S E C RE T // NOFORNI I 20300422 DBPARTMENT OF DEF'ENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY. CUBA APO AE 09360 JTF GTMO-CG 22 Aprrl2005 3511NW 9lstAvenue, UnitedStates Southem Command, MEMORANDUMFORCommander, M i a m i . L 33 1 7 2 . F to Recommendation Transfer the Controlof AnotherCountryfor to SUBJECT:Update (S) (TRCD)for Guantanamo ISN: US9LY-000557DP Detainee, Detention Continued Assessment JTF GTMODetainee Information: 1. (FOUO) Personal o JDIMSAIDRC ReferenceName: Abu Sufian Ibrahim Ahmed Hamouda o Aliases and Current/TrueName: Abu Sufian Ibrahim Ahmed Hamuda Bin Oumu. Abu Mariam. Abdul Faris Al Libi. Abu Faris Al Libi. Marwan. Al Hassari.Abdul RazzaqHamad. Ibn Mabrukah Hamad o Placeof Birth: Darna.Libya (LY) o Date of Birth: 26 }une 1959 o Citizenship: Libya o InternmentSerialNumber (ISN): US9LY-000557DP 2. (FOUO) Health: Detaineehas a non-specificpersonalitydisorder. He has no known drug and refuses allergiesand is not on any chronic medications.Detaineehas latentTuberculosis treatment. He has no travel restrictions. 3. (S//NF)JTF GTMO Assessment: to detainee Transferred the be a. (S) Recommendation: JTFGTMO recommends (TRCD). Detention Controlof AnotherCountryfor Continued Retainin DoD (DoD)on assessed detainee b. (S//NF)Summary: JTFGTMO previously previous it is assessment, since detainee's 23 August2003.Based uponinformation obtained CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O. 12958SECTION 1.5(C) DECLASSIFY ON: 20300422 S E C R E T // NOFORN/ I 20300422 HNOFORN //20300422 TF i SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: (S) now recommended he be Transferred to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) to his country of origin (Libya) if a satisfactory agreement can be reached that allows access to detainee and/or access to exploited intelligence. If a satisfactory agreement cannot be reached for his continued detention in Libya, he should be retained under control. For this update recommendation, detainee is assessed as a former member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIF G), a probable member of Al Qaida, and a member of the North African Extremist Network (N AEN). Detainee used his employment at the Wafa Humanitarian Organization (AL-Wafa) as a front for extremist activities. It is assessed this detainee is a MEDIUM to HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. 4. (SIINF) Detainee Background Summary: Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements. a. Prior History: Detainee served as a tank driver in the Libyan armed forces as a private. The Libyan Government states he was addicted to illegal drugs/narcotics and had been accused ot` a ntunber of crimes including: murder, physical assault, armed assault, and distributing narcotics. He was sentenced to l0 years in prison. In 1993, he escaped from prison and fled to Egypt. He traveled to Afghanistan (AF) and trained at Usama Bin Laden's (UBL) Torkham Camp. After participating in the Sovietjihad, he moved to Sudan (SU). Detainee worked as a truck driver for Wadi Al?'Aqiq, one of UBL's companies in Suba, SU. The Libyan Government further stated detainee joined LIFG and was assigned to the military committee. Under pressure from the Libyan and Sudanese governments, he left Sudan sometime in 1997, using a false Mauritanian passport. He traveled to Pakistan (PK), where he resided in the area near the Al~Atariyah University/mosque (variants Al Yassir Al Khayria, Athariya and Atharia) in Peshawar. b. Training and Activities: In 1998, he withdrew from the LIFG andjoined the Taliban movement (this is likely a reference to Al-Qaida support to the Taliban). He moved to Peshawar where he lived with Abu Zayd Al-Tunisi (assessed to be In 2000, he lived in the tribal region of Peshawar, PK (This is an area under tribal control, not government control. UBL was known to have spent time in this area). He communicated with likely extremist elements in Afghanistan via radio during this period, indicating a position of leadership. Around August to November 2001, detainee worked for Al-Wafa in Kabul, AF. Detainee fought with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance and was wounded in the leg. He left Kabul arormd mid-November 2001. _stated detainee fled to Peshawar, where he likely assisted the Qadhafi Foundation in relocating extremists and their families. Detainee arrived in Peshawar 2 HNOFORN I 20300422 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 20300422 JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT: Update Recommendationto Transfer to the Control of Another Country for ContinuedDetention(TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9LY-000557DP(S) no later than 4 December2001, after transiting first through Logar, AF, and then Khowst, AF. c. (S) Gapture lnformation: The Pakistanipolice were tipped off as to detainee's