Uflivei-i y oi- i,,a.yland FIRE AT BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY MARCH 22, 1975 FINAL REPORT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE MAY 7, 1975 TABLE OF CONTENTS Pa. e 1. -Introduction . . . . o.*' . ---- 1 0 Purpose and Scope III. Findings A. Construction and Operational Status of Plant at the Time of the Fire ... . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1 2 B. Relevant Design and Construction Features 1. Plant . . . o. . . . .. " . . . . . .. Q o o 2 2. Electrical Cable Penetrations a. Wall Penetration as Designed . . . b. ... Wall Penetration as Originally Constructed. . . . . . . . . .... . . 4 5, 5 6 Materials Used in Penetrations 4. Status of Penetration at Time of Fire .... . . . C. Activities Preceding the Fire. D. Fire . 1. Spreading Room Area, a. b. Sequence of Events Description of Fire in Equipment. . . . . .. ' . . 9 . . . the Spreading Roomi 14 15 c. d. Time of Events e. 16 .0 e. Reporting the Fire. 17 2. Reactor Building Area .a. Sequence.of Events. .. . . . . . 18 24 25 .Description of Fire in Reactor Building " c. Equipment . . ...... o.. 0 d. Time of Events . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . 27 27 .e. Minor Fires on Thursday, March 20, 1975 oTABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED) E. Effect on Plant Systems and Operations .1. Status of Plant Operations Prior to Fire. ..... 28 ~Unit 1 3. -4. . ".........` . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 33 Unit 2 . . .. .. Detailed Operating Events, Operator Action, and . . . . . .. Equipment Response and Nonresponse Status of Major Plant Equipment and Systems and Plant Parameters at the Initiation of Reactor Long-Term Shutdown Cooling 34 5. a. Unit 1 at 0410 Hours on March 23, 1975 ...... . . . 35 . 37 b. Unit 2 at 2240 Hours on March 22, 1975 . F. Damage Assessment (Cable Tray System, Conduit and Grounding System, and All Cables Routed Through These Raceway Systems). 1. .2. Zone of Influence of the Fire . ... . . . o .... 38 Identification of Damaged Conduits, Cables Routed Through Raceways . Cable Trays, and . . ... . . .. . . . 39 3. 4. Materials Available as Possible Fuel for the Fire 40 41 General List of Materials Associated With the Fire . -C. Radiological Assessment 1. 2. 3. H". Releases Within the Plant and Personnel Exposures Releases From the Plant ."...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 44 .. . . . Environmental Consequences -Injuries . . . . . 46 48 Personnel . iAdministrative Controls :1. DPP-DEC Interface for Work by Construction Forces in an Operating Unit .................. Construction Work Control ......... 49 .2. 51 rC .TABLEOF CONTENTS (CONTINUED) 3. 4. Fire Reporting 51 . . . . . Work Hazards Control .......... . . . . . . . 52 52 * 9 -. * .J. Other Findings IV. Other General Information .A. Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) B. C. DPP Emergency Control Center Other Programs for Repair and Return to Service . . . 52 53 '0', . cif Equipment . . . . . . . . 0 54. LIST OF FIGURES 1. Vertical Cross Section - Reactor Building, Spreading Room (Referenced on page 2) -Typical Wall Penetration Control Room, and. 2. 3. 4. (Referenced on page 3) Typical Wall Penetration (Referenced on page 3) ?-Partial Cross Section of Penetrations (as Constructed) on page 5) Area of Fire (Referenced on page 38) Area of Fire - (Referenced 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Zone of Influence (Rfrenced on page 38) (Referenced on page 38) Cable Trays to Reactor Building (Looking South) Part Plan View of Cable Trays (Referenced on page.38) Cable Tray Single Line (Referenced on page 38) Part Plan View of Conduits Near Trays (Referenced on page 39) 11. Elevation View Looking North Toward Control Bay From.Reactor Building Unit 1 Elevation 593 Showing Conduits and Trays in Zone of Influence (Referenced on page 39) Elevation View Looking East Toward Unit 2 (Referenced on page 39) 12. LIST OF TABLES 1. Description of Specialty Items Associated with Penetrations (Referenced on page 5) Checkpoints Used for Routing Cables on Each Cable Tray (Referenced on page 38) Sample Cable Tabulation Sheet (Referenced on page 39) Number of Each Class of Safety-Related Cables Routed in Fire Zone (Referenced on page 40) Summary of Cable Types Involved in Fire (Referenced on page 40) 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. BFNP Unit 1 Sequence of Significant Operational Events at Time of Fire (Referenced on page 34) 7. BFNP Unit 2 Sequence of Significant Operational Events at Time of Fire (Referenced on page 34) LIST OF APPENDICES A. Memorandum, James E. Watson, Manager of Power, to Preliminary Investigation Committee for Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, subject, "Establishment of Committee to Investigate the March 22, 1975, Fire at Browns Ferry" (Referenced on page 1) B. Key Photographs of Fire Area (Referenced on page 38) I. INTRODUCTION A preliminary investigating committee was established on March 23, 1975, to conduct an early fact-finding investigation of the fire and related events which occurred at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant on March 22, 1975. following members: The interdivisional committee consists of the H. S. Fox, Chairman Charles Bonine, Jr. -Division - of Power Production Division of Construction Manager of Power's office Harry'S. Collins, ReporterDavid G. Powell M. N. Sprouse - - Division of Law Division of Engineering Design - Felix A. Szczepanski Manager of Power's office The committee's charter is included as appendix A. The committee reported to the plant on March 24, 1975, to initiate its investigation of the fire. A preliminary assessment of the damage was made, numerous interviews were conducted, and a preliminary report of the committee's findings was transmitted to the Manager of Power on April 7, 1975. II. PURPOSE AND SCOPE The purpose of this report is to present the committee's findings of facts on conditions and events relative to the fire and to provide a point of reference for other evaluations which may be required. -2- This report describes events leading up to, during, and after the fire until each unit was placed in the cold shutdown condition, III.o FINDINGS A. Construction and Operational Status of Plant at the Time of the Fire . and Units 1 and 2 were operating at normal full-load capacity, construction work was proceeding on unit 3. B. Relevant Design and Construction Features 1. Plant A positive air pressure is maintained in the control bay, whichincludes the cable spreading room, with respect to the reactor building. -In order to maintain the pressure differential, all penetrations between the control bay and reactor building are designed to provide an air pressure seal. building, A vertical cross section of the reactor and spreading room, which is is shown as figure 1. the control room, area under consideration, 2. Electrical Cable Penetrations Electrical cable penetrations provide a means of routing -.. cablesthrough barriers such as floors and walls. can be in sleeves. They the form of conduit or special fabricated steel -3- a. Wall Penetration as Designed The cable penetration where the fire atarted is contained in a 48-inch-square opening through the concrete wall separating the units 1 and 2 cable spreading room from the unit 1 reactor building. Division of Engineering Design (DED) drawings require the installation of a 1/2-inch-thick steel plate bulkhead slightly less than 48 inches square in center of the opening in the concrete wall. openings are cut in Teo the the bulkhead plate, and two stacks of five 18-1/2- by.5-1/2-inch steel sleeves are welded into the openings. The steel sleeves are 6 inches long and extend 3 inches on each side of the bulkhead centerline. between the sleeves is clearance is is 5 inches. The vertical clearance and the horizontal 4 inches, The steel bulkhead assembly framed and attached to the wall inside the concrete opening by 1-1/2- by 1-1/2- by 1/4-inch mounting angles. The cable trays abut the wall and are secured to angle iron extending horizontally across the face of the wall. through the wall penetration. Only the cables extend (See figures 2 and 3.) The design requires that the penetration sleeves, the cables installed, with be filled with polyurethane foam (See figure 3.) A to create an air pressure seal. -4- iflameproofing compound, Flamemastic 71A, was specified -to be applied 1/8 to 1/4 inch thick over the foam and the cables on both sides of the bulkhead for a distance of 12 inches to form a fire stop. Field tests were conducted on a typical cable pene- tration at the site in 1973. Later a test sample was sent to the TVA Singleton laboratory for fire performance testing. A DED staff 6g4.neer evaluated the test data and approved the results. b. Wall Penetration as Originally Constructed To facilitate sealing of the penetrations and to provide a-practical starting point for filling the space around the cables with polyurethane foam, a means of forming a dam is required to prevent the liquid foam from flowing out of the sleeves. A preformed, resilient polyurethane foam was cut to size for insertion into the sleeve opening to form a dam. Other materials, such as styrofoam, were also used in some instances as a back dam. Pourable polyurethane foam was applied over and around the installed cables; after hardening of the pourable polyurethane foam, sprayable Froth Pak Insta-Foam polyurethane was used to finish filling the sleeve. The pourable foam is used since it more easily The sleeve and 12 fills the voids between the cables. -5inches of cables on both sides of the penetration were then coated with Flamemastic to provide the fire stop. The steel bulkhead as constructed was mounted in the opening with the centerline 3 inches from the surface of the wall on the reactor building side and 23 inches from the surface of the wall on the spreading room side, as indicated by dimensions on figure 4. Materials in addition to polyurethane foam were used to form the pressure seal. 3. Materials Used in Penetrations Materials used for construction