United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013 Note by the Secretary-General 1.In transmitting simultaneously to the Security Council and the General Assembly the report on the incident which took place on 21 August 2013 in the Ghouta area of Damascus (see annex), the Secretary-General expresses his profound shock and regret at the conclusion that chemical weapons were used on a relatively large scale, resulting in numerous casualties, particularly among civilians and including many children. The Secretary-General condemns in the strongest possible terms the use of chemical weapons and believes that this act is a war crime and grave violation of the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare and other relevant rules of customary international law. The international community has a moral responsibility to hold accountable those responsible and for ensuring that chemical weapons can never re-emerge as an instrument of warfare. 2.The Secretary-General wishes to express his deep appreciation to the Head and members of the Mission, including the dedicated teams of experts from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the World Health Organization. The Secretary-General is grateful for the support provided by Member States. The SecretaryGeneral counts on the continued support of all concerned until the Mission completes its investigation into all other allegations and submits its final report. 3.The accession of the Syrian Arab Republic on 14 September 2013 to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction is a welcome development. As depositary of the Convention, the Secretary-General has long called for its universality. The SecretaryGeneral welcomes the agreement reached on 14 September 2013 between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on a framework for the elimination of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. He hopes that the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations Security Council quickly move to consider and implement this proposal, which is aimed at expediting the fufillment of the obligations of the Syrian Arab Republic under the Convention. The Secretary-General calls upon the Syrian Arab Republic to implement faithfully all of its disarmament obligations and he stands ready to facilitate international efforts aimed at providing assistance in this regard. 4.The Secretary-General reiterates that any use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances is a grave violation of international law. 5.Where there are allegations of the use of chemical weapons, however, the international community looks to the United Nations for an impartial and objective determination whether, and to what extent, such allegations can be substantiated. It is imperative therefore that the authority extended to the Secretary-General by the General Assembly (A/RES/42/37 C) and endorsed by the Security Council (S/RES/620 (1988)) continues to be respected and that the mechanism related thereto continues to be strengthened. The Secretary-General believes that an effective mechanism to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons can serve as an important deterrent against their employment. Letter of'T1'ansn1ittal The I-Iagte. 13 September 2013 Sir. We have the honour to submit our report on the investigation of the alleged use of chemical weapons on 11 August 2013 in the Ghouta area of Damascus in the Syrian Arab Republic. We also confirm tl1at. in accordance with our terms of reference. we are continuing our investigation of allegations of other incidents involving the use otclieinica] weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and will report thereon as soon as possible. At your request. and ta]-ting into account the large scale of the 21 Attgust events in the Ghouta area of Damascus and the continued loss of civilian life. we are issuing the Ghouta report without. prejudice to our continuing investigation of. and final report on. other allegations involving the use of chemical weapons in the yrian Arab Republic. I-laving arrived in the yrian Arab Republic on 18 August 2013. we were in Darnascus on the El August preparing to conduct on-site inspections in connection with our investigation into the allegations concerning the use of chemical weapons in Khan al--Asal and in Shells: Maqsood and Saraqueb. Based on several reports of allegations on the use of chemical weapons in the Ghouta area ot."Darnascus on 21 August 2013. you instructed us to focus our investigation efforts on the Ghouta allegations. We. therefore._ proceeded to conduct on-site inspections in lvloadarniyah in West Ghouta and Ein Tartna and Zamallta in East Ghouta. On the basis of the evidence obtained during our investigation of the Ghouta incident.' the conclusion is that chemical weapons have been used in the ongoing conflict between the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic. also against civilians. including children. on a relatively large scale. ln particular. the environmental, chemical and medical samples. we have collected. provide clear and convincing evidence that surface-to-surface rockets containing the nerve agent sarin were used in Ein Tanna. Moadatnijvah and Zainallta in the Ghouta area of Damascus. This result leaves us with the deepest concern. We are grateful for the indispensable support provided by Ms. Angela Kane. the High Representative for