03/30, /00 11:38 FAX 2022933451 NEI NIS&IP Post4t- Fax Note CoiDepL 7671 Dale 31000 - [pages )3 ,u Re C /-3O Co. A/ RUL2 & ~ ~ :~1 ,* : 23Phone )3C~REE Fax Phn # .~~ t3( Fax# US NioC /aLerial March 29, 2000/ Mr. David L. Meyer, Chief Rules Review and Directives Branch Office of Nuclear material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Felix M. Killar, Jr. 01rector Licemees and Nuclear Insurance Tel: (202) 739-808126 Fax: (202) 533-0157 y j 0 REFERENCE: Comments on a Draft Standard Review Plan for the Review of an Application for a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (SR1718) (Federal Register Vol. 65, No. 21, p. 4856 dated February 1, 2000) Dear Mr. Meyer: The Nuclear Energy Institute' (NEI) is pleased to submit the attached comments on the draft Standard Review Plan (NUREG-1718) for MOX fuel fabrication facility licensing which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) released for public comment in January 2000. Draft NUREG-1718 builds upon the structure and content of draft NUREG-1520 ('StandardReview Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility') and addresses the proposed rule revisions to 10 CFR 70. Draft NUREG 1718 addresses some of the deficiencies contained in the NUREG-1520 Standard Review Plan (SRP). It distinguishes between the license application information for a construction license and for one to possess licensed material. Overly prescriptive provisions in some of the chapters of NUREG-1520 have been reduced or eliminated and greater reliance is placed in several chapters of NUREG-1718 on evaluation of a license applicant's programmatic commitments than on review of detailed programs and procedures. 'NEI is the organization responsible for establishing unified nuclear industry policy on matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues. NEI's members include all utilities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect/engineering firms, fuel fabrication facilities, materials licensees, and other organizations and individuals involved in the nuclear energy industry. 17"76 1 STREET. NW SUITE 400 WASHINGTON, DC 20006-3708 PHONE 202.739.8000 FAX 202,785.4019 www~nei?Org] 03/30/00 11:40 FAX 2022933451 NEI NIS&IP 4o002 Mr. David L. Meyer U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 29, 2000 Page 2 been identified. Several areas of concern with draft NUREG-1718 have, however, regulatory guidance more Certain chapters remain highly prescriptive and provide in which the SRP applicable to commercial nuclear power reactors. The manner codes and standards is of expects an applicant to adopt NRC regulatory or industry why a particular particular concern. The expectation for an applicant to justify to meet a performance standard is not endorsed, rather than to propose methods remarks persist requirement, requires revision. Confusing and contradictory the licensing concerning the content and use of the ISA and ISA Summary in often fails to incorporate the results process. The license application review process of the ISA as presented in the ISA Summary. to this NEI's comments on draft NUREG-1718 are addressed in the attachment not include detailed letter. Our comments address generic issues of concern, but do a thorough technical mark-ups of individual chapters. We do recommend, however, grammatical review of this document to address inconsistent usage of terminology, errors and misplaced regulatory references. to provide you NEI appreciates the opportunity to have reviewed this draft SRP and its with a summary of our principal concerns. We compliment the NRC on to further involvement solicitation of stakeholder participation and look forward with the Commission and its staff in revising this draft guidance document. Yours Sincerely, Feli M. Kill Attachment c: r Peter S. Hastings, DCS I:\Files\MOXX\NUREG-1718 Comments.msw -a ___ 03/30/00 11:41 FAX 2022933451 NEI NIS&IP lo 003 COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT STANDARD REVIEW PLAN FOR THE REVIEW OF AN APPLICATION FOR A MIXED OXIDE (MOX) FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY (SR1718) (FederalRegister 65FR4856) Submitted by the Nuclear Energy Institute Introduction Draft NUREG-1718 is designed to provide guidance for the review of license applications for both the construction and operation of MOX fuel fabrication facilities. It adopts the structure and content of NUREG-1520, the SRP that is now under preparation for review of fuel cycle facilities licensed under 10 CFR: 70. The authors of NUREG-1718 have incorporated some of the improvements to NUREG 1520 that were suggested by NEI in submissions to the NRC over the July December 1999 period. NEI has conducted a preliminary review of the draft MOX SRP to examine for consistency with the existing 10 CFR 70 rule and its proposed revisions, for adoption of a risk-informed, performance-based