of fire stops, air pressure seals, and resealing after modifications to penetrations are described on table 1. Diligent efforts are being made to secure from the manufacturers the physical and chemical properties of the materials in table 1, items 1-8, and will be made available if received. For small leaks in cable penetrations, was typically used as a sealant. RTV silicone rubber For larger leaks, resilient polyurethane foam was typically used as a dam or a plug to contain the RTV silicone rubber or polyurethane foam. 4. Status of Penetration at Time of Fire The penetration in which the fire started had been originally -6sealed with polyurethane foam. There is evidence that the penetration had originally been coated with Flamemastic on the spreading room side. An examination after the fire indicates that Flamemastic had been applied to the unit.1 reactor building side of the penetration at some time prior to the fire and modifications which made resealing necessary. Additional cables had been pulled through the penetration since initial installation. In order to make an opening for additional cables through the penetration, holes were punched with a wooden stick similar to a broom handle. This resulted in breaching any flameproofing that had been applied. This process usually resulted in pieces of polyurethane and Flamemastic in the penetration being knocked onto the cables on both sides of the penetration. This procedure has been generally followed when additional cables are pulled through completed penetrations. Frag- ments of these materials were observed on the cables in a number of other trays adjacent to the penetrations. C. Activities Preceding the Fire The areas within the plant are designed such that the air movement from one plant area to another will always be toward the area of possible higher radiation. supply and exhaust fans. This is controlled by The area of the reactor building and -7- refueling floor (secondary containment) pressure, is the area of lowest and any leakage between secondary containment and other plant areas will be inleakage into the secondary containment. Under certain conditions, the standby gas-treatment system must exhaust air from the reactor building to maintain a negative pressure. the system, a minimum. In order not to exceed the capacity of inleakage Co the reactor 'building must be kept at In the completed plant, three reactor units. is the refueling zone is common for all During construction an airtight partition required between operating units and those under construction; and unit 3 which is and one exists between operating units 1 and 2, under construction. 3 could be removed, it Before this partition between units 2 and was necessary to ascertain the degree to which the standby gas-treatment'system could handle the added inleakage from the unit 3 reactor building. of Power Production (DPP) The Division was requested to run leakage tests The results of those on the units 1 and 2 reactor buildings. tests indicated that leakage had to be reduced to a minimum if the unit 3 reactor building could be included and inleakage remain within the requirements of the units Land 2 technical specifications. -8- In a program to reduce leakage, the Division of Construction (DEC) wrote workplan 2892. The plan required (1) (2) that all and leaks be identified and listed, (3) that leaks be sealed, that work be verified and signed off by an engineer. The method for detecting air leaks was largely left discretion of the engineer in been employed at Browns Ferry. soap solutions, and candles. charge. to the Several methods have These include smoke devices, The movement of the flame of a locating leaks in dimly candle was an effective method in lighted areas and generally was the method used. A list was made of all leaking penetrations. These were identified by elevation and wall location, cable tray identification, and conduit number. The list was given to the electrical craft supervision with a requirement for the foreman to sign off for completed items. Checking the resealed penetrations was basically the same as inspecting for leaks. However, experience had shown that as the differential pressure the number of leaks was reduced, increased; and other penetrations that originally did not seem to leak began to show airflow. Therefore, the inspectors penetrations (engineering aides) were instructed to check all in their assigned areas. The inspectors were accompanied by electricians who sealed any leaking penetrations as they were discovered. The inspectors often aided the electricians by checking penetrations as they were being sealed. -9A successful leakage test and its documented approval were considered as evidence of the pressure seal's integrity. For production efficiency, application of the Flamemastic did not immediately follow the sealing activities but was applied at intervals when sufficient numbers of seals were made ready. On March 22, 1975, DEC workers were in the spreading room, sealing and leak-testing cable penetrations between the cable spreading room and the reactor building, when (at approximately 1220 hours--all times are Central Daylight Time) some of the sealant material in the penetration was unintentionally ignited at cable tray VE. D. Fire 1. Spreading Room Area a. Sequence of Events Six men were working in the units I and 2 cable spreading room, checking conduit and cable penetrations for air leaks and sealing leaks. An engineering aide and an electrician were checking cable penetrations through the wall between the spreading room and the unit 1 reactor building, in a window containing 10 cable trays in 2 vertical rows of 5 trays. The engineering aide was using a candle flame to detect air leaks. -10A differential air pressure existed between the spreading room and the reactor building, with the reactor building having a slightly negative pressure and thus causing air to flow from the spreading room through leaks into the reactor building. The aide detected a strong air leak in the penetration for the second tray from the bottom on the west row. The leak was caused when additional cables were pulled. through the penetration, which resulted in breaching the originally installed air pressure seal and fire stop. The electrician could not reach the penetration since it was recessed into the wall farther than he could reach. The aide volunteered to seal the leak for the electrician. The electrician handed the aide two pieces (about 2 inches by 2 inches by 4 inches) of resilient polyurethane foam which the aide inserted into the hole. After inserting the resilient polyurethane foam into the leak, the aide placed the candle about 1 inch from the resilient polyurethane foam. -11- The airflow through the leak pulled the candle flame into the resilient polyurethane foam, which sizzled and began to burn. The aide immediately told the electrician that the candle had started a fire. The electrician handed the aide a flashlight, which was used to try to beat out the fire with no success. Another construction worker heard the aide state that there was a fire and gave the aide some rags to use to smother the fire, which was also unsuccessful. The electrician called for fire extinguishers. When the rags were pulled away from the penetration, they were smoldering. Meanwhile, the other worker brought a C02.fire extinguisher to the aide. The fire burned for about 1-1/2 minutes before the first extinguisher arrived. -12- The entire contents of this CO extinguisher was 2 emptied on the fire. The fire appeared to be out. About 1/2 to 1 minute later, the fire started up again. The aide stated that the fire was now on the reactor building side of the wall. Two construction workers left the spreading room for the reactor-building to fight the fire. The electrician took two fire extinguishers to the aide who remained in the spreading room. extinguisher gave only one good puff. Each When the aide received the third extinguisher, he heard a fire extinguisher being discharged on the reactor building side of the wall. As the aide prepared to discharge the fourth extinguisher, the spreading room CO system alarm was sounded; and 2 all workers evacuated the spreading room. - I - - -13assistant shift engineer (ASE), the spreading A plant operator, after ensuring that no workers were in room, attempted to initiate the spreading room fixed CO 2 system from outside the west door to the room but was unable to do so because it while workmen were in had been deenergized. the spreading room. The ASE then ran to the east door of the spreading room, where he restored the electrical power and initiated the CO 2 system, which then operated properly. .Another ASE later operated the CO2 system a second time. After the CO2 system had been operated the second time, the first ASE checked the spreading room and found that the fire had restarted. He then directed the fire brigade in in the spreading room. fighting the fire At 1310 hours, the ASE in charge of the reactor building fire requested the Athens Fire Department to come to the plant. Employees from the Athens Fire Department assisted in fighting the spreading room fire. -14- The spreading room CO2 system was operated one additional time. An off-duty shift engineer (SE) arrived about 1500 hours and took charge of firefightingin the spreading room and relieved the ASE. The spreading room fire was extinguished between 1600 hours and 1630 hours, primarily by using dry chemicals. b. Description of Fire in the Spreading Room The material ignited by the candle flame was resilient polyurethane foam. Once the foam was ignited, the flame spread very rapidly. After the first application of the C02 , the fire had spread through to the reactor building side of the penetration. Once ignited, as it burned. the resilient polyurethane foam splattered After the second extinguisher was applied, there was a roaring sound from the fire and a blowtorch effect due to the airflow through the penetration. -15- The airflow through the penetration pulled the material from discharging fire extinguishers through the penetration