why, sir? 21 A The amount of effort would be one. You Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 63 1 know, you could -- if a person has gone wrong, you 2 could come out of a facility with classified 3 information, you know, tucked inside your sock, tucked 4 inside your cargo pocket. 5 different places either in satchel bags or on your 6 body. 7 MR. HURLEY: Ma'am, I'm sorry. 8 object. 9 General Carr's expertise. 10 It could be in many We again In this instance, it's beyond the scope of He's not offered as an information assurance expert. 11 THE COURT: I'm going to overrule it on 12 that. Major Fein, this is very cumulative to what is 13 going on in the merits a little bit. 14 point and move on. 15 MR. FEIN: Yes, ma'am. 16 this section, one final question. 17 BY MR. FEIN: 18 Q Establish the Your Honor, for Sir, what ultimate then prevents from your 19 experience, sir, an intelligence professional from 20 disclosing classified information that they learn 21 about? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 64 1 A It's their own values. It's their legal 2 obligation. 3 we put in. 4 could be a SCIF and you can't stop that. 5 data that comes in that all of us start to acquire over 6 a period of time that we do our work, there's nothing 7 that you can do to prevent that accumulation of 8 knowledge in there. 9 confidence of the people that, when we walk out, they 10 Q The amount of You have to rely on the trust and Yes, sir. Sir -- I'm sorry for bouncing back and forth, but back to the IRTF. 13 14 I mean, at the end of the day, my head would do the appropriate thing and protect it. 11 12 It's their -- it's the trust factor that Did IRTF -- did you direct any way for the IRTF to capture its findings, its ultimate conclusions? 15 A There was a final report that was done and 16 signed out as we closed down the IRTF in the summer of 17 2011. 18 19 Q that report was published? 20 21 And was the impact to DOD complete when A No, the impact of DOD continued to be on that. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 65 1 2 Q Why did the task force then stand down and the report get published prior to that? 3 A It was stood down because we had reviewed 4 all the documents. 5 a set of criteria and attempted to understand them and 6 understand the implication of when they would come out 7 and we attempted to quantify that, put that in writing 8 and close the task force up. 9 10 Q We had looked through them through Sir, in your opinion, was that IRTF review necessary? 11 A 12 continue. 13 It was critical to us to have confidence to We needed to figure out where the risks were. 14 Q And why, sir? 15 A It would have been morally unconscionable 16 to have all of this data out there and not have 17 somebody take a look at it as to how much risk was 18 being placed on a U.S. soldier or on the U.S. Intel 19 system or on, you know, our ability to continue 20 relations within the world. 21 Q Sir, if -- would the impact would have been Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 66 1 more severe if IRTF had not acted so quickly? 2 MR. HURLEY: 3 THE COURT: 4 THE WITNESS: Objection, speculation. Do you know? I do know of a couple of 5 cases that I think it would have been significantly 6 more severe had we not acted in the way we acted. 7 THE COURT: 8 Q Overruled. BY MR. FEIN: 9 All right. Sir, could you please -- first, answer the 10 question. Would the impact have been more severe if 11 the IRTF had not acted so quickly and forcefully? 12 A Yes. 13 Q And why is that, sir? 14 A I think in the particular case, when we had 15 come to an understanding and completely reviewed the 16 495 or 400,000-plus documents out of the Iraq files and 17 we went to great lengths to work with CentCom and the 18 U.S. forces in Iraq to have a full understanding and 19 because we had that understanding of what was in there, 20 we were able to take that knowledge and go to the Iraqi 21 government so that when those documents hit, the Iraqi Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 67 1 government wouldn't be surprised. 2 back, they wouldn't stop interacting with us. 3 would continue to be good allies. 4 They wouldn't pull They So us working forward showing that trust 5 and confidence helped them to understand what the 6 release was going to mean and what the impacts were 7 going to be in the press. 8 THE COURT: 9 MR. HURLEY: Yes? Ma'am, we would object and 10 move to strike. 11 of this is in the personal knowledge of General Carr 12 and he's only seen these reports and is held to this 13 conclusion and we would ask the court to go through the 14 same process understanding. 15 It's the same hearsay problem. THE COURT: None In this case, I believe under 16 SEM 703 that information is probative and outweighs the 17 prejudicial effect, but let's not continue down this 18 road. 19 MR. FEIN: Yes, ma'am. 20 THE COURT: Go ahead. 21 MR. FEIN: That was the last question for Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 68 1 that section, ma'am. 2 BY MR. FEIN: 3 Q Sir, I just have two more questions just to 4 clarify something you said earlier. 5 two more. 6 Hopefully, just Sir, when you were testifying about the 7 duty to notify, for those individuals in Iraq and 8 Afghanistan, the foreign nationals, what type of 9 information do we typically gather from those 10 11 individuals that cause the duty to notify? A The type of information that you gain from 12 these individuals might be an understanding as to who 13 in the village might be an insurgent. 14 understand who might be threatening that village. 15 an understanding of where this village leadership or 16 the police chief needs help with his security, what 17 kind of vulnerabilities he has where he needs help. 18 It might be to It's So it's a set of information that they 19 share with us so that we can work together to better 20 their situation and to allow them to maintain security. 21 Q Sir, why is that important to our national Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 69 1 2 security in a war fighting mission? A Because we are over there trying to build 3 them up to the point where they can take their security 4 and then we can come home. 5 forward momentum. 6 we need to protect folks. 7 8 Thank you, sir. Your Honor, no further questions. THE COURT: Defense, would you like a recess before cross-examination? 11 12 We need to keep that dialogue up and MR. FEIN: 9 10 So we need to keep that MR. HURLEY: No, we can grab one in the afternoon. 13 THE COURT: All right. 14 EXAMINATION BY MR. HURLEY: 15 Q Good afternoon, General Carr. 16 A Good afternoon. 17 Q We're going to start off talking about your 18 experience in working for the United States government. 19 You worked for the United States 20 21 governments for years? A For 31 years, yes. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 70 1 Q You worked in the Department of the Army? 2 A I was a member of the Department of the 3 Army. I obviously had assignments with joint 4 organizations and other services as well. 5 Q You draw a government pension? 6 A I do. 7 Q You now work for a government contractor? 8 A I do. 9 Q That contractor is Northrop Grumman? 10 A It is. 11 Q You're the lead executive for Fort Meade? 12 A Corporate lead executive for the Fort Meade 13 14 15 area and Aberdeen Proving Ground. Q And your military experience was vital to getting you that position? 16 A I suspect it was. 17 Q You worked in the intelligence field your 18 entire career? 19 A 20 entire career. 21 outside the intel field. I was a member of the intelligence for my I did have some assignments that were Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 71 1 MR. HURLEY: Ma'am, if I might, I don't 2 need to repeat my questions that I asked on voir dire, 3 do I? Maybe we can use those for -- 4 THE COURT: 5 MR. HURLEY: 6 BY MR. HURLEY: 8 Q I have them written down to save us some time. 7 Yes, yes. 9 10 with local nationals that show up in the CIDNE reporting, both CIDNE I and CIDNE A, right? 11 12 First, let's talk about these conversations So, sir, there were names listed in those reporting? 13 A In some of the reporting, yes. 14 Q And those names were in Arabic? 15 Arabic names? 16 A 17 18 19 Those are They were either Iraqi or Afghan names or whatever nationality those individuals were. Q And we don't share an alphabet with either of those countries, do we, sir? 20 A No. 21 Q So they're transliterated (phonetic) into Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 72 1 English? 2 A They are. 3 Q And the other identifying information is 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 transliterated into English, right? A I'm not sure what you mean by the other identifying information? Q Well, sir, let me be more specific. The village name was transliterated into English? A Sure. THE COURT: You're saying transliterated. 11 Do you mean translated? 12 MR. HURLEY: Translated, yes, ma'am. 13 THE COURT: I didn't know if there was 14 another word, but wasn't sure I understood. 15 MR. HURLEY: 16 THE WITNESS: 17 THE COURT: 18 MR. HURLEY: 19 THE COURT: 20 21 means translated. I apologize. I'm struggling myself. You mean translated? Yes, ma'am. If transliterated comes out, he We got it. MR. HURLEY: Thank you, ma'am. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 73 1 BY MR. HURLEY: 2 Q That information -- and not only that, but 3 there's often communication difficulties between 4 coalition forces and local national populous, right? 5 6 7 8 A Sure. Our interrogators -- we have linguists on the battlefield. Q But even with linguists, sometimes that bridge is not completely crossed? 9 A Sure. 10 Q So the information that gets translated, 11 there could be a misunderstanding as to the identifying 12 information, correct? 13 14 15 A There could be a misspelling or something like that, absolutely. Q Right. For example, it could be that any 16 of the information including the SigActs -- because it 17 was classified, I won't use the actual information -- 18 it could be Steve works at the market, but really there 19 was a miscommunication and the true information is 20 Steve works at the shoe store? 21 Do you see what I mean? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 74 1 A I see what you mean. 2 Q And do you agree that's a possibility? 3 A I agree that it's a possibility, but that's 4 the whole point of continuing to build a body of 5 knowledge so that you reconcile those and you build 6 enough knowledge so that the next guy coming through 7 that village has an enhanced understanding. 8 9 Q But that enhanced understanding isn't always achieved, is it? 10 A Over time it is always achieved, but there 11 are occasions where there are misrepresentations of 12 individuals, yes. 13 Q You talked about the SigAct reports. So in 14 the CIDNE database there are SigAct reports; is that 15 right? 16 A Yes. 17 Q And there are HUMINT reports? 18 A Not necessarily HUMINT reports. There's 19 SigAct reports, there's spot reports. There's other 20 reports, but did not necessarily what I would refer to 21 as HUMINT source reports. Those are put into different Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 75 1 databases. 2 Q So they wouldn't be in CIDNE at all? 3 A They shouldn't be. 4 Q And you indicated on your direct 5 examination that SigAct reports were historical 6 reporting? 7 A They are not what one would call planning. 8 They are reports of events that just took place. 9 You've done something and now you're documenting what 10 transpired and put it down. 11 Q Backward looking in time? 12 A Yes. 13 Q And you talked about, in your testimony 14 with Major Fein -- and we're going to talk about the 15 reactions of local nationals to these disclosures. 16 17 You indicated the reactions were on a broad spectrum? 18 A Yes. 19 Q From an outright refusal to talk? 20 A There were cases where that was reported. 21 Q To not talking for a while, but then Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 76 1 eventually talking? 2 A Absolutely. 3 Q To talking but being a little concerned? 4 A Yes. 5 Q To continuing on as if nothing has 6 happened? 7 A There are cases of that as well. 8 Q And your basis of knowledge of this are 9 10 things you read, right, General Carr? A Basically, things I read, things that in 11 reporting that came up that the team put together and 12 briefed me at various staff meetings. 13 14 Q Right. So it's information that you consumed in your role as director of the IRTF? 15 A Yes. 16 Q And in Afghan especially, Afghans are not 17 as plugged in? 18 A This is true. 19 Q So many people didn't know about these 20 disclosures? 21 A This is true. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 77 1 2 3 4 5 6 Q And continued on as if nothing had happened after these disclosures? A There certainly are cases of that, absolutely. Q And there was no analytic process conducted by the IRTF about the reactions, was there? 7 A (Pause.) 8 Q So, sir, perhaps my question was confusing. 9 10 I can rephrase it you would like. A There was an analytic process to understand 11 and to provide warning when we thought there might be a 12 duty to notify. 13 Q Sure. 14 A That analytic process then kind of put a 15 judgmental effect as to whether this might be more 16 significant or less significant. 17 was mentioned one time and he said something, probably 18 not a big deal. 19 insurgent's names on multiple occasions, you need to 20 warn him. 21 and sent forward. You know, his name This guy has been known to give up That analytical judgment was put in place An analytical judgment based on what Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 78 1 that village's response was was not necessarily put in. 2 What was done was, as we sent these things forward, we 3 attempted to capture feedback. 4 understood and that we would factor that into future 5 analysis as we worked through and continued to move 6 forward with the names. 7 of names and there's a difficulty mixing in, getting 8 the names together. 9 person. 10 Q So, one, we kind of As you said, there were a lot So you're talking about the common And that mixing difficulty would occur 11 whether you were an American or a member or someone 12 from a foreign -- so that analytical problem, because 13 of the names being translated back and forth, that's a 14 problem for Americans, right? 15 IRTF? 16 17 18 19 It was a problem for the A It was a challenge for the IRTF to solve, Q Sure. yeah. And that challenge would exist for foreign nationals too? 20 A Absolutely. 21 Q And it would exist for our adversaries too? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 79 1 A I suspect so. 2 Q Because so they could have to translate it 3 back from English to whatever their native tongue is? 4 A Yup. 5 Q In the analysis I was talking about when I 6 said there was no analysis done about the reactions is 7 analysis an like this, 24 percent of the people that we 8 went back to stopped talking to us. 9 10 Was any analysis done like that quantifying it in some way? 11 A 12 number. 13 Q 14 15 I don't recall capturing that percentage or So the assessment is simply some quit talking and others kept talking? A The assessment is that we had evidence of 16 cases of both of those types of things happening as 17 well as other scenarios out there. 18 Q That fell in between those two? 19 A That fell in between those two extremes. 20 Q In your experience within intelligence 21 operations, General Carr, you understand there are many Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 80 1 case to determine public opinion? 2 A Yes. 3 Q Polls? 4 A Yes. 5 Q Questionnaires? 6 A Certainly. 7 Q A census even which is, in fact, 8 recommended for counterinsurgency operations? 9 to say yes or no. 10 11 A You have A census meaning a population count or a census more like a pole or a survey? 12 Q No, a census meaning a population count. 13 A Okay. 14 Q Where you collect data. 15 A If you are collecting demographic data that 16 are associated with that, then, absolutely, that would 17 be part of counterinsurgency. 18 Q Were any polls used in Iraq to gauge the 19 response -- to engage the response to these 20 disclosures, to your knowledge? 21 A There were a number of information Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 81 1 operational activities in both countries and there were 2 a number of surveys, poles and questionnaires that took 3 place. 4 particular case for this, but I do believe that pieces 5 of this data might have been part of polls in the 6 aftermath. 7 that cites them. 8 You know, I can't pinpoint or can I cite a Q 9 10 11 12 But I don't have the knowledge in my head Thank you, sir. So, sir, you said there were 900 names. Is that in all of the CIDNE I and CIDNE A? A No, I think in the Afghan database we had about 900 names to deal with, I believe. 13 Q 900? Do you recall how many were in the 14 Iraq database? 15 A I do not. 16 Q So with all of those individuals whether in 17 the Iraq or Afghanistan database, you received no 18 report that no one listed in there was killed, correct? 19 A Many of those names were of people that are 20 already dead, had died at some point in the 21 battlefield. I remember these documents span a long Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 82 1 period of time and not just a point in time. 2 So, you know, what I don't have is a 3 specific example of somebody tying it this to this to 4 this and he died as a result of this. 5 the one individual I talked about earlier. 6 7 8 9 Q No, other than So you weren't doing the IRTF full-time in the 2010, 2011 timeframe, were you, sir? A I still maintain my job as the director of DCHC probably for the first 45 to 60 days of the IRTF. 10 I've probably spend a good eight hours a day on it, 11 but, over time, I balance the two missions. 12 13 Q And perhaps my question was poorly drafted. You had other missions besides that? 14 A I did. 15 Q And one of those missions was the overall 16 supervision of defense attache offices? 17 A It was. 18 Q And those offices are in embassies around 19 the globe? 20 A They are. 21 Q You put out a request for information to Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 83 1 these offices about the WikiLeaks disclosures? 2 A I didn't personally put out a request for 3 information, but my team was on the lookout for where 4 impacts had taken place. 5 back up into the consolidated system. 6 getting briefs in the morning and again at night and I 7 needed to understand and calibrate those impacts so we 8 could take actions. 9 10 Q So we were reporting them Again, I was And you -- the defense attache offices were asked about the effects of WikiLeaks, though? 11 A I do believe that my subordinates 12 identified the issue with their respective teams that 13 were in the field and asked them to report instances 14 back. 15 Q But that was not done at your direction? 16 A It was done in the sense that as I was 17 going through the morning briefings and everything, I 18 encouraged my team to try to comprehend and understand 19 where the impacts were taking place so that we could 20 work through them. 21 Q And there are several layers between you Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 84 1 and the actual defense attache offices? 2 A There are. 3 Q And getting back to your broad spectrum 4 expression, the reactions in those attache offices fell 5 across a broad spectrum? 6 A They did. 7 Q From an outright refusal to speak with? 8 A In some cases, not all. 9 Q To being pushed down the food chain? 10 11 That's an expression that I got... A Meaning you used come in routinely and meet 12 with lieutenant general so-and-so and now he refuses to 13 see you, but he let you meet with colonel so-and-so. 14 15 Q To being queried for more information about the disclosures? 16 A Absolutely. 17 Q And to continuing on as if nothing had 18 19 happened? A In some cases some countries were immune 20 from it because they weren't -- they didn't necessarily 21 see it as an issue. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 85 1 2 3 Q And even in some instances there was joking about it? A There was certainly -- as you know, defense 4 attaches live in capitals around the world there were 5 there were other attaches that poked fun at us because 6 we had this to deal with. 7 Q Again, you use the expression it created 8 these fractures in the defense attache offices, one 9 thing that helped mend these fractures was the 10 personnel turnover over time, right? 11 12 13 I'm just going off what we talked about yesterday. A I'm not sure. You know, personnel turnover 14 is a routine thing in the Department of Defense. 15 has its -- obviously if there's a bad relationship, a 16 turnover could, in fact, move to a good relationship. 17 But there's also a loss of knowledge and interaction at 18 that point in time. 19 to get at. 20 21 Q It So I'm not sure what you're trying Could -- the personnel turnover at defense attache office and the personnel turnover with foreign Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 86 1 interlocutors, those mutual turning over of personnel 2 that, according to our discussion yesterday, helped 3 mend these fractures that you talked about? 4 A It's always an opportunity for a restart. 5 Q And that opportunity was utilized in this 6 instance? 7 A I don't -- it's utilized in every instance. 8 I mean, whenever there's a change, you want to take 9 advantage of that change and try to build the right 10 relationship. 11 Q 12 for a second. 13 a legal duty to notify legitimate human sources? 14 Okay. Let's talk about the duty to notify In the IRTF, you believed that there was A I think I referred to that as the duty to 16 Q Duty to warn? 17 A There is a distinction we created known as 15 warn. Thank you, sir. 18 duty to notify. If it was a legitimate human source, 19 if somebody had created a relationship with the U.S. 20 government and they were operating on our behalf, if we 21 thought they were in harm's way, we had a requirement Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 87 1 to warn them. 2 Q 3 4 So, sir, you and your team searched the data, the data that was disclosed? A We searched all of the data that was 5 disclosed and we looked for those things. 6 for the potential identification of HUMINT source. 7 8 Q We looked And you found none that had been revealed as legitimate HUMINT sources? 9 A (Pause.) 10 Q You didn't find any legitimate HUMINT 11 12 resources revealed by the in-data? A I'm not so sure that's the case. I think 13 what we found in those names that included some folks 14 who had previously been HUMINT sources and we found 15 some folks who, when they were in the data, were not 16 HUMINT sources at the time they were in the data. 17 because of their cooperative relationship may have 18 evolved to a HUMINT relationship. 19 20 21 Q But But the data didn't reveal them as legitimate HUMINT sources? A No, the data didn't say, hey, this is a Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 88 1 HUMINT source. 2 relationship of talking to U.S. service personnel. 3 Q What the data showed was a cooperative In that the duty to warn went to a duty to 4 notify any individuals that cooperated with the U.S. 5 government or coalition forces? 6 A We believed that -- the Department of 7 Defense believed that we had a moral obligation to 8 protect those civilian people on the battlefield that 9 were cooperating and helping our efforts. 10 11 12 Q And you pushed that assessment to the U.S. CentCom? A We worked on those assessment 13 collaboratively between the IRTF and U.S. CentCom. 14 pushed them down and then they pushed them forward to 15 the battlefield. 16 Q We And they did that -- based on your 17 experience and training, they did that probably through 18 what, fragmentary order? 19 A Exactly. 20 Q And you received back reports from U.S. 21 CentCom as to how the notifications were going? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 89 1 A We received feedback on what happened as a 2 result of those fragmentary orders that CentCom sent 3 out, exactly. 4 Q Some people were notified? 5 A Some people were. 6 Q Some people couldn't be found? 7 A Some people couldn't be found. 8 were determined to already be dead. 9 10 Some people Q Some were in some places that were deemed too dangerous to send soldiers? 11 A Some folks were in places where we 12 determined that individual was more part of the 13 insurgency today than they were part of our cooperative 14 effort and it was not worth risking soldiers' lives to 15 go make that identification. 16 17 Q To amplify, some were assessed as playing both sides? 18 A Some were assessed as playing both sides. 19 Q And those individuals were not contacted? 20 A I don't know that all of them. 21 them. Many of That was a decision by the commander on the Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 90 1 battlefield who tried to play out that moral obligation 2 that we thought we had as Americans and at the same 3 time protect his soldiers from operations harm. 4 5 Q overall picture, General Carr. 6 7 So -- I'm just going back to the more You made these assessments/judgments in 2011? 8 A Between the 2010, 2011 timeframe, yes. 9 Q I'm sorry, General Carr. 10 I'm going to ask you more one question about the defense attache office. 11 A Sure. 12 Q We talked yesterday in an interview; is 13 that right? 14 A Yes. 15 Q In that interview, you indicated that the 16 effects in the defense attache offices were short-term 17 effects? 18 A I don't know the -- they certainly more 19 immediate effects. As I said, when this -- when we 20 closed up the task force, it didn't necessarily mean 21 that effects didn't continue. I think there were some Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 91 1 in the attache business that were, in fact, short-term. 2 Others had more of an intermediate long-term nature to 3 it. 4 Q So you were overseeing the defense 5 attache -- pardon me, the defense attache function up 6 until you left active duty? 7 A I was, yes. 8 Q And there were relationships that had been 9 affected? 10 A There were. 11 Q But some of those had returned to normal 12 before you left? 13 A Yes. 14 Q But some of them hadn't? 15 A Yes. 16 Q In the assessments that you've down now, 17 you haven't assessed whether locals and nationals in 18 Afghanistan are currently affected by these WikiLeaks 19 disclosures, have you? 20 21 A I do not know the answer, whether they're currently affected today, no. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 92 1 Q And you haven't made an assessment with 2 respect to Iraqi cooperation with U.S. government 3 personnel today to date? 4 A To date, no. 5 Q Sir, let's talk about intelligence analysts 6 for a second and this is in your experience and your 7 expertise. 8 9 10 11 Intelligence analysts put information together? A They coalesce information? True, and attempt to make analytical assessments and judgments from that body of knowledge. 12 Q And that takes training? 13 A It does. 14 Q It also takes experience? 15 A Certainly one would expect to improve with 16 17 18 experience, yes. Q As in all things to improve with experience. 19 A Sure. 20 Q Not just anybody can do it? 21 A I would agree. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 93 1 Q It takes skill to connect the dots? 2 A It takes training. 3 Q And predicative analysis itself is a 4 learned skill? 5 A Analysis is definitely a learned skill. 6 Q Let's talk about -- you indicated that on 7 direct examination that sometimes it's appropriate to 8 remove people who have security clearances. 9 10 11 12 13 14 What's a derog? A Derogatory information I would assume you're referring to. Q And, if you would, describe it briefly for the court. A Derogatory information might be information 15 that's known about a particular individual that would 16 cause one to be concerned about their reliability. 17 you might take steps to mitigate the risk. 18 Q 19 report? 20 A So 21 By submitting a derogatory information You could submit a derogatory information report and the example would be, depending on your Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 94 1 level of access you have and the security clearance 2 that you're granted, if you were to get a DUI, that 3 would constitute a derogatory information report being 4 submitted into the system. 5 Q And intelligence leaders -- and by leaders 6 I mean NCOs and officers, have a responsibility to 7 ensure soldiers are qualified to maintain a security 8 clearance? 9 A They certainly have a responsibility to 10 oversee those subordinates that have a security 11 clearance and if there are indicators such as a derog 12 and other things, then they would take the appropriate 13 steps. 14 15 Q And they have a responsible to take those appropriate steps when they know about them, correct? 16 A Yes. 17 Q Getting back to intel analysts generally 18 and perhaps soldier supervision generally, junior 19 soldiers, be they intelligence analysts or whatever, 20 they need the right tools, right? 