approach to evaluate and approve license applications, for selection of appropriate regulatory and industry standards against which to judge an application's acceptability, and for correct use of the results of the ISA in the licensing process. This review highlights both the improvements incorporated into draft NUREG-1718 and deficiencies and areas, of concern that require further consideration and revision. Favorable Attributes The amount of prescriptive detail has been reduced in some areas of NUREG-1718. For some safety programs the SRP places greater reliance on assessing a license applicant's programmatic commitments and less on review of detailed procedures and programs. The clarity of the SRP language is much improved. Distinguishing between the licensing requirements for facility construction and for licensed material possession (facility operation) is very useful. Inclusion of examples in the Regulatory Acceptance Criteria sections of individual chapters (e.g. ?6.4.3) may be helpful to a reviewer, although many appear to exceed the specificity of the acceptance criteria and must be revised. Such examples should not in themselves create additional reviewer expectations. The separation of 10 CFR 51 requirements (environmental assessment, environmental impact study) from draft SRP Chapter 10 ('Environmental Protection') significantly simplifies the SRP and its treatment of environmental impact analysis. Several subsections of the "03/30/00 11_:41 FAX 2022933451 NEI NIS&IP Comments on Draft NUREG-1718 Nuclear Energy Institute Page 4 removal 15) have been improved through Measures chapter (Chapter plants. power Management appropriate only to nuclear prescriptive detail and terminology of Issues of Concern applicable to commercial nuclear use of regulatory guidance The continuing programs as the benchmark and the adoption of complex reactor facility is of overriding' concern. reactors fuel fabrication industry acceptance criteria for a MOX principles of an NRC-endorsed applicants to commit to the standard or code Permitting However, fixing an industry and requiring standards and codes is commended. license application will be judged poor benchmark against which a as the standard or code constitutes justify any deviations from that of theterms the applicant to between chapters in the use There is often little consistency practice. of information in the The SRP frequently seeks inclusion ISA and ISA Summary. in the ISA Summary. For that should only be included license application is appropriate for the ISA on plant systems (Chapter 12) impose example, the information The draft SRP often seeks to not for the license application. new Summary, but regulatory basis. Of the four for which there is no supporting simply repeat requirements 8 , two appear redundant and measures. Such chapters incorporated into NUREG-171 of an applicant's proposed management SRP information for assessment be expunged. On several occasions-the methods or redundancy and duplicity should proposed should assess an applicant's language suggests that a reviewer of detailed with a regulation. Assessment procedures to achieve compliance review and should not be expected. lies outside of the license application procedures below. Detailed mark-ups of individual Each of these concerns is discussed as part of this preliminary review. have not, however, been prepared chapters (i) SRP Terminology and corrected terminology that were discussed Numerous inconsistencies in example, 'ensure' should be persist in NUREG-1718. For in NUREG-1520 throughout the SRP, as a license by 'provide reasonable assurance' replaced that is associated with the very seldom provide the certainty of applicant can start-up. The term 'consequences term, especially prior to plant former the proposed 10 from an early 1999 version of concern' (?15.1.5) is a holdover requirements.' been replaced by 'performance CFR 70 rule revisions and has to the 10 CFR 70.4 term 'unacceptable 15.7 The SRP should also make reference various terms used in Chapter deficiencies' rather than the performance Interchangeable of a Corrective Action Plan. and when discussing the provisions safety' and 'structures, systems of the terms 'item relied on for usage this confusion should be clarified. In ?5.4.3.1 (the components' is confusing and an SCC is always an IROFS the erroneous statement that results in safety controls). The term 'management converse is true for engineered of 13 03/30/00 11:42 FAX 2O02933451 NEi NIS&IP 10.005 Comments on Draft NUREG-1718 Nuclear Energy Institute Page 5 of 13 measures' has two distinctive uses in the SRP that should be better distinguished: functions as defined in 10 CFR 70.4 that pertain to the reliability and availability of IROFS, and the oversight and direction provided by plant management for safe and efficient facility operation. The SRP often