into the reactor building. Dry chemicals would extinguish flames, would start back up. but the flame c. Equipment Portable CO 2 and dry-c64Ical fire extinguishers were used in the spreading room fire. The spreading room fixed CO 2 system was activated three times. Breathing apparatus in (air packs) received limited use the spreading room. The doors to the spreading room were kept open most of the time to assist in keeping smoke out of the control room. An inplant fire hose was run from an outlet in building to the spreading room. the turbine This was not used. - -16- The Athens Fire Department made available in the spreading room about 5 gallons of an agent which, when combined with water, This was not used. forms "light water." Athens Fire Department employees discussed with the SE the possibility of using water on the fire in the spreading room. No water was used in the spreading room since there was no assurance that the cables were deenergized. d. Time of Events (Approximate tj Lines shown with n ) ' 1220 1230 Fire started in penetration Two construction workers leave spreading room for reactor building 1235 Plant fire alarm sounded. SE's log Fire logged in 1237 First fire extinguisher discharged in reactor building 1240 CO 2 alarm sounded in system operated spreading room; CO 2 Spreading room CO2 system operated second time . . i- -17ASE assumes direction of fire brigade in fighting fire Spreading room CO2 system operated third time 1500 SE assumes charge of spreading room firefighting 1600-1630 Spreading room fire extinguished e. Reporting the Fire Two construction workers left the spreading room at about 1230 hours to go to the reactor building to fight the fire. One worker stopped at post 8D, a construction portal manned by the Public Safety Service (PSS), and informed the public safety officer on duty that there was a fire in reactor building number 1 and took the fire extinguisher with him to use in fighting the fire. The officer in immediately called the SE and reported a fire unit 1 reactor building. The ASE who received the fire report immediately gave the message to the SE and the unit 1 operator and then proceeded to the control room and switched the fire sounding. alarm to assure continuous -18- The unit operator (UO) immediately began to announce the over the PA system thaL there was a fire in unit 1 reactor building. At this time, operators in the control room did not know the exact location of the fire. An ASE located the fire in the unit I reactor building shortly after the construction workers had begun to fight it there. He telephoned the exact location to the control room. the operators in Shortly thereafter another ASE in the reactor building reported the spreading room fire to the operators in the control room. 2. Reactor Building Area a. Sequence of Events When workers in the spreading room saw that the fire had two construction spread into the reactor building, workers left the spreading room and proceeded to the reactor building to fight the fire. One worker told the public safety officer at post 8D that there was a fire in the reactor building and took a fire The other construction worker extinguisher with him. t proceeded to the reactor buIilding where he met a third worker; each of the three workers took a fire extinguisher to the fire. All three workers arrived at the fire at about the same time. It was burning in the trays which were 20 feet One moved Another above the second floor of the reactor building. a ladder, already at the scene, next to the fire. worker climbed the ladder and discharged a dry-chemical extinguisher on the fire. This application kn~ocked down the flames, but the fire flared up again. One of the workers alerted other workers on the second level of the unit 1 reactor building of the fire. The worker who applied the first extinguisher was affected by the smoke and fumes around the cable trays at the top of the ladder. The unit 1 control room operator was informed by telephone of the precise location of the fire by a plant operator on the scene. An ASE then arrived and, along with another operator, discharged a CO and a dry-chemical extinguisher 2 -20simultaneously on the fire. of firefighting activities. The ASE assumed charge Construction workers were-instructed to leave the operating units. Smoke was becoming so dense that breathing apparatus was required; approximately 5 minutes after it was requested, it was available. Until it arrived, CO 2 was applied to the cable trays from the floor. After the breathing apparatus (air packs) arrived, it was utilized in fighting the fire until visibility became so bad that the workers could not get near the fire. The smoke backed them up to the area of the reactor building closed cooling water system heat exchangers. The ASE left the fire to assist in unit shutdown. assistant unit operator (AUO) firefighting activities. assumed charge of An The first floor of the The AUO went to reactor building was also evacuated. the control room due to some ill effects of the smoke. Another ASE assumed charge of firefighting activities. Power to the elevator was lost. The second floor of Some time the reactor building was then evacuated. -21was utilized to check 5 floors of the reactor building for the elevator to ensure that no one was trapped on the elevator. A head count was made, and from that point on a count was kept of all entering the reactor building. personnel leaving and About 1330 hours, building. lighting was lost in the reactor Limited firefighting for a was resumed in the reactor building A wire was period between 1430 hours and 1500 hours. guideline. At this was used to rig a still time the fire confined to the area in the cable trays near the north wall and had not proceeded very far on the south trays. At this time, the doors between units 1 and 2 were opened, which improved visibility on the second level of unit 1 to about 5 feet. At about 1630 hours, the SE who had been directing activities in the spreading room took charge of firefighting in the reactor building in order to concentrate activities there. The SE consulted the plant superin- tendent frequently during fighting of the reactor building fire. 'n . A -22- On inspection of the fire at 1630 hours, was in the major fire the cable trays running south from the penethe cable trays running tration, with a smaller fire in west from the penetration. The SE established a routine of sending 2 to 3 people in at a time to fight the fire, using dry chemicals primarily. Shortly after 1630 hours, temporary d.c. lighting was strung on the second level of unit 1. A rope was utilized as a guideline, which assisted employees from the Athens Fire Department.in approaching the fire to inspect it. The SE went into the vicinity of the fire between 1730 hours and 1800 hours. On one of his trips into the second level, the SE laid out the fire hose installed there and checked to ensure that water was available. The plant superintendent for authorized the use of water as an emergency backup, example, in case a worker's clothing caught fire.. Otherwise, there was a decision not to use water on the The Athens fire fire due to the electrical shock hazard. chief suggested that water would be the best thing to use on the fire if it could be used. . 1-11,?, -- 11 - -, 'g., -23- The SE suggested to the plant superintendent that water be used on the fire. The superintendent made the decision to allow the Athens Fire Department employees to use water on the fire. Water was initially however, applied to the trays running west; the water would Athens Fire from the floor level, effectively reach only the bottom tray. Department employees attempted to utilize one of their nozzles on the hose, but the thread did not match; and the nozzle came off when pressure was applied. Water was also applied to the fire in the cable trays along the north wall and successfully extinguished it. Firefighters began using Chemox respirators as the supply of compressed air for the air packs ran low. The SE and two other operations workers entered the area of the fire to utilize water to fight the fire. The SE took the hose and climbed within four feet of the fire with assistance of the other two men. sprayed water on the fire in approximately 10 seconds, He the south cable trays for which extinguished the fire. -24- The fire hose was left stuck in a position so that it continued to apply water to the south cable trays. The second level was entered again and water reapplied. It was then determined that the fire was out. There were subsequently some reports of sparks, but investigation failed to reveal any further fire. During the course of the fire, it was noticed that a small diameter station control air line under about 90 pounds of pressure, had parted. running along the north wall, The line was later isolated. Several fire extinguishers were discharged early in the fire from the third floor through an opening in the floor, but all missed the fire in the the cable trays since the opening was not directly over the fire. b. ,Description of Fire in Reactor Building the lower cable trays, The fire was initially observed in extending out from the penetration a distance of 2 to 4 feet. Height of the flames varied from a few inches to a few feet, dying down as extinguishing materials were The applied and flaring up between applications. flames were coming straight up. -25Some polyurethane foam was flowing from the penetrations into the trays, and bright yellow flames were comning from the penetrations. The trsyv fire did tur tintii after ;,.!v;iince v i'ri'oic~ ntIv into thv so,;t,o 1500) ho*,:r?. Scaffold boards had been previously placed below the trays in the unit I reactor building, started. near the cable These boards tray penetration where the fire were used to work from in penetration. pulling cables through the These boards were charred by the fire. The charring did not extend to the side away from the fire, indicating little influence as fuel for the fire. c. Equipment Portable CO 2 used in and dry-chemical fire extinguishers were the reactor building fire. MSA air packs were used that had a rating of 30 minutes of the user. A cascade for chargin; for moderately heavy activity system of large air the packs, cylinders was available but the supply was eventually compressor facilities packs. depleted. There are no air at the plant to some fully recharge the air 'The charges in I -26- air packs did not last 30 minutes. Air packs from Athens Fire Department were also used along with their recharging facilities on their truck and at their station in Athens. MSA Chemox respirators were used.. Several users experienced difficulty when using these for very strenuous activity. The fire hose and nozzle provided in the second level of the reactor building functioned properly and successfully extinguished the fire. A nozzle from the Athens fire truck did not fit the threads on the hose on the second floor of the reactor building. Ladders present on the second level of the reactor building were utilized. Temporary d.c. lighting was utilized. A wire and a rope were utilized as guidelines. A fire hose was laid out on the third floor of the reactor building but was not utilized. -27- d. Time of Events ' 1230 Two construction workers leave spreading room for reactor building 1237 First fire extinguisher discharged in reactor building 1240 Unit operator informed of exact location of fire in ? 