21 A Yes. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 95 1 Q They need the right leadership? 2 A They do. 3 Q At the NCO level? 4 A Yes. 5 Q And at the officer level? 6 A Yes. 7 Q You talked about the potential harm to 8 service members' families that could result from 9 reading about their death through these disclosures. 10 Do you recall that? 11 A I do. 12 Q So the disclosed data did include some 13 information about the deaths of service members? 14 A I believe they did. 15 Q And family members could ostensibly review 16 17 this data if it was publicly available? A You know, at some point if it was released 18 out onto the web, I suspect family members could run 19 the appropriate search tool and find the data, yes. 20 21 Q And these initial reports may be inconsistent with what they were told? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 96 1 A The initial reports are just that, they're 2 initial reports and often -- you know, as I said 3 earlier, every death is investigated and families are 4 informed of how that went through and it includes more 5 than just an initial report, but it includes the entire 6 body of knowledge. 7 Q It could also be that the disclosed 8 information was consistent with what the families were 9 told, right? 10 A Could be. 11 Q Because initial reports not only are they 12 sometimes wrong, but they're also sometimes right? 13 A You're absolutely right. 14 Q And the family's confidence in the United 15 States government could have been buoyed by this 16 information? 17 the truth? Something happened and the Army told me 18 A Could be. 19 Q Let's talk about tactics, techniques and 20 procedures and the enemy and I'm going to use the 21 common acronym TTPs. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 97 1 A Yes. 2 Q Perhaps I'll transliterate it. 3 4 Enemies -- out adversaries in the field can watch our TTPs, right? 5 A Yes, they can. 6 Q If you put in an ID, ID is sort of a modern 7 term for what is essentially a mine, isn't it? 8 A Okay. 9 Q And mine always needs to be overwatched? 10 A Sure. 11 Q And they can adapt -- the adversary can 12 adapt their TPPs based on what they see in coalition 13 forces, right? 14 A This is true. 15 Q They're constantly adapting their TTPs? 16 A They are. 17 Q And we're constantly adapting our TTPs? 18 A We do. 19 Q What is true today in the intelligence 20 world may not be true tomorrow, right? 21 Things that change rapidly? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 98 1 2 3 A Assessments change as you gather more information, this is true. Q And what was true today that's not 4 necessarily true tomorrow may certain not be true two 5 years from now? Is that possible? 6 A It's possible. 7 Q Let's talk about the enemy real quick. 8 enemy that we face or -- you served as a J2 in 9 Afghanistan? 10 A Yes. 11 Q The You had to come to assess the local 12 populous? 13 A I did. 14 Q To one degree or another? 15 A Yes. 16 Q Afghanistan struggles with a high degree of 17 illiteracy? 18 A It does. 19 Q Iraq also struggles with a high degree of 20 21 illiteracy? A Less so. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 99 1 Q But it's still problematic? 2 A I don't know the percentage in Iraq. I 3 think they were one of the more educated societies, to 4 tell you the truth. 5 different situation. 6 Q But certainly Afghanistan is in a And that, in part, explains something you 7 testified earlier about with Afghans being less plugged 8 in than their Iraqi counterparts? 9 A Yes. 10 Q Did you ever coordinate in your role as the 11 director of the IRTF with the Center for Army Lessons 12 Learned? 13 A I did. 14 Q Did you ever call for any rapid adaptations 15 16 to be issued from the Center for Army Lessons Learned? A I don't think that we did this through the 17 Center for Army Lessons Learned. 18 done more through the CentCom headquarters and not 19 through the Center for Army Lessons Learned. 20 21 I think they were There were a couple of cases where we identified potential areas that CentCom may want to Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 100 1 take a look at and either adapt their practices or take 2 a fresh look at them. 3 4 Q And you passed that information along to the U.S. CentCom? 5 A 6 U.S. CentCom. 7 not make those decisions. 8 were risks. 9 Q We passed that information along to the We did not make that judgment. We did We identified where there You talked with the government on your 10 direct examination about your review of the JTF Gitmo 11 information? 12 A Yes. 13 Q Did you look at the facts that -- you 14 understand that there's a good deal of litigation 15 that's going on with respect to those particular 16 individuals at JTF Gitmo? 17 A I do know there's a litigation process. I 18 can't explain it all, but I do understand that there's 19 a litigation process. 20 21 Q Did you ever review any of those court filings to see what information was disclosed in those Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 101 1 court filings versus what information you had in the 2 detainee assessment briefs? 3 A As part of the IRTF, I do not recall having 4 gone through that. 5 been a significant amount of data that's been passed 6 into the legal process. 7 Q I know that, over time, there has You testified on direct that you were 8 trying to move people out of the detention center at 9 JTF Gitmo? 10 11 A There were processes to lower the population down there, yes. 12 Q And that was an administration priority? 13 A I don't know where it was exactly on the 14 priorities, but there was a State Department ambassador 15 that had the primary responsibility of repatriating 16 folks out of Gitmo. 17 Q There was substantial resistance in 18 repatriating people out of Gitmo from inside the United 19 States government, correct? 20 A I don't know that. 21 Q Do you have any knowledge about whether or Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 102 1 not the legislators on Capitol Hill were for or against 2 closing the detention center? 3 A I think there was probably a number of 4 public statements out there made between the various 5 parties. 6 some want to close it. 7 came into the discussion with the IRTF. 8 9 10 Q I talked to -- some want to keep it open and I don't know that that ever Now, we're getting to that ambassador that you were talking about from the Department of State that you talked to. 11 You recall talking to him a couple of times 12 on the phone? 13 A I did. 14 Q And you recall that there were meetings 15 between your subordinates and either him or his 16 subordinates, so lower level meetings? 17 A I certainly wouldn't call a meeting with 18 the ambassador a lower level meeting. 19 did not go over a brief. 20 that went over a brief. 21 But I personally I had subordinates on my team Again, my job there, what we were trying to Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 103 1 do was to understand the potential of that information 2 making it out and trying to let the individual 3 responsible for his government activities be forewarned 4 and take steps to protect the government. 5 Q So you were told about the delta -- that's 6 the word you used -- between what the United States 7 government had told foreign governments that we were 8 trying to give these detainees to? 9 that delta, right? You were told about 10 A I was told that there is a delta. 11 Q And you were similarly told there's a delta 12 between what -- the information we gave to the foreign 13 governments and the information that the foreign 14 governments relay to its people? 15 A What I was told is that the information 16 exchange between two governments might contain more 17 information than what was in a public press statement. 18 Again, a lot of classified information translated and 19 then there is a public press statement that is coming 20 afterward. 21 Q We're going to talk about the loss that Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 104 1 accrued as a result of these leaks. 2 3 Leaked information can show vulnerabilities in weapon systems? 4 A It certainly can. 5 Q And communications platforms? 6 A It certainly can. 7 Q And ground vehicles? 8 A Absolutely. 9 Q And aircraft? 10 A Yup. 11 Q Did coalition forces -- but coalition 12 forces did not stop using any weapon system because of 13 these disclosures, correct? 14 A Not that I know of. 15 Q And they did not stop using any 16 17 18 communication platform because of these disclosures? A I think we made some changes in communications. 19 Q But they did not step using any vehicles? 20 A No. 21 Q And they didn't stop using any aircraft? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 105 1 A True. 2 Q TTPs were given away, though, or TPPs were 3 4 part of the SigAct -- part of the SigAct information? A As you said earlier, somebody could 5 overwatch an IED and get a TPP and all of the sudden 6 now what we have, that individual in that other army or 7 that other insurgency or that element that's watching 8 us, do they really have the ability that we maintain in 9 our country to spread that word out and learn that 10 lesson across their force? 11 They don't. The release of this type of information 12 allow people to sit at higher levels and to look 13 through that and get an accumulative understanding. 14 15 Q Do those people that are overwatching it have the ability to read oftentimes? 16 A I'm not -- I don't know that judgment. 17 Q There is a high illiteracy rate in 18 Afghanistan? 19 A 20 Afghanistan. 21 Q There's certainly a high illiteracy rate in We talked earlier that TTPs evolve? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 106 1 A They do. 2 Q And SOPs, standard operating procedure, 3 they likewise evolve? 4 A Yes. 5 Q Evolve because of a change in technology? 6 A One reason. 7 Q Evolve because of a change in tactics? 8 A Absolutely. 9 Q And all unit TTPs are not the same? 10 11 12 13 14 15 Different units or going to do things different ways? A I suspect that there's some commonality as well as some differences and preferences. Q And some units will rarely follow their own standard operating procedures, right? A I'm not prepared to say that. I think it 16 depends on the unit environment there and their 17 standard operating procedures they ought to be 18 following. 19 Q Sir, just one second. 20 (Pause.) 21 Last line of question, General Carr. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 107 1 Before I commit to that statement of intent, I'm going 2 look at a few notes. 3 All right, sir. So the conversation we had 4 yesterday again, we talked about how the actual effects 5 from these disclosures could be graphed in one way, 6 right, that they could be plotted on a graph, 7 potentially? 8 A 9 10 11 I don't recall that discussion. I don't recall making any graphs, so to speak. Q Perhaps I'm mistaken. There was -- let me restate the question again. 12 13 Do you recall that? Then there was a lot of reaction initially to these disclosures? 14 A Yes. 15 Q And, over time, that reaction reduces, it 16 goes -- there's a level of reaction and that reaction 17 reduces over time? 18 A I think that -- yes, and that action often 19 reduces through mitigation where the U.S. government 20 attempts to go heal whatever effect or whatever that 21 happened detrimental. We work hard to heal that. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 108 1 Q And some of it is a result of this 2 mitigation you talk about and some of it is just a 3 result of people moving on? 4 A Okay. 5 Q And, as a result, perhaps of mitigation or 6 perhaps some other reasons it reduces even more, 7 correct, over time? 8 9 10 So you have the third step where it's even less than where it was at the second spot? A I think in many cases, over time, it would. 11 I think there's some instances, depending on the 12 severity and the impacts that erosion of impact might 13 be a little slower. 14 Q Right, but you haven't gone back to check 15 to see if that erosion of impact is as slow as you 16 assessed it might be in 2011? 17 18 19 A I have not. MR. HURLEY: Thank you, General Carr. Thanks, ma'am. 20 THE COURT: 21 MR. FEIN: Is there a redirect? Yes, ma'am. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 109 1 THE COURT: 2 MR. FEIN: 3 THE COURT: 4 EXAMINATION BY MR. FEIN: 5 Q Is it going to be lengthy? It is not. Okay, go ahead. In reference to your testimony just now 6 about Afghanis being plugged in and their literacy 7 rate, sir, did the Taliban know this information was 8 there? 9 A They absolutely did. 10 Q Did they seek this information? 11 A I'm sure they did. 12 Q In reference to the derogs and the 13 questions the defense asked you about derogs, in your 14 experience, in your 31 years, have intel soldiers that 15 at least worked for you committed minor misconduct and 16 received counseling but not been derogged? 17 A Absolutely. 18 Q And why, sir? 19 A As you said, the minor misconduct didn't 20 reach the level of warranting a requirement to put in a 21 derog report and through counseling the leadership Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 110 1 chain gained confidence that it was a one time error 2 and was not going to be a vulnerability in the future. 3 Q And, sir, as far as your testimony just now 4 about the information, specifically the Iraqi/Afghani 5 names, a lot of it in Arabic within SigActs in CIDNE, 6 could you explain for the report that vetting process 7 that you've alluded to? 8 9 I guess before that, did the IRTF just take a single report and then credit a duty to notify? 10 A No. 11 Q What was the process to vet those names in 12 13 order to create that duty? A We used an incredible amount of technical 14 tools to try to make sure that we drew all the 15 particular records associated with the many variable 16 ways that a particular name could be spelled and then 17 we would correlate them by location on the battlefield. 18 We went to great efforts to find out that, you know, 19 five, six, seven names would come down to a single name 20 and, yes, it was. 21 who's now the village police chief or something. It was the guy that ran the shop Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 111 1 So it was a huge effort and a time 2 expenditure and a cost expenditure in a sense to try to 3 make sure that we were providing the best understanding 4 of that data to forward forces because at the end of 5 the day the forward force had to make a decision to put 6 folks in harm's way to go make that notification. 7 8 9 Q On those SigActs were the coordinates included? A In many cases there's coordinates and 10 locations included. 11 single one, but in many cases they are, absolutely. 12 Q I don't know that they're on every And those coordinates, for the ones at 13 least the ones with individual's names, those aren't 14 subject to translation between countries, correct? 15 A Absolutely not. 16 MR. FEIN: 17 EXAMINATION BY MR. HURLEY: 18 Q Thank you, sir. So the Taliban has our maps? Don't you 19 have to have a map to have the grid coordinate mean 20 anything? 21 A I don't think I said the Taliban has our Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 112 1 maps. 2 access to this information and the answer is yes. 3 4 Q The last question was it includes grid coordinates, correct? 5 6 I think the question was does the Taliban have A The grid coordinate on there, yes. There is also village names on there as well. 7 Q But do our adversaries have our maps? 8 Because do you have to have a map to have a grid 9 coordinate mean anything? 10 A You have to have a map to have a grid 11 coordinate mean anything. 12 understand city names if you don't have personal 13 knowledge of the environment. 14 an element that understands a lot about the local 15 environment. 16 Q 17 You have to have a map to But you're dealing with So you said there were 900 or so names in the CIDNE A database; is that right? 18 A I think I said in the Afghan database we 19 were dealing with something in the neighborhood of 900 20 names. 21 Q Is that number there before or after you Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 113 1 filtered through the process you were talking about 2 just now with Major Fein? 3 4 5 6 A after we filtered through the process. Q Let's talk about derogatory information reports real quick. 7 8 I think that was the number that we got to Have you ever had to file a derogatory information report? 9 A I have. 10 Q Without identifying the person that you 11 filed it on, have you had to file more than one? 12 A Absolutely. 13 Q Again, without tying it to a specific 14 person, what's the type of information that you've had 15 to file derogatory information reports on? 16 A DUIs, positive testing on urinalysis, 17 events such as that. 18 would cause one to meet that threshold. 19 Q Maybe domestic battery cases And with domestic -- in your cases was law 20 enforcement always involved when you would file a 21 derogatory information report? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 114 1 A (Pause. 2 Q The cases you cited all seem to contemplate 3 4 5 6 the involvement of law enforcement? A I think those particular cases all have law enforcement involved. Q But one person responsible could file a 7 derogatory information report not having law 8 enforcement involved, right? 9 A I think there are probably events that 10 could take place in units that meet the threshold 11 without having to have law enforcement, yes. 12 13 14 15 Q A history of outbursts from a particular person with security clearance? A A history of outbursts and workplace violence would certainly meet that threshold. 16 MR. HURLEY: 17 THE COURT: 18 Thank you, sir. Any final redirect from the government? 19 MR. FEIN: No, ma'am. 20 THE COURT: 21 Is there a regulation or some guidance out A couple of questions. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 115 1 there for derogs on what type of activity or misconduct 2 triggers the requirement to have one? 3 THE WITNESS: 4 THE COURT: 5 THE WITNESS: 6 9 10 11 And what would that be? I don't know the exact nomenclature of it, but... 7 8 Yes, there is. THE COURT: Does it have some that are mandatory? THE WITNESS: THE COURT: It does, it does. Do they have others that if you believe it's necessary, but you don't have to? 12 THE WITNESS: 13 you're absolutely right. 14 particular event happens, the reporting of that into 15 the security classification, the personal security 16 system is mandatory. 17 a commander could make an individual decision as to 18 whether he thought or she thought that that particular 19 event needed to be captured for the longer term. 20 21 Yes, absolutely. I think -- There are some that if a There would be other events that THE COURT: Do you have knowledge of someone with a top secret security clearance begins to Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 116 1 have -- to be referred to behavioral health or mental 2 health, what if any impact does that have on the 3 security clearance? 4 THE WITNESS: That has changed over time 5 and so I think there were points in time when a 6 referral of that nature might have caused someone to be 7 removed from the environment. 8 has adapted over time to judge each case independently 9 and try not to prevent them from going to get But I think the system 10 behavioral treatment or counseling for fear of losing 11 their jobs. 12 So this system is trying to encourage that 13 mental health and that -- without causing people to be 14 fearful of it and losing their jobs. 15 to adapt that. 16 17 THE COURT: Thank you. So they're trying Any followup based on that? 18 MR. FEIN: 19 EXAMINATION BY MR. HURLEY: 20 21 Q No, ma'am. General Carr, if I asked you -- if I gave you a regulatory number, might that jog your memory as Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 117 1 to where this derog information is located? 2 A I doubt it seriously. 3 Q Well, let's just give it a stab. 4 How about army regulation 380-67? 5 A I believe it would be in the 380 series. 6 AR380 often has a number of personnel security, what 7 was incited. 8 mind at this point. 9 10 MR. HURLEY: THE COURT: Thank you, Temporary or permanent excuse him? 13 MR. FEIN: 14 THE COURT: 15 Thank you, sir. Your Honor. 11 12 Whether a 67 or not doesn't come to my testimony. Temporary, ma'am. Mr. Carr, thank you for your You are temporarily excused. 16 You are free to go today, right? 17 MR. FEIN: 18 THE COURT: Yes, ma'am. But temporary excusal means 19 just at some point that the court martial may call you 20 back. 21 Please don't discuss your testimony or Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 118 1 knowledge of the case with anyone other than counsel of 2 the accused while the trial is still going on. 3 THE WITNESS: 4 THE COURT: Thank you. Just to be clear, for the 5 record, I'm going to disregard any testimony about the 6 Taliban killing somebody in accordance with the leak, 7 for example, and tying it to the WikiLeaks and the name 8 of the individual was not released. 9 10 Yes? MR. HURLEY: Is there anything else that 11 you need from us other than our filing with respect to 12 the issues that we have encountered? 13 14 15 16 THE COURT: Well, just identify the issues in your filing. MR. HURLEY: Yes, ma'am. filing, nothing else, ma'am? 17 THE COURT: 18 MR. HURLEY: 19 THE COURT: 20 21 Other than No, that's fine. Thank you. All right. We have another witness to go through today. MR. FEIN: Yes, ma'am. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 119 1 2 THE COURT: How long of a recess do we need? 3 4 And we will do that. MR. FEIN: A 15-minute recess, ma'am and they're we're ready to call Mr. Kirchhofer. 5 THE COURT: 6 MR. HURLEY: 7 THE COURT: 8 recess for 15 minutes. 9 10 All right. Does that work? Yes, Your Honor. All right. The court is in (There was a recess taken at 3:46 and the trial resumed at 4:09 p.m.) 11 THE CLERK: All rise. 12 THE COURT: Please be seated. The court is 13 called to order. 14 present when the court last recessed are again present 15 in court. 16 Let the record reflect all parties I met briefly with counsel in my chambers. 17 The defend counsel came to advise me that they had a 18 chance to speak with brigadier general retired Carr 19 with respect to whether or not there was a prepared 20 statement for his congressional testimony. 21 MR. COOMBS: Yes, Your Honor. I spoke with Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 120 1 General Carr. He indicated that although he's aware of 2 the statement, he did not put any information into the 3 statement. 4 of the statement, nor did he sign off on it. 5 him if he had any other statements from his previous 6 testimony to congress. 7 THE COURT: So he didn't participate in the preparation I asked He said no). All right. So does that 8 satisfy the defense that there's no outstanding RCA 914 9 matter out there? 10 MR. COOMBS: 11 THE COURT: Yes, Your Honor, it does. And, government, I understand 12 you're continuing to seek this information from the 13 expert witnesses you have coming in? 14 MR. FEIN: 15 THE COURT: 16 to address before we continue on? 17 MR. FEIN: No, ma'am. 18 THE COURT: Proceed. 19 MR. FEIN: 20 Is there anything else we need The United States calls Mr. John Kirchhofer. 21 Yes, ma'am. Whereupon, Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 121 1 JOHN KIRCHHOFER, 2 called as a witness, having been first duly sworn to tell the truth, 3 the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, was examined and testified 4 as follows: 5 6 7 EXAMINATION BY MR. FEIN: Q Sir, you're Mr. John Kirchhofer for the Defense Intelligence Agency? 8 A Yes, sir. 9 Q And you are a member of the senior 10 executive service? 11 A That's correct. 12 Q And, sir, prior to beginning, you 13 understand that you're here today to discuss your 14 expertise in strategic planning for Department of 15 Defense counter-intelligence and HUMINT functions? 16 A Yes. 17 Q And based off that, sir, also, are you 18 prepared today to provide specialized knowledge to 19 assist the court in understanding the operation of the 20 IRTF and the impact by the WikiLeaks disclosure? 21 A Yes, I am. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 122 1 2 THE COURT: this witness as an expert? 3 4 Are you going to be qualifying MR. FEIN: The United States does intend to qualify -- 5 THE COURT: 6 MR. FEIN: In what? In the field, Your Honor, of 7 strategic planning for the Department of Defense 8 counter-intelligence -- 9 THE COURT: 10 MR. FEIN: 11 Strategic planning -- For DOD, CI and HUMINT, counter-intelligence and HUMINT intelligence. 12 13 Hold on. THE COURT: So strategic planning for DOD -- 14 MR. FEIN: No, ma'am. I'm sorry. 15 Department of Defense counter-intelligence and 16 Department of Defense HUMINT. 17 HUMINT. It's So I said DOD, CI and One field, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Thank you. 19 MR. FEIN: Yes, ma'am. 20 BY MR. FEIN: 21 Q Sir, what is your current position at the Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 123 1 Defense Intelligence Agency? 2 3 A Q And how long have you been the deputy chief DIA. 4 5 I'm the deputy chief financial officer for financial officer, sir? 6 A Only two months. 7 Q And how long have you worked at DIA? 8 A I've been with the agency since August of Q And how did you first become associated 9 10 11 12 2008. with the WikiLeaks disclosures? A When -- on the 28th of July, the Secretary 13 of Defense asked the director of DIA to stand up an 14 effort to review what had been compromised and what 15 potentially was going to be compromised. 16 up a task force immediately. 17 they started to realize the scope of it, they started 18 pulling in additional people and I was in that second 19 wave that came in on the 2nd of August. 20 21 Q So we stood About three days in, once And when you were pulled in, sir, what was your position on the IRTF? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 124 1 A I was the deputy chief of the IRTF. 2 Q And so now we'll talk about the IRTF a 3 little bit later, sir. 4 on your background. 5 We're really just now focused When you were pulled in to the IRTF, what 6 position did you hold or what position did you hold 7 before becoming the deputy chief financial officer? 8 9 A I was the deputy chief of the office of counter-intelligence at DIA. 10 Q And how long were you in that job for, sir? 11 A Just shy of a year. 12 Q And what position did you hold prior to 13 becoming the deputy chief of the counter -- 14 A Counter-intelligence. 15 IRTF effort. 16 enterprise strategies for the defense CI and HUMINT 17 center. So before and after I was the chief of 18 THE COURT: 19 THE WITNESS: 20 21 It sandwiched the What was that again? The defense counter-intelligence and human intelligence center. Q Sir, you used the term chief of enterprise Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 125 1 strategies. 2 3 4 Can you please explain for the court? What does that mean? A It's a DISL position, defense intelligence 5 senior level, which is reserved for grades above GS-15 6 with subject matter expertise. 7 So we were in charge of doing all of the 8 strategic planning for the CI HUMINT enterprise and I 9 can describe that if you'd like. We also did perform 10 its management, lessons learned and we exercised 11 functional oversight of the budget. 12 Q 13 14 15 So since you offered, sir, yes. Could you please describe what you mean by the CI HUMINT enterprise? A The CI HUMINT enterprise is -- an 16 unclassified figure would be under 20,000 in manpower. 17 The bulk of the workforce is in the U.S. Army in the 18 tactical force, but it also includes all of the other 19 services, the Defense Diligence Agency and then the 20 counter-intelligence elements of other defense 21 agencies. For example, the National Security Agency Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 126 1 has a large counter-intelligence staff. 2 the counter-intelligence enterprise. 3 Q That's part of And as the chief of enterprise, you also 4 said performance management was one of your functions. 5 What is performance management? 6 A Performance management is developing 7 performance measures in metrics by which we can 8 determine how well we're performing and then that 9 informs how we're going to change the force in the 10 future or change our effort in the future to improve, 11 constant improvement. 12 13 14 Q And, sir, is that part of the long range planning that you're responsible for? A It's part and parcel of it. So the 15 strategic planning is the whole focus of looking at 16 future threats and in building a force that's going to 17 get us to address those strategic threats down the road 18 and performance management feeds that. 19 If we're failing in one area, what are we 20 going to do to improve on it? Is it going to take more 21 money, more training, change the doctrine? That's all Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 127 1 involved in that effort. 