September 23rd, 2010 MEMORANDUM TO: Chairman Jaczko Commissioner Svinicki Commissioner Apostolakis Commissioner Magwood Commissioner Ostendorff FROM: Alexander P, Murray Senior Chemical Process Engineer Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards SUBJECT: NRC REVIEW OF MIXED OXIDE FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY (MFFF) SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT (SER) Colleagues have brought to my attention the fact that the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) is reviewing the MFFF SER and is conducting meetings to discuss the matter. I have heard rumors of statements that I agree with the SER conclusions. Such rumors are incorrect as I have neither seen nor reviewed the SER and, thus, I can neither agree nor disagree with its conclusions. I am neither a proponent for nor a detractor against the proposed MOX facility - I am impartial and I am interested in adequate assurances of safety for the MFFF. Please note that I am not currently assigned as part of the MFFF review. However, I was the Lead Chemical Safety Reviewer for the MOX Construction Authorization Request (CAR) for the 2001-2005 timeframe and I was the initial Lead Chemical Safety Reviewer for the MOX License Review (2006) before I was directed by management to work on other programs. I have largely been excluded by management from the MFFF license application review. I was last involved circa 18 months ago to briefly comment on a Brookhaven National Laboratory report and the red oil phenomena. I have not been involved in the NRC staff's SER preparation or review. I have seen a copy of an earlier draft of the SER and have accrued some insights via normal office interactions. These raise some safety concerns and I request that the Commission verify that these concerns have been adequately addressed by the staff review. These concerns are listed below. General and Programmatic MFFF Concerns: 1. Safety culture: several staff members have observed and commented on my almost complete exclusion from the MOX review and MOX Branch (I was moved by management to another Branch - I am currently being moved to another Division, against my wishes), and the firing/forced resignation of another staff member who raised many safety issues similar to my own, including issues related to DPOs (Differing Professional Opinions) on MOX. This redirection, isolation, and ostracism have given the impression to some staff members that if one raises significant issues, there seems to be a potential for negative consequences; that is, a potentially chilling effect. In addition, some areas of the review have new or very inexperienced staff (five or less years at the NRC) who may not have been adequately counseled by more senior staff, and, thus, their review may be less than adequate. Several staff also approached me earlier this year to complain that management was attempting to force closure of safety issues in the SER; after some pushback by the staff, management apparently relented. The Agency and ACRS need to verify that these safety culture attributes have not negatively impacted the safety review and conclusions of the review and SER. 2. DPO and NCP issues: six DPOs were filed on MOX and panels were formed for five of these DPOs that concluded one or more of the concerns in each DPO had merit. Management did not act upon the panel findings, often citing the presence of an additional review during the license application as a reason for inaction. Several nonconcurrences (NCP) were also filed. It is not clear that the DPO/NCP issues and areas of concern have been addressed by the review, if at all. The Agency and ACRS need to verify that the DPOs/NCPs and their issues/findings have been adequately addressed. 3. Issues from ACRS 2005 letter: the ACRS issued a five-page letter on the MFFF at the time of the construction request that included multiple concerns and issues, including some raised by the DPOs. The Agency and ACRS need to verify that these have been adequately addressed by the license application and review. 4. Verification and Validation (V&V) of Models and codes: the application and reviews use many mathematical models and codes. Some of these have been used to make or otherwise support safety conclusions. Staff were directed by management to accept some models at the time of the construction review that were not appropriately V&V'd (a subject of a DPO and an NCP). Appropriate verification and validation of any codes and models used to make or otherwise support safety conclusions in the SER should be confirmed by the Agency and ACRS. 5. Issues raised during the December 2004 ACRS Meeting: Several issues were raised at this meeting, including the "death cloud" that had the potential to kill all of the workers at the proposed facility. The Agency and ACRS need to verify that these safety issues have been adequately addressed by the license application and review. 