Disarinarnent. and the innumerable UN Secretariat officials who have assisted us in Nicosia. Beirut. Damascus. The Hague and New Yorlt. Our work is only possible due to the indispensable contributions of the OPCW and the WHO. We also deeply appreciate the efficient and effective assistance provided by the OPCW-designated laboratories in Finland. Gennany. Sweden and Switzerland. We also wish to thank you, Sir. for the confidence you have placed in us. We count on your and the others continued support as we continue and hopefully soon complete our investigation into the other allegations. yours. Professor z-like Head of Mission) I. Mr Scott aims Dr Maurizio Barbeschi (Head of and signing for the OPCW Component) ("Head of and signing for the WHO Component} UN Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic Report on Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013 I. Terms of Reference l. The Secretaiy-General decided to establish the UN Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic based on his authority under General Assembly resolution 4213 7C and Security Council 620 (1988). The purpose of this Mission is to ascertain the facts related to the allegations of use of chemical weapons and to gather relevant data and undertake the necessary analyses for this purpose and to deliver a report to the Secretary-General. 2. For the purpose of ascertaining the facts related to the allegations of use of chemical weapons, gathering relevant data and undertaking the necessary analyses, the Secretary- General has requested the Organisation the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to put its resources at his disposal, including providing a team of experts to conduct fact- finding activities. The Secretary~General has also requested the World Health Organization to provide technical support in assessing the public health, clinical and event- specific health aspects of the allegations that have been brought to his attention. 3. The UN Mission has conducted its investigation and all related activities in accordance with the terms of reference issued by the Secretary-General to the UN Mission including the above provisions as well as others on cooperation, methods of work and scope and reporting. As such, the terms of reference applied in respect of its investigation of the Gouta allegations on which this report is submitted without prejudice to the continuing investigation of, and final report on, all allegations involving the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. 4. In discharging its mandate, the Mission was guided by the United Nations Guidelines and Procedures for the timely and efficient investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons (A14-M561) and, as appropriate and to the extent applicable, the OPCW provisions as identified in Article of the Supplementary Arrangement to the Agreement concerning the Relationship between the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. 5. Other relevant legal instruments governing the cooperation between the UN and the OPCW and WHO and guiding the work of the UN Mission are set out in Appendix I. II. Methodological Considerations 6. In its investigation of the alleged use of chemical weapons in the Ghouta are of Damascus on 2] August 2013, the Mission visited Moadamiyah on 26 August 2013 and Ein Tarma and Zamalka on 23-29 August. During its on-site visits, the UN Mission carried out the following activities: lnterviews with survivors and other witnesses; Doctunentation of munitions and their sub-components; Collection of environmental samples for subsequent analysis; Assessment of of survivors; Collection of hair, urine and blood samples for subsequent analysis; Doing so, the Mission adhered to the most stringent protocols available for such an investigation. Key to investigation methods of alleged use of chemical weapons are concepts like traceability, documentation, use of standardized and recognized procedures as well as relevant and up-to-date training of inspectors. 8. Traceability means that all processes and procedures are recorded and continuity is maintained for transparency and to withstand future scrutiny. 9. For example, the chain of custody procedures for sampling involved the following: The retrieval of samples is recorded and witnessed, samples are sealed, detailed documentation is prepared, transported to the preparatory laboratory under supervision of the members of the Mission, seals are confirmed and then broken, and the samples are representatively subdivided. The re-sealed samples are then distributed to the OPCW-designated laboratories with guidance documents, again, under the same supervision. The laboratories conduct their activities using standardized procedures (including quality assurancefquality control checks) for receiving, storing, and analyzing samples. The results are then returned under supervision to the investigation Mission for review. Each transfer of material is accompanied by handover receipts. 10. All inibrmation received, be it witness statements, pictures, videos, audios or patient records and other documentation, is recorded and registered for filing and archiving with the United Nations. 1 1. Methods for interviews, sampling, and documentation follow well established standard operating procedures (SOPS), developed and enforced by the OPCW and the WHO and in accordance with the Guidelines. 