specifies that a license applicant to 'demonstrate' compliance with a regulatory requirement. A license applicant can describe how a regulatory requirement will be met, but demonstration can only be achieved through actual plant operation. Finally, imprecise language in the draft SRP could be construed to broaden NRC regulatory oversight to include all hazardous chemicals and effluents from a MOX facility. For example, ?10.3(C) directs the reviewer to examine "... accident sequences.. .which, if unmitigated, [would] result in releases to the environment...". In fact, the reviewer should be constrained to examine radiological releases to the environment that could, for example, exceed the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. (The issue of hazardous chemicals is addressed below.) Acceptance criteria language in draft SRP Chapter 14 ('Emergency Management') is particularly deficient in its use of such terminology. (ii) Incorporationof Standards Several SRP chapters permit a license applicant to meet a regulatory requirement through adoption of provisions of an NRC Regulatory Guide or an NRC-endorsed industry standard. NEI supports this approach, so long as the regulatory guide or standard does not constitute the only acceptable method to meet the requirement and so long as the applicant is not expected to adopt guides or standards by reference in the license application. Guides and standards were never originally written for the purpose of becoming license conditions. Use of such terms as "...commit to (or satisfy) the intent of..," "demonstrateequivalency with..." or "... be consistent with the principles of..." are acceptable approaches when referencing a standard or code. Alternatively, the applicant should be permitted to simply incorporate into the license application appropriate provisions of a guide or standard. Draft SRP Chapter 6 ('Nuclear Criticality Safety') generally uses this approach. In contrast, however, the approach used in draft SRP Chapter 7 ('Fire Safety') is not acceptable. The SRP identifies an inordinately large number of NFPA codes outlining parameters that '...may be applied...' (?7.4.3), but then in an overly prescriptive manner, essentially mandates their adoption. NUREG 0800, which is referenced extensively throughout Chapter 7, provides regulatory guidance applicable to the review of nuclear power plants based upon particular rules in 10 CFR 50. Numerous sections of this NUREG are not, however, appropriate for the review of a MOX facility and should not be referenced or used. Chapter 7 promotes an erroneous regulatory philosophy by requiring the applicant to defend why specific sections of NFPA codes and standards are not adopted, rather than to assess whether the applicant's 03/3-0/00 11:43 FAX 2022933451 "I " Comments on Draft NUREG- 1718 Nuclear Energy Institute Page 6 of 13 approach will meet the regulatory requirement. An SRP should always approach rather the adequacy of an applicant's direct the reviewer to assess to why another approach was not adopted. than to seek explanation as (e.g. ?7.4.3.2) 7 are unnecessarily prescriptive Individual sections of Chapter the fire safety program so prescriptively to Tying and should be simplified. must also be corrected. NFPA codes and standards reactors for commercial nuclear cite regulatory guidance application (e.g. Many SRP chapters for evaluating a MOX license risks to human as the basis ('lowest threshold') This pre-supposition that the 0 ). 0 NUREG-080 , NUREG-122 on a par with those of a the environment will be health and safety and This unjustified and inappropriate. and.the nuclear power reactor is both ISA in the licensing process both ignores the role of the the safety presumption 10 CFR 70.62(a) to grade granted the applicant by latitude as presented in the ISA with the results of the ISA program in accordance Summary. (iii) ISA and ISA Summary SRP chapters on the content guidance is provided in individual Inconsistent in the licensing process. Some and use of the ISA and ISA Summary of the ISA Summary in the license consultation chapters (correctly) direct 'ISA Documentation' which, Others dictate review of the assessment process. to include the docketed ISA not clearly defined, is construed although both of which are and supporting ISA documentation, the Summary and the ISA the SRP directs inclusion in facility. In many chapters in the ISA retained at the that need only be presented application of information license with draft NUREG-1718: clear is a serious, generic problem application Summary. This be included in the license of what information need delineation in the ISA Summary. and what need only be presented ISA Summary directed to primarily use the Reviewers must be consistently example, to information is sought, for in assessments. When additional approach, or to review low-risk the logic behind a particular understand then the ISA itself and not included in the ISA Summary, accident sequences be both consulted at the facility. background information may Summary. of the content of the ISA to be a misunderstanding at There appears "...identifies all hazards states that the ISA Summary those For example, ? 