2 Q So, sir, with building a force, what force? 3 A The CI HUMINT force, that manpower I just 4 talked about. 5 Q Sir, also, as the chief of enterprise 6 strategies, you mentioned that you're responsible for 7 Lessons Learned. 8 9 What do you mean by that? Could you provide an example? A In a very classic sense, across the 10 Department of Defense Lessons Learned is treated as a 11 federation of organizations. 12 the joint staff J7 to lead the effort, but we handled 13 that specifically for the counter-intelligence and 14 human intelligence disciplines. 15 system that fed into the joint staff's system and we 16 shared those lessons in best practices across the 17 entire community. 18 19 20 21 Q budgeting? A So, typically, we look to So we had our own And what about functional management and What does that aspect -Functional management is typically you have a budget to your -- that is going to match dollars to Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 128 1 the plan that you've built. 2 is the -- it's the intelligence portion of the budget. 3 So we don't just give dollars, we have to explain those 4 dollars. 5 personnel. 6 for travel, you know, those types of pockets. 7 But functional management So the dollars are going to pay for They're going to pay for operational funds So with the intelligence, it's that 8 functional piece that gets added to the budget and that 9 was something that I oversaw. 10 11 Q time, you were a DISL. 12 13 Sir, you mentioned earlier that, at the What is a DISL? A A DISL, apparently many years ago they did 14 away with GS grades above the grade of 15 and they 15 merged them into one group that they call senior level. 16 Sometimes you'll hear it called senior technical level 17 if it's in the sciences fields and so it's -- SES light 18 some people call it. 19 20 21 Q Sir, is that a technical expert? Are you a technical expert when you're in a DISL? A I'm careful on the word technical, but, Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 129 1 yes. 2 for CI and HUMINT enterprise strategies. 3 4 5 My exact position description read senior expert Q And was that -- to be selected as a DISL, is that a competitive process? A Yes, very competitive. You have to do a 6 great deal of narrative development. 7 technical qualifications -- I go back to that word 8 now -- to prove that you have that expertise to do that 9 job, that niche expertise. 10 11 Q Again, specific And, sir, in your current position now, are you still a DISL? 12 A 13 service now. 14 Q 15 16 17 18 19 And what is your current, at least military equivalent rank, sir? A I'm a tier 2. So it's a two star equivalent. Q Thank you, sir. At this point, I'd like to have you testify about your professional background. 20 21 No, I'm a member of the senior executive When did you first join the Department of Defense? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 130 1 A In January of 1991. 2 Q And what was your first job, sir? 3 A I was a clerk-typist in a force management 4 office with the Army Intelligence and Security Command. 5 Q Have you been a civilian for your entire 6 career? 7 A I have, yes. 8 Q Then where did you move to, sir? 9 A I did that for about a year and then I 10 moved into a position as a human intelligence reports 11 officer and a reports officer, I know not many people 12 are familiar with it. 13 collection requirements that have been identified by 14 analysts, making sure that the collectors in the field 15 have those requirements and know what they need to be 16 working on. 17 they've gathered, putting it into a report and pushing 18 it back out to the community. 19 20 21 Q It's essentially taking Then it's taking that raw intelligence and And then where did you move, sir, after being a reports officer at U.S. Army INSCOM? A After I left INSCOM, I came to Fort Meade Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 131 1 to the U.S. Army central security facility and I worked 2 in information security activities. 3 4 Q And what is the army central security facility? 5 A At the time, the central security facility 6 contained the U.S. Army investigative records 7 repository and the Freedom Of Information and Privacy 8 Act office. 9 10 Q So what was your job, sir, as an information security specialist with that facility? 11 A So my primary job was to review classified 12 information to determine whether it could be released 13 to the public under the provisions of the FOIA or 14 Privacy Act. 15 Q And then where did you move to after that, A Then I went to the 92nd military 16 17 sir? 18 intelligence group on the group S3 and I helped them 19 build a collection management and dissemination 20 element. 21 Q And what do you mean by that, sir? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 132 1 A Collection management is the way we 2 prioritized those collection requirements that come in 3 and figure out which particular detachment or office 4 could actually collect the office data we needed. 5 it's then tasking it out to them to collect, monitoring 6 them when it comes back and, again, publishing the 7 report back to the community. 8 9 10 Q Sir, so you build this collection management platform. A So Did it not exist beforehand? It did not exist beforehand. In 1995, all 11 defense HUMINT was combined a defense intelligence 12 agency and most of that capability of -- collection 13 management capability was resident on the HUMINT side. 14 So that all went to DIA. 15 out of scratch in '95. So the army had to rebuild 16 Q And was that your responsibility? 17 A For that group it was, yes. 18 Q And how long did you do that until, sir? 19 A Until 1998. 20 Q And then what did you do following that job 21 So '95 to 98. as the 92nd group -- Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 133 1 A I went back to headquarters INSCOM, Fort 2 Belvoir and I became the army counter-intelligence and 3 human intelligence collection manager. 4 5 6 Q And how did job differ from what you had previously done at 92nd? A It's a higher headquarters perspective. 7 as opposed to balancing the collection activities 8 across specific detachments, I was now balancing it 9 So across the theater of MI brigades. 10 Q Did those belong to INSCOM? 11 A They were subordinate to INSCOM, yes. 12 Q And what year did you leave INSCOM and then 13 14 where did you go after that, sir? A In 2003, early 2003 -- I believe it was 15 February -- I went to the Department of Defense 16 counter-intelligence field activity. 17 Q Is that what's called CIFA, sir? 18 A Yes, sir. 19 Q And what did you do at CIFA? 20 A At CIFA I was a program manager for three 21 different portfolios. So I was the chief of the Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 134 1 collection analysis and functional services office. 2 3 Q And so collection, sir, is that the same as what you've already testified about? 4 A Yes. 5 Q And then what do you mean by the analysis 6 of functional services? 7 A So there five functions of 8 counter-intelligence. Those are three of the five that 9 we just mentioned, so collection being very 10 traditional, much like HUMINT if you want to think of 11 it that way. 12 analysis but it's specific to foreign intelligence 13 threats and then the third piece is functional 14 services. 15 development effort. 16 technical surveillance counter measures. 17 bug, you've got to found out what you're going to do 18 with it or it could be for travel debriefings after you 19 get back where you're followed to a hotel, that type of 20 thing. 21 Q Analysis and production is all source It's easiest to think about that as a lead So it could include polygraph, Sir, I apologize. If you find a I should have said this Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 135 1 before you even started testifying. If there's any 2 questions that are asked that would elicit classified 3 information, please notify the court from either party 4 before answering. 5 A Okay. 6 Q And we can take the appropriate steps. 7 Thank you. Sir, after -- how long did you spend at 8 CIFA as the chief of collection analysis and functional 9 services? 10 11 A I was at CIFA until 2008 when CIFA was merged into the Defense Intelligence Agency. 12 Q And where did you go after that, sir? 13 A Then I went to DIA headquarters and that's 14 15 when I went into the enterprise strategies element. Q Now, sir, when you were the chief of 16 collection analysis and functionality services, did you 17 have any requirements to brief senior government 18 officials or members of Congress? 19 A We did because that was -- I was in the 20 program management directory. So as part of that we 21 had to do budget roll-outs to Congress. We built the Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 136 1 strategy, the plan for we were going to build to and 2 then we built to budget around it and we would go brief 3 that to overseers to include members and staffers on 4 the hill. 5 Q And can you just, in general, explain if -- 6 you said -- explain in a little bit more detail but 7 keeping it in general what you mean by you develop the 8 requirements and built a budget? 9 10 What are you actually talking about? A So as its most basic, strategic planning is 11 looking at future threats and then you have to figure 12 out how you're going to mitigate those. 13 going to build a capability or maintain a capability 14 that can deal with those threats over time. 15 the first step in the whole process is developing a 16 strategic plan, where you want to be, and then you 17 start figuring out how you're going to get there and 18 that includes identifying the resources, identifying 19 the manpower, identifying training requirements, 20 looking at doctrine and policy to make sure that's 21 up-to-date because all of that has to evolve to meet How are you So that's Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 137 1 the goals and objectives of the strategic plan. 2 Q Thank you, sir. So when you merged -- when 3 CIFA merged into DIA, when did you get picked up to be 4 a DISL? 5 A I went into the enterprise strategies 6 element in an acting capacity in 2008. 7 at the time. 8 competitively into that in, I believe it was, April of 9 2010. 10 11 Q I was a GS-15 And then I was promoted to DISL And how long, sir, were you then the chief of the DIA enterprise strategies? 12 A Until September of 2012. 13 Q Sir, earlier when you were talking about 14 the general responsibilities as being the chief of 15 enterprise strategies, the one question I didn't ask 16 you about was: 17 job there as the chief? 18 A How did Lessons Learned play into your Well, lessons Learned is key to how you're 19 going to impact the entire DOD spectrum, doctrine, 20 organization, training, manpower, logistics -- I 21 haven't thought about this in a while -- personnel and Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 138 1 facility. 2 Sorry. So that's one of key drivers to tell you 3 you need to change your strategic plan. 4 Learned is going to flag items where we're failing or 5 having problems. 6 plan for the future. 7 Q Lessons Then that feeds back into how you Thank you, sir. 8 Sir, in September of 2012, where did you 9 move after being the chief of enterprise strategies? 10 A That's when I was promoted to SES and I 11 moved down to the office of counter-intelligence in 12 Quantico, Virginia. 13 Q Sir, when you were the deputy chief of the 14 counter-intelligence office, how large was that office 15 that you were a deputy of? 16 17 A contracted, 600 to 700 personnel. 18 19 20 21 That office was, depending of how you Q And how long were you the deputy chief A Just shy of a year. there? I just moved up here in June. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 139 1 Q What were your general duties and 2 responsibilities as the deputy chief of the 3 counter-intelligence office? 4 A It was really day-to-day management of the 5 office. 6 tried to make sure that headquarters VIA was happy, 7 that our overseers at the director of national 8 intelligence and USDI were taken care of and I looked 9 down. So the chief of the office looked up and I So I made sure all of the personnel actions were 10 completed, that we met all of our tasks. 11 the day-to-day leadership and management. 12 Q It really was Sir, now, I'd like you to focus on your 13 education, first your civilian education outside of 14 your time of DOD. 15 16 17 Could you please just briefly describe to the court your civilian education? A In 1992, I got a bachelor's of arts in 18 international relations and European studies from 19 George Mason University in Virginia. 20 master of arts in international affairs from the George 21 Washington University of Washington, D.C. In 1999, I got a Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 140 1 2 3 4 Q training have you received within DOD? A 7 Within DOD, I guess I could work backwards, from a leadership perspective, I've gone through apex. 5 6 And in a very brief way, what type of THE COURT: A What is that? Which is the civilian equivalent of touchstone, cornerstone, the -- 8 Q The capstone, sir? 9 A Capstone for regional officers. So it's a 10 civilian equivalent of that. I went through the 11 national security study program at George Washington 12 University which is an office the Secretary of Defense 13 led, a month long program for senior leaders. 14 Early in my career, I had a lot of training 15 in collection management, force management, kind of all 16 of those basic level training courses to support the 17 jobs I was doing. 18 security, classification rules, that type of training. 19 20 21 Q Information security, operation Thank you, sir. Sir, have you -- in reference to the field of strategic plan for DOD and HUMINT, have you ever Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 141 1 taught in that field before? 2 A I do. I still do occasionally or did until 3 the job I went to in June. The Joint Counter 4 Intelligence Training Academy which provides all of the 5 advanced training for military services. 6 Q Is that JCITA, sir? 7 A JCITA, yes. 8 Q And how long have you been teaching up 9 until your recent job in June in JCITA? 10 A So the JCITA training actually goes back to 11 late '90s. 12 been a long time. 13 14 15 I couldn't give you an exact date. It's Q And what type of courses have you taught A Across all levels. there? They have an advanced 16 course which is where we train our case officers for 17 offensive counter-intelligence operations and 18 investigators. 19 specialists all go through the advanced course. 20 they also have a basic level course, 21 counter-intelligence awareness, if you want to call it Surveillance, counter-surveillance But Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 142 1 that, for new CI employees and then I've often -- 2 Q Sir, have you taught any type of joint 3 staff courses? 4 A At the joint military intelligence training 5 center, they have the CI awareness course also that's 6 kind of designed for non-CI people so that they can 7 figure out how to plug into CI. 8 four times a year. 9 10 Q 13 14 15 And for how long have you been briefing four times a year? 11 12 I brief on that about A That goes back to 2008 when we merged into Q Sir, how often do you teach at JCITA that DIA. you were just talking about? A The advanced course was three to four times 16 depending on the number of reiterations each year that 17 they do. 18 six to eight. 19 many other issues they can do. 20 21 Q That's a long course. For the basic course, Usually that depends on funding, how And in general, sir, what type of topics are you teaching within your field of strategic Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 143 1 2 planning? A It's long term planning for CI HUMINT. 3 It's where the force needs to go and how we're going to 4 get the force there. 5 planning effort. 6 7 8 9 Q So it does all go back to the Sir, have you participated in any type of seminars at National Defense University? A Yes, the National Defense University runs an international fellows program. I believe that's 10 annual and I go in and participate in the seminars and 11 serve on panels for discussions. 12 13 14 Q And who are the typical participants in those seminars each year? A These are foreign general officers, 15 typically new general officers coming in to get 16 exposure to the U.S. military. 17 Q Sir, have you ever testified in a criminal 18 court before? 19 A I have not. 20 Q Have you ever briefed members of Congress? 21 A I have briefed members of Congress, but I Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 144 1 2 have not testified. Q And approximately how many members have 3 you -- how many times have you briefed members and then 4 staffers? 5 A If you go back to 2003 for my time in CIFA, 6 probably four to five times for members. 7 budget briefings over the years and then, with 8 staffers, maybe 40 different occasions. 9 Q Typically Sir, when you say in reference to the four 10 to five times to members in reference to budget, is 11 that within your field of strategic planning for DOD CI 12 and HUMINT? 13 A Well, yes, it was always related to how 14 were we going to build -- it's under the context of a 15 budget rollout. 16 be next year and this is our we're going to fund it. 17 So it is future capabilities, yes. 18 Q So it's what our capability going to And, sir, were these briefings with members 19 and staffers based on your expertise in the field of 20 DOD CI HUMINT and strategic planning? 21 A Yes. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 145 1 2 Q Sir, you said in your current job you're the deputy CFO? 3 A Correct. 4 Q Why is it that DIA selects intel, career 5 intel officers as the deputy CFO within the 6 organization? 7 A That's something the DIA does to make sure 8 that the CFO who doesn't have the expertise and the 9 capabilities themselves counter-intelligence, human 10 intelligence, analysis and production. 11 to have a functional expert that sits with her in this 12 case to make sure that when people say if you cut that 13 man, you're going to break my program. 14 flag and say not necessarily true from a mission 15 perspective. 16 MR. FEIN: So the idea is I can throw the Ma'am, the United States offers 17 Mr. Kirchhofer as an expert in strategic plan for DOD 18 CI HUMINT? 19 20 21 MR. HURLEY: We do object, Your Honor. May we have voir dire? THE COURT: Yes. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 146 1 EXAMINATION BY MR. HURLEY: 2 Q Good afternoon, sir. 3 A Good afternoon. 4 Q Now, Mr. Kirchhofer, you didn't know that 5 you were going to be qualified as a expert until 6 yesterday, correct? 7 A Correct. 8 Q That's when you sat down before you sat 9 down with us and they told you? 10 A Yes. 11 Q And they told you what your area of 12 expertise was going to be? 13 A Yes. Well, they knew about my background. 14 Q But you didn't say to them, hey, I know a 15 lot about strategic planning for CI and HUMINT, 16 correct? 17 A As we -- I don't think I said that first. 18 I think they were asking me about my expertise and that 19 was when it came out. 20 21 Q Okay. But they let you know that they were going to qualify you yesterday? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 147 1 A Yesterday, yes. 2 Q Now, sir, if you're qualified as an expert, 3 you're going to offer a number of opinions and you told 4 us about those opinions yesterday. 5 6 Those opinions are derived from your work on the IRTF, correct? 7 8 A Largely, yes. Yeah, primarily. Absolutely. 9 Q And when you were working on the IRTF, you 10 were pretty high up in that program, just General Carr 11 was above you, correct? 12 13 A program or in the leadership and that was Scott, yes. 14 15 There was one other senior executive in the Q And then you had a number of people underneath you? 16 A That's correct. 17 Q And those people would report things to 19 A Correct. 20 Q And you would take those reports at face 18 21 you? value? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 148 1 A I checked their logic trail. I looked at 2 it from the perspective of how would a non-intelligence 3 analyst review this. 4 Secretary of Defense, would it elicit more questions? 5 Did the logic seem sound, the argument that we were 6 making? 7 Q So when we sent something to the That was the review that I dealt with. Sure. You wanted to make sure that it was 8 package neatly for the higher level people who were 9 going to read it? 10 11 A Whether it answered the mail. I don't know about package, but, yes. 12 Q 13 understand it? 14 A Correct. 15 Q But you didn't look into, I guess, the 16 17 When I say package, I mean they can specifics of what was being reported? A That they made citations in the 18 documentation, yes. 19 that we were appropriately developing the argument that 20 they were making in their assessments. 21 Q Okay. I would look at that to make sure And when you say citation, they may Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 149 1 2 have cited some sort of report that they created? A Well, not just they created it. It could 3 have either been current intelligence reporting that we 4 were using to inform our understanding of the impact of 5 the compromise or it could have been one of the records 6 that we WikiLeaks posted. 7 different items like that. 8 9 Q Okay. So they were citing lots of And some of that could have been just raw intelligence? 10 A Yes, absolutely. 11 Q And if that was cited, you would have 12 looked at it? 13 A Correct. 14 Q Now, I want to talk, I guess, about CIs 15 sort of generally. 16 Now, like the people on the ground were 17 doing CI and they're developing a relationship with 18 some national, correct? 19 A They can. 20 Q Okay. 21 A Right. That might be one thing they do? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 150 1 2 Q And as part of that relationship sometimes they're going to tell that national the truth, right? 3 A Yeah. I don't want to stray too far into 4 classified. 5 that deal with foreign nationals and some of them are 6 what we would call offensive activities that might 7 involve a witting or an unwitting foreign national. 8 9 10 Q There particular activities that we do Okay. Let's use an example where I'm a CI person, you're a national. We've developed some sort of rapport, right? 11 A Okay. 12 Q And sometimes I tell you the truth when 13 we're talking, right? 14 A Right. 15 Q And sometimes I would lie to you too, 17 A Again, sometimes it gets to either witting 18 or unwitting. 19 Q 16 20 21 right? Part of counter-intelligence can be telling someone else something that's not true, correct? A I'm more comfortable talking about that in Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 151 1 2 closed session in great detail. Q 3 Fair enough. Sure. Sometimes when we're talking to foreign 4 nationals or CI folks, sometimes those foreign 5 nationals lies to the CI folks? 6 A Yes. 7 Q Correct? 8 A Correct. 9 Q And so when you're looking at all of this 10 stuff up at the IRTF level, a lot of it based on this 11 reporting done on the ground where local national tells 12 CI folk individual what could be a lie, right? 13 A Correct. 14 Q And then that CI person reports it up, 15 correct? 16 A Correct. 17 Q To their supervisor, right? 18 A To the customer, right. 19 Q Sure, and then that person may have 20 reported it to the IRTF, hey, this is what we're 21 hearing about the reaction to all of this, correct? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 152 1 A Right. It would have gone -- if it was 2 happening during the time of the IRTF, it would have 3 been reported like any other piece of intelligence and 4 it would come back into a database where we could 5 access it. 6 7 8 9 Q Okay. It would go through multiple levels, correct? A In some cases. It's not always the case. Some places it will come right from the field home and 10 other places to other elements, you know. 11 actually, they try to put more levels of quality 12 control in before they report, typically. 13 Q Okay. The army, But you personally, when you were 14 looking at these reports, didn't do anything to test 15 the reliability of the intelligence that was the basis? 16 A That's the whole basis of analytic 17 tradecraft is vetting the information. 18 So that was all done before that came up to me. 19 Q Okay. 20 A That's part and parcel of what a analyst 21 does, try to determine the voracity or validity of that Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 153 1 raw intelligence that's been collected. 2 Q One moment. 3 A Sure. 4 Q Now, you said that your opinions are mostly 5 based on your time in the IRTF and the reports that you 6 would have looked at there and those reports you took 7 for face value, correct? 8 A What does that mean, face value? 9 Q You looked at it and you assumed that what 10 was in there was true? 11 A I questioned them if I felt their logic was 12 wrong. In general, I think they did a pretty good job, 13 though, and I felt comfortable with it. 14 question, I did send reports back. 15 obligation because I was the first senior executive in 16 the chain of command for them. But I did I felt that 17 MR. HURLEY: One second Your Honor. 18 (Pause.) 19 Your Honor, we don't have any further voir 20 dire. We would object based under 702 on the 21 reliability of the underlying data. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 154 1 We would also make a relevance objection as 2 to the expertise. 3 pretty much based on his time at the IRTF and so we 4 don't think he would need to be qualified as an expert 5 to discuss that. 6 cumulative to what Mr. Carr, General Carr, retired, 7 discussed. 8 9 Mr. Kirchhofer said that this is We would also think that it would be THE COURT: Thank you. While we have this discussion, does the witness need to depart the room? 10 Does either side care if the witness remains in the 11 witness chair? 12 13 14 15 16 MR. FEIN: The United States doesn't see an issue if he stays, ma'am. THE COURT: What is government position? What are you trying to elicit? MR. FEIN: Ma'am, ultimately, the United 17 States is trying to elicit a few items. 18 findings that Mr. Kirchhofer oversaw from IRTF about 19 the damage to national security of the United States. 20 Second, the -- what was referenced before 21 One, specific with General Carr, the actual resourcing that went into Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 155 1 creating the IRTF and how they function internally. 2 it's not cumulative because General Carr did not 3 testify about that, plus, as General Carr testified, he 4 was not necessarily involved in the daily operations 5 where Mr. Kirchhofer was. 6 7 As far as the actual expertise, Your Honor, the reliability... 8 9 10 So THE COURT: The expertise that you want is strategic planning for DOD counter-intelligence and DOD HUMINT. 11 How does that relate to the IRTF? 12 MR. FEIN: 13 I -- well, I can answer that, but I probably would rather -- well... 14 15 Yes, ma'am. THE COURT: Well, if you want him qualified as a witness, you want to answer it now. 16 MR. FEIN: 17 BY MR. FEIN: 18 Q Yes, ma'am. Mr. Kirchhofer, when you were selected to 19 be the deputy chief of the IRTF, where were you working 20 at the time? 21 A I was the chief of enterprise strategies Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 156 1 doing CI and doing strategic planning. 2 3 Q And based off of that, when you were -- you were one of the original leaders selected for the IRTF? 4 A I was about three days in, four days in. 5 Once they realized the scope, they brought a second 6 senior in. 7 understanding at the time was because of my information 8 security background, my counter-intelligence background 9 and then the nexus between strategic planning and It was their whole intent. My 10 dealing with foreign threats or future threats and that 11 was where they thought that this task force was going 12 to tee up information for how to deal with those future 13 threats. 14 Q So, sir, you were hand picked to do that 16 A That's correct. 17 Q And that's from your position as a chief of 15 18 job? the enterprise management for CI HUMINT? 19 A Correct. 20 Q Sir, was the -- I'm sorry? 21 A Enterprise strategies. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 157 1 2 Q I'm sorry, thank you. Enterprise strategies. 3 Sir, was the WikiLeaks disclosures 4 considered a counter-intelligence issue or was it some 5 other type of issue? 6 A In the early stages of an issue like that, 7 you don't necessarily know until you can get a clear 8 foreign connection and typically in a 9 counter-intelligence perspective, it's a connection to 10 a foreign intelligence service or an international 11 terrorist organization. 12 So the question early on was where does 13 WikiLeaks fall that has the data. 14 are they a foreign government? 