1310 reactor building Air packs requested and received ASE requested that Athens Fire Department come to the plant 1330 1645 1835 1930 Lighting lost in Temporary d.c. reactor building lighting installed Water applied to fire Fire determined extinguished e. Minor Fires on Thrusday,_March 20 There were two minor fires on Thuusday, March 20, arising from the use of candles for leak-testing in electrical cable penetrations different from the penetration involved in the first fire, the March 22, 1975, fire. In the candle flame ignited some RTV The construction worker using the silicone rubber. candle extinguished the flareup with his fingers. In the second fire, the candle flame ignited dust and debris in the cable tray. The fire lasted about 30 seconds I -...p, -11L. -28- and was extinguished with a'discharge from a CO 2 extinguisher. The first fire was reported orally to construction supervisory workers; the second fire was entered in the SE's log and reported in writing to construction supervisory workers. There was no damage from either fire. E. Effect on Plant Systems and Operations 1. Status of Plant Operations Prior to Fire At the time of the fire on March 22, 1975, units 1 and 2 Unit 1 and were each producing approximately 1,100 MWe gross. was declared in commercial operation on August 1, 1974, unit 2 on March 1, 1975. 2. Unit 1 The ignition of the fire in the cable penetration has been established as accurately as possible to have occurred at 1220 hours on March 22, 1975. The first indication of its effect on unit 1 operation came 20 minutes later, at 1240 hours. This was 5 minutes after the UO's were notified of the fire and the alarm initiated at 1235 hours. The first effect on the unit was almost simultaneous residual heat removal.(RIIR) annunciation of several events: -29- or core spray (CS) automatic blowdown permissive, reactor water level low-automatic blowdown permissive, and core cooling system/diesel initiate. At this point the UO observed that normal conditions of reactor water level, reactor steam pressure, and drywell atmosphere pressure existed. Over the next 7 to 8 minutes, occurred, pumps, a mounting number of events including the automatic starting of RHR and CS pump, and high-pressure coolant-injection (HPCI) reactor core isolation coolant (RCIC) pump; control board dimming, indicating lights were randomly glowing brightly, and going out; numerous alarms occurring; and smoke coming from beneath panel 9-3, which is the control panel for The operator such emergency core cooling systems (ECCS). shut down equipment that he determined was not needed, as the RHR and CS pumps, only to have them restart again. When the reactor power became affected by an unexplained runback of the reactor recirculating pumps, the SE instructed the operator to reduce recirculating pump loading and scram the reactor. While this was being done, the recirculating pumps tripped off. by the operator at 1251 hours. The reactor was scrammed - - -I -30The turbogenerator was then removed from service; steam from the reactor was bypassed around the turbine to use the condenser as a heat sink; and unneeded condensate, condensate booster, from service. and reactor-feed pumps were removed One of each pump was left running to Beginning at approximately several maintain reactor water level. 1255 hours and continuing for about 5 minutes, electrical boards were lost, supplying control voltages and power voltages of 120, 250 volts d.c. equipment. 480, and 4,160 volts a.c. and These mainly affected reactor shutdown As a result of the loss of these electrical boards and previous effects, many of the systems used in reactor after it is cooling the This and shut down became inoperative. included the RHR system, core spray system, HPCI, RCIC. This is attributed to loss of valve control signals, motor control signals, motor power In addition, many of valve power voltage, voltage, or a combination of these. the instruments and indicating lights were put out of order. (MSIV's) Also, the outboard main-steam isolation valves This isolated the steam generated by The closed. reactor decay heat from the condenser heat sink. valve closure also isolated the steam supply to the turbinedriven reactor feed pumps, and consequently this high- pressure source of water to the reactor was lost. At this -31time the water input to the reactor was limited to the control rod drive pumps as a high-pressure water source since the steam pressure built to a pressure of 1,080 psi and was being relieved by automatic operation of the relief valves to the suppression pool. Alternative systems were available and were used effectively to shut down and cool the reactor. This was accomplished by manual opening of the relief valves to reduce reactor pressure below 350 psi where the condensate booster pumps could pump an adequate supply of water to the reactor. reactor water level decreased during this operation, The but it did not drop below a point 48 inches above the top of the active fuel and was returned to normal level by 1345 hours. Early in the chain of events, the diesel generators started During a short period and were allowed to run on standby. of time the four diesel generators were used to supply their respective shutdown buses. About 1443 hours one of the diesel generators became unavailable. Soon after the loss of electrical boards, operating workers began attempts to restore the electrical supplies. -32- Initially, this was generally unsuccessful. Attempts to manually position valves and locally operate the equipment were hampered by darkness and the smoke and fumes from the fire filling the reactor building, air-breathing packs. requiring the use of Some smoke and CO2 came into the units 1 and 2 control room from firefighting efforts in the spreading room, but it control room at any time. was not necessary to vacate the Two of the operators in the unit 1 control area donned breathing apparatus for a short period of time because of the smoke and fumes. establish the electrical supply boards, electricians joined the operators in circuits in To maintenance isolating faulted order that the boards could be reenergized. and needed equipment This was done over several hours, to provide suppression pool cooling and reactor long-term shutdown ccoling was gradually made available. With adequate electrical power, valve alignment, along with some manual the operators established suppression 1975, 12 hours Normal pool cooling at 0130 hours on March 23, 39 minutes after the unit 1 reactor was scrammed. reactor shutdown cooling was achieved at 0410 hours on March 23, scrammed. 1975, 15 hours 19 minutes after the unit was -33- 3. Unit 2 Nine minutes after unit 1 was scrammed, began occurring on unit 2. bus 2 deenergized; reactor power, abnormal events At 1300 hours the 4-kV shutdown and the operator observed decreasing and the loss of some many scram alarms, indicating lgh~is. The operator put the reactor in scrammed at 1300 hours. shutdown mode..and it The turbine was immediately tripped, feed pumps. along with the reactor the In approximately 4 minutes after scram, isolating the reactor steam from MSIV's closed, the condenser heat sink and the reactor feed pumps steam supply. RCIC was immediately initiated for reactor water level control and the IIPCI to aid as a heat / sink for the steam being generated in decay heat. the reactor by These two systems tripped several times over and at approximately 1345 hours HPCI became RCIC continued to run and supply high- the next hour, unavailable. pressure water to the reactor. When suppression pool temperature began to increase from relief valve steam heating, RIIR suppression pool cooling was established at 1320 hours; and the temperature of the water in the torus did not exceed 135e F. -34When the MSIV's closed, reactor pressure was relieved by manual operation of the relief valves. Manual operation of the relief valves was lost at 1320 hours and the relief valves lifted intermittently on pressure until .1415 hours, when manual operation was restored; and the reactor was depressurized by use of the relief valves. At 2010 hours the MSIV's were reopened, making the condenser heat sink available. At 2020 hours on March 22, 1975, equipment was made available to establish operation of the RHR system to be used for reactor long-term shutdown cooling. This was 7 hours 20 minutes after the unit was scrammed. 