AL-QAIDA PAPERS: AL-QAIDAʼS SAHARA PLAYBOOK In a confidential letter to his troops in Mali, the head of al-Qaidaʼs North African branch lays out a point-by-point strategy for taking over the countryʼs north. His advice is not what you might expect: He advises them to be gentle with the population, and he compares their jihad in Mali to a newborn learning to walk. “We must ease its burden, take it by the hand, help it and support it until it stands.” The following pages are part of a cache of documents that the Associated Press found on the floor in a building occupied by al-Qaida fighters for almost a year in Timbuktu, Mali. The AP has pieced together the order of the pages as far as possible. ! INTRODUCTION PAGE Instructions concerning the Islamic Jihadi Project in Azawad From Abu Musab Abdel-Wudoud to his brother emirs and members of the Shura Council of the organization and Ansar edDin in the Great Desert. VARIOUS ISLAMIC GREETINGS This paper contains a set of directions and recommendations that the leadership of the organization presents to the brother emirs in the Sahara by which to operate. They are in the context of the continual observation, advising and instructing over the developments in the Sahara. We have tried in a succinct way to treat the general picture and the idea way of action that we see as suitable for the complicated reality and quickly changing events connected to this Islamic Jihadi project in Azawad. This project, vital and very important to us and to our jihad, is in this very sensitive and dangerous phase, which requires us all to give it particular care and to prepare the ground for success and avoid as much as possible the elements.... MAY BE MATERIAL MISSING CHAPTER 1, PAGE 1 1) General picture of the Islamist Jihadi Project in Azawad 2) Setting the situation of al-Qaida in the current phase and defining the nature of its internal and external activity 3) The ideal policies on how to deal with the various sectors of Azawad society, as well as the external players 4) Important considerations on the draft agreement between Ansar Dine and the Azawad Liberation Movement 5) A vision for forming and moving ahead with the temporary government 6) Important instructions on the possible foreign military intervention General picture of the Islamist Jihadi Project in Azawad Picturing something is a basic foundation for understanding it and if the picture is not correct or does not take into account all aspects of the issue under consideration, the planning and decisions that emerge will be deficient if not outright wrong. For our project, it is very important that we take into account in our overall picture two important matters: The first matter: That the great powers with hegemony over the international situation, despite their weakness and their retreat caused by military exhaustion and the financial crisis, still have many cards to play that enable them to prevent the creation of an Islamic state in Azawad ruled by the jihadis and Islamists. And so, It is very probable, perhaps certain, that a military intervention will occur, whether directly or indirectly, or that a complete economic, political and military blockade will be imposed along with multiple pressures, which in the end will either force us to retreat to our rear bases or will provoke the people against us because of starvation or the cutting of supplies and salaries, or will enflame the conflict between us and the other armed political movements in the region by increasing the points of dispute and causing problems and following a carrot-andstick policy with them to incite them against us. And so, based on taking into account this important factor: CHAPTER 1, PAGE 2 1) We must not go too far or take risks in our decisions or imagine that this project is a stable Islamic state. It is too early for that, God knows. Instead, it is necessary to be cautious in the matter and we must be more realistic and look at it from a broader and more complete perspective to see a historic opportunity that must be exploited to interact with the Azawad people, including all its sectors, with the aim of uniting it and rallying it behind our Islamic project, by adopting its just cause and achieving its legitimate goals, while giving it an authentic Islamist tinge. This exceptional people, upon whose shoulders were established the Islamic conquests of the region and the Moravid nation (which maintained Islam and defended the Islamic nation for aged), is one of the warrior Islamic peoples that is a candidate for championing Islam and bearing its burdens in the region in the future. It is an important golden opportunity to extend bridges to the various sectors and parts of Azawad society _ Arab and Tawareg and Zingiya (black) _ to end the situation of political and social and intellectual separation (or isolation) between the Mujahedeen and these sectors, particularly the big tribes, and the main rebel movements with their various ideologies, and the elite of Azawad society, its clerics, its groupings, its individuals and its noble forces. MISSING