15 They're foreign, but Are they journalists? Yes, what you would typically do or what 16 you would often see happen in the military department, 17 CIA investigators or criminal investigators would work 18 together until it's clear which way it should go and 19 then that the informs the authorities that they use for 20 the remainder of their investigation. 21 Q But that's not what happened in this case, Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 158 1 correct? 2 A Correct. We did not get involved at all in 3 the investigation. 4 wouldn't harm any of the equities. 5 6 Q We steered clear of that so we You say investigating. You mean the criminal investigation? 7 A Correct. 8 Q And, sir, what about -- where does insider 9 threats come into play as far as CI and HUMINT? 10 A CI has a piece of insider threat, but 11 there's also information assurance that the key 12 partners -- security is a key partner in that and I 13 think this is what the army has really struggled with 14 in post Fort Hood environment is all of these 15 stovepipes looking at the inside threat. 16 17 18 Q And, sir, were you brought for that purpose A Bringing that counter-intelligence to -- 19 awareness and knowledge, yes, that's part of it and 20 understanding where those lines of authority go. 21 MR. FEIN: Thank you, sir. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 159 1 Your Honor, the United States will maintain 2 that based off Mr. Kirchhofer's selection as being the 3 deputy chief, the one who is essentially the XO of the 4 organization who had Mannings -- that he does have 5 unique specialized knowledge in order to help the trier 6 of fact understand why certain decisions were made both 7 in the makeup and, ultimately, of the findings that 8 were made by IRTF. Specific findings, not all of them. 9 THE COURT: 10 MR. HURLEY: Yes? Ma'am, the defense's position 11 would be that while Mr. Kirchhofer may have been 12 selected because of his background, that background 13 doesn't really have anything to do with his testimony. 14 This sounds like sort of a resourcing argument which we 15 don't think would be proper under 1001B4. 16 like what CIP does or what -- 17 THE COURT: It would be Well, that's the issue on the 18 table. Remember, we talked about early. I said I 19 would allow the testimony in, listen to both sides and 20 then decide, after I heard it, whether it falls within 21 the line of cases that you're talking about. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 160 1 So for that purpose -- I mean, I understand 2 your objection. 3 into briefing tonight, but I'm going to hear, in my 4 interrogatory capacity at least, that testimony. 5 It's noted for the record. It's going Okay? Why does this witness have to be an expert, 6 though, is where I'm a little confused. 7 talking about resourcing all of the rest of that, isn't 8 that more of a fact? 9 MR. FEIN: If you're Ma'am, the resourcing part, 10 absolutely, is the fact -- it's the second part. 11 his specialized knowledge and experience on the 12 findings, the intelligence findings on national 13 security -- their assessment, his assessment on how 14 national security was impacted by PFC Manning's 15 actions. 16 is ultimately playing into this. 17 It's It's that, Your Honor, of where his expertise I mean, all of it feeds into each other 18 because in order to make those assessments there had to 19 be an organization to do it. 20 21 So I agree, Your Honor, that simply saying how many people worked there and how long did they work Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 161 1 to and why, that's all just fact witness testimony 2 which we intend to elicit. 3 THE COURT: 4 MR. HURLEY: Yes? Ma'am, we would say that the 5 opinions are opinions you've already heard from General 6 Carr, one. 7 defense position would be -- I understand we'll brief 8 it this evening, but our position would be the reason 9 that this individual is being qualified as an expert is So it could be cumulative. And, two, the 10 so that he talk about hearsay and serve as the 11 case's -- talk about hearsay dump truck pulled up by 12 someone who is an expert so that they can testify about 13 an opinion that otherwise wouldn't be admissible. 14 our position this expertise doesn't have anything to do 15 with the opinion. 16 otherwise inadmissible testimony, Your Honor. 17 And So the purpose here is to get in THE COURT: All right. The court is going 18 to be in recess for 15 minutes. 19 your testimony or knowledge of the case with anyone 20 other than counsel while the court is in recess. 21 Please don't discuss (There was a brief recess taken at 4:47 and Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 162 1 the trial resumed at 5:07 p.m.) 2 THE CLERK: All rise. 3 THE COURT: Please be seated. The court is 4 called to order. Let the record reflect all parties 5 present when the court last recessed are again present 6 in court. 7 an expert in the field of strategic planning for DOD 8 counter-intelligence and DOD human intelligence. 9 defense objects to Mr. Kirchhofer's expertise and that The government has offered Mr. Kirchhofer as The 10 his expertise has nothing to do with his opinion and 11 his opinions are cumulative with Brigadier General 12 Carr. 13 The court has considered the defense's 14 objections to Mr. Kirchhofer's expertise and finds the 15 government has established that Mr. Kirchhofer is an 16 expert in the field of strategic planning for DOD 17 counter-intelligence and DOD human intelligence. 18 19 20 21 He was specifically selected to become deputy of the IRTF because of that expertise. With respect to his expertise, the court finds he's properly qualified as an expert by his Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 163 1 knowledge of strategic planning operations and budget 2 in the fields of counter-intelligence and human 3 intelligence. 4 understand the evidence and determine the facts at 5 issue. 6 His opinion will help the trier of fact Mr. Kirchhofer was deputy chief of the IRTF 7 and, as such, was directly involved in efforts to 8 mitigate any impact caused by the WikiLeaks disclosures 9 of information given to them by PFC Manning. His 10 testimony is based on sufficient facts and data. 11 The IRTF is not a law enforcement agency. 12 Mr. Kirchhofer is qualified under MRE an 02 13 as an expert in the field of strategic planning for DOD 14 counter-intelligence and DOD human intelligence. 15 court will allow the government to lay law a foundation 16 for his opinion without eliciting any hearsay 17 foundation for that opinion. 18 opinions cumulative with Brigadier General Retired 19 Carr's opinion on direct examination, the court will 20 stop the direct examination. 21 The Should the witness offer The defense motion opposing Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 164 1 Mr. Kirchhofer's qualifications as an expert under MRE 2 702 is denied. 3 resourcing the IRTF as a fact witness. 4 determines after reviewing the filings by the parties 5 that the evidence is not admissible aggravation 6 evidence under RCM 1001 before the court will disregard 7 the testimony. Mr. Kirchhofer may testify about 8 Proceed. 9 If the court EXAMINATION BY MR. FEIN: 10 Q 11 12 13 One moment, please. Sir, what were your responsibilities as the deputy chief of the IRTF? A Really, it was the day-to-day management of 14 the task force, making sure that all of our folks were 15 focused on the right priorities, making sure that we 16 were responsive to requests for information coming from 17 really everywhere, especially in the early days, 18 overseeing the work, the quality of work and really 19 focused primarily inward at the effort while the chief 20 focused out. That was the difference between us. 21 Q And how long did you have that role with Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 165 1 the IRTF, sir? 2 A 3 4 of 2011. Q From the 2nd of August until -- through May So August 2010 until May 2011. And earlier, sir, you testified that 5 originally there were three or four individuals that 6 were originally selected to stand up to the IRTF. 7 8 9 How did you as the deputy then determine who else was needed in order to establish the IRTF? A By that point, it was a Monday when I went 10 and joined the task force and the original team, the 11 first four or five people had spent the weekend 12 identifying what they needed in terms of tools and 13 facilities and IT requirements, rough orders of 14 magnitude for a number of people. 15 So then starting that Monday was when we 16 were reaching out across the department trying to get 17 people brought in. 18 DIA bureaucracy to get laptops. 19 75 computers all set up in a row so we could get all of 20 these analysts working together and collaborating. 21 all of that was going on on Monday that was getting We were working internally to the We had a room with So Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 166 1 2 that going. Q And, sir, can you please explain -- well, 3 before that, I'm sorry, what criteria or what factors 4 did you and you said Ms. Iliard (phonetic) before, the 5 chief -- 6 A Correct. 7 Q Did you consider in order to figure out how 8 9 to man and resource it? A Our initial focus was kind of going in 10 three different directions. 11 help us manage data. 12 none of us had the technical expertise to do that. 13 what kind of tools could we use? 14 should we have? 15 U.S. central command to DIA headquarters onto a 16 Jaywicks environment, a top secret environment as 17 opposed to a secret environment. 18 technical expertise in that way. 19 So the first was people to Because of the volume of data, So What kind of service How could we get stuffed moved from So we needed Then we needed very traditional all source 20 analysts from the DIA director of analysis. These are 21 folks who know how to use every intelligence discipline Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 167 1 to inform their analytical effort. They've come with 2 that tradecraft that's been taught to the director of 3 national intelligence standards and the third big piece 4 for us was counter-intelligence expertise, folks that 5 understand the foreign threat, how foreign governments 6 or foreign intelligence services might try to use the 7 data for terrorists organizations. 8 So that was our first thrust. It wasn't 9 until we started going into the data that we started 10 realizing, okay, you know, we might need expertise from 11 the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 12 Organization, JIEDDO. 13 and asking them for help. 14 So we were reaching out to them So it varied depending upon what we were 15 reviewing at any given time, but the first thrust was 16 all source analysis counter-intelligence and it 17 technical expertise. 18 19 20 21 Q Sir, when you talked about getting through the data, what do you mean by that? A So we were trying to determine what exactly had gone public on what WikiLeaks had posted and Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 168 1 comparing that to what we thought was in U.S. central 2 command holdings and then it was just dealing with that 3 volume. 4 impact and that's where we needed to start on right 5 away. 6 Q We pledged to read every word, to get to the Sir, can you please explain the task force 7 op tempo during the initial weeks of the IRTF standing 8 up? 9 A The initial two weeks were pretty painful. 10 As people were coming onboard, we were dealing with 11 security clearances, getting access to the systems 12 because they were coming in from everywhere, not just 13 DIA. 14 just trying to get them in the door, getting them up 15 and going and running. We had folks from all over. 16 So it was really Probably by the midst of August was when 17 really hit our stride. 18 We went to a 24-hour a day, seven day a week op tempo 19 where we were just doing nothing but reading, reading, 20 reading all of these records. 21 Q We were up to 125 personnel. And for how long, sir, did the IRTF sustain Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 169 1 this 24-hour a day seven-days a week? 2 A That went through September. 3 Q Why was that? 4 A Because at that point we had felt 5 confident -- we had completed reviewing of the CIDNE 6 Afghanistan data and finished the CIDNE Iraq data at 7 that point going into early October. 8 Q 9 Excuse one moment, please, sir. (Pause.) 10 Sir, you mentioned for the composition of 11 the IRTF that there was internal DIA organizations. 12 You also mentioned CentCom. 13 14 15 What other organizations were represented that you all pulled into this task force? A So from within DOD, we had personnel from 16 the Secretary of Defense for intelligence and that was 17 where -- one of the places we turned to for the 18 technical expertise. 19 support office, I think it's called. 20 other Secretary of Defense for policy provided 21 personnel from OARDEC, the Office for the They have an intelligence system And then the Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 170 1 Administrative Review of Detention of Enemy Combatants. 2 So they sent personnel. Each of the four 3 military services provided people. 4 Southern Command, U.S. Special Operations Command sent 5 people, the defense production agency, the defense 6 security service. 7 from within the department. 8 Q 9 10 11 CentCom, U.S. That was the primary elements of -- Sir, what do you mean -- excuse me. In regards to those -- at least within the DOD, what do you mean by "they sent people?" A They actually physically sent people to be 12 a part of the -- integral to the task force, working on 13 our op tempo, working in our facilities. 14 on the floor, the analytical floor where we have the 75 15 terminals, they were integrated into that piece of it. 16 So when I say So some of those folks we partnered with 17 who just would fly in or out or just deal with this on 18 a VTC type capacity. 19 they were literally there taking guidance from us day 20 in and day out. 21 Q But when I say on the task force, And why so many organizations within the Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 171 1 2 Department of Defense? A Because just the scope of the data, 3 especially as we moved on beyond the city data that we 4 were concerned about it. 5 Q Everyone had equities in it. And what about organizations in general, 6 sir, not naming -- just a brief description of 7 organizations outside of DOD? 8 9 A So we did have organizations that put people, again, on the task force, on the floor, and 10 that was the Drug Enforcement Administration, the FBI 11 sent eight analysts to support us and then -- I'm 12 missing one. 13 of State sent a special agent from their diplomatic 14 security element to sit with us and he sat for the 15 duration. 16 the floor and, of course, we had our partners that we 17 were communicating with daily, via intelligence 18 community and even broader ATCs. 19 Q There was a third group. Oh, Department So that was the extra [Inaudible.] all on Sir, over the course of its total 20 operation, about how many people total were either 21 assigned to IRTF or direct support of the IRTF? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 172 1 A We tracked what was assigned. So within 2 that cap of 125 that we were dealing with, we had about 3 300 people cycle on and off the task force over the 4 duration. 5 6 Q talked about the 24-7 operation. 7 8 9 Sir, why was it necessary -- earlier you Why was it necessary for the task force to work around-the-clock to get through the data? A Our whole intent was to make sure that 10 there was no strategic surprise to the secretary or 11 other senior leaders of the department. 12 like we had to rapidly catch up on what had already 13 been posted related to Afghanistan and then try to get 14 ahead of any potential release of the Iraqi data. 15 that was really driving that non-stop 24 hours a day 16 nightshift/dayshift just to crank through that data. 17 18 19 Q So we felt So Sir, you used the term strategic surprise. What do you mean by that? A At the end of the day, it's about giving 20 the secretary options to mitigate any potential impacts 21 that were identifying for them. So if he could do that Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 173 1 before a public release, the idea was that the impact 2 would be much less on the back end. 3 4 5 Q Was the IRTF focus at the strategic or tactical level? A Primarily at the strategic level. I don't 6 know if you want to call it dipping down to the 7 tactical level as needed. 8 soldier's personally identifiable information, we made 9 sure that the Army would be notified and let that So if we identified a 10 person know that their personnel information was out. 11 So if you want to define that as tactical, for the most 12 part we were looking at bigger impacts particular along 13 the line of the seven category of focus areas that the 14 secretary gave us. 15 16 Q And are those sort of the areas that were in the secretary's memo? 17 A From 5 August, yes. 18 Q Okay, sir. 19 20 21 Sir, how did the IRTF internally conduct its review? A So we -- using -- we first triaged the Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 174 1 data. 2 to run quick searches of alarming things, you know, 3 unclassified nicknames of things that we knew were 4 sensitive. 5 then we went through the very -- the network of having 6 an analyst put eyes on every record and then flagging 7 anything that they assessed to have some sort of impact 8 or put up a flag for them and that went to a second 9 level more senior analytical review. 10 11 12 So we had it in the database that we were able Q So that was the very first thing we did and So what did the IRTF have to do with the kind of findings based off this review? A So our whole focus was on transparency 13 engagement across the community and as it turned out 14 the federal government. 15 the national counter-intelligence executive and it was 16 easier because we were in the same building as them who 17 helped us reach out across the federal government to 18 other departments and agencies. 19 identified and if it's not a DOD equity but someone 20 else's, to immediately reach out and give them the 21 opportunity to help themselves. We worked very closely with But our thing was That's how DEA for Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 175 1 example ended up sending people on to the task force 2 floor. 3 4 5 Q How were the conclusions of the IRTF at least on a daily or weekly basis captured? A We either looked at things functionally, 6 sometimes regionally. We looked at it from a lot of 7 different ways. 8 categories the secretary had given us. 9 at special interest items. So always mindful of the seven Then we looked We were able to do that 10 based on the expertise on the task force. So we had 11 DIAs preeminent -- I don't know the right word -- star 12 Iraqi analyst that came from our director of analysis 13 and he was able to point out some things to do deep 14 dive looks at in advance of them going public. 15 Q And were there products produced from this? 16 A There were. They did a number of small 17 papers that came up from the analytical floor. 18 they would go through that analytical trade craft at 19 that level and then it would come into the front office 20 where I would do a review. 21 Q Again, And did you review all of those individual Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 176 1 reports, sir? 2 A Yes, every one. 3 Q And then what happened, sir -- at the 4 conclusion of the IRTF, what happened with all of those 5 individual reports? 6 A They were used to inform the development of 7 a final report that's over 100 pages in length. It 8 wasn't just cut and paste. 9 that the early analysis that we had done in August and We were trying to make sure 10 September was still valid the following May when we 11 were putting that final report together. 12 was integrating the analytical results of all of those 13 earlier efforts into a cohesive document. But it really 14 Q And who did the IRTF relate findings to? 15 A Our final due out was the director of DIA 16 to the Secretary of Defense, but that was shared. 17 final report was shared with others because they were 18 impacted. 19 Q 20 report? 21 A That What was your role, sir, in the final I did the final -- the senior executive Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 177 1 review of it. 2 staff that we had in the front office of the IRTF so 3 the analysts could keep working there. 4 on in the front office. 5 6 Q We built that actually out of the small So we took that Sir, why -- when you -- were your findings also related to other members of the U.S. government? 7 A They touched on it. For the most part, we 8 tried to really limit -- our focus was all the 9 authority we had on impacts of the department. So 10 primarily for us with other agencies, it was 11 highlighting to them, hey, did you see this, did you 12 know that this is in this dataset. 13 to look at it. 14 pushing it off to them so they could do something about 15 it. 16 17 18 We think you need So it was highlighting it and then Q And why push off the DOD findings to them, A Not necessarily DOD findings. sir? I mean, we 19 shared them all. They all -- the Department of State 20 and our other intelligence community partner saw 21 everything we did before we published it so we could Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 178 1 benefit from their combined wisdom. 2 what we were pushing off was if we identify equities 3 that go back to the DEA example that we found, we 4 couldn't necessarily be the organization to say the 5 impact to DEA. 6 made sure that they knew this is what's out there about 7 you or that impacts you, you know, you need to help 8 yourself to try to figure out how to mitigate that. 9 Q It was really -- They needed to do that. Yes, sir. So we just Now, sir, I'd like to focus your 10 testimony on some specific findings of the IRTF. 11 Again, this isn't an unclassified session, so.... 12 THE COURT: 13 MR. HURLEY: Yes? Ma'am, I think we'll object 14 right now. 15 clear that the findings of the IRTF were done by 16 subject matter experts. They are the ones who did -- 17 came to the conclusions. So if it was an IED issue, 18 JIEDDO made a conclusion, not Mr. Kirchhofer. 19 I think the witness's testimony has made So our position is that any conclusion that 20 Mr. Kirchhofer would testify about would be hearsay 21 that would be prohibited under 703. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 179 1 THE COURT: 2 MR. FEIN: 3 One, the conclusions that Mr. Kirchhofer is 4 relying on are conclusions that were made in the course 5 of the actual IRTF work product that he oversaw. 6 signed off on every document, all these conclusions. 7 Yes? Two major issues, ma'am. He Second, Your Honor, Mr. Kirchhofer's 8 testimony is based off of a [Inaudible] damage 9 assessment which has already been determined by the 10 Court to not be hearsay based off of defense's motion 11 of judicial notice. 12 So in regards whether it's hearsay or 13 not -- well, the Court has already determined the 14 damage testimony is not hearsay and it's -- but going 15 back to even if it's hearsay, Your Honor, this was 16 relied upon by Mr. Kirchhofer in his official capacity 17 as the deputy chief. 18 himself. 19 and send it off. He had a role in all of this He even said he didn't just sign the document 20 THE COURT: Did you make the opinions that 21 you're testifying about yourself? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 180 1 THE WITNESS: All opinions were informed by 2 what was coming in from where the analytic expertise 3 was. 4 I felt like I had to agree with either recommendations 5 or we would challenge them, if that makes sense. But it came out of the authority of the IRTF. 6 THE COURT: 7 objection. 8 Q I'm going to overrule the BY MR. FEIN: 9 So Go ahead. Sir, during the review of this data -- 10 11 THE COURT: I said overrule the objection. If you want to make further record, go ahead. 12 MR. HURLEY: Yes, ma'am. Our position 13 would be that the prejudice that would derive from this 14 is we don't have the opportunity to cross examine the 15 person who actually made -- formed the opinion. 16 while Mr. Kirchhofer may have ultimately said, yeah, I 17 agree or I don't agree, he's not in a position to be 18 examined on the actual specifics of what informed the 19 decision. He can't do that. 20 21 And so THE COURT: Overruled. BY MR. FEIN: Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 181 1 2 Q Sir, during the review of data, did the IRTF actually identify any areas of impact? 3 A Yes, we did. 4 Q And excuse me, sir, one moment, please. 5 (Pause.) 6 Sir, for the first area I'd like you to -- 7 this person who testified before was on the SigActs, 8 the CIDNE A and CIDNE I databases. 9 Are you familiar with those databases? 10 A Yes, I am. 11 Q What were some of the areas where IRTF 12 identified impact or potential impact for the CIDNE A 13 and CIDNE I SigActs? 14 A I think the first thing that we 15 recognize -- this has actually stretched through the 16 entire IRTF experience was the enhanced risk that 17 cooperating foreign nationals would be having to deal 18 with because their names were not only associated in 19 some way with the U.S. military. 20 Q And were there any others, sir? 21 A Yes, there were some probably less Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 182 1 long-term strategically. 2 THE COURT: 3 Yes? MR. HURLEY: Your Honor, we'll renew our 4 cumulative objection. 5 General Carr has testified about. 6 THE COURT: 7 Are you asking the same questions that you asked with General Carr? 8 9 These are all things that MR. FEIN: pauses. No, ma'am. I'm making sure. That's why these I do understand that 10 knowingly, although that was the same answer, 11 Mr. Kirchhofer has his own unique information and it 12 will be narrowly tailored, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: All right. If we start getting 14 into the cumulative, I'm going to pull up the prior 15 opinion here in just a moment. 16 MR. FEIN: Yes, ma'am. 17 THE COURT: (Pause.) 18 I'm going to overrule the objection for 19 now, but keep it focused on the things that the last 20 witness didn't give opinions about. 21 MR. FEIN: Yes, ma'am. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 183 1 BY MR. FEIN: 2 Q Sir, specifically with counter IED in 3 reference to the SigActs, what did the IRTF do with 4 related reports that it discovered within the 5 compromised data? 6 A So that -- the shear volume was probably 7 the first challenge we had to deal, particularly when 8 you looked at what was coming out of the Iraqi data 9 set. So the way the secretary had set up the IRTF, he 10 gave us the sole authority to talk to the impact or to 11 assess the impact of this compromise. 12 So we did reach out to U.S. central 13 command. 14 hold that specific data, cull through it all and then 15 send their findings back to us for final review. 16 17 Q We worked with JIEDDO so that they could -- I'm sorry, one moment, please. Sir, specifically now talking about NATO 18 information that was contained with the SigActs and 19 your personal experience with that information, that's 20 this next area. 21 At any point in the IRTF, did you Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 184 1 personally brief NATO partners about the loss of 2 information? 3 A Yes, I did. 4 Q And what did you have to do in order to 5 6 brief them? A I had to appreciate the impact to each of 7 them that were going to be present. I went to an 8 annual counter-intelligence counter conference at SHAP, 9 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers. So there were 10 delegations from a number, not quite all of our NATO 11 partners. 12 So I went in to try to explain to them what 13 we thought the impact was going to be both to them on 14 our military to military relationships with them and 15 set the stage for what we knew was coming. 16 happened to be the same week that WikiLeaks started 17 posting records from Iraq. 18 on a Tuesday and later that week is when that data 19 started going public. 20 21 Q So it So I think I briefed them Sir, what level of individuals did you personally brief when you traveled to the SHAP Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 185 1 headquarters? 2 A The majority were one star equivalence. 3 did some cases of civilians much like the U.S. active 4 I duty, one stars. 5 6 7 Q And, sir, how would you describe their reaction when you provided this information? A It varied. 8 THE COURT: 9 MR. HURLEY: 10 Yes? We'll renew our hearsay objection. 11 THE COURT: 12 but go ahead. 13 BY MR. FEIN: 14 Q Describing reactions overruled, 15 16 17 18 What was the reaction, sir, not necessarily what they, overall, told you? A I'm trying to get the nuisance of the question, sorry, the difference. The response range, there were some 19 unpleasant comments directed at me and accusations at 20 the U.S. and others patted me on the back and said 21 "we'll get through this." So it really did range from Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 186 1 pretty aggressive people getting chesty -- I don't know 2 how else to describe it -- in that open forum and in a 3 closed forum I can tell you what countries if that 4 matters. 