location by Libyan nationals from the Libyan Humanitarian Organization aka Qadhafi Organization. In Peshawar,PK, PakistaniPolice apprehended detaineeat the PlazaHotel, where he was staying. Detaineewas then turned over to US forces. (Analyst note: The Qadhafi Organization operatedout of the Libyan Embassyand worked to secure transportationto Libya for any Arab fleeing the region, including Al-Qaida members. There appeared have been an agreementbetweenthe governmentsof Libya and Pakistanthat to allowed the Pakistanisto interview the Arabs before they left. Detaineewas likely detained by the Pakistani'sand turned over to US forcesagainstthe Libyan govemment'swishesdue to discrepancies his story.) in d. (S) Transferredto JTF GTMO: 5 May2002 e. (S//NF)Reasonsfor Transferto JTF GTMO: Toprovide information the on following: o o o The Al-Wafa Organization Al-Wafa officials Al-Qaida/Al Wafa relationship and financial operations 5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat: posesa MEDIUM to HIGH risk, as he is a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed detainee the likely to posea threatto the US, its interests and allies. Reasons ContinuedDetention: b. (S//NF) for . (S) Detaineehas a long-termassociation with Islamic extremistjihad and membersof Al-Qaida and other extremist groups. Detaineerefusesto disclosecomplete information regardinghis past,associates, activities. and . (S//I{F) The Libyan Govemment considersdetaineea "dangerousman with no qualms about committing terrorist acts. He was known as one of the extremist commandersof the Afghan Arabs." (Analyst note: "The Afghan Arabs" refers to Arab Mujahideen that electedto stay in Afghanistan and Pakistanfollowing the Soviet Jihad. In this position detaineewould be linked, at least indirectly, to the Taliban, Al-Qaida, NAEN, and other extremistelements the region during the mid to late 1990's. He is in ) S E C R E T // NOFORNI I 20300422 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 20300422 JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT: Update Recommendationto Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Detainee, ISN: US9LY-000557DP(S) ContinuedDetention(TRCD) for Guantanamo his to not assessed have been a senior level commanderand likely lost or surrendered leadershiprole when he left the LIFG community.) . (S) Detaineeis an associate UBL's from Sudan. Al Sheikh,possiblya reference to of Ibn SheikhAl Libi, recommended detainee UBL. UBL reportedlyknows detainee's to while living in brothervery well. Detaineedrove a truck for one of UBL's companies Sudan. . (S) Detaineehasknown or suspected to associations the following NAEN or LIFG members: (Analyst note: NAEN is a Tier 0 CounterterrorismTarget defined as terrorist groupswhich posea clear and immediatedangerto US personsor interests.The LIFG is a Tier 1 Counterterrorismtarget defined as terrorist groups,especially those with state support,that have demonstrated intention and the capability to attack US personsor the interests.) o Abdul Latif Al Turki, US9AF-000556 o AbuZar (variant Thar) o Ashraf Salim Abd Al Sharif,US9LY 000263(ISN 263) o Umar Al Libi, US9LY 000695(ISN 695) o Abu Nasim Al Tunisi (NAEN Facilitator) o Abd Al Karim Al Libi o Abu Hazim Al Libi o Abu Sulaiman Al Jazairi, o Abu Tayyib o Abd Al Latif Al Libi, o HamzaAl Libi o Saif Al Libi, o Abu Za'ah, Abu Wathilh Al Libi. o (S/AIF) Detaineehas admitted or has alleged associations with numerousextremist elements and personalities, includethe following: to o Rida Walili, US9EG-000663 (ISN 663) o AbuZayed Al Tunisi (likely ISN 721) o Ayyub Al Libi, Al-Qaida/LIFG facilitator o Ansaf Sarraf o Abu Al Munthir o Abu Abdullah Al Sadiq o (S/AIF) Abu Zubaydah,Al-Qaida facilitator, recognizeddetaineeas a former member of the LIFG. Abu Zubaydah statedhe provided detaineewith a false Iraqi passportat the requestof Abu JaffarAl Iraqi in 1999. (Analyst note: Detaineehas not acknowledged theseassociations.) . (S) Ibn Sheikh Al Libi, Khaldan camp director and Al-Qaida member, identified detainee. 4 S E C R E T //NOFORN / I 20300422 S E C R E T //NOFORN / I 20300422 JTFGTMO-CG SUBJECT:UpdateRecommendation Transfer the Controlof AnotherCountryfor to to (TRCD)for Guantanamo (S) Detention Detainee, ISN: US9LY-000557DP Continued o (S) Ibn Sheikh Al Libi noted detaineeworked at the Wafa organizationafter having financial difficulties. Abu Zubaydahmet detaineeat Ibn Sheikh Al Libi's guesthouse Kabul in 2000. (Analyst note: There is reporting detaineewas in ostracizedfrom the Libyan community, at which time he cameto Wafa seeking employment. The financial difficulties may have arisenfrom detainee'sfalling from favor in the Libyan community, which would result in losing the monthly stipends noted in Al-Qaida documentsand a subsequent need for funds. There is no reporting relations other than his links to Abu on the