5.6 identify all hazards, but only The ISA Summary does not hazards the facility". for example, those workplace to NRC jurisdiction and not, in ?8.1 where subject An additional example occurs falling under OSHA jurisdiction. ISA Summary identifies potential incorrectly states that "...the the SRP accident Summary only identifies at the facility..."; the ISA accidents 03-/30/00 11:43 FAX 2022933451 .\,el . Comments on Draft NU1REG- 1718 Nuclear Energy Institute Pag sequences whose consequences could exceed the performance requirements of tafety-signflicant- Additionally, of the 10 CR 70.61 and that are, as a result, safety-signlficant, high radiological hazards assessed in the ISA, only those addressed in the ISA sequences are and intermediate-consequences Summary. for accident sequence analysis acceptance criteria in ?5.4.3.2 The regulatory a reviewer to examine, For example, directing cart. (p. 5.0-18) are very confusing. seems to be putting the and "...failures of IROFS..." accident sequences to first examine the NRC reviewer should be directed consequences before the horse. The and analysis, the mitigated "accident sequence identification or mitigative measures (i.e. the adequacy of proposed preventive sequence -- including the and finally examination IROFS). The logic of the reviewer's consequences -- requires revision. to examine unmitigated accident need require correction: Some additional areas that to example, that the ISA is submitted "* the statement in ?5.3, ?3, for of the ISA results of the ISA includes all the NRC is incorrect ("... the submits to the NRC..."). This information that the applicant while the ISA Summary is retained at the facility site, information 5) is placed on the docket. the reviews of the ISA (Chapter " the SRP somewhat coordinates fire safety, etc.) so as to topic reviews (radiation safety, and specific expenditures of resources. minimize duplicate and repetitious still appear to direct duplicate However, certain SRP chapters reviews of the same material. for Risk Evaluation') is incorrectly " Appendix A ('Example Procedure ISA Summary'. It is a sample referred to in ?5.4.2 as a 'sample (As we and is not an ISA Summary. approach for risk evaluation NUREG-1520, NEI recommends noted in our comments on draft into NUREG-1513). that this Appendix be incorporated process, Summary in the licensing the use of the ISA and ISA Clarification of reviews of individual safety of each and procedures to coordinate the content of the ISA are warranted. programs within the framework. (iv) Chemical Safety be 8 ('Chemical Safety') could language in draft SRP Chapter Imprecise all hazardous chemicals at NRC jurisdiction to include use of construed to broaden rectified in NUREG-1520 through facility. This confusion was to a MOX produced from licensed material..." term "...hazardous chemicals For example, the subject to OSHA regulation. distinguish from other chemicals 03/30/00 11:44 FAX 2022933451 NEi NIS&IP 4008 Comments on Draft NUREG-1718 Nuclear Energy Institute Page 8 of 13 in the discussion of Chemical Accident Consequences in ?8.3, the last part of the sentence could be rewritten to read "... identified in the ISA that involve licensed materials or hazardouschemicals produced from licensed materials..." or "identified in the ISA that involve licensed materials or any associated hazardous chemicals directly incident thereto...". Process Safety Information is one of the three components of a licensee safety program, but ?8.4.3.5, although entitled 'Process Safety Information', does not address this subject as defined in 10 CFR 70.62(b). This section, which appears instead to discuss items relied on for safety used in chemical accident sequences, should be re-titled. (v) Prescriptiveness There are many examples of unnecessary prescriptiveness in the SRP. Seven examples are noted below: education and qualifications: the SRP specifies detailed qualification standards in several safety programs (e.g. ?9.2.4.2.3, ? 