5 Q 6 Thank you, sir. Sir, now, in reference to Lessons Learned in 7 your involvement at the IRTF. 8 assessments conducted by IRTF, are you aware of any 9 Lessons Learned studies that were conducted as a result 10 In addition to the of the compromise? 11 A Yes, I am. 12 Q And were you personally involved in 13 conducting or overseeing these Lessons Learned? 14 A Some, but not all. 15 Q And how were you involved, sir, or why 16 17 would you have been involved? A So one -- as we were building the IRTF 18 originally and then I got assigned to it shortly 19 thereafter, I actually brought a chunk of my team along 20 and that included my whole Lessons Learned team partly 21 because they do knowledge management well, just because Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 187 1 of how they operate and that's when we needed. But we 2 decided then to taking advantage of having them on the 3 staff to start doing Lessons Learned studies internally 4 on how the agency handles crisis and contingency 5 response. 6 at how we reacted to this. So they did a number of studies that looked 7 That was our internal work. And then we also worked with -- through the 8 joint staff, J7, with what was then the joint forces 9 command. They did a look for Lessons Learned on how 10 central command and the joint task forces in 11 Afghanistan and Iraq notified those cooperating foreign 12 nationals. 13 They did that review. Then a third one that I didn't have any 14 oversight of as they developed it was JIEDDO related to 15 their area of expertise. 16 Q One moment, please, sir. 17 A Sure. 18 Q Sir, when the IRTF stood down, are there 19 still members at DIA who are -- that were members of 20 the IRTF that are still tracking the effects of these 21 disclosures? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 188 1 A Tracking the effects and probably even the 2 bigger chunk of time is responding to requests from 3 across the department because -- 4 THE COURT: 5 MR. COOMBS: 6 Your Honor, could we have a very brief 882? 7 THE COURT: 8 MR. COOMBS: 9 10 Yes? You want a ten-minute recess? Yes, Your Honor. (There was a recess taken at 5:36 and the trial resumed at 6:00 p.m.) 11 THE COURT: Please be seated. 12 called to order. 13 recess are again present in court. 14 The court is the witness stand. 15 All parties present before the last The witness is on Major Fein? 16 BY MR. FEIN: 17 Q 18 Sir, was there a financial cost associated with the operations of IRTF? 19 A Of direct and indirect, yes. 20 Q And direct, sir, what was the financial 21 cost? Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 189 1 A The direct cost to the DIA portion 2 specifically -- that's the only thing I would have 3 visibility on -- was $6.2 million. 4 Q And what did that include, sir? 5 A That include civilian pay, overtime, IT 6 tools, facilities, extensions into the lease space 7 where we were. 8 stuff. I think that's the most all inclusive 9 Q What do you mean by indirect costs, sir? 10 A Opportunity cost. So, for example, we shut 11 down Lessons Learned program, we pulled analysts off of 12 regional analysis or other accounts, foundational 13 analysis to do this work and I think, from a CentCom 14 perspective, certainly they pulled a lot of people off 15 of the focus on the Middle East to work this issue. 16 Q Sir, given those financial and other 17 opportunity costs, do you still believe that the IRTF 18 was necessary? 19 A I believe it was, yes. 20 Q Why sir? 21 A So that we could mitigate those things that Absolutely. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 190 1 we could before information went public and put us in a 2 bad spot with allies or others. 3 4 MR. FEIN: 7 Your Honor, no further questions. 5 6 Thank you, sir. EXAMINATION BY MR. HURLEY: Q Mr. Kirchhofer you've worked your entire professional career in the government; is that correct? 8 A That's correct. 9 Q From your testimony, it seems like you 10 started while you were still in school? 11 A I was, yes. 12 Q You started as a typist? 13 A I did. 14 Q So fair to say you started sort at the 15 lower level? 16 A That's correct. 17 Q You've done very well for yourself and now 18 you're -- 19 A Yes. 20 Q I just need you to verbalize your 21 responses. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 191 1 A It's just awkward. 2 Q Okay. 3 A That's correct. 4 Q In that time, 42 years or so? 5 A Yes. 6 Q You've worked for the government the whole 8 A That's correct. 9 Q And in that time you've always dealt with 7 10 11 12 13 And now you're a senior executive? time? classified information or intelligence in some way? A Yes, I've always been within an intelligence organization. Q I want to talk briefly about -- you 14 testified a little bit about NATO and you talked about 15 having some meetings with folks at NATO, correct? 16 A I went to a conference to brief what we 17 believe the impact would be either to our relationship 18 with them or to capabilities, I guess. 19 Q Okay. When was that, do you recall? 20 A That was in October of 2010. 21 Q Okay. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 192 1 2 A Q interactions with NATO partners? A At working levels, but I hadn't recently in my career. 9 10 So October of 2010 you went and Before that time, had you ever had 7 8 Okay. briefed some NATO partners. 5 6 I don't remember what day I briefed that week, but... 3 4 The week of the 18th. Q Okay. Following that briefing, did you have any interactions with NATO partners? 11 A 12 nothing else. 13 Q 14 Some followup actions related to that, but Since you left the IRTF in 2011, have you had any interactions with those NATO partners? 15 A Not so much NATO. 16 say. 17 The five eyes, I would No, not NATO specifically. 18 So a different group of international partners. Q Okay. So the folks that you gave a brief 19 to and said, hey, here's what we think might be coming, 20 you haven't talked to those people since? 21 A Yes, for the Brits, but not with the Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 193 1 others. 2 accurate response. 3 relationship as opposed to a NATO engagement if that 4 makes sense. 5 Q 6 And that was more of a trying to give you an Sure. It was more of a bilateral You spoke to them, did you speak about this? 7 A No, it was about counter-intelligence. 8 Q Something about something else? 9 A Correct. 10 Q So after you gave them the briefing about 11 this subject, you didn't talk to them about this 12 subject anymore? 13 A Correct. 14 Q Now, you spoke about those small papers, I 15 think you called them, that formed your opinion here 16 today and the small papers, how often would you get 17 those? 18 19 A Aperiodic, but routinely. They were coming in kind of steadily the whole time. 20 Q Starting from when you all set up the IRTF? 21 A Probably after the first couple of weeks. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 194 1 I think generally most of what we were doing in the 2 first couple of weeks was all based off of PowerPoint, 3 just throw something down so we can get the message 4 across. 5 have an audit trail of our analytical efforts. 6 that's when we decided we were just going to go with 7 this information paper I think is what we called them. 8 9 10 11 12 13 Q We were trying to come up with a better way to So So those information papers, can you give us an estimate of how many of those you would say you received? A I would say at least 100, but I don't know how much more than that. Q Okay. At least 100. And this in those small papers, you 14 were getting analysis from the people who were doing -- 15 working for you? 16 17 A That's correct. Analysis and some of them were related to methodology and tradecraft. 18 Q So methodology -- 19 A Yes. 20 Q Tradecraft? 21 A Yes. Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 195 1 Q Some analysis? 2 A Yes. 3 Q And ultimately conclusions as well? 4 A Yes. 5 Q Now, speaking generally about the IRTF, the Right, expected impact. 6 IRTF was stood up because Secretary Gates said so, 7 correct? 8 A Correct. 9 Q And when he said so, he distributed a 10 two-page memo? 11 A Yes, two pages. 12 Q And those in that memo he said tell me what 13 the damage is? 14 A He said I want you to look at this. 15 not use the word damage. 16 a statutory authority within the national 17 counter-intelligence executive. 18 look at the impact on DOD and he gave us seven specific 19 focus areas to start. 20 21 Q We were very careful. We did That's We were just trying to And you would say that memo from the Secretary of Defense saying tell me what the effect is Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 196 1 might compel folks to tell him that there was an 2 effect? 3 A He didn't -- no. 4 I don't think we felt that. 5 would have said it. 6 I don't know that's true. If there was no impact, we at there. I think that's what you're getting 7 Q Now -- one moment, please. 8 A Sure. 9 Q Mr. Kirchhofer, you left the IRTF when you 10 11 all finished, correct? A Right, we were winding down into a small. 12 At that point we were calling it a WikiLeaks damage 13 assessment team. 14 15 Q Okay. So that was sometime in the middle of 2011? 16 A That was in May. 17 Q May 2011 you get your final report? 18 A We had finished drafting it and then it 19 kind of went into quality control and final editing. 20 At that point I left, yes. 21 Q Okay. So then once you had that final Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 197 1 report, you're not getting updates anymore? 2 A That's correct. 3 Q So you're not receiving the short papers. 4 A That's correct. 5 Q And generally you're not involved in what 6 is going on with respect to this? 7 A That's correct. 8 Q And so your opinion is a snapshot? 9 A Primarily, yes. 10 It's an informed snapshot but, yes. 11 Q And that snapshot was May of 2011? 12 A Correct, that was when I stepped away. 13 MR. HURLEY: 14 THE COURT: 15 MR. FEIN: 16 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Redirect? No, Your Honor. All right. Is there a need 17 to -- before I get there, let me just put on the record 18 we have an RCA802 conference between trial counsel and 19 the defense counsel in court and we discussed certain 20 discovery issues. 21 upon the government not going down a certain line of The counsel have conferred and based Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 198 1 questioning, the defense no longer requires that 2 discovery. 3 Is that correct? 4 MR. COOMBS: 5 THE COURT: That is correct, Your Honor. And the defense did ask for 6 certain documents with respect to this witness's 7 testimony. 8 Have those been available? MR. FEIN: I've asked for Bates numbers 9 when we produced and that's being created right now. 10 The documents have been found and we're trying to get 11 the Bates numbers. 12 would offer the United States that before we move into 13 a closed session, that we give that to the defense and 14 give them time to look at it and that way if they want 15 to ask additional questions they have the opportunity. 16 17 18 So we're going to do that. THE COURT: We How long is it going to take you to get the documents to the defense? MR. FEIN: Ma'am, we can do it concurrent 19 with closing the courtroom, the actual process of 20 closing the courtroom. 21 will happen at the same time. If we do that, hopefully that So no more than 20 Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 199 1 minutes. 2 MR. COOMBS: Actually, Your Honor, I've 3 looked at every document that has a Bates number on it. 4 So, based upon Major Fein's proffer, there's a Bates 5 numbers on this that's been provided in discovery, I'm 6 confident, once I see, that will refresh my memory and 7 we won't have questions based upon that. 8 9 So we can go into the closed session and I'll just confirm that we got in Bates numbers. I'm 10 sure once I see it, I'll understand why I didn't ask 11 certain questions. 12 THE COURT: Why don't we do this then? The 13 idea here is we're going to go into a closed session 14 and that's going to be it for the open sessions today 15 and then we're going to have an open session tomorrow 16 morning. 17 parties need additional time in the morning to prepare 18 for that? 19 20 21 Now, starting tomorrow morning, do the MR. FEIN: Yes, ma'am. We could offer that court start tentatively at 10:00 tomorrow morning. THE COURT: Does that give you enough time Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 200 1 or do you want to say 11:00 just to be safe? 2 MR. COOMBS: 3 safe. 4 I think maybe 11:00 would be That would give us a little over an hour of each witness. 5 6 THE COURT: Do you anticipate them to be lengthy witnesses? 7 MR. FEIN: Ma'am, based off the court's 8 guidance today, it will be shorter. 9 my co-counsel how much shorter we can make that but it 10 I have to talk to will be shorter. 11 However, just to clarify, one witness will 12 be available beforehand, ma'am. The other witness 13 don't come until the afternoon. So we're probably 14 going to extend lunch to give that opportunity for the 15 second witness. 16 17 MR. COOMBS: Then in that case 10:00 to start. 18 THE COURT: You're sure? 19 MR. COOMBS: Yes, ma'am. 20 THE COURT: 21 we'll do. All right. Then that's what We'll just start at 10:00. So for the Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 201 1 gallery, we'll be starting at 10:00 tomorrow. 2 be going into recess now and enjoy a brief closed 3 session involving classified information that the 4 public is not allowed to attend. 5 findings in that regard in an appellant exhibit 6 earlier. 7 extended lunch so defense can have an opportunity to 8 prepare for the second witness that comes along. 9 may be a late day tomorrow as well. 10 We will I made the specific We'll start at 10:00 tomorrow and take an It We'll see. Is there anything else we need to address 11 before we end the public session? 12 MR. FEIN: 13 14 Ma'am, just your ruling was appellant Exhibit 550 for court closure. THE COURT: Thank you. The court is in 15 recess until 10:00 tomorrow morning with the exception 16 of the closed section that we're going to be doing. 17 You need a recess to set the court room up for that? 18 19 20 MR. FEIN: Yes, ma'am the United States would ask that we can reconvene 18:30. (Trial was adjourned at 6:10 p.m.) 21 Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 2:9;49:10;193:2 accusations (1) 185:19 ACCUSED (2) $6.2 (1) 3:10;118:2 189:3 achieved (2) 74:9,10 [ acquire (1) 64:5 [Inaudible] (3) acronym (1) 31:7;171:15;179:8 96:21 across (18) A 5:11;8:19;36:13;54:13; 56:6,17;84:5;105:10;127:9, Aberdeen (1) 16;133:8,9;141:15;165:16; 70:13 174:13,17;188:3;194:4 ability (16) across-the-board (1) 2:8;13:14;29:5,13;37:21; 54:5 38:8;39:8;46:13;51:18,20; act (3) 54:12;58:10;59:11;65:19; 43:5;131:8,14 105:8,15 acted (4) able (5) 66:1,6,6,11 34:14;66:20;174:1;175:9, acting (1) 13 137:6 above (3) action (2) 125:5;128:14;147:11 8:12;107:18 above-titled (1) actions (8) 1:15 6:6;47:16;48:2;58:18; absent (1) 83:8;139:9;160:15;192:11 56:1 active (2) absolutely (34) 91:6;185:3 14:17;23:16;25:10;26:18; activities (14) 37:7;38:2,4;54:9;58:5,15; 10:7;13:12;25:11,11; 60:2,8;61:6,16;73:14;76:2; 27:18;35:11;48:9;50:10; 77:4;78:20;80:16;84:16; 81:1;103:3;131:2;133:7; 96:13;104:8;106:8;109:9, 150:4,6 17;111:11,15;113:12; activity (7) 115:12,13;147:8;149:10; 23:14,16,21;24:3;32:18; 160:10;189:19 115:1;133:16 Academy (1) actual (10) 141:4 2:4;47:10;73:17;84:1; access (10) 107:4;154:21;155:6;179:5; 16:11;54:12;59:15,19; 180:18;198:19 60:6;61:2;94:1;112:2; actually (18) 152:5;168:11 13:20;14:1;19:6;30:4; accessed (2) 42:4;45:5;53:7;132:4; 21:7;27:16 136:9;141:10;152:11; accessible (1) 170:11;177:1;180:15; 30:18 181:2,15;186:19;199:2 accordance (1) adapt (4) 118:6 97:11,12;100:1;116:15 according (1) adaptations (1) 86:2 99:14 accounts (1) adapted (1) 189:12 116:8 accredited (1) adapting (2) 62:6 97:15,17 accrued (1) added (1) 104:1 128:8 accumulation (2) addition (1) 23:7;64:7 186:7 accumulative (1) additional (4) 105:13 41:12;123:18;198:15; accurate (3) $ Min-U-Script(R) 199:17 address (4) 46:1;120:16;126:17; 201:10 adds (1) 51:9 adjourned (1) 201:20 administration (2) 101:12;171:10 Administrative (1) 170:1 admissible (3) 52:2;161:13;164:5 advance (1) 175:14 advanced (4) 141:5,15,19;142:15 advantage (3) 59:4;86:9;187:2 adversaries (5) 25:21;26:17;78:21;97:3; 112:7 adversary (6) 11:1;27:5;34:12;59:3,8; 97:11 advise (1) 119:17 advisors (1) 18:1 affairs (1) 139:20 affect (1) 56:2 affected (7) 53:18;54:6,8,8;91:9,18,21 affects (1) 29:13 afford (1) 46:16 affronted (1) 54:16 Afghan (17) 7:21;15:1,2;18:15;24:10; 26:21;28:6;36:20;41:19; 42:7,9,9;46:3;71:16;76:16; 81:11;112:18 Afghanis (1) 109:6 Afghanistan (26) 7:21;12:3;20:3,16,17; 21:13,14,15,20;22:17;24:9; 29:7;38:11;44:21;46:14; 68:8;81:17;91:18;98:9,16; 99:4;105:18,20;169:6; 172:13;187:11 Afghans (2) 76:16;99:7 aftermath (1) 81:6 afternoon (6) 69:12,15,16;146:2,3; 200:13 Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 afterward (1) 103:20 Again (27) 9:9;31:12,21;36:21; 42:14;46:2;49:19;59:4; 63:7;83:5,6;85:7;102:21; 103:18;107:4,11;113:13; 119:14;124:18;129:6; 132:6;150:17;162:5;171:9; 175:17;178:11;188:13 against (1) 102:1 agencies (7) 7:7;8:19;56:7;59:9; 125:21;174:18;177:10 Agency (10) 121:7;123:1,8;125:19,21; 132:12;135:11;163:11; 170:5;187:4 agent (1) 171:13 aggravation (1) 164:5 aggressive (1) 186:1 ago (3) 6:10;30:11;128:13 agree (7) 74:2,3;92:21;160:20; 180:4,17,17 ahead (11) 10:10;19:15;26:13;35:5; 60:13;67:20;109:3;172:14; 180:7,11;185:12 Air (2) 47:14;50:9 aircraft (2) 104:9,21 alarming (1) 174:2 ALEXANDER (1) 3:8 Allied (1) 184:9 allies (8) 13:10;14:10;29:8;34:9; 44:14;46:14;67:3;190:2 allow (5) 48:18;68:20;105:12; 159:19;163:15 allowed (3) 30:21;40:18;201:4 allows (1) 23:3 alluded (1) 110:7 alone (2) 24:9;38:7 along (5) 100:3,5;173:12;186:19; 201:8 alphabet (1) 71:18 (202) $6.2 - alphabet United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning although (2) 120:1;182:10 always (11) 49:9;74:9,10;86:4;97:9; 113:20;144:13;152:8; 175:7;191:9,11 amazing (1) 56:13 ambassador (3) 101:14;102:8,18 American (1) 78:11 Americans (2) 78:14;90:2 among (2) 42:18,18 amount (8) 10:21;13:7,17;50:14; 62:21;64:4;101:5;110:13 amplify (1) 89:16 analysis (24) 52:5;78:5;79:5,6,7,9; 93:3,5;134:1,5,11,12;135:8, 16;145:10;166:20;167:16; 175:12;176:9;189:12,13; 194:14,16;195:1 analyst (6) 27:15;41:9;148:3;152:20; 174:6;175:12 analysts (12) 22:2,5;92:5,8;94:17,19; 130:14;165:20;166:20; 171:11;177:3;189:11 analytic (5) 77:5,10,14;152:16;180:2 analytical (11) 77:20,21;78:12;92:10; 167:1;170:14;174:9; 175:17,18;176:12;194:5 and/or (1) 24:16 ANGEL (1) 3:6 annual (2) 143:10;184:8 answered (2) 10:9;148:10 anticipate (1) 200:5 anymore (3) 39:6;193:12;197:1 Aperiodic (1) 193:18 apex (1) 140:4 apologize (2) 72:15;134:21 apparently (1) 128:13 APPEARANCES (1) 3:1 appellant (2) Min-U-Script(R) UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 201:5,13 apply (1) 31:12 appreciate (3) 23:8,10;184:6 appropriate (9) 47:15;48:1;58:18;64:10; 93:7;94:12,15;95:19;135:6 appropriately (2) 56:6;148:19 approval (1) 45:7 approximately (3) 8:7;36:14;144:2 April (1) 137:8 AR380 (1) 117:6 Arabic (3) 71:14,15;110:5 area (7) 23:21;70:13;126:19; 146:11;181:6;183:20; 187:15 areas (7) 56:15;99:21;173:13,15; 181:2,11;195:19 argument (3) 148:5,19;159:14 arm (1) 48:15 ARMY (27) 1:2,7,9;47:14,18,19;50:9; 70:1,3;96:16;99:11,15,17, 19;105:6;117:4;125:17; 130:4,20;131:1,3,6;132:14; 133:2;152:10;158:13;173:9 around (4) 38:5;82:18;85:4;136:2 around-the-clock (1) 172:8 arrangement (2) 39:15,16 article (1) 18:13 arts (2) 139:17,20 ASHDEN (1) 3:4 aspect (2) 58:21;127:19 aspects (1) 23:5 assess (2) 98:11;183:11 assessed (5) 89:16,18;91:17;108:16; 174:7 assessment (13) 6:21;41:14;55:17;79:13, 15;88:10,12;92:1;101:2; 160:13,13;179:9;196:13 assessments (6) 91:16;92:11;98:1;148:20; 160:18;186:8 assessments/judgments (1) 90:6 assigned (3) 171:21;172:1;186:18 assignment (1) 59:21 assignments (2) 70:3,20 assist (1) 121:19 assistance (1) 50:12 assistant (1) 33:18 associated (7) 25:15;42:12;80:16; 110:15;123:10;181:18; 188:17 assorted (1) 20:5 assume (2) 34:20;93:10 assumed (1) 153:9 assurance (2) 63:10;158:11 ATCs (1) 171:18 attach (1) 41:8 attache (16) 49:18,21;50:5;51:13; 52:21;82:16;83:9;84:1,4; 85:8,21;90:10,16;91:1,5,5 attaches (10) 29:1;50:2,4,18;51:3,17; 53:18;54:5;85:4,5 attempt (3) 10:6;49:15;92:10 attempted (3) 65:5,7;78:3 attempts (1) 107:20 attend (1) 201:4 attention (1) 55:11 audio (1) 2:7 audio/video (1) 2:6 audit (1) 194:5 August (7) 123:8,19;165:2,3;168:16; 173:17;176:9 authorities (3) 5:4;6:1;157:19 authority (10) 5:7,10,13,16;52:7; 158:20;177:9;180:3; Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 183:10;195:16 available (6) 10:21;21:5;55:18;95:16; 198:7;200:12 aware (3) 42:3;120:1;186:8 awareness (5) 22:5;31:1;141:21;142:5; 158:19 away (4) 105:2;128:14;168:5; 197:12 awkward (1) 191:1 B bachelor's (1) 139:17 back (43) 12:19;23:18;25:12;35:18; 39:17;43:3;44:4;46:5; 47:15;48:17;51:8;64:12,12; 67:2;78:13;79:3,8;83:5,14; 84:3;88:20;90:4;94:17; 108:14;117:20;129:7; 130:18;132:6,7;133:1; 134:19;138:5;141:10; 142:11;143:4;144:5;152:4; 153:14;173:2;178:3; 179:15;183:15;185:20 background (7) 124:4;129:19;146:13; 156:8,8;159:12,12 backup (1) 2:7 Backward (1) 75:11 backwards (1) 140:3 bad (3) 37:19;85:15;190:2 bags (1) 63:5 balance (1) 82:11 balancing (2) 133:7,8 Base (1) 1:10 based (28) 25:19;26:15;45:13;49:2; 55:7,18;77:21;88:16;97:12; 116:16;121:17;144:19; 151:10;153:5,20;154:3; 156:2;159:2;163:10; 174:11;175:10;179:8,10; 194:2;197:20;199:4,7; 200:7 basic (4) 136:10;140:16;141:20; 142:17 basically (2) (203) although - basically United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning 60:20;76:10 basis (6) 22:16;46:3;76:8;152:15, 16;175:4 bat (1) 11:19 Bates (5) 198:8,11;199:3,4,9 battery (1) 113:17 battlefield (18) 7:17;11:21;13:11;22:7, 20,21;38:19,20;49:4,5,8; 51:1;73:6;81:21;88:8,15; 90:1;110:17 became (5) 7:4;15:9;37:15;57:1; 133:2 become (2) 123:10;162:18 becomes (1) 39:18 becoming (2) 124:7,13 beforehand (3) 132:9,10;200:12 began (2) 14:7;56:12 begin (11) 7:8;11:2,20;14:4;15:6,16, 18;23:8;28:1;40:7;56:17 beginning (1) 121:12 begins (1) 115:21 BEHALF (6) 3:3,10;39:16;40:4;43:6; 86:20 behavioral (2) 116:1,10 belong (1) 133:10 below (1) 18:7 Belvoir (1) 133:2 benefit (2) 30:13;178:1 besides (1) 82:13 best (7) 6:14;41:7;55:17,18; 56:20;111:3;127:16 betrayed (1) 59:2 better (6) 6:14;57:2,2,3;68:19; 194:4 beyond (2) 63:8;171:3 big (2) 77:18;167:3 bigger (2) Min-U-Script(R) UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 173:12;188:2 biggest (2) 11:16;38:13 bilateral (1) 193:2 bit (4) 63:13;124:3;136:6; 191:14 blunt (1) 29:2 board (1) 56:17 body (6) 49:5;51:9;63:6;74:4; 92:11;96:6 both (10) 56:14;62:11;71:10;79:16; 81:1;89:17,18;159:6,19; 184:13 bouncing (1) 64:11 Bradley (1) 1:6 break (3) 31:6,7;145:13 bridge (1) 73:8 brief (17) 31:13;102:19,20;135:17; 136:2;140:1;142:7;161:7, 21;171:6;184:1,5,21;188:6; 191:16;192:18;201:2 briefed (7) 76:12;143:20,21;144:3; 184:17;192:2,4 briefing (4) 142:9;160:3;192:9; 193:10 briefings (3) 83:17;144:7,18 briefly (5) 61:18;93:12;119:16; 139:15;191:13 briefs (3) 9:12;83:6;101:2 brigades (1) 133:9 brigadier (3) 119:18;162:11;163:18 bring (1) 49:12 bringing (3) 7:6;35:13;158:18 British (1) 13:9 Brits (1) 192:21 broad (4) 54:13;75:16;84:3,5 broadened (1) 7:6 broader (2) 34:17;171:18 - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 broadly (1) 5:11 brought (5) 7:5;156:5;158:16;165:17; 186:19 budget (11) 125:11;127:21;128:2,8; 135:21;136:2,8;144:7,10, 15;163:1 budgeting (1) 127:19 bug (1) 134:17 build (14) 23:2;24:21;38:20;43:21; 50:12;69:2;74:4,5;86:9; 131:19;132:8;136:1,13; 144:14 building (8) 25:1,2;46:15;53:6; 126:16;127:2;174:16; 186:17 built (5) 128:1;135:21;136:2,8; 177:1 bulk (1) 125:17 buoyed (1) 96:15 bureaucracy (1) 165:18 business (1) 91:1 buy (2) 51:7,8 178:17;180:3 can (55) 20:21;23:2,8,9;29:9;31:6; 41:7;43:17;53:13;54:13; 57:16;59:8,10;61:18;64:7; 68:19;69:3,4,11;71:3;77:9; 81:3;92:20;97:3,5,11,11; 104:2,4,6;125:2,9;126:7; 135:6;136:5,14;142:6,19; 145:13;148:12;149:19; 150:19;155:12;157:7; 161:12;166:2;168:6;186:3; 194:3,8;198:18;199:8; 200:9;201:7,19 cap (1) 172:2 capabilities (5) 14:7;60:20;144:17;145:9; 191:18 capability (7) 58:17,19;132:12,13; 136:13,13;144:15 capacity (5) 50:1;137:6;160:4;170:18; 179:16 capitals (1) 85:4 Capitol (1) 102:1 capstone (2) 140:8,9 CAPTAIN (6) 3:5,6,7,8,12;40:7 capture (5) 10:7;24:2;51:3;64:14; 78:3 C captured (5) 22:21;34:19;35:9;115:19; 175:4 cables (18) captures (1) 18:16;20:7,8,9,13;27:12; 51:2 28:10,12,15,20;29:18,20,20, capturing (1) 21;30:3,12,15;32:21 79:11 calibrate (1) care (3) 83:7 29:10;139:8;154:10 call (10) career (10) 75:7;99:14;102:17; 59:14,17,18;70:18,20; 117:19;119:4;128:15,18; 130:6;140:14;145:4;190:7; 141:21;150:6;173:6 192:8 called (10) careful (2) 31:20;119:13;121:2; 128:21;195:15 128:16;133:17;162:4; cargo (1) 169:19;188:12;193:15; 63:4 194:7 CARR (27) calling (1) 4:4;19:4;42:15;52:16,21; 196:12 67:11;69:15;76:9;79:21; calls (1) 90:5,9;106:21;108:18; 120:19 116:20;117:14;119:18; came (21) 120:1;147:10;154:6,6,21; 6:16;8:15;20:6;23:18; 155:2,3;161:6;162:12; 25:12;39:21;41:13;42:11; 182:5,7 44:1;47:2;76:11;102:7; Carr's (2) 119:17;123:19;130:21; 63:9;163:19 146:19;152:18;175:12,17; Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation (204) basis - Carr's United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning case (19) 6:9;12:16;46:3;48:7,10; 62:3;66:14;67:15;80:1; 81:4;87:12;116:8;118:1; 141:16;145:12;152:8; 157:21;161:19;200:16 cases (31) 24:8,14,15,17;25:16; 33:21;35:9;39:5;55:2; 58:16;59:13;61:1,21;66:5; 75:20;76:7;77:3;79:16; 84:8,19;99:20;108:10; 111:9,11;113:17,19;114:2, 4;152:8;159:21;185:3 case's (1) 161:11 casual (1) 12:20 catch (1) 172:12 categories (1) 175:8 category (1) 173:13 cause (5) 36:11;37:5;68:10;93:16; 113:18 caused (2) 116:6;163:8 causing (1) 116:13 census (4) 80:7,10,11,12 CentCom (18) 12:7;41:9,15,17,18,21; 66:17;88:11,13,21;89:2; 99:18,21;100:4,6;169:12; 170:3;189:13 center (10) 7:4;99:11,15,17,19; 101:8;102:2;124:17,20; 142:5 central (7) 131:1,3,5;166:15;168:1; 183:12;187:10 centric (2) 6:21;7:1 certain (8) 23:6;33:4;98:4;159:6; 197:19,21;198:6;199:11 certainly (25) 5:6;14:8;21:13;23:7,8,10; 24:15;28:14;30:1;33:6,15; 54:21;77:3;80:6;85:3; 90:18;92:15;94:9;99:4; 102:17;104:4,6;105:19; 114:15;189:14 CFO (3) 145:2,5,8 chain (4) 56:5;84:9;110:1;153:16 chair (1) 154:11 Min-U-Script(R) UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session challenge (4) 78:16,18;180:5;183:7 chambers (1) 119:16 chance (3) 27:7;46:18;119:18 change (11) 56:2;86:8,9;97:21;98:1; 106:5,7;126:9,10,21;138:3 changed (2) 56:10;116:4 changes (1) 104:17 characterize (3) 20:21;21:2;40:17 charge (1) 125:7 charged (2) 5:8;45:12 charts (1) 35:7 chat (3) 15:12,15;18:13 chats (1) 32:9 check (1) 108:14 checked (1) 148:1 chesty (1) 186:1 chief (35) 40:7;43:18;51:2;68:16; 110:21;123:2,4;124:1,7,8, 13,15,21;126:3;127:5; 133:21;135:8,15;137:10,14, 17;138:9,13,18;139:2,5; 155:19,21;156:17;159:3; 163:6;164:12,19;166:5; 179:17 choice (1) 57:12 choose (1) 39:6 chunk (2) 186:19;188:2 CI (26) 122:10,16;124:16;125:8, 14,15;127:3;129:2;142:1,5, 7;143:2;144:11,20;145:18; 146:15;149:17;150:8; 151:4,5,12,14;156:1,18; 158:9,10 CIA (1) 157:17 CIDNE (31) 7:21;15:2;16:7;20:2,3,16, 16,17;21:9,14,21;22:1,19; 23:5;25:8;45:17;71:9,10, 10;74:14;75:2;81:10,10; 110:5;112:17;169:5,6; 181:8,8,12,13 CIFA (8) 133:17,19,20;135:8,10, 10;137:3;144:5 CIP (1) 159:16 CIs (1) 149:14 citation (1) 148:21 citations (1) 148:17 cite (1) 81:3 cited (3) 114:2;149:1,11 cites (1) 81:7 citing (1) 149:6 city (3) 47:6;112:12;171:3 civil (2) 43:19,21 civilian (8) 12:21;88:8;130:5;139:13, 16;140:6,10;189:5 civilians (1) 185:3 clarified (1) 32:5 clarify (4) 17:12;20:15;68:4;200:11 clarity (1) 27:5 Class (2) 57:7;58:1 classic (2) 55:5;127:9 classification (4) 18:4,6;115:15;140:18 classified (24) 7:16;18:9;21:6;37:10,21; 59:15,19;60:6,17;61:2,15, 20;62:6,12,16;63:2,20; 73:17;103:18;131:11; 135:2;150:4;191:10;201:3 classifieds (1) 62:9 clear (5) 118:4;157:7,18;158:3; 178:15 clearance (6) 94:1,8,11;114:13;115:21; 116:3 clearances (2) 93:8;168:11 CLERK (4) 31:15,18;119:11;162:2 clerk-typist (1) 130:3 close (4) 5:17;27:2;65:8;102:6 closed (9) 64:16;90:20;151:1;186:3; Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 198:13;199:8,13;201:2,16 closely (1) 174:14 closing (3) 102:2;198:19,20 closure (1) 201:13 coalesce (1) 92:9 coalition (8) 13:4;35:14;50:13;73:4; 88:5;97:12;104:11,11 co-counsel (1) 200:9 cohesive (1) 176:13 collaborating (2) 27:6;165:20 collaboratively (1) 88:13 collect (4) 50:18;80:14;132:4,5 collected (1) 153:1 collecting (1) 80:15 collection (14) 130:13;131:19;132:1,2,8, 12;133:3,7;134:1,2,9;135:8, 16;140:15 collectors (1) 130:14 colloquy (1) 2:17 Colonel (2) 1:17;84:13 combat (1) 23:6 Combatants (1) 170:1 