6. Appropriateness of Part 70 for licensing MFFF and adequate levels of safety: Part 70 was revised in 2000 to include a risk-informed, performance based approach for licensing primarily low-enriched uranium (LEU) processing facilities. These are considered to be relatively low hazard facilities, with a small number of high consequence events and relatively few safety controls (IROFS - items relied upon for safety). Thus, the binning method is relatively coarse (a 3x3 matrix - the chemical process industry typically uses a larger matrix). In contrast, the MFFF utilizes weaponsgrade plutonium in MOX; on a unit mass, inhalation dose basis, this presents potential consequences some four-orders of magnitude greater than those for LEU facilities and far beyond what was contemplated with the revision of Part 70. The MFFF also features a reasonably-sized PUREX cycle, similar to a reprocessing facility. Part 70 allows qualitative risk analyses and does not aggregate risk - there is no total risk goal or limit. Therefore, the MFFF may represent a risk several orders of magnitude greater than contemplated by the Part 70 revision - this could be an unacceptable level of risk that might require compensatory actions and additional safety controls. The Agency and ACRS need to review the appropriateness of Part 70 for the MFFF and the total level of risk presented by the facility, and order additional safety controls as necessary. In addition, the Agency and ACRS need to review Part 70 to determine if another revision is needed to address known deficiencies, such as the aforementioned lack of risk aggregation and a total risk/safety goal, and to add a requirement for IROFS on NRC regulated, chemical safety events. 7. Commitments: the applicant made many commitments during the construction permit phase. Undoubtedly, more commitments have been made during the license application phase. The facility may not be completed and start operations until 2015 or later. This represents some fifteen years and the same staff will not be involved throughout this time period. Consequently, the Agency and ACRS need to verify and ensure that the commitments are appropriately tracked. 8. NRC Review and Transparency: The MFFF license application review and SER have been conducted in a significantly more closed manner than for the construction permit review. The need for more transparency has been stated as a key concern by several members of the public; the perception is the NRC overuses redaction to avoid public disclosure, review, and comment. The Agency and ACRS need to ensure that as much transparency as possible is allowed with the licensing documents and SER; for example, whole documents should not be redacted because of only a few sentences of sensitive information. Some Specific Safety Concerns: There are a number of specific issues that were touched upon during the construction permit review that require verification of adequate closure by the SER, Agency, and ACRS, such as: 9. Red oil phenomena: some aspects of the applicant's safety strategy could not be demonstrated experimentally yet they are included in the safety analyses. There were also assertions of passive engineered controls when, in reality, these were actually active controls. Redundancy may be compromised by interdependencies between IROFS. 10. Receptors and emergency planning: there is a discrepancy between the distance to Part 70 receptors (Individual outside the controlled area boundary, about 160 meters) and the distance used in the Emergency Plan (several miles). Many people on the SRS site do not meet the NRC definitions of worker in Parts 19 and 70 and, thus, the 160 meter distance would be more appropriate. 11. Control room and facility habitability: the SER for the Construction Permit review included a requirement for control room habitability. A DPO was closed based upon an assertion of habitability for the entire facility. 12. Chemical releases and "death" clouds:" there is a management memorandum from the construction permit review that indicated one release would be "immediately lethal" at 100 meters, and the applicant acknowledged there would be radiation doses associated with these events. 13. HAN/Hydrazine: unvalidated computer models were used to close this issue for the construction permit review. The SER safety determination should only use V&V'd computer models. 14. Electrolyzer: the applicant had indicated a number of additional analyses and safety controls would be present in the final design, including safety controls for the electrical parameters. 15. HVAC and filters: special metal prefilters and low flammability HEPA filters were proposed by the applicant to address staff concerns about hot embers and uranium dioxide "burnback" adversely affecting HEPA performance. 16. Solvent fires: the applicant proposed a minimalist approach based upon ambient cooling; this was to be supported by calculations at the license application stage. Finally, I note that the staff review schedule is being driven by a schedule metric. As an Agency, we should be focused on safety not schedule, and I encourage the NRC and ACRS to do a thorough review of the MFFF SER and safety issues, as we have plenty of time (as previously noted, the facility will not be completed for another five years or so) and the public expects us to conduct appropriate due diligence. Please contact me if you have any questions.