15.4.4.3(1)). Establishment of educational standards and qualifications should remain the prerogative of the licensee subject to the provision that plant personnel have the knowledge and skills needed to perform any activity that is important to, or relied upon for, safety that are identified in the ISA Summary. * criticality oversight: the SRP mandates weekly NCS walkthroughs and quarterly NCS audits without consideration of the results of the ISA (?6.4.3.2(b)). The ISA safety assessment should establish this inspection frequency. * nuclear reactor programs: the guidance imposes many programs that are used in the licensing of nuclear power plants. For example, human-systems interface analysis (?12.3) and systems approach to training (?12.4.3(H) are established as the basic acceptance criteria. These analyses may be appropriate to nuclear power reactors, but not necessarily to MOX fuel fabrication facilities, unless dictated by the ISA. * safety committees: the SRP frequently directs the applicant to establish diverse safety committees such as the AIARA Committee, (?9.2.4.1.3) and the Human Factors Engineering (?12.4.3(B)(ii)). Having several plant committees with overlapping responsibilities all dealing with safety-related issues does not constitute an effective use of licensee safety resources. A single 'Safety Committee' may be all that is appropriate. 0 investigative teams: the SRP also directs establishment of 'teams' to investigate abnormal events or unacceptable performance * 03/3-0/00 11:44 FAX 2022933451 NEI NIS&IP 4 009 Comments on Draft NUREG-1718 Nuclear Energy Institute Page 9 of 13 deficiencies and establish their root cause(s). Mandatory use of 'teams' is too prescriptive. Based upon the severity or complexity of the event, an individual may be all that is needed to conduct the evaluation. 0 program design: the SRP often prescribes actions that should be established by the ISA. For example, the design of the air sampling program (?9.2.4.5.2) should be based upon the results of the ISA (e.g. reflecting where licensed materials are handled or where occupational exposures could be expected). The environmental monitoring program (?10.4.3) can only be designed with the results of the ISA in mind. laboratory personnel qualifications: Chapter 9 further expects a licensee to commit to a QA program that includes oversight of the qualifications of laboratory personnel. If the licensee contracts with an outside laboratory, the contractual relation should govern and the licensee should not be expected to have responsibility for the qualifications of the contracted laboratory personnel. This constitutes an unnecessarily prescriptive and unreasonable expectation and should be deleted. For an internal laboratory, as has been discussed above, establishment of educational standards and qualifications should remain the prerogative of the licensee, subject to the requirement that laboratory personnel have the knowledge and skills needed to perform any activity that is important to, or relied upon for, safety that is identified in the ISA Summary. (vi) SRP Structure The approach for assessing license applicant safety programs differs significantly amongst the fifteen SRP chapters. For example, the prescriptiveness, acceptability of programmatic commitments, imposition of NRC-endorsed industry codes and standards, and reliance on reactor-type requirements differs appreciably amongst individual chapters. Certain chapters focus the reviewer's attention on license applicant commitments (Nuclear Criticality Safety), whereas others hardly reference an applicant's commitments. The suggested Safety Evaluation Report (SER) language often states (e.g. ?15.4.6) that the reviewer has examined the applicant's commitments, whereas the acceptance criteria and review procedures neglect such examination. Greater uniformity should be applied to the review of individual license safety programs in terms of programmatic commitment assessment. NUREG-1718 incorporates a new chapter -- Plant Systems (Chapter 11) that provides guidance to ensure "... that items relied on for safety will be 03/30/00 11:45 FAX 2022933451 NM *\j.1i Comments on Draft IURBEG- 7 18 Nuclear Energy Institute Page 10 of 13 dsftfucinWe safety function when available and reliable to perform their intended of this chapter is the verbatim definition of needed...". The stated purpose which are discussed in draft SRP Chapter 15. management measures', all of redundant. The expectations are Chapter 11 appears, therefore, to be totally basis criteria of 10 CFR the design overly prescriptive and far exceed this chapter is more information sought in the 70.64(a). Additionally, rather than in the license in the ISA Summary appropriate for inclusion discussed in the chapter are addressed in other SRP application. Many topics Some information isnew (design in chapters and need not be repeated here. electrical) and may be applicable cooling water, facility, but it clearly does not fall within criteria for pumps, bases of the assessing the design deletion of Chapter 11 from the purview of this chapter. NEI recommends the draft SRP. applies to human activities for a separate chapter that is unclear. Similarly, the need controls) in Chapter 12 and was also deleted relied on for safety (administrative mentioned, in 10 CFR 70 'Human factors' is no longer prescriptiveness of a 0 of NUREG-152 . The inherent of fuel cycle facilities