combination (1) 9:14 combinations (1) 2:15 combined (2) 132:11;178:1 comfortable (3) 44:3;150:21;153:13 coming (13) 36:8;74:6;103:19;120:13; 143:15;164:16;168:10,12; 180:2;183:8;184:15; 192:19;193:18 command (12) 23:1;28:5;41:18;130:4; 153:16;166:15;168:2; 170:4,4;183:13;187:9,10 commander (4) 55:17;56:3;89:21;115:17 commanders (1) 40:18 commander's (1) 60:20 (205) case - commander's United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning commentary (1) 15:10 comments (1) 185:19 commit (1) 107:1 commitment (2) 60:10,16 committed (3) 40:3;60:5;109:15 common (7) 10:4,11;21:20;38:8;45:2; 78:8;96:21 commonality (1) 106:11 communicate (2) 9:19;29:5 communicating (1) 171:17 communication (2) 73:3;104:16 communications (2) 104:5,18 community (12) 8:20;15:14;39:15,17; 45:5;55:13;127:17;130:18; 132:7;171:18;174:13; 177:20 companies (1) 14:8 Company (1) 1:8 comparing (1) 168:1 compel (1) 196:1 competitive (2) 129:4,5 competitively (1) 137:8 complete (1) 64:18 completed (2) 139:10;169:5 completely (2) 66:15;73:8 composition (1) 169:10 compound (1) 24:19 comprehend (1) 83:18 compromise (4) 34:1;149:5;183:11; 186:10 compromised (12) 14:19,20;18:10;29:20; 30:1;37:4;38:11;46:7;47:3; 123:14,15;183:5 compromises (1) 42:4 compromising (3) 22:10;57:8;62:16 Min-U-Script(R) UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session computer (1) 48:20 computers (1) 165:19 concept (1) 40:12 concern (13) 17:4;30:8,10;34:2,5,6,15; 37:20;38:17;44:1;48:10; 54:20,21 concerned (9) 18:8,11;24:10;35:12; 37:15;39:5;76:3;93:16; 171:4 concerns (4) 35:16;37:5;38:10;46:1 conclusion (6) 47:3;55:19;67:13;176:4; 178:18,19 conclusions (9) 46:9;56:2;64:14;175:3; 178:17;179:3,4,6;195:3 concurrent (1) 198:18 conduct (2) 47:7;173:19 conducted (3) 77:5;186:8,9 conducting (1) 186:13 conference (3) 184:8;191:16;197:18 conferred (1) 197:20 confidence (13) 14:3;54:10;56:4,19;59:1; 60:20;61:5;62:11;64:9; 65:11;67:5;96:14;110:1 confident (4) 53:21;54:2;169:5;199:6 configured (1) 9:18 confirm (1) 199:9 conflict (1) 36:11 confused (1) 160:6 confusing (1) 77:8 congress (5) 120:6;135:18,21;143:20, 21 congressional (1) 119:20 connect (2) 7:9;93:1 connection (2) 157:8,9 consider (1) 166:7 considered (2) 157:4;162:13 consistent (1) 96:8 consolidated (2) 46:4;83:5 constant (1) 126:11 constantly (3) 21:18;97:15,17 constitute (1) 94:3 construct (1) 62:5 constructs (1) 41:4 consumed (1) 76:14 contact (1) 55:3 contacted (1) 89:19 contain (5) 2:13;22:1;47:6;51:10; 103:16 contained (7) 18:13;20:20;22:3;28:11; 36:4;131:6;183:18 contemplate (1) 114:2 contends (1) 52:14 context (3) 40:16;47:1;144:14 contingency (1) 187:4 continue (12) 38:18;39:3;46:14;48:18; 58:10;59:12;65:12,19;67:3, 17;90:21;120:16 continued (6) 1:16;57:3;60:19;64:20; 77:1;78:5 continuing (5) 19:12;74:4;76:5;84:17; 120:12 contracted (1) 138:17 contractor (2) 70:7,9 control (6) 2:8;8:4;23:1;46:6; 152:12;196:19 conversation (3) 12:21;50:20;107:3 conversations (4) 23:20;44:2,5;71:8 Convoy (1) 23:12 COOMBS (10) 3:11;119:21;120:10; 188:5,8;198:4;199:2;200:2, 16,19 cooperate (1) 43:20 Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 cooperated (1) 88:4 cooperating (4) 40:5;88:9;181:17;187:11 cooperation (5) 37:19;41:14;42:1;50:11; 92:2 cooperative (4) 35:10;87:17;88:1;89:13 coordinate (9) 5:10;50:10,11,11;99:10; 111:19;112:5,9,11 coordinated (1) 6:7 coordinates (4) 111:7,9,12;112:4 coordination (3) 5:17;28:7;30:19 cornerstone (1) 140:7 Corporate (1) 70:12 correlate (1) 110:17 correspondence (1) 8:12 cost (5) 111:2;188:17,21;189:1, 10 costs (2) 189:9,17 counsel (7) 118:1;119:16,17;161:20; 197:18,19,20 counseling (3) 109:16,21;116:10 count (2) 80:10,12 counter (6) 5:18;124:13;134:16; 141:3;183:2;184:8 counterinsurgency (2) 80:8,17 counter-intelligence (38) 8:18;59:9;121:15;122:8, 11,15;124:9,14,20;125:20; 126:1,2;127:13;133:2,16; 134:8;138:11,14;139:3; 141:17,21;145:9;150:19; 155:9;156:8;157:4,9; 158:18;162:8,17;163:2,14; 167:4,16;174:15;184:8; 193:7;195:17 counterparts (1) 99:8 counter-surveillance (1) 141:18 countries (13) 28:17;29:9;36:1;51:17; 54:14;55:3;59:10,13;71:19; 81:1;84:19;111:14;186:3 country (8) 13:6,13;27:19;36:1;45:9; (206) commentary - country UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning 51:18;54:15;105:9 couple (9) 16:20;20:5;44:12;66:4; 99:20;102:11;114:20; 193:21;194:2 course (13) 11:5;19:11;62:10;141:16, 19,20;142:5,15,17,17; 171:16,19;179:4 courses (3) 140:16;141:13;142:3 court (145) 2:2,13;13:15;15:21;19:1, 8,14;26:8,13;31:8,10,12,19, 19,21;32:1;42:6,20;43:9; 45:10,16,19;49:20;52:4,9, 12,17;53:3,10;60:13;61:9; 63:11;66:3,7;67:8,13,15,20; 69:9,13;71:4;72:10,13,17, 19;93:13;100:20;101:1; 108:20;109:1,3;114:17,20; 115:4,7,10,20;116:16; 117:11,14,18,19;118:4,13, 17,19;119:1,5,7,7,12,12,14, 15;120:7,11,15,18;121:19; 122:1,5,9,12,18;124:18; 125:2;135:3;139:16;140:5; 143:18;145:21;154:8,14; 155:8,14;159:9,17;161:3, 17,17,20;162:3,3,5,6,13,20; 163:15,19;164:3,6;178:12; 179:1,10,13,20;180:6,10, 20;182:2,6,13,17;185:8,11; 188:4,7,11,11,13;197:14,16, 19;198:5,16;199:12,20,21; 200:5,18,20;201:13,14,14, 17 COURT-MARTIAL (1) 1:6 courtroom (3) 2:4;198:19,20 court's (2) 55:8;200:7 craft (1) 175:18 crank (1) 172:16 create (1) 110:12 created (9) 29:4;39:15;40:12;85:7; 86:17,19;149:1,2;198:9 creating (2) 9:20;155:1 credit (2) 16:5;110:9 crime (1) 31:3 criminal (3) 143:17;157:17;158:6 crisis (1) 187:4 criteria (2) Min-U-Script(R) 65:5;166:3 critical (12) 29:2;38:2,2,4;43:17; 55:14,15;56:1,7;58:15; 61:17;65:11 cross (1) 180:14 crossed (1) 73:8 cross-examination (2) 53:12;69:10 cull (1) 183:14 cumulative (11) 26:4,7;36:16;63:12; 154:6;155:2;161:6;162:11; 163:18;182:4,14 current (5) 122:21;129:10,14;145:1; 149:3 currently (2) 91:18,21 customer (1) 151:18 cut (2) 145:12;176:8 cycle (1) 172:3 D DABs (1) 36:4 daily (7) 8:16;9:5,10;22:16;155:4; 171:17;175:4 damage (7) 48:2;154:19;179:8,14; 195:13,15;196:12 dangerous (3) 34:7,8;89:10 data (78) 10:21;11:20;12:7;13:7, 15,17,21,21;14:2,3,21; 15:15;18:18;19:19,21;21:5; 27:16;29:6;32:8;33:3; 35:13;36:13;37:13;38:11; 39:21;40:16;41:12;45:2; 46:6;47:3,10,11;48:8,10; 49:12;54:3,17;64:5;65:16; 80:14,15;81:5;87:3,3,4,15, 16,19,21;88:1;95:12,16,19; 101:5;111:4;132:4;153:21; 157:13;163:10;166:11,11; 167:7,9,19;169:6,6;171:2,3; 172:8,14,16;174:1;180:9; 181:1;183:5,8,14;184:18 database (29) 7:21;15:2;16:7;20:2,20; 21:9,14,20;22:12;23:3,17; 24:4,9;27:10;28:1;33:3; 36:19,20;45:2,17;49:2; 74:14;81:11,14,17;112:17, 18;152:4;174:1 databases (7) 20:18;21:17;32:8;41:6; 75:1;181:8,9 dataset (1) 177:12 date (4) 33:4;92:3,4;141:11 DAVID (1) 3:11 day (13) 9:5;64:3;82:10;111:5; 168:18,18;169:1;170:19,20; 172:15,19;192:2;201:9 days (9) 9:4;11:14;14:17;47:2; 82:9;123:16;156:4,4; 164:17 day-to-day (3) 139:4,11;164:13 DC (1) 139:21 DCHC (3) 51:11;53:1;82:9 DCHT (1) 50:2 DEA (3) 174:21;178:3,5 dead (2) 81:20;89:8 deal (13) 7:15;32:13;77:18;81:12; 85:6;100:14;129:6;136:14; 150:5;156:12;170:17; 181:17;183:7 dealing (7) 41:4;112:13,19;156:10; 168:2,10;172:2 dealt (2) 148:6;191:9 death (3) 49:4;95:9;96:3 deaths (1) 95:13 debriefings (1) 134:18 decide (2) 46:10;159:20 decided (2) 187:2;194:6 decision (6) 40:18;57:14;89:21;111:5; 115:17;180:19 decisions (3) 56:3;100:7;159:6 deemed (1) 89:9 deep (1) 175:13 deeper (1) 56:21 Defeat (1) 167:11 Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 defend (2) 56:14;119:17 Defense (83) 5:8,11,15;9:3,11;20:12, 14;28:21;29:1;30:8,10,12, 18;32:15;34:2;37:3;50:4,5, 6,8,15,17,19;51:3,5,13; 52:3;53:11;55:8,13;69:9; 82:16;83:9;84:1;85:3,8,14, 20;88:7;90:10,16;91:4,5; 109:13;120:8;121:7,15; 122:7,15,16;123:1,13; 124:16,19;125:4,19,20; 127:10;129:21;132:11,11; 133:15;135:11;140:12; 143:7,8;148:4;161:7;162:9; 163:21;169:16,20;170:5,5; 171:1;176:16;195:21; 197:19;198:1,5,13,17;201:7 Defense's (4) 9:6;159:10;162:13; 179:10 define (1) 173:11 defined (1) 40:10 definitely (1) 93:5 definition (1) 62:4 degradation (1) 54:12 degraded (1) 51:19 degree (3) 98:14,16,19 delegations (1) 184:10 delta (6) 36:6,9;103:5,9,10,11 demographic (1) 80:15 demonstration (1) 60:19 denied (1) 164:2 Denise (1) 1:18 depart (1) 154:9 Department (54) 5:8,11;7:6;13:6,14;18:16; 20:7,8,9,11,13,14;27:12; 28:7,10,15;30:7,8,9,10,11, 12,16,18;31:4;32:20,21; 34:2;36:2;37:2;50:6,19; 70:1,2;85:14;88:6;101:14; 102:9;121:14;122:7,15,16; 127:10;129:20;133:15; 157:16;165:16;170:7; 171:1,12;172:11;177:9,19; 188:3 departments (2) (207) couple - departments United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning 8:20;174:18 depending (7) 16:3;61:21;93:21;108:11; 138:16;142:16;167:14 depends (2) 106:16;142:18 deployment (1) 28:16 deputy (19) 123:2,4;124:1,7,8,13; 138:13,15,18;139:2;145:2, 5;155:19;159:3;162:19; 163:6;164:12;165:7;179:17 derive (1) 180:13 derived (1) 147:5 derog (4) 93:9;94:11;109:21;117:1 Derogatory (10) 93:10,14,18,20;94:3; 113:5,7,15,21;114:7 derogged (1) 109:16 derogs (3) 109:12,13;115:1 describe (7) 61:18;93:12;125:9,13; 139:15;185:5;186:2 described (1) 10:14 Describing (1) 185:11 description (3) 45:14;129:1;171:6 designed (2) 61:14;142:6 detachment (1) 132:3 detachments (1) 133:8 detail (2) 136:6;151:1 detained (2) 34:19;35:8 detainee (4) 18:14;33:19;35:19;101:2 detainees (1) 103:8 detention (3) 101:8;102:2;170:1 determine (11) 14:18;32:21;44:10;52:6; 80:1;126:8;131:12;152:21; 163:4;165:7;167:20 determined (5) 45:3;89:8,12;179:9,13 determines (1) 164:4 deterrence (1) 62:11 detrimental (3) 6:8;39:7;107:21 Min-U-Script(R) UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session develop (1) 136:7 developed (2) 150:9;187:14 developing (4) 126:6;136:15;148:19; 149:17 development (3) 129:6;134:15;176:6 Device (1) 167:11 DIA (20) 9:2;123:3,7,13;124:9; 132:14;135:13;137:3,11; 142:12;145:4,7;165:18; 166:15,20;168:13;169:11; 176:15;187:19;189:1 dialogue (4) 15:19;38:19;39:4;69:5 dialogues (1) 51:9 DIAs (1) 175:11 died (3) 25:18;81:20;82:4 differ (1) 133:4 difference (2) 164:20;185:17 differences (1) 106:12 different (17) 12:20;19:19;50:21;51:17; 54:9;62:14;63:5;74:21; 99:5;106:10,10;133:21; 144:8;149:7;166:10;175:7; 192:16 difficult (3) 29:16;39:2;41:3 difficulties (1) 73:3 difficulty (2) 78:7,10 Diligence (1) 125:19 diplomacy (1) 27:10 diplomatic (1) 171:13 dipping (1) 173:6 dire (3) 71:2;145:20;153:20 direct (11) 64:13;75:4;93:7;100:10; 101:7;163:19,20;171:21; 188:19,20;189:1 directed (3) 44:13;57:15;185:19 direction (4) 17:8,18;18:1;83:15 directions (2) 17:16;166:10 directly (3) 37:2;41:19;163:7 director (14) 8:17;9:2;50:2;51:11; 53:1;76:14;82:8;99:11; 123:13;139:7;166:20; 167:2;175:12;176:15 directory (1) 135:20 discipline (1) 166:21 disciplines (1) 127:14 DISCLAIMER (1) 2:1 disclosed (6) 19:2;87:3,5;95:12;96:7; 100:21 disclosing (1) 63:20 disclosure (1) 121:20 disclosures (23) 42:17,21;43:3,4,8;51:12; 58:2;75:15;76:20;77:2; 80:20;83:1;84:15;91:19; 95:9;104:13,16;107:5,13; 123:11;157:3;163:8;187:21 discovered (1) 183:4 discovery (3) 197:20;198:2;199:5 discuss (4) 117:21;121:13;154:5; 161:18 discussed (2) 154:7;197:19 discussion (5) 21:15;86:2;102:7;107:8; 154:9 discussions (2) 29:16;143:11 DISL (9) 125:4;128:11,12,13,20; 129:3,11;137:4,7 disregard (3) 57:19;118:5;164:6 dissemination (1) 131:19 distinction (1) 86:17 distributed (1) 195:9 dive (1) 175:14 doctrine (3) 126:21;136:20;137:19 document (8) 6:5;36:18,20,21;176:13; 179:6,18;199:3 documentation (1) 148:18 documenting (1) Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 75:9 documents (33) 5:9,12;6:16;7:15,16;10:3, 3,16,18,18;12:4;13:19;21:2; 31:4;32:16;33:1,13,14,16, 17;34:16;35:7;36:18;45:4, 6,6;65:4;66:16,21;81:21; 198:6,10,17 DOD (37) 6:21;7:1;8:12;28:10,11, 14;29:13;41:20;55:13; 64:18,20;122:10,13,16; 137:19;139:14;140:2,3,21; 144:11,20;145:17;155:9,9; 162:7,8,16,17;163:13,14; 169:15;170:10;171:7; 174:19;177:16,18;195:18 dollars (5) 58:16;127:21;128:3,4,4 domestic (2) 113:17,19 done (14) 64:15;75:9;78:2;79:6,9; 83:15,16;99:18;133:5; 151:11;152:18;176:9; 178:15;190:17 door (1) 168:14 dots (1) 93:1 doubt (1) 117:2 doubted (1) 37:21 down (33) 9:7;13:2;21:7;24:19; 31:5;35:13;41:7,14;56:5; 57:17;58:7;64:16;65:1,3; 67:17;71:5;75:10;84:9; 88:14;91:16;101:11; 110:19;126:17;138:11; 139:9;146:8,9;173:6; 187:18;189:11;194:3; 196:11;197:21 draft (1) 2:12 drafted (1) 82:12 drafting (1) 196:18 draw (1) 70:5 drew (1) 110:14 drivers (1) 138:2 driving (1) 172:15 drove (1) 11:13 Drug (1) 171:10 due (2) (208) depending - due United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning 2:17;176:15 DUI (1) 94:2 DUIs (1) 113:16 duly (1) 121:2 dump (1) 161:11 duplicate (1) 7:8 duration (2) 171:15;172:4 during (8) 11:14;26:5;31:7;59:18; 152:2;168:7;180:9;181:1 duties (1) 139:1 duty (18) 39:13;40:13,13;41:1; 68:7,10;77:12;86:11,13,14, 16,18;88:3,3;91:6;110:9,12; 185:4 UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session eight (3) 82:10;142:18;171:11 either (19) 6:1;9:12;36:1;48:14; 50:5;51:19;63:5;71:16,18; 100:1;102:15;135:3;149:3; 150:17;154:10;171:20; 175:5;180:4;191:17 element (7) 5:7;105:7;112:14;131:20; 135:14;137:6;171:14 elements (5) 10:8;53:7;125:20;152:10; 170:6 elicit (5) 135:2;148:4;154:15,17; 161:2 elicited (1) 53:5 eliciting (1) 163:16 ELLEN (1) 3:8 else (12) E 8:5;13:10;15:8;118:10, 16;120:15;150:20;165:8; 186:2;192:12;193:8;201:10 earlier (19) else's (1) 32:7;33:13;39:10;44:21; 174:20 47:5;50:1;59:5;68:4;82:5; 96:3;99:7;105:4,21;128:10; embassies (1) 82:18 137:13;165:4;172:5; emotional (2) 176:13;201:6 48:13;49:15 early (9) employees (1) 32:19;133:14;140:14; 142:1 157:6,12;159:18;164:17; encountered (1) 169:7;176:9 118:12 easier (1) encourage (1) 174:16 116:12 easiest (1) encouraged (1) 134:14 83:18 East (1) end (5) 189:15 64:3;111:4;172:19;173:2; editing (3) 201:11 2:7,14;196:19 ended (1) educated (1) 175:1 99:3 Enemies (1) education (3) 97:3 139:13,13,16 enemy (4) effect (5) 96:20;98:7,8;170:1 67:17;77:15;107:20; enforcement (10) 195:21;196:2 6:2,7;17:16;113:20; effects (8) 114:3,5,8,11;163:11;171:10 83:10;90:16,17,19,21; engage (2) 107:4;187:20;188:1 37:16;80:19 effort (20) engaged (1) 5:20;7:8,9;9:16;10:10; 37:14 11:14;15:4,7;62:21;89:14; engagement (2) 111:1;123:14;124:15; 174:13;193:3 126:10;127:1,12;134:15; English (4) 143:5;164:19;167:1 72:1,4,8;79:3 efforts (8) enhanced (4) 29:11;35:10;36:12;88:9; 31:1;74:7,8;181:16 110:18;163:7;176:13;194:5 Min-U-Script(R) enjoy (1) 201:2 enlisted (3) 60:1,4,5 enough (4) 44:16;74:6;151:2;199:21 ensure (8) 6:8;29:9;44:13,16;56:13; 58:18;61:14;94:7 enterprise (18) 124:16,21;125:8,14,15; 126:2,3;127:5;129:2; 135:14;137:5,11,15;138:9; 155:21;156:18,21;157:1 entire (10) 52:21;59:17;70:18,20; 96:5;127:17;130:5;137:19; 181:16;190:6 entirety (1) 20:8 envelope (1) 7:6 environment (14) 27:19;33:10;39:2,9; 46:16;61:21;106:16; 112:13,15;116:7;158:14; 166:16,16,17 equities (3) 158:4;171:4;178:2 equity (1) 174:19 equivalence (1) 185:2 equivalent (4) 129:15,17;140:6,10 Erie (1) 20:1 erosion (2) 108:12,15 error (1) 110:1 especially (3) 76:16;164:17;171:3 essentially (4) 52:5;97:7;130:12;159:3 Establish (2) 63:13;165:8 established (1) 162:15 establishment (1) 11:15 estimate (1) 194:9 European (1) 139:18 evaluate (2) 40:14;52:19 even (15) 15:17;16:10;18:9;45:6; 60:4;73:7;80:7;85:1;108:6, 8;135:1;171:18;179:15,18; 188:1 evening (1) Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 161:8 event (3) 48:21;115:14,19 events (7) 22:21;48:12,14;75:8; 113:17;114:9;115:16 eventually (2) 26:10;76:1 everyone (3) 11:1;60:16;171:4 everywhere (2) 164:17;168:12 evidence (5) 57:18;79:15;163:4;164:5, 6 evolve (5) 105:21;106:3,5,7;136:21 evolved (1) 87:18 exact (4) 8:1;115:5;129:1;141:11 Exactly (9) 17:14;20:19;24:9;33:5; 35:3;88:19;89:3;101:13; 167:20 Examination (15) 4:5,10;69:14;75:5;93:7; 100:10;109:4;111:17; 116:19;121:5;146:1; 163:19,20;164:9;190:5 examine (1) 180:14 examined (2) 121:3;180:18 example (12) 24:5;55:5;73:15;82:3; 93:21;118:7;125:21;127:8; 150:8;175:1;178:3;189:10 exception (1) 201:15 excerpts (1) 15:12 exchange (1) 103:16 excusal (1) 117:18 excuse (4) 117:11;169:8;170:8; 181:4 excused (1) 117:15 executive (12) 5:19;8:18;70:11,12; 121:10;129:12;147:12; 153:15;174:15;176:21; 191:2;195:17 exercised (1) 125:10 exhibit (2) 201:5,13 exist (4) 78:18,21;132:9,10 existed (1) (209) DUI - existed UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning 33:9 expect (2) 37:10;92:15 expected (2) 32:17;195:4 expenditure (2) 111:2,2 experience (21) 11:9;21:21;25:19;57:5, 21,21;60:3;61:13;63:19; 69:18;70:14;79:20;88:17; 92:6,14,16,18;109:14; 160:11;181:16;183:19 experienced (1) 61:19 experiences (1) 26:15 expert (19) 63:10;120:13;122:2; 128:19,20;129:1;145:11,17; 146:5;147:2;154:4;160:5; 161:9,12;162:7,16,21; 163:13;164:1 expertise (31) 7:5;42:1;63:9;92:7; 121:14;125:6;129:8,9; 144:19;145:8;146:12,18; 154:2;155:6,8;160:15; 161:14;162:9,10,14,19,20; 166:12,18;167:4,10,17; 169:18;175:10;180:2; 187:15 experts (2) 52:15;178:16 explain (11) 13:15;19:4;100:18;110:6; 125:2;128:3;136:5,6;166:2; 168:6;184:12 explains (1) 99:6 Explosive (1) 167:11 exposure (1) 143:16 expression (3) 84:4,10;85:7 extend (1) 200:14 extended (1) 201:7 extensions (1) 189:6 extent (2) 16:19;37:18 extra (1) 171:15 extremely (1) 54:2 extremes (1) 79:19 eyeball (1) 14:6 eyes (2) Min-U-Script(R) 174:6;192:15 federation (1) 127:11 feed (1) F 2:6 feedback (2) face (5) 78:3;89:1 16:21;98:8;147:20;153:7, feeds (3) 8 126:18;138:5;160:17 facilities (3) feel (1) 165:13;170:13;189:6 48:3 facility (9) feels (1) 62:5,9,12;63:2;131:1,4,5, 51:5 10;138:1 FEIN (84) fact (16) 3:4;4:6,11;5:2;16:14; 17:2,10;31:2;36:11;44:6; 19:3,10,16,17;26:10,14; 51:3;53:9;80:7;85:16;91:1; 31:11;32:3;43:11,12;45:20; 159:6;160:8,10;161:1; 52:9,11,13,20;53:6,15,16; 163:3;164:3 57:20;60:14;61:11,12; factor (2) 63:12,15,17;66:8;67:19,21; 64:2;78:4 68:2;69:7;75:14;108:21; factors (5) 109:2,4;111:16;113:2; 11:13,16;56:1;61:3;166:3 114:19;116:18;117:13,17; facts (3) 118:21;119:3;120:14,17,19; 100:13;163:4,10 121:5;122:3,6,10,14,19,20; factual (2) 145:16;154:12,16;155:12, 53:4,14 16,17;158:21;160:9;164:9; failing (2) 179:2;180:8,21;182:8,16, 126:19;138:4 21;183:1;185:13;188:15, Fair (2) 16;190:3;197:15;198:8,18; 151:2;190:14 199:19;200:7;201:12,18 fall (3) Fein's (1) 32:19;57:19;157:13 199:4 falls (1) fell (3) 159:20 79:18,19;84:4 familiar (12) fellows (1) 21:9;22:8,11;27:9,14; 143:9 33:12,14;51:12,15,16; felt (8) 130:12;181:9 31:4;153:11,13,14;169:4; familiarity (1) 172:11;180:4;196:4 33:17 few (4) families (4) 19:19;21:1;107:2;154:17 48:12;95:8;96:3,8 field (18) family (6) 52:16;70:17,21;83:13; 48:18;49:6,12,16;95:15, 97:3;122:6,17;130:14; 18 133:16;140:20;141:1; family's (1) 142:21;144:11,19;152:9; 96:14 162:7,16;163:13 far (5) 37:18;110:3;150:3;155:6; fields (2) 128:17;163:2 158:9 fighting (1) fast (4) 69:1 13:7,15,18;14:13 figure (15) FBI (1) 11:7;14:6;15:17;16:10; 171:10 35:4,6;59:8,10;65:12; fear (1) 125:16;132:3;136:11; 116:10 142:7;166:7;178:8 fearful (1) figuring (1) 116:14 136:17 February (1) file (5) 133:15 113:7,11,15,20;114:6 fed (1) filed (1) 127:15 113:11 federal (5) files (15) 17:9,13;57:12;174:14,17 Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 7:21;8:2;16:6,6;18:14,15, 15;20:3,4;26:21;34:11; 36:21;37:8;46:3;66:16 filing (5) 19:14;57:17;118:11,14, 16 filings (3) 100:21;101:1;164:4 filtered (2) 113:1,4 final (13) 63:16;64:15;114:17; 176:7,11,15,17,19,21; 183:15;196:17,19,21 financial (6) 123:2,5;124:7;188:17,20; 189:16 find (7) 12:4;48:4;57:18;87:10; 95:19;110:18;134:16 findings (15) 64:14;154:18;159:7,8; 160:12,12;174:11;176:14; 177:5,16,18;178:10,15; 183:15;201:5 finds (2) 162:14,21 fine (2) 31:9;118:17 finished (3) 169:6;196:10,18 First (43) 8:16;9:4;12:7;14:15; 15:9;16:9,16,20;32:12,12; 34:7,17;41:2;47:2;48:11; 49:2,3,9;52:14;57:7;58:1; 66:9;71:8;82:9;121:2; 123:10;129:20;130:2; 136:15;139:13;146:17; 153:15;165:11;166:10; 167:8,15;173:21;174:4; 181:6,14;183:7;193:21; 194:2 five (8) 15:6;110:19;134:7,8; 144:6,10;165:11;192:15 flag (3) 138:4;145:14;174:8 flagging (1) 174:6 floor (6) 170:14,14;171:9,16; 175:2,17 flow (1) 42:2 flows (1) 56:18 fly (2) 11:8;170:17 focus (13) 32:10;35:15;55:10; 126:15;139:12;166:9; 173:3,13;174:12;177:8; (210) expect - focus United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning 178:9;189:15;195:19 focused (7) 6:20;32:8;124:3;164:15, 19,20;182:19 FOIA (1) 131:13 folk (1) 151:12 folks (29) 6:17;11:21;12:17;14:9; 27:7;30:20;34:18;35:6,8,8; 39:5;58:8;59:1;69:6;87:13, 15;89:11;101:16;111:6; 151:4,5;164:14;166:21; 167:4;168:13;170:16; 191:15;192:18;196:1 follow (1) 106:13 followed (1) 134:19 following (4) 106:18;132:20;176:10; 192:9 follows (1) 121:4 followup (2) 116:16;192:11 food (1) 84:9 foolproof (1) 62:19 force (35) 9:1;11:10;12:6;17:3; 40:21;47:14;50:9;65:1,8; 90:20;105:10;111:5; 123:16;125:18;126:9,16; 127:2,2,3;130:3;140:15; 143:3,4;156:11;164:14; 165:10;168:6;169:14; 170:12,18;171:9;172:3,7; 175:1,10 forcefully (1) 66:11 forces (17) 20:11;25:12;27:7;28:18; 29:10;38:5;41:15;62:8; 66:18;73:4;88:5;97:13; 104:11,12;111:4;187:8,10 foreign (35) 35:12;36:3,9;37:6,7,14; 44:11;46:2,12;50:7,9;59:9; 68:8;78:12,19;85:21;103:7, 12,13;134:12;143:14;150:5, 7;151:3,4;156:10;157:8,10, 13,14;167:5,5,6;181:17; 187:11 foremost (2) 12:8;41:2 forewarned (1) 103:3 formed (2) 180:15;193:15 Fort (7) Min-U-Script(R) UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 1:11,17;70:11,12;130:21; 133:1;158:14 forth (2) 64:12;78:13 forum (2) 186:2,3 forward (17) 9:8;11:8,17;15:20;23:3; 36:12;40:17;46:15;57:3; 67:4;69:5;77:21;78:2,6; 88:14;111:4,5 found (11) 15:1;22:9;45:13;87:7,13, 14;89:6,7;134:17;178:3; 198:10 foundation (3) 26:12;163:15,17 foundational (2) 53:7;189:12 four (9) 142:8,10,15;144:6,9; 156:4;165:5,11;170:2 fractures (4) 29:4;85:8,9;86:3 fragmentary (2) 88:18;89:2 free (1) 117:16 Freedom (1) 131:7 French (1) 13:10 fresh (1) 100:2 friends (2) 13:10;34:8 front (3) 175:19;177:2,4 full (2) 55:4;66:18 full-time (1) 82:6 fully (1) 30:4 fun (1) 85:5 function (7) 12:5;24:16;32:12;39:8; 47:20;91:5;155:1 functional (10) 125:11;127:18,20;128:1, 8;134:1,6,13;135:8;145:11 functionality (1) 135:16 functionally (1) 175:5 functions (3) 121:15;126:4;134:7 fund (1) 144:16 funding (1) 142:18 funds (1) - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 128:5 funneling (1) 56:7 further (4) 69:8;153:19;180:11; 190:4 future (10) 78:4;110:2;126:10,10,16; 136:11;138:6;144:17; 156:10,12 41:3,16;105:2;163:9; 167:15;175:8;189:16 giving (3) 46:17;53:3;172:19 globe (1) 82:19 goals (1) 137:1 goes (4) 25:5;107:16;141:10; 142:11 G good (10) 38:8;67:3;69:15,16; 82:10;85:16;100:14;146:2, G1 (2) 3;153:12 47:18,19 goodness (1) gain (2) 58:20 27:16;68:11 Government (58) gained (2) 2:3;3:3;6:21;7:8;8:4,13; 34:17;110:1 10:8,17;12:19,19;29:12,12; gallery (1) 30:3;36:9;37:6;42:10; 201:1 43:18;44:13,16;46:7;48:9; Garrison (1) 50:7;52:18;56:10;57:7,12, 1:9 14;58:3,14;66:21;67:1; Gates (1) 69:18;70:5,7;86:20;88:5; 195:6 92:2;96:15;100:9;101:19; gather (3) 103:3,4,7;107:19;114:18; 39:17;68:9;98:1 120:11;135:17;154:14; gathered (1) 157:14;162:6,15;163:15; 130:17 174:14,17;177:6;190:7; gauge (1) 191:6;197:21 80:18 governments (9) gave (16) 35:10,12;36:3;69:20; 5:6,7,10,13,15;17:3;22:5; 103:7,13,14,16;167:5 24:5;49:10;103:12;116:20; grab (1) 173:14;183:10;192:18; 69:11 193:10;195:18 grade (1) general (41) 128:14 14:10;18:3;19:4;22:18; 39:10;42:15;50:3;52:16,21; grades (2) 125:5;128:14 63:9;67:11;69:15;76:9; 79:21;84:12;90:5,9;106:21; granted (1) 94:2 108:18;116:20;119:18; graph (1) 120:1;136:5,7;137:14; 107:6 139:1;142:20;143:14,15; graphed (1) 147:10;153:12;154:6,21; 107:5 155:2,3;161:5;162:11; graphs (1) 163:18;171:5;182:5,7 107:9 Generally (12) gravity (1) 6:12;9:9;20:21;22:8,11; 7:4 60:5;94:17,18;149:15; great (8) 194:1;195:5;197:5 17:4;30:18,19;61:6; George (3) 66:17;110:18;129:6;151:1 139:19,20;140:11 greater (2) gets (5) 27:8;40:16 49:5;59:7;73:10;128:8; greatly (1) 150:17 37:15 gist (1) grid (5) 9:12 111:19;112:3,5,8,10 Gitmo (12) grips (1) 16:6;18:14;20:4;33:13; 11:2 35:21;36:21;37:8;100:10, ground (7) 16;101:9,16,18 38:15;41:15;55:2;70:13; given (7) Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation (211) focused - ground United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning 104:7;149:16;151:11 group (7) 128:15;131:18,18; 132:17,21;171:12;192:16 grow (1) 50:13 Grumman (1) 70:9 GS (1) 128:14 GS-15 (2) 125:5;137:6 Guantanamo (1) 36:12 guard (2) 37:21;62:8 guess (7) 5:4;46:21;110:8;140:3; 148:15;149:14;191:18 guidance (3) 114:21;170:19;200:8 guilty (2) 22:9;45:13 guy (3) 74:6;77:18;110:20 UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session harm's (5) 40:20;56:16;59:2;86:21; 111:6 head (4) 8:11;52:21;64:3;81:6 heading (1) 17:8 Headquarters (10) 1:8,8;99:18;133:1,6; 135:13;139:6;166:15; 184:9;185:1 heal (2) 107:20,21 health (3) 116:1,2,13 hear (4) 52:7;57:18;128:16;160:3 heard (2) 159:20;161:5 Hearing (2) 1:15;151:21 hearsay (16) 52:1,4,10,14,17;53:4; 67:10;161:10,11;163:16; 178:20;179:10,12,14,15; 185:9 held (1) H 67:12 help (12) Hall (1) 43:21;48:18;50:13;56:14; 1:10 68:16,17;159:5;163:3; hand (1) 166:11;167:13;174:21; 156:14 178:7 handled (1) helped (5) 127:12 67:5;85:9;86:2;131:18; handles (1) 174:17 187:4 helping (2) handling (1) 52:19;88:9 61:15 here's (1) hands (2) 192:19 32:17;56:21 hey (5) hang (1) 87:21;146:14;151:20; 46:16 177:11;192:19 happen (3) high (5) 41:5;157:16;198:21 98:16,19;105:17,19; happened (11) 147:10 49:7;76:6;77:1;84:18; 89:1;96:16;107:21;157:21; higher (4) 41:18;105:12;133:6; 176:3,4;184:16 148:8 happening (2) highlighting (2) 79:16;152:2 177:11,13 happens (1) highly (1) 115:14 18:9 happy (1) hill (3) 139:6 12:3;102:1;136:4 hard (1) himself (1) 107:21 179:18 harm (5) historical (3) 34:10;59:13;90:3;95:7; 23:1;48:5;75:5 158:4 history (2) harmed (1) 114:12,14 42:4 hit (4) harmful (1) 16:21;49:13;66:21; 44:18 Min-U-Script(R) 168:17 Hold (5) 122:9;124:6,6,12;183:14 holdings (1) 168:2 home (2) 69:4;152:9 Honor (27) 52:8;63:15;69:7;117:10; 119:6,21;120:10;122:6,17; 145:19;153:17,19;155:6; 159:1;160:15,20;161:16; 179:7,15;182:3,12;188:5,8; 190:3;197:15;198:4;199:2 Honorable (1) 1:17 Hood (1) 158:14 Hopefully (2) 68:4;198:20 host (4) 29:1,3,12;55:5 hotel (1) 134:19 hour (1) 200:3 hours (2) 82:10;172:15 huge (1) 111:1 human (14) 12:18;39:18;59:4;86:13, 18;124:20;127:14;130:10; 133:3;145:9;162:8,17; 163:2,14 HUMINT (34) 74:17,18,21;87:6,8,10,14, 16,18,20;88:1;121:15; 122:10,11,16,17;124:16; 125:8,14,15;127:3;129:2; 132:11,13;134:10;140:21; 143:2;144:12,20;145:18; 146:15;155:10;156:18; 158:9 hundreds (2) 40:1;42:18 HUNTER (1) 3:7 HURLEY (48) 3:13;4:7,12;18:20;19:11; 26:4;31:6,9;42:5,14;45:11; 49:19;51:21;57:10;60:11; 63:7;66:2;67:9;69:11,14; 71:1,5,7;72:12,15,18,21; 73:1;108:18;111:17; 114:16;116:19;117:9; 118:10,15,18;119:6;145:19; 146:1;153:17;159:10; 161:4;178:13;180:12; 182:3;185:9;190:5;197:13 hurt (1) 13:4 Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 I ID (2) 97:6,6 idea (5) 34:12,13;145:10;173:1; 199:13 identifiable (1) 173:8 identification (3) 24:18;87:6;89:15 identified (8) 16:18;83:12;99:21;100:7; 130:13;173:7;174:19; 181:12 identify (11) 6:15,17;40:21;41:3,8; 47:8,12;48:16;118:13; 178:2;181:2 identifying (13) 24:13,14;25:6;47:21; 72:3,6;73:11;113:10; 136:18,18,19;165:12; 172:21 IED (4) 23:11;105:5;178:17; 183:2 Iliard (1) 166:4 illiteracy (4) 98:17,20;105:17,19 image (2) 33:2,9 imagine (1) 54:14 immediate (1) 90:19 immediately (2) 123:16;174:20 immune (1) 84:19 impact (36) 10:5;20:11;38:11;43:14; 44:8;49:15;51:12;54:20; 57:6;58:2;64:18,20;65:21; 66:10;108:12,15;116:2; 121:20;137:19;149:4; 163:8;168:4;173:1;174:7; 178:5;181:2,12,12;183:10, 11;184:6,13;191:17;195:4, 18;196:4 impacted (4) 8:21;53:2;160:14;176:18 impacts (11) 11:3;54:11;67:6;83:4,7, 19;108:12;172:20;173:12; 177:9;178:7 implication (1) 65:6 implications (3) 12:1;13:8;37:2 important (7) (212) group - important United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning 11:18;35:19;48:3;50:18; 55:12;58:12;68:21 improve (4) 92:15,17;126:10,20 improvement (1) 126:11 Improvised (1) 167:11 inadmissible (2) 52:3;161:16 inaudible (1) 2:17 incidences (1) 23:10 incited (1) 117:7 include (10) 23:19;24:6,12,15;60:1; 95:12;134:15;136:3;189:4, 5 included (7) 22:19;25:13;45:17;87:13; 111:8,10;186:20 includes (5) 96:4,5;112:3;125:18; 136:18 including (1) 73:16 inclusive (1) 189:7 inconsistent (1) 95:21 increase (1) 17:5 incredible (2) 50:14;110:13 in-data (1) 87:11 independently (1) 116:8 INDEX (1) 4:1 indicate (1) 25:11 indicated (5) 75:4,16;90:15;93:6;120:1 indications (1) 20:10 indicators (1) 94:11 indirect (2) 188:19;189:9 individual (19) 24:18;25:17;39:15;40:20; 41:11;42:8,8;43:7;82:5; 89:12;93:15;103:2;105:6; 115:17;118:8;151:12; 161:9;175:21;176:5 individually (1) 54:16 individuals (16) 15:13;25:8;41:1;47:16; 61:2;68:7,10,12;71:17; Min-U-Script(R) UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 74:12;81:16;88:4;89:19; 100:16;165:5;184:20 individuals' (1) 43:14 individual's (3) 42:17;43:4;111:13 industries (1) 14:9 inform (6) 6:17;11:21;49:6;149:4; 167:1;176:6 information (178) 7:18,19;8:3;9:11;10:17; 12:18;14:19;17:17;18:4,7,9, 17,21;19:2;20:10,14;21:3,6, 17,20;22:1,3,18;23:4,13; 24:3,13,15;25:2,6,7,20; 26:16;28:9,11,11;32:10,11, 13;34:1;36:14;37:5,10; 38:1;39:3,6;41:16;42:13, 21;45:1,8,12,16;46:11,15; 47:5,8;48:4,5;50:18;51:4,9; 52:2,7,9;53:4,8;55:11,12, 18;56:5,13,18,20;57:6;58:2, 7,9,11,13;59:3,7,16,20;60:6, 17,19;61:2,5,15,20;62:7,9, 12,17;63:3,10,20;67:16; 