4. Detailed Operating Events, Response and Nonresponse Operator Action, and Equipment Tables 6 and 7 provide the sequence of events, operator action, and equipment response which occurred during the fire and until conditions were stabilized (initiation of shutdown cooling) on both units 1 and 2. The events listed on tables 6 and 7 are arranged chronologically, with the best possible establishment of times without the benefit of complete operator logs. Most of the time, particularly during the early stages of the fire, operators were too busy to log the frequent events and actions. Some of the times and facts were established by charts and printers but for .the most part by interviews with operating personnel, both individually and in groups. -355. Status of Major Plant Equipment and Systems and Plant Parameters at the Initiation of Reactor Long-Term Shutdown Coolin& a. Unit 1 at 0410 hours on March 23, 1975 Reactor coolant temperature 360' Reactor vesselowater F level normal. Suppression pool water level +5" Suppression pool water temperature 153' F Control rod drive pump and condensate pumps providing makeup water to reactor vessel Standby liquid control system available Core neutron monitoring provided by two temporary source range monitors connected outside primary containment with the monitors manned by a licensed reactor operator in communication with a licensed reactor operator in the control room Primary and secondary containment integrity being maintained All 4-kV shutdown boards available Shutdown bus 2 available and supplying offsite power to the shutdown boards Remote indications (amps, watts, and volts) being read locally at shutdown boards where equipment operation required Diesel generators A, B, and D available and operable from shutdown boards--diesel generator C unavailable because of control cable problems -36- RHR loop T pumps and valves available RHR loop I1 pump B and valves available Control for 3 RHR pumps available from control room; from local stations for most valves control All loop T and loop II .available,.. Four relief valves core spray pumps and valves remotely operable from unit control board No automatic initiation of diesel generators, core spray system, (LPCI) or RHR system in mode available low-pressure coolant-injection Suppression pool cooling in service Suppression pool water level indication and drywell pressure indication operable Train A of standby gas-treatment system operable Control rod drive pump in operation--system flow and pressure indication unavailable Process computer in by fire) Telephone communication reactor building, In out of service for unit 1 and stack; service. (40 analog inputs damaged offgas vent building, service for other areas from the reactor building raw cooling water, and Liquid monitor on the effluent closed cooling water system, residual heat-removal heat exchangers out of service. ........... ' ... ................ -37Grab samples of effluent water taken periodically by chemical laboratory personnel. b. Unit 2 at 2240 hours on March 22, 1975 Reactor coolant temperature 260* F Reactor vessel water level normal Control;--rod drive and condensate pumps providing makeup water to reactor vessel All RUIR pumps operable HPCI pump inoperable Core spray loop I pumps A and C and RHR loop I pumps A and C operable only from shutdown boards Conditions of long-term reactor shutdown cooling were considered normal F. Damage Assessment (Cable Tray System, Conduit and Grounding System, and all Cables Routed Through These Raceway Systems) This section summarizes the extent of the physical damage to the cables and the raceway systems involved in Browns Ferry on March 22, found in 1975, the fire at and indicates the detail to be the a complete report provided by DED for use in The complete report is restoration program. numbered BF-DED(BHP-l). Excluded from the damage assessment are the effects of faults in these cables to mechanical and electrical systems; damage to other equipment resulting from products of combustion and the chemicals and water used in extinguishing the fire; possible structural and concrete damage; and damage outside the zone of influence of the fire. These areas are being evaluated in detail by others within TVA. -38A fire consultant has been retained by DED to perform a thorough inve.stigation with the purpose of providing a factually accurate and professional determination or assessment of the mechanisms and their interactions responsible for the initiation, propagation, magnitude, duration, and extent of damage of the fire. The consultant's report has not been received at the time of issuance of this report. 1.- Zone of Influence of the Fire It has been determined that the fire started when an open flame came into contact with material used as the seal around the cables where they penetrate the wall between the units 1 and 2 control bay spreading room and the unit 1 reactor building. Figures 5 and 6 indicate the area being Figure 6 shows the zone considered in this description. of influence of the fire. Figure 7 shows a cross section The cables of' trays near the point where the fire started. and raceways in the spreading room were damaged approximately 5 feet north of the wall penetration; and the fire propagated along all trays, as marked on figure 8, in the reactor building on floor elevation 593. Many photographs were taken, and 10 key ones are included in this report as appendix B. Figure 9 shows affected trays and their Checkpoints intersections in single-line representation. used for routing cables on each cable tray are also shown. (See table 2 for loading of cable types onto each tray at each checkpoint.) -39Visible damage in the reactor building was observed east along the double stack of 3 trays to the .wall between units 1 and 2, south along the 4 trays to a fire stop approximately 28 feet from the wall between the reactor building and the control bay, stack of 5 trays, and west along the double for a distance-of approximately 38 feet Cables were also from the wall between units 1 and 2. damaged on 2 of the 4 vertical trays from the top about 10 feet down, and cables in 1 of the other 2 trays were Figures 10-12 show the zone damaged about 4 feet down. of influence of the fire for all damaged or assumed-damaged conduits and grounding systems. 2. Identification of Damaged Conduits, Routed Through Raceways Cable Trays, and Cables A total cf 117 conduits and 26 cable trays was damaged by -the fire, and it is assumed that all supports for the There was a total of raceway system were also damaged. 1,611 damaged cables, and these are tabulated on 204 cable Table 3 is a sample tablulation sheets prepared by DED. sheet of the 204 cable tabulation sheets which show the purpose of each cable and other pertinent information needed by DEC to be used in a procedure for identification and removal of damaged cables. This procedure is being written by DEC to require that the damaged portion of each cable be identified and measured -40- during its removal. This procedure will also require that a section of the undamaged portion of each cable be removed, identified, and stored for future reference. This section will be cut to assure that all manufacturer's data stamped on the outer jacket will be included in the sample. As of this date there have been 1,169 cables identified as damaged for unit 1, 75 for unit 2, 340 common to plant. listed in table 3, it 27 for unit 3, and Of the total cables identified and was determined that a total of 628 These are grouped safety-related cables was damaged. into categories shown on table 4. The bare ground cable used for grounding the cable tray system was also damaged by the fire. along the 480-volt power trays FM, through the zone of influence. FK, It was routed and FO-ESII 3. Materials Available as Possible Fuel For the Fire Of the 1,611 cables, involved in there were 65 different-type cables Figure 7 the fire, as listed on table 5. shows a cross section of the cable trays where the fire started. (See table 2, sheets 8 and 9, for the type cables found there.) These types are representative of the area. Types WBB through accordance each voltage level tray in WNF are power and control cables manufactured in with TVA standard specification and are composed of 1* -41- insulating material footnoted on table 5, sheets, and 4. 2, 3, The remaining types are signal cables which are specified and documented on numerous individual contracts. These are composed of insulating material footnoted in table 5, sheets 2, 3, and 4. In all cases, the actual types used will be verified in and will be included in The filler included in materials in the removal of cables the final DED report BF-DED(BHP-1). these cables and cable ties are the listing at the conclusion of this section. Another possible "fuel" was the wall penetration pressure seal materials used between the spreading room and the reactor building. figures 2 and 3. expandable foam, Fiamemastic, A typical penetration is shown in The sealant material was polyurethane a pressure seal, which is covered with a flameproofing compound. Another sealant material iihich is a possible fuel source would be the sealing conduits RTV silicone rubber compound used in through walls and in some cases to seal around new cables added through penetrations. 