actual causeof detainee'sdecreased Wathilh Al Libi's group.The needfor funds may simply be an aspectof his cover story to misleadintenogations.) . (S) Detaineeassociated with (andwas likely a memberof) Abu Wathilh Al Libi's group,which had splinteredfrom the LIFG due to disagreements. Libi's group was Al linked to Abu Zubaydah's North African network of facilitators. Abu Wathilh Al Libi is a reported alias for Abdul Latif Al Libi (variant Wathelal, possibly aka Khaled Al Madaoui),a one-timeseniormemberof the LIFG. Al Libi was known to attendthe Athariyah mosqueat approximately the sametime detaineeis believed to have an associationwith the mosque.The detaineeintroduced Al Libi to NAEN facilitator, Abu Nasim. Al Libi, a UBL associate, relocatedfrom Pakistanto Afghanistanby August had 2000. o (S) In November 2000, Abdul Latif (Abu Wathilh Al Libi) was in Europe enroute to the UK and appearedto have a working relationship with the North African network in the UK. With the UK as his destination,Abdul Latif likely has associations with the Doha group and personnelwithin the extremist mosquessuch as Finsbury Park. (Analyst note: The Doha group was an extremist facilitation network within the UK directedby Abu Doha. Abu Doha is suspected conspiracyto of commit terrorist attacksagainstthe US in associationwith convicted Millennium plotter Ahmed Ressam.Abu Doha is also suspected being the architect for an of Algerian terrorist network within Europe.) o (S) Since membersof the Algerian terrorist network passedthrough the mosque and are known to have traveled to locations in which detaineeresided,and since detaineehad a working associationwith Abdul Latil detaineelikely has associations with NAEN facilitators and recruits as well. The detaineelikely servedas a conduit for the NAEN within Wafa. o (S/A.{F) Detainee'salias is found on a list of probableAl-Qaida personnel receiving monthly stipends. His aliaswas also found on Al-Qaida's 11 September attacksfinancier Mustafa Al Hawsawi's laptop as an Al-Qaida member receiving family support. Detainee'sprobable name was found in the pocket litter of Arab Mujahideen who entered Croatia from Bosnra rn 1996. One of the mujahid who had his pocket litter confiscated was Isa Muqrin, leader of the Al-Qaida Muqrin cell in Saudi Arabia responsiblefor the beheadingof US citizenPaul Johnson. S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 20300422 IINOFORN 20300422 JTF SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: (S) F) identified detainee as a _who ran a Libyan guest ouse in es awar. (S) Detainee uses a variety of counter-interrogation techniques to guide interrogations and prevent disclosure of infomation of an incriminating nature. Detainee has willingly admitted to criminal activity such as drug use, probably in an attempt to show cooperation, but is guarded when discussing associates and his activities. There are numerous inconsistencies and timeline gaps in detainee's story, evident when compared with other intelligence reporting. c. (SIINF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee's behavior has been generally uncooperative and aggressive. He has been cited numerous times for failure to comply, harassing guards, and hostile/inciting activity. Detainee had one assault on 27 July 2003. Detainee's most recent incident involved harassment on 7 March 2005. 6. Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: TF GTMO determined this detainee is of HIGH intelligence value, (S) Detainee has infomation on Al-Qaida in Sudan and Central Asia. Additionally, he has infomation on the facilities, capabilities, personnel, and operations of the LIFG and the NAEN. b. Areas of Potential Exploitation: Al-Wafa NGO UBL commercial and militant activities in Sudan Al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan Training Torkham Camp, trainers, curriculum Athariyah Mosque use by and support to extremist personnel Senior personnel including Abu Zubaidah, Sheikh Isa, and Isa Muqrin and relationship to extremist elements and terrorist operations LIFG and NAEN 0 Personnel Facilities and locations guesthouses, Peshawar and Tribal Areas of support, training and logistical facilities, Jalalabad and Kabul support structure United Kingdom Personalities and recruiting operations Egress assistance provided to fleeing Al-Qaida and extremist members by indigenous and foreign parties including the Qadhaii organization and likely the Lashkar Tayyiba based on its historical support 6 RE S E C RE T // NOFORN/ I 20300422 JTFGTMO-CG to to SUBJECT:UpdateRecommendation Transfer the Controlof AnotherCountryfor (TRCD)for Guantanamo (S) Detainee, ISN: US9LY-000557DP Detention Continued on 2004, 7. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status reassessed 2 November was an andhe remains enemycombatant. 7 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 20300422