MATERIAL HERE 2) Based on taking care of this important factor, we should also take into consideration not to monopolize the political and military stage. We should not be at the forefront. That is not in our interest now. Rather, we should strive to include the main effective powers in the region, such as the Azawad Liberation Movement and the Arab Azawad Movement and others. This will have three fundamental benefits. First, we would not alone bear the fault of the possible failure and the expected blockade. Rather if it happens _ God forbid, though it is very probable _ all the main parties would bear responsibility before the people, and everyone will consider the matter objectively and responsibly. Second, administration of the region and standing up to the international, foreign and regional challenge is a large duty that exceeds our military and financial and structural capability for the time being. So it is wise then for us not to bear the burden alone in this phase, but rather to include.... CONTINUED, CHAPTER 1, PAGE 2 These people that are carrying on their backs the consequences of the Islamic crusades. These people are a fighting nation which has the potential to support Islam, and to carry its burden on their shoulders in the region as a whole. This is an important opportunity to build bridges, between all factions of the Azawadi community, including the Arabs, the Tuaregs and the blacks (word used = zingiyea. Lee: is this derogatory?) The aim of building these bridges is to make it so that our Mujahideen are no longer isolated in society, and to integrate with the different factions, including the big tribes and the main rebel movement and tribal chiefs. .... And if we can achieve this positive thing in even a limited amount, then even if the project fails later, it will be just enough that we will have planted the first, good seed in this fertile soil and put pesticides and fertilizer on it, so that the tree will grow more quickly. We look forward to seeing this tree as it will be: stable and magnificent. CHAPTER 1, PAGE 3 One of the wrong policies that we think you carried out is the extreme speed with which you applied Shariah, not taking into consideration the gradual evolution that should be applied in an environment that is ignorant of religion, and a people which hasn't applied Shariah in centuries. And our previous experience proved that applying Shariah this way, without taking the environment into consideration will lead to people rejecting the religion, and engender hatred toward the Mujahideen, and will consequently lead to the failure of our experiment. So in the first stage, we should have focused on preparing the terrain to apply Shariah, to spread dawa, and to talk and preach to people in order to convince them and educate them. Until we see that the circumstances are ready to apply Shariah in a wise way, we should instead take the example of Khalifa Omar Bin Abdul El Aziz ... because at his time, corruption was widespread so he could not reform the area all at once. Some of the examples where we feel you were hasty in applying Shariah, and which we hope you will not repeat include: Point 1: The destruction of the shrines, because on the internal front we are not strong, and there is a potential for an external intervention, and negative repercussions are expected. Point 2: The application of the "had" (religious punishment) in the case of adultery, in the lashing of people and the use of force to try to stop things that are haram, and the fact that you prevented women from going out, and prevented children from playing, and searched the houses of the population etc etc ... this behavior, even at an individual level, is contradictory to the policy of Salaf (our forebearers), so your officials need to control themselves, and commit themselves to the guide that we will elaborate here. CHAPTER 2, PAGE 1 No doubt, the situation of al-Qaida now and the nature of its activity in Azawad are different from what they were before, given the challenges that these important new situations have brought. That demands of us to establish a new framework regulating the organizational relationship with Ansar Dine and defining the nature of the appropriate activities, in a way that combines the continuation of our global jihadi project and the preserving of the Azawad Islamic project, while developing it and avoiding its failure. Combining these two missions is a true dilemma. The final decision is very important and consultations must be widened as much as possible. So we present to you two basic proposals, which we arrived at after gathering the opinions of a number of prominent figures. We ask you to let us know your opinion and the opinion of Sheikh Abu Fadl on which of the two proposals is best. First Proposal: (first line of proposal is cut off in the photo, Ch2Page1Bottom) … and international of the organization. As for internal activity, in this we would be under the emirate of Ansar Dine. Our emir would follow their emir and our opinion would follow their opinion. By internal