4. General List of Materials Associated With the Fire a. b. C. d. Candle Polyurethane foam, Polyurethane, Polyethylene Froth Pak Insta-Foam pourable type -42- e. f. g. h. i. J. k. 1. m. n. o. p. q. r. s. t. u. v. w. Nylon Cross-linked polyethylene Polyvinyl-chloride Mylar Aluminum foil Polyolefins Chlorosulfonated polyethylene Neoprene Fiberglass RTV silicone rubber Galvanizing material on raceways Carbon Thermoplastic Preformed, nonhygroscopic cable filler polyurethane foam material and rigid aluminum conduit resilient Marinite panels Styrofoam Copper Steel Flamemastic 71A G. Radiological Assessment Based on interviews with the plant health physics supervisor and the plant chemical engineer, Plant Results Section Planning, and information provided by the and the Division of Environmental the following has been established. -431. Releases Within the Plant and Personnel Exposures a. At the time of the fire, one health physics technician was present at the facility. As requested, off-shift technicians reported to the plant, with the health physics supervisor arriving at approximately 1600 hours. At one time as many as 9 health physics workers were onsite. b. Direct radiation surveys conducted within the reactor building indicated there was no increase in direct radiation above normal levels. c. Numerous samples to detect airborne radioactivity present within the reactor buildings showed that the only significant particulate or halogen isotope present was the isotope Rubidium 88, a daughter product of the fission The gas Krypton 88, with a half-life of 17 minutes. buildup of Rubidium 88 is attributed to the shutdowns of the reactor building ventilation systems during the fire. d. Analyses of the samples showed the maximum concentration of this isotope approximated only 35 percent of the maximum concentration permitted under NRC regulations in 10CFR20 for a 40-hour workweek. -44- a. Following the fire, a number of individuals, operations and construction workers, including who were considered the most likely to have received internal radiation exposure from being in the unit 1 reactor building, All wholewere whole-body counted (on March 24 and 25). body counts showed no indication of internal deposition of radioactive material. f. Based on dosimetry information, no plant individual is shown to have exceeded the daily radiation exposure limit; and the film badge readings for the Athens Fire Department employees indicated they received no detectable radiation exposure. 2. Releases From the Plant a. As a result of the fire, the radiation detectors that monitor the ventilation air exhausted from the unit 1 and the unit 2 reactor buildings were made inoperable. The unit 2 monitor was restored at about 1900 hours on March 22, 1975, and the unit 1 monitor restored at 1975. 1600 hours on March 23, b. During the course of the fire and the time the monitors were out of service, grab samples were taken from the units 1 and 2 exhausts on the reactor building roof starting at approximately 1645 hours and each hour -45- thereafter and analyzed in the plant radiochemistry laboratory to determine concentrations of radioactivity. Charcoal filter and particulate filter samples were also taken from these airstreams periodically during the event. c. All other required building ventilation duct monitors and the plant stack release monitors remained operable. d. Gamma spectrum analysis of the grab samples indicated that the principal Isotopes present were Xenon 133, Xenon 133m, Krypton 85m, and the Rubidium 88 detected In Analysis of the charcoal the inplant air samples. samples indicated no detectable amount of iodine. e. Review of the airborne release rate information shows that the total plant release rate was the highest at 2200 hours on March 22 and corresponds to about 8 percent of the technical specification allowable limit for gross activity release. f. Liquid radwaste is discharged from the plant periodically The last batch released before While as a direct and on a batch basis. the fire occurred was on March 19. result of the fire the liquid radwaste monitor became -46inoperable, at no release from the plant was being made the time; and the monitor was returned to operation the next batch was released. on March 24 before 3. Environmental Consequences a. While not required, Plan was activated approximately Emergency the Environs Radiological Emergency for precautionary purposes at with the Environs approximately 1500 hours on March 22, Staff remaining active until 0500 hours on March 23. b. A report on the radiological of the fire, environmental consequences is made at the committee's request, summarized below: (1) Analyses of air particulate and charcoal filter the samples collected by monitoring teams in downwind direction from the plant, based on continual meteorological evaluation of data from the plant's station, show that no radioactivity except that due occurring radionuclides was detected to naturally in the environment. -47(2) Results from both particulate and charcoal filters collected from environmental-monitoring for the week of March 17-24, 1975, stations reveal no significant differences between concentrations at local and remote monitors. (3) Results of thermoluminescent dosimeter analysis for the quarter January 8 to April 3, 1975, data when compared with preoperational-monitoring indicate no basic differences from the data collected during the preoperational-monitoring program. (4) Calculations utilizing the reactor building ventilation exhaust air grab sample results, the data from other operable building vent monitors, the stack release monitoring data, and data from -the plant meteorological station indicate the maximum whole-body dose in any I of 16 sectors about the plant for the period 1300 hours on March 22 to 1800 hours on March 23 would be only 0.7 mrem at the site boundary. o-48- (5) The report states that "Based on, actual measurements and collected data, calculations show that during the incident at the Browns Ferry'Nuclear Plant, amounts of radionuclides released to the environment were well below the plant technical specification limits. Conservative calculationsashow that the radioactivity released to the environment had a very minimal and insignificant environmental impact." II. Personnel Iniuries Information provided by the TVA medical director states that 7 TVA employees (6 from DPP and 1 from DEC) reported to the Browns Ferry construction project medical office and the health station with complaints associated with smoke inhalation. direction of a TVA physician, Under the each was evaluated and treated by the nurses on duty and released with instructions to report immediately any delayed effects. Shortly after being seen, one of the~employees reported the onset of generalized chest discomfort on respiration. He was referred immediately to a local hospital, where he was examined and released by the physician. None of the employees revealed evidence of severe effects from their exposure. Followup medical evaluations revealed no residual effects from the activities and exposures associated with fighting the fire. -49There has been no medical indication for.lost time from work. Each.,employee was medically approved to resume full duties on the next scheduled work shift. I. Administrative Controls 1. DPP-DEC Interface for Work by Construction Forces in Operating Unit a. Under DEC Quality Control Procedure BF-104, Administrative an Procedures to Maintain Physical Separation Between Construction and Operating Units and Control of Work in Restricted Access Areas, all modifications and completion work required on a licensed unit by construction employees are done under a workplan. This procedure also specifies (1) that workplans can be written by either DEC or DPP, (2) must be approved by the DEC coordinator, and (3) the DPP coordinator will determine the level of review required within DPP and finalize approval with his signature. b. BFNP Standard Practice BFA-28, describes how modifications performed, necessary, and documented, Plant Modifications, to the plant will be requested, including the approvals depending on whether the modification is categorized as safety related or nonsafety related. -l -50c. The work being performed at the-time the fire started was approved by the DEC coordinator and authorized by the DPP plant modification coordinator under BFNP workplan 2892 which was issued under BF-104 on March 7, 1975. d. On workplan 2892, as follows: the work to be performed is described "Check electrical and mechanical sealing (1) make a punch list of for secondary containment. sleeves and cable penetrations that require sealing, (2) complete sealing, (3) verify and sign off areas that were found leaking." A list is of identified secondary containment air leaks attached to the workplan. e. The space provided for identification of drawings associated with the work has the letters N/A (not applicable) entered. f. A review of workplan 2892 and applicable administrative procedures indicates the work being performed under this workplan was not processed as a modification under BFA-28 but was processed under BF-104 which does not require that an unreviewed safety question determination be made according to the provisions of 10CFR50.59. -51- 2.. Construction Work Control With regard to the control of the work being performed by forces,. the committee established the following: construction a. There were no written procedures covering the sealing and testing the original installation or work instructions of penetrations for or the modifications except for notations on DED drawings. b. At the time the fire started, the engineering aide whose (i.e., assigned responsibility was to inspect the work to find the air himself (i.e., leaks) was actually plugging electrician. the leaks) doing the work instead of the journeyman 3. Fire Reporti_ a. The existence of a fire was not reported immediately by the fire. Whenreported portal post 8D, construction workers discovering to the PSS officer manning construction the exact location of the fire was not specified. b. BFNP Standard Practice instructs BFS3, Fire Protection and Prevention, a fire, whether in a DPP personnel discovering construction area or an area to report the fire for which DPP is fire responsible, to the construction Explosion, department, telephone 235. BFNP Fire, and Natural Disaster -52- Plan instructs personnel discovering a fire to dial 299 (PAX). The construction extension cannot be and the plant extension phone system. dialed from the PAX system, cannot be dialed from the construction c. Dialing instructions for reporting fires are located on telephones and are also included on the emergency procedure sheet posted at various locations in operating areas. the 4. Work 11azards Control While control requirements exist for certain potentially hazardous work, e.g., welding and burning operations, no written procedures or instructions have been issued at Browns Ferry regarding the introduction into and use of potentially hazardous materials or substances in connection with construction work in operating plant areas such as ignition sources and flammables. J. Other FIndings The possibility of sabotage was investigated, suspect sabotage was found. and no reason to IV. OTI!ER GENERAL INFORMATION A. Central Emergency 1. Control CoLrer (CECC). 