12. Mission members are regularly trained and periodically updated on aspects of their respective specializations, including risk assessments, epidemiology, sampling, scene assessment, acquisition and processing of bio-medical samples, the performance of interviews, munition designs, unexploded ordnances, epidemiology as well as safety and security. 13. The selection process used was designed to primarily identify survivors who had severe clinical presentations, since these were also expected to have had significant exposure to the chemical agent. The ability to provide a sound history of the event and identify the alleged impact sites was also considered in selecting survivors. 14. The selection process was guided by a standardized checklist that aimed to identify individuals who either demonstrated moderate to severe and signs, or were able to provide a clear and detailed history of the event. These survivors were requested to present to the local hospital on the day of the field visit to meet with the investigation Mission. Physicians at Zamalka were also asked to provide a purposive sample ofeight medical records of patients with significant and signs. Narrative and Results of the Mission 15. Having arrived in the Syrian Arab Republic on 18 August 2013, we were in Damascus on the 21 August preparing to conduct on-site inspections in connection with our investigation into the allegations concerning the use of chemical weapons in Khan al--Asal and in Sheik Maqsood and Saraqueb. Based on several reports of allegations on the use of chemical weapons in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 21 August 2013, you instructed us to focus our investigation efforts on the Ghouta allegations. We, therefore, proceeded to conduct on-site inspections in Moadarniyah in West Ghouta and Ein Tarma and Zamalka in East Ghouta. I6. Pursuant to the joint understanding reached with the Syrian Government and separate arrangements agreed on an ad-hoc basis with the other parties to the conflict, a temporary ceasefire was effectively in place for five hours daily between 26-29 August. 17. The planning of this mission was therefore complex and highly delicate. The time window for operations was determined by actual hours of access. The route of entry into the areas remained uncertain until the final moments. Finally, the understanding of what the Mission could be expected to find once in opposition-controlled area was also uncertain. Crucial elements for the planning, such as the number of patients affected or the surface area covered by the attacks remained undefined until the actual arrival of the Mission on the affected sites. (For more information on preparation of the mission see Appendix 3). 18. On 26 August, the Mission visited Moadamiyah of West Ghouta for two hours. On 23- 29 August the Mission visited Zamalka and Ein Tarma ofEast Ghouta for a total time of five and a half hours. In spite of the imposed time constraints, and repeated threats of harm, including an actual attack on the convoy by an unidentified sniper on 26 August, the Mission was nonetheless able to gather a considerable amount of information and to collect the necessary amount of samples. 19. The Mission was also able to collect primary statements from more than fifty exposed survivors including patients, health workers and first--responders. Based on these statements and the information gathered from various reports, the surface-to-surface rockets impacted in the early morning hours of 2] August. 20. Survivors reported an attack with shelling, followed by the onset ofa common range of including shortness of breath, disorientation, rhinorrhea (runny nose), irritation, blurred vision, nausea, vomiting, general weakness, and eventual loss of consciousness. Those who went to assist other community members described seeing a large number of individuals lying on the ground, many of whom were deceased or unconscious. These individuals reported observing labored breathing and excessive salivation among a large proportion of the survivors. Several of these "first responders" also became ill, with one describing the onset of blurred vision, generalized weakness, shaking, a sensation of impending doom, followed by fainting. 21. Nine nurses and seven treating physicians were interviewed by the Mission. Most were at their respective homes at the time of incident, with several responding immediately to assist exposed individuals at the site of the incident. Those clinicians who responded in the field described seeing a large number of ill or deceased persons lying in the streets without external signs of injury. Most survivors were described as being unconscious, with many demonstrating laboured breathing. The responders attempted to assist the survivors through the provision of first aid, decontamination with water where possible, and transfer to the nearest hospital by whatever means possible -- usually by private car. Weather conditions in Damascus on 21 August: 22. Weather information from Damascus on the morning of 21 August shows a falling temperature between 0200b and 05 00h in the morning (Worldweatheronlinecom). This means that the air is not moving from the ground upwards, but rather the opposite. Chemical weapons use in such meteorological conditions maximizes their potential impact as the heavy gas can stay close to the ground and penetrate into lower levels of buildings and constructions where many