68:9,11,18;72:3,6;73:2,10, 12,16,17,19;76:13;80:21; 82:21;83:3;84:14;92:8,9; 93:10,14,14,18,20;94:3; 95:13;96:8,16;98:2;100:3,5, 11,21;101:1;103:1,12,13, 15,17,18;104:2;105:3,11; 109:7,10;110:4;112:2; 113:5,8,14,15,21;114:7; 117:1;120:2,12;131:2,7,10, 12;135:3;140:17;152:17; 156:7,12;158:11;163:9; 164:16;173:8,10;182:11; 183:18,19;184:2;185:6; 190:1;191:10;194:7,8; 201:3 informed (4) 96:4;180:1,18;197:9 informs (2) 126:9;157:19 initial (10) 11:14;35:16;95:20;96:1, 2,5,11;166:9;168:7,9 initially (3) 7:20;9:15;107:12 injured (1) 48:6 injuries (1) 25:15 INSCOM (6) 130:20,21;133:1,10,11,12 inside (6) 22:12;23:17;63:3,4; 101:18;158:15 insider (2) 158:8,10 instance (3) 63:8;86:6,7 instances (5) 29:15;56:18;83:13;85:1; 108:11 instead (1) 40:12 insurgency (2) 89:13;105:7 insurgent (5) 23:14,16,21;24:3;68:13 insurgent's (1) 77:19 integral (1) 170:12 integrated (1) 170:15 integrating (1) 176:12 Intel (15) 5:13;8:20;22:1,5;30:21; 37:17;39:17;55:15,16; 65:18;70:21;94:17;109:14; 145:4,5 Intelligence (58) 5:18,19;8:17;39:14;40:3; 55:12,13;56:9,10;63:19; 70:17,19;79:20;92:5,8;94:5, 19;97:19;121:7;122:11; 123:1;124:20;125:4; 127:14;128:2,7;130:4,10, 16;131:18;132:11;133:3; 134:12;135:11;139:8; 141:4;142:4;145:10;149:3, 9;152:3,15;153:1;157:10; 160:12;162:8,17;163:3,14; 166:21;167:3,6;169:16,18; 171:17;177:20;191:10,12 intend (2) 122:3;161:2 intent (3) 107:1;156:6;172:9 interact (1) 51:18 interacting (1) 67:2 interaction (3) 28:21;43:16;85:17 interactions (4) 44:5;192:6,10,14 interagency (1) 30:19 interest (1) 175:9 interlocutor (1) 50:8 interlocutors (1) 86:1 intermediate (1) 91:2 internal (4) 15:16;30:16;169:11; 187:6 Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 internally (4) 155:1;165:17;173:19; 187:3 international (5) 139:18,20;143:9;157:10; 192:16 Internet (3) 14:4;48:20;49:14 interrogators (1) 73:5 interrogatory (1) 160:4 interrupt (1) 15:21 interview (3) 57:12;90:12,15 into (60) 8:4;12:19;30:4,20;36:8; 43:17;47:12;48:8,17;56:7, 21;59:1,8;62:4;71:21;72:4, 8;74:21;78:4;83:5;94:4; 101:6;102:7;115:14;120:2; 127:15;128:15;130:10,17; 135:11,14;137:3,5,8,16; 138:5;142:7,11;148:15; 150:3;152:4;154:21;158:9; 160:3,16,17;167:9;169:7, 14;170:15;175:19;176:13; 182:14;189:6;196:11,19; 198:12;199:8,13;201:2 investigated (2) 49:5;96:3 investigating (1) 158:5 investigation (3) 157:20;158:3,6 investigative (1) 131:6 investigators (3) 141:18;157:17,17 investment (1) 58:16 involve (1) 150:7 involved (13) 36:2;59:15;113:20;114:5, 8;127:1;155:4;158:2;163:7; 186:12,15,16;197:5 involvement (3) 6:2;114:3;186:7 involves (1) 50:14 involving (1) 201:3 inward (1) 164:19 Iraq (24) 16:7,21;17:1,3;18:15; 20:3,16,17;28:5;29:7; 36:19;38:11;41:19;66:16, 18;68:7;80:18;81:14,17; 98:19;99:2;169:6;184:17; 187:11 (213) improve - Iraq UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning Iraqi (8) 66:20,21;71:16;92:2; 99:8;172:14;175:12;183:8 Iraqi/Afghani (1) 110:4 IRTF (112) 5:5;6:20;7:19,20;8:6,11, 11,17;9:16;10:15;11:14; 18:4;19:5;20:1;21:8;22:13, 15;27:20;32:7,8,20;33:15; 34:4,21;36:14;38:9;39:11; 45:21;46:10;47:1,7,21; 64:12,13,14,16;65:9;66:1, 11;76:14;77:6;78:15,16; 82:6,9;86:12;88:13;99:11; 101:3;102:7;110:8;121:20; 123:21;124:1,2,5,15;147:6, 9;151:10,20;152:2;153:5; 154:3,18;155:1,11,19; 156:3;159:8;162:19;163:6, 11;164:3,12;165:1,6,8; 168:7,21;169:11;171:21,21; 173:3,19;174:10;175:3; 176:4,14;177:2;178:10,15; 179:5;180:3;181:2,11,16; 183:3,9,21;186:7,8,17; 187:18,20;188:18;189:17; 192:13;193:20;195:5,6; 196:9 ISAF (2) 25:19;26:16 issue (14) 9:8;20:15;51:6;52:17; 83:12;84:21;154:13;157:4, 5,6;159:17;163:5;178:17; 189:15 issued (1) 99:15 issues (5) 118:12,13;142:19;179:2; 197:20 items (4) 138:4;149:7;154:17; 175:9 J J2 (7) 21:14;25:20;26:16;27:15; 33:18;56:7;98:8 J7 (2) 127:12;187:8 January (1) 130:1 Jaywicks (1) 166:16 Jaywiks (1) 18:18 JCITA (5) 141:6,7,9,10;142:13 JIEDDO (4) 167:12;178:18;183:13; 187:14 Min-U-Script(R) job (23) 12:5;33:17;50:14;51:20; 54:13;60:19;61:6,7;82:8; 102:21;124:10;129:9; 130:2;131:9,11;132:20; 133:4;137:17;141:3,9; 145:1;153:12;156:15 jobs (3) 116:11,14;140:17 jog (1) 116:21 JOHN (4) 4:9;120:19;121:1,6 join (1) 129:20 joined (2) 8:19;165:10 Joint (13) 1:10;33:18,20;70:3; 127:12,15;141:3;142:2,4; 167:11;187:8,8,10 joking (1) 85:1 JOSEPH (1) 3:5 JOSHUA (1) 3:12 journalists (1) 157:14 JTF (4) 33:13;100:10,16;101:9 Judge (3) 1:18;24:1;116:8 judgment (4) 77:20,21;100:6;105:16 judgmental (1) 77:15 judgments (1) 92:11 judicial (1) 179:11 July (3) 1:16;4:2;123:12 June (3) 138:21;141:3,9 junior (4) 60:1,3,4;94:18 K keep (7) 38:18,21;69:4,5;102:5; 177:3;182:19 keeping (1) 136:7 kept (2) 17:21;79:14 key (5) 44:14;137:18;138:2; 158:11,12 killed (6) 42:8,11;43:2,7;48:6; 81:18 - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 killing (1) 118:6 kind (19) 9:20;11:8;12:12;16:7; 17:7;23:11,12;28:19;68:17; 77:14;78:3;140:15;142:6; 166:9,13,13;174:11;193:19; 196:19 KIRCHHOFER (25) 4:9;119:4;120:20;121:1, 6;145:17;146:4;154:2,18; 155:5,18;159:11;162:6,15; 163:6,12;164:2;178:18,20; 179:3,16;180:16;182:11; 190:6;196:9 Kirchhofer's (5) 159:2;162:9,14;164:1; 179:7 knew (8) 10:9;14:3;15:2;53:8; 146:13;174:3;178:6;184:15 knowing (1) 46:17 knowingly (1) 182:10 knowledge (30) 9:7;11:12;23:2;25:1; 34:12;39:17;45:8;49:5; 64:8;66:20;67:11;74:5,6; 76:8;80:20;81:6;85:17; 92:11;96:6;101:21;112:13; 115:20;118:1;121:18; 158:19;159:5;160:11; 161:19;163:1;186:21 known (5) 18:17;35:11;77:18;86:17; 93:15 L Lamo (1) 32:9 laptops (1) 165:18 large (3) 19:21;126:1;138:14 largely (3) 22:20;49:2;147:7 last (10) 10:6;19:6;31:21;67:21; 106:21;112:3;119:14; 162:5;182:19;188:12 late (2) 141:11;201:9 later (3) 45:2;124:3;184:18 laterally (1) 56:6 law (10) 6:2,7;17:16;113:19; 114:3,4,7,11;163:11,15 lay (1) 163:15 Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation layers (1) 83:21 laying (1) 26:11 lead (4) 70:11,12;127:12;134:14 leaders (7) 30:14;43:19;94:5,5; 140:13;156:3;172:11 leadership (9) 8:13;28:7;45:8;68:15; 95:1;109:21;139:11;140:4; 147:13 leading (3) 22:13,15;26:11 leak (1) 118:6 Leaked (1) 104:2 leaks (2) 35:17;104:1 learn (4) 28:1;50:20;63:20;105:9 learned (20) 18:12;93:4,5;99:12,15,17, 19;125:10;127:7,10;137:16, 18;138:4;186:6,9,13,20; 187:3,9;189:11 lease (1) 189:6 leased (1) 8:1 least (11) 6:6;9:4;10:6;109:15; 111:13;129:14;160:4; 170:9;175:4;194:11,12 leave (1) 133:12 led (1) 140:13 left (8) 19:4;30:2;91:6,12; 130:21;192:13;196:9,20 leg (1) 48:15 legal (9) 16:13,17;17:21;39:19; 40:9;48:8;64:1;86:13;101:6 legislators (1) 102:1 legitimate (6) 40:2;86:13,18;87:8,10,20 length (1) 176:7 lengths (1) 66:17 lengthy (2) 109:1;200:6 less (7) 44:5;77:16;98:21;99:7; 108:9;173:2;181:21 lesson (1) 105:10 (214) Iraqi - lesson United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning Lessons (18) 99:11,15,17,19;125:10; 127:7,10,16;137:16,18; 138:3;186:6,9,13,20;187:3, 9;189:11 letters (1) 46:11 level (26) 5:20;8:11;9:7;41:20; 55:16;94:1;95:3,5;102:16, 18;107:16;109:20;125:5; 128:15,16;140:16;141:20; 148:8;151:10;173:4,5,7; 174:9;175:19;184:20; 190:15 levels (7) 44:12;58:7;105:12; 141:15;152:6,11;192:7 liaison (1) 50:15 lie (2) 150:15;151:12 lies (1) 151:5 lieutenant (1) 84:12 life (1) 59:13 lift (1) 12:5 light (2) 36:8;128:17 likely (1) 33:10 likewise (1) 106:3 limb (1) 25:17 limit (1) 177:8 limitations (2) 6:1,4 Lind (1) 1:18 line (4) 106:21;159:21;173:13; 197:21 line-by-line (2) 14:6;20:12 lines (3) 29:9,10;158:20 linguists (2) 73:6,7 linked (1) 17:8 list (1) 13:3 listed (4) 42:16,17;71:11;81:18 listen (1) 159:19 listening (1) 2:6 Min-U-Script(R) UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session literacy (1) 109:6 literally (2) 15:9;170:19 litigation (3) 100:14,17,19 little (8) 63:13;76:3;108:13;124:3; 136:6;160:6;191:14;200:3 live (2) 2:6;85:4 livelihood (1) 39:8 lives (3) 24:18;49:17;89:14 local (15) 23:20;24:6;38:21;40:4, 18;43:15,18;50:15;51:1; 71:9;73:4;75:15;98:11; 112:14;151:11 locals (1) 91:17 located (1) 117:1 location (2) 16:11;110:17 locations (1) 111:10 locked (1) 62:4 logic (3) 148:1,5;153:11 logisticians (1) 22:4 logistics (1) 137:20 logs (8) 15:12,15;16:21;17:1; 18:12,13;42:7,13 long (24) 8:6;10:20;31:8;58:20; 81:21;119:1;123:4,7; 124:10;126:12;132:18; 135:7;137:10;138:18; 140:13;141:8,12;142:9,17; 143:2;160:21;164:21; 168:21;198:16 longer (5) 44:3;46:6;58:8;115:19; 198:1 long-term (2) 91:2;182:1 look (20) 13:5;15:16;19:6;20:9; 33:20;61:3;65:17;100:1,2, 13;105:12;107:2;127:11; 148:15,18;177:13;187:9; 195:14,18;198:14 looked (15) 65:4;87:5,5;139:5,8; 148:1;149:12;153:6,9; 175:5,6,8;183:8;187:5; 199:3 - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 looking (13) 8:10;24:4;32:9;33:8; 34:21;75:11;126:15; 136:11,20;151:9;152:14; 158:15;173:12 lookout (1) 83:3 looks (1) 175:14 losing (3) 48:14;116:10,14 loss (3) 85:17;103:21;184:1 lost (2) 25:17;49:16 lot (13) 13:19;29:8,8;78:6; 103:18;107:12;110:5; 112:14;140:14;146:15; 151:10;175:6;189:14 lots (1) 149:6 loved (2) 48:14;49:7 lower (4) 101:10;102:16,18;190:15 lowest (1) 58:7 Loyalty (1) 60:18 lunch (2) 200:14;201:7 113:2;179:2;188:15;199:4 majority (1) 185:2 makers (1) 57:14 makes (2) 180:5;193:4 makeup (1) 159:7 making (12) 10:2;12:10;19:12;58:6; 103:2;107:9;130:14;148:6, 20;164:14,15;182:9 man (2) 145:13;166:8 manage (1) 166:11 management (21) 125:10;126:4,5,6,18; 127:18,20;128:1;130:3; 131:19;132:1,9,13;135:20; 139:4,11;140:15,15;156:18; 164:13;186:21 manager (2) 133:3,20 mandatory (2) 115:8,16 manipulated (1) 14:1 MANNING (7) 1:6;15:13;22:9;29:21; 45:13;57:15;163:9 Mannings (1) 159:4 M Manning's (3) 57:7;58:1;160:14 Ma'am (57) manpower (4) 19:3,10;26:7;31:6,11; 125:16;127:3;136:19; 42:14;43:11;52:11,13,20; 137:20 53:6,15;61:11;63:7,15;67:9, 19;68:1;71:1;72:12,18,21; many (26) 24:8,10;25:10;30:3;35:9; 108:19,21;114:19;116:18; 38:6;54:8;63:4;76:19; 117:13,17;118:15,16,21; 79:21;81:13,19;89:20; 119:3;120:14,17;122:14,19; 108:10;110:15;111:9,11; 145:16;154:13,16;155:12, 128:13;130:11;142:19; 16;159:10;160:9;161:4; 144:2,3;160:21;170:21; 178:13;179:2;180:12; 171:20;194:9 182:8,16,21;198:18;199:19; map (4) 200:7,12,19;201:12,18 111:19;112:8,10,11 macro (1) maps (3) 8:11 111:18;112:1,7 magazine (3) marine (2) 15:10,12;16:5 47:14;50:9 magazines (1) market (1) 15:11 73:18 magnitude (4) martial (1) 7:3;17:1;36:17;165:14 117:19 mail (1) Maryland (1) 148:10 1:17 maintain (9) Mason (1) 5:17;55:1,3;68:20;82:8; 139:19 94:7;105:8;136:13;159:1 massive (1) MAJOR (9) 10:21 3:4,13;52:9;63:12;75:14; Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation (215) Lessons - massive United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning master (1) 139:20 match (2) 41:7;127:21 material (1) 62:2 matter (6) 1:15;8:14;52:15;120:9; 125:6;178:16 matters (2) 53:14;186:4 may (27) 2:13;6:18;25:18;42:14; 46:9;48:12;52:11;62:1; 87:17;95:20;97:20;98:4; 99:21;117:19;145:19; 148:21;151:19;159:11; 164:2;165:2,3;176:10; 180:16;196:16,17;197:11; 201:9 Maybe (4) 71:3;113:17;144:8;200:2 mayor (1) 43:19 Meade (4) 1:17;70:11,12;130:21 mean (44) 6:12;7:12;10:14;12:15, 17;13:17;15:1;16:15;20:16; 28:3;34:7;35:3;51:5;56:12; 64:3;67:6;72:5,11,17; 73:21;74:1;86:8;90:20; 94:6;111:19;112:9,11; 125:3,13;127:7;131:21; 134:5;136:7;148:12;153:8; 158:5;160:1,17;167:19; 170:8,10;172:18;177:18; 189:9 meaning (3) 80:10,12;84:11 means (2) 72:20;117:18 measure (1) 62:15 measures (6) 61:14,17,19;62:15;126:7; 134:16 medevac (2) 23:9;25:13 media (1) 2:5 medical (1) 48:10 meet (7) 12:12;84:11,13;113:18; 114:10,15;136:21 meeting (5) 9:5;21:8;25:3;102:17,18 meetings (4) 76:12;102:14,16;191:15 member (5) 70:2,19;78:11;121:9; 129:12 Min-U-Script(R) UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session members (17) 25:16;49:16;95:13,15,18; 135:18;136:3;143:20,21; 144:2,3,6,10,18;177:6; 187:19,19 members' (1) 95:8 member's (1) 47:13 memo (4) 173:16;195:10,12,20 memorandum (1) 5:3 memory (2) 116:21;199:6 mend (2) 85:9;86:3 mental (2) 116:1,13 mentioned (12) 6:10;12:16;33:13;47:6; 54:15;59:5;77:17;127:6; 128:10;134:9;169:10,12 merge (1) 21:16 merged (5) 128:15;135:11;137:2,3; 142:11 merits (2) 26:5;63:13 message (1) 194:3 met (6) 17:13;25:4;44:15;46:2; 119:16;139:10 methodology (2) 194:17,18 metrics (1) 126:7 MI (1) 133:9 middle (3) 12:3;189:15;196:14 midst (1) 168:16 might (42) 6:14,15;8:20;20:10;23:8, 19,20;24:15,16,17;25:17; 29:17;34:16;36:8;38:11; 39:5;41:5,12;56:1;61:3; 62:3;68:12,13,13,14;71:1; 77:11,15;81:5;93:14,17; 103:16;108:12,16;116:6,21; 149:20;150:6;167:6,10; 192:19;196:1 militaries (1) 50:14 military (18) 28:4,5,16;30:13,20;50:9; 59:14;70:14;129:14; 131:17;141:5;142:4; 143:16;157:16;170:3; 181:19;184:14,14 million (1) 189:3 millions (1) 58:16 mind (1) 117:8 mindful (1) 175:7 mine (3) 54:21;97:7,9 minimized (1) 51:19 ministry (4) 29:1;50:8,15;51:5 minor (2) 109:15,19 minutes (5) 31:9,14;119:8;161:18; 199:1 mirror (2) 33:2,8 miscommunication (1) 73:19 misconduct (3) 109:15,19;115:1 misled (1) 49:13 misrepresentations (1) 74:11 missing (3) 2:16;15:8;171:12 mission (10) 5:14;6:20;7:1;23:3;27:1; 29:14;32:7;44:6;69:1; 145:14 missions (3) 82:11,13,15 misspelled (1) 2:15 misspelling (1) 73:13 mistaken (1) 107:10 misunderstanding (1) 73:11 mitigate (7) 48:2;93:17;136:12;163:8; 172:20;178:8;189:21 mitigation (6) 6:11,13;35:6;107:19; 108:2,5 mixing (2) 78:7,10 modern (1) 97:6 moment (11) 6:10;19:16;52:11;153:2; 164:10;169:8;181:4; 182:15;183:16;187:16; 196:7 momentum (3) 38:18;44:6;69:5 Monday (3) Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 165:9,15,21 money (1) 126:21 monitoring (1) 132:5 month (2) 14:15;140:13 months (2) 8:9;123:6 moral (3) 40:10;88:7;90:1 morally (1) 65:15 more (47) 18:9;24:3;27:5,16,17; 28:1;29:16;30:20;31:1; 35:18;44:13;56:17,18;61:3; 66:1,6,10;68:3,5;72:7; 77:15;80:11;84:14;89:12; 90:4,10,18;91:2;96:4;98:1; 99:3,18;103:16;108:6; 113:11;126:20,21;136:6; 148:4;150:21;152:11; 160:8;174:9;193:1,2; 194:12;198:21 morning (7) 83:6,17;199:16,16,17,20; 201:15 MORROW (1) 3:5 mortar (1) 23:11 most (9) 11:18;24:14;49:9;132:12; 136:10;173:11;177:7; 189:7;194:1 mostly (1) 153:4 motion (2) 163:21;179:10 move (19) 11:8;19:8;35:20;36:12; 43:9;46:15;55:9;56:12; 57:3;63:14;67:10;78:5; 85:16;101:8;130:8,19; 131:15;138:9;198:12 moved (6) 30:15;130:10;138:11,20; 166:14;171:3 moving (2) 48:1;108:3 MRE (2) 163:12;164:1 much (14) 30:21;34:13;36:14;38:13; 51:14;59:14;65:17;134:10; 154:3;173:2;185:3;192:15; 194:12;200:9 multiple (3) 41:6;77:19;152:6 mutual (1) 86:1 Myer (1) (216) master - Myer United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning 1:11 Myer-Henderson (1) 1:10 myself (1) 72:16 UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session NCOs (1) 94:6 nearly (1) 59:21 neatly (1) 148:8 necessarily (15) N 11:5;40:2;62:19;74:18, 20;78:1;84:20;90:20;98:4; name (15) 145:14;155:4;157:7; 40:14,15;41:3,4,5,8; 177:18;178:4;185:14 42:17;43:4,5,7;72:8;77:16; necessary (8) 110:16,19;118:7 47:16;56:4;61:8;65:10; names (33) 115:11;172:5,7;189:18 2:15;24:7,10,12;40:1,2; need (33) 42:18,18;43:13,14;44:1; 39:3,4;43:18,19,19; 71:11,14,15,16;77:19;78:6, 46:14;55:1;56:14;58:17; 7,8,13;81:9,12,19;87:13; 60:18;61:5;69:4,5,6;71:2; 110:5,11,19;111:13;112:6, 77:19;94:20;95:1;118:11; 12,16,20;181:18 119:2;120:15;130:15; naming (1) 138:3;154:4,9;167:10; 171:6 177:12;178:7;190:20; narrative (1) 197:16;199:17;201:10,17 129:6 needed (37) narrow (1) 10:5,9;11:1,10;12:9,13; 41:7 14:14,20;15:20;17:6;38:18, narrowly (1) 19,20,21;39:1;40:19;41:21, 182:12 21;42:1,1;46:11;48:11; nasty (1) 55:3,4,6;65:12;83:7; 59:11 115:19;132:4;165:8,12; nation (4) 166:17,19;168:4;173:7; 29:1,3;55:5;56:20 178:5;187:1 National (26) needs (5) 5:17,20;7:7;8:17;15:1; 62:6;68:16,17;97:9;143:3 41:20;42:9,9;68:21;73:4; negotiation (4) 125:21;139:7;140:11; 28:16,18;29:11;36:5 143:7,8;149:18;150:2,7,9; 151:11;154:19;160:12,14; negotiations (1) 36:2 167:3;174:15;195:16 neighborhood (1) nationalist (1) 112:19 24:6 Net-Centric (1) nationality (1) 27:9 71:17 network (1) nationals (12) 174:5 23:20;43:15;68:8;71:9; 75:15;78:19;91:17;150:5; new (7) 7:3,11,13;10:17;51:7; 151:4,5;181:17;187:12 142:1;143:15 nations (3) next (9) 36:11;37:21;38:8 10:10;15:19;24:21;25:4, native (1) 5;49:14;74:6;144:16; 79:3 183:20 NATO (19) nexus (1) 21:16,18,19;44:21;45:5; 156:9 46:4,14;183:17;184:1,10; 191:14,15;192:4,6,10,14,15, niche (1) 129:9 17;193:3 nicknames (1) nature (2) 174:3 91:2;116:6 night (1) Navy (2) 83:6 47:14;50:9 nightshift/dayshift (1) NCDs (1) 172:16 37:1 nobody (1) NCO (1) 14:12 95:3 Min-U-Script(R) - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 nomenclature (1) 115:6 non-CI (1) 142:6 none (4) 18:18;67:10;87:7;166:12 non-intelligence (1) 148:2 non-stop (1) 172:15 nor (1) 120:4 normal (1) 91:11 Northrop (1) 70:9 noted (1) 160:2 notes (3) 2:14;16:4;107:2 notice (1) 179:11 notification (1) 111:6 notifications (1) 88:21 notified (4) 47:13;89:4;173:9;187:11 notify (14) 39:13;40:13,20;41:1; 44:11;68:7,10;77:12;86:11, 13,18;88:4;110:9;135:3 notifying (1) 46:5 nuisance (1) 185:16 number (33) 7:15,16;8:1;27:20;30:11; 34:6,8;37:13;41:8;45:3; 51:16,17;54:7,14;55:1; 57:3;61:16;79:12;80:21; 81:2;102:3;112:21;113:3; 116:21;117:6;142:16; 147:3,14;165:14;175:16; 184:10;187:5;199:3 numbers (4) 198:8,11;199:5,9 numerous (1) 28:20 O OARDEC (1) 169:21 object (6) 42:14;63:8;67:9;145:19; 153:20;178:13 objecting (1) 45:14 Objection (22) 18:20;26:4;31:10;42:5; 43:9;45:11;49:19;52:1,1; 53:11;57:10,17;60:11; Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation 61:10;66:2;154:1;160:2; 180:7,10;182:4,18;185:10 objections (2) 19:12;162:14 objectives (1) 137:1 objects (1) 162:9 obligation (9) 37:11;39:19;40:9,11; 48:8;64:2;88:7;90:1;153:15 obligations (1) 13:1 observe (2) 57:5;58:1 obtained (1) 34:12 obviously (4) 14:21;30:5;70:3;85:15 occasionally (1) 141:2 occasions (3) 74:11;77:19;144:8 occur (1) 78:10 occurred (1) 47:1 October (3) 169:7;191:20;192:3 off (26) 11:18;18:17;26:15;44:4; 49:4;54:10;55:7;69:17; 85:11;120:4;121:17;156:2; 159:2;172:3;174:11; 177:14,16;178:2;179:6,8, 10,19;189:11,14;194:2; 200:7 offensive (2) 141:17;150:6 offer (4) 147:3;163:17;198:12; 199:19 offered (3) 63:9;125:12;162:6 offering (1) 53:1 offers (1) 145:16 Office (23) 5:17;9:7;85:21;90:10; 124:8;130:4;131:8;132:3,4; 134:1;138:11,14,14,16; 139:3,5,5;140:12;169:19, 21;175:19;177:2,4 officer (8) 55:16;95:5;123:2,5; 124:7;130:11,11,20 officers (8) 60:4,5;94:6;140:9; 141:16;143:14,15;145:5 offices (8) 82:16,18;83:1,9;84:1,4; 85:8;90:16 (217) Myer-Henderson - offices United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning official (2) 2:3;179:16 officials (3) 9:6;44:13;135:18 often (11) 17:19;25:13;62:8;73:3; 96:2;107:18;117:6;142:1, 13;157:16;193:16 oftentimes (1) 105:15 onboard (1) 168:10 once (11) 15:17;16:11,17;27:21; 31:12;44:16;123:16;156:5; 196:21;199:6,10 one (77) 5:7;6:10;7:14;9:1;11:16, 18;12:9;14:15;15:11;16:21; 19:16;20:15;26:21;27:15; 34:7;35:18;38:13;41:5; 42:8;44:12,20;54:16;57:13; 62:21;63:16;69:11;75:7; 77:17;78:3;81:18;82:5,15; 85:8;90:10;92:15;93:16; 98:14;99:3;106:6,19;107:5; 110:1;111:11;113:11,18; 114:6;115:2;122:17;126:4, 19;128:15;137:15;138:2; 147:12;149:5,20;153:2,17; 154:17;156:3;159:3;161:6; 164:10;169:8,17;171:12; 176:2;179:3;181:4;183:16; 185:2,4;186:17;187:13,16; 196:7;200:11 ones (4) 48:14;111:12,13;178:16 ongoing (3) 10:7;22:6;27:18 only (10) 37:1;42:7;54:11;55:20; 67:12;73:2;96:11;123:6; 181:18;189:2 onto (2) 95:18;166:15 op (3) 168:7,18;170:13 open (9) 30:4;47:12;48:9,19;59:8; 102:5;186:2;199:14,15 opened (1) 56:19 operate (3) 8:6;9:19;187:1 operated (1) 8:8 operating (6) 39:16;40:3;86:20;106:2, 14,17 operation (5) 40:8;121:19;140:17; 171:20;172:6 operational (3) Min-U-Script(R) UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 23:15;81:1;128:5 operations (18) 8:11;23:9,12;37:17;38:5, 6;43:15;49:18;50:1;51:13; 79:21;80:8;90:3;141:17; 155:4;163:1;170:4;188:18 operators (2) 22:4;30:21 opinion (22) 52:19;53:2,5,8,9,12,17; 54:1,4;65:9;80:1;161:13, 15;162:10;163:3,16,17,19; 180:15;182:15;193:15; 197:8 opinions (11) 147:3,4,5;153:4;161:5,5; 162:11;163:18;179:20; 180:1;182:20 opportunity (12) 30:19;33:7;49:11;86:4,5; 174:21;180:14;189:10,17; 198:15;200:14;201:7 opposed (3) 133:7;166:17;193:3 opposing (1) 163:21 options (1) 172:20 order (13) 2:9;17:2;31:20;88:18; 110:12;119:13;159:5; 160:18;162:4;165:8;166:7; 184:4;188:12 orders (2) 89:2;165:13 organization (8) 137:20;145:6;157:11; 159:4;160:19;167:12; 178:4;191:12 organizations (9) 70:4;127:11;167:7; 169:11,13;170:21;171:5,7,8 original (5) 5:21;32:7,8;156:3;165:10 originally (3) 165:5,6;186:18 originated (3) 45:4,5;46:4 ostensibly (1) 95:15 others (11) 40:10;43:6;54:11;79:14; 91:2;115:10;176:17; 181:20;185:20;190:2;193:1 otherwise (3) 52:2;161:13,16 ought (1) 106:17 ourselves (1) 37:12 out (102) 9:18;10:5;11:6,7;12:7,12, 17;13:5;14:4,6;15:2,8,15, 17;16:10;20:6;21:7;23:18; 25:5,5;29:17;31:4;33:5,6; 35:4,6,13,21;36:8,18,20,21; 37:13;38:15,19;39:7,21; 41:13;42:11;43:6;44:1,8, 19;45:7;46:17;48:8;49:7, 14;50:21;59:8,10;63:2; 64:9,16;65:6,12,16;66:16; 72:19;79:17;82:21;83:2; 89:3;90:1;95:18;97:3; 101:8,16,18;102:4;103:2; 105:9;110:18;114:21; 120:9;130:18;132:3,5,15; 134:17;136:12,17;142:7; 146:19;164:20;165:16; 166:7;167:12;170:17,20; 173:10;174:13,17,20; 175:13;176:15;177:1; 178:6,8;180:3;183:8,12 outbursts (2) 114:12,14 outlines (1) 2:13 outright (2) 75:19;84:7 outside (4) 9:6;70:21;139:13;171:7 outstanding (1) 120:8 outweighs (1) 67:16 over (27) 27:1;30:15;41:5;47:17; 58:20;64:5;69:2;74:10; 82:11;85:10;86:1;101:4; 102:19,20;107:15,17;108:7, 10;116:4,8;136:14;144:7; 168:13;171:19;172:3; 176:7;200:3 overall (4) 44:6;82:15;90:5;185:15 OVERGAARD (2) 3:6;57:16 overrule (4) 63:11;180:6,10;182:18 Overruled (7) 26:13;42:6;45:19;60:13; 66:7;180:20;185:11 oversaw (4) 50:2;128:9;154:18;179:5 oversee (1) 94:10 overseeing (4) 34:4;91:4;164:18;186:13 overseers (2) 136:3;139:7 oversight (2) 125:11;187:14 overtime (1) 189:5 overwatch (1) 105:5 overwatched (1) Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 97:9 overwatching (1) 105:14 overwhelmingly (1) 61:4 own (9) 36:1;46:8,8,20;59:1;64:1; 106:13;127:14;182:11 P package (3) 148:8,11,12 Page (2) 4:5,10 pages (2) 176:7;195:11 painful (1) 168:9 Pakistan (1) 55:6 panels (1) 143:11 paper (1) 194:7 papers (7) 20:6;175:17;193:14,16; 194:8,13;197:3 parcel (2) 126:14;152:20 pardon (1) 91:5 part (25) 10:1;27:20;36:4;45:2; 80:17;81:5;89:12,13;99:6; 101:3;105:3,3;126:1,12,14; 135:20;150:1,19;152:20; 158:19;160:9,10;170:12; 173:12;177:7 participants (1) 143:12 participate (2) 120:3;143:10 participated (2) 8:16;143:6 participating (1) 22:16 particular (34) 5:18;24:17;26:21;27:19; 28:1;29:3;33:4;34:16; 35:14;38:15;39:20;40:20; 41:5;47:19;48:17;49:2; 50:7;51:5,6;58:17;62:5; 66:14;81:4;93:15;100:15; 110:15,16;114:4,12;115:14, 18;132:3;150:4;173:12 particularly (2) 48:4;183:7 parties (7) 31:20;102:5;119:13; 162:4;164:4;188:12;199:17 partly (1) 186:20 (218) official - partly United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning partner (4) 37:8,16;158:12;177:20 partnered (1) 170:16 partners (19) 21:16;37:6,14;38:4,6,7; 44:11;46:2,12;50:13; 158:12;171:16;184:1,11; 192:4,6,10,14,16 party (1) 135:3 pass (1) 24:21 passed (3) 100:3,5;101:5 paste (1) 176:8 patrol (2) 23:17,18 patrols (1) 40:5 patted (1) 185:20 Pause (9) 52:12;77:7;87:9;106:20; 114:1;153:18;169:9;181:5; 182:17 pauses (1) 182:9 pay (3) 128:4,5;189:5 pension (1) 70:5 people (61) 7:7;9:19;10:5,11;12:11, 17;27:6;34:8;35:20;36:10; 44:8;46:9;48:1;56:14,19; 58:6;64:9;76:19;79:7; 81:19;88:8;89:4,5,6,7,7; 93:8;101:8,18;103:14; 105:12,14;108:3;116:13; 123:18;128:18;130:11; 142:6;145:12;147:14,17; 148:8;149:16;160:21; 165:11,14,17;166:10; 168:10;170:3,5,10,11; 171:9,20;172:3;175:1; 186:1;189:14;192:20; 194:14 percent (3) 15:7;55:21;79:7 percentage (2) 79:11;99:2 perform (1) 125:9 performance (6) 60:18;126:4,5,6,7,18 performing (1) 126:8 perhaps (9) 6:13,14;77:8;82:12; 94:18;97:2;107:10;108:5,6 period (6) Min-U-Script(R) UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 10:20;30:15;54:10;58:20; 64:6;82:1 permanent (1) 117:11 permitted (2) 2:4,7 person (13) 42:16;63:1;78:9;113:10, 14;114:6,13;150:9;151:14, 19;173:10;180:15;181:7 personal (5) 47:5;67:11;112:12; 115:15;183:19 personally (7) 83:2;102:18;152:13; 173:8;184:1,21;186:12 personnel (20) 59:19;60:1,4;85:10,13,20, 21;86:1;88:2;92:3;117:6; 128:5;137:21;138:17; 139:9;168:17;169:15,21; 170:2;173:10 persons (1) 25:8 perspective (7) 13:16;133:6;140:4; 145:15;148:2;157:9;189:14 Pfc (7) 1:6;22:9;29:21;45:12; 57:15;160:14;163:9 phone (1) 102:12 phonetic (4) 18:18;25:20;71:21;166:4 physical (3) 25:15;61:14,19 physically (2) 62:1;170:11 picked (2) 137:3;156:14 picture (2) 41:10;90:5 pie (1) 55:21 piece (7) 35:19;128:8;134:13; 152:3;158:10;167:3;170:15 pieces (2) 20:6;81:4 PII (4) 47:6,12;48:7,8 pinpoint (1) 81:3 pipes (1) 56:18 place (10) 2:5;14:5;31:3;62:10; 75:8;77:20;81:3;83:4,19; 114:10 placed (1) 65:18 places (7) 29:7;63:5;89:9,11;152:9, 10;169:17 plan (9) 19:11;128:1;136:1,16; 137:1;138:3,6;140:21; 145:17 planning (22) 75:7;121:14;122:7,9,12; 125:8;126:13,15;136:10; 143:1,2,5;144:11,20; 146:15;155:9;156:1,9; 162:7,16;163:1,13 platform (2) 104:16;132:9 platforms (1) 104:5 play (3) 90:1;137:16;158:9 playbook (1) 11:7 played (1) 29:17 playing (3) 89:16,18;160:16 please (22) 13:15;19:16;31:19;61:18; 66:9;117:21;119:12;125:2, 13;135:3;139:15;161:18; 162:3;164:10;166:2;168:6; 169:8;181:4;183:16; 187:16;188:11;196:7 pledged (1) 168:3 plotted (1) 107:6 plug (1) 142:7 plugged (3) 76:17;99:7;109:6 plus (1) 155:3 pm (5) 1:16;119:10;162:1; 188:10;201:20 pocket (1) 63:4 pockets (1) 128:6 point (21) 15:3;18:8;35:16;61:10; 63:14;69:3;74:4;81:20; 82:1;85:18;95:17;117:8,19; 129:18;165:9;169:4,7; 175:13;183:21;196:12,20 pointer (1) 15:9 points (2) 32:5;116:5 poked (1) 85:5 pole (1) 80:11 poles (1) 81:2 Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 police (5) 40:7;43:18;51:1;68:16; 110:21 policy (3) 57:14;136:20;169:20 Political (2) 28:4,6 Polls (3) 80:3,18;81:5 pol-mil (2) 28:2,3 pol-military (1) 27:18 polygraph (1) 134:15 poorly (1) 82:12 population (8) 27:1,2,3;33:1;38:21; 80:10,12;101:11 populous (2) 73:4;98:12 portal (1) 30:17 portfolios (1) 133:21 portion (3) 26:5;128:2;189:1 position (22) 24:16;51:6;52:3;70:15; 122:21;123:21;124:6,6,12; 125:4;129:1,10;130:10; 154:14;156:17;159:10; 161:7,8,14;178:19;180:12, 17 positive (2) 57:4;113:16 possession (2) 10:19,19 possibility (3) 36:7;74:2,3 possible (11) 6:19;15:17,18;16:1,2,10, 12,18;46:5;98:5,6 post (3) 56:11,12;158:14 posted (3) 149:6;167:21;172:13 posting (1) 184:17 potential (11) 12:1;34:21;35:5,13;87:6; 95:7;99:21;103:1;172:14, 20;181:12 potentially (5) 14:19;36:7;44:18;107:7; 123:15 PowerPoint (1) 194:2 Powers (1) 184:9 practices (2) 100:1;127:16 (219) partner - practices United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning preclude (1) 17:20 predicative (1) 93:3 preeminent (1) 175:11 preferences (1) 106:12 prejudice (1) 180:13 prejudicial (1) 67:17 preparation (1) 120:3 prepare (2) 199:17;201:8 prepared (3) 106:15;119:19;121:18 present (10) 31:21;32:1;62:1;119:14, 14;162:5,5;184:7;188:12,13 press (3) 67:7;103:17,19 pretrial (1) 57:11 pretty (6) 34:7;147:10;153:12; 154:3;168:9;186:1 prevent (2) 64:7;116:9 prevented (1) 62:16 prevents (1) 63:18 previous (2) 55:8;120:5 previously (3) 18:19;87:14;133:5 primarily (5) 147:7;164:19;173:5; 177:10;197:9 primary (4) 27:1;101:15;131:11; 170:6 prior (5) 21:8;65:2;121:12;124:12; 182:14 priorities (5) 11:13;13:3;39:11;101:14; 164:15 prioritized (1) 132:2 priority (3) 15:3;32:12;101:12 Privacy (2) 131:7,14 private (5) 14:8,9;15:13;57:7;58:1 probably (18) 9:4;11:18;17:10;47:2; 77:17;82:9,10;88:17;102:3; 114:9;144:6;155:13; 168:16;181:21;183:6; Min-U-Script(R) UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 188:1;193:21;200:13 probative (4) 52:5,19,20;67:16 problem (4) 67:10;78:12,14,14 problematic (1) 99:1 problems (1) 138:5 procedure (1) 106:2 procedures (3) 96:20;106:14,17 Proceed (4) 32:2,4;120:18;164:8 proceedings (3) 2:5,9;5:1 process (20) 33:15;36:5;40:14;42:2; 47:7;58:13;67:14;77:5,10, 14;100:17,19;101:6;110:6, 11;113:1,4;129:4;136:15; 198:19 processes (4) 14:5;15:5;33:19;101:10 produce (1) 2:9 produced (2) 175:15;198:9 product (1) 179:5 production (3) 134:11;145:10;170:5 products (1) 175:15 professional (3) 63:19;129:19;190:7 proffer (1) 199:4 program (9) 133:20;135:20;140:11, 13;143:9;145:13;147:10, 13;189:11 progress (1) 10:2 prohibited (1) 178:21 prohibitions (2) 6:1,3 promoted (2) 137:7;138:10 proper (2) 61:14;159:15 properly (1) 162:21 prosecution (1) 17:21 prosecutor (1) 16:17 prosecutors (4) 15:19;17:9,13,17 protect (18) 13:1;27:1,3;37:11;38:14, 14;39:19;46:18,20;47:16; 58:18;59:5;61:19;64:10; 69:6;88:8;90:3;103:4 protected (2) 28:19;44:4 protecting (6) 11:17;37:11;58:9,10; 60:6,17 prove (1) 129:8 provide (11) 5:14;32:15;48:11;56:21; 58:7,20;61:4;62:11;77:11; 121:18;127:8 provided (6) 30:17;44:14;169:20; 170:3;185:6;199:5 provides (2) 59:3;141:4 providing (4) 12:18;55:17;59:7;111:3 Proving (1) 70:13 provisions (1) 131:13 public (18) 11:1;29:17;34:17;36:8; 44:18;54:17;80:1;102:4; 103:17,19;131:13;167:21; 173:1;175:14;184:19; 190:1;201:4,11 publicly (3) 35:11;42:11;95:16 published (4) 35:1;64:19;65:2;177:21 publishing (1) 132:6 pull (2) 67:1;182:14 pulled (7) 21:7;123:20;124:5; 161:11;169:14;189:11,14 pulling (2) 32:10;123:18 purpose (4) 26:7;158:16;160:1; 161:15 purposes (3) 2:8,15;23:1 push (3) 