activity, we mean all activity connected to participating in bearing the responsibilities of the liberated areas. In external activity, connected to our global jihad, we would be independent of them (Ansar Dine). We would ensure that none of that activity or its repercussions is attributed to them, as care must be taken over negative impacts on the project of the state. The second proposal: A portion of the Mujahedeen of al-Qaida would be set aside and put under the complete control of the emir of Ansar Dine to participate in bearing the burden of running the affairs of the liberated cities. The other portion would remain completely independent of Ansar Dine and its activity would be limited to jihadi action outside the region. We propose in this vein, concerning the first portion, that the brothers in the future be sure to seize their right to belong to the nation of Azawad, that the future constitution of the nation, if there is a constitution, provide that the basic condition for nationality, citizenship and belonging to this nation be Islam and the covenant POSSIBLY MISSING MATERIAL HERE CHAPTER 3, PAGE 2 …. All the active parties and all sectors of the people. And the second benefit comes in easing the foreign and international pressure on us. The Second Issue: It is very important that we view our Islamic project in Azawad as a small newborn, with many phases ahead of it that it must pass through to grow and mature. The current baby is in its first days, crawling on its knees, and has not yet stood on its two legs. So is it wise that we start now to lay burdens on it that will inevitably prevent it from standing on its own two feet and perhaps even smother it?!! If we really want it to stand on its own two feet in this world full of enemies waiting to pounce, we must ease its burden, take it by the hand, help it and support it until it stands. Based on this framework, we must adopt the logic of putting aside rivalries and avoiding a policy of provocation or making enemies or agitating enemies. We should make sure to win allies, be flexible in dealing with the realities and compromise on some rights to achieve greater interests, as our Prophet, peace and prayers of God be upon him, did with the treaty of Hudeibiya. Not every concession to the enemy is forbidden or means accepting Kufr (disbelief) and evil. It's not necessarily an evil act to respond to their demands. The logic in this is to achieve greater gains with the least concessions. Not all concessions are forbidden. The reason is that you should gain the most by giving the least concessions. And we should make a distinction between the weak stage that our baby is going through, and between the adolescent stage where we will be strong, and standing up ready to face our enemies. So like our Cheikh Osama Bin Laden, may he rest in peace, says in a previous letter to our emir of tanzeem (Zawahiri?): "In a state of strength, Muslims fight the kafirs either until they become Muslims or unless they pay jzyah (a religious tax). However if the situation is not like that, we follow what our Prophet Mohamed did when he wanted to give a third of the fruits of the city to Ghatqan (?) so that they leave Muslims alone. So instead of fighting them and gain their money, we give them a third or our economy and at that time, the fruits of the city were its economy. The smart, Muslim leader would do these kind of things in order to achieve the word of God eventually and to support the religion. And another stance of the Prophet that we remember the al-hadeebiya deal where he did a truce with Quraish (same tribe that prophet comes from / made deal with them) because it was in the grerater interest of the Muslims and that is how we should walk on the path of Jihad, where God's word will be supreme and form a state with Shariah, because states are not created from one night to the next and there needs to be a lot of elements for it to succeed. One of these very important elements is to take the allegiances of the tribes." CHAPTER 3, PAGE 3 And the Cheikh, may God have mercy on him, is right. The reform we are calling for is not going to happen from one night to the other. Going gradually is a rule from God that every reformer should take into account. This is our master, Omar Ben Abdel Aziz, says as his son Abdel Malick came to see him: "My father why don't you apply things (why don't you cancel all the things that disagree with Shariah all at once.)