people were seeking shelter. Information about munitions: 23. Information gathered about the delivery systems used was essential for the investigation. Indeed, several surface to surface rockets capable of delivering significant chemical payloads were identified and recorded at the investigated sites. These were carefully measured, photographed and sampled. Samples later confirmed to contain Sarin were recovered from a majority of the rockets or rocket fragnients. For more detailed information and assessments see Appendix 5. Information concerning environmental samples: 24. In total, 30 enviromnental samples were recovered during the investigation. The samples were taken from impact sites and surrounding areas (See Appendix 6 for further specifications). Samples were subsequently processed and sent for analysis. According to the reports received from the OPCW-designated laboratories, the presence of Sarin, its degradation and/or production by-products were observed in a majority ofthe samples. In addition, other relevant chemicals, such as stabilizers are indicated and discussed in Appendix 7. Information concerning 25. The Mission requested to see 30 survivors who met the criteria established by the Mission. Of the 80 presented the Mission selected 36 who were diagnosed by the medical experts of the Mission. Patients clearly showed such as: loss of consciousness shortness of breath blurred vision irritation!' inflammation excessive salivation vomiting and convulsionsfseizures These are consistent with an organophosphate intoxication. For a more full discussion of the see Appendix 4. Information concerning bio-medical samples: 26. Blood, urine and hair samples were withdrawn from 34 of the 36 patients selected by the Mission who had signs ofintoxication. The positive blood and urine specimens provide definitive evidence of exposure to Sarin by almost all of the survivors assessed by the Mission. These results are corroborated by the clinical assessments, which documented and signs that are consistent with nerve agent exposure, including shortness of breath, irritation, excessive salivation, convulsions, confusionfclisorientation, and miosis. The findings of the clinical assessments were consistent with information derived from both the interviews with clinicians and the review of medical records, which each reported and signs consistent with nerve agent exposure. The results of the biomedical samples are discussed in Appendix 4 and displayed in Appendix 7. Conclusions 27. On the basis of the evidence obtained during our investigation of the Ghouta incident, the conclusion is that, on 21 August 2013, chemical weapons have been used in the ongoing conflict between the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic, also against civilians, including children, on a relatively large scale. 28. In particular, the environmental, chemical and medical samples we have collected provide clear and convincing evidence that surface-to--surface rockets containing the nerve agent Sazrin were used in Ein Tarma, Moadamiyah and Zamalka in the Ghouta area of Damascus. 29. The facts supporting this conclusion are: 0 Impacted and exploded surface-to-surface rockets, capable to carry a chemical payload, were found to contain Sarin. In Close to the rocket impact sites, in the area where patients were affected, the environment was found to be contaminated by Sarin. I Over fifty interviews given by survivors and health care workers provided ample corroboration of the medical and scientific results. I A number of patients! survivors were clearly diagnosed as intoxicated by an organophosphorous compound. I Blood and urine samples from the same patients were found positive for Sarin and Satin signatures. 30. This result leaves us with the deepest concern. Appendices Appendix 1: Relevant Legal Instruments Appendix 2: Methodology Used in the Investigation and Securing Evidences Appendix 3: Planning and Preparing for Entries into the Areas to be Investigated Appendix 4: Bio-medical Fact Finding Activities Appendix 5: Munitions Recovered in Moadamiyah and Zamall-:afEin Tarma Appendix 6: Environmental Samples Collected in Moadamiyah and Zamalka!Ein Tanna Appendix 7: Results from Laboratory Analysis Appendix 1 Relevant Legal Instruments and Guidance I . 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in war of Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare 2. Guidelines and Procedures for the Timely and Efficient Investigation of Reports of the Possible Use of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) or Toxin Weapons (A!-44l56l) 3. Agreement concerning the Relationship between the United Nations and the Organization for the .Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Supplementary Arrangement concerning the Implementation of Article of the UN-OPCW Relationship Agreement 4. Agreement between the United Nations and the World Health Organization adopted by the World Health Assembly and the UN-WHO Memorandum of Understanding concerning WHO Support to the Secretary--General Mechanism for Investigation ofthe Alleged Use of Chemical, Biological or Toxin Weapons Appendix 2 Methodology Used in the Investigation and Securing Evidences The Mission was guided by the United Nations Guidelines and Procedures for the timely and efficient investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons 61), as well as the modern scientific standards applied by OPCW and WHO for their respective specializations. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) and Working Instructions (WI) used in the present mission: Standard Operating Procedure for Evidence Collection, Documentation, Chain-of-Custody and 1 Preservation during an Investigation of Alleged use of Chemical Weapons Standard Operating Procedure for Managing 2 1 Inspection Laptops and Other Confidentiality Support Materials Standard Operating Procedure Off-Site Analysis of 3 Authentic Samples Handling of Authentic Samples from Inspection Sites 4 S01 and Packing Off-Site Samples at the OPCW Laboratory Work Instruction Preparation and Analysis of Control 5 Samples and Corresponding Matrix Blanks at the OPCW Laboratory Documentation, Chain of Custody and Confidentiality I5 QDOCJLABIWIICSO3: for Handling Off-Site Samples at the OPCW Laboratory . WI The Chain of Custody and Documentation for 7 QDOCILABIWUOSA1 OPCW Samples On-Site 8 Packing of Off-Site Samples In addition staff training is regularly performed and documented in the various sub-topics essential for the performance of safe and efficient inspections. During this particular investigation the Mission collected the following types of evidence: Bio-medical samples, envirornnental samples, witness interviews/statements (collected as audio and video} and documents, photos and videos. The following procedures were also applied during the present investigation: In All sampling and taking of evidence was performed by qualified and fiully trained inspectors. I All witness statementsfinterviews were recorded and the recordings documented as evidence. All bio-medical samples were collected by local medical professionals under supervision of'UN inspectors. Biomedical sample processing was completed by inspectors in the Mission office. All solvent impregnated sampling wipes were pre-prepared by the Mission's chemists using analysis-grade solvents and materiel. Such pre--prepared wipes were sealed (with OPCW red frangible seals) in clean vials for use by the field teams. The whole process was recorded on video. The collected samples were in the possession of at least one inspector from the time of collection to the transport back to the Mission office. At the Mission office, the environmental samples were fully documented, packaged, sealed and packed appropriately for safe transport. The integrity of the samples was ensured through tamper-proof seals and/or through their physical possession by an inspector until the hand-over to the OPC laboratory personnel at the Rotterdam airport on the 3] August 2013. The hand over was documented and photographed and witnessed by Syrian representatives. The collection, packaging, sealing and hand-over of the samples were documented through video and photo records. A11 seals and accompanying documentation were confirmed correctfintact prior to the issuance ofhand--overftaI> *9 ts re, 3% 43460 's 4: 14% "is Physical examination demonstrated that 39% of survivors were C01'lfilSE:Cl or disoriented at the time of the assessment and that 14% had miosis (constriction of pupils) (Figures 2 and 3). 13 Figure 2: Miosis (constriction of pupils) Figure 3: Inflammation of the In spite of the fact that the clinical assessments in Moadamiyah occurred five days following the alleged incident and the assessments in Zamalka occurred seven days following the alleged incident, these signs were persistent. Moreover, according to treating clinicians almost all patients received atropine, although it was not possible to determine which of the survivors who were assessed by the Mission received atropine, nor what dose was administered. There were no signs of physical injury among the survivors examined. Bio-medical Samples. Blood samples were available for laboratory analysis from 34 of 36 survivors, two refusing to have blood withdrawn (Table 1). Fifteen of the survivors who had more severe or signs during the clinical assessment also had urine samples taken, with three of these also having hair samples taken. Specimens were analyzed at laboratories designated by the OPCW. 14 Of the 34 blood samples tested, 91% tested positive for Sarin exposure in Laboratory 4 and 35% tested positive in Laboratory 3 (Table 2). There was discordance of results for two samples only. A higher percentage of samples from Moadamiyah were positive (Laboratory 4 100% and Laboratory 3 93%) than from Zamalka (Laboratory 4 91% and Laboratory 3 At the time of writing, results for the urine samples were only available from Laboratory 4. Overall, 93% of urine samples were positive, with 100% positive from Moadamiyah and 91% positive from Zamalka. None of the three hair samples tested positive for Sarin exposure. Table 2: Results of biomedical testin Laboratory 3 Laboratory 4 Plasma Urine Plasma Urine Number 1 Number Number Number I Moadamiyah Positive 14 93% NM NIA I5 l00% 4 100% Negative Total 15 100% I5 100% 4 100% Zamalka Positive 91% Negative Total 19 100% 19 100% I 100% Combined totals Positive 93% Negative Total 34 100% 34 100% 15 I 00% NA not available Results of Plasma testing I Poilivi. 