1975, during the Browns The CECC was activated on March 22, Ferry fire as a precautionary measure, although no radiological emergency exiated. the Edney Building in CDT on March 22, 1975, The CECC was directed from Chattanooga, heginning at 1525 hours by the Assistant to the Director of Other available members of the Environmental Planning. CECC were notified of the fire. 2. The CECC performed a valuable function--keeping Regulatory Commission (in Atlanta), and the Nuclear the Alabama State Department of Public Health, the Tennessee State rather than fulfilling (REP). Department of Public Health informed a requirement of the Radiological Emergency Plan direct communication The CECC was in Control Center. with the DPP Emergency 3. The CECC office was secured at 2230 hours on March 22, 1975. B. DPP Emergxecyn 1. Control Center Chattanooga was established Nuclear The DPP Emergency Control Center in at 1510 hours on March 22, Generation 20 DPP staff Branch, in 1975, with the Chief, By 1630 hours, charge. approximately members had assembled at the control center, including the division director and other key management personnel. The branch chief and others were in with the superintendent frequent This communication at Browns Ferry. management team participated in all major decisions associated activities. with the plantoperation and firefighting -54- 2. The major group of the staff assembled left at 2200 hours on March 22, 1975. A small group manned the DPP Emergency 1975.' Control Center until 1500 hours on March 23, C. Other Programs for Repair and Return to Service of Equipment A number of programs have been initiated to evaluate various aspects of the fire and its of the equipment. consequence and return to service F. Thomas to R. H. Dunham A memorandum from E. 1975, and H. H. Mull dated March 28, subject "Repair of Damage Caused by the Cable Fire and Return to Service of Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2" has been, issued and is being updated to provide directions for these efforts. . ...-. ...... .. . 1- .- -.. -.. . 1 r rfm cm cm 26-0 Us..(73. F cm cm !q'3. y -1 ([9,0, (/f A/ Nm f-a fnh o ~ o.p 'r/ 66R (~~~/d35 K PH [aDd /60 2'? 8/ /.nk .4' ~w C/C d-?,c Q///- 0/90 ~ //84R88 /5920 05830 .5950 El 551.0 '00 FIGURE 1 Vertical Cross Section Reactor Building, Control Room, and Spreading Room 41520OR2 FIG. 1 0 0 Fildd &oIAbrlca/e sleeve wi11 ,nslde di nelsions o1 5"x /6 "and i's fall as shown Cable \ rt Wa/I C-round s/eel plai'e lo ground cable. on Anrey ranni9 C abAc fray see Ablo 8 (Fi u rc 3) wy ,, -Polyurefharefoeam, tee Note A(FyIre 3) N , l ro K H W4( c/ eound -- - -- r '--For fray sup, ar sir sleel dws. on borh %(des "Weld or bo/f A. see DE7-ToIL B (45N830 / 7) and " "A. A. o" ___ , xs/Y/ xall pl/ae Ao angle I and use jolnl 7-O mThAle ,Iin' 5,d'e5 of opin/n. .4nchor Mo concret;e and use sea/an*to make yjointalr?,h SIDE VIE W Scale: 3--'0" Po/yurethane foam -C'-ES: A. When all cables have been installed through cable sleeve, seal the remaining opening and voids with 6" + of Urethane foam or equal before applving flame proofing compound, Fa-wnemastic 71A or equal. Apply approx-imately 1/8" to 1/41" of flame proofing compound on the steel sleeve and on both top and bottom of the tray and cables for 12" on both sides of the barrier. B. 1? FRWOI T EL E VA 7"/ON FIGURE 3 TYPICAL WALL PENETRATION IVOTE: F1-RE STA P TED PENE TRA T1 0 Al IN SECOIVD RoRM 80 TFOrO - TRAY Cable Iray (if left UA//ITS SPREADING ROOM SIDE /c 51IDE VIE-W FI m 4 PART/4L CROSS SECT/OA/ OF PJNE?TRA T/OA/S L 0 fAT/OMN IN WALL AS CONSTV. IC TED) (To SHOW 81UL KH/-EAD ?1 4/ QP C9 Qoow "imp 2994 5 Kwde . easoq/ AREA 5 OF FIRE - WT rx 0 4 0 19 A .1 swoon, N, Q, me v~oo? . vvwwwfFIRE 2 FI a_ 6 R7 TRAY DES IGNAT ION FM .. I. . (TYPICAL) MW-ESII SEE FIGURES 2 and 3-" MX-ESII LFIRE.MSTARTED LY VK MD VE IN WEST STACK OF TRAYS RY FOR TYPICAL*V PENETRATION THROUH WALL TK TE EL 611.O' CABLE TRAYS TO REACTOR BLDG. (LOOKING SOUTH) SAME AS CHECKPOINT 131 EXCEPT OPPOSITE RA!D SPREADING ROOM FLOOR ELGOG.O Cable tray designation (typical)> -7 F1 /14'-9" Tray elevations (typical) A AX.PFN,, K?-zslj Y, A Y-Z-5JI, FK,LZX, L VK YK,6;WK[-Eslf T Condluit through wall (typical) d" . H ." i.- , .. i -oz. TTy A")'-.oA I q rA" - - Tl ,, thr.u. CI-SO4O r, ii =i!"~ , ,, , "'ll?A~~P - /.If rr-II1 1"I LLE-IA-3 oIP , , -,I,A WI - .4 I0 ,2k. f's/a, .,,,~o-,,H,.,, till -,'/4&O : -, FIGURE U1 ELEVATION VIEW LOOKING N(BTH TOWARD .CONTRaL BAY FROM .REACTCo BLDG UNIT 1 EL 593 SHOWING CONDUITS AND TRAYS IN ZONE OF INFLUENCE 0 ZONE OF INFLUENCE-> I 3 A -A i/ ! I I it I .'I I Mechanical-a-.,D) rN 9"19-1 9" ,4,-P4, 29 (AX), { 3A-fS5011 , ?A-PP63(AX), V3A-.82(.f) o A .oJ "1 Sleeves , 3,4./B67(fX-?614 3A 1cq-/.C9"'FS/D 3A- 73A -145 d29X-FsI) I I cv, I - 2A-ES3825(FK-t ,.32-C37f5 )4-/B4o(2 KI), S - ,ZA , 3A -/653.O(IX'137), 3A-IA /0S6( YK) i 'MC 3'kFJ), o ,2AMC ?2o (1Y) " 4. I I I 1 I -I lie I ELEVATION VIEW LOOKING EAST TOWARD UNIT 2 (cable trays run to wall and stop and cables are fed into unit 2 through conduits.) f -J Ut t i l F - - FIGURE 12 DESCRIPTION OF SPECIALTY ITEMS ASSOCIATED WITH PENETRATIONS* Item 1. Froth Pak Description Insta-Foam Manufacturer Insta-Foam Products Company Joliet, Illinois Froth Pak Insta-Foam is the trade name for a kit using an aerosol dispensing unit which contains the chemical components for making rigid polyurethane foam. When the unit is activated, high-quality froth foam is dispensed from two pressurized- containers, forming a rigid cellular polyurethane product in less than 1 minute. 2. Polyurethane Pourable type Part A Witco Chemical Company New Castle, Delaware No. 0293A Pourable type Part B No. 67010 Polyurethane, pourable type, produces a rigid cellular polyurethane product similar to that produced by the Froth Pak Insta-Foam. The liquids, part A and part B, are mixed equally by pouring back and forth between two containers until mixed and reaction starts. Before it expands, it more readily flows into small crevices to effect a better seal upon expansion. 3. Flamemastic 71A Dyna-Therm Corporation 598 West Avenue Los Angeles, California Dyna-Therm Flamemastic coatings are compounded of thermoplastic resinous binders, flame-retardant chemicals, and inorganic incombustible fibers. They have a gray fibrous appearance when dry. .A. Marinite panels No. 36, type B Johns -Manville Marinite panels are composed of incombustible asbestos fibers, diatomaceous silica, and a hydrothermally-produced inorganic binder. They were originally developed to isolate and prevent the spread of shipboard fires. They are hard, dense boards. 5. Resilient polyurethane foam Hickory Springs Manufacturing Company 2200 Main Avenue, SE. Hickory, North Carolina Resilient polyurethane foam is a preformed, resilientcellular polyurethane foam material which was developed primarily to make furniture cushions. 6. Styrofoam Unknown Styrfoam is a lightweight, preformed thermal-insulating material and packing material. It is commonly used for making ice chests. It is readily found on construction sites since it is also used as protective packing material for fragile equipment. TA"BI 1 1 OF 2 1r Item Description Silicone rubber Manufacturer General Electric Company Silicone Products Department Waterford, New York. a liquid "rubber" (not RTE 102 vhite RTV (room temperature vulcanizing) silicone rubber is a natural rubber) which cures at room temperature to a resilient, toughL adhesive. It was originally developed for sealing space vehicles.' It is commonly used in the home to seal around bathtubs. 8. -T-Rap cable ties TY-525M Thomas and Betts Elizabeth, New Jersey Ty--Rap cable ties are small straps about 1/32 inch thick and 1/8 inch wide, of varying lengths, with a loop in one end for binding cables together. They are generally made of nylon or similar plastic. 9. Other materials may have been used in construction penetration seals. under- *These "descriptions" are provided by the comnittee to assist the laymen in standing the various materials. The descriptions should not be construed as definitions or precise technical descriptions. TA=I 1 2072 Checkpoint 102 (Looking North) WE w. KT I CABLE OD CABLE MRAY DESIG TYPE WVA WVA-1 WVB wYC 1MR RQT CABLE OD TOTAL AREA CABLE -RPYDESIG TYPE WFB TOTAL AREA QTY -1 2 YE 67 38 3 14 1 o.353 .333 .371 .40o .242 6.566 3.306 .324 1.764k KS-ESII .490 .425 .444 .484 WFE WGB .659 1046 r: am TE WUB WUB-1 123 117 25 .231 .339 12.006 4.914 2.250 7.164 wGc WGD WGE WGG WGI WGK WHB WHC WEE WHG WHI WHJ WLB TOTAL KT WGB WGG WHB WHG WTO 3 2 1 3 1 1 .559 6 2 .660 .710 .789 .384 ... 480 .189 .684 5.68 e465 .368 .246 1.026 .396 .490 .696 ---- .',6o8 TOTAJL 142 4 1 '3- M.05 .258 .519 .64W .710 .509 .212 .966 .396 .204 32,884 72 1 1 2 7 1 1 WTR wvI WVE WVG WVR 1 1 11 8 101. 2 .425 .660 .384 .439 .519 ,34o .360 .461 .587 .834 1.012 .650 .142 .342 .232 1.o64 .212 .091 .102 .167 .271 7.205 6.44o 33.532 wVU-]. TOTAL .439 .304 5o.104 138 TABLE 2 SHEET . OF 11 Checkpoint 127 (Looking North) I TL-ESIIL1ITL-ESIiC1* q D I .TRAY DESIG CABLE TYPE WDD WDF WDG WDH WDI WLB WLC WLN WLO QTY CABLE OD TOTAL AREA .273 TRAY DESIG CABLE TYPE WVA CABLE QTY -OD TOTAL AREA ;FO-ESIJ 3 4 7 3 3 1 4 1 4 30 .34o .429 VK .48s .580 1.295 WVA-" WVB TOTAL TL-ESIIC WFB WFD WGB 8 20 .619 .660 .509 .539 .559 .627 9 37 8 1 21 5 1 2 2 .903 1.o26 .204 .353 .333 .371 .784 1.74o .. 972 3.496 .916 .245 1.236 6.678 TOTAL WGC WGD WGE WGI WGK WHS .490 .600 -. 425 .444 .484 .559 .710 1.512 .283 NwE-ESIIT WDE' * WDD. WFB 2 4 1 27 WGB WGD WGG WGI WGc WGM 3 4 1 35 5 1 .379 .340 .490. .425 .484 .559 .660 .710 .789 .874 .226 .364 .189 WHD 3.834 .552 .984 .342 13.86o 2.45o WHE WHG WTO WTR Belden 3 6 1 1 4 9 1 1 70 .789 .384 .439 .480 .519. .340 .360 ,405 .284 1775 .184 .492 .792 .147 .696 .152 .181 .848 .819 .102 .129 WHB WHC WHG WHI WHJ WKEL * WLB 6 9 4 5 4 4 7 1 1 WTO WTR 8 1 2 2 wvU-1 WWN TOTAL .384 .4o5 .439 .48o .519 .640 .710 .781 .509 .340 .360 .439 .0172 .6oo .696 1.161 TOTAL TL-ESIIL 8213 7.396. .231 .339 .353 1.680 .360 .784 2.824 .6o8 .905 .848 1.288 2.772 WUB WUB-I WVA 40 4 8 52 .479 .204 .728 TOTAL .102 .304 .0344 137 33,530 * C - indicates control level portion of TL L - indicates low level portion of TL TABLE 2 SHE=. 