from earlier drafts the appreciably lower risks human factors program, of incorporating this power reactors and the difficulty framework all compared to nuclear performance-based regulatory topic within the risk-informed, Specification of a systems of Chapter 12 from the SRP. teams support omission of human factors engineering to training and establishment approach controls is unnecessarily ensure the reliability of administrative measures applicable to to of management prescriptive. Discussion discussed in draft SRP which is more thoroughly administrative controls, is no useful guidance in and unnecessary. There Chapter 15, is redundant the SRiP. therefore be deleted from Chapter 12 and it should, of a background information of the SRP often solicit Separate chapters process information, licensed (e.g. facility or site description, other chapters. While some general nature has been presented in activity description) that to cross-reference such do permit the license applicant SRP chapters The SRP should be others do not (?14.4.3.1.1). of information. information (e.g. ?8.3), and allow such cross-referencing consistent throughout (vii) Management Measures an in NUREG-1718 represents of management measures there The presentation in NUREG-1520. However, in on the equivalent chapter improvement without a specific basis programmatic criteria requirements. We remain many prescriptive, not become de facto regulatory become the 10 CFR 70 and that should criteria may over time concerned that SRP acceptanceon the ladder'). Several new programmatic are rung minimum standards ('lowest 03/30/00 11:46 FAX 2022933451 NEI NIS&IP 4 011 Comments on Draft NUREG- 1718 Nuclear Energy Institute Page 11 of 13 expectations patterned after those for nuclear power reactors are introduced, including, for example, application of a full performance-based 'systematic approachto training.' Such a level of comprehensive and exhaustive training may not be appropriate for a MOX fuel fabrication facility. Many of the acceptance criteria for the Training and Qualification management measure are taken directly out of the SAT guidance manual. The Training and Qualification management measure (?15.4) introduces a new programmatic expectation by specifying SAT as the standard or 'base case' against which a licensee's training program will be judged. There is no requirement in 10 CFR 70 that mandates such a comprehensive level of staff training. Imposition of SAT criteria for nuclear power plant operators is required by a specific regulation (10 CFR 50.120) which establishes SAT as a formal regulatory requirement for certain designated categories of personnel. Draft SRP Chapter 15.4 attempts to set a new and higher standard for performance (SAT) in the absence of a corresponding 10 CFR 70 regulation and before the results of an ISA demonstrate the need for that level of performance. Risk-informed, performance-based regulation grants a licensee the latitude to establish the content, detail and comprehensiveness of its staff training and qualification program. The scope of the program will be established based upon the results of the ISA and specifically, the graded level of risk associated with each operator task and the appropriate level of responsibility. If the ISA indicates a need for enhanced training of certain operators (i.e. an unacceptable performance deficiency exposed by the ISA), due to the licensee's reliance on actions by those operators to prevent excessive radiation exposures, the licensee will determine the most: appropriate way to address the training needs (e.g. increase the frequency of operator training, expand the content of the training, impose new qualification requirements). Such actions may be adequate and effective in addressing the identified vulnerability in the context of the licensee's existing training program. Extreme caution should be taken in referencing NUREG 1220, a regulatory guidance document created for nuclear power plant licensees, as the basic regulatory reference for a MOX fuel fabrication plant (?15.4.4.2). The Audits and Assessments chapter (?15.6) requires considerable revision. The purpose of the chapter (?15.6.1) is incompletely stated. It fails to distinguish between an audit (to monitor compliance with regulatory requirements and license commitments) and an assessment (to determine the effectiveness of management measures to provide reasonable assurance of the availability and reliability of IROFS when required to perform their intended safety functions.) and provides no clarity on the meaning of the phrase "... reasonable assurancethat an adequate level of protection will be maintained at the facility." Footnote 1 (p. 15.6-1) is incorrect. Audits and 03/3-0/00 11:46 FAX 2022933451 NEI NIS&Ie Comments on Draft NUREG- 1718 Nuclear Energy Institute P assessments are not performed solely to assess ,,... implementation how This audits and effectiveness of QA-...." The prescriptive measures on footnote should be should be conducted is unnecessary. assessments removed. The acceptance criteria of ?15.6.4.3 are too prescriptive (e.g. (vii), and they incorporate language from Part 50 (e.g.