91% Puclliw. lfifii IF'bsiive If-lagatrve Laboratory 3 I Laboratory 4 15 Interviews with Survivors. Detailed interviews were conducted with 23 survivors. Clinical information was obtained from l7 individuals and environmentalfimpact site information was obtained from 11 (Table 3). Brief epidemiological interviews were conducted with 25 survivors. Table 3: Details of survivors undergoing detailed interviews. Detailed Interviews Location interview Topic Daily Clinical Environmental Tun" Moadamiyab 3 4 Zamalka I4 I0 24 Total 17 1 28 Final analysis of the detailed interviews was not available at the time of writing. But several key details were consistently obtained from the interview records and videofaudiotapes. Survivors reported a military attack with shelling, followed by the onset of a common range of including shortness of breath, disorientation, rhinorrhea (runny nose), irritation, blurred vision, nausea, vomiting, general weakness, and eventual loss of consciousness. Those who went to assist other community members described seeing a large number of individuals lying on the ground, many of whom were deceased or unconscious. These individuals reported observing labored breathing and excessive salivation among a large proportion of the survivors. Several of these "first responders" also became ill, with one describing the onset of blurred vision, generalized weakness, shaking, a sensation of impending doom, followed by fainting. Many survivors reported deaths among family members. Two brothers from Zamalka reported that of the 40 family members who lived in the same building, they were the only survivors. Of the 25 survivors participating in the brief epidemiological interviews, 16 lost at least two family members. Survivors were transported to medical facilities by a variety of means, often being referred between facilities. Of those who were able to describe the treatment provided, most reported receiving atropine, hydrocortisonefcortisone, and oxygen. Interviews with Clinicians. Nine nurses and seven treating physicians were interviewed by the Mission. Most were at their respective homes at the time of incident, with several responding immediately to assist exposed individuals at the site of the incident. Those clinicians who responded in the field described seeing a large number of ill or deceased persons lying in the streets without external signs of injury. Most survivors were described as being unconscious, with many demonstrating laboured breathing. The responders attempted to assist the survivors through the provision of first aid, decontamination with water where possible, and transfer to the nearest hospital by whatever means possible -- usually by private car. The most common signs described by the clinicians among survivors brought to the hospital were laboured breathing, excessive salivation, and loss of consciousness- patients were treated with atropine injections, hydrocortisone injections, and oxygen therapy - dosages were not available. A range of severity was reported by the clinicians - a proportion 16 of survivors were treated on an outpatient basis: others required admission, with some still inpatients at the time of the field visit: others were transferred to other health facilities for a higher level of care. Medical records. The eight medical records from Zamalka Hospital were reviewed for demographics, clinical presentation, and treatment. All cases were male, with an average age of 27 years (range 18 -- 50 years). The most common and signs documented included shortness of breath I labored breathing (87.5 blurred vision (7 vomiting rniosis (5 and headache All patients received atropine treatment, although dosages were not consistently recorded. The other main treatments reported included hydrocortisone (315%) and oxygen Again, dosages were not consistently recorded. Conclusion. The positive blood and urine specimens provide definitive evidence of exposure to Sarin by a large proportion of the survivors assessed by the investigation Mission. These results are corroborated by the clinical assessments, which documented and signs that are consistent with nerve agent exposure, including shortness of breath, irritation, excessive salivation, convulsions, confusionfdisorientation, and miosis. The findings of the clinical assessments were consistent with information derived from both the interviews with clinicians and the review of medical records, which each reported and signs consistent with nerve agent exposure. 17 Appendix 5 Munitions recovered in Moadamiyah and Zamalka/Ein Tarma Observations and assessments from Moadamiyah findings: The team began the investigation of an alleged impact site which was initially located in the backyard terrace of an apartment building. The information given to the Mission was that, in and around this building, persons either died or were affected by a toxic material alter coming under attack via barrage on the 21 August 2013. The members of the Mission discovered, at this location, a small craterfimpact point in the stone tiles which formed the floor of the terrace. Stone and earth debris were scattered outside of the crater as well as small metal fragments were visible in the locality. Of primary interest was the intact rocket motor found coincident to the impact crater. This rocket motor was noted to have stone and earth debris impacted in the front section of the motor identical to that found in the crater. There was no indication of damage around the crater area having been caused by blast or explosives. This implies that the warhead was not present upon final impact. Noting the location of the impact crater and other damage to the upper parts of existing fence/trellis work, the inspectors followed the