2 OF 11 Checkpoint 128 (Looking East) xI LY- WIw MAY DESIG CABLE TYPE WoiB QTY CABLE OD TOTAL AREA TRAY DESIG AY-ESII FK CABLE TYPE QTY CABLE CD TOTAL AREA * AX 6 .915 3.942 0 WDF WDG WDH WDI WDK WDN WDO WFB 8 10 WLC WLS WDG WDN WGD TOTAL 12 1 32 13 32 2 .539 .817 .485 , 940 ,.484 .229 .524 2.220 9.022 .920 12.915 TOTAL .362 1.188 .182 .342 .568 LX-ESII 5 .3 8 4 2 .485 .619 .660 .769 .94o 1.029 .429 1.16o 1.85o 1.505 l.026 .465 5.552 .490 3.332 .378 15.268 KE-ESII wIE WHJ WDD WFE WGB WGG WHB .3 2 1 2 4 1 22 1 o.480 .710 .340 .659 .425 .660 .41 WHC WHE WTO WaC 1 .405 .480 .340 .129 .181, .637 .155 .184. .492 .342 WWN TOTAL ND. .384 .148 .342 2.552 .0172 WGE WGG WGI WGK TOTAL LY WTD WTO WTR WDD WFB WFD WGB WGC WGD WGE WGG 1 1 2 1 7 .444 .484 .559 .660 .710 36 WED WBE WHG WGB 1 2 17 5.708 .789 .396 .980 WGE WGG 7 1 1 9 1 1 WILB WVA-1 2 2 1 WVI WVJ wVU-1 TOTAL 1 8 .439 .480 .519 .425 .559 .660o .384 .333 .834 1.4012 .4+39 1.064 1.278 .181 .212 .342 .232 3.496 24 1 2 2 .246 1 2 1 4 10 .174 .655 5.240 .152 .4 5 56 9.776 TOTAL .638 .34o .360 .34o .49o .600 .425 .444 .484 .559 .66o 2.184 .2o4 .182 .189 1.132 1.420 .310 .184 .320 .984 1.710 8.819 TABLE 2 SKEo 3 OF 11 --4, Checkpoint 128 Looking East) Continued) { MRAY D!.SIG VE CABLE TYPE_ WVA WVA-1 1WVB wvC QTY CABLE OD TOTAL AM-EA 9.212 TRAY DESIG LY TOTAL VK . CABLE TYPE WcGc WHtB QTry 1 C BLE CD TOTAL AREA 94 85 12 4 195 .. 353 .333 .317 .4o0 7.395 1.296 6 7 .789 .384 .490 .696 1.186 .504 TOTAL 18.4o7 .231 .339 .353 WUB WUB-1 WVA TOTAL 80 23 3.360 2.070 .294 5.724 TOTAL TOTAL WVA WVA-l WVB 29 91 9 129 .353 .333 .371 2.842 7.917 .972 1.1731 3 106 WUB WVA 16 6 22 .231 .353 .672 .588 1.260 TABLE 2 SHEET 4 OF ii Checkpoint 129 (Looking East) LFU -MLSLJ IK FEt, L2E CABLE TRAY DESIG AX CABIE TOTAL AREA I X-ESTIII |T-ST ITEsIncI TYPE QTY OD TRAY DESIG CABLE TYPE 10 WDF WDG WDH WDK WDN WDO WFB WHB WLB WLN WLO WVA QTY CABLE CD TOTALS AREA Same as checkpoint 128 Same as checkpoint 228 AY-ESII FK-ESII 0 io 0 .429 0 1.45 1.295 .602 KE-ESII WDD 2 WFB. WFE WGB WGC WGD 1 1 -.34o .490 .659 .425 .444 .484 .559 .66o .710 .384 .405 .480 .519 .182 .189 .342 6.1o6 .465 1.104 .246 1.368 .396 3.016 .258 .724 WGE 43 3 6 1 WGG WGI WKHB WHC WHE WMG WHI WHJ wuB 4 1 26 2 2. .619 4 .769 8 .94o 4 1.o29 2 .49o 1 .384 I .509 2-1 -559 2 .627, 2 .353 44 7 .485 1.86o 5.552 3.332 .378 .316 .204 .245 .618 .196 14.544 .364 .226 .189 3.550 TOTAL LX-ESII WDD WDE WFB WGB 4 2 .424 4 2 1 2 .64o .710, .0172 .644 4 1 1 101+ WWN TOTAL 1.584 .2o4 .0172 18.024 25 2 WGD WGE WGG WGI WGK 3 5 Same as checkpoint 131 VE Same as checkpoint 131 Same as checkpoint 131 WGM WHB WHC WED WHE WHG WHI 36 5 1 WHL WLB WTA WVU-1 WHJ WWN TOTAL * C - 1 1 1 2 2 123 6 9 4 5 3 4 7 .490 .425 .484 .559 .660 .710 .789 .87? .384. .M05 .439 .480 .519 .640 .710 .552 2.230 .681+ 14.256 2.450 .600 .696 1.161 .6o8 .905 .636 1.288 .781 .509. 1.139 .439 .0172 2.872 .479 .204 1.020 .304 .034 33.718 L indicates control level portion of TL indicates low level portion of TL TABLE 2 SHEET 5 OF 11 Checkpoint 129. (Looking East) (Continued) MAY DESIG CABLE TYTE QTY CABLE OD TOTAL AREA TRAY DESIG TK-ESIIC CABLE TYPE WFB QTY CABLE OD TOTAL AREA 1 .512 8 1 16 WFD WGB WGC WGD .49o .600 .425 .283 2.272 6 2 2 2 WGE WGI .444 .484 .559 WGK WHB WHC WED WHE WHG WTO WTR Belden 8213 TOTAL TK-ESIIL 4 4 1 1 2 .710 .789 .930 .368 .492 .792 1.960 .384 .405 .439 .464 .129 .152 .362 .48o .519 .34o .360 4 1 1 .848 .091 .102 .129 1o.886 1 .4o5 56 WHB WUB WUB-1 WVA 34 4 4 .384 .231 .339 .353 1.428 .360 .392 2.296 .U6 TOTAL LY VK 43 Same as checkpoint 128 Same as checkpoint 128 TABLE 2 sUEh 6 OF 11 Checkpoint 130 (Looking West) IFA-ESII I IKE-ESII 'WAY D2SIG AX FN TOTAL KE-ESII TOTAL WLB CABLE ITYE QTY CABLE OD TOfAL AREA TRAY DESIG AY-ESII CABLE TYPE CABLE QTY 0 OD TOTAL AREA Same as checkpoint 129 WDN W*LS 4 1 .94o .817 2.576 .524 3.100 FK-ESII 5 2 1 .509 .2o4 .2o4 TOTAL LX-ESII WDF WDG WDH WDK WDN WFB WLO 8 8 2 1 .429 .485 .619 1.48o .602 1.160 .465 .940 8 2 1 .769 5.552 .490 .627 .378 .309 5.334 30 WGB WGD WGG WGK WHB 4 1 2 10 .425 .484 .66o .789 .568 .980 .184 .342 .232 .384 TOTAL 2.306 TABLE 2 SHEET 7 OF 11 Checkpoint 131 (Looking North) I FMLL MX-ESII 1 FL I I IMW-ESII ! LY V LYMD LV1 TRAY DESIG FM CABLE TYPE WDF WDG WDK WDN WD0 WLC CABLE L I QTY 2 12 3 3 4 1 on TOTAL AREA TRAY DESIG ML CABLE IrYPE V'DTN WLB WLN WLO CABLE qTY OD .940 TOTAL AREA .485 .769 .940 1.029 .539 .429 .290 2.220 1.395 2.082 3.332 .229 6 1 1 .509 .559 .627 4.164 .204 .245 ,309 TOTAL 9 WFD wc-c WQD WGB WFB 1 23 3 2 3 4.922 TOTAL MX-ESII WDD WDE WFB 25 2 2 1 2 9.573 MW-ESII 9 6 .490 .6oo .425 .444+ 1.701 .283 3.266 .930 WFE WGB WOC WGD WGE WGG W1GI WGK WGM WaB 58 1 .425 .340 .379 .429 .659 .182 .226 .145 .684 :8.236 WGE .484 .559 .710 .552 .492 1.188 3 4 4 37 3 1 .444 .484 .559 .660 .155 .552 WGI WGK WHB .984 1.026 WEE 3 14 5 1 71 1 .789 .384 .480 .. 509 1.47 1.624 .905 .710 14.652 1.47 WHC WHD 26 10 WHE WHG WHI WHJ WvL 4 7 4 4 4 1 2 1 .789 .874 .384 .405 .439 .480 .519 .600 3.o16 1.290 .608 1.267 WHJ WL~B WTA Belden 8213 .710 .396 .204 1.139 .405 1.020 .129 11.919 TOTAL 73 .640 .710 .848 1.288 1.584 .479 .304 .0172 LY WDD WFB V.FD ITGB WGC WGD WGM WGG WGK WHB WHC W-HI 2 1 .340 .182 .781 .490 .600 .425 .189 .849 1.136 .310 .368 1.230 1o710 .490 .696 .129 .966 .174 5.783 WWN TOTAL WGB WGE W'HB WTO WVE .439 .148 3 8 2 2 38.290 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1.425 .142 .246 .444 .484 .559 .660 .5 5 .559 .384 .439 .48o .340 .116 .304 6 1 2 41 -.789 .384 .405 .640 .181 .091 0102 3 IWVA-1 TOTAL .360 .461 .333 .167 TABLE 2 SKEET 8 OF 11 Checkpoint 131 Looking North) Continued) TAY DESIG CABLE TYPE WVG WVI QTY 1 101 CABLE 0D TOTAL AREA .271 7.205 12.880 33.532 TRAY DESIG CABLE TYPE QTY CABLE OD TOTAL AREA MD (Continued) .587 o834 1.012 VK TOTAL TK wvJ WVR WVU-1 TOTAL VE WVA WVA-1 WVB wvC NFRS WVA WVA-I 41 46 87 3 141 52 61 15 10 1 .650 .439 .353 .333. 3.332 4.oo2 7.334 S.1456 55.693 .353 .333 .371 5.096 WUB 34 WUB-1 WVA TOTAL 25 2 61 .231 .339 .353 1.428 2.250 .196 3.8741 5.307 1.620 1.260 .41o .242 .046 13.329 TOTAL 139 WUB WUB-1 WVA 37 47 3 87. .231 .339 .353 1.974 4.230 .2940 TOTAL 6.498 TABLE 2 SHEET 9 OF 11 Checkpoint 145 (Looking North) I LFO-ESII LL- ESII CABLE TYPE WDD WDF WDG WDH WDI WLB WLC CABLE OD -ESII CI CABLE TYPE WVA WVA-I WVB TOTAL AREA TOTAL AREA TRPAY DESIG FO-ESII QTY IRAY DESIG VK QTY 10 o22 CABLE 0D 3 2 .34o0 6 1 1 1 .429 .485 .619 .66o .509 .273 .290 1.110 .301 .342 9 41+ .353 .333 .371 .980 1.914 .972 TOTAL TL-ESIIC WFB WLN WLO TOTAL 1 1 ..539 .559 1+ 20 .627 .204 .229 .245 1.236 4*.230 3.866 .49o .6o0 .425 .444 1.512 .283 8 1 29 WFD ME-ESII WDE WDD 2 WFD WGB WGD WGE WGG WGI WGK WGM 41 1 27 o 379 .34o .6oo .425 .484 .559 .66o .710 .226 .364 .283 3.834 3 4 1 35 3 1 WEB WHC WHD "WIiE WHG WWI WHJ WHL WLB WTA WTO WTR 5 8 4 5 4 4 7 1 1 1 1 o 789 .874 .384 oM05 .439 .480 .519 .640 .552 .984 .342 13.86o .147 .60o . 580 1.032 .608 WGB WGC WGD WGE WGI WGK "WB. WHO WHD WlE WHG WTO WTR BELDEN 8213 TOTAL 5 1 .484 4. 118 .775 .184- 4 2 3 6 1 1 2 o559 .710 .789 .384 .405 .439 .480 . 519 .9814 o792 .147 .696 .129 .152 .362 4 8 1 1 .848 o728 .102 .340 .360 .45o .129 11.941 77 WUB, WUB-1 .905 .848 1.288 2.772 TL-ESIIL 50 WVA TOTAL 4 8 62 .231 .339 .353 2.100 .360 .784 3.21+1 .710 .781. . 509 8 2 2 1.139 .340 .479 .2o4 1.020 .728 .102 .222 wVU WWN TOTAL .360 o 376 .0172 .034. 134 32.014 * indicates control level portion of TL CL - indicates low level portion of TL TABLE 2 SHEET 10 OF 11 Note: Tray loading for vertical tray connecting trays MW-II and TK-II south of checkpoint 131 TRAY DESIG SAI-ESII CABLE TYPEVI WFB WFD WGB WGC WaD WGE WGI WGK WHB3 WHC WHD WHE WHG Belden 8213 CABLE QTY OD TOTAL AREA TRAY DESIG CABLE TYPE QTY CABLE OD TOTAL AREA 8 1 .49o .600 .425 .444 1.512 .283 2.698 .620 .368 .492 .792 1.470 19 4 2 2 2 .484 .559 .710 3 1 1 2 6 .789 .384 .405 .. 439 .696 .129 .152 .480 .519 .405 .362 4 1* .848 .129 10.551 TOTA.L 56 TABLE 2 SBEEET 11 OF 11 COpmUnDBYc~ FOIUL emRckl ) I &'5 s PPTYPE D~ese/Gen~ Air Ginpr Bf'vT97/ R W-ERE TO DISCONNECT e 1 o OR D- 7 gB ixp movt WR LA40e' tVrler-yg,6d m 4&nbil? -r-"" A tMol,- -o r) 6 keroo,,/ ed9r -- p-i 5,N IV &o pM 5nA 1I Anl i_____ o_____________ 5 ta'~nIB I3ea e .7 .ipplyl /M73 5o,,- -.4A58 415Y7-o--7 ?7 .3r . 7. 50~~ -rv15676q4-k5W V. . . _ "eCJ ,/ol479 PL~lq 75 Trans;?#- RompIP Surp? K'3-1 pller nala _oI_ 415/V -71!PCAM/5c4/74- 2- q 54/ MY-_Z_4?_-..... o -" / o Zo7 - / - p -- A -. - A/;1-Z ?/5777 eN r Tjj ,______ k1 t3? -777./ 7 C & 2 718, 7 0 e4 4 ,, ~~Q ?,j I &upba#e2pn/ 7 1 F f 4Vhd'&aI Fd 71 s 7 78 -77 r;r 4;b2,VL 7 /vz 9,0. eo IOz-_ s_e _ SCo'R-l/s d ' 4Z 51V77-2 &,Y-5d3Phi7 &r 471 74W_-_"451174t1 ,51/711 420V Y5hufin EJI2B -1 SAl I7-0A --3 If/ "-- [2io1/ 0, I______vR~~v~n ,r Y o 134 "LI -4 517cD 3 - / H 3,, 10A14 7 o 45A1747-2 U", .. 0 4/s! 7 5 7 -3 pv-i , 4"61VI - I ,/=45751-3i~ 7513 -wro J5g .. Ti/-/- ...... - ... ,,9,,q:)" c'"'r- ,o7OV-o A 4, P JOv k&#C79 C r oo'64 aEo~rCre s'5.re Rl S.>'%Qf ' I ~'~*\ p' rr-~r~ LL .L.W.4 C2CO~ / CA' 4, AVAiLA 5,1,-,Z PHOTOGRAPH WH-K-86577-B VIEW OF CABLE TRAY PENETRATION THROUGH WALL INTO CLEANUP BACKWASH RECEIVING TANK ROOM EXTENT OF FIRE PROPAGATION SOUTHWARD WHERE FIRE WAS EXTINGUISHED WITH WATER-s AREA OF FIRE 8 5 . I _'-ji532_'axes -- - 'ku I 111' fir?" #lf S=95_ /_km . A35 6 . . fh _Ly 3.'_af -I 75' 5 A j?fgy ff"` - 5 5 13-ff, phi' mf' Emi; 1 11 _.Mu mm .4 - sn; s:.Acr< 4~9~ PHOT06RAPH 89I38K VIEW OF FIRE DAMAGE TO CONDUIT IN NORTHEAST CORNER OF REACTOR BUILDING, -- AREA OF FIRE 9 ? \fx I -Ak if: qF t i U / 9/Y N I -~t '1 o oroiv oIo 'I-rn A,- t 'p 7- I I 4 I L :4 ( I / *v-f- -?1 VA> . -ci 1> 4- --. -'At J -~J ,1 ~ -~ ~' ~ofl..~Lc.% A - - .1 WERE Eh Qgicwff 1 LJ p, A 2:/1 1625 34 ax: 1 41t4 ;I PHOTOGRAPH WH-K-86577-C r l I II VIEW OF PENETRATION IN CLEANUP BACKWASH RECEIVING TANK ROOM OPPOSITE SIDE OF WALL FROM WHERE FIRE WAS EXTINGUISHED-lu AREA OF FIRE i0 I 1 .SE _fy 4.fifiajHV, yea_vkw of fi wi: Aj -QQvim_,wi 2 4 1 . @1111 'W., ifwfk 35 .1 - 1 Qs, Ga," ef