(i)) (ix)), is only appropriate for nuclear reactors. Much terminology in ?15.6 is that often repetitive, audits and confusing: references to the "quality" of IROFS, the need for assessments to "..[determine] reasonable assurance that the audits and 1ROFS will perform..." iona. assurance t assessments till providet (?15.6.5.2). although as we noted chapter (?15.7) reads well, The Incident Investigations plant abnormal for using 'teams' to investigate unnecessarily earlier, the expectation deficiencies is or unacceptable performance conditions by 'personnel.' NEI should simply be replaced not be prescriptive. 'Teams' of corrective action investigations root cause(s) recommends that the purpose but rather 'investigation of used in the to root cause investigation, limited To be consistent with terminology and generic mplicatiofs.' NEI recommends that Program for Part 70 licensees, 'Incident Investigation Regulatory Oversight or 'Corrective Action Plan' Chapter 15.7 be re-named and CorrectiveAction Plan.' (viii) Regulation Interpretation provisions in the have been identified in referencing Several inaccuracies the SRP often directs the 70 revisions. For example, program, proposed 10 CFR approach in the safety assess the applicant's graded reviewer to The discussion of is, in fact, optional (70.62(a)). to when such grading sequences in ?5.4.3.2 appears are nuclear criticality accident unshielded principle; these statements the double contingency the double permit exemptions to states that adherence to 10 CFR 70.64(a)(9) which in conflict with occupational radiation design principle is mandated. The contingency of potential radiological in Chapter 9.1 seeks estimationunder accident conditions guidance to workers consequences (i.e. exposures) never been established for workers at NRC have (?9.1.4.6.3). Such criteria under certain defined (with the exception of operators 10 licensed facilities in calculating such doses. because of the difficulty impose this. conditions), in part and the SRP must not require such estimates CFR 70 does not the context of to ALARA, generally in references ALARA is a The SRP contains numerous some performance standard. a facility's operations goals' for setting 'ALARA by a licensee to of excellence that is applied Its use in the philosophy performance objectives. with regulatory to ensure compliance 03/30/00 11:47 FAX 2022933451 NET NIS&IP 4013 Comments on Draft NUREG-1718 Nuclear Energy Institute Page 13 of 13 meaning and to discourage any SRP should be corrected to convey this goal.' attempt to assign numerical values as an 'ALAARA criteria of ?10.4.3 make no The radiation safety regulatory acceptance of 10 CFR 70.61; this omission reference to the performance requirements basis in 10 CFR 70 that should be corrected. There is no regulatory must cause the plant to be shut down mandates setting of 'action levels' that or (ii)(f). Exceeding a regulatory limit as is proposed in ?10.4.3(B)(i)(i) and one legal basis that can be used by, performance requirement constitutes down a facility operation. However, regulators to cite and possibly shut regulatory basis can not be used is exceeding an 'action level' that has no grounds for cessation of operations. SRP Chapter 14 ('Emergency There are several requirements in draft requirements of 10 CFR 70. The Management') that exceed the regulatory develop "... an adequate training SRP specifies that the license applicant to response personnel."(?14.4.3.2. 11). programfor onsite and offsite emergency for the licensee to offer "...special The requirement in 10 CFR 70.22(L)(3)(x) police, medical and other instructionsand orientation tours... to fire, training such as that which emergency personnel..." does not imply formal and familiarization does not will be offered to facility workers. Orientation states that offsite equate to formal training. Similarly, ?14.4.3.2.14(D) changes to the on response organizations must review and comment especially since approval emergency plan. This will be very time-consuming,Again, 10 CFR 70 does not months. changes from the NRC now require 6-12 on changes to the emergency plan require offsite agency review or comment NEI supports continuation of the as it does for the initial emergency plan. changes to the emergency plan current policy whereby licensees can make its effectiveness and that offsite (and under 10 CFR 70.72) that do not impair of such changes. Bringing in all response organizations only be informed the approval process without offsite organizations will greatly lengthen adding to safety enhancement.