trajectory of the rocket and determined that it initially impacted the corner of the second floor of an adjacent apartment building to the east, with either the warhead functioning or shearing off from the body at that point and the motor section having sufficient kinetic energy to continue along its path to its terminal impact location. Following an overall reconnaissance of the area, the members of the Mission took samples, made detector readings (no detection indications on the LCD 3.3) and took measurements of the area and the discovered munition. The scene was photographed and video was recorded throughout the entire activity. Upon further discussion with alleged witnesses, the team moved to the adjacent apartment building where the initial debris from the first impact! functioning of the rocket was found. The Mission was told that the inhabitants of this location were also inj tired or killed by a 'gas'. This location was also surveyed and no intact identifiable munitions fragments were located. Masonry debris and smaller metal fragments were noted and relevant samples were taken both inside the apartment where victims were alleged to have been as well as from the debris field. The ordnance identified had the following characteristics: E: light gray painting Markings: 1. Black numbers on the outside: 97-179 2. Engravings on the bottom ring ofthe engineI79 Dimensions: Length - 630 mm Width 140 mm The engine had ll) jet nozzles ordered in a circle at the end of the rocket with a metal electrical contact plate in the middle. Limitations: The time necessary to conduct a detailed survey of both locations as well as take samples was very limited. The sites have been well travelled by other individuals both before and during the investigation. Fragments and other possible evidence have clearly been handledfmoved prior to the arrival of the investigation team. 18 elektr. plate Numbers Engraving Observations and assessments from the ZamalkalEin Tarma findings: One team moved to the location of an alleged munition impact located on the roof of a five story building, the second team moved to another alleged impact point located in a nearby open field. The two teams worked in parallel and identified the same type of munition at both sites. The munition had features noted as being consistent with that of an unguided rocket. All measurements and dimensions are the result of both team findings. Some rocket parts were deformed on impact and the measurements should be considered as best estimates. Based on the orientation of the impact craters, orientation of certain surviving munition components and other damage in the areas, the rockets are believed to have arrived from the northwest. Below is a drawing of the found ordnance, the body has been divided into two parts. Rocket engine Warhead 19 The rocket engine: Six stabilizer fins are equally arranged in a circle and stabilized with a metal ring. One rocket had a red number 153 sprayed in the middle of the engine tube. The engine tube is attached to the warhead with 12 bolts. Total length of the engine: em (exit nozzle not included) Length of rocket motor fins: ~16.5 cm Width of stabilizing ring: ~55 em Length of motor exit nozzle: -4.5 em Length of motor engine shaft: ~l 12 em 6 of engine shaft: ~12 em 9 of stabilizer ringThe warhead consists of: - Front metal plate with a fuse thread in the center I 9 outside: 36 em I 0 fuse thread: 9 cm 20 I Six threaded attachment holes are equally arranged in a circle near the outer ring - Body outer container consisting of metal plate I Thickness 5 mm - Metal base plate with filling plug, tube and attachment ring with 12 bolts. I 6 outside: 36 cm I I3 square bolt 7 cm I [55 integrated tube on the base plate 3 cm - Length of the tube 10 cm - Central tube of the warhead I Length of tube: 70 cm I El ofthe tube: 12 cm Plu inside Central I. 4 - 3" T--.-I Front late outside -. Liguid capacity of the warhead: The approx. capacity of liquid in the warhead is according to the measurements between 56 6 liters. This calculation is exclusive to the thickness of the container walls and any other unknown components possibly contained in the warhead. 21 1. The rocket found by the sub-team on the roof penetrated a cinderhlock wall and a rebar containing concrete floor before coming to rest in a room below. The suspected front plate of the warhead and other parts suspected of being the warhead casing were found in front of the first wall and not in the lower room. Additionally, they did not exhibit signs of significant deformation or damage due to kinetic impact. Based on the found evidence; there is an indication that the rocket warhead appeared to function prior to impacting on the roof, releasing its contents and depositing the discovered fragments before travelling through the structure to its terminal location. Apart from the rocket motor and the front central tube with the base plate, no other munition fragments were found in the lower room. 2. The front plate showed 6 symmetric threaded holes around the outline. It's unclear what part(s) are attached through these holes. As with other sites, the locations have been well traveled by other individuals prior to the arrival of the Mission. Time spent on the sites was well used but limited. During the time spent at these locations, individuals arrived carrying other suspected munitions indicating that such potential evidence is being moved and possibly manipulated. Considerations on the likely traj eetory of the rockets Of the five impact sites investigated by the mission, three do not present physical characteristics allowing a successfiil study of the trajectories followed by the rockets involved, due to the configuration of the impact places. However, Impact site number 1 (Moadamiyah) and Impact site number 4 (Ein Tarma.) provide sufficient evidence to determine, with a sufficient degree of accuracy, the likely trajectory of the projectiles. 