? Omar answers in a confident tone: "Do not rush my son. God in the Quran first before forbidding wine, he spoke twice negatively about it, and then he made it haram. I am scared that if I do everything in one go it will create fitna (discord)." So in the name of God our brothers should work step by step, and take into account the interest and the impact it might create and every mistake in this important stage of the life of the baby will be a heavy burden on his shoulder. The larger the mistake, the heavier the weight on his back and we could end up suffocating him suddenly and causing his death. And that would be a disaster that should not take us by surprise. And at this stage a very important note about some of the events that happened with you recently and which we see as wrong policies which do not serve our Islamic project in the region which you and us should solve as soon as possible. No. 1: The decision to go to war against the Azawad Liberation Movement, after becoming close and almost completing a deal with them, which we thought would be positive, is a major mistake, in our assessment, which we could have overcome and dealt with it in a circumscribed way instead of going into full-on war. And with all the reasons our brother gave via their statements through the media (we have not until now received any clarification from you, despite how perilous the operation was !!) we can see that all these reasons are not good enough to declare a war on a very important wing of the society which we should have made sure to work with in order to reach a deal. This fighting will have a negative impact on our project. So we ask you to solve the issue and correct it by working toward a peace deal with the (NMLA.) CHAPTER 4 About the deal between Ansar Dine and Azawad Liberation Movement Before enterring details of the deal, and discussing its points, we would like to refer to a very important point that our state right now has a lot of similarities with the state of the Prophet, may he rest in peace, when he came to Medina and he created an Islamic entity there and there were a lot of dangers around him. CHAPTER UNKNOWN Know that the duty of establishing a just Islamic regime ruling people by the Shariah of the people's Lord is a very big duty that exceeds the capabilities of any organization or movement whatever its size. So one of our goals is to include the Islamic nation with us, its men and women, to achieve this goal. The people of jihad serve as the directing and leading vanguard that works to implement this project amid our Islamic nation and among the various sectors of its people. For our Islamic nation, it is like the heart for the body. 4: As for foreign policies, you must adopt mature and moderate rhetoric that reassures and calms. To do so, you must avoid any statements that are provocative to neighboring countries and avoid repeated threats. Better for you to be silent and pretend to be a "domestic" movement that has its own causes and concerns. There is no call for you to show that we have an expansionary, jihadi, Qaida or any other sort of project. Gaining a region under our control and a people fighting for us and a refuge for our members that allows us to move forward with our program at this stage is no small thing and nothing to be underestimated. The enemy's constant, persistent effort now is to not leave any safe havens for the Mujahedeen. So take that into account. CHAPTER UNKNOWN No. 2: At this stage you should avoid issues of takfir (= accusing muslims of being infidels)and the issue of sects and other issues that the mind of the youth cannnot understand. The general logo at this stage should be defending Muslims from those who want to victimize them, and this means that you should limit the circle of confrontation and of your enemies to the maximum. Those that you can marginalize, do that; if you can win their hearts, do that; if you can attract them, do that. You are walking in a minefield full of tribalism, conspiracy, and revenge, corruption and arrogance. So you have to be dilligent. ¶ No. 3. And a wise policy in this stage, is not to push people away and make sure to integrate everybody, to integrate good people, decent people, notables, people with qualifications in every town; and know that the mission of creating a just Islamic system is a huge mission, which is beyond the potential of any organization or movement no matter how big it is. That is why we should include all the ummah, with the men and women with us in order to achieve the bigger goal. But of course the people of jihad will stay as the leaders that make sure that the vision is being implemented in the ummah. It is (the people of jihad) are to the ummah like the heart is to the body. As for foreign policies you have to have a mature speech, which is moderate and gives assurances and has a calming effect. And to achieve that you have to avoid giving any confrontational speeches against neighboring countries and do not threaten to them. And you can pretend to be silent by making as if its an internal issue, and no need to always show our global, expansionistic jihadi project. Gaining an area which is allied to us and a people that support us and offers a safe haven for our members, which allows us to carry out our project at this stage, is not a little thing. And the enemy is always seeking not to leave safe havens for the mujahideen. Take that into account. REST OF THE DOCUMENT IS MISSING H555 F1) .e .1941! - -Jar-'1' -.5-5 .9 95:4 '.3113#313 3 - E1.n..-.11 blJ_t_-31 .1, II I, ah]? 5 pl: uh ml 33". ill 1..- 1 - -. J"J--flIILEJHWM . . Had511EuJ1.-.. Q. L41 -- J1: "lit"! fin. .4 . 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