10:4;12:7;177:16 pushed (9) 21:7;40:17;41:14;46:4; 47:14;84:9;88:10,14,14 pushing (3) 130:17;177:14;178:2 put (33) 13:11,16;14:5,12;19:14; 34:14,14;40:16,19;41:10; 57:16;62:10;64:3;65:7; 74:21;75:10;76:11;77:14, 20;78:1;82:21;83:2;92:8; 97:6;109:20;111:5;120:2; Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 152:11;171:8;174:6,8; 190:1;197:17 putting (2) 130:17;176:11 puzzle (1) 34:13 Q qualifications (2) 129:7;164:1 qualified (8) 94:7;146:5;147:2;154:4; 155:14;161:9;162:21; 163:12 qualify (2) 122:4;146:21 qualifying (1) 122:1 quality (3) 152:11;164:18;196:19 Quantico (1) 138:12 quantify (1) 65:7 quantifying (1) 79:9 queried (1) 84:14 Questionnaires (2) 80:5;81:2 quick (6) 6:19;15:5;49:11;98:7; 113:6;174:2 quickly (6) 7:4;17:6;46:5;48:16;66:1, 11 quit (2) 44:9;79:13 quite (1) 184:10 R ran (1) 110:20 range (3) 126:12;185:18,21 rank (1) 129:15 rapid (1) 99:14 rapidly (2) 97:21;172:12 rapport (1) 150:10 rarely (1) 106:13 rate (3) 105:17,19;109:7 Rather (3) 7:8;41:19;155:13 raw (3) (220) preclude - raw United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning 130:16;149:9;153:1 RCA (1) 120:8 RCA1004 (1) 57:19 RCA703 (1) 52:18 RCA802 (1) 197:18 RCM (1) 164:6 reach (4) 109:20;174:17,20;183:12 reaching (2) 165:16;167:12 reacted (1) 187:6 reaction (7) 107:12,15,16,16;151:21; 185:6,14 reactions (6) 75:15,16;77:6;79:6;84:4; 185:11 read (7) 15:14;76:9,10;105:15; 129:1;148:9;168:3 reading (6) 22:16;25:14;95:9;168:19, 19,20 ready (1) 119:4 real (2) 98:7;113:6 realize (1) 123:17 realized (3) 15:18;27:21;156:5 realizing (1) 167:10 really (18) 49:7;73:18;105:8;124:3; 139:4,10;158:13;159:13; 164:13,17,18;168:13,17; 172:15;176:11;177:8; 178:1;185:21 real-time (1) 11:8 reason (2) 106:6;161:8 reasons (4) 11:11;16:20;55:2;108:6 reassurance (1) 12:2 rebuild (1) 132:14 rebuilt (1) 54:11 recall (16) 6:3,4;8:1;28:13;46:21; 49:1;79:11;81:13;95:10; 101:3;102:11,14;107:7,8,9; 191:19 received (7) Min-U-Script(R) UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 26:5;81:17;88:20;89:1; 109:16;140:2;194:10 receiving (1) 197:3 recent (1) 141:9 recently (1) 192:7 recess (17) 31:13,16,21;69:10;119:2, 3,8,9;161:18,20,21;188:7,9, 13;201:2,15,17 recessed (2) 119:14;162:5 recognition (1) 6:6 recognize (1) 181:15 recommendations (1) 180:4 recommended (1) 80:8 reconcile (1) 74:5 reconvene (1) 201:19 record (8) 31:20;118:5;119:13; 160:2;162:4;174:6;180:11; 197:17 recording (1) 2:7 records (7) 23:1;33:9;110:15;131:6; 149:5;168:20;184:17 redirect (4) 53:13;108:20;114:17; 197:14 reduces (4) 107:15,17,19;108:6 refer (2) 27:11;74:20 reference (10) 47:4;49:18,21;109:5,12; 140:20;144:9,10;183:3; 186:6 referenced (2) 19:19;154:20 referral (1) 116:6 referred (2) 86:14;116:1 referring (1) 93:11 reflect (3) 31:20;119:13;162:4 refresh (1) 199:6 refusal (2) 75:19;84:7 refuses (1) 84:12 regard (1) 201:5 regards (3) 35:1;170:9;179:12 regional (2) 140:9;189:12 regionally (1) 175:6 regulation (2) 114:21;117:4 regulatory (3) 39:19;40:9;116:21 reiterate (1) 51:21 reiterations (1) 142:16 relate (2) 155:11;176:14 related (8) 57:15;144:13;172:13; 177:6;183:4;187:14; 192:11;194:17 relations (4) 28:6;38:20;65:20;139:18 relationship (14) 42:10;51:18;54:18;85:15, 16;86:10,19;87:17,18;88:2; 149:17;150:1;191:17;193:3 relationships (6) 28:4;40:4;50:12;55:1; 91:8;184:14 relay (1) 103:14 release (12) 6:16;7:15;8:21;34:11; 35:4;45:3;49:14;59:3;67:6; 105:11;172:14;173:1 released (11) 8:3;9:2;30:4;35:1;40:15; 47:12;48:8;59:7;95:17; 118:8;131:12 releases (4) 44:9;53:19;54:6;56:11 relevance (6) 19:1,3;42:15;45:11; 60:11;154:1 relevancy (2) 18:20;45:15 reliability (4) 93:16;152:15;153:21; 155:7 reliance (1) 38:3 relied (2) 52:15;179:16 relive (2) 48:12,20 reluctance (2) 58:6,6 rely (3) 29:7,8;64:8 relying (1) 179:4 remainder (1) Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 157:20 remains (1) 154:10 remember (4) 6:5;81:21;159:18;192:1 remnants (1) 19:5 remove (2) 61:1;93:8 removed (1) 116:7 renew (2) 182:3;185:9 repatriate (1) 35:21 repatriating (2) 101:15,18 repeat (1) 71:2 rephrase (1) 77:9 reply (1) 38:7 report (33) 9:2,3;23:19;39:17;43:14; 49:4,9;64:15,19;65:2; 81:18;83:13;93:19,21;94:3; 96:5;109:21;110:6,9;113:8, 21;114:7;130:17;132:7; 147:17;149:1;152:12; 176:7,11,17,20;196:17; 197:1 reported (6) 25:12;54:3;75:20;148:16; 151:20;152:3 reporter (4) 2:3,3,14,17 reporting (16) 2:13;7:17;22:6,20;23:15; 30:7,9;71:10,12,13;75:6; 76:11;83:4;115:14;149:3; 151:11 reports (44) 9:10,13;20:19;23:18; 24:6;25:9,10,13;41:9; 43:13;47:6;49:3,3;51:8; 67:12;74:13,14,17,18,19,19, 20,21;75:5,8;88:20;95:20; 96:1,2,11;113:6,15;130:10, 11,20;147:20;151:14; 152:14;153:5,6,14;176:1,5; 183:4 repository (1) 131:7 representative (1) 50:7 representatives (1) 44:15 represented (1) 169:13 represents (2) 50:5,6 reps (1) (221) RCA - reps United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning 8:19 request (4) 12:18;52:4;82:21;83:2 requests (2) 164:16;188:2 require (1) 17:5 required (4) 8:2;29:11;52:6;62:1 requirement (5) 5:16;44:11;86:21;109:20; 115:2 requirements (7) 130:13,15;132:2;135:17; 136:8,19;165:13 requires (1) 198:1 reserved (1) 125:5 resident (1) 132:13 resistance (1) 101:17 resource (1) 166:8 resources (6) 7:9;9:17;14:12;17:5; 87:11;136:18 resourcing (5) 154:21;159:14;160:7,9; 164:3 respect (7) 92:2;100:15;118:11; 119:19;162:20;197:6;198:6 respective (1) 83:12 respond (3) 23:6,9,10 responded (1) 29:3 responding (1) 188:2 response (6) 78:1;80:19,19;185:18; 187:5;193:2 responses (1) 190:21 responsibilities (5) 5:19;50:3;137:14;139:2; 164:11 responsibility (6) 5:9;59:5;94:6,9;101:15; 132:16 responsible (7) 53:18;54:5;94:14;103:3; 114:6;126:13;127:6 responsive (1) 164:16 rest (1) 160:7 restart (1) 86:4 restate (1) Min-U-Script(R) UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 107:11 result (25) 6:16;13:12;24:4;29:17, 19;32:17;33:17;35:9;41:11; 42:4,7,12;44:9,19;48:9,14; 59:2;82:4;89:2;95:8;104:1; 108:1,3,5;186:9 resulted (1) 6:15 results (1) 176:12 resumed (4) 31:17;119:10;162:1; 188:10 retain (1) 5:16 retired (3) 119:18;154:6;163:18 returned (1) 91:11 reveal (2) 23:5;87:19 revealed (2) 87:7,11 review (31) 7:19,20;8:2;11:14;18:5; 20:8,13;32:16;33:1,16; 36:15;46:8;65:9;95:15; 100:10,20;123:14;131:11; 148:3,6;170:1;173:20; 174:9,11;175:20,21;177:1; 180:9;181:1;183:15;187:12 reviewed (12) 14:20;19:20;20:2,3,4; 27:13;33:20;36:18,19,21; 65:3;66:15 reviewing (5) 5:9;32:20;164:4;167:15; 169:5 reward (1) 61:6 right (66) 11:18;12:14;17:8,14; 19:4,8;35:3;53:4;56:21; 66:7;69:13;71:10;72:4; 73:4,15;74:15;76:9,13; 78:14;85:10;86:9;90:13; 94:20,20;95:1;96:9,12,13; 97:4,13,20;103:9;106:14; 107:3,6;108:14;112:17; 114:8;115:13;117:16; 118:19;119:5,7;120:7; 149:21;150:2,10,13,14,16; 151:12,17,18;152:1,9; 161:17;164:15;168:4; 175:11;178:14;182:13; 195:4;196:11;197:16; 198:9;200:20 rise (4) 31:15,18;119:11;162:2 risk (17) 6:15,15,17,18;10:5; 13:12;27:8;35:5;40:16; - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 41:12,13;46:9;47:21;61:4; 65:17;93:17;181:16 risking (1) 89:14 risks (2) 65:12;100:8 road (2) 67:18;126:17 ROBERT (1) 4:4 role (8) 33:19;34:4;51:11;76:14; 99:10;164:21;176:19; 179:17 rollout (1) 144:15 roll-outs (1) 135:21 room (4) 2:5;154:9;165:18;201:17 rough (1) 165:13 routine (3) 8:14;46:3;85:14 routinely (5) 27:16;37:14;44:15;84:11; 193:18 row (1) 165:19 rule (2) 14:10;62:2 rules (3) 31:12;62:10;140:18 ruling (3) 35:14;55:8;201:12 run (2) 95:18;174:2 running (1) 168:15 runs (1) 143:8 S S3 (1) 131:18 safe (2) 200:1,3 safes (1) 62:4 same (12) 31:12;52:14;67:10,14; 90:2;106:9;134:2;174:16; 182:6,10;184:16;198:21 sandwiched (1) 124:14 sat (3) 146:8,8;171:14 satchel (1) 63:5 satisfy (1) 120:8 save (3) Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation 7:9;49:15;71:6 saw (2) 44:7;177:20 saying (6) 36:7,10;41:11;72:10; 160:20;195:21 scenarios (1) 79:17 school (1) 190:10 sciences (1) 128:17 SCIF (1) 64:4 scope (4) 63:8;123:17;156:5;171:2 Scott (1) 147:13 scratch (1) 132:15 sealed (1) 54:9 search (1) 95:19 searched (3) 43:3;87:2,4 searches (1) 174:2 seated (4) 31:19;119:12;162:3; 188:11 second (21) 9:1;10:1;12:9;16:1; 34:15;36:1;44:20;49:1; 86:12;92:6;106:19;108:9; 123:18;153:17;154:20; 156:5;160:10;174:8;179:7; 200:15;201:8 secret (4) 18:6;115:21;166:16,17 Secretary (19) 5:15;9:3,6,11;32:15; 40:10;123:12;140:12; 148:4;169:16,20;172:10,20; 173:14;175:8;176:16; 183:9;195:6,21 secretary's (1) 173:16 section (3) 63:16;68:1;201:16 secure (2) 31:2;33:10 securely (2) 10:19;14:3 security (37) 30:2;40:8;50:12;61:14; 62:15;68:16,20;69:1,3; 93:8;94:1,7,10;114:13; 115:15,15,21;116:3;117:6; 125:21;130:4;131:1,2,3,5, 10;140:11,17,18;154:19; 156:8;158:12;160:13,14; 168:11;170:6;171:14 (222) request - security United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning seek (2) 109:10;120:12 seem (2) 114:2;148:5 seems (1) 190:9 selected (6) 129:3;155:18;156:3; 159:12;162:18;165:6 selection (1) 159:2 selects (1) 145:4 SEM (1) 67:16 seminars (3) 143:7,10,13 send (5) 46:11;89:10;153:14; 179:19;183:15 sending (1) 175:1 senior (21) 8:12;9:5;44:13;55:16; 60:4,5;121:9;125:5;128:15, 16;129:1,12;135:17; 140:13;147:12;153:15; 156:6;172:11;174:9; 176:21;191:2 sense (8) 2:16;13:7;55:14;83:16; 111:2;127:9;180:5;193:4 sensitive (1) 174:4 sent (10) 77:21;78:2;89:2;148:3; 170:2,4,10,11;171:11,13 sentencing (1) 52:7 September (4) 137:12;138:8;169:2; 176:10 series (2) 8:19;117:5 seriously (1) 117:2 serve (2) 143:11;161:10 served (1) 98:8 service (16) 25:15;47:13,13,15,20; 48:17;50:6,16;88:2;95:8, 13;121:10;129:13;157:10; 166:13;170:6 services (12) 47:18;49:11;70:4;125:19; 134:1,6,14;135:9,16;141:5; 167:6;170:3 SES (2) 128:17;138:10 session (8) 151:1;178:11;198:13; Min-U-Script(R) UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 199:8,13,15;201:3,11 sessions (1) 199:14 set (10) 11:10;62:10;65:5;68:18; 165:19;183:9,9;184:15; 193:20;201:17 sets (3) 19:20,21;36:13 settlements (1) 6:7 seven (5) 110:19;168:18;173:13; 175:7;195:18 seven-days (1) 169:1 several (1) 83:21 severe (3) 66:1,6,10 severity (1) 108:12 SHAP (2) 184:8,21 share (3) 30:12;68:19;71:18 shared (7) 9:7;56:5,10;127:16; 176:16,17;177:19 sharing (7) 46:15;55:11,12,15;57:6; 58:2,13 shear (1) 183:6 shed (1) 15:6 shells (1) 23:11 shoe (1) 73:20 shop (1) 110:20 shopkeeper (1) 25:3 short (1) 197:3 shorter (3) 200:8,9,10 shortly (1) 186:18 short-term (2) 90:16;91:1 show (2) 71:9;104:2 showed (1) 88:1 showing (1) 67:4 shut (1) 189:10 shy (2) 124:11;138:20 side (2) 132:13;154:10 sides (3) 89:17,18;159:19 SigAct (6) 74:13,14,19;75:5;105:3,3 SigActs (16) 20:17;21:10;22:9,12,16, 19;23:5;25:8;49:3;73:16; 110:5;111:7;181:7,13; 183:3,18 sign (2) 120:4;179:18 signed (2) 64:16;179:6 significant (8) 17:2,5;21:15;34:15; 48:13;77:16,16;101:5 significantly (1) 66:5 signs (2) 44:7,7 similar (1) 11:11 similarly (1) 103:11 simply (3) 19:3;79:13;160:20 single (6) 5:7;36:18;49:4;110:9,19; 111:11 SIPRNET (3) 21:5,6;30:17 sit (3) 12:2;105:12;171:14 sits (1) 145:11 sitting (2) 32:11,13 situation (4) 7:3,13;68:20;99:5 situational (3) 22:5;27:17;31:1 situations (1) 23:6 six (2) 110:19;142:18 size (1) 37:4 skill (3) 93:1,4,5 slow (2) 44:5;108:15 slower (1) 108:13 small (6) 175:16;177:1;193:14,16; 194:13;196:11 smaller (1) 54:11 snapshot (3) 197:8,9,11 snapshots (1) 37:1 Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 so-and-so (2) 84:12,13 societies (1) 99:3 society (1) 43:21 sock (1) 63:3 soldier (4) 40:19;50:21;65:18;94:18 soldiers (13) 40:6;43:16;46:18,20; 47:5;48:5;49:16;61:4; 89:10;90:3;94:7,19;109:14 soldiers' (1) 89:14 soldier's (1) 173:8 sole (1) 183:10 solve (1) 78:16 somebody (5) 65:17;82:3;86:19;105:4; 118:6 someone (8) 35:4;62:16;78:11;115:21; 116:6;150:20;161:12; 174:19 sometime (1) 196:14 sometimes (16) 24:6;27:11;29:2;35:11; 73:7;93:7;96:12,12;128:16; 150:1,12,15,17;151:3,4; 175:6 somewhere (1) 35:14 SOPs (1) 106:2 sorry (12) 51:21;55:7;63:7;64:11; 90:9;122:14;138:1;156:20; 157:1;166:3;183:16;185:17 sort (8) 97:6;149:1,15;150:9; 159:14;173:15;174:7; 190:14 sound (1) 148:5 sounds (1) 159:14 source (11) 39:18,20;55:18;59:6; 74:21;86:18;87:6;88:1; 134:11;166:19;167:16 sources (14) 12:10,12,15,21;38:14,16; 39:12;40:3;59:11;86:13; 87:8,14,16,20 Southern (1) 170:4 space (1) (223) seek - space United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning 189:6 span (1) 81:21 speak (4) 84:7;107:9;119:18;193:5 speaking (3) 7:18;9:9;195:5 special (4) 38:5;170:4;171:13;175:9 specialist (1) 131:10 specialists (1) 141:19 specialized (3) 121:18;159:5;160:11 specific (15) 37:5;38:10;45:21;72:7; 82:3;113:13;129:6;133:8; 134:12;154:17;159:8; 178:10;183:14;195:18; 201:4 specifically (12) 8:10;19:21;28:10,13; 38:10;110:4;127:13; 162:18;183:2,17;189:2; 192:17 specifics (2) 148:16;180:18 spectrum (4) 75:17;84:3,5;137:19 speculation (1) 66:2 spelled (1) 110:16 spend (2) 82:10;135:7 spent (1) 165:11 spoke (3) 119:21;193:5,14 spot (4) 49:3;74:19;108:9;190:2 spread (1) 105:9 stab (1) 117:3 staff (9) 33:19,20;76:12;126:1; 127:12;142:3;177:2;187:3, 8 staffers (4) 136:3;144:4,8,19 staff's (1) 127:15 stage (1) 184:15 stages (1) 157:6 stand (5) 32:1;65:1;123:13;165:6; 188:14 standard (3) 106:2,14,17 Min-U-Script(R) UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session standards (1) 167:3 standing (1) 168:7 standpoint (1) 37:8 star (3) 129:16;175:11;185:2 stars (1) 185:4 start (14) 12:10;15:3;53:13;64:5; 69:17;136:17;168:4; 182:13;187:3;195:19; 199:20;200:17,21;201:6 started (12) 14:21;18:4;123:17,17; 135:1;167:9,9;184:16,19; 190:10,12,14 starting (4) 165:15;193:20;199:16; 201:1 State (20) 7:7;20:7,8,9,13;27:12; 28:8,10,15;30:7,9,11,16; 31:4;32:20;36:2;101:14; 102:9;171:13;177:19 statement (7) 103:17,19;107:1;119:20; 120:2,3,4 statements (3) 44:18;102:4;120:5 STATES (26) 1:2,4;37:9;39:14;42:10; 44:3;45:4;52:13;54:18; 56:15;57:6;58:3;69:18,19; 96:15;101:19;103:6; 120:19;122:3;145:16; 154:12,17,19;159:1;198:12; 201:18 stating (1) 47:1 status (2) 9:15;28:18 statutory (1) 195:16 stays (1) 154:13 steadily (1) 193:19 steered (1) 158:3 step (6) 10:11;30:11;45:7;104:19; 108:8;136:15 stepped (1) 197:12 steps (8) 15:19;39:11;45:21;93:17; 94:13,15;103:4;135:6 Steve (2) 73:18,20 still (12) 37:15,16;82:8;99:1; 118:2;129:11;141:2; 176:10;187:19,20;189:17; 190:10 stood (4) 65:3;123:15;187:18; 195:6 stop (8) 36:12;37:19;64:4;67:2; 104:12,15,21;163:20 stopped (2) 51:19;79:8 store (2) 25:4;73:20 stories (1) 25:14 story (2) 25:16;56:1 stovepipes (1) 158:15 strategic (28) 121:14;122:7,9,12;125:8; 126:15,17;136:10,16;137:1; 138:3;140:21;142:21; 144:11,20;145:17;146:15; 155:9;156:1,9;162:7,16; 163:1,13;172:10,17;173:3,5 strategically (1) 182:1 strategies (14) 6:11,13;124:16;125:1; 127:6;129:2;135:14;137:5, 11,15;138:9;155:21; 156:21;157:2 strategy (1) 136:1 stray (1) 150:3 stretched (1) 181:15 stride (1) 168:17 strike (1) 67:10 structure (2) 15:16;17:3 struggled (1) 158:13 struggles (2) 98:16,19 struggling (1) 72:16 studies (4) 139:18;186:9;187:3,5 study (1) 140:11 stuff (8) 12:13;16:8;23:11,12; 28:14,19;151:10;189:8 stuffed (1) 166:14 subject (6) 52:15;111:14;125:6; Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 178:16;193:11,12 submit (2) 57:13;93:20 submitted (2) 9:2;94:4 submitting (1) 93:18 subordinate (1) 133:11 subordinates (5) 83:11;94:10;102:15,16, 19 substantial (1) 101:17 success (2) 44:6;56:8 sudden (4) 10:20;59:6,10;105:5 sufficient (2) 44:14;163:10 summer (1) 64:16 supervise (1) 59:19 supervision (2) 82:16;94:18 supervisor (1) 151:17 supply (2) 29:9,10 support (5) 55:4;140:16;169:19; 171:11,21 supposed (1) 62:13 Supreme (1) 184:9 sure (50) 12:10,13;13:5,21;14:8; 17:7,19;21:4;49:10;57:11; 72:5,9,14;73:5,9;77:13; 78:18;85:13,18;87:12; 90:11;92:19;97:10;109:11; 110:14;111:3;130:14; 136:20;139:6,9;145:7,12; 148:7,7,18;151:2,19;153:3; 164:14,15;172:9;173:9; 176:8;178:6;182:9;187:17; 193:5;196:8;199:10;200:18 surprise (2) 172:10,17 surprised (2) 44:17;67:1 surround (1) 62:8 surveillance (2) 134:16;141:18 survey (1) 80:11 surveys (1) 81:2 suspect (4) 70:16;79:1;95:18;106:11 (224) span - suspect United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning sustain (4) 46:13;53:11;61:9;168:21 Sustained (3) 43:9;58:19;62:12 swath (1) 54:13 sworn (2) 34:9;121:2 synced (2) 16:13,17 system (20) 12:20;16:13,17;18:17; 30:16;51:7;53:1,2;54:3; 56:12;65:19;83:5;94:4; 104:12;115:16;116:7,12; 127:15,15;169:18 systems (2) 104:3;168:11 UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 172:3,7;175:1,10;187:10 tasked (2) 7:19,20 tasking (2) 5:21;132:5 tasks (2) 6:11;139:10 taught (4) 141:1,13;142:2;167:2 teach (1) 142:13 teaching (2) 141:8;142:21 team (16) 18:1;21:19;25:1,5;41:21; 45:1,1;76:11;83:3,18;87:2; 102:19;165:10;186:19,20; 196:13 teams (2) T 28:16;83:12 technical (13) 14:5,7;110:13;128:16,19, table (1) 20,21;129:7;134:16;166:12, 159:18 18;167:17;169:18 tactical (4) techniques (1) 125:18;173:4,7,11 96:19 tactics (2) technology (1) 96:19;106:7 106:5 tailored (1) tee (1) 182:12 156:12 Taliban (8) telling (1) 42:11;43:2,6;109:7; 150:19 111:18,21;112:1;118:6 tells (1) talk (26) 151:11 12:17;16:7;19:18;39:6; tempo (3) 42:15;43:20;57:11;71:8; 168:7,18;170:13 75:14,19;86:11;92:5;93:6; 96:19;98:7;103:21;108:2; temporarily (1) 117:15 113:5;124:2;149:14; 161:10,11;183:10;191:13; Temporary (3) 117:11,13,18 193:11;200:8 ten (3) talked (38) 15:7;31:9,13 15:8,12;16:6;18:14,14,15, 16,17,19;28:15,21;32:6,9; ten-minute (1) 188:7 35:7;37:9;39:12;40:6; 42:19;44:20;57:17;74:13; ten-plus (1) 8:8 75:13;82:5;85:11;86:3; 90:12;95:7;100:9;102:5,10; tentatively (1) 199:20 105:21;107:4;127:4; term (9) 159:18;167:18;172:6; 7:10;10:13;16:5;28:2; 191:14;192:20 97:7;115:19;124:21;143:2; talking (28) 172:17 14:11;36:17;38:21;44:9; terminals (1) 51:1;55:15;69:17;75:21; 170:15 76:1,3;78:8;79:5,8,14,14; 88:2;102:9,11;113:1;136:9; terms (6) 2:15;7:4,10;17:18;28:9; 137:13;142:14;150:13,21; 165:12 151:3;159:21;160:7;183:17 terrorist (2) task (25) 43:5;157:11 9:1;11:10;12:6,19;15:7; terrorists (1) 32:14;40:21;41:3;65:1,8; 167:7 90:20;123:16;156:11; test (1) 164:14;165:10;168:6; 152:14 169:14;170:12,18;171:9; Min-U-Script(R) testified (15) 32:6;39:10;47:4;50:1; 99:7;101:7;121:3;134:3; 143:17;144:1;155:3;165:4; 181:7;182:5;191:14 testify (5) 129:19;155:3;161:12; 164:2;178:20 testifying (4) 42:20;68:6;135:1;179:21 testimony (24) 2:16;35:15;75:13;109:5; 110:3;117:15,21;118:5; 119:20;120:6;159:13,19; 160:4;161:1,16,19;163:10; 164:7;178:10,14;179:8,14; 190:9;198:7 testing (1) 113:16 Thanks (1) 108:19 theater (1) 133:9 thereafter (1) 186:19 therefore (1) 58:9 third (7) 24:19;25:4;108:8;134:13; 167:3;171:12;187:13 THOMAS (1) 3:13 thorough (1) 20:13 though (5) 45:6;83:10;105:2;153:13; 160:6 thought (14) 8:3;30:13;33:3;37:2; 44:2;77:11;86:21;90:2; 115:18,18;137:21;156:11; 168:1;184:13 thousand (1) 36:19 threat (4) 34:21;158:10,15;167:5 threatening (2) 43:6;68:14 threats (9) 126:16,17;134:13; 136:11,14;156:10,10,13; 158:9 three (8) 8:15;123:16;133:20; 134:8;142:15;156:4;165:5; 166:10 threshold (3) 113:18;114:10,15 throughout (1) 28:17 throw (2) 145:13;194:3 thrust (2) Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 167:8,15 tied (2) 42:21;43:3 tier (1) 129:16 timeframe (2) 82:7;90:8 times (8) 41:6;102:11;142:8,10,15; 144:3,6,10 today (13) 26:2;89:13;91:21;92:3; 97:19;98:3;117:16;118:20; 121:13,18;193:16;199:14; 200:8 together (17) 14:2,13;21:17;34:14,14; 38:8;40:8;41:10;49:6; 50:13;68:19;76:11;78:8; 92:9;157:18;165:20;176:11 told (14) 36:10;95:21;96:9,16; 103:5,7,8,10,11,15;146:9, 11;147:3;185:15 tomorrow (9) 97:20;98:4;199:15,16,20; 201:1,6,9,15 tongue (1) 79:3 tonight (1) 160:3 took (10) 2:5;16:5;30:11;31:3; 45:7;54:16;75:8;81:2; 153:6;177:3 tool (1) 95:19 tools (5) 94:20;110:14;165:12; 166:13;189:6 TOOMAN (1) 3:12 top (3) 12:3;115:21;166:16 topic (1) 21:15 topics (1) 142:20 total (3) 36:14;171:19,20 touched (1) 177:7 touchstone (1) 140:7 tough (1) 25:14 town (1) 43:20 TPP (1) 105:5 TPPs (2) 97:12;105:2 tracked (1) (225) sustain - tracked United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning 172:1 tracking (2) 187:20;188:1 trade (1) 175:18 tradecraft (4) 152:17;167:2;194:17,20 traditional (2) 134:10;166:19 trail (2) 148:1;194:5 train (2) 11:6;141:16 training (15) 28:16;88:17;92:12;93:2; 126:21;136:19;137:20; 140:2,14,16,18;141:4,5,10; 142:4 transcript (3) 2:2,10,12 transfer (1) 47:17 translate (1) 79:2 translated (8) 2:14;72:11,12,17,20; 73:10;78:13;103:18 translation (1) 111:14 transliterate (1) 97:2 transliterated (5) 71:21;72:4,8,10,19 transmit (1) 45:8 transparency (3) 44:14,17;174:12 transpired (1) 75:10 travel (2) 128:6;134:18 traveled (1) 184:21 treated (1) 127:10 treatment (1) 116:10 triaged (1) 173:21 trial (8) 26:6;31:17;118:2;119:10; 162:1;188:10;197:18; 201:20 tried (7) 9:7;40:17;41:6;48:16; 90:1;139:6;177:8 trier (2) 159:5;163:3 triggers (1) 115:2 troops (4) 11:17;38:14;55:2;56:16 truck (1) Min-U-Script(R) UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session 161:11 true (17) 53:13;73:19;76:18,21; 92:10;97:14,19,20;98:2,3,4, 4;105:1;145:14;150:20; 153:10;196:3 trust (10) 38:3,7;46:13;58:8,12,15, 21;64:2,8;67:4 trusted (1) 37:16 truth (7) 96:17;99:4;121:2,3,3; 150:2,12 try (14) 6:13;41:10;49:15;83:18; 86:9;110:14;111:2;116:9; 152:11,21;167:6;172:13; 178:8;184:12 trying (26) 9:15;24:20,20;35:20,21; 44:21;46:19;69:2;85:18; 101:8;102:21;103:2,8; 116:12,14;154:15,17; 165:16;167:20;168:14; 176:8;185:16;193:1;194:4; 195:17;198:10 TTPs (8) 23:5;96:21;97:4,15,17; 105:2,21;106:9 tucked (2) 63:3,3 Tuesday (1) 184:18 turned (2) 169:17;174:13 turning (1) 86:1 turnover (5) 85:10,13,16,20,21 twice (1) 16:16 two (17) 7:10;27:15;35:10;36:11; 68:3,5;79:18,19;82:11; 98:4;103:16;123:6;129:16; 161:6;168:9;179:2;195:11 two-fold (1) 48:11 two-man (1) 62:2 two-page (1) 195:10 tying (3) 82:3;113:13;118:7 type (25) 5:4;7:7,16,19;9:11;22:11, 18;28:11,14;47:7;48:4; 68:8,11;105:11;113:14; 115:1;134:19;140:1,18; 141:13;142:2,20;143:6; 157:5;170:18 types (6) - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 21:1,3;61:18;62:14; 79:16;128:6 typical (1) 143:12 typically (8) 68:9;127:11,20;143:15; 144:6;152:12;157:8,15 typist (1) 190:12 unpleasant (1) 185:19 unusual (3) 7:2,11,13 unwitting (2) 150:7,18 up (51) 9:10;11:10;16:13,17; 21:6;26:11;34:11;41:7; 48:19;53:6,12;54:3;56:5, 11;62:4;65:8;69:3,5;71:9; U 76:11;77:18;83:5;90:20; 91:5;123:13,16;137:3; ultimate (3) 138:20;139:5;141:8; 26:12;63:18;64:14 147:10;151:10,14;152:18; ultimately (8) 156:12;161:11;165:6,19; 29:13;41:1;56:2;154:16; 168:8,14,17;172:12;174:8; 159:7;160:16;180:16;195:3 175:1,17;182:14;183:9; uncertified (1) 193:20;194:4;195:6;201:17 2:12 updates (1) unclassified (3) 197:1 125:16;174:3;178:11 upon (5) uncomfortable (1) 167:14;179:16;197:21; 48:13 199:4,7 unconscionable (1) up-to-date (1) 65:15 136:21 undefined (2) urinalysis (1) 9:20;10:13 113:16 under (14) USDI (1) 46:6;52:4,6,18;67:15; 139:8 125:16;131:13;144:14; use (11) 153:20;159:15;163:12; 14:7;71:3;73:17;85:7; 164:1,6;178:21 96:20;150:8;157:19; underlying (1) 166:13,21;167:6;195:15 153:21 used (20) underneath (1) 7:10;10:13;15:15;16:5; 147:15 21:13;22:1,4;25:21;26:16, understands (1) 20;28:2;33:20;41:13;80:18; 112:14 84:11;103:6;110:13; understood (2) 124:21;172:17;176:6 72:14;78:4 using (6) undertaking (1) 104:12,15,19,21;149:4; 9:17 173:21 unedited (1) Usually (1) 2:12 142:18 unfortunate (1) utilized (2) 48:21 86:5,7 unique (2) 159:5;182:11 V unit (2) 106:9,16 UNITED (26) VA (1) 1:2,4;37:9;39:14;42:10; 1:11 44:3;45:4;52:13;54:18; valid (1) 56:15;57:6;58:3;69:18,19; 176:10 96:14;101:18;103:6; validated (1) 120:19;122:3;145:16; 16:12 154:12,16,19;159:1;198:12; validity (1) 201:18 152:21 units (3) value (7) 106:10,13;114:10 52:5,19,20;58:20;147:21; University (5) 153:7,8 139:19,21;140:12;143:7, values (1) 64:1 8 Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation (226) tracking - values United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning van (1) 3:8 variable (1) 110:15 varied (2) 167:14;185:7 various (10) 8:19;10:7;28:17;55:3; 56:6;61:3,16;62:4;76:12; 102:4 vehicles (2) 104:7,19 verbalize (1) 190:20 verbatim (1) 2:9 verification (1) 17:10 verify (1) 13:20 versus (1) 101:1 vet (1) 110:11 vetting (2) 110:6;152:17 VIA (2) 139:6;171:17 victims (1) 6:18 video (1) 21:3 videos (2) 20:6;21:2 view (2) 20:1;23:21 village (10) 24:17;27:6;43:17;68:13, 14,15;72:8;74:7;110:21; 112:6 villagers (1) 40:5 village's (1) 78:1 violence (1) 114:15 Virginia (2) 138:12;139:19 visibility (1) 189:3 visits (1) 50:11 vital (1) 70:14 voir (3) 71:2;145:20;153:19 VOLUME (5) 1:1;11:5;166:11;168:3; 183:6 voracity (1) 152:21 VS (1) 1:5 Min-U-Script(R) UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session VTC (3) 8:16;9:12;170:18 VTCs (1) 9:10 vulnerabilities (3) 12:4;68:17;104:2 vulnerability (1) 110:2 vulnerable (1) 12:10 weeks (4) 168:7,9;193:21;194:2 weren't (3) 44:17;82:6;84:20 what's (9) 15:8;16:18;31:1;49:13; 51:6;93:9;113:14;133:17; 178:6 whenever (1) 86:8 Whereupon (1) W 120:21 wherewithal (1) 14:12 wait (1) whole (12) 35:4 55:1;74:4;121:3;126:15; walk (2) 136:15;152:16;156:6; 13:2;64:9 172:9;174:12;186:20; war (5) 191:6;193:19 7:17;38:3;41:19;57:2; who's (2) 69:1 51:1;110:21 warn (7) whose (1) 40:13;49:12;77:20;86:15, 51:17 16;87:1;88:3 WHYTE (1) warning (5) 3:7 5:14;32:16;48:12,19; wide (1) 77:11 6:21 warranting (1) WikiLeaks (23) 109:20 8:4;18:10;32:11,14,17; wars (1) 42:16;53:19;54:6,15;56:11; 38:12 83:1,10;91:18;118:7; Washington (3) 121:20;123:11;149:6; 139:21,21;140:11 157:3,13;163:8;167:21; watch (1) 184:16;196:12 97:4 winding (1) watching (2) 196:11 2:6;105:7 wirecom (4) wave (1) 15:10,14;16:4;18:13 123:19 wired (1) way (23) 30:20 13:2;14:2;40:20;43:1; wisdom (1) 56:16;59:2;62:6;64:13; 178:1 66:6;79:10;86:21;107:5; 111:6;132:1;134:11;140:1; within (33) 5:8;14:15,17;15:13; 157:18;166:18;181:19; 20:10,20;28:9,12;40:15; 183:9;191:10;194:4;198:14 43:19;47:2;56:10;57:19; ways (8) 58:3,13;62:12;65:20;79:20; 27:15;34:6;54:9;56:13; 110:5;140:2,3;142:21; 57:4;106:10;110:16;175:7 144:11;145:5;159:20; weapon (3) 169:15;170:7,9,21;172:1; 51:7;104:3,12 183:4;191:11;195:16 web (2) without (6) 15:1;95:18 46:17;113:10,13;114:11; website (3) 116:13;163:16 32:11,14;33:5 Witness (38) Wednesday (1) 4:4,9;7:14;16:3;32:1,1; 1:16 43:2;45:18;57:10;66:4; week (8) 72:16;115:3,5,9,12;116:4; 9:4;44:16;168:18;169:1; 118:3,20;121:2;122:2; 184:16,18;192:1,2 124:19;154:9,10,11;155:15; weekend (1) 160:5;161:1;163:17;164:3; 165:11 180:1;182:20;188:13,14; weekly (2) 200:4,11,12,15;201:8 9:10;175:4 Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 witnesses (2) 120:13;200:6 witness's (3) 45:13;178:14;198:6 witting (2) 150:7,17 word (12) 2:15;6:14,15,18;72:14; 103:6;105:9;128:21;129:7; 168:3;175:11;195:15 work (33) 5:13;12:6;21:8;23:9; 28:6;29:9;38:8;40:8;41:9,9, 21;43:17,20;48:18;50:12; 64:6;66:17;68:19;70:7; 83:20;107:21;119:5;140:3; 147:5;157:17;160:21; 164:18,18;172:8;179:5; 187:6;189:13,15 worked (20) 5:11;10:11;21:16;41:20; 60:16,17;69:19;70:1,17; 78:5;88:12;109:15;123:7; 131:1;160:21;174:14; 183:13;187:7;190:6;191:6 workforce (1) 125:17 working (17) 10:9;21:18;34:9;38:15; 58:8;67:4;69:18;130:16; 147:9;155:19;165:17,20; 170:12,13;177:3;192:7; 194:15 workplace (1) 114:14 works (2) 73:18,20 world (10) 9:20;10:13;28:17;38:5; 54:14;59:4,11;65:20;85:4; 97:20 worth (1) 89:14 write (1) 23:19 writing (1) 65:7 written (1) 71:5 wrong (3) 63:1;96:12;153:12 X XO (1) 159:3 XXV (1) 1:1 xxx-xx-9504 (1) 1:7 Y (227) van - xxx-xx-9504 UNOFFICIAL DRAFT 7/31/13 Afternoon Session United States vs. PFC Bradley E. Manning year (9) 124:11;130:9;133:12; 138:20;142:8,10,16;143:13; 144:16 years (9) 11:9;30:11;69:20,21; 98:5;109:14;128:13;144:7; 191:4 yesterday (8) 85:12;86:2;90:12;107:4; 146:6,21;147:1,4 Yup (2) 79:4;104:10 190 (1) 4:12 1991 (1) 130:1 1992 (1) 139:17 1995 (1) 132:10 1998 (1) 132:19 1999 (1) 139:19 1:16;4:2;11:9;69:21; 109:14 380 (1) 117:5 380-67 (1) 117:4 8 2 0 02 (1) 163:12 1 1:25 (1) 1:16 1:57 (1) 31:16 10:00 (6) 199:20;200:16,21;201:1, 6,15 100 (3) 176:7;194:11,12 1001 (1) 164:6 1001B4 (1) 159:15 109 (1) 4:6 11:00 (2) 200:1,2 111 (1) 4:7 116 (1) 4:7 121 (1) 4:11 125 (2) 168:17;172:2 146 (1) 4:12 15 (3) 119:8;128:14;161:18 15-minute (1) 119:3 164 (1) 4:11 18:30 (1) 201:19 18th (1) 192:1 Min-U-Script(R) 2 (2) 27:20;129:16 2:00 (1) 31:14 2:11 (1) 31:17 20 (1) 198:21 20,000 (1) 125:16 2003 (3) 133:14,14;144:5 2008 (4) 123:9;135:10;137:6; 142:11 2010 (7) 32:19;82:7;90:8;137:9; 165:3;191:20;192:3 2011 (11) 64:17;82:7;90:7,8; 108:16;165:3,3;192:13; 196:15,17;197:11 2012 (2) 137:12;138:8 2013 (2) 1:16;4:2 22211 (1) 1:11 24 (2) 79:7;172:15 24-7 (1) 172:6 24-hour (2) 168:18;169:1 28th (1) 123:12 2nd (2) 123:19;165:2 3 3:46 (1) 119:9 30 (1) 47:2 300 (1) 172:3 31 (5) 153:20;164:2 703 (4) 52:4,6;67:16;178:21 75 (2) 165:19;170:14 77,000 (2) 12:4;13:19 4 Z zone (1) 38:3 - Vol. 25 July 31, 2013 4:09 (1) 119:10 4:47 (1) 161:21 40 (1) 144:8 400,000-plus (2) 17:2;66:16 403 (1) 52:5 42 (1) 191:4 45 (2) 9:4;82:9 490-some (1) 36:19 495 (1) 66:16 5 5 (2) 4:6;173:17 5:07 (1) 162:1 5:36 (1) 188:9 550 (1) 201:13 800,000 (1) 36:17 882 (1) 188:6 9 900 (5) 81:9,12,13;112:16,19 900-plus (1) 24:10 90s (1) 141:11 9-11 (2) 56:11,12 914 (1) 120:8 92nd (3) 131:17;132:21;133:5 95 (2) 132:15,19 98 (1) 132:19 6 6:00 (1) 188:10 6:10 (1) 201:20 60 (1) 82:9 600 (1) 138:17 67 (1) 117:7 69 (1) 4:7 7 70 (1) 55:21 70,000-plus (1) 8:2 700 (1) 138:17 702 (2) Provided by Freedom of the Press Foundation (228) year - 98