22 Impact Site Number I The munition linked to this impact site, by observed and measured characteristics, indicatively matches one of the variants of the M14 artillery rocket, with either an original or an improvised warhead (not observed at the impact site). In the final stage of this trajectory, the projectile hit and pierced through a vegetal screen existing over one of the adjacent walls, before impacting the ground producing a shallow crater. The line linking the crater and the piercing in the vegetal screen can be conclusively established and has a bearing of 35 degrees. This line represents an inverse azimuth to the original trajectory of the rocket, that is to say, the original trajectory of the projectile, as it hit the ground, had an azimuth of 215 degrees. Impact Site Number 2 is located 65 meters away from number 1 and with an azimuth of214 degrees. Both relative positions are fully congruent with the dispersion pattern commonly associated with rockets launched from a single, multi-barrel, launcher. Impact Site Number 4 The munition related to this impact site by observed and measured characteristics indicatively matches a 330 mm caliber, artillery rocket. The projectile, in the last stage of its trajectory, hit the surface in an area of earthy, relatively sofi, ground where the shafifengine of the projectile remained dug in, undisturbed until investigated. The said shafi/engine, presenting no form of lateral bending, pointed precisely in a bearing of 285 degrees that, again, represent a reverse azimuth to the trajectory followed by the rocket during its flight. It can be, thus, concluded that the original azimuth of the rocket trajectory had an azimuth of 105 degrees, in an East!Southeast trajectory. 23 Appendix 6 Environmental Samples Collected in Moadamiyah and Zamalka/Ein Tarma Erwiromnental samples collected in Moadamivah on 26 August 2013 Sampling at Moadamiyah started at approximately l600h and ended 16-45h. Below is the of all environmental samples recovered in Moadamiyah. Team Sampling date Time Sampling Description I I 3 16:16 fiorn one impact point in one house in 2 I 16:22 Metal fragment taken from the floor of the outside terrace. 3 I 3 163] Pieces of fabric taken 'from one bed sheet and one carpet, on the floor, In the living room of an apartment. 4 I Zfimsizflm 16:32 A methanol wipe sample taken from the floor ofthe first room on the ground floor of an apartment. 5 I 26 mg ?2013 1633 A dichloromethane wipe sample taken from the floor of the first room on the ground floor of an apartment. 6 1 26m&,2m3 16:35 A dichloromethane wipe sample taken from the floor of the second room on the ground floor of an apartment. A methanol wipe sample taken fi'ont the floor, wall edge 7 I 26fD8i"2fll3 16:36 and wall of the second room on the ground floor of an apartment. 3 I 2 6 mg 3013 16:33 Metal fragment taken from the floor of the outside terrace of an apartment. Dichloromethane wipe sample taken from a ceramic coated 9 2 2I5i'08a"2l} 3 16:22 floor in the bedroom where victims were allegedly affected with a toxic chemical. ID 2 26:'08:'20 13 16:25 A methanol wipe sample taken fi'om the sole of a slipper. 24 A head scarf wom by one victim, allegedly affected with a I 2 26/08/2013 16:26 toxic chemical. 12 2 26108/2013 16:31 Pieces of fabric taken From one pillow. 13 2 1633 Pieces offabric, taken from the outer and the inner liners of a mattress. Environmental samples collected in Zama1ka!Eiri Tarma on 28 August 2013 The sampling at ZamalkaJ'Ein Tarma started at approximately 1350b and ended at 143 6h. The following environmental samples were recovered: Team Sampling date Time Sampling Description 1 23 I08 U1 3 14:14 A fragment from the rocket found on the roof of the building14:26 Rubble taken from the impact point on the roof of the building. A methanol wipe sample taken from a metal fragment 3 1 1428 found on the roof of the building. . A metal fragment taken next to the impact point on 4 1 23m8f2O13 1430 the roof of the building. . A metal fragment taken next to the impact point on 1 28/03,2013 I435 the roof of the building. A dichloromethane wipe sample taken from a metal 6 I 1437 piece found on the roof of the building. A wipe with dichloromethane sample taken from 7 1 3 14:40 inside the central tube of the rocket warhead one floor below the roof. 8 2 14:34 Soil sample taken near the rocket warhead. 9 2 28i'U8z'20l3 14:33 Soil sample taken near the rocket warhead. 25 10 3 14:40 A dichloromethane wipe sample taken from rocket body. 11 23;'03r'2013 14:49 A methanol wipe sample taken from a metal fragment. 1.2 14:51 Metal bolt removed from rocket head combined with paint rust scratched from the surface surrounding the bolt. Environmental samples collected in Zamalka./Bin Tarma on 29 August 2013 The sampling